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Reformulating Jihad in the Context of theIsraeli–Palestinian Conflict: A TheoreticalFramework

HALIM RANE�

(Griffith University)

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains unresolved largely due to a failure to redress its

asymmetry and the fact that the ‘peace process’ is not based on international law, specifically

the resolutions of the United Nations. The mounting religious dimension is also perpetuating

the conflict’s intractability. The classical Islamic siyar 1 with the doctrine of jihad at its core

represents an authoritative ‘Islamic’ response to conflict and relations with non-Muslims.

However, the militant response of some Palestinians to the Israeli occupation has been detri-

mental to their struggle for a restoration of rights, including self-determination. This article

presents a theoretical framework for a reformulation of the classical doctrine of jihad. This

reformulation must possess Islamic legitimacy, consistency with modern international norms,

and the capacity to contribute to a just resolution of the conflict. The reformulation process

needs to overcome the method of naskh (abrogation)2 and replace it with an approach to

interpretation based on ‘contextualization’ so as to make accessible the broadest possible

range of strategies in response to conflict contained in the Quran and the Prophetic tra-

ditions.3 Such a reformulation of jihad is necessary, though not sufficient, to generate the

requisite international support for the norms of racial equality, dignity, and self-determi-

nation to redirect the strategic and material interests of influential states, shifting their

foreign policies toward a just resolution of the conflict based on the resolutions of the

United Nations.

Introduction

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is characterized by an immense asymmetry in terms of the

military, political, diplomatic, and economic power of the two parties. The conflict’s religious

dimension is mounting and perpetuating its intractability. Palestine has been at the forefront

of the Islamic resurgence in the Arab and Muslim world, which has continued to expand since

the 1970s and has reached the point where Palestine’s Islamic party, Hamas, achieved a

� Halim Rane, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. Email: ,h.rane@griffith.edu.au.1 Muhammad Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, 4th edn, (Lahore: Ashraf, 1961), p. 10. Hamidullah defines

siyar as the branch of the Islamic law that contains the doctrines of war and peace, including the concept ofjihad and regulations for dealing with non-Muslims.

2 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2nd edn, (Kuala Lumper: Ilmiah, 1998),p. 149. Though naskh literally meaning to ‘obliterate’, Kamali defines naskh as ‘abrogation’—the ‘suspensionor replacement of one shariah ruling by another, provided the latter is of subsequent origin, and that the tworulings are enacted separately from one another.’

3 The term ‘Prophet traditions’ refers to the body of texts that includes the Sunnah (statements and actions of theProphet Muhammad), Hadith (reports or narrations of the Prophet’s Sunnah), and the Sira (biographies of theProphet Muhammad).

Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 19, Number 2, June 2007

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landslide parliamentary election victory in January 2006.4 Islam has continued to be valued

by Muslims, in general, as the source of solutions for the Muslim world’s social, economic,

and political problems, including ‘the problem of Israel’.

From the Palestinian perspective, as addressed in such United Nations General Assembly

resolutions as 3236 (1974), the conflict is a struggle for the right to self-determination without

external interference; the right to national independence and sovereignty; and the right to

return to homes and property from which people have been displaced and uprooted. From

the Israeli perspective, it is a struggle to ensure such claims are not realized, for they are con-

sidered detrimental to Zionist ambitions.5 Israel’s military occupation of Palestine and the

corresponding Palestinian struggle for liberation have continued to be regarded as an issue

of immense importance for the Arab–Muslim world, as survey research has demonstrated.6

The conflict not only impacts upon the entire Middle East, but is central to relations between

‘Islam’ and the ‘West’. Analysis of the causes and consequences of conflict in the Middle

East since 1945 by Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe concludes that a defusion of the conflict

between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ depends on a just resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian

conflict.7

A ‘just’ resolution of the conflict is regarded as one based on international law, specifi-

cally the resolutions of the United Nations (UN). Cheryl Rubenberg, for instance, observes

that the ‘most important defect’ of the peace process was that it was ‘not based on any

aspect of international law or UN resolutions relating to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict’.8

It could not lead to peace, she explains, because it was ‘not based on law, rights, or precedent

but on a political agreement between two parties that are depicted as symmetrical’.9

Addressing the General Assembly on 19 September 2006, the UN Secretary-General,

Kofi Annan, tied the success of the UN and even the war on terror to the ability of the Security

Council to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict on the basis of its resolutions:

As long as the Security Council is unable to end this conflict, and the now nearly 40-year-oldoccupation, by bringing both sides to accept and implement its resolutions, so long willrespect for the United Nations continue to decline. So long, too, will our impartiality be ques-tioned. So long will our best efforts to resolve other conflicts be resisted, including those inIraq and Afghanistan. (emphasis added)10

The centrality of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to broader concerns for peace and security in

the Middle East and beyond has also been recently reaffirmed in two major documents: the

final report of the High-Level Group of the UN Alliance of Civilizations11 and the Iraq Study

Group report.12

There is a desperate need for a resolution of the conflict but unfortunately one seems

unlikely at present, particularly when the conflict is examined through the lens of the

4 ‘Landslide’ is the term the 6 February 2006 issue of Time Magazine used to describe the Hamas victory. Hamaswon 76 seats of the 132-seat Palestinian parliament.

5 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 520, 597–598.6 David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, (London: Faber & Faber, 2003), pp. 100–101. Hirst documents that

60 per cent of Saudis, Kuwaitis, Lebanese, and citizens of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and 79 per cent ofEgyptians surveyed regarded Palestine as the ‘single most important issue to them personally’.

7 Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchliffe, Conflicts in the Middle East since 1945, 2nd edn, (London:Routledge, 2005), p. 128.

8 Cheryl Rubenberg, The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace, (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2003), p. 87.9 Rubenberg, The Palestinians, p. 87.10 Kofi Annan, ‘Secretary-General’s Address to the General Assembly’, New York, (19 September 2006),,http://

www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid¼2209. (accessed 21 September 2006).11 Alliance of Civilizations, Final Report of the High-Level Group, (United Nations, 2006), p. 9, ,http://www.

unaoc.org/repository/report.htm. (accessed 13 November 2006).12 James Baker and Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), pp. 54–56,

,http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html. (accessed 13 December 2006).

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dominant theoretical perspectives of international relations. However, the compelling work

of Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations, may have identified an alternative route

on the map. It is widely acknowledged that domestic and international pressure on South

Africa was instrumental in ending apartheid in that country. In spite of extensive strategic

and material interests, particularly in the case of the United States, Britain, and Zimbabwe,

almost the entire international community isolated and imposed sanctions on South Africa

in support of the international norm of racial equality.13 Klotz advocates thinking of sanc-

tions as part of a socialization process rather than a coercive one. She asserts that ‘both

states and nonstates are motivated and constrained by global norms’,14 which operate at

both the domestic and international levels. In respect to the former, Klotz explains,

At the domestic level as well, both social and economic sanctions appear to have convincedthe white electorate that the benefits of reform (including the resumption of internationalsporting contacts in addition to normal trade relations) outweighed the costs to them ofmajority rule. Neither Afrikaner leaders nor the white electorate, however, needed to be con-verted to a sincere belief in racial equality to eliminate the apartheid system. White SouthAfricans were induced—rather than coerced—to reform by a combination of material andsocial incentives.15

At the international level, the fact that the United States and Britain, in spite of economic

interests and Cold War concerns, had both imposed sanctions on South Africa by the late

1980s demonstrates the potential of international norms to produce change in nations’

foreign policies. Klotz explains that the ‘extraordinary success of transnational anti-apartheid

activists in generating U.S. sanctions against South Africa offers evidence that norms, inde-

pendent of strategic and economic considerations, are an important factor in determining

great powers’ policies’.16

On the basis of the above one might be hopeful that the already established norms of

racial equality, dignity, and self-determination would come to the fore in the case of the

Israeli–Palestinian conflict. However, this conflict remains unresolved largely due to a

failure to redress its asymmetry and the fact that the ‘peace process’ is not based on inter-

national law, specifically the resolutions of the UN. The impact of this asymmetry on a res-

olution of the conflict is intensified by the image of the conflicting parties. Given this context,

an adherence to the classical doctrine of jihad by certain Palestinian groups and parties is a

liability for the Palestinian struggle for a restoration of rights, including self-determination. A

change of approach, a re-tooling of the struggle, is necessary for the Palestinians to generate

the international support necessary for international norms to compel the international com-

munity to pressure Israel in a requisite manner to produce a just resolution of the conflict

based on international law, specifically the resolutions of the UN.

Central to this process, particularly post-9/11, is for Muslims to re-examine their

approach to, and understanding of, certain concepts in Islam. A prerequisite for Palestinians

to be able to develop effective strategies for redressing the asymmetry of their relations with

Israel is a reformulation of the classical doctrine of jihad. This article discusses the asymme-

try of the conflict as well as the image of the conflicting parties and the role these factors play

in its continuity. It then examines the concept of jihad and prospects for a reformulation in

terms of Islamic legitimacy, consistency with modern international norms, and the capacity

to contribute to a just resolution.

13 Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1995), p. 8.

14 Klotz, Norms in International Relations, p. 164.15 Klotz, Norms in International Relations, pp. 168–169.16 Klotz, Norms in International Relations, p. 94.

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Asymmetry of the Conflict

With the notable exception of population size, an immense disparity exists between Israel and

Palestine in terms of power and potential. From the earliest days, the conflict has been one

between unequals. The pre-1948 Zionist settlers were largely industrialized people from a

developed Europe who, under the wing of Britain, colonized a land of largely underdeveloped

agriculturalists. Today, Israel is a developed state, possessing 78 per cent, and controlling all,

of historical Palestine. It has the largest economy in the region and has full UN-member status

as well as the diplomatic, financial, and military support of the world’s only superpower, the

United States (US).

In contrast, Palestinians are a population of mostly refugees and exiles who collectively

do not have a fully recognized or viable state. They lost 55 per cent of their land through par-

tition,17 a subsequent 23 per cent through military conquest,18 and the remaining 22 per cent

is under Israeli military occupation. The Palestinian economy is completely dominated by

Israel’s. Palestine does not possess UN-member status. Moreover, Israel is a nuclear power

with the most powerful military in the region and one of the most powerful in the world,

while Palestinians possess lightly armed militia, their most sophisticated weapon being

home-made rockets with a range of only a few kilometres. The Palestinians, even with the

support of the Arab world, could not defeat the Israelis militarily, as demonstrated in

1948, 1967, and 1973.

However, in asymmetric conflict, it is not a given that the stronger party will prevail. The

work of Andrew Mack19 and Ivan Arreguin-Toft20 has demonstrated this to be the case on the

field of battle, while William Zartman and Jeffrey Rubin have made corresponding con-

clusions in the context of negotiations. Zartman and Rubin assert that negotiations

between equal powers are not more effective than those between unequal powers. They

find that stronger parties attempt to dominate negotiations with the weaker but that this

does not necessarily result in a submissive response. Their major conclusion is that the

success of a weaker party lies in the extent to which it can adjust its response to the relative

power of the stronger side.21

The failure of the Palestinians to address the asymmetry of the conflict, coupled with a

lack of strong external pressure on Israel, has propelled the conflict’s continuity and intensi-

fication. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall argue that for the

Palestinians to resolve their conflict with Israel the asymmetric structure must be changed.

They find promise in the South African anti-apartheid model, where international sanctions,

divestment, and boycotts increased the pressure on South Africa, producing a ‘structural

transformation’ that rebalanced the asymmetric relationship of blacks and whites, and ulti-

mately resulted in the dismantling of apartheid.22 Johan Galtung agrees and contends that

the key to a peaceful resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is equality—equality in

17 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947) recommended the partition of Palestine to forms aJewish state and a Palestinian state, allocating 55 per cent of the land to the former and 45 per cent to the latter.

18 Israel is currently in possession of 78 per cent of historical Palestine (all of the territory with the exception ofthe Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jersualem, which combined amount to 22 per cent of the land).55 per cent was allotted to Israel through UNGA Resolution 181 (1947). The remaining 23 per cent wasconquered by Israel during the war of 1948, giving Israel a total of 78 per cent of historical Palestine.

19 AndrewMack, ‘Why Big Nations Loose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict’, World Politics, 27, 2(1975), pp. 175–200.

20 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, ‘How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict’, International Security, 26, 1(2001), pp. 93–128.

21 William Zartman and Jeffrey Rubin, Power and Negotiation, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003),pp. 271–290.

22 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention,Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, 2nd edn, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005), p. 184.

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terms of law, justice, reciprocity, and symmetry. He argues that the conflict urgently needs

balance and also advocates the South African model as a basis for the internal and external

change necessary in the resolution process.23

Hilal Khashan’s research, highlighting the importance of honour in the Arab psyche,

explains that almost 70 per cent of Lebanese, Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian respondents

to his survey stated that they personally did not want peace with Israel due to what they per-

ceive as ‘unequal relations between the victorious Israelis and defeated Arabs.’24 In fact, 78

per cent of respondents stated that they believe that the most important reason why a peace

agreement would not endure was because of ‘imbalance’.25 The author explains that ‘the

majority of Arabs generally view peace with Israel as taking place under duress, due to

their weakness’ and they ‘tend to express . . . determination to undo their humiliation, no

matter how long it might take them to do it’.26

In the assessment of a number of scholars, including the late Edward Said, it’s the over-

whelming dominance of Israel and weakness of the Palestinians that has resulted in the failure

of over a decade of negotiations to resolve the conflict.27 In fact, the Oslo Accords, although

hailed as a ‘breakthrough’ by many, served only to further entrench the Israeli occupation of

the Palestinian territories.28 In the context of the so-called ‘peace process’, a critical dimen-

sion to the asymmetry of the conflict is the US–Israel relationship. The Palestinians have not

been successful in negotiations with Israel, particularly because the principal mediator of

these negotiations, the US, has been throughout Israel’s primary diplomatic, financial, and

military supporter.29

Saadia Touval has argued that impartiality ‘is neither an indispensable condition for

acceptability of mediators, nor for their success’ in resolving international conflict.30

However, over 15 years of active US mediation has failed to resolve the conflict. Numerous

scholars, including Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, David Hirst, and Cheryl Rubenberg, have

documented the impact US diplomatic, financial, and military support for Israel has had on

perpetuating the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall find US

support for Israel to be the ‘lynchpin of the conflict’ and argue that a resolution requires a

modification of US economic, political, and military support for Israel.31

The impact of the US–Israel relationship is perhaps most prominent in the UN. Peter

Wallensteen explains that while the conflict resolution policy in the UN Charter demands

a restoration of the status quo ante bellum in the case of territory acquired by force, the prin-

ciple is in reality subject to ‘interpretation’ and ‘evasion’. Other factors, namely ‘political

proximity to the United States’, determines a state’s ability to ‘avoid being pressured to

comply with the principle’.32 Wallensteen finds special arguments for Israel’s ‘security’

central to it being permitted to continue its occupation of Palestine. The status quo ante

23 Johan Galtung, Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work, (London: Pluto, 2004), pp.104–106.

24 Hilal Khashan, ‘Arab Attitudes toward Israel on the Eve of the NewMillennium’, Journal of Social, Political, andEconomic Studies, 25, 2 (2000), p. 143.

25 Khashan, ‘Arab Attitudes toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium’, p. 181.26 Khashan, ‘Arab Attitudes toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium’, p. 176.27 Edward Said, The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After, (New York: Vintage, 2001), pp. xvi–xix.28 Cheryl Rubenberg, The Palestinians, pp. 86–88.29 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, ‘The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’, Working Paper Number

RWP06-011, pp. 2–3, ,http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011. (accessed 9September 2006). An edited version of this paper was published in the London Review of Books, 28, 6 (2006),and is also available on ,www.lrb.co.uk..

30 Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979, (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 12.

31 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, p. 183.32 Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, (London: Sage,

2002), p. 101.

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bellum principle should, he asserts, be ‘the one most easily agreed to by the major powers and

UN member states’, though it is often not so in instances where powerful states have a par-

ticular interest in a conflict. Wallensteen observes that ‘for the United States there is a con-

sistent pattern [of using its veto power] in issues involving Israel’.33

Image of the Conflicting Parties

An explanation of the extent of US support for Israel lies, in part, in the status of Israel and the

memory of the Jews as victims of European anti-Semitism and the Nazi Holocaust. These are

significant factors in the context of Palestinian options for resistance, as they still haunt the

Western consciousness. Being the enemies of Hitler and Holocaust victims has been a source

of sympathy and fortification against punitive sanctions for violations of human rights and

international law. Those who would go to war against the Jews would be seen as particularly

villainous.34

It has been argued, however, that this sympathy and guilt-driven pro-Israel support is

largely manufactured. Certain Jewish organizations have sought to ensure that the memory

of the Holocaust continues to remain undiminished.35 Norman Finkelstein has documented

the exploitation of the Nazi Holocaust by powerful Jewish organizations to form what he

terms the ‘Holocaust Industry’ from which enormous financial and political gains

have been derived.36 Finkelstein explains that ‘organised American Jewry has exploited

the Nazi Holocaust to deflect criticism of Israel’s and its own morally indefensible pol-

icies’.37

Rather than a case of guilt and admiration, or even morality and strategy, former

Congressman Paul Findley,38 as well as academics John Mearsheimer and Stephen

Walt,39 have argued that it is the power of the pro-Israel lobby in the US that has

driven American’s pro-Israel foreign policy. Findley, Mearsheimer, and Walt provide

extensive documentation of the strategies and tactics used by the pro-Israel lobby in the

US to ensure adherence to Israel’s agenda. Mearsheimer and Walt explain that neither

the arguments of ‘strategic interests’ nor ‘compelling moral imperatives’ explain ‘the

remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to

Israel’.40 The authors assert that an end to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is dependent

on US pressure on Israel, and in this context they consider the pro-Israel lobby to be a

central factor in the conflict’s continuation. They state that ‘by preventing US leaders

from pressuring Israel to make peace, the Lobby has also made it impossible to end the

Israeli–Palestinian conflict’.41

As for the Palestinians, it is their misfortune to be Arabs and mostly Muslims, people

who historically, under the banner of Islam, presented a powerful threat to Christendom,

which has resonated until the present.42 In addition to the conflict on the ground, Palesti-

nians must also contend with the pejorative stereotypes ascribed to Arabs and Muslims in

33 Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution, p. 101.34 Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, p. 301.35 Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry, 2nd edn, (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 41–78.36 Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry, pp. 11–139.37 Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry, p. 149.38 Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby, 3rd edn, (Chicago: Lawr-

ence Hill Books, 2003), pp. 117–185.39 Mearsheimer and Walt, ‘The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’, pp. 1–82.40 Mearsheimer and Walt, ‘The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’, p. 1.41 Mearsheimer and Walt, ‘The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’, p. 41.42 John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, 3rd edn, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

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the Western media.43 Jean Allain observes that the global negative perception of Islam has

intensified since 2001 and negatively impacted on the Palestinians on account of the fact

that over 90 per cent of them are Muslims. It has manifested itself, he notes, in the

form of isolation and diminishing sympathy for the Palestinian cause.44

Allain approaches the struggle ahead of the Palestinians from a ‘constructivist’ perspec-

tive. He remarks that the field of international relations is beginning to take seriously the sig-

nificance of ‘ideas’ or what the Americans refer to as the need to ‘win hearts and minds’.

Echoing the work of Audie Klotz, Allain states that ‘because our lives are a social construct,

those ideas which we believe in and hold dear affect international relations’.45 A significant

obstacle confronting the Palestinians in terms of generating the requisite international support

to force Israel’s compliance with UN resolutions is their own recourse to violence.

The Islamic Factor

The role of religion is contributing to the increasing intractability of the Israeli–Palestinian

conflict. Specifically, religiously motivated violence, in the form of jihad, presents a compli-

cating factor in terms of shifting the Palestinian response to Israeli repression from one of

violent to non-violent resistance. Stephen Cohen46 and Shibley Telhami47 state that religion

has come to dominate the narratives on each side of the conflict. While some Israelis and

Palestinians dispute the centrality of the religious dimension to the conflict, Johnston

remarks that, even in situations where religion is not the central factor in a conflict, the

fact that ‘its prominence in some societies leads many to perceive that it is’ makes it necess-

ary to ‘address a conflict’s religious aspects in order to move toward a just and peaceful settle-

ment consistent with each side’s religious imperatives’.48

Sohail Hashmi observes that the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence has reached the point

where ‘every Muslim leader must make concessions to Islamic values’.49 He explains that

pressure to ‘Islamize’ policy is exerted on Muslim governments from the masses and not

only from radical Islam or militant groups. Coupled with the belief, advocated most strongly

by such ‘fundamentalist’ figures as Sayyid Qutb, that Islam is the answer for the crises of

modern Muslim societies has been the demand for the implementation of Islamic law

across the Muslim world.50

It is pertinent at this point to highlight the central role of Islamic law in how Islam is

defined and understood by Muslims. The ‘law’ has always been central to Islamic societies.

Majid Khadduri remarks that even when the Muslim world became politically divided with

simultaneous Muslim caliphates in Iraq, Spain, and Egypt, Islamic law remained the unifying

43 Jack Shaheen, ‘Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People’, Annals of the American Academy, 588(2003), pp. 271–293. See also Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine HowWe See the Rest of the World, (London: Vintage, 1997), pp. 3–79.

44 Jean Allain, Beyond the Armed Struggle: The Relationship of International Law and the International Organiz-ations to the Palestinian Cause, (Birzeit, Palestine: Birzeit University, 2005), p. 11.

45 Allain, Beyond the Armed Struggle, p. 11.46 Stephen Cohen, ‘Intractability and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict’, in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and

Pamela Aall (eds), Grasping the Nettle: Analysing Cases of Intractable Conflict, (Washington: United StatesInstitute of Peace, 2005), pp. 343–355.

47 Shibley Telhami, ‘Beyond Resolution? The Palestinian–Israeli Conflict’, in Chester Crocker, Fen OslerHampson, and Pamela Aall (eds), Grasping the Nettle: Analysing Cases of Intractable Conflict, (Washington:United States Institute of Peace, 2005), pp. 357–372.

48 Douglas Johnston (ed.), Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),p. 12.

49 Sohail Hashmi, ‘Islamic Ethics in International Society’, in Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan Funk, and Ayse Kadayifci(eds), Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precept and Practice, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,2001), p. 108.

50 Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, pp. 135–138.

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factor, as ‘one legal superstructure’.51 The Islamic resurgence the world has been witnessing

since the 1970s is characterized by the demand to implement Islamic law, as John Esposito

observes:

Whatever the differences in orientation and agenda, central to the Islamic revivalism throughoutthe Muslim world has been the demand for more Shariah law. The rule of the thumb employed tojudge the Islamic commitment and character of Muslim society has been the presence or absenceof Islamic law. Moderates and radicals alike see the un-Islamic nature of their societies, as epit-omised by Western-inspired legal codes, and clamour for the implementation of Islamic law.52

Mohammad Hashim Kamali, explains that although the two terms have distinct meanings,

‘Shariah’ and ‘Fiqh’, are used by Muslims interchangeably.53 It is important to note that

when most Muslims call for the implementation of ‘Shariah’, they are actually referring to

the body of legal rulings developed by Muslim jurists from the 8th century, which are

more accurately defined as ‘Fiqh’. Moreover, in spite of this body of law being a human

interpretation of what Muslims regard as divine sources—the Quran, supplemented by the

Prophetic traditions—Muslims generally regard Islamic law as a divine law, adherence to

which is considered commensurate with obeying the Will of God.54

The challenge this conception poses is a central concern of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im’s

book Toward an Islamic Reformation. He argues that the first, and perhaps most difficult, step

in reforming the public law of Islam is to make the Muslim masses and the ulema (Muslim

religious teachers or leaders) understand that ‘the public law of Shariah, as developed by the

founding Muslim jurists, is not really divine’55 and that the Shariah is ‘not the whole of Islam

but instead is an interpretation of its fundamental sources as understood in a particular his-

torical context’.56 From the perspective of conflict resolution, this phenomenon poses a con-

siderable challenge. When Muslims turn to Islamic law for direction in the face of conflict,

the response is defined in militaristic terms, most prominently referred to as jihad.

Jihad

A comprehensive definition of the role and function of jihad is presented in The Islamic Law

of Nations, Majid Khadduri’s translation of Muhammad Shaybani’s classic work on siyar. 57

It states that ‘jihad is the Islamic bellum justum and may be regarded as the very basis of

Islam’s relationship with other nations’.58 He defines jihad as the ‘instrument which would

51 Majid Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam: A Study of Muslim International Law, (London: Luzac,1940), p. 43.

52 John Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 3rd edn, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 234.53 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, An Introduction to Shariah, (Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah, 2006), p. 3. Kamali states that

‘Shariah’ literally means ‘a path to the watering place’ or ‘path to salvation’ and refers to the legal rules containedin the Quran and Prophetic traditions (pp. 2–3). ‘Fiqh’ is defined by Kamali as the body of knowledge developedby Muslim jurists, consisting of rules derived from the Quran and Prophetic traditions through the use of humanreasoning and certain juristic tools or methods (p. 14).

54 Esposito, Islam, p. 78.55 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International

Law, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p. 10.56 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, p. xiv.57 Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966). According to

Khadduri, the most authoritative text on siyar was written in the 8th century by the Hanafi scholar MuhammadShaybani. Khadduri regards Shaybani as ‘the most important jurist to write on the siyar’ (p. 22), as ‘he was thefirst to consolidate all the legal materials relevant to the subject and to provide perhaps the most detailed study ofit’ (p. 56). In fact, Khadduri regards Shaybani as ‘the father of the science of the Islamic law of nations’ (p. 57).The scope of Shaybani’s siyar is almost entirely devoted to the details involved in the conduct of war. War is thenormal state of relations with non-Muslims; his work does not contain any debate about alternatives. EvenShaybani’s chapter that deals with ‘Peace Treaties’ is almost entirely focused on issues of taxation of occupiedpeople, rights of slaves, and ransom of captives.

58 Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, p. xi.

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transform the dar al-harb into the dar al-Islam’. It is regarded as an individual duty for

Muslims in the context of self-defence (when Muslim lands are attacked) and a collective

duty in the context of universalizing the faith. Jihad, according to the Islamic theory of

war, is to remain until dar al-harb is overcome by dar al-Islam 59 and only then can a

state of peace be said to have been attained.60 This transformation need not be pursued

through the use of force, however. Khadduri explains that armed warfare was the normative

approach at the time, a point reinforced by Shafi’i’s Risala in its discussion on jihad.61

The earlier work of Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam, recognizes the pre-

sence of universalism in the Islamic worldview, but asserts that for the Prophet Muhammad

the focus was on establishing a universal religion rather than a universal state, and that the

purpose of jihad even in the Medinan period was concerned with religious propaganda

rather than empire-building.62 Khadduri proceeds to explain that when jihad became

central to both universalism of religion and state, it came to mean ‘continuous exertion of

power until the whole world would be converted to Islam and constituted the Islamic

state’.63 Thus, as Khadduri argues, jihad came to be regarded in Muslim legal thinking as

the ‘normal condition’ of the Islamic state, while peace was seen as temporary.64 Ibn

Rushd documented that the consensus amongMuslim jurists was to limit to ten years peaceful

intervals in accordance with the Treaty of Hudaybiyya,65 while others, such as those from the

Shafi’i school of legal thought, reduced the timeframe to as little as three years.66

Mohammad Talaat Al Ghunaimi explains that in its quest for universalism jihad became a

central concept in Muslim international law. In a legal sense, at least, it became the vehicle

for ‘proselytizing, exacting tribute or exterminating the idolaters’.67 In the process of codify-

ing Islamic law, Muslim jurists came to consider jihad as synonymous with qital,68 which

resulted in a narrowing of the definition of jihad to what became the classical Muslim doctrine

of war, an aggressive and permanent war against non-Muslim states and against dhimmis 69

within Muslim lands who refused to pay the poll tax.70

In summing up the approach of the classical Muslim jurists in utilizing abrogation in

developing the siyar, AbdulHamid AbuSulayman states,

The classical period of Muslim history was basically an extension of the late Madinan period(7–11AH / 628–632AC) when Muslims held a position of superiority and strength vis-a-visall their non-Muslim adversaries. The formative period for the establishment of jurisprudenceand its usul under the Umawi and early ‘Abbasi dynasties (sixth–ninth century AC) was a vic-torious experience similar to that of the last stage of Madina. The approach of most jurists,perhaps understandably, was simply to negate the early experience in Mecca and early Medinathrough the technique of abrogation.71

59 Dar al-harb literally means the ‘adobe of war’; effectively, any land or territory not under Muslim rule. Dar al-Islam literally means the ‘abode of Islam’; effectively, any land or territory under Muslim rule.

60 Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, pp. 13–15.61 Majid Khadduri, Al-Shafiis Risala: Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2nd edn, (Cambridge,

UK: Islamic Texts Society, 2003), p. 84.62 Majid Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam, p. 30.63 Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam, p. 30.64 Khadduri, The Law of War and Peace in Islam, p. 30.65 The Treaty of Hudaybiyya was a ten-year peace treaty signed between the Prophet Muhammad and the Quraysh

tribe in 628.66 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, (Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner, 1996), p. 40.67 Mohammad Talaat Al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach, (The

Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. 144.68 Aurang Zeb Azmi, A Glossary of the Quran, (New Delhi: Goodword Books, 2003), p. 173. Qital is defined as ‘the

act of fighting’, p. 173.69 Protected non-Muslim residents of an Islamic state.70 Al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach, pp. 136–137.71 AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Method-

ology and Thought, (Herndon, VA: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993), p. 91.

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The original Islamic tolerance of only ‘just’ war eventually gave way to the ‘interpret-

ation of Muslim writers and the practice of Muslim states’ which ‘contemplated “just-

ness” in a way which is not strictly consistent with the genuine principles of Islam’.72

Rather than understanding the Quranic verses concerning fighting as being revealed

according to particular circumstances, scholars who were instrumental in the development

of the classical doctrine, such as Shamsul A’imma Sarakhsee (d.671), understood them as

a progression toward increasingly aggressive use of fighting. He considered the Quranic

policy of warfare against non-Muslims to have evolved according to the following five

successive periods: (1) trust, forgiveness, and withdrawal; (2) preaching and inviting to

Islam; (3) fighting in self-defence; (4) aggressive fighting at certain times; and (5) aggres-

sive fighting in absolute terms.73 Commenting on Sarakhsee, Al-Ghunaimi states that this

interpretation was a central component of the classical Muslim theory of a global division

into dar al-Islam and dar al-harb and the associated goal of transforming the latter into

the former.74

Khadduri, among others, clearly explains, however, that the broad definition of jihad

involved ‘exertion’ by both violent and non-violent means.75 While it is beyond the scope

of this article to elaborate, the Quran contains numerous verses that use the term ‘jihad’

not in a military sense but in reference to ‘striving’, ‘struggling’, or ‘making effort’ in the

broadest sense of intellectual, charitable, and spiritual work. The work of Mohammed

Abu-Nimer makes an important contribution to non-violent approaches to conflict resolution

and peace-building in Islam.76

However, the use of the method of naskh (abrogation) narrowed the definition of jihad

by according primacy and authority to the later ‘specific’ Medinan verses over the earlier

‘universal’ Meccan ones on which scholars like Abu-Nimer rely in advocating non-violence

in Islam. In fact, the estimates of the actual number of verses that were abrogated by the so-

called ‘Sword Verse’ (Quran 9:5) range from 124 to over 140.77 Elaborating on this point,

AbuSulayman explains that the primacy given to the Sword Verse resulted in the abrogation

of ‘all preceding verses pertaining to patience (sabr), persuasion (husna), tolerance (la ikrah),

and the right to self-determination (lasta ‘alayhim bi musaytir)’.78

As it stands, the most authoritative definition of jihad is found in sources of Islamic law in

which jihad is defined in militaristic terms. For instance, the ‘classical manual of Islamic

sacred law’, Reliance of the Traveller, by the famous Islamic scholar Ibn Naqib al-Misri

(d.1368) and translated into English by Nuh Ha Mim Keller, is certified by the Islamic

world’s most prestigious institution of higher learning, Al-Azhar University, as conforming

to ‘the practice and faith of the orthodox Sunni Community (Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a)’.79

It defines jihad as ‘to war against non-Muslims, and is etymologically derived from the word

mujahada, signifying warfare to establish the religion’.80

The writings of the so-called fathers of Islamic fundamentalism, namely Sayyid Qutb and

Abul A’la Mawdudi, defended and reinforced the classical conception of jihad. Rudolph

72 Al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach, p. 73.73 Al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach, p. 74.74 Al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach, p. 74.75 Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, p. 15.76 Mohammad Abu-Nimer, Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice, (Gainesville:

University Press of Florida, 2003), pp. 5–84.See also: Mohammad Abu-Nimer, ‘A Framework for Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam’, Journal of Lawand Religion, 15 (2000), pp. 217–265.

77 AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, p. 44.78 AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, p. 44.79 Ibn Naqib Al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, trans. Nuh Ha Mim

Keller, (Beltsville, MD: Amana, 1994), p. xx.80 Al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, p. 599.

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Peters regards such ‘fundamentalists’ as ‘heirs of the earlier jihad movements’ and asserts

that their views on jihad are ‘in content identical to the classical doctrine’.81 Mawdudi and

Qutb were writing in the context of European colonization and neo-colonization of

Muslim lands. Both were particularly concerned with what they considered to be the presence

of jahiliyyah 82 in their respective societies, which required the use of jihad for its eradication

and replacement with Islam, particularly the implementation of the Shariah.

Qutb and Mawdudi applied the concept of jihad for revolutionary and liberation purposes,

respectively. By the 1960s, the ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ had re-affirmed the applicability of

the classical conception of jihad to the modern era.83 In practical terms, the Algerian war of

liberation against the French ‘proved’ the enduring value of militant jihad, which was more

recently reaffirmed by the victory over the Soviets in Afghanistan. In ideological terms, the

classical conception of jihad is manifested in the writings of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah

Khomeini, the Neglected Duty booklet of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Hamas

Charter (1988) in the sense of defining jihad in militaristic terms.

Peters, in his examination of the impact of European colonialism on Islam, describes the

classical doctrine of jihad as of ‘paramount importance’ in resisting colonialism and as

having ‘inspired many movements that have waged armed struggle against Western colonial

domination’.84 A critical question raised in Peters’ work concerns the impact of colonialism

upon the doctrine of jihad. He observes that some Muslims came to recognize the need for a

reinterpretation in the wake of the military superiority of the European powers. The result was

a temporary suspension of the obligation to wage jihad but nonetheless the rule remained

intact. Writing at the end of the 1970s, he argues that the practical political importance of

jihad in the Muslim world has decreased and that ‘the doctrine of jihad did not play any

important part in nationalist politics in the Islamic world in this century’.85 However, he

identifies one important exception: the Muslim response to ‘the Zionist colonisation of

Palestine’.86 On the question of Palestine he finds agreement among Muslim scholars as to

the applicability of jihad.87

An ‘Islamic’ Response to the Conflict

Arguably, the most salient movement in the Muslim world today, in terms of the pervasive-

ness of its ideas, interpretations, and influence, remains the Muslim Brotherhood. It is note-

worthy that the major Islamic resistance movements in the Middle East, including Hamas,

have their origins in this movement. Peters explains that the Muslim Brotherhood and the

Jamaat Islami represent exceptions to the rule of their era (late 1920s and 1930s), as they

‘operated within the tradition of the earlier, religiously inspired anti-colonial movements’,

rather than adhering to the dominant secular trends of the time.88 From the outset, the

Egypt-based Brotherhood was committed to jihad as the most appropriate ‘Islamic’ response

to the situation in Palestine.

81 Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History, (The Hague: Mouton, 1979),p. 165.

82 John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 30,59–60. Esposito explains that jahiliyyah was a term originally used to describe the state of ‘ignorance’ thatcharacterized pre-Islamic Arabian Society prior to the advent of Islam. In modern times, Muslim scholarssuch as Qutb and Mawdudi used the term to refer to ignorance, corruption, and general absence of Islam inMuslim societies, most prominently characterized by the lack of implementation of the Shariah.

83 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 131–132.84 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 39–41.85 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 156.86 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 157.87 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 134.88 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, p. 159.

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Muslim Brotherhood fighters were among the few Arab contingents present in Palestine

during the war of 1948 which were actually there in the interest of defending Palestine and the

Palestinian people.89 The defeat of the Arabs in 1967, coupled with ‘the failure of the inter-

national community to bring about a withdrawal of Israeli forces, gave credence to the views

preached by the Muslim Brotherhood since the 1930s concerning adherence to Islamic law

and commitment to jihad.90

After the war of 1967, the Al-Azhar Academy of Islamic Research held a conference

attended by the religious leaders of most of the world’s Muslim countries, Arab and non-

Arab. The focus was the need for an international Islamic response to the loss of Jerusalem.

Two resolutions were adopted and classified as fard (religious obligations). The first was

the obligation for all Muslims to seek knowledge and disseminate the truth about Israel’s

occupation of Palestine. The second was the obligation of jihad upon the Muslim commu-

nities to combat the injustice of the Israeli occupation.91 At the sixth such conference at

Al-Azhar the necessity of jihad was reaffirmed in the wake of the failure of the international

community to redress the occupation. As stated by Haddad, it was agreed that

The Quranic principles that justified jihad were all applicable in this case because of Israel’sactions. These actions included ‘aggression against the Arab and Islamic land, desecration ofthe holy places, expulsion of Muslims and Arabs from the land and the use of savage force inkilling helpless old men, women and children.’ Jihad under such circumstances was incumbenton all Muslims. The use of force was depicted as inevitable, for what was taken by force couldonly be reclaimed in the same manner.92

Hilal Khashan’s research confirms that the Muslim commitment to this position has not

diminished over time. His survey of the attitudes of Muslim Lebanese, Jordanians,

Palestinians, and Syrians toward Israel found two main unifying factors in attitude formation

among the respondents: ‘the role of Islam in society and perceptions toward Israel’.93 In fact,

43 per cent of respondents stated that their political identity was best expressed in terms of

Islam, while a further 13 per cent referred to religion in general.94 In terms of the Israeli–

Palestinian conflict, this degree of religious identity manifested itself in the finding that for

85 per cent of respondents the Palestine question ‘essentially concerns’ the ‘Arab world’

and ‘Islamic world’ (45 and 40 per cent, respectively). Only 5 per cent of respondents

stated that the issue ‘essentially concerns’ Palestinians only.95

The author explains that in the Arab world ‘the opinions of highly religious people make

stronger waves in society than the wealthy’.96 Over 82 per cent of respondents stated that

they either ‘approve’ or ‘strongly approve’ of ‘the use of force against Israel if the Arab mili-

tary situation permits’. Among those who approve of the ‘use of force’ against Israel, 65 per

cent advocated the destruction of Israel when asked ‘how far a war with Israel should go’.

When cross-tabulated with ‘religiosity’, the author found 92 per cent of those ‘high’, and

32 per cent of those ‘medium’, on the religiosity scale supported the use of force to

destroy Israel. By contrast, less than 10 per cent of those who were ‘low’ on the religiosity

scale supported Israel’s destruction.97 Moreover, 87 per cent of respondents either

89 Yvonne Haddad, ‘Islamists and the Problem of Israel: The 1967 Awakening’, Middle East Journal, 46, 2 (1992),pp. 266–286.

90 Haddad, ‘Islamists and the Problem of Israel’, pp. 266–286.91 Haddad, ‘Islamists and the Problem of Israel’. p. 279.92 Haddad, ‘Islamists and the Problem of Israel’, p. 282.93 Khashan, ‘Arab Attitudes toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium’, p. 158.94 Khashan, ‘Arab Attitudes toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium’, p. 154.95 Khashan, ‘Arab Attitudes toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium’, p. 165.96 Khashan, ‘Arab Attitudes toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium’, p. 179.97 Khashan, ‘Arab Attitudes toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium’, p. 183.

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‘support’ or ‘strongly support’ the ‘militant activities of Islamic groups against the state of

Israel’.98

Contemporary ‘Islamic’ writings on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are consistent with

the classical siyar. The work of prominent Islamic intellectual Ismail Raja’ Al Faruqi,

Islam and the Problem of Israel, is a case in point. Faruqi argues that the problem that

Israel presents to the Muslim world is unique, having ‘neither precedent nor parallel in

Islamic history’.99 He offers a three-point ‘Islamic solution’. First, he advocates dismantling

the Arab states and reorganizing their populations so as to undo the colonial legacy of the

region and to reconstruct a ‘single, united Islamic state’.100 This transformation includes

the discarding of the laws inherited from the Western colonial experience and the implemen-

tation of the Shariah laws.

Second, ‘Israel, the Zionist state, would be dismantled; by force, if necessary’, though the

Jewish citizens of Israel ‘would not be required to move’ but would be ‘invited to dwell in any

city or village of the whole Islamic state’. The right of return of the Palestinian refugees

would be fulfilled and they would be ‘compensated, under Islamic law, for their damages’.

Thus, those Jewish citizens of Israel presently living in stolen homes or on stolen land

would in fact have ‘either to vacate or compensate their owners’.101 Third, as dhimmi citizens

of the Islamic state, the Jews would be able to keep ‘all the public institutions they have so far

developed in Palestine (Courts of law, learned societies of art and culture, public corpor-

ations, schools, colleges, and universities) to continue their operation, whether in any locality

of Palestine or any anywhere else where Jews might choose to dwell’.102

Faruqi’s ‘solution’, while consistent with the classical Islamic siyar, is inconsistent with

contemporary realities, most notably the right to self-determination, the strength of Jewish

nationalism, and the desire among Israelis to preserve their Jewish identity. A global

survey by Gallup International found that ‘sixty percent of Israelis answered that nationality

was the most important thing to them, nearly double the global average’.103 It is unrealistic

and unfair to deny the Jews their right to independent statehood and expect that they should

be satisfied with mere citizenship in Islamic or Western states, vast as these territories may be

relative to Palestine. Andrea Nusse agrees that the central problem to be resolved, from the

Muslim perspective, is the presence of Israel in the middle of the Arab–Muslim world. She,

however, rejects a resolution of the conflict that involves the dismantling of Israel but asserts

that a stable settlement of the conflict must take into account the ‘Islamic factor’, represented

most prominently by Hamas.104

Rethinking Jihad

As mentioned above, Andrew Mack and Ivan Arreguin-Toft have demonstrated that the

weak can and do defeat the strong. In the past 200 years ‘weak actors were victorious

in nearly 30 percent of all asymmetric wars’ and ‘have won with increasing frequency

over time’.105 Thus, the question could legitimately be raised as to why the Palestinians

should not maintain tradition and pursue jihad in the form of an armed struggle against

98 Khashan, ‘Arab Attitudes toward Israel on the Eve of the New Millennium’, p. 203.99 Ismail Raja’ Al Faruqi, Islam and the Problem of Israel, (Kuala Lumpur: Other Press, 1980), p. 1.100 Al Faruqi, Islam and the Problem of Israel, p. 112.101 Al Faruqi, Islam and the Problem of Israel, p. 113.102 Al Faruqi, Islam and the Problem of Israel, p. 113.103 BBC News, ,http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/4246764.stm. (accessed 14 September

2005).104 Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology of Hamas, (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998),

p. 29.105 Arreguin-Toft, ‘How the Weak Win Wars’, p. 96.

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Israel in spite of the asymmetry. One supportive response is found in the work of Mack,

who identifies ‘interest’ as a central factor in asymmetric conflict and argues that

weaker parties defeat stronger ones because for them, unlike the stronger party, winning

is a matter of survival.106 This explanation corresponds with that offered by Telhami as

to why Hezbollah were able to force Israel to end its two-decade-long occupation and with-

draw from southern Lebanon in 2000.107

Arreguin-Toft argues that it is the problem of an inflated expectation of a quick victory

on the part of the stronger side that is central to its defeat by a weaker opponent. When the

quick victory does not eventuate, domestic pressure usually forces the stronger side to

abandon the war.108 Although Israel is the stronger and more powerful party in its conflict

with the Palestinians, neither the ‘interest/survival’ explanation of Mack nor the ‘inflated

expectation of a quick victory’ explanation of Arreguin-Toft apply in this case. Israel has

insulated itself from both by inverting reality—by perpetuating a domestic and

international image of being the underdog; the party with overriding security concerns;

the party in need of protection. Moreover, in spite of Israel’s dominance, the state and

its supporters regard the conflict with the Palestinians as ‘existential’, a matter of survi-

val.109

While armed resistance has been a consistent response of the Palestinians to Israel’s

occupation, evidence concludes that violence has not yielded the Palestinians any signifi-

cant political gains. The most extreme form of Palestinian violence has been the use of

suicide bombings, primarily by Hamas and Islamic Jihad since 1994. Robert Pape

asserts that the use of suicide terrorism is increasing due to the discovery of its effective-

ness. He explains, however, that suicide terrorism is ‘unlikely to cause targets to abandon

goals central to their wealth or security, for example, by allowing a loss of territory

that would weaken the economic prospects of the target state or strengthen the target

state’s rivals’.110 While a correlation can be observed between suicide bombings by

Hamas and Israeli compliance with its obligations under the Oslo Accords to withdraw

from Gaza and Jericho, it should be noted that the Oslo Accords were not inconsistent

with Israel’s strategic interests.111

Pape observes that ‘Israel’s withdrawals from Gaza and the West Bank in 1994 and

1995 occurred at the same time that settlements [in the West Bank, including Jerusalem]

increased and did little to hinder the IDF’s [Israel Defence Force’s] return, so these

concessions were more modest than they appear’.112 The Palestinian armed struggle,

including the use of suicide bombings, has had no observable positive impact on the

issues most fundamental to resolving the conflict: ending the occupation, the status of Jer-

usalem, dismantling settlements, control of water resources, and the return of refugees.

Nonetheless, the use of violence has persisted. John Burton asserts that delays in nego-

tiations have led to violence among Palestinians. He argues that violence will persist

when people ‘perceive no prospect of change’.113

Not only has Palestinian use of violence not succeeded in producing political

gains or a restoration of rights, it has been to the detriment of the Palestinian people

and their means of livelihood. In terms of loss of life alone, Palestinian losses, over the

106 Mack, ‘Why Big Nations Loose Small Wars’, pp. 175–200.107 Telhami, ‘Beyond Resolution?’, pp. 366–367.108 Arreguin-Toft, ‘How the Weak Win Wars’, p. 105.109 Alan Dershowitz, The Case for Israel, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003), pp. 237–244.110 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (Melbourne: Scribe, 2005), p. 75.111 Norman Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel–Palestine Conflict, 2nd edn, (London: Verso, 2003),

pp. xvi–xxv.112 Pape, Dying to Win, p. 75.113 John Burton, Violence Explained, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 114.

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course of the conflict, have been three to four times higher than those of Israelis,114 while

the rates of serious injuries inflicted on Palestinian civilians by the Israeli military are

recorded in the tens of thousands.115 Tanya Reinhart has given a detailed account of

Israel’s ‘policy of injuries’.116 Her work also documents a pattern of Israeli provocations

designed to encourage Palestinian resistance in order to justify massive ‘retaliatory’

actions, which result in heavy Palestinian casualties and extensive destruction of their

homes and civil infrastructure.117 Other scholars, such as Norman Finkelstein, have also

documented Israel’s use of Palestinian resistance as a pretext or justification for further

repression.118

Given this context, the Palestinians need to adopt an alternative approach to resistance

and effectively utilize the corpus of UN resolutions that have been passed in relation to the

conflict for more than half a century. As observed by Allain, it was the largely non-violent

resistance of the Palestinians in the first Intifada that prompted Israel to the negotiating

table in 1991. The second Intifada, however, which was characterized by the use of

armed resistance, ‘brought no gains and much suffering’, including the loss of ‘the

moral high ground’.119

A Reformulation of the Jihad Doctrine

As discussed, Islamic law is not ‘divine’ in the sense that Muslims regard the Quran as divine,

being the word of God. Rather, Islamic law, including the siyar, was developed from the 8th

century by Muslim jurists, who relied on their own interpretation of the Quran, the Prophetic

traditions, the opinions of the companions of the Prophet and their successors, and other

sources120 to develop laws for the Islamic empire concerning not only domestic matters

but external relations as well. Abdullah Saeed explains the critical point that interpretation,

unlike revelation, is not divine but a ‘human endeavour’ and therefore there is nothing

sacred about a personal interpretation, even that given by ‘a Companion of the Prophet, or

by a Successor or by early imams’ and that ‘their understandings, like ours, are limited by

context and culture and may or may not be relevant outside their culture, their context’.121

The classical siyar now stands in contradiction to contemporary norms and realities. What

is required is a reformulation of the siyar, specifically the doctrine of jihad, to provide an

alternative response to the conflict and a redirection for Palestinian resistance that will

serve to redress the conflict’s asymmetry. This reformulation must have consistency with

modern international norms as well as the capacity to effectively contribute to a just resol-

ution of the conflict. Additionally, given the prominence of Islam in Palestine and the

Arab–Muslim world today, in order for an alternative response to develop and be accepted,

it must have Islamic legitimacy.

114 Norman Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History, (Berkeley:University of California Press, 2005), pp. 96–98.

115 Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948, 2nd edn, (New York: Seven Stories, 2005),p. 116.

116 Reinhart, Israel/Palestine, pp. 112–116.117 Reinhart, Israel/Palestine, pp. 95–105, 116–128.118 Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel–Palestine Conflict, pp. xxii–xxvi.119 Allain, Beyond the Armed Struggle, p. 33.120 Muhammad Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, p. 18, lists the following as additional sources of siyar:

orthodox practice of the early caliphs; practice of other Muslim rulers not repudiated by the jurisconsult;opinions of celebrated Muslim jurists (ijma and fatwa); arbitral awards; treaties, pacts, and other conventions;official instructions to commanders, admirals, ambassadors, and other state officials; internal legislation forconduct regarding foreigners and foreign relations; and custom and usage.

121 Abdullah Saeed, Interpreting the Quran: Towards a Contemporary Approach, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 4.

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Islamic Legitimacy

To achieve Islamic legitimacy, any reformulation must be derived firstly from the Quran and

secondly from the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad. Historically, the Quran and the Pro-

phetic traditions formed the basis of the usul methodology, which remains an indispensable

component of Islamic law. AbuSulayman explains:

No idea or social institution can win the legitimacy or acceptance of the Sunni Muslim scholarsunless it can pass this traditional methodological test (usul). Ideas and institutions failing to passthis test will continue as foreign objects in the body of Muslim thought, generating inner psycho-logical tensions. These ideas and institutions lack effective rapport within the inner core of theMuslim personality and motivation.122

An-Na’im argues that while Quranic verses that are inconsistent with contemporary standards

of human rights can be explained in their historical context, they can no longer be justified or

accepted as the basis of law and must be replaced with those verses that are compatible.123 He

too cautions that Islamic legitimacy must be maintained in this process ‘if it is to be effective

in changing Muslim attitudes and policies on these issues’.124 The author contends that the

pervasiveness and persistence of the Islamic resurgence demands that ‘the process of adjust-

ment and reformulation can take place only when the nation-state is legitimised in Islamic

terms and is reconciled with the principles of Islamic law’.125 He envisages a version of

public law that is ‘as Islamic as Shariah has ever been’, which can be achieved by basing

the law on ‘the same basic sources of Islam from which the relevant principles of Shariah

were constructed by the early jurists’.126

Although doubtful that the classical usul methods of human reasoning (ijtihad) remain rel-

evant today, An-Naim finds great prospects in the ijtihad precedents of Umar, the second caliph

(d.644).127 Umar exercised ijtihad in matters governed by clear and definite texts of Quran and

Sunnah (statements and actions of the Prophet Muhammad). In each case he justified his

decision on the basis of changed circumstances having rendered the texts irrelevant and, if

imposed, contrary to the best interest of the community. In An-Na’im’s view, Umar’s decisions

represent a ‘clear and strong precedent’ that ‘policy considerations may justify applying a rule

derived through ijtihad even if that required overriding clear and definite texts of the Quran and

Sunnah’. Such examples or precedents, he adds, ‘cannot be dismissed as isolated cases which

were overruled by the subsequent systematic formulation of usul al-fiqh’. He argues that

‘Muslims have the competence to reformulate usul al-fiqh and exercise ijtihad even in

matters governed by clear and definite texts of the Quran and Sunnah as long as the outcome

of such ijtihad is consistent with the essential message of Islam’.128

Central to An-Na’im’s approach to reform is distinguishing the Meccan revelations from

the Medinan, the former being ‘the eternal and fundamental message of Islam, emphasizing

the inherent dignity of all human beings, regardless of gender, religious belief, race, and so

forth’ and the latter representing ‘the more practical principles’ relevant to the circumstances

faced by the Muslim community of Medina.129 He contends that the conditions of the 7th

century were not appropriate for the implementation of the earlier, ‘superior’, message

revealed in Mecca but that today conditions have become such that the Meccan verses are

122 AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, p. 66.123 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, pp. 171–177.124 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, p. 172.125 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, p. 8.126 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, pp. 9–10.127 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, pp. 28.128 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, pp. 28–29.129 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, pp. 52–53.

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more relevant than the Medinan.130 An-Na’im argues that the original audience of the Quran

in the 7th century were not capable of implementing the universal message provided by the

Meccan verses, due to their social and global circumstances. Conditions today, however, have

become conducive and even desperate for the implementation of the message to proceed.131

An overriding obstacle that remains is adherence to the classical method of abrogation in

Islamic law. AbuSulayman is one of many contemporary Islamic scholars who are critical of

the historical use of abrogation; he opposes its rigid application in the development of Islamic

law. As for the reasons why the verses of the later Medinan period were accorded such

primacy by the classical jurists, AbuSulayman states that ‘in their understanding of early

Muslim history, the jurists seemed to be impressed more by conflict and animosity

between Muslims and non-Muslims than by other elements of Islam’.132 He calls for a re-

examination of the Quranic experience and the accompanying role of abrogation. The

author argues that the maximum number of options should be available to Muslims, that

‘Muslims should always be able to resort to persuasion, sabr (patience), as well as qital (fight-

ing), psychological as well as physical etc., according to their immediate needs’.133

Louay Safi agrees and explains that the pacifism displayed by the Muslims during the

Meccan period was ‘a political choice to affect peaceful change and to protect the community

from self-destruction’.134 He draws a distinction between jihad as a ‘permanent obligation

incumbent upon Muslims’ and the most appropriate ‘method’ of jihad to be used in prevailing

circumstances. He states that ‘while the Muslim ummah [nation or people] is obliged to

uphold the principle of jihad and satisfy its requirements, the method of honouring this prin-

ciple is a question of strategy’.135 For Safi, the question of strategy remains open, even in cir-

cumstances where the task demands eliminating oppression, protecting human life, defending

Muslim sovereignty, or upholding Islamic law.

The reform methodology of An-Na’im makes an important contribution to this process.

A number of other approaches to reforming Islamic law have also been developed.

Though it is not possible to discuss them in this article, the most salient of these include

the ‘double-movement’ of Fazlur Rahman,136 the ‘time-space’ methodology of AbdulHamid

AbuSulayman,137 the ‘maqasid-oriented’ approach of Mohammad Hashim Kamali,138 and

the interpretation model of Abdullah Saeed.139 The central feature of all of these approaches

is their rejection of abrogation and its replacement with contextualization. These approaches

all maintain Islamic legitimacy, as they are based on the primary sources of Islam: the Quran

and the Prophetic traditions.

Compatibility with Modern International Norms

An integration of the siyar and modern international norms in order to construct a contem-

porary Islamic theory of international relations has a number of advocates. An-Na’im calls

for Islamic law to align itself with modern international law ‘in the interest of justice and

130 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, p. 53.131 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, p. 67.132 AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, p. 29.133 AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, p. 118.134 Louay Safi, Peace and the Limits of War: Transcending Classical Conceptions of Jihad, (Herndon: International

Institute of Islamic Thought, 2001), p. 24.135 Safi, Peace and the Limits of War, p. 41.136 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition, (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 13–42.137 AbuSulayman, Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, pp. 64–161.138 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Issues in the Legal Theory of Usul and Prospects for Reform, (Kuala Lumpur:

International Islamic University Malaysia, 2002), pp. 1–25.139 Saeed, Interpreting the Quran, pp. 116–144.

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peace in the world’.140 The standard against which he measures Islamic law is the Charter of

the United Nations, on the grounds that the latter is ‘a treaty binding on almost all states of the

world, including all modern Muslim states’.141

Ralph Salmi, Cesar Majul, and George Tanham even suggest that the future of inter-

national law may reside in the integration of various non-Western systems, including

siyar.142 They argue that the task of contemporary scholars of the siyar is to relate its concepts

to analogous concepts in Western international law and to accurately define points of differ-

ence and similarity. This body of work, explain the authors, will ‘serve as the prelude to

developing a dialogue for the future, especially as Muslim organisations and groups, overt

and clandestine, become more active in international affairs’.143

Hashmi argues that Muslim states have made a formal commitment to contemporary

international norms. He explains that ‘it is utterly meaningless today to speak of an

Islamic “tradition” or “civilisation” as a monolithic force operating in international poli-

tics’.144 Rather, Islam has always displayed a strong ‘syncretistic inclination’, demonstrated

by its capacity to adapt to the cultural conditions of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe

as it expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula. For Islam to adapt to contemporary inter-

national conditions and norms, be they dominated by Western culture, is not contrary to

its nature, but consistent with the dynamism historically displayed by Islam.

The argument could be made that Muslim states have generally fulfilled this commitment

and have established peace as the basis of their relations with other nations in accordance with

the UN Charter. However, Hashmi, among others, contends that this standard has not been

met on an ‘Islamic’ basis, as such international norms have not yet been integrated into

Islamic political thought, much less a reformulated ‘Islamic’ theory of international

relations.145 The question could therefore be raised that if the current Muslim regimes,

most of which are relatively secular in orientation, were replaced by their ‘Islamically

oriented’ opposition, would such new regimes be able to maintain such international

norms given their current incompatibility with the siyar?

Muhammad Hamidullah asserts that, in recognizing and joining the United Nations and

accepting the International Court of Justice, Muslim states have surrendered some of their

sovereign powers to these entities, and therefore the UN Charter and resolutions need to

be considered in a discussion of Muslim international law.146 This position lends consider-

able support to the UN Charter, as well as decisions and resolutions of UN organs,

forming not only a contemporary source of a reformulated siyar, but an ‘Islamic’ basis for

resolving conflict involving Muslim nations, including the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Capacity to Contribute to a Just Resolution

The denial or frustration of human needs is a primary source of conflict.147 Moreover, there is

a need for solutions to be just if peace is to be considered genuine and therefore lasting. High-

lighting the necessity of a just solution of conflict, Kriesberg explains that ‘simply ending a

140 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, p. 137.141 An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation, p. 140.142 Ralph Salmi, Cesar Majul, and George Tanham, Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices,

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), p. 78.143 Salmi et al., Islam and Conflict Resolution, p. 83.144 Sohail Hashmi (ed.), Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2002), p. 149.145 Hashmi, Islamic Political Ethics, pp. 161–162.146 Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State, p. 15.147 Edward Azar and John Burton (eds), International Conflict Resolution, (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf Books,

1986), pp. 29, 51–52.

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conflict may not be the correct objective in the eyes of many people’, for their concern will be

‘justice and morality regarding the terms of the accommodation’.148

In this context, Salem examines some of the salient philosophical, moral, psychological,

and cultural foundations of conflict and conflict resolution within a Western context and how

they contrast with the Arab–Islamic context. He asserts that while Western conflict resolution

theorists focus on the ‘suffering’ of the people as the most important element in need of res-

olution, ‘the justice and morality of the cause’ are of particular significance in the Arab–

Islamic context.149

Additionally, Said, Funk, and Kadayifci consider peace to be a central concept in Islam

but one that is not without qualification. It is a concept closely related to justice and the

absence of oppression. They explain that peace, from the Islamic perspective, is ‘not only

an absence of oppression and tumult, but also a presence of justice and the conditions for

human flourishing’.150 Safi concurs, stating that ‘peace in Islam does not mean the absence

of war, but the absence of oppression and tyranny. Islam considers that real peace can

only be attained when justice prevails.’151 In the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict,

the requisite ‘just peace’ can be found within the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and

Security Council152 as well as the Advisory Decision of the International Court of Justice.

Allain advocates the International Court of Justice as the central dispute resolution organ

of the United Nations. He considers the Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice

(9 July 2004) regarding ‘Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied

Palestinian Territory’ to be ‘the most significant pronouncement—bar none—of the legal

framework which exists regarding Palestine’ as it provides

an authoritative pronouncement of the law, sustains the fundamental outlines of the Palestinianreading of what the law is, and goes beyond considering solely the issue of the construction of theWall by dealing with fundamental issues regarding the continued Israeli occupation ofPalestinian territories, including violations of human rights, humanitarian law and settlements,but also the right of self-determination.153

The problems associated with the UN Security Council are well documented, particularly in

terms of the Council’s lack of impartial and effective mechanisms for enforcing its decisions

and for being ‘closer to power than justice’ in its organization and operation.154 However, on

the issue of Palestine, Allain considers that ‘international law and the United Nations should

be considered as instrumental in this struggle’. While he acknowledges that they do not in

themselves provide a solution, he argues that they do provide ‘a normative framework and

fora within which such a solution can emerge’.155

Allain explains that international law and the United Nations have established the ‘norms

and obligations’ incumbent on Israel, the Palestinians, and the international community. With

respect to how the Palestinians utilize these ‘normative standards’, he asserts that ‘they must

148 Louis Kriesberg, ‘Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability’, in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, andPamela Aall (eds), Grasping the Nettle: Analysing Cases of Intractable Conflict, (Washington: United StatesInstitute of Peace, 2005), p. 95.

149 Paul Salem (ed.), Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays, (Beirut: American Universityof Beirut, 1997), p. 15.

150 Abdul Aziz Said, Nathan Funk, and Ayse Kadayifci (eds), Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam: Precept andPractice, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), p. 7.

151 Safi, Peace and the Limits of War, pp. 37–38.152 Musa Mazzawi, Palestine and the Law: Guidelines for the Resolution of the Arab–Israel Conflict, (London:

Ithaca Press, 1997), pp. 10, 219–220.153 Allain, Beyond the Armed Struggle, p. 17.154 Jean Allain, International Law in the Middle East: Closer to Power than Justice, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,

2004), p. 1.155 Allain, Beyond the Armed Struggle, p. 8.

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understand them, accept them, and utilise them to their advantage’.156 However, the respon-

sibility for the creation of conditions to facilitate a solution lies with the Palestinian people,

within Palestine and exiled.

Like Allain, other international law specialists such as William Thomas Mallison, Sally

Mallison, Musa Mazzawi, Francis Boyle, and John Quigley regard international law, particu-

larly the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council, as fundamental

sources for understanding, assessing, and resolving the conflict.157 Boyle, for instance,

states that ‘there is no way anyone can even begin to comprehend the Israeli–Palestinian con-

flict and how to resolve it without developing a basic working knowledge of the principles

of international law and human rights related thereto’.158 This point has been long realized.

Mallison and Mallison state that international law is

the only practical alternative to an indefinite continuation of the present situation. It may be pre-dicted with considerable assurance that if the present Middle East peace conference is to reachtoward peace based on justice, it will have to employ the principled criteria of internationallaw. Another so-called ‘practical’ settlement based upon naked power bargaining and calculationwill, at best, provide a short interlude between intense hostilities.159

Indeed, over thirty years later, the authors’ predictions have continued to be proven correct.

They further explain that the incorporation of international law in a resolution of the conflict

is essential in terms of moving it ‘from a situation of conflict to one of basic order and then to

optimum order’.160

Allain argues that the spirit of the times, post-9/11, has shifted in a direction that renders

an end to the acceptability and legitimacy of armed liberation struggles not only in de facto

terms but increasingly in de jure terms as well.161 In this context, he states that ‘while the

right to self-determination remains in existence, the right to self-defence remains true in

the Palestinian context, its feasibility as a means of gaining a viable Palestinian state

seems to be diminishing’.162 Consequently, a ‘re-tooling of the struggle’ is required, one

that excludes armed struggle in favour of a ‘total pacific war’ based on civil disobedience

and ‘challenging the Israel[i] occupation from higher ground’.163

Conclusion

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains unresolved largely due to a failure to redress its

asymmetry and the fact that the ‘peace process’ is not based on international law, specifically

the resolutions of the UN. The comprehensive support Israel receives from the United States

stands in stark contrast to the isolation of the Palestinians, marred by being Arab and mostly

Muslim in a Western-dominated world that has historically viewed such people as a threaten-

ing ‘other’, a perception that has intensified since 11 September 2001. Palestinian use of vio-

lence in adhering to the classical doctrine of jihad has served to reinforce this image. On a

156 Allain, Beyond the Armed Struggle, p. 43.157 See, for instance, William Thomas Mallison and Sally Mallison, ‘The Palestine Problem in International Law

and World Order’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 3, 3 (1974), pp. 77–87.Mazzawi, Palestine and the Law, p. 10.Francis Boyle, Palestine, Palestinians, and International Law, (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2003), p. 23.John Quigley, The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,2005), p. xii.

158 Boyle, Palestine, Palestinians, and International Law, p. 23.159 Mallison and Mallison, ‘The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order’, p. 79.160 Mallison and Mallison, ‘The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order’, p. 87.161 Allain, Beyond the Armed Struggle, p. 43.162 Allain, Beyond the Armed Struggle, p. 43.163 Allain, Beyond the Armed Struggle, p. 43.

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strategic level, it is more of a liability than an asset for the Palestinian struggle for a restor-

ation of rights, including self-determination. Israel has been successful in utilizing the armed

resistance of the Palestinians as justification for its continuation of the occupation and repres-

sion of the Palestinian people. Moreover, the militancy of certain Palestinian groups has

inhibited the international community from more substantively supporting the Palestinian

cause and applying pressure on Israel to comply with the terms of a just peace as enshrined

in international law, specifically the resolutions of the UN.

The classical doctrine has narrowed the definition of jihad to the use of armed force, a

position accepted by modern Islamic scholars, particularly the so-called ‘fundamentalists’.

This narrowing is a consequence of the historical use and continued acceptance of the

method of naskh (abrogation) introduced by Islamic jurists of the 8th century. The failure

of contemporary Islamic scholars to reject naskh and adopt a method of interpretation

based on contextualization has left dormant numerous Quranic verses and Prophetic tra-

ditions that endorse an alternative, non-violent response to conflict. Such a response is necess-

ary for international norms of racial equality, dignity, and self-determination to be able to

challenge current strategic and material interests of influential nations and produce a requisite

shift in their policies concerning the conflict. Displaying the capacity to attract a broad base of

support across the Islam–West divide by retaining Islamic legitimacy, establishing consist-

ency with modern international norms, and advancing a just resolution of the conflict, a refor-

mulation of jihad as outlined in this article is more conducive to the Palestinian struggle for a

restoration of rights than its classical conceptualization.

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