ReformCompass I · political scientists call “agenda surfing”—i.e., jumping on top of something that is already being publically de-bated. Before doing so, though, you also

ReformCompass I The Strategy Instrument for Policy Reform

3

Table of ConTenTs

4 Foreword: Recognize earlier, decide better

5 Introduction

6 The never-ending story: Why are reforms so hard to implement—and why do they so often fail?

7 The makeup of strategic guidelines for the political reform process

11 The three C’s of a successful reform strategy

15 The strategic core group: The “strategy unit”

20 Phase 1: Agenda Setting – Finding your issues

27 Phase 2: Formulating and decision-making – Getting going

31 Phase 3: Implementation – The right thing at the right time

35 Phase 4: Ongoing Impact Evaluation – The hour of truth

38 The driving force of reform: Personnel and organizations adept at strategic thinking

40 The how: Methods and tools

44 A brief overview of the ReformCompass

45 Works cited and links

4

FoReWoRd:ReCognize eaRlieR, deCide beTTeR

David Gergen, an adviser to several US presidents, has

noted that strategy is not just about tomorrow, but also

about the day after tomorrow and that, even so, adminis-

trations often focus more on tomorrow’s headlines than

on those a year from now. The issue he is addressing is

the tendency of politicians to focus on issues that are

most immediate and in an almost panicky fashion. In-

deed, although you can often still hear politicians us-

ing the word “strategy,” in reality, they increasingly use

short-term tactics and ad hoc solutions rather than stra-

tegic plans and long-term political reforms.

This booklet is the result of a joint effort by the Ber-

telsmann Stiftung and experts in the field of policy the-

ory and practice to take a long, hard look at the political

reform process. Our goal has been to figure out: Why

do some reforms succeed while others fail? Is it really

worthwhile to think through reforms ahead of time and

engage in long-term planning for them? What are the

key elements a proposed reform must have in order to

succeed?

In compiling it, we have taken what we could learn

from the findings of various analyses, German case

studies and international comparisons and summarized

them into a set of practical guidelines for the policy-re-

form process. Its findings have been organized so as to

be directly usable in the realm of real-world policy work.

These guidelines take into account structures and

processes as well as set central goals and tasks. In do-

ing so, it provides a framework for orienting strategic

reform. It also discusses the results of recent examples

of reform at both the federal, state and municipal level

in completely practical terms.

Politicians who have the courage to institute reforms

at any of these three levels are leaders in terms of shap-

ing thought, taking action and designing policies. When

they see a chance to put a necessary change in motion,

they seize it. These guidelines are intended to help indi-

viduals like these recognize such opportunities earlier

so they can make better decisions. However, the booklet

isn’t just meant for decision-makers. Likewise, it is also

intended for use by NGOs eager to exercise greater in-

fluence on the processes of political and societal trans-

formation.

The three strategic factors that determine more than

anything whether a reform will succeed or fail are the

three C’s: competence for viable solutions, persuasive

internal and external communication, and he capability

to implement the solutions.

What is crucial is paying attention to each of these

three factors during all phases of the reform process—

and to an equal degree. Indeed, if you put too much

stress on one factor and neglect the others, you will end

up with only incomplete reforms. For example, too much

communication at the expense of competence results in

policy marketing instead of policy results. And if poli-

cy-making relies too much on using strong-arm tactics

to implement reforms, the quality of the reform might

suffer. On the other hand, if you put your main focus

on competence, you can lose sight of the importance of

having the capability to implement reforms, with the

result that your plan never even makes it to the imple-

mentation phase.

These guidelines can help you recognize the need for

policy action early on, optimize the structure of a reform

process, plan reforms in a more goal-oriented way and

implement them more efficiently. We warmly welcome

you to apply these reform strategy guidelines in your

own daily work as well as to share them with others.

Frank FrickDirector of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’sLearning for Life program

5

InTRoduCTIon

Wouldn’t it be nice if you could just plan out a reform

in an orderly, set way? The answer, of course, is yes.

But, when you live in a democracy, things never work

out that way in reality. Policy processes also never un-

fold in a linear fashion but, instead, often have the most

diverse—and often unforeseeable—feedback loops. Still,

many of the problems that cause reforms to fail can be

spotted beforehand—and eliminated before causing fail-

ure.

These guidelines are meant to help you do just that.

They can assist you in determining where particular re-

forms stand, creating and expanding your options for

implementing them, and planning them. Moreover, they

discuss several examples of recent reforms in practical

terms, asking:

· What went right?

· What went wrong?

· How could the reform process have been planned

better?

· What are the key elements needed for a reform

process to succeed?

These reform strategy guidelines are mainly intended

to be used by politicians who make decisions on a daily

basis and who plan and implement reforms. Specifical-

ly, this document is aimed at: officials at the federal,

state and municipal levels; representatives of political

parties and factions; and decision-makers and individu-

als working within state chancelleries, senate chancel-

leries, ministries and municipal administrations.

Realizing that your time is short and valuable, we

have composed these strategy guidelines in a style that

is as concise and to-the-point as possible and included

several examples. The latter make it very clear that it

is impossible to create any kind of “instruction manu-

al” for reforms. Indeed, every reform is different, and

circumstances are different wherever you go. Even so,

there are still basic patterns and key moments that oc-

cur in almost all reform scenarios, which can be stra-

tegically planned out and, most importantly, analzyed.

The three factors mainly responsible for determining

whether a reform fails or succeeds are:

· Competence

· Communication

· Capability to implement reforms

The following chapters will define and explain these

three C’s. With the aid of examples, we will show why

these three factors are so crucial and why forgetting or

ignoring them so often causes reform efforts to fail.

This guide also uses examples, key questions and

illustrations to walk you through—in a simple, chap-

ter-by-chapter way—how to plan a reform process. In ad-

dition, it helps you figure out where you are and where

you need to go in ongoing implementation processes as

well as analyze what you did wrong and right once pro-

cesses are completed.

At the end, this guide provides a selection of tools

that can aid in the analysis, strategy-formulation and

implementation of reforms. The central goals and tasks

are graphed out according to the process phases and the

“three C’s” structure.

6

The neveR-endIng sToRy: Why aRe RefoRms so haRd To implemenT—and Why do They so ofTen fail?

Since democratic societies have lots of political actors

with various interests—and they don’t always stay the

same—it’s hard to plan reforms. Still, there is a whole

series of strategies you can use to handle these process-

es, which are often interrelated and can usually be used

at the same time.

If you ask politicians for their subjective feelings,

they’ll tell you that implementing reforms in today’s so-

ciety is getting more and more complicated. But there

are objective reasons for this: Voters are tired of re-

forms. In the 1960s and 1970s, they might have been

very enthusiastic about reform, but now they’ve come

back down to Earth and grown skeptical of them. In fact,

most voters now associate the term “reform” with cut-

backs in the quantity or quality of government services

rather than with progress or improvements. What’s

more, these days, a majority of voters don’t trust politi-

cians and political parties, and half of them think that

governments don’t have what it takes to solve pressing

problems.

Furthermore, there is often much disagreement

within the party base, which causes it to split up into

battling factions. So, while political parties have become

less important, it has simultaneously been getting hard-

er and harder to put together viable majority coalitions

that can implement much-needed reforms. The result:

constant pressure to reach compromises. And, to make

matters worse, there is the media’s never-ending hun-

ger to make politics into something you can put on TV in

just brief, little bites. In other words: There is no short-

age of obstacles to reform.

As if all of this wasn’t enough of a challenge for re-

formers, on top of it come the demands of today’s in-

formation society, which only adds more and more

complexity and globalization to the mix. In such an en-

vironment, if you want to implement reforms without

risking a sharp drop in popularity or even being voted

out of office, it’s absolutely essential that you have a re-

form strategy. By “strategy,” we mean a long-term goal

that takes available resources into account and that can

be adapted to meet ever-changing circumstances.

7

The mAkeuP oF sTRATegIC guIdelInes foR The poliTiCal RefoRm pRoCess

Over the entire process, strategic reform policies always

keep an eye on—and to an equal extent—the goals of

all the relevant key stakeholders as they relate to both

making reforms and exerting political power. In addi-

tion to the appropriate policy content, they must also

feature communication elements and an awareness of

the chances the political reform measures have of gain-

ing majority support and making it through both the

consensus-building and voting stages.

These guidelines can help during these processes by

providing a framework for analysis, consultation and

strategic planning for all political actors working not

only on making everyday policies, but also on planning

long-term reforms. Indeed, they can help these thought

leaders “recognize earlier” and “decide better.”

PhASES OF ThE POlIcy-REFORM PROcESS: An InITIAl OvERvIEW

All reforms go through various phases. These strate-

gic guidelines depict these phases with the help of a

policy phase model that defines basic areas of action

and describes them in simple terms. No chronological

sequences are provided because it’s not really possible

to do so. In reality, it’s rare to have things go forward in

a set sequence and in an orderly manner. Instead, it’s

much more usual for various phases to be interwoven

and to occur at the same time. Likewise, these guide-

lines make a point of approaching matters from the per-

spective of those involved in policy reform.

sTRaTegy guidelines foR The RefoRm pRoCess—aReas of aCTiviTy

sTRATegIC CoRe gRouP

AgendA seTTIng

FoRmulATIng And deCIsIon-mAkIng

ImPlemenTATIon

ongoIng ImPACT evAluATIon

8

state’s minister presidents since German reunification in 1990 have publicly stated that they view demographics as a top priority, the issue has been given a relatively higher de-gree of political importance. Likewise, from the very begin-ning, the government succeeded in making it clear (a) that demographic change was not a fixed problem but, rather, one that would change over time and (b) that, for this rea-son, it would remain a societal issue requiring long-term political attention. Over time, the state’s inhabitants have learned about the problem, and it has become a matter of widespread concern.

The sTaTe ChanCelleRy as a pRimaRy moveR

It terms of demographic policies, Saxony’s state chancel-lery sees its role as being a partner in dialogue, a primary mover and a forum for exchanging ideas. It views its job as making a rough framework of orientation available, but one that can be fleshed out at the various levels of govern-ment. In doing so, the latter are meant not only to mobi-lize local actors, but also to enable them to come up with local solutions. Thus, in effect, the state government not only supports projects financially and conceptually, but also launches them and provides incentives for their continuing development. For example, Saxony is the first German state to have launched a demographics support program whose aim is to enable various actors to jointly devise ways to cope with demographic change. Fredi Holz, head of the Office of Strategic Planning, Demographics and Demoscopy in the state chancellery, says that: “Strategic planning shouldn’t be a short-term undertaking. When the state chancellery, municipal governments or average citizens seize the initia-tive, strategy managers must be there and active at the local level to provide support and act as liaisons.”

One of the key successes of Saxony’s demographic poli-cies has been making most people in the state view demo-graphic change as an opportunity. In large part, this can be attributed to the state chancellery’s efforts to speak about demographic change in positive terms rather than focusing on its negative effects. Such efforts include, for example,

Over the past decade, the eastern state of Saxony has been forced to close 800 schools.

It is predicted that Germany as a whole will have a smaller and older population. But, for Saxony, this is al-ready a reality. This situation has put a lot of pressure on politicians to act. Thus, at a very early stage, the state government started to raise awareness about this demo-graphic change among both the state’s authorities and inhabitants.

a goveRnmenT Well-oRganized foR sTRaTegy

For years, policy-making in the state of Saxony has had a significant strategic orientation. This can be attributed in large part to the state’s minister presidents, who have always been very interested in increasing and expanding the strategic capabilities of the state government. The im-portance given to big-picture issues that exceed the scope of everyday lawmaking can already be seen in the way the government’s administrative offices are organized. For ex-ample, there is an Office of Strategic Planning, Demograph-ics and Demoscopy, whose employees work on issues re-lated to the future (e.g., demographic change) and develop strategies within an institutional framework.

suCCessfully defining and CommuniCaTing pRoblems

In general, state governments in Germany have only very limited resources. In Saxony, though, the state chancellery managed to issue a comprehensive and well-substantiat-ed report on the challenges of demographic change. The report was based on: the findings of a panel of experts appointed by the minister president; conferences and re-gional forums on demographics; and numerous analyses, studies and expert reports. With this report, the state chan-cellery succeeded in making demographic issues a matter of permanent concern in terms of policy reform—among state authorities, in communities and in the minds of the state’s inhabitants. What’s more, since all three of the

demogRAPhIC PolICy In The sTATe oF sAxony:hoW a goveRnmenT made pioneeRing sTRaTegiC RefoRms

cASE STUDy (May 2010)

9

No two reforms are alike. And it makes a big difference

whether the reform has to do with something at the

national level, where hundreds of actors are involved

(e.g., in Germany, with national health-care reform),

the state level (e.g., with smoking bans) or the munic-

ipal level (e.g., with school reforms). Still, all of these

reforms have certain common elements and tasks that

share the same basic structure and that should not be

overlooked.

It all already begins at the so-called agenda-setting

phase. Indeed, the greater the need for reform can be

made in the eyes of the general public, the easier it will

be to make them willing to support it. A good example

of this in Germany can be seen with educational reform:

Once people recognized the problems in kindergartens,

schools and universities, they exerted pressure for re-

form.

Once people are aware of a problem, the real work of

reform can begin. But although there are a number of

ways that any reform can be achieved, there is often se-

rious disagreement about the best way. The purpose of

this policy-formulation and decision-making phase is to

evaluate various possible courses of action, foster trust

among the various actors and build majority support.

During all of this, it can be an enormous help to have a

strategic approach since it allows you to see where the

actors are at every stage in the process and to notice

what needs more attention.

Once a decision in favor of making reforms has

been made, the policy-implementation phase can be-

gin. The chances of this phase’s success can also be

increased if you use a strategic approach addressing

issues such as:

· How can we ensure that our reform efforts will

achieve quality results?

· How can we connect with the general public on this

issue?

· How can we establish clearly defined spheres of

responsibility and accountability and bring all rele-

vant stakeholders onboard?

Addressing these issues can make the pro-cess of im-

plementing the reform go faster and increase its level

of acceptance.

the Generationenpreis (“Generations Award,” www.gener-ationenpreis.sachsen.de) sponsored by the minister presi-dent, which focuses on how societal change can be actively shaped at the local level. Prize competitions like this one, which attracted roughly 300 submissions, have helped en-courage people in the state to get involved in demographic policy. In the words of Stanislaw Tillich, Saxony’s minister president: “The state’s government cannot solve all the problems resulting from demographic change. But we can see to it that people who are willing to face the future with courage, who have a plan and who want to change things have the freedom and the support they need to do so.” Dominic Schwickert

10

Lastly, there is the impact-evaluation phase. This is a key

phase when it comes to documenting a reform’s positive

impact. What’s important here is using the right evalu-

ation methods, making an overall cost-benefit analysis

and—preferably during the process—learning:

· How satisfied are the citizens with the reform?

· How can the process be managed from this point

on? How can we avoid losing sight of the reform’s

original goals?

· Are we going down the right path? Or: What is the

public response to the reform?

· What can we improve the next time around?

Thus, impact evaluation is an ongoing task taking place

within the framework of a strategic process.

ThE “STRATEGy MAkERS”—ThE cORE STRATEGIc GROUP

Analyses of successful reforms stress the immense

importance of the main people involved in them. The

contacts that these individuals have and their ability to

communicate well can be crucial to the reform’s suc-

cess. When the three strategic criteria of competence,

communication and capability to implement reforms

can be seen in this “core group,” we refer to it as a “stra-

tegic core group.” This is both the engine and the steer-

ing wheel behind reform.

demogRAPhIC PolICy In sAxony

· 2004: first demographics summit is held

· 2005: panel of experts begins its work

· 2006: second demographics summit is held (to dis-cuss the expert panel’s recommendations)

· Five regional forums are held with the state’s min-ister president

· 2008: the findings and final report of the state com-mittee on demographics are issued

· The coalition agreement calls for drafting a demo-graphics action plan; instituting a demographics check for demographics-related cabinet matters; forming model regions

TIMETABlE (May 2010)

11

The ThRee C’s oF A suCCessFul ReFoRm sTRATegy

All phases of the reform process—agenda setting, policy

formulation and decision-making, and policy implemen-

tation and impact evaluation—are based on the three C’s

of a successful reform strategy: competence, communi-

cation and the capability to implement solutions. These

three criteria are in a tug-of-war between goals related

to making reforms and those related to exercising polit-

ical power, and they are all key elements for the success

of reforms.

It is crucial to pay equal attention to each of these

criteria during all phases of the reform process. Indeed,

if you put too much stress on one criteria and neglect

the others, things can get quickly out of control. For ex-

ample, too much communication at the expense of com-

petence results in policy marketing instead of policy

results. And if policy-making relies too much on using

strong-arm tactics to implement reforms, the quality of

the reform can suffer. On the other hand, if policymak-

ers put their main focus on competence, they can lose

sight of the importance of having the capability to im-

plement reforms. No matter what the imbalance is, it

will only lead to incomplete reforms.

cOMPETEncE FOR vIABlE SOlUTIOnS

Even if it seems obvious at first glance, you still have to

ask if you have the competence you need—that is, the

right people with the right skills for the job—at all levels

of the reform process. These days, if you are going to

find good solutions for complex problems, they have to

be based on extensive expertise. What’s more, you need

to take advantage of the full range of expert knowledge

available and regularly make sure you have the most up-

to-date facts. Still, you don’t have to have all the neces-

The ThRee C’s of a suCCessful RefoRm sTRaTegy

ComPeTenCe CommunICATIon CAPAbIlITy To ImPlemenT

12

sTRaTegy guidelines foR The RefoRm pRoCess—an oveRvieW

sary competence on your policy team itself. In fact, from

a budget perspective, it might even be a better idea to

“hire” outside expertise. For example, it makes no sense

to saddle a good communicator with research tasks if

his or her time could be better spent spreading the word

about reforms and their objectives.

cOMMUnIcATIOn

In the minds of many politicians, reform-related com-

munication is only about PR, i.e., about using marketing

techniques to advertise the reform to the public, usual-

ly via spokespersons or journalists. But just as import-

ant is engaging in a dialogue with the citizens who will

Picking up on future-related issues

Fostering a desire for reform

calculating the chances of success

Ensuring quality results

connecting with citizens

Mobilizing implementation actors

Formulating reform plans

Building trustObtaining

majority support

Ensuring factual bases

Guaranteeing implementation

Strengthening communication abilities

ImPl

emen

- TA

TIo

n

ImPl

emen

- TA

TIo

n

FoRm

ulA

TIn

g

An

d d

eCIs

Ion

-m

Ak

Ing

FoRm

ulA

TIn

g

An

d d

eCIs

Ion

-m

Ak

Ing

Allowing feedback

keeping options open

Implementing control mechanisms effectively




Ag

end

A

seTT

Ing

Ag

end

A

seTT

Ing

13

be affected by a planned reform—as well as with your po-

litical rivals. Likewise, it is also very important to com-

municate internally, i.e., within your own faction, party

or administrative body. In this guide, we put a particular

stress on internal communication precisely because it

is so often ignored. Indeed, how can you expect the av-

erage person to embrace a reform if members of your

own party or the people you work with have different

understandings of the issues involved and, as a result,

present different key messages to the public? Situations

like this can make a reform fail before work on it has

even really begun. For this reason, you need to work on

your internal “persuasion efforts” as well.

Still, you obviously also have to communicate poli-

cies to the broader public via the mass media. These

days, a politician won’t go far without active message

management that addresses:

· What would be the best time to communicate the

various elements of my message?

· Should I make my message public on the weekend,

when there is less news?

· Would it be better to appear on TV or to speak with

print journalists?

· Should I coordinate with my political allies to make

sure that they publicly back what I’ve said right

after I’ve said it?

In particular, this kind of active message management

needs to be communicated internally, i.e., within your

own organization. Indeed, the key to successful commu-

nication with the public is good internal communica-

tion. If what you say and what you do are the same, you

can win a lot of credibility.

cAPABIlITy TO IMPlEMEnT REFORMS

In this case, the most important thing is to identify the

constellations of both actors and power by asking:

· Who can help me implement the reform?

· Who is my most important—and most powerful—rival?

· Which personal or strategic constellations could

pose a problem—or pre-sent a potential opportunity?

InTeRnAl PARTy PRoblems: paul KiRChhof and his Tax model

In this context, a tragic case is that of Paul Kirchhof and his tax model in Germany’s 2005 federal election cam-paign. The expert in tax and constitutional law was part of Angela Merkel’s “team of excellence” as she ran for chancellor, and he was considered to be the likely next minister of finance. Although he was supported early in the campaign, more and more members of Merkel’s own party started criticizing Kirchhoff and his tax model. This made it very easy for Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998 – 2005), Merkel’s top rival, to discredit it.


14

Obviously, the core team cannot make all reform-related

decisions on its own, so a number of actors from poli-

tics, business and civil society should also be included

in the reform process at every step of the way. What’s

important here is building up coalition support and se-

curing poli-tical majorities at an early stage. Two other

key elements are the support of your own party and of

the wider public.

In addition, you have to get support for your policies

from both your political rivals and anyone who stands

to lose if they are implemented. To do so, you can use

negotiation strategies focused on consensus-building,

conflict resolution and problem-solving. And since the

constellations of people involved are always changing,

you also need to constantly adapt the negotiation strat-

egies you employ. In these situations, the more options

you have available, the better off you are.

ThE lIMITS AnD PREcOnDITIOnS OF SUccESS OF ThESE STRATEGIc GUIDElInES

This booklet is not meant to—nor can it—serve as an

“instruction manual” on how to implement reforms. In-

stead, it aims to broaden the range of actions you can

employ in doing so. Since the circumstances surround-

ing reform are subject to constant change, you have to

be able to quickly fine-tune your strategies and adapt

your actions. What’s more, you also need people with

leadership skills—or, in a word, leadership. As some-

one involved in the process, it’s not enough to just be

familiar with the logic of political processes. You also

have to possess outstanding problem-solving abilities, a

willingness to openly discuss mistakes and the ability to

learn from your mistakes and those of others. Likewise,

if you constantly pay attention to alternative courses of

actions, your chances of succeeding at policy-making

will improve.

15

The sTRATegIC CoRe gRouP: THe “STrATeGy unIT”

A “strategic core group” can take various forms, in-

cluding an informal, but functioning network working

outside of a well-defined organizational structure. An

example of a formalized core group, on the other hand,

was the Strategy Unit that was formed by and worked

solely for former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The

Strategy Unit also had outside consultants as well as

two bodies—a policy directorate and an implementation

section—working for it.

“There are two key leadership skills: the ability to make decisions and the ability to inspire, i.e., the power to persuade. Having only one of these two is not enough.” David Gergen (cited in Fischer, Schmitz and

Seberich 2007: 189)

In Germany, the makeup of the core groups differs at the

various federal levels. In the deliberative process, the

first issue to be addressed is who will and should take

an active role in the reform process. For example, at the

federal level, this would normally be the federal govern-

ment. Still, this raises a number of issues, such as:

· Should the policy process be controlled (whether

formally or informally) by the office of the head of

government or by one of the ministries?

· How much say should the leaders of parties or

factions have in policy-making decisions?

· How much should state political leaders be in-

volved?

· Are there specific key leadership roles within the

core leadership circle?

It is also important to figure out the stances of the vari-

ous members of the core group by asking oneself ques-

tions such as: Do most of them support the proposed

reform? Could disagreements carried over from other

collaborations make it hard for them to work together

now?

Indeed, it is crucial not only to analyze the relevant

actors and their assigned roles, but also to continue do-

ing so throughout the entire reform process. The reason

for this is that, over the course of a reform process, a

number of factors—e.g., the outcomes of state elections,

personnel changes, organizational restructuring and

sudden, unanticipated changes in circumstances—can

dramatically alter the situation. Thus, having a core

group that is strong, flexible and able to learn from ex-

perience is a key element in a reform’s success.

EnSURInG FAcTUAl BASES

One of the hallmarks of a core leadership circle with

outstanding strategy capabilities is a robust culture of

innovation in which people are encouraged to be inven-

tive and no ideas are off-limits. The more open organi-

zational structures are and the more diverse its employ-

ees are, the more perspectives they bring to the table

in the search for solutions. Under these circumstances,

you can establish the kind of creative environment that

makes reform work easier. In doing so, you have to think

about long-term prospects. The basis of any reform is

knowledge, not only of its subject matter, but also of all

the processes and structures involved. For this reason,

core leadership circles should be made up not only of

subject experts, but also of people familiar with political

processes and structures. In fact, the more complex the

matter at hand, the more important this becomes.

16

In many cases, it is also often necessary to enlist the aid

of outside experts. This can help when it comes to both

the reform itself and its surrounding political context

because outside experts are often in a better position to

“People are extremely distrustful when you make claims that don’t match up with their own experi-ences. What they want you to do is find a reasonable solution to their problems. And in no case will they allow themselves to be used by politicians like props in a play.” Political scientist Franz Walter, Neue Westfälische,

22 February 2010

point out problems and to express what can sometimes

be “politically incorrect” thoughts. Still, if the feedback

of these experts is going to have any chance of being

heard, they and the members of the core leadership cir-

cle need to work together very closely–in a way that is

predefined, out of public view and lacking any tempta-

tions for someone to make him- or herself look good.

Otherwise, recommendations might be over-discussed

out of the fear of how the public might react to them.

For this reason, it is also crucial that the members of

the core group have extremely high personal skills, the

ability to come up with new ideas and formulate plans,

and management and coordination skills. Likewise, they

should have the courage and initiative to implement a

sTRaTegiC CoRe gRoup—TasKs and QuesTions


· Include internal knowledge · Secure access to external knowledge · Develop personnel capacities · Pay attention to a heteroge-neous composition


· Adjust communication resources and competencies · coordinate communication and dialog


· Include network actors across departments · networking with stakeholders · Plan decision processes


What knowledge is required? (Knowledge of the subject matter, administrative knowledge or experi-ence with political processes?)

Does the strategic core group have sufficient knowledge of the subject?

How can internal know-how and internal knowledge be incorporated systematically?

What access to external expertise is available? How can this be used and expanded?

Does the strategic core group have sufficient resources for communica-tion?

Does the strategic core group itself have enough communication knowledge and experience?

Have stable communication channels been set up that ensure the internal and external flow of information?

Has the strategic core group agreed on uniform core messages?

Are the communication instruments in line with each other in terms of content and schedule?

Are there feedback mechanisms?

Which actors give the reform more assertive power and should therefore cooperate in the strategic core group?

Are there influential institutions with which cooperation or networking would be beneficial?

How are stakeholders taken into consideration?

Are there positions in the public which endanger the implementa-tion?

Which actors must definitely be gained?

How are formal decision processes successfully coordinated?


17

hesse’s susTAInAbIlITy sTRATegy:sTRaTegiC managemenT in an exTRemely Challenging poliTiCal enviRonmenT

getting ordinary citizens (and particularly younger ones) involved.

For example, the state chancellery paid attention to making sure that members of all the parties in the state parliament as well as high-profile actors from academic, business and civil-society organizations were represented in the highest decision-making body, known as the Sustainability Conference. Another special aspect was that younger people were also included in political decision-making at the institutional level by means of a so-called youth Council. Moreover, the state’s sustainability strategy has and continues to focus on concrete “partic-ipatory” projects, whose main communication platform is the website www.hessen-nachhaltig.de, which encourages all citizens to participate in these projects on a volunteer basis.

Given the focus of the state’s sustainability strategy on fostering dialogue and participation, managerial responsi-bility was delegated for certain matters. under these cir-cumstances, numerous civil-society actors were persuaded to take an active role in implementing the strategy. In the end, what had started as a top-down state initiative grew into a broad-based social program.

AcTIvE InTERnAl POlIcy MAnAGEMEnT

The former Minister President roland Koch managed the sustainability strategy in a very hands-on and results-ori-ented way: He established well-defined spheres of respon-sibility; he broke down the relevant matters into specific, clearly structured projects with set time frames; and he used effective tools to measure results.

In the first step, Koch had his staff commit themselves to implementing a common strategy as quickly as possi-ble. Likewise, several new projects were launched that were mainly coordinated by an office in the state’s environment Ministry. While the Sustainability Conference (chaired by Koch himself) determined the goals to be met by 2020 and how the various projects would be financed, the state gov-ernment placed great emphasis on setting formal regulatory measures, very careful quality control and strict deadlines.

Following the 2008 state parliamentary elections, roland Koch, the then-minister president of the German state of Hesse, was forced to “rule” for one year without a majority in the state parliament. Although the general public viewed him as somewhat politically weakened, he was still able to develop and successfully implement a statewide sustainability strategy from the state chancel-lery. The strategy defined sustainability as a key, overarching goal that should reconcile ecological, economic and social considerations. A large number of new projects were initiated and placed under a single sustainability- strategy “roof” with pre-existing projects, which allowed various policy measures to be brought together into a sin-gle, overarching governance model. This consolidated ap-proach gave new meaning and coherence to government measures both within the government itself and in the eyes of the general public. At the same time, it also gave the government more freedom to act and increased overall ap-proval of its policies.

This success is owed in large part to the two-part strate-gy of the strategic core group surrounding Koch, which con-sisted of: (1) adopting a dialogue- and consensus-oriented external approach that gave members of the political par-ties in the state parlimanet, civil-society actors and “ordi-nary” citizens numerous opportunities to become involved in the sustainability strategy; and (2) having Koch and his advisers closely control the individual phases of the strategy as well as keep a firm grip on policy management vis-à-vis the internal administrative apparatus.

Willingness To engage in exTeRnal dialogue

Immediately after the highly polarizing 2008 state parlia-mentary elections, Minister President Koch received good advice—i.e., that he should address a future-oriented issue and demonstrate his willingness to both engage in dialogue and be an active participant. He followed this advice and, with the state’s sustainability strategy, he succeeded in including all of the parties in the state parliament, bring-ing various civil-society actors into an active network and


18

plan even in the face of opposition. Here, as elsewhere,

the same principle holds true: You can’t wage a war if

you’ve got too many officers and not enough regular

soldiers. So-called “A-type” people might prefer to make

decisions by themselves, but the smart ones first get ad-

vice—which is one of the reasons why the core team is

there. An example of this can be found with US Presi-

dent Barack Obama: The members of his core team are

allowed to—and supposed to—express negative feedback

and opposition behind closes doors in order to improve

the quality of the decision that Obama ultimately has to

make himself.

STREnGThEnInG cOMMUnIcATIOn ABIlITIES

The core group must always include a member who is

in charge of internal and external communication. Both

of these are important, and neither of them should ever

be confused with PR. If political communication reaches

a point where so-called spin doctors take over and start

delivering policy “messages” instead of policy content,

the public usually sees through such tactics—and dis-

approves of them—quickly. The result is a loss of trust

and support, either of which can cause the public to not

appreciate how successful certain policies have been—or

the reform effort to fail.

Likewise, to measure policy effectiveness, a “Goals and Indicators Task Force” was formed with equal represen-tation. under the supervision of the state’s statistics bu-reau, the task force has developed a system for tracking sustainability in three pillars—business, environment and society—and reviewing its findings at regular in-tervals.

The fact that impressive sustainability-strategy “out-put” has been achieved in a relatively short period of time is mainly owed to the quality of the leadership and policy management of the strategic core group sur-rounding Minister President Koch. It successfully man-aged the execution of activities related to the internal administration at all stages of the process (from agen-da-setting all the way to impact-evaluation)—and in a very efficient and effective way. Dominic Schwickert

hesse’s susTAInAbIlITy sTRATegy

· Timeline: – Spring 2008: launch of the conceptualization phase

– October 2008: first Sustainability Conference meeting

– August 2009: launch of the first concrete projects – June 2009: second Sustainability Conference meeting

· Total financing: €10 million over a four-year period, on the condition that 50 percent of it is obtained from outside sources

· Initiators and key actors: Hesse’s state government, in general, and Hesse’s state chancellery, environ-ment Ministry and Sustainability Conference, in particular

· Components: The sustainability strategy includes a broad range of very different individual projects.

SnAPShOT (May 2010)

The more actors involved in any given communica-

tion process, the more difficult it becomes to commu-

nicate. In Germany, it is undoubtedly extremely compli-

cated at the federal level of government and within the

existing party coalitions. Likewise, Chancellor Merkel

“In municipalities, if you don’t ultimately want to be rejected by voters, you also have to get the people who will be affected involved. As mayor, the actions I take in the public eye are greatly influenced by those I take within my own government. Mayors need to be able to bring party members onboard, persuade city employ-ees to participate and foster cooperation between different sections of the city government. In other words, city hall’s ability to participate must grow from the inside out.” Andreas Osner, former project manager of the

Bertelsmann Stiftung

also has a reputation for being a master of telephone

communication, often spending much of her Sunday

afternoons on the phone discussing the upcoming

week’s issues with party allies and other key actors. In

this situation, the very order in which these calls are

made can be crucial when it comes to whether she will

19

When leAdeRshIP Is mIssIng:healTh-CaRe RefoRm and The ChRisTian demoCRaTs

When former German Health Minister ulla Schmidt (2001–2009) was trying to implement health-care re-form, her Social Democratic Party (SPD) had an effec-tive and thoroughly capable core team of strategists. Schmidt herself headed the team, and its other key members were Klaus Vater, her spokesman, and sever-al experienced section heads and state secretaries. The various team members knew each other well, agreed with the goals of the reform and had the tactical and subject-related skills they needed to reach these goals.

At the time, the SPD was ruling as part of a “grand coalition” with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic union (CDu) and the Christian Social union (CSu), the CDu’s Bavarian sister party (jointly called “the union”). For its part, the union didn’t have much to offer in terms of opposition, particularly since its main critic, Horst Seehofer, had stepped down from federal office. Seehofer had built up his own power base (at least in the minds of his CSu party). Thus, there was a strategic core power base associated with the Seehofer forces as well as two new core power bases within the union: one associated with health-care expert Wolfgang Zöller and, of course, the Federal Chancellery, where An-gela Merkel was actively involved in the process. Many observers complained about how fragmented the union was, arguing that it would make the negotiations more difficult for them and would weaken their position vis-à-vis the Social Democrats.


ReFoRm eFFoRTs WIThouT A PoPulAR mAndATe: AGenDA 2010

The economic reform measures of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005) known as “Agenda 2010” are a perfect example of what happens when a core group tries to implement reforms without the support of either its parliamentary caucus or its voter base. According to political scientist Frank nullmeier (Fischer, Kiessling and novy 2008), at the time, Schröder had a close inner cir-cle that was driving the reforms. However, the course of reform being pursued could not be clearly assigned to either the ruling coalition—made up of his Social Dem-ocratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party—or the SPD party itself. As nullmeier sees it, this is one of the main reasons why Schröder ultimately lost both the sup-port of his own party and that of the voters.


get as much information as possible from the conver-

sations and communicate her messages to the people

on the other end of the phone. Indeed, political leaders

usually know how important it is for everyone involved

to stay “on message.” But they rarely understand that

they must also keep their support structure informed

via internal communication if they want to make and

keep it possible to implement reform initiatives or the

key elements of reform.

These days, external communications need to be

managed by professionals. Whether it is politicians

themselves or their appointed representatives doing the

communicating, it is always necessary to have a commu-

nication strategy and someone in charge of it.

GUARAnTEEInG IMPlEMEnTATIOn cAPABIlITIES

If you’re going to engage in big-picture policy strate-

gy, you need a retreat where you can escape from the

media, come up with fresh ideas and take a long, hard

look at your proposed reforms. Such retreats must be

very carefully organized so as to make sure that the key

players can work there in an efficient and strategic man-

ner. At such places, decision-makers and their closest

advisers can come up with long-term strategies, think

about the available options and weigh their chances of

successfully implementing proposed reforms. At least

sometimes, these discussions are carried out confiden-

tially. Still, that creates a dilemma within the core group

because certain aspects of the proposed reform—and of-

ten even its basic elements—must be debated without

any imput from either the faction or the party.

Thus, to plan a reform within the context of a core

group and to approach its implementation in a strategic

way, you must also always think about how it can work

its way through various political situations (e.g., between

parties and their parliamentary caucuses, between de-

partments and cabinets, and between city administrators

and party officials) and at various points in time.

20

PhAse 1: AGenDA SeTTInG – FInDInG yOur issues

Every reform has a unique story behind it. In some cas-

es, current circumstances force the government to push

for reform, as was the case with business and consumer

policies after the scare surrounding mad cow disease

or the controversy surrounding genetically modified

corn. In other cases, reforms are devised by the govern-

ment—“from the top down,” so to speak—even when the

general public and political parties don’t have a well-de-

fined awareness of the problem. Examples of the latter

can be found in Germany with the “Agenda 2010” and

“Retirement at 67” reforms.

Still other reforms come into being when a political

party is trying to improve its image among voters or

when something unexpected happens—e.g., a change in

personnel, an upset election victory or an unanticipat-

ed political event—that creates a window of opportunity.

An example of this type of reform are the debt brakes

that Germany’s federal and state governments recently

imposed on themselves. This only became possible as

a result of the global economic and financial crisis in

what Thomas de Maizière, then-minister of the Federal

Chancellery (2005–2009), called a “kind of positive col-

lateral damage” (Heckel 2009: 210).

“The better the surrounding debate (or just having a discussion at all), the easier it is for politicians to respond to the problems and issues in an appropri-ate and adequate way.” Uwe-Karsten Heye (cited in Fischer,

Schmitz and Seberich 2007: 89)

Before presenting some examples of the various ways

that reforms can come about, we would first like to dis-

cuss some of their key parts and how they fit together.

Successful agenda-setting—i.e., identifying a need for

reform and finding your issues—involves three tasks

that are somewhat related to the three C’s: picking up

on issues related to the future, fostering a desire for re-

form and calculating the reform’s chances of success.

“Conflicts between political parties often prevent re-form processes that are urgently needed for nonparti-san reasons from gaining any impetus. (...) The other party can’t be allowed to have any good ideas and plans.” Heinz-Peter Lehmann, former Nuremberg city official

cOMPETEncE: ADDRESSInG FUTURE-RElATED ISSUES

Whether it’s at the federal, state or municipal level,

high-ranking politicians always need more time than

they have. But reforms demand a lot of time, attention

and planning. And things in need of reform are every-

where to be found.

For this reason, the way you conceptualize a reform is

critically important. High-ranking politicians will never

be able to implement all the reforms they want. In fact,

by the time they retire, their name will be associated

with a maximum of two successful reforms. In Germa-

ny, for example, Helmut Kohl is associated with German

reunification, and Gerhard Schröder with Agenda 2010.

The chances that any reform will succeed are great-

ly improved if its conceptualization process is carried

out in a structured way. This begins with identifying the

need for reform by asking:

· Is this a reform issue that has already been dis-

cussed much in public?

21

agenda seTTing—TasKs and QuesTions

Ag

end

A s

eTTI

ng

Ag

end

A s

eTTI

ng

Picking up on future- related issues

· Identify the need for reform early on · Analyze the reform contents · clarify the direction of the reform


· Work out communication concept in order to create problem awareness, establish interpretation patterns and communicate central ideas

Calculating the chances of success

· Identify windows of opportunity · Determine profiling opportunities · Define negotiation corridors

What is the status of the current academic debate?

Which long-term trends are forecast by academia?

What internal knowledge is already available on the topic?

What are the attitudes to this topic in one’s own faction and party?

What are the interests of the popu-lation and what are the interests of the lobby groups?

Do the reform contents affect basic social convictions (controversial)?

Where can potential conflicting interests arise?

What are the risks and what is the time requirement?

Is the reform linked to the basic convictions of one’s own party?

Have one's own party and the faction been informed?

Has the reform issue already been discussed in public or must an aware-ness of the problems still be created?

How can citizens, the media and also implementing actors be sensitized to the reform topic?

Which media players, which multi- pliers can be won over as reform supporters?

Which academic arguments can be used communicatively, and how?

Which numbers, data, facts, and cost information influence the public debate?

Does the reform referred to social discussions and overarching values?

Are the positive effects highlighted?

Does a current development open up a window of opportunity for reform that can be used?

Is the public an important stakeholder or is it only partially interested?

What are other actors doing? What interests do they pursue? What concepts do they have?

How does the reform gain additional supporters?

Does a future-related issue bring sufficient profiling potential for the actors and the party?

What options do potential oppo-nents have to torpedo reforms?

How high is the conflict potential of the reform topic?

How could opponents succeed in mobilizing the public against the reform?

How wide are the negotiation corridors and what are the chances of the reform succeeding?

What are the limits of one's own willingness to compromise? Are there any exit scenarios?


22

In June 2000, nuremberg’s city council voted unanimously to start a program called Bündnis für Familie (“Alliance for the Family”). The aim of the program was to put a greater focus in municipal policy-making on issues related to family life as well as on helping families better reconcile work- and family-related demands. The Alliance has been so successful that it has been copied in more than 600 places throughout Germany.

A decisive element was the successful start in the agen-da-setting phase. It was the “right” time for such a reform: There were the issues of Germany’s extremely low birth rate and worries about demographic changes, and struc-tural disadvantages for families (e.g., not enough child-care facilities) were causing pressing problems in nuremberg. under these circumstances, the city’s Department of youth, Family and Social Affairs responded to a suggestion by the city council by coming up with a completely new idea: to set up a network of various political and civil-society actors that could support families at the municipal level! Since this “Alliance for the Family” was completely new, the political parties didn’t have any pre-existing reservations about it. This allowed the proposal to pass with the support of all parties. By holding several informal meetings outside of official channels, key actors were led to identify with the alliance idea and even come to view the project as “theirs.”

To suCCeed, you need all Key gRoups To WoRK TogeTheR

In 2000, nuremberg’s city council passed a funding bill called “A Million for nuremberg’s Families,” which aimed to transform the city into a model family-friendly commu-nity between 2001 and 2005. One of the main things that helped the policy-implementation phase of the “Alliance for the Family” succeed was getting all the key societal groups and institutions (e.g., chambers of commerce and industry, trade unions, churches, businesses, law enforcement, labor offices and many more) to agree to actively participate in the program. All of these groups have representatives on the program’s so-called steering committee, which dis-cusses and determines all of the Alliance’s key projects

suCCessFul AgendA-seTTIng:nureMBerG’S “ALLIAnCe FOr THe FAMILy” PrOGrAM

and goals. For managing the Alliance and implementing its projects, on the other hand, a team was set up within the city’s Department of youth, Family and Social Affairs. This so-called “family staff” is provided with the personnel and financial resources it needs.

bRanding The RefoRm

To help it communicate its messages, the Alliance adopted a logo: the “Alliance Flower.” Moreover, in order to realize the Alliance’s wide spectrum of projects, a broad range of part-ners was recruited and organized into specific, issue-based networks. Doing so got many institutions and individuals involved in the project and, together, they provided what the Alliance needed to become a broad-based movement. What’s more, the Alliance now has its own website (www.bff-nbg.de) and a newsletter. Various conferences, research projects and evaluations help make sure that the Alliance’s activities meet a high standard of quality.

THe “FAMILy STAFF” AS A MeAnS OF ConTinuiTy

After its first five years, the “Alliance for the Family” project was extended for another five years and, in 2009, the city council voted to give it funding for a permanent staff. In order to guarantee continuity and foster closer ties with the other city offices it worked with, half of the members of the “family staff” were integrated into those departments. nuremberg then declared itself a “child- and family-friendly city” and issued a comprehensive 10-point declaration that was signed by all of the key municipal groups. The contents of the declaration were then publicized and explained in more detail via a Pr campaign.

reiner Prölss, the head of the Department of youth, Family and Social Affairs was himself surprised by the fact that “the `Alliance for the Family’ made it through the city-council approval process so easily on its first try, some-thing which I’ve only seen happen a few times in my many years working for nuremberg’s city government.” As he sees it, this happened because the “idea was a sound one,


23

and it was communicated to the right people at the right time.” He adds: “The key to the Alliance’s long-term suc-cess was: first, that it was developed with and not against existing structures and actors; and, second, that, instead of just trying to look good and attract a lot of attention, the project was given a lot of financial and human resources at the very beginning that allowed visible and quick progress to be made. Without people taking care of them”—e.g., the family staff—”these kinds of fundamental reforms cannot succeed.”

The dIReCTIon oF ReFoRm? THIS WAy! nO, THIS WAy!

Already at the beginning of the effort to reform the Ger-man health-care system, it was clear that success would be difficult. This was particularly true because the two sides involved wanted the reforms to go in complete-ly opposite directions. The union (CDu/CSu) wanted a “health-care premium”—i.e., for everyone to pay the same set amount. The SPD, on the other hand, wanted a sliding scale—i.e., for people to pay an amount deter-mined by what they earn. The two ideas had nothing in common. And since there was no single, clear direction for the reform, it had problems from the very start (Fisch-er, Kiessling and novy 2008: 37).


· Or is this an issue that would first need to be

brought to the public’s attention?

· Have current circumstances opened a “window for

reform,” so to speak, that should be taken advantage

of?

· Or is this a reform that a special interest group is

pushing for internally and that only has to do with

part of the population?

After identifying the need for reform, your next step is

to analyze the context. Political problems are complex

and multifaceted. In order to figure out everything in-

volved—i.e., the so-called “big picture”—you first need to

examine the material, temporal, spatial and social di-

mensions, asking:

· What is the reform really about?

· How long would the reform take?

· Is the reform just a local matter? Or does it also

affect other regions, states or even countries?

· Which societal groups would it affect?

For a reform to be strategically implemented, the peo-

ple behind it must: (a) try to identify future trends and

developments; (b) get a clear idea of the scope of the

problems to be solved; (c) determine cause-and-effect re-

lationships (with the help of both internal and external

experts); and (d) be able to roughly estimate who will be

affected and how much.

24

After performing this analysis, you need to clarify the

direction the reform will take, asking:

· What is the reform’s primary focus?

· What are its overarching, key objectives?

· In what framework will it take place?

All of these questions should be addressed by experts,

and the answers should fit with the basic goals and val-

ues of the reform’s key backers. Thus, your party and

its various official levels will also play a central role in

this process.

cOMMUnIcATIOn: hElPInG OThERS EMBRAcE REFORM

No matter how needed a reform might be, you will never

be able to implement it if you can’t get a majority of

the public to support it. For this reason, already in the

agenda-setting phase, you need to start thinking about

what kind of communication you will need to foster

support for the reform. This means that if the public

isn’t already aware of the problem, you need to build

this awareness. And if the public is already sufficiently

aware of the problem, you need to come up with models

for interpreting issues (i.e., ways of viewing and under-

standing issues) that will foster support and communi-

cate your key ideas clearly.

“With amazing openness, Klinsmann (the trainer of Germany’s national soccer team from 2004 to 2006) said what all the problems were without holding anything back, and he communicated this informa-tion tirelessly within the German Football Association (DFB) and the media until every last person concerned was aware of the need for change.” (Jenewein 2008)

The first of these is sometimes also called “agenda-build-

ing.” At this stage, it is crucial to communicate both in-

ternally and externally. For example, it’s no use to raise

awareness of an issue with the public little by little, when

your own party and fraction aren’t behind you. This is

exactly what happened with the efforts of the Kohl ad-

ministration to reform taxes. Members of the administra-

tion’s inner circle had different views about the need to

increase Germany’s value-added tax. And when different

members said different things in public, the public got

the impression that the whole issue really wasn’t all that

important (Fischer, Kiessling and Novy 2008: 38).

Still, not all issues can be successfully placed on the

agenda in this way. A number of factors go into determin-

ing the “right” issue to choose, including subject matter,

timing, media cycles and, last but not least, the commu-

nication strategy adopted by your political opponents.

“From the very beginning, it’s important to use lan-guage for your reform that is both clear and delib-erately chosen. In my own case, I sat down with my communication director right at the start and spent an entire night choosing the specific terms we would use. It might sound crazy, but the fact is: Certain words have very strong associations, and choosing the wrong ones at the start will eventually lead to an explosive situation.” Clemens Graf von Waldburg-Zeil, general

secretary of the German Red Cross

In some cases, it can make sense to engage in what

political scientists call “agenda surfing”—i.e., jumping

on top of something that is already being publically de-

bated. Before doing so, though, you also have to think

about a few things: Is the scope of the public debate

really broad enough? And are the “right” target groups

leading the debate? For example, as political scientist

Frank Nullmeier sees it, it was primarily economic lib-

erals who controlled the public debate that came before

the “Agenda 2010” economic reform measures. “It later

became clear,” Nullmeier says, “that the (Schrö-der gov-

ernment) bet on the wrong horse, i.e., the discourse of

an elite subgroup, which didn’t at all reflect the views

of the majority of people” (Fischer, Kiessling and Novy

2008: 39).

Another important task when it comes to issues is

coming up with models for interpreting them. Social re-

alities can be interpreted in a lot of different ways. Both

people who observe them and those who report on them

are forced to focus on a tree rather than the forest, i.e.,

on particular aspects rather than the “big picture.” Take

the issue of health-care reform in Germany, for example:

For the media—and the political opposition—this “par-

ticular aspect” was especially financing (which made

sense, seeing that it affected people’s wallets). But this

resulted in practically nothing but negative headlines—

and ones that the reform actors failed to counter. If they

had instead tried to stress the improvements in quality

that the reform would bring, the discussion would have

probably been a lot different. In retrospect, you can say

that it was a mistake to not provide a model for inter-

preting the reform.

Of course, you can’t provide a model for interpreting

every issue. In fact, when it comes to many pressing

25

When A CRIsIs oPens A “WIndoW FoR ReFoRm”

The financial crisis made possible the 2008 reform of Germany’s vehicle tax. “We had talked about reforming the vehicle tax for years,” recalls then -Federal Chan-cellery Minister Thomas de Maizière (2005–2009). “All of the arguments had already been made long ago, but nothing had happened.”

However, when the government was putting togeth-er the first economic stimulus package after the crisis, there was heated debate between the coalition partners about the tax exemptions proposed by the government. This eventually resulted in a broader debate about the vehicle tax. experienced reformers, such as de Maizière, saw this as an opportunity for settling the matter for good. All vehicle-tax revenues now go to the federal government, and the states are financially compensated for the loss in revenue (Heckel 2009: 210).

The PoWeR oF PosITIve FoRmulATIon

reforms should always be formulated in positive terms. According to German sociologist and politician Lord Dahrendorf, the German formulations “Hartz IV” and “one-euro jobs” would have never been accepted in Britain because they are far too negative. As he once said: “The political language in Germany is full of de-pressing policy terms, so it’s no wonder that the whole country is always in a bad mood.” He then went on to explain that masters of political communication, such as Tony Blair, would never use the term “reform” but, rather, “modernization” and would always say “better regulation” instead of “deregulation.”

Of course, critics might say that we are ultimately just talking about words. But, to show that they are wrong, Dahrendorf “translated” President Horst Köhler’s 2005 speech to the German Bundestag, the lower house of parliament, using more positive language. Köhler’s origi-nal wording ran: “Our country faces massive challenges. Our future and that of our children are at stake… Our federal and state budgets are facing a crisis bigger than they have ever seen before. Our current federal system is outdated …” But, in Dahrendort’s version, it ran: “Our country faces massive challenges. Our future and that of our children are in our hands … The government can and will help those who cannot help themselves, but we won’t burden our children with debt just so we can make our own lives comfortable. In politics, as elsewhere in life, you have to make decisions at the local level, i.e., in a decentralized manner. For this reason, we intend to modernize our federal system.” (excerpted from Frank-furter Allgemeine Zeitung of August 20, 2005; cited in rüb, Alnor and Spohr 2009: 30)

cASE STUDy (May 2010) cASE STUDy (May 2010)

issues, people have an opinion about them that they al-

ready formed long ago. But, even in these cases, it is

always still possible to change their interpretive model.

Take the issue of Germany’s aging population. Using

an easy-to-understand age pyramid helped the general

public better grasp the general scope of demographic

change. Though it didn’t increase public support for

pension reform, it at least helped some people realize

its theoretical benefits (even if they continued to oppose

it on an emotional level). It is here that the third main

communication task of agenda-setting comes into play:

formulating and conveying convincing core messages.

The golden rule of communication—less is more—par-

ticularly applies to such messages. The core message

should consist of three words—or, at most, one sentence.

For the foreseeable future, then-US presidential candi-

date Barack Obama’s “Yes we can” will remain the best

example of this. And the slogan that got one of his pre-

26

decessors, Bill Clinton, into the White House was “It’s

the economy, stupid!” It is also incredibly helpful to be

able to tell stories. This so-called “storytelling” makes

the central message of your reform even more believ-

able and, more than anything, brings it closer to the

everyday reality of people’s lives.

cAPABIlIy TO IMPlEMEnT REFORM: cAlcUlATInG ThE chAncES OF SUccESS

Some politicians are so committed to a specific reform

that they will do whatever they have to to implement

it. And if they are willing to carve a tunnel through a

mountain, so to speak, they sometimes even succeed.

In any case, it makes sense to first think about a re-

form’s chances of success by asking these four ques-

tions:

· Does the reform reflect one of my fundamental

political beliefs, one that is central to my political

identity?

· Will there come a time when there is a window of

opportunity for this reform, i.e., when the surround-

ing circumstances will be particularly favorable?

· Will adopting an issue related to the future provide

the actors and their party enough of an opportuni-

ty—and the right one—to distinguish themselves?

· How much freedom to negotiate is there to get the

reform passed?

“I used to work with a head of the environmental department who was a master at opening windowsof opportunity. If he didn’t have one, he would make one—for example, by publicly accusing companies thatviolated environmental regulations.”Jürgen Heinrich,

former department head for the city of Bielefeld

The start of any legislative period provides a good win-

dow of opportunity for reform. Political scientists call

this the “honeymoon effect”: Right when it enters into

office, a government enjoys a higher degree of public

trust that can be taken advantage of to implement re-

forms. Another good time for reform is right when a

budget is adopted. Take the example of former German

Labor Minister Walter Riester (1998–2002): By propos-

ing his pension reform during his second year in office,

he still had enough time to implement it.

Another important thing is to be aware of the pen-

dulum-like nature of politics. Indeed, long periods of

calm are often followed by times marked by a mood for

change, which can make it easier to implement reforms.

But remember: People tend to associate the term “re-

form” with loss and costs rather than with opportunities

and improvements. And when a reform goes against a

set belief within the population,

its chances of success are rarely good—as are the re-

form advocate’s chances of staying in office. But if you

follow a carefully planned strategy, your chances of im-

plementing the reform are greatly improved. For this

reason, it’s important to keep an eye out for windows

of opportunity (in terms of public opinion)—or to try to

open them yourself.

This brings us to the issue of how a particular reform

can help reform advocates and their parties distinguish

themselves. There are issues that are particularly prom-

ising for certain politicians because they allow them

a chance to both use their core skills and make them-

selves look good. But there are also other issues that

can upset parts of their own supporter base. With this

in mind, politicians should consider how likely there

reform is to gain the support of voters, their own refer-

ence groups, members of their own party and coalition

partners.

Likewise, you will often have to find compromises.

For this reason, early in the process, it’s a good idea to

take a look at how much room there is for compromise,

asking:

· Just how far am I willing to compromise?

· How could opponents of the proposed reform cause

it to fail?

· Are there any formal veto rights involved?

· How could the reform’s opponents mobilize the

public against it?

· Which alliances can and must I enter into in order

to implement all or part of my reform? In what order

should I put my reform steps if I want to increase

my freedom or options for negotiating?

In order to get a clear idea of how you should proceed

with your reform efforts, you need to analyze the gener-

al situation in this way. Already in the agenda-setting

phase, you should determine how much freedom you

have to negotiate, explore the chances of reaching a

compromise and decide just how willing you personally

are to negotiate. Doing so should give you some gener-

al clarity about how much your ideas share in common

with those of the other political actors. You can then use

this information to define your minimum and maximum

positions, which will also help you more precisely de-

fine the external framework for your reform.

27

PhAse 2: FOrMuLATInG AnD DeCISIOn-MAKInG – geTTing going

Once you have established the foundation for reform,

you can formulate the reform plan. Then, you have to

build support for it among the general public and in cer-

tain bodies and organizations.

cOMPETEncE: FORMUlATInG REFORM cOncEPTS

Whoever wants to formulate reform concepts will find

their job much easier if they have been following these

guidelines. The reason for this is that they will have al-

ready talked about what the reform should look like in

the agenda-setting phase. The next step is to define the

reform’s goals and devise a roadmap for it. Sometimes

it makes sense to carry out the reform in separate steps.

An example could be first consolidating the budget be-

fore having a good chance of implementing tax reform.

This is particularly important in this phase because

it also involves building up the support needed to im-

plement your reform. In its broadest sense, support is

trust—the precondition, the means and the goal of a suc-

cessful reform policy. Without it, no reform can succeed.

And you need to build up support not only externally,

but internally as well

cOMMUnIcATIOn: BUIlDInG SUPPORT AnD TRUST

To build support for and faith in their proposed reforms,

reformers need to be viewed as credible actors. In other

words, reformers should take voters seriously and hon-

estly explain to them how the proposed reform would

improve stability and security as well as what it would

change.

For example, Germany’s “Retirement at 67” program

mainly concerns people born in or after 1960. And the

reform’s primary effect—i.e., that people will have to

work up to two more years before retiring—will only be

felt two to three decades from now. Still, practically the

only people to discuss and criticize the measure were

those who were either already close to retirement age

or had already retired. In other words, the reform would

have no negative effects on them—and it was actually

even designed to guarantee that they would get their

pension payments. However, since this key fact was

unfortunately neither communicated nor understood,

there was a basic lack of faith in and support for the

reform.


usIng All AvAIlAble ResouRCes

reformers can only have the full range of reform options available if they make use of all possible resources. But, as Peggi Liebisch, former director of the VAMV, a nation-al German association of single parents, will tell you, this isn’t always done. Although the organization has roughly 9,000 members and represents the interests of 2.6 million single parents and their 3.7 million children across Germany, politicians rarely take advantage of the organization’s expertise—or only when it’s too late. Liebisch finds this regrettable and says that politicians should contact experts like herself early on: “Through a number of means, including our website and Internet portal, we are always well-informed about how daily life really is for those affected.”

28

The credibility of reforms can also be severely hurt when

politicians are too quick to make promises they can’t

keep. Although these promises might have a positive ef-

fect in the short term, this benefit is far outweighed by

the loss of credibility that follows—and credibility that

can’t be won back. For this reason, it is extraordinari-

ly important for reform-related promises to only create

realistic expectations. In fact, this is one of the reasons

why support for health-care reform has always been so

weak. Politicians always promise that such reforms will

stabilize insurance premiums—but this promise is al-

most always broken. It would probably make more sense

to draw attention to other aspects of the reform, such as

increases in the quality of care.

foRmulaTing and deCision-maKing—TasKs and QuesTions

FoRm

ulA

TIn

g A

nd

deC

IsIo

n-m

Ak

Ing

FoRm

ulA

TIn

g A

nd

deC

IsIo

n-m

Ak

Ing


· Sound out options for action · Evaluate alternative solutions · Draft reform plans

Building trust

· communicate credibility · Use clear and positive reform language · Generate realistic expectations · Establish dialog

Obtaining majority support

· choose negotiation strategies · Win alliance partners and the public · Manage political decision processes

How was an existing problem solved in other countries?

What do the experts and the implementing actors say? What are the facts?

Are effectiveness tests meaningful and possible, for example, in the form of pilot projects?

What are the options for action and alternative solutions?

What is the advantage of a “grand reform” and what is the advantage of a reform undertaken in small steps?

is the schedule realistic?

When is the appropriate point in time for communicating specific contents/topics?

How do I bring my own party and employees on board?

Are the winners and gains empha- sized, and positive language used?

Are the reform plans presented and justified as the best workable solution?

Is it clear what is possible, what changes and what doesn’t?

Are milestones also communicated in addition to the overall goal?

Should citizens be included and if yes, how?

Has the government agreed on a reform draft?

Was the formal legislation process planned?

Do quick successes help to gain supporters?

Have the key decision-makers been made offers for cooperation and profiling?

Has it been decided whether negoti-ations will be carried out conflict- or consensus-orientated?

Can potential reform proponents and the public be mobilized? Can reform opponents be brought around?

Are all implementing actors on board?


29

demogRAPhIC ChAnge In münsTeR: hoW a CiTy builT up populaR suppoRT foR RefoRms


the very beginning, Mr. Schowe and his colleagues made up the strategic core team for the city’s demography-related process of change because of other thing his department was already responsible for. “We ended up being in charge of this area because we had always been responsible for statistics and forecasts,” Schowe explains. For this reason, there was no need to set up a separate demography office or a special “demographic change” steering group.

a WoRKing gRoup made up of vaRious aCToRs

To get other city departments involved in the process, Münster’s city administration set up a demography work-ing group. Made up of representatives drawn from several specialized departments, the group has been meeting two or three times a year since 2004. Its meetings are chaired by officials from the city’s urban planning department in charge of monitoring demographics, whose primary task is to con-vey information about demographic issues and to raise and maintain awareness of them. The main tool they use is the so-called “demographics check,” a checklist of easy-to-un-derstand questions that the “demographic change” working group compiled in consultation with other city officials. The tool allows all city officials to determine how consistent the measures, projects and decisions of their own specialized divisions are with the city’s broader demographic goals.

If a reform issue touches upon all city departments, it also means that the city’s residents will be confronted by the consequences of the city’s efforts to adapt to demo-graphic change. For this reason, Münster’s demography ex-perts focus on keeping residents well-informed and encour-aging their participation. To do so, they have held a public hearing, initiated discussions with citizens and put together an informational brochure about the city’s demographic action plan. Beginning in 2011, these efforts at providing information and fostering participation will be intensified by involving city institutions, such as its adult education center, groups representing senior citizens and the youth council. This should help to reach the broadest number of people possible and make them aware of the issue.

Münster isn’t just the bicycle capital of Germany; it’s also the German city that is best-prepared for demographic change. By 2015, the proportion of the city’s population over 70 will have increased by 17 percent, while the proportion of 6- to 10-year-olds will have declined by 14 percent. Still, the city’s population will remain relatively stable because it is home to a large university full of students between 18 and 25.

The city began addressing demographic issues some years ago, and it had already devised a demographic action plan by 2008. When you take all these factors together, you can see that—in terms of organizational strategy—this is both promising and problematic. For how are you supposed to persuade city employees, politicians and the general public to initiate processes of change and adaptation in ev-ery last area of city life when—at least in their immediate view—there appears to be no pressing need for action?

“By providing the right information in an understand-able way as well as comprehensive communication,” ex-plains Thomas Schulze-Schwienhorst, who works in the demographic change section of Münster’s urban develop-ment department. “especially when it comes to opening the eyes of both citizens and politicians to something whose consequences still can’t be felt,” he adds, “it’s particularly important to always keep providing information about it.”

using a meThod To figuRe ouT WheRe you sTand

Münster now approaches its urban-development issues in a methodological way that focuses on demographic issues. Its first step on this path came in the form of a 2005 report that looked at the city’s demographic makeup and provided an overview of the city’s basic policy approaches, projects and measures related to demography.

The city then developed an overall demographic concept based on its demographic profile, an integrated urban-de-velopment and city-marketing plan, and its current strate-gic goals. ”This overall concept formed the basis for the process of change and the action plan we then went on to devise,” says Christian Schowe, the head of Münster’s urban development and traffic planning department. From

30

cAPABIlITy TO IMPlEMEnT REFORM: WInnInG MAjORITIES

This brings us to what is by far the most important

thing a reformer has to be able to do: obtain majority

support. Since Germany’s democratic system focuses on

negotiation and coalition-building, this is a particularly

difficult thing to do in this country. In fact, in Germa-

ny, politican decisions are much more likely to result

from an effort to please various combinations of interest

groups or to divide power between the various actors

involved than from selecting an alternative based on ra-

tional considerations.

“During the planning phase of a strategic reform, you can claim whatever you want. No one has to believe you. But by allowing us to test certain things first, our pilot project was priceless.” Clemens Graf von Waldburg-Zeil,

general secretary of the German Red Cross

Reformers and their core teams need to focus on three

management tasks: (a) developing negotiating tactics

tailored to the situation that will allow flexibility to

change strategies during the process; (b) using these

tactics to secure the broadest-possible range of poten-

tial alliance partners; and (c) mobilizing a high degree

of public support for the reforms.

In Germany, you only rarely see politicians using a

negotiating style stressing conflict. As a result, negoti-

ation partners can usually only say “yes” or “no.” How-

ever, if you do choose to negotiate in an aggressive, con-

flict-oriented way, you first have to make sure you have

the political power and support you need. Sometimes

politicians even choose to use a “divide and conquer”

strategy—i.e., using concessions to attract specific sub-

groups away from their negotiating partners.

In Germany, it is much more common to see a ne-

gotiating style focused on building consensus. In other

words, politicians try to persuade their negotiating part-

ners to back their reform by offering them something in

return. But, when this happens, it almost always means

that the reform has been watered-down. Likewise, us-

ing this style exposes politicians to public accusations—

that their poor negotiating skills have resulted in a

type of political horse-trading, temporary solutions and

half-hearted formal compromises. Moreover, in addition

to often being very expensive, this style of negotiating

also consumes a great deal of time.

“In retrospect, the people who most bitterly opposed the reform helped improve its overall strategy more than anything else.” Clemens Graf von Waldburg-Zeil, general

secretary of the German Red Cross

An alternative way to negotiate is by using a prob-

lem-oriented style. This style primarily focuses on using

arguments based on facts and undeniable realities. It is

particularly well-suited for negotiations at the local lev-

el because everybody can clearly see the problems that

the reform is trying to solve. What’s more, it is better to

use the problem-oriented negotiating style in situations

that do not involve conflicts about how resources should

be distributed.

The faster citizens can see the first improvements re-

sulting from the reform, the more successful it will be.

It is unfortunate, however, that people seem to pay much

more attention to short-terms losses caused by reforms

than to their long-term benefits. All reformers need to

be aware of this basic, unavoidable reality. If the only

way to succeed in changing society is to suffer some

short-term losses, you need to combat potential negative

public reactions by getting your expectations-manage-

ment activities started at a very early stage.

münsTeR:sTeps in planning iTs RefoRm

2004: The city council adopts the basic concept and instructs the city’s urban planning department to start preparing for it.

2005: The first report is issued.2006: The data are reviewed, and a dialogue is started

with city residents.2007: An action plan is devised.2008: The city council adopts the action plan, and

a demographics checklist is devised for all city departments.

2009: A brochure is issued to inform city residents about the action plan; a survey helps determine what residents want.

2010: A comprehensive communication and participa-tion plan is produced.

MIlESTOnES (May 2010)

31

PhAse 3: IMPLeMenTATIOn – THe rIGHT THInG AT The RighT Time

Once a reform process has been started, things normal-

ly get very hectic. In the implementation phase, there

are lots of things you have to think about, and all sorts

of new problems and obstacles seem to pop up. For

that reason, at this point, it’s already important to make

sure that your reform will bring about quality results,

asking:

· What impact should the reform have?

· How will we know that the reform’s goals

have been met?

· Which management and control tools can I use?

cOMPETEncE: EnSURInG qUAlITy RESUlTS

Ensuring quality results is admittedly very complicated

because it often takes a long time before you can see any

effects. In fact, it’s only very rarely clear that a particu-

lar cause led to a particular result. In most cases, there

is an extremely broad range of factors that have some

influence—some of which hurt each other, and others

that reinforce each other. What’s more, it can ultimately

be very politically risky to define clear goals. For exam-

ple, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder once

committed himself to a certain number that he wanted

to reduce unemployment to. But this eventually hurt

him because he wasn’t able to reach it. Likewise, the

“Agenda 2010” name given to the Hartz reforms now

sounds odd because 2010 has already been reached—but

the reform’s objectives haven’t.

Although it’s difficult, it still makes an extra-

ordinary amount of sense to think reforms through

backwards—i.e., starting from the end point and work-

ing your way back—as well as to design them from the

perspective of the people who will be affected by them.

For example, you need to ask yourself how the process

of change will influence their lives and how they will

react.

One way to learn these things is with the help of

surveys. Another important way is to work closely with

government agencies—since, if any problems arise, they

will be the first ones to hear about it. Taken together,

you have a broad range of management and implemen-

tation tools you can use, including: instructions and pro-

hibitions; stimuli (e.g., positive and negative financial

ones); providing benefits (e.g., goods or services); and

non-material incentives (e.g., allowing a specific role in

implementation). In most cases, using a mix of these

tools works best.

“One problem with many initiatives for change is that they don’t include any short-terms successes. (...) This frequently makes people feel insecure. It is precisely then that traditionalists, opponents and so-called ‘reform losers’ see an opportunity and call for the change to be either slowed down or stopped complete-ly. For this reason, once a project that changes things has been started, it’s important to make sure that everyone can see that performance has improved and that there have been successes.” (Jenewein 2008: 22)

If you fail to make sure that your reform will return

quality results at an early point, there is a great danger

that your reform will fail. Take, for example, the Riester

reform regarding government-subsidized pensions. At

the beginning, hardly anyone signed up for the policies

because a government regulation said that providers

would only have their commissions paid out over 10

years rather than immediately. Since this arrangement

32

was not worthwhile for most providers, they hardly ad-

vertised the Riester policies at all. In the end, the situ-

ation only improved after the government changed this

regulation.

Another government measure in Germany that

doesn’t seem to have achieved its goal is the so-called

Praxisgebühr, a 10 euro fee you have to pay once every

three months when seeing a doctor. The original goal of

the measure was to discourage people from going to the

doctor more than they needed to. But since this regula-

tion went into effect, Germans have become Europe’s

doctor-visiting “champions.” Indeed, it looks like people

have been so upset by the fee that they have decided to

get as many doctors visits as possible out of it once they

had paid the quarterly fee. In other words, the measure

has achieved the exact opposite of what it was supposed

to. That could have been figured out a lot earlier if the

reform actors had made an effort to make sure that the

reform would have quality results.

cOMMUnIcATIOn: cOnnEcTInG WITh ThE GEnERAl PUBlIc

The problem with the fee for visiting doctors can clearly

be blamed on a lack of communication between govern-

ment reformers, on one hand, and medical associations

and the persons affected (i.e., doctors and patients), on

the other. This example once again shows how crucial

communication is during each phase of a reform. In

these situations, transparency can also be immensely

helpful. For example, after implementing pension re-

form, the Schröder administration decided to send each

pension fund participant an annual report on the state

of his or her pension account. Doing so allowed people

to see for the first time the exact amount of their future

pension. This measure persuaded many people to sign

up for the Riester pension program, which was also in-

tended to strengthen the pension system.

cAPABIlITy TO IMPlEMEnT REFORM: MOBIlIzInG IMPlEMEnTATIOn AcTORS

Many reforms fail because the actors who were sup-

posed to implement them actu-ally end up sabotaging

them. For this reason, it’s helpful to put together a

“map” of the various actors and their various interests.

Once you’ve identified which actors will definitely sup-

port your reform, you can take measures to strengthen

their hand. And, when it comes to your opponents, you

should try to think of how to get them involved. For ex-

nuRembeRg’s AugusTIneRhoF: hoW failing To ConsulT WiTh The geneRal publiC Can ThRoW a pRojeCT off TRaCK

The Augustinerhof is an excellent, 54,000-square-me-ter piece of property in nuremberg’s historical town center. In 1989, a developer purchased the property and planned to build a steel-and-glass high-rise on it designed by a well-known American architect. nurem-berg’s city council and urban development department were excited about the project because they felt it would create an appealing contrast to other buildings in the area. unfortunately, however, the public was only in-formed about the project at a very late stage and pre-sented with a project that was more or less set in stone.

When the plans for the building were made public, the city’s schocked inhabitants immediately formed a citizens’ initiative. It was only at this point that a de-bate was started between the reformers (i.e., those behind the project) and the general public—but it was already too late. The reformers offered concessions, such as new designs and changed building plans, but these weren’t enough to win the support of the angry public. This debate lasted for five years (1991–1996) before a city-wide referendum—the first and only one in nurem-berg’s history—cancelled the project. In the 1996 elec-tion, the mayor from this period was voted out of office, and it wasn’t until 2008 that a new investor purchased the property. nothing has been built on it yet, and it is currently used as a parking lot.


33

implemenTaTion—TasKs and QuesTions

ImPl

emen

TATI

on

ImPl

emen

TATI

on


· Ensure effectiveness · Determine implementation steps · choose suitable management instruments

Connecting with citizens

· Ensure communication between citizens, the administration and politics · clarify the workability of the reform · Ensure that processes are transparent


· clarify interactions with relevant actors · create clear responsibilities

Have the key goal of the reform and the implementation measures been concretely determined?

How can the measures and perfor-mances be coordinated with the needs of citizens in day-to-day life?

Do the implementing actors have sufficient resources? Can problems be immediately eliminated?

Have detailed time plans, budgets and decision-making rules been prepared?

Have management instruments, information measures, precepts and prohibitions as well as financial incentives been selected?

Do the implementing actors have sufficient resources and competencies in order to convey contents to citizens in an understandable manner?

Has continuous dialog with imple-mentation actors been ensured?

Are problems in implementation, suggestions and criticism openly discussed with those responsible for implementation?

Are successes communicated to the public and are they perceived as such?

Are problems mentioned openly and solutions presented at the same time?

Are stakeholders able to influence the process?

Does the administration have lee-ways for their decision-making?

Are responsible persons nominated and competencies clearly regulated?

Have schedules, budgets and content been determined with binding effects?


34

ample, you can think of giving them specific tasks to

improve their own status.

In Germany, the federal structure makes implement-

ing reforms even more complicated. The federal govern-

ment is usually in charge of making laws, and the states

are usually in charge of implementing them in adminis-

trative terms. But, when it comes to implementing them

at the state level, you constantly run into serious prob-

lems that might have been avoided with better planning.

bAvARIA’s eFFoRTs To bAn smokIng:When RefoRm-implemenTaTion aCToRs bloCK implemenTaTion

Bavaria’s attempt to implement a statewide smoking ban is a good example of how a reform can fail when the actors that are supposed to implement it do just the opposite. Bavaria’s state government and the various hotel and restaurant associations had already had a chance to state their positions. But the increasingly loud protests of one important group—the owners of small hotels and restaurants with large numbers of steady customers—were completely ignored during the agen-da-setting phase of the reform process.

On January 1, 2008, the strictest smoking law in any of Germany’s states went into effect in Bavaria. In response, many hotel and restaurant owners simply de-cided to open members-only “smoker clubs,” which was then the only legal way to allow guest to smoke in their establishments.

Within a few weeks, hundreds of these clubs had sprung up. This provoked a media frenzy and breathed new life into the bitter smoking-ban debate, which hurt the state government a lot in political terms. In fact, some even believe that the ruling party at the time lost in the 2008 state parliamentary elections because of the debacle surrounding the smoking ban.

In any case, soon after the election, the state’s newly elected minister president, Horst Seehofer, eased the ban. Since August 1, 2009, smoker clubs have been banned, but smoking is once again allowed in marked side rooms. Ironically, this prompted yet another citizen’s movement, this time under the leadership of a splinter party known as the ecological Democratic Party (ÖDP), which collected 1.3 million signatures for a petition call-ing for the previous ban to be reinstated. Many viewed this success as yet another “slap in the face” for Ba-varia’s government. eventually, in a referendum held in July 2010, a majority of voters supported a complete smoking ban in all Bavarian restaurants and hotels.This whole back-and-forth surrounding Bavaria’s smoking ban clearly shows how the implementation phase of a reform can fail if all the relevant actors aren’t on board.


35

PhAse 4: OnGOInG IMPACT eVALuATIOn – The houR of TRuTh

Continuously evaluating the impact of your reform is

an important part of any reform process. In fact, al-

ways checking to see whether its goals have been met

is one of the best management tools for a reform—and it

also immediately lets you know if something has gone

wrong. This process in usually conducted internally, and

its findings are not publicly presented and discussed. If

possible, though, you should always publicize a reform’s

positive results—in any case, right after the successes

have become visible and particularly after the reform

has been completed. The tool for doing this is the im-

pact-evaluation process. It allows you to: (a) determine

how much of an effect the reform has had and make ad-

justments, if necessary; and (b) to strengthen the trust

in and credibility of those behind the reform.

cOMPETEncE: IMPlEMEnTInG cOnTROl MEchAnISMS EFFEcTIvEly

You can only have impact evaluation for a reform if its

goals were defined at the very beginning. This only gets

more difficult when the reforms are complex or subject

to a broader range of factors that can influence them.

Still, it should be a bit easier at the local and state level.

Setting clear goals is risky for any politician. For

this reason, most of them avoid making any concrete

statements about what they hope to achieve with their

reforms. And doing so also allows them to take credit for

any success that is achieved.

“Having lost sight of our goals, we redouble our efforts.” Mark Twain

One thing that is absolutely necessary if you want to

have effective impact evaluation is a knowledge base

full of solid and broadly accepted data. This provides

you with a dependable way to check whether you’ve

reached your goals. For example, if a city decides to im-

prove the quality of life of its inhabitants by building

new bicycle and hiking paths, the indicator of success

will be the number of miles/kilometers of paths that

have been created. For a state implementing educational

reforms, the indicator of success might be the number

of classes cancelled for various reasons. Or, for health-

care reform at the national level, it could be the number

of health-care institutions that have been evaluated and

how much the quality of their care has improved over a

pre-defined period of time.

The method you use to evaluate your reform’s impact

might be very sophisticated. But the fact is: If it doesn’t

36

geRmAny’s CAR-sCRAPPIng bonus PRogRAm: When CommuniCaTion foCuses on a deTail of a RefoRm RaTheR Than The Whole Thing

When Germany’s government introduced a car-scrap-ping bonus in 2009, the media coverage focused al-most exclusively on the billions the program would cost the government. From the government’s point of view, however, one of the program’s goals was to stimulate consumer spending and get the billions it had spent on economic stimulus to find their way back into econom-ic circulation. When it comes to the car-scrapping pro-gram, this was a complete success. However, for other programs in the economic stimulus package (e.g., the reduction in social security contributions that went into effect on July 1, 2009), there is simply no way to know how much more money consumers actually spent. In fact, it is quite likely that some of the funds intended to stimulate consumer spending actually ended up staying in people’s savings accounts.

The media’s concentration on only the cost issue of the reform can probably be blamed on the government’s failure to communicate any other reform goals. Looking back, we can see that the new cars that were purchased actually have much lower levels of carbon emissions than the older ones they replaced and that consumers tended to buy cars that were smaller—and therefore presumably more fuel-efficient—than their older ones.

Though these environmental goals were discussed before the measure was passed, the government didn’t really mention them much during the reform’s imple-mentation phase.


lead to a political learning process, it hasn’t done any

good. In order to reveal their added value, you have to

be very capable of learning new things.

However, in the world of everyday politics, it’s clear

that there is only a very limited amount of this learning

ability. This was particularly the case with the Agenda

2010 economic reforms. Facing severe public criticism

for its reform course, the Schröder government felt com-

pelled to put its head down and push its policies straight

forward. Its fear was that, if it didn’t, its reforms would

be hurt (Fischer, Kiessling and Novy 2008: 179).

cOMMUnIcATIOn: AllOWInG FEEDBAck

Anyone interested in politics evaluates the reform poli-

cies of a particular government in their own way. It’s also

true that this way is rarely objective and doesn’t alway

just look at how good the reform was in terms of content

or design. When you are engaged in reform-related com-

munications, it’s important to keep this in mind.

“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasion-ally look at the results.” Winston Churchill

Given this reality, the best thing to do is to analyze the

public response to your reform policies in an ongoing

way. Likewise, it often makes sense to have specific

messages for certain target groups in addition to the

messages you have for the broader public. Indeed, since

some groups of people are particularly affected by cer-

tain reforms, they should also be particularly well-in-

formed about their success.

This is even more important because the media de-

termine the topics that ordinary citizens will hear about

based on their own ideas of their professional function

and what they are supposed to communicate. Indeed,

the media are not always focused on the same kinds of

positive reform outcomes that the government is, and

they frequently play up things that the government

doesn’t consider all that important.

cAPABIlITy TO IMPlEMEnT REFORM: kEEPInG yOUR OPTIOnS OPEn

Impact evaluations can only be effective if they foster

political learning and lead to any necessary adjustments

in managing the process. However, to do so, political ac-

tors also need to have freedom to act. For this reason,

you should design your reform strategies in a way that

37

impaCT assessmenT—TasKs and QuesTions

cases, people ultimately admitted that these reforms

were correctly implemented—but it often took years for

that to happen.

What’s even more difficult is when reform actors are

willing to react to cri-ti-cism, but unable to do so. This

is always a sign of a lack of options and poor planning

both before and during the reform process. By strategi-

cally planning a reform, you can minimize the risk of

this happening.

keeps your options open and preserves some space for

maneuver.

On the other hand, if reform actors are unwilling to

respond to feedback, they run the risk of being bom-

barded with criticism—and, ultimately, of losing any po-

litical legitimacy. There are few reforms that justify tak-

ing this king of risk. Still, this kind of response might

still be necessary in certain situations involving very

fundamental decisions of national or even international

scope. One example would be the introduction of the

euro, which most Germans opposed for many years. An-

other would be former Chancellor Willy Brandt’s efforts

to normalize relations with Eastern bloc countries (Ost-

politik), the NATO “double-track” decision of 1979 and

making it mandatory to wear a seatbelt. In all of these


· choose suitable evaluation methods · Evaluate these methods as part of the process · Evaluate the costs and benefits

Allowing feedback

· Analyze public resonance · Maintain dialog with relevant actors · Pass on reform results according to the target group

Keeping options open

· Build up an early warning system · Make adjustments flexibly · Take into account changed configurations of actors

Are the goals so clearly formulated that they can be reviewed and results and effects be measured?

Are the level of target achievement, performances, costs and efficiency as well as processes evaluated?

Has a systematic exchange between the implementation actors been es-tablished, such that an overall need for action can be recognized?

Do the management instruments fulfill their purpose and are they accepted?

Are the opinions and suggestions for improvement of citizens and other stakeholders actively obtained and taken into account?

How are suggestions for improvement and changes dealt with?

Are successes disseminated specific to the targed group?

Are negative results communica-ted together with suggestions for improvement?

In which direction is the public debate developing?

Were review dates for reform succes-ses determined in advance?

Which criteria and decision-making rules should apply to the reform change?

Are potential conflicts between the relevant actors being continuously sounded out in the reformCompass?

Does the composition of the strate-gic core group need to be adjusted?

Is it necessary to adjust the imple-mentation strategy?



38

The dRIvIng FoRCe oF ReFoRm: peRsonnel and oRganizaTions adepT aT sTRaTegiC ThinKing

Strategic core groups will be put together in different

ways depending on the policy field and the political lev-

el involved, and the makeup of this group will also con-

tinuously change during the process itself. For example,

in Germany, a reform plan at the federal level of the en-

tire government (e.g., one from the coalition agreement)

would have a core team made up of the chancellor, the

head of the Chancellery, the heads of the parties and

parliamentary groups, and the general secretaries of

the majority parties. Depending on the policy field, state

heads (i.e., minister presidents) might also be included.

As a rule, staff members (e.g., aides and, if necessary,

civil servants and other administrative workers) remain

invisible. However, they are often important drivers of

reform, transforming the vaguer notions of political ac-

tors into concrete strategic concepts.

“In recruiting their leadership team, Klinsmann, Löw, and Bierhoff (who were, at one time, the trainer, assis-tant trainer and manager, respectively, of Germany’s national soccer team) were very careful to make sure that they had both job-related skills and people skills. Klinsmann viewed the members of this leadership team less as subordinates and much more as partners with capabilities that mutually complemented those of others. The leadership team shared the same values and worked in decentralized structures with clearly defined responsibilities.” (Jenewein 2008: 20)

At the state and local level, core teams can be small-

er—which also usually increases their chances of suc-

cess. Still, the makeup of this team is a decisive factor: If

it works, your reform has a good chance of making it. If it

doesn’t, things will be difficult from the very beginning.

As noted, the loyalty of the core team’s members is

a key factor. Without it, the core team cannot function.

Indeed, the value of loyalty cannot be overestimated—es-

pecially since, in politics, it can be here at one moment

and gone the next. All members of the core team should

be able and allowed to openly say whatever they want.

And unless it is decided otherwise, all internal conver-

sations should remain confidential. As a reformer, being

a “leader” also means you can take criticism and deal

with it in a constructive way. This is extraordinarily im-

portant and cannot be stressed enough.

“In a strategic process, nothing happens automatical-ly. The key elements of a successful process of change are developing a strong leadership mindset and lead-ing in the clearest sense of the word. Employees need goals that have been jointly developed with them, and associations need a sense of direction, i.e., something to focus their efforts on. Likewise, the entire system of goals must be organized in a way that (...) allows everyone involved to derive some kind of personal benefit.” Clemens Graf von Waldburg-Zeil, general secretary of the

German Red Cross

The expectations placed on leaders are particulary high

during times when strategic reform processes are being

formulated. As a leader, you have a central management

and coordination function that you cannot delegate to

someone else. You need to be able to understand, evalu-

ate and overcome highly complex situations.

At a basic level, this calls for completely standard

leadership skills, such as accountability, decisiveness,

persistence, the ability to work under pressure, commu-

nications skills, the ability to lead a team, etc. But, in

the context of a strategic reform process, you will need

other skills, as well, including:

· The ability to see the big picture, think ahead and

be flexible in thought and action

· The ability to constantly challenge your own goals

· The ability to both stick to your initial analysis of

the overall situation while still constantly asking

whether you and your team are on the right path

· The ability to adjust your tactics while keeping the

reform process on track

39

TWo CenTeRs oF PoWeR ARe one Too mAny

When the “grand coalition” of the union (CDu/CSu) and the SPD was trying to reform Germany’s health-care system, there were two strategic centers of power—one in the union-controlled Chancellery and one in the SPD-controlled Health Ministry. under normal circum-stances, this kind of “doubling” can cause problems. In this case, however, the mutual trust between Chan-cellor Angela Merkel and Health Minister ulla Schmidt (2001–2009) made it possible to get the votes needed for the reform (Fischer, Kiessling and novy 2008: 34). Still, this came at a certain price: Figures from all three parties who did not belong to the core group greatly disturbed the process by often requesting opportunities to speak.

cASE STUDy (May 2010) · The ability to weather crises and make cool-headed

and goal-oriented decisions in transitional periods,

when everything can seem chaotic

· Familiarity with and the ability to use strategic tools

and methods, when necessary

· The ability to make sure that there is the necessary

sense of direction and transparency both internally

and externally, knowing that both sides need to be

constantly harmonized in a strategic process

A study on the leadership roles of mayors found that

the following traits were central: credibility; authentic-

ity; persistence; the ability to give others direction; the

ability to connect with ordinary people; and a willing-

ness to get people involved in governmental processes

(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009: 182).

The core group’s ability to formulate strategies also

depends on the staff members they directly work with.

It’s important to ask:

· Does the staff have the strategists, communicators,

researchers, organizers, etc. that you need?

· How well do they work together?

· How quickly can they get support from outside

experts?

It is also important for the members of your staff to have

good connections within other individual administra-

tive units, such as ministries or departments. Having

this allows you to set up the kind of early-warning sys-

tem that every core group needs. A large number of re-

forms lack—or simply ignore—such sytems.

40

The hoW: meThods and Tools

As a whole, these strategy guidelines serve as a kind of

air traffic controller that helps you navigate your way

through the entire reform process. But, when it comes

to the strategic core group and the individual phases,

you need to use concrete methods and tools of project

management. These can help you determine where you

stand, get a deeper understanding of individual issues

and prepare to make strategic decisions. This chapter

presents examples of three methods. For each concrete

question, you will have to separately determine whether

you have the expertise you need, you can build it up or,

if necessary, you need to get it from outside sources.

METhOD 1: STAkEhOlDER AnAlySIS AnD MAnAGEMEnT

In this context, stakeholders are any individuals or

institutions that can influence and/or be affected by

the goals of a reform. Indentifying them is the job of a

stakeholder analysis. Likewise, this method also makes

clear the role and importance that each individual stake-

holder has for a reform process. Using this information,

stakeholder management can take things a step further

by identifying strategies and courses of action for inter-

acting with stakeholders.

The first step in a stakeholder analysis is to gather

information on the various stakeholders. In some cases,

it can make sense to make direct contact with strategi-

cally important individuals or institutions so as to get a

feeling for what they think about the reform plan. Then,

you can analyze what you’ve learned so as to determine

how you should deal with those particular stakeholders.

The amount of attention and “love” you give to each of

these persons of institutions will depend on how much

influence they have on and interest they have in the re-

form. In some cases, it can be helpful to be able to use a

graphic method (e.g., a metaplan board using cards) to

visualize your assessments.

The stakeholder-analysis method is particularly

well-suited for the “agenda-setting” and “policy-for-

mulation and decision-making” policy phases. These

phases involve calculating a proposed reform’s chances

of succeeding, building up trust and securing majori-

ties. A thorough stakeholder analysis makes it easy to

make decisions about how to deal with particular stake-

holders.

METhOD 2: FUTURE WORkShOPS

In a so-called future workshop, up to 25 people come

together to jointly develop concepts for the future with

the help of facilitated brainstorming and other creative

techniques. Future workshops allow you to come up

with courses of action, innovations and solutions for

both real-world and theoretical problems. By putting to-

gether a group made up of diverse individuals, you can

get different basic attitudes, interests, ideas, perspec-

tives and expertise.

Future workshops call for fresh ideas, inventiveness

and imagination. They are focused on finding solutions,

and they are based on an open-mindedness to results.

They typically have three phases: a critique phase, a

fantasy phase and an implementation phase.

Depending on the question, of course, a future work-

shop can be used for all of the policy phases in these

guidelines. But you need to make sure that the work-

shop participants have both a genuine interest in and

some basic knowledge about the issue to be addressed.

This method is particularly well-suited for steps with-

in a reform process that involve determining various

perspectives and developing inventive solutions. This

method also gives people who are only rarely asked for

their thoughts in the planning stage of a reform pro-

cess (including the affected, average citizens, interest

groups and experts) a chance to contribute their points

of view and work out their own suggestions for creative

solutions.

METhOD 3: GOAl PyRAMIDS

There is an ancient Greek saying that holds that: “Only

someone who knows what the goal is can reach it.”

41

MUCH INFLUENCE

LITTLE INFLUENCE

SUPPORTREJECTION

S1

S2

S3

Stakeholder with above-average level of influence and above-average level of supportStakeholder with above-average level

of influence and significant rejection

Stakeholder with little influence and full support

sTaKeholdeR analysis—TheiR influenCe oveR and aTTiTude ToWaRd The RefoRm plan

sTeP-by-sTeP

1. Stakeholder identification: Who are the key actors that could influence the reform plan and/or the re-form goals? Who has political legitimacy, resources and connections?

2. Attitudes toward reform plans: What are the various interests and attitudes? Who is likely to support it? Who is likely to oppose it? And who are the wild cards?

3. Power and influence related to the reform: How much can the reform plan be influenced? Who could support, quicken, slow down or block the reform goals?

4. Forecasting stakeholder reaction: How will the stake-holders react to the reform plan?

5. Courses of action and stakeholder management: How can I build up trust and find supporters and allies for the reform? How can veto players be “neu-tralized”?

The IndIvIduAl PhAses

1. Critique phase: Listing and evaluating related issues and problems What do I like? What should absolutely be changed? Collect, group and weigh problems.

2. Fantasy phase: development of ideas, visions, solu-tions and alternatives How would I want things differ-ent? What better situation could we imagine? What solutions can we think of? Gather and select the best ideas.

3. Implementation phase: development of solutions and steps for implementing them Which of my wishes can really be made reality? How can the ideas and sug-gestions be realized? What are the next steps? Gather and evaluate suggestions; draw up an implementa-tion plan.

STAkEhOlDER AnAlySIS AnD MAnAGEMEnT FUTURE WORkShOPS

42

Source: Lecture entitled Strategisches Management in einem Ministerium (“Strategic Management in a Ministry”) delivered by Christof eichert on July 8, 2009 in Berlin.

goal pyRamid—example using family poliCies In THe GerMAn STATe OF nOrTH rHIne-WeSTPHALIA (nrW)

Strengthen children’s rightsImprove child rearing, education and care

Strengthen families Better harmonize family- and work-life

We foCus ouR poliCies on families and ChildRen and impRoving TheiR developmenT oppoRTuniTies

nrW Alliance for Family friendliness

establishment of family centers

goal pyRamid—example

Source: based on Beywl and Schepp-Winter 1999: 42

Action Goal 2Action Goal 2Action Goal 2

Action Goal 3Action Goal 3

Action Goal 1 Action Goal 1 Action Goal 1

Intermediate Goal 2Intermediate Goal 1 Intermediate Goal 3

oveRaRChing goal

43

When it comes to the importance of goals in the reform

process, this is particularly true.

When we say “goal,” we are talking about a desirable

future condition that can be reached through action. At

the beginning of a reform plan, you need to ask what

your goal or goals are. Precisely defining these goals

makes the entire strategic process easier. By using a so-

called “goal pyramid,” you can answer on three hierar-

chical levels the question: What are my goals and how

can I reach them?

At the very top, there is the overarching goal. This

can represent a general vision or the most important

principle of a reform. This generally formulated goal can

be narrowed down using intermediate goals based on

concrete “action goals.” In this way, a goal pyramid can

help you systematically think through various goal lev-

els, gain some overall clarity, keep in view both overar-

ching and intermediate goals (and, in doing so, the core

part of your reform), and open up options for concrete

action goals.

Imagine you ask yourself the question: What do I

want to accomplish in the future? Using the pyramid,

you can start working on an answer to this question by

starting at either the top (i.e., the most important level)

or the base (i.e., the most concrete level).

In this context, overarching goals are like lighthous-

es in the distance: They can be seen from any point in

the reform process, and they provide a basic direction

for the entire reform to take. They also define the actual

purpose of the reform while simultaneously specifying

its basic values.

Intermediate goals more precisely define and

characterize the specific content of the overarching

goal. But they are still too abstract to be able to either

specify or evaluate concrete reform results and effects.

Indeed, if you want to understand intermediate goals,

you have to understand the action goals they are based

on. From them, you can get concrete measures that

can be inspected and evaluated. Action goals should be

formulated according to the SMART principle: They

should be specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and

timely.

Like many other steps described in this guide, suc-

cessfully finding and defining goals for a reform plan

are based on dialogue and collaboration. In order to

set goals that are realistic and right, you first need to

have various points of view as well as competence and

knowledge from a wide range of fields. After conducting

analyses of the surrounding environment, you will be

able to make sure that your plans don’t ignore actual

circumstances.

A goal pyramid can help you set goals during the agen-

da-setting phase and particularly during the policy-for-

mulation and decision-making phase. For the policy-im-

plementation phase and ongoing impact evaluations, a

goal pyramid provides an important basis for making

goals more concrete as well as evaluating and adapting

them.

44

A bRIeF oveRvIeW oF The ReFoRmComPAss

Allowing feedback

· Analyze public resonance · Maintain dialog with relevant actors · Pass on reform results according to the target group

Keeping options open

· Build up an early warning system · Make adjustments flexibly · Take into account changed configurations of actors


· choose suitable evaluation methods · Evaluate these methods as part of the process · Evaluate the costs and benefits

Picking up on future- related issues

· Identify the need for reform early on · Analyze the reform contents · clarify the direction of the reform


· Work out communication concept in order to create problem awareness, establish interpretation patterns and communicate central ideas

Calculating the chances of success

· Identify windows of opportunity · Determine profiling opportu-nities · Define negotiation corridors


· Ensure effectiveness · Determine implementation steps · choose suitable management instruments

Connecting with citizens

· Ensure communication between citizens, the administration and politics · clarify the workability of the reform · Ensure that processes are transparent


· clarify interactions with relevant actors · create clear responsibilities


· Sound out options for action · Evaluate alternative solutions · Draft reform plans

Building trust

· communicate credibility · Use clear and positive reform language · Generate realistic expectations · Establish dialog

Obtaining majority support

· choose negotiation strategies · Win alliance partners and the public · Manage political decision processes


· Include internal knowledge · Secure access to external knowledge · Develop personnel capacities · Pay attention to a hetero- geneous composition


· Include network actors across departments · networking with stakeholders · Plan decision processes


· Adjust communication resources and competencies · coordinate communication and dialog

Ag

end

A

seTT

Ing

Ag

end

A

seTT

Ing

ImPl

emen

TATI

on

ImPl

emen

TATI

on

FoRm

ulA

TIn

g A

nd

d

eCIs

Ion

-mA

kIn

g

FoRm

ulA

TIn

g A

nd

d

eCIs

Ion

-mA

kIn

g




45

WoRks CITed And lInks

WORk cITED

Althaus, Marco. Strategien für Kampagnen. Klassische

Lektionen und modernes Targeting. In Kampagne! Neue Strategien für Wahlkampf, PR und Lobbying, edited by Marco Althaus. Münster, Hamburg, Lon-

don: Lit Verlag, 2002: 11–44.

Beck, Andrea. Die zweite Reihe im Zentrum der Macht:

Politikberatung durch Fraktionsreferentinnen und

wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter in Abgeordneten-

büros. In Handbuch Politikberatung, edited by Sven-

ja Falk, Dieter Rehfeld, Andrea Römmele and Martin

Thunert. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2006: 228–240.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.). Strategisch. Praktisch. Gut. Strategie-Kompass für nichtstaatliche und gemein-nützige Organisationen. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertels-

mann Stiftung, 2010.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.). Die Demokratiemacher. Von Beruf Bürgermeister/in: Führung und Beteiligung in der lokalen Demokratie. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertels-

mann Stiftung, 2009.

Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.). Kommunen schaffen Zukun-ft. Grundsätze und Strategien für eine zeitgemäße Kommunalpolitik. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann

Stiftung, 2008.

Fischer, Thomas, Gregor Peter Schmitz and Michael

Seberich (eds.). Die Strategie der Politik. Ergebnisse einer vergleichenden Studie. Gütersloh: Verlag Ber-

telsmann Stiftung, 2007.

Fischer, Thomas, Andreas Kiessling and Leonard Novy

(eds.). Politische Reformprozesse in der Analyse, Un-tersuchungssystematik und Fallbeispiele. Gütersloh:

Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008.

Grasselt, Nico, and Karl-Rudolf Korte. Führung in Poli-tik und Wirtschaft. Instrumente, Stile und Techniken. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2007.

Heckel, Margaret. So regiert die Kanzlerin: Eine Report-age. Munich: Piper, 2009.

Jenewein, Wolfgang. Das Klinsmann-Projekt. Harvard Business Manager 6: 16–28, 2008.

Korte, Karl-Rudolf. Politikmanagement und Steuerung.

Machtmakler im Kommunikationskontext. In Regie-ren und Kommunikation. Meinungsbildung, Entschei-dungsfindung und gouvernementales Kommunika-tionsmanagement–Trends, Vergleiche, Perspektiven, edited by Klaus Kamps and Uwe Nieland. Cologne:

Halem, 2006a: 73–87.

Korte, Karl-Rudolf. Politikberatung von innen: Bera-

tung der Regierungszentralen-Bund. In Handbuch Politikberatung, edited by Svenja Falk, Dieter

Rehfeld, Andrea Römmele and Martin Thunert.

Wiesbaden: VS Verlag 2006b: 175–188.

Markus, Wolfram, and Andreas Osner (eds.). Handbuch Kommunalpolitik. Stuttgart: Raabe, 2010.

Osner, Andreas (ed.). Personalentwicklung in der Politik, Kommunale Mandatsträger qualifizieren–politischen Nachwuchs fördern. Gütersloh: Verlag

Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2005.

Raffel, Tobias. Unternehmensberater in der Politikbera-tung: Eine empirische Untersuchung zu Aktivitäten, Gründen und Folgen. Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2006.

Raschke, Joachim, and Ralf Tils. Politische Strategie. Eine Grundlegung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2007.

Rüb, Friedbert W., Karen Alnor und Florian Spohr.

»Die Kunst des Reformierens«. Schriftenreihe des

Projektes »Optimierung politischer Reformprozesse«

der Bertelsmann Stiftung. Gütersloh 2009. www.

bertelsmann-stiftung.de/bst/de/media/xcms_bst_

dms_30519_30520_2.pdf

Schröder, Peter. Politische Strategien. Baden-Baden:

Nomos, 2000.

Schwickert, Dominic. Strategieberatung im Zentrum der Macht. Strategische Planer in deutschen Regierungsz-entralen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010.

Speth, Rudolf. Strategiebildung in der Politik. For-schungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen (18) 2:

20–37, 2005.

Tils, Ralf. Politische Strategieanalyse. Konzeptionelle Grundlagen und Anwendung in der Umwelt- und Nachhaltigkeitspolitik. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2005.

Vetter, Angelika. Erfolgsbedingungen lokaler Bürger-beteiligung. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008.

46

lInkS

The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Optimierung politischer Re-formprozesse (Optimizing Political Reform Process-

es) project at a glance: www.bertelsmann-stiftung.

de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-E749C498-CA521403/bst/

hs.xsl/ 14185_94649.htm.

“Wider den Strategieoverkill.” Publication series of

the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Optimierung politischer Reformprozesse project: www.bertelsmann-stiftung.

de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-E749C498-CA5 21403/bst/

Beitrag%202 %20Kronacher.pdf.

Strategic management in municipal politics and

administration, civic participation and demographic

change: www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/

xchg/SID-A8016161-4BCCDC6B/bst/hs.xsl/80430.

htm.

www.politik-digital.de/ (information and communica-

tion website on the Internet and politics)

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy-unit.aspx (main site

of the cabinet office’s “Strategy Unit” in the United

Kingdom)

www.verwaltung-innovativ.de/cln_110/DE/Home/

homepage_node. html?_nnn=true (information on

innovative management practices of the German

government)

www.bk.admin.ch/themen/planung/index.htm-

l?lang=de (websitewith information on policy plan-

ning in Switzerland, with other relevant links)

Steinbeis-Europa-Zentrum (examples of strategic policy

management tools): www.steinbeis-europa.de/488.

html.

DTN (examples of scenario planning): www.dtn.net/

drupal/.

“Wissen für Entscheidungsprozesse” funding initiative:

www.sciencepolicystudies.de/.

Zeitschrift für Politikberatung: www.vsjournals.de/

index.php;do=viewmag/site=zpb/lng=de/area=pol/

id=174/alloc=269/sid=0c23058149ae31b69d-

4458f9ecc61b49.

Imprint

© 2014 Bertelsmann Stiftung, GüterslohResponsible: henrik Brinkmann, Anna Renkamp, henrik Riedel, christina TillmannDesign: Dietlind EhlersDiagrams: Werner Tiki küstenmacher, GröbenzellGraphics: kopfstand GbR, Bielefeld, Dietlind Ehlerscover photo: Shutterstock/khakimullin Aleksandr

Adress | Contakt

Bertelsmann Stiftungcarl-Bertelsmann-Straße 25633311 GüterslohGermanyPhone +49 5241 81-0Fax +49 5241 81-81999

Dr. henrik BrinkmannProject Manager Project reformcompassPhone +49 5241 81-81567Fax +49 5241 [email protected]

www.reformcompass.com

Documents

ReformCompass I · political scientists call “agenda surfing”—i.e., jumping on top of something that is already being publically de-bated. Before doing so, though, you also