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Choson politics
The equilibrium could shift from strong monarch to
bureaucratic-aristocratic domination, but there was
balance of forces; monarch and aristocracy
depended on each other
The balance was asset for maintaining stability, but
became hurdle when Korea faced the need to
strengthen central power to mobilize resources
The king controlled access to bureaucracy by the
examination system and appointment of officials
In the 14th and the 15th century a series of strong
kings, but in the next centuries the power of the
throne was checked by yangban bureaucracy
Yangban lineages dominated the throne: queens
were selected among yangban families; some kings
did not have male hairs and other kings were either
infants or youths
Normative restraints on royal despotism were
institutionalized in two ways: Censorate (to
exercise both surveillance and remonstrance
functions) modeled after Chinese system, and daily
royal lectures by which young kings were tutored
in Confucian learning
Korea in the Universal Order
Preeminence of man’s pursuit of moral perfection in Neo-Confucianism; the Great Learning (eight steps for sagehood) reaffirmed man as moral being and his role in the moral universe
Thus the importance of individual effort; man should strive for sagehood because he is fallible
To be moral is a matter of mind and attitude
The rectification of imperial mind was focal point, source of national well-being and harmony between the moral universe and the ethical and social order in the kingdom
Fan Tsu-yu, 11th c. scholar in Sung China:
“Order and disorder in the world all depend on the heart-and-mind of the ruler. If his heart-and-mind is correct, the myriad affairs of the court will be not incorrect.”
The authority of the Choson king was first and foremost based on the rhetoric of the ideal Confucian kingship
The vision of the founding group of Choson (Yi) dynasty was creation of a new Confucian moral order
The investiture (komyong) of the Korean king by
the Son of Heaven, the Chinese emperor –
mediator between Heaven and civilized world
Investiture symbolized the tributary status of
Choson Korea to China (Korean king was
“subject” to the emperor), peace and good will,
mutual protection
Most importantly investiture symbolized a definite
and secure place of Korean monarchy in the
hierarchy of the orderly universe
Choson statehood as cultural identity: in the Confucian world China was civilized, relegating other countries to various degrees of barbarism
Koreans regarded Confucian norms as universal standards by which society is judged as either civilized or barbarous
Choson Korea was to become member of civilized world, even better than China, by excelling by these standards
Confucianism was projected as rediscovery of native tradition initiated by sage Kija and which had been lost
The demise of Ming dynasty in 1644 and the replacement of the ruling house by the barbarian Manchus in the Central Kingdom disturbed the Choson dynasty's sense of the Confucian world order
Choson Koreans became the defenders of the authentic Confucian tradition, which resulted from the Korean commitment to Chu Hsi orthodoxy
Perception that now Korea was the only bastion of Confucian civilization; as a sole carrier and custodian of the civilized tradition, the Choson monarchy had to be guarded with greater zeal
Korea in the early 1860s
Powerful aristocratic lineages dominated political
and economic life
Threat of foreign invasion and peasant rebellion
Eastern Learning (Tonghak) challenged the
ideological orthodox unity
In 1864 an eleven year old boy (known for his
posthumous title Kojong) ascended the throne
Major effort in the next years under boy-king’s
father Yi Ha-ung, known as the Grand Prince or
the Taewongun
The heyday of the factions was the 17th and the
18th centuries; by 1864 factionalism was no longer
the most important basis of bureaucratic politics.
It was replaced by cleavages over issues of policy
Struggle between Taewongun and Min faction
(some scholars argue)
Yangban proved to be much more formidable
opponent of the throne in competition for
resources than the Chinese gentry
Reforms’ objectives
The Taewogun was pragmatist, not modernizer
Restoration the prestige and power of the throne to
earlier levels (early Choson)
Preserve the country and the dynasty by removing
some of the reasons for peasants discontent:
bureaucratic corruption, illicit taxation, and usury
Increase central government control over finances
Eliminate heterodox and subversive doctrines
Build military strength by traditional means
Reforms
Greatest fund-raising effort in the dynasty: imposed
land surtaxes; river, boat, commercial transit, and
gate taxes; “voluntary contributions” for special
purposes like palace construction
Reduced tax-exempt sector by curtailing autonomy
the palace estates and private academies; but did not
raise taxes on large landowners or reduce taxes on
small holdings
Authorized cloth tax on all households for military
defense; an act which was far easier in 1870 than
1750 because the tax-exempt yangban had
increased in size out of proportion to what was
tolerable in a fiscal sense
Precedent of relatively equal tax distribution at the
village level under the village cloth system (tongp’o);
by the middle of the 19th century yangban
households were already sharing in the payment of
military cloth taxes in many villages
Granary loan system: canceled debts and reduced
corruption; loan interest (10%) went to central
taxation agency; government could not refinance
grain loans except for overvalued currency
Minting of large cash (100 times the value of
normal copper coin) and importation of Qing cash
generated inflation
Prejudice against the use of cash (commercial activities), based on orthodox Confucian economics
Confucian doctrine emphasized social stability and frowned at social mobility (basic Confucian dogma) – especially via business activity
The Taewongun tried to control the market to offset the inflation
Problems of reforms: the predominance of landed aristocracy, Confucian dogma, and weakness of political leadership
King Kojong
Surpluses in treasuries were held in depreciated Qing cash
King Kojong tried to follow Confucian principles when he came to the throne in 1873: reduced taxes on peasantry and liquidated most of the reserves
Confucian economics was concerned with people’s subsistence but not with their affluence; agriculture was virtually the only legitimate occupation for none-scholar class
Decision-making shifted to state council in 1875
The decade after 1876: the king, the queen, and the government in the centre of political spectrum between the Taewongun with his conservative supporters and radical progressives like Kim Ok-kyun
Encounters with foreign powers
Taewongun’s anti-Catholic persecution in the 1860s:
belief that the missionary movement was the
vanguard of foreign imperialism; 1866 persecution
In 1866: American ship arrived off Pyongyang;
French expedition to Kanghwa; the German
adventure (Ernst Oppert)
1871: American punitive expedition, Kanghwa
Koreans felt that they won victories over Western
barbarians, vindicating Taewongun’s policy of
resistance
Relations with China, serving a superior (sadae), with Japan, dealing with a neighbor (kyorin)
In 1868 Japanese envoy arrived in Korea to report the Meiji restoration; Koreans rejected the communication on the grounds of wording (title emperor)
From 1868 to 1873: Japanese attempts to gain Korean recognition of the Japanese government were unsuccessful
Seikan “Conquer Korea” debate in Japan, 1873:
retribution for Korean “insults” and safety valve for
discontent among former samurai class, Saigo
Takamori
Threat of force for diplomatic purposes; Japan did
not regard war as feasible policy alternative
Saigo Takamori
Japanese ship Unyokan, 1875: survey of Korean
coastal area; armed confrontation, city of Yongjiong
razed
To Koreans regarded Kanghwa island was a “door to
national capital”
Unyokan
Kojong’s regime devised a new solution: neutralize
the most dangerous military threat (Japan) in order
to preserve Korea’s defenses against the more
distant and more insidious Western menace
Western missionaries, Western merchandise, and
Western ideas were regarded as the real danger to
Korea, not the Japanese
Kanghwa Treaty 1876
Japanese navy in Pusan, 1876
Signing the Treaty
Korea presented herself as a country dependent
on China, and China described her tributary ties;
fruitless Sino-Japanese negotiations in 1876 and
seeds of conflict over Korea
Li Hung-chang: clause one of the 1871 treaty of
peace and amity between China and Japan
guarded against each other’s dependent countries
(mutual non-aggression)
Mori Arinori: It was incomprehensible that Korea
was called “dependent country” by the Tsungli
Yamen (Chinese foreign office) when Korea was in
full possession of the administration of her
internal and external affairs
Kuroda mission to Korea (with two warships) and
signing the Kanghwa Treaty in February 1876
The treaty recognized Korea as independent chaju
(article one); mutual exchange of envoys; trade at
Pusan and opening two additional ports;
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Japanese
The supplementary treaty was even more unequal
than Japan’s treaties with Western powers:
purchase Korean goods with Japanese money at
face value, exemption of tariffs on Japanese
exports and imports
Mori: “Treaties would do only for ordinary
commercial relations. But great national decisions are
made according to comparative strength, not according
to treaties.”
Machtpolitik
Mori Arinori
Li Hung-chang
Korea’s seclusion ended, but Koreans considered the treaty a mere affirmation of tradition-sanctioned reality (“diplomacy” was right of China)
The Japanese intended to use the treaty as a means of isolating Korea from the Chinese tributary system
It would take years before exchanging envoys and opening additional ports (Wonsan 1880, Inch’on 1883)
Up to the early 1880s, Japan was contended herself
in seeking the fulfillment of the treaty terms
Reasons: little commercial prospects of Korea;
frustration over Korean intransigence; Satsuma
rebellion (1877)