Reform with Chinese Characteristics: The Context of Chinese Civil Service Reform

Reform with Chinese Characteristics: The Context of Chinese Civil Service ReformAuthor(s): Steven E. Aufrecht and Li Siu BunSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1995), pp. 175-182Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/977183 .

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Reform th Chinese Charaatefsfcs: The Context of Chinese Civil Service Refor Steven E. Aufrecht, University of Alaska Li Siu Bun,' Hongda Trading and Industrial, Ltd.

What do Western scholars and administrators need to know about China to understand Chinese civil service reform? During the last 15 years of reform, the Chinese government has studied and incorporated many Western ideas. Nearly all their reforms are labeled, "reform, with Chinese characteristics. " Steven Aufrecht and Li Siu Bun identify those Chinese characteristics most necessary to understand Chinese civil service reform. The authors use Suzanne Ogden's model of three basic competing Chi- nese values-traditional Chinese culture, socialism, and development-as aframework to examine Chinese characteristics. Under traditional Chinese values, they examine Confucianism, civil service exams, and guanxi. Under socialism, they examine the Communist Party, cadres, work units, and equity. Under development they discuss China's size, poverty, and educational level. The authors discuss how each of these factors is likely to affect the implementation ofcivil service reform. They conclude that the fate of reform will shift as China s leaders'priorities vac- illate among these three basic values.

In an article in 1887, Woodrow Wilson called for a disci- pline of public administration separate from political science. He argued that Americans should look to European governments for administrative structures. He spent much of the article justifying the concept that a democracy should seek advice on how to govern from authoritarian European regimes. It is possible that Wilson emphasized the separation between politics and administration to support his argument that Americans could borrow administrative techniques from countries whose politics they abhorred. Wilson wrote, "If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it..." (Wilson, 1887; 24). In a metaphor more appropriate to this article, Wilson also wrote, "We borrowed rice, but we do not eat it with chop- sticks" (p. 23).

Today, Chinese Communists studying capitalist civil service systems have been making a similar point. Deng Xiaoping has said, in reference to economic reforms, "It doesn't matter if the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice." The current Chinese civil service reform (CSR) is an adjunct to the economic reforms begun in 1978. By 1988, the personnel function of the Ministry of Labor and Personnel was transferred into its own Ministry of Personnel. Regional and city governments, as well as a few national ministries, began experimenting with Western civil service techniques (particularly the use of examinations for selection). With United Nations' help (United Nations Development Program, 1987, 1989), the Chinese have been bringing foreign personnel experts to China and sending Chinese administrators abroad to study Western personnel technology. Although they are studying foreign systems, in the end, they insist that they will adopt a system with distinct "Chinese characteristics."

What are Chinese characteristics? Just as a foreigner would have difficulty understanding the current American debate over health care without knowing American economic, social, and political traditions, foreigners unaware of Chinese traditions will miss much when approaching China's public administration and civil service. We will highlight characteristics that we found to be either particularly confusing in our initial interviews with Chinese officials or especially enlightening in our follow-up research. We believe that the factors we have chosen play important, often unspoken, roles affecting the design and implementation of civil service reform in China. Our goal is not to give a detailed description of Chinese civil service reform (CSR) (there already exist excellent sources for that),2 but to identify and explain a few Chinese characteristics that are particularly important in understanding China's CSR

Public Administration Review . March/April 1995, Vol. 55, No. 2 175



Even this is a formidable task in a short article. To live in China is to live in a different reality. The rules, rewards, and sanctions are different. "In Asia...you either lose your inner moorings, start to sink, go some kind of crazy, and just let it happen, or you will leave sooner than you expected and not learn anything" (Holm, 1990; 20). This advice is contrary to our academic training. Yet to understand China, we must sus- pend our paradigmatic preconceptions. Deductively applying Western models to describe China's CSR is misleading. Foreign experts with little knowledge of China cannot even take their interpreter's words at face value.3 These difficulties impose limitations on us as interpreters of Chinese CSR. They make descriptive study most realistic and useful. Even so, our words also should be taken tentatively.

Three Basic Values in Tension Suzanne Ogden (1989) proposes that three basic competing

values underlie all decisions of the Chinese government: traditional Chinese culture, socialism, and development.4 As the political winds change, the priority of the values changes. Chi- nese CSR reflects the tensions among these values. Civil service reform was first seen as a necessary supplement to economic development. The reform movement's call for a separation of party and government, using technical rather than political criteria for selection, marked a weakening of socialist values in favor of development values. However, following Tiananmen Square and the fall of Soviet and Eastern European Communism, hard- liners reasserted socialist values by appealing to fears of excessive Western (non-Chinese) influence. As development has once again moved to the forefront, it is always carefully qualified with the phrase, "with Chinese characteristics." Ogden, writing before Tiananmen, made it clear that Chinese culture was the dominant of the three values. "If we pose the question of what is the most crucial element in a Chinese person's identity, what is a Chinese person most afraid of losing, it would be his or her Chineseness. 'I am a Marxist' has a hollow ring. 'I am a modern person' defies reality. But 'I am a Chinese' speaks to a funda- mental identity" (Ogden, 1989; 6-7).

We found Ogden's three competing values a useful way to organize those factors we chose to examine. Those factors that reflect traditional Chinese cultural values are: Confucianism, civil service examinations and scholar rulers, and the Chinese brand of personalism known as guanxi. Those factors that reflect the socialist values are: the Communist Party, cadre, work unit, and equity. Those that impact the development values are: China's size, poverty, and education levels. Before addressing these three values, it would be useful to give a brief overview of Chinese CSR.

Background of Chinese Civil Service5 In a Communist state, one might be tempted to assume that

every organizational employee is a civil servant. Our confusion began when we were told during interviews at the Ministry of Personnel that the civil service reform would affect about four

We employed ethnographic methods (Fetterman, 1989) to gather data from a wide sample of Chinese officials, academics, and ordinary Chinese.

Our first Beijing trip was in May 1990, followed by trips in July 1990, July 1991. and October 1992. We conducted exten- sive interviews in various offices at the Ministry of Personnel, and five of the six departments experimenting with civi service reform: the Environmental Protection Agency, the Tax Bureau, the Audit Bureau, the Bureau of Statistics, and the Ministry of Construction Materials. Other agencies and organizations as well as Chinese nationals living in Hong Kong) and the United States gave us valuable insights. While we do not believe we are revealing particularly sensitive information, we feel it is prudent not to attribute specific information to specific individuals.

We extensively read academic studies, Chinese news accounts, biographies, and fiction. To ensure our data and anal- ysis would be grounded in the experiences of our informants (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), our interviews were open ended, per- mitting our sources to tell us their stories of CSRS Typically, our questions followed rather than directed the narrative. As a cross- cultural team, we constantly challenged each other. Our initial thoughts on the benefits and problems of a cross-cultural research team were presented at the American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) National Conference in 1991.

We analyzed our data using an iterative process to induce generalizations that were supported by the interviews of multiple informants and consistent with scholarly work on China. That is, we developed low-level generalizations, then returned to other portions of the data to confirm our speculations until a coherent description emerged.

million civil servants (Interviews, May 1990). The Chinese dis- tinguish several categories of organizations run and/or funded by the government: service organizations (hospitals, schools); mass organizations (women's association, youth league); parties (in addition to the Communist Party there are other minor parties); enterprise units (industry); and government. The four million figure referred only to government cadres (see the section on cadres later). Exacdy who is a civil servant has not always been altogether clear. We asked our hosts in the China Training Cen- ter for Senior Civil Servants, a part of the Ministry of Personnel, if they were civil servants. The answer was, "That hasn't been decided yet" (Interview, May 1990). New regulations promulgated in October 1993 seem to include them.

In addition to the central government, there are provincial and local governments. The duties of the different levels, as well as the duties of different branches within levels, overlap. In addition, the Communist Party bureaucracy overlaps all of the other bureaucracies. Within every work unit, the local Party branch is responsible for selection and promotion and maintaining dossiers on all employees. This is to insure commitment to Party goals. In each unit, the Communist Party Secretary is the head Party official. The director of a unit and the Party secretary of a unit may or may not be the same person. The result is mas- sive duplication and red tape. In some discussions, we were told the civil service of Chinese CSR included only the upper levels

176 Public Admninistration Review * March/April 1995, Vol. 55, No. 2



of the central government which set policy, but not that part which implements it (Interview, 1991). It also is limited to white-collar employees. Thus janitors and drivers are not civil servants. Altogether this covers about 4.9 million people in all of China (Interviews, 1990; 1991; 1992). However, provincial and city governments are also experimenting with reforms, and although their employees may not figure in official central governmental counts, they are certainly involved in CSR

China has a rank-in-person classification system. People do not lose rank, even if they switch to a less responsible position, unless it is the result of disciplinary action. Pay is based on rank. Actual cash salary is low, but access to commodities and services not readily available in the market is also counted as pay. These perquisites are determined by the work unit's (discussed later) ability to provide them. A wealthy work unit will provide much better housing than a poor one. Pensions are based on rank and many people postpone retirement to improve their retirement benefits. The ministries and other government agencies annual- ly estimate the number of new job openings. Internal promotions fill some. Entry level openings are filled by universities, where professors choose which candidates can interview for which openings and ultimately decide which students go to which jobs. The Party secretaries at the universities play a key role in these decisions. The Civil Service Reform refers to a set of changes in this system that have been approved at various levels, supported in the official Chinese press, and promulgated as reg- ulation (Dai, 1993). Experimentation with reform began officially in the late 1980s in six ministries and several provincial and local governments. There are also many unofficial experiments.

The "Provisional Regulations on State Civil Servants," the culmination of many drafts6 went into effect October 1, 1993. Chapter 1 of the regulations says the main purpose is to achieve scientific management of state civil servants and to ensure the excellence and honesty of civil servants ("Provisional Regulations for State Civil Servants," 1993; 278). The regulations strongly reflect China's study of Western merit principles. They establish a job classification system, recruitment by examination, and per- formance evaluations. Wages are to be approximately compara- ble to equivalent state enterprise cadres, and a normal retirement age of 60 for men and 50 for women is set. ("Provisional Regula- tions for State Civil Servants," 1993; 278-295; Dai, 1993) Civil servants are given protection against unlawful removal and the right to quit their jobs.7 "The establishment of the new personnel management system nationwide is expected to take at least three years" (Dai, 1993; 5). Our interviews at the experimenting agencies suggest such official predictions may be optimistic.

Chinese Values and Their Impact on Civil Service Reform Traditional Chinese Culture

Although the Chinese leadership promotes adoption of West- ern civil service with Chinese characteristics, not all traditional Chinese characteristics are sacred. Some are seen as evil remnants

of feudalism. Thus the Chinese leadership finds itself in the position of defining which Chinese characteristics are to be pre- served and which are to be suppressed. Some values have been favored for a while, then fell from grace. We will examine some of the Chinese characteristics, favored, disapproved, and in- between, which most impact CSR

Confiucianism. The teachings of Confucius have had an over- whelming impact on China. A collection of dialogues Confu- cius held in the fifth century B.C. is known as the Analects. Over the centuries, scholars distilled from Confucian thought nine works (the Five Classics and the Four Books) which "were believed to contain the basic precepts needed for leading a moral life..." (Spence, 1990; 59-60).

Chinese scholars have debated the meaning of Confucius' thought seeking explanations for puzzling events, guidance for current affairs, and justification for their desired actions. Various schools of thought developed different emphases and interpreta- tions. Is Confucianism relevant to modern China? Twentieth century Chinese have both rejected and embraced Confucian thought, yet they cannot escape it (Spence, 1990; 225-226; 285; 315; 520). In September 1994 Confucius resurfaced in the Peo- pLes Daily. The official paper of the Chinese Communist Party called for a Confucian Renaissance to fill the moral vacuum caused by "money worship" Japan Economic Newswire, 1994). Confucianism is ingrained in China just as Judeo-Christian values are ingrained in the West, even among nonbelievers.

The hierarchy of Western civil service bureaucracies is consistent with the Confucian assumption that there is order in the cosmos. Prosperity comes when there is stability and society is well ordered in strict hierarchical relationships: children obey parents, who obey officials, who obey rulers. However, the Con- fucian ideal of filial loyalty can cause conflicts with merit.8

The authorities, in return for the loyalty of the people, are responsible for maintaining stability and prosperity. "Men should not serve unworthy rulers and must be ready to sacrifice their lives, if necessary, in defense of principle" (Spence, 1990; 59). It is no accident that the Chinese government always uses the phrase "stability and prosperity" when referring to the 1997 transition of Hong Kong to China. Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms introduced capitalist economics. This radical deviation from the Communist path was possible, in part, because it was in reaction to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. This fear of chaos suggests gradual changes. A paper by a Personnel Ministry researcher reflects this: "the reform proceeds slowly but prudent- ly and steadily...and reduces...social shocks" (Luan, 1993).

Traditional Civil Service Exams and Scholar Rulers. For centuries, mastery of Confucian thought, through the memoriza- tion of the "Five Classics" and the "Four Books," was the test for entry into the Chinese Civil Service. Although the system strongly favored the sons of families who could afford the exten- sive schooling the exams required, there were some schools for the poor, and, on occasion, a brilliant but poor Chinese rose to the top (Smith, 1983). Only a small percentage passed all the exams and eventually achieved a position in the administration, but those who did were guaranteed a life of high status and com-

The Context of Chinese Civil Service Reform 177



fort. These scholar rulers made decisions based on their interpretation of Confucian text. This is subtly, but importantly, different from rule of law.

The legacy of traditional exams is mixed. Merit testing is imbedded in Chinese tradition, and there is still an aura of respect around scholars. However, the elitist nature of such exams conflicts with the classless ideal of communism. The Communist Party has carried out a number of anti-intellectual campaigns accompanied by slogans such as Mao's "The more books you read, the more stupid you become" (Chang, 1991; 426). Decision making based on interpretation of Confucian philosophy is more consistent with interpreting Marxist philosophy than with following a strict rule of law.

Personalism. Guanxi is a network of outstanding personal favors and obligations stemming from town or regional ties, school ties, and family ties. While this sort of obligation is ephemeral and unpredictable in the United States, it is formal- ized in China. Lucian Pye writes:

The first thing to note about guanxi is that it is thought of as having an almost physical objective existence, and therefore it is not merely a subjective phenomenon.... Thus it is perfectly reasonable for one person to inquire of another as to whether two other people do or do not "have guanxi," and if the answer is yes, then it is assumed that the third party should be able to give a precise read- ing of the exact "quantity" and not just the "quality" of guanxi (Pye, 1985; 215).

The merit system in the United States developed in response to the abuses of the spoils system. Guanxi is a sophisticated social and economic tradition, compared to which the network of spoils was crude and simple. The lack of a free market for so many commodities in China makes guanxi a particularly tricky obstacle to reform.

Socialist Values

The Communist Party: Historic Role. For many Westerners, it is difficult to consider the term "Communist Party" objectively. If one is to understand the context of Chinese CSR, one must see the Party in the context of Chinese history. In the early 20th century, China was a showcase of the evils of feudalism and capitalism. Western powers had forcibly broken open China's trading doors in the mid-19th century by addicting a sizeable por- tion of the population to opium. A few Chinese lived in incredible wealth while much of the population starved. Rich Western enclaves developed amidst the squalor of the surrounding Chinese cities. Bandits roamed the countryside. The ideal- ism surrounding the Nationalist Revolution led by American educated Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911 slowly faded in the corruption that followed. Marx's polemics on class, exploitation, and the historic inevitability of the collapse of capitalism had an obvious appeal. China's current ruling octogenarians lived through those times, joined the Party as idealistic youth, and have seen enormous improvements since the Communists came to power in 1949.

The Communists took control after a long and bloody civil war that was only partially interrupted by the Japanese occupa-

I he lack of afee market for so many commodities in

China makes guanxi a particularly trick obstacle to reform.

tion of China in World War II. After Chiang Kai-shek and the Koumintang fled to Taiwan, many Koumintang loyalists remained in China, and the struggle to retake China from the Communists continued from Taiwan. Thus concern for loyalty to the Communist cause was a high priority in selecting government officials. Along with the fear of left-over Koumintang, the Communists were driven by an ideology of total change from China's old corrupt ways and the need to create a new China. Those with questionable loyalty were subject to a variety of consequences ranging from self-criticism to execution.

The new Communist rulers' harsh behavior appears to have been tolerated for several reasons. After years of war, upheaval, and corruption, peace was welcomed. Land reform and other early initiatives greatly improved the lot of the peasants. Com- pared to the Koumintang and Japanese, the Communist leaders and the People's Liberation Army were relatively honest and decent. Finally, many hoped these new leaders might lead China to a new prosperity.

The Anti-Rightist Movement (1957) and the Great Leap For- ward (1958-1959) were the first major failures. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was an unimaginable hell that severely damaged the Communist Partys reputation. Everyone in China has Cultural Revolution horror stories, either their bitterness at being victimized or their guilt now at having been used to vic- timize others.10 By 1978, the backlash against the Cultural Rev- olution allowed Deng Xiaoping to implement vast reforms, even borrowing Western market concepts, to move China's economy forward.

Unlike the Soviet Union, in China the Party remains the center of power ("When China Wakes," 1992; 16-17). Although there are conflicts inside the Party, power rests currently with those Party leaders who see economic development as key to Party survival, even if it means using market mechanisms.

The Communist Party: The relationship between the Party and the government. The government is one of the tools with which the Party implements its policy. Since liberation, there has been a struggle between red and expert. Red has always won. While technical expertise is important, even more important are the ends to which that expertise will be put. Expertise has never been seen as neutral, in part because technical expertise is often associated with the West. Selecting officials with regard only to technical expertise has been unthinkable. The Party and government have been structured to ensure that government employees are loyal to Communist Party ideals.

Although the National People's Congress is nominally the ultimate power in China, the Communist Party is really in control. There are actually two overlapping bureaucracies. Part of the Party bureaucracy is permanently placed inside the government bureaucracy. This begins at the top where there is overlap between the members of the Central Committee and the

178 Public Administration Review * March/April 1995, Vol. 55, No. 2



It appears that the percentage ofpeople who are strongly committed to communism is now very small.

National People's Congress. The key appointments to the National People's Congress must be approved by the Party. This same relationship works at every level of the governmental bureaucracy. Members of the Party bureaucracy are placed in every organization, and they report up the Party chain of com- mand. Their key purpose is to educate the government workers about current political ideology and to monitor loyalty to that ideology. They do this through employee political meetings and through veto power over personnel decisions. Party control is also augmented simply because many government cadres are also Party members.

The reforms of the last decade have attempted to separate the government from the Party. Not only is it recognized that the duplication is inefficient, but also that needed technical expertise is often sacrificed for inexpert Party loyalists. The shifting of values that Ogden (1989) highlights can be seen here. When we visited the Personnel Ministry in the summer of 1990, a point often repeated was the need for separation of the government and the Party. In the summer of 1991, each meeting began with a speech declaring the government's subordination to the Party. The emphasis switched again after the 14th Party Congress in October 1992 strongly endorsed CSR.

The Communist Party: The meaning of Party membership. The Chinese Communist Party is in many ways more like a private club than a Western political party. Membership is exclu- sive. Less than 5 percent of the population, only 50 million Chi- nese, are members (The Europa World Yearbook, 1993). Party membership is given to those who display hard work, dedica- tion, and belief in the Party's definition of correct political thought. While some non-Party members have achieved important positions, particularly in technical areas, most people seem to agree that Party membership has been the major path to future promotions. To the extent that the Party takes in the best people, it is natural for Party members to have top positions. Despite Western stereotypes of corrupt Communist officials, Party members are expected to make sacrifices for the good of the people: receive lower wages, work overtime, organize extra activities, and generally work selflessly for the good of the people. People join the Party for various reasons. Some truly believe communism is the best path to the future. Despite the changes in Eastern Europe, they would argue that there are different types of communism and just as Western capitalist democracies have aspects of socialism, there is no contradiction for a basically Marxist state to have some aspects of capitalism. Or they may argue that to reach the socialist state a nation must pass through a capitalist stage. It appears that the percentage of people who are strongly committed to communism is now very small (Rosen, 1990; Interviews, 1992).

Many Party members are simply hard working, honest, public spirited people for whom the Party represents the legitimate authority of China. Others join the Party opportunistically.

They believe the only way to improve their quality of life is to join the Party. Of this group many are decent, competent people who reluctantly have joined. Others are simply ambitious. Everyone we spoke to on this subject felt that the Party was so powerful in China that all changes in the foreseeable future would have to come from within the Party.

Cadre. The term cadre is used constantly and needs clarifica- tion. We quote directly from an official Chinese dictionary of administrative terms, because it gives as clear a definition as any, it gives a sense of the spirit of CSR, and it shows how, even in a dictionary, correct political thought plays an important role.

After 1949, [cadre refers to] those who work in different ranks in the Party and in governmental agencies: military, social, economic, and educational organizations. They are responsible for the leadership and to a certain extent...for the management of those who work for education, scientific research, public personnel. Workers, peasants, those lower than military unit leader rank, and those who carry out technical and miscellaneous jobs are not cadres.... Cadres are the backbone of the Party's work. They have the function of leadership in the organization or job. They should carry out the Party's policies.... They are the activists of social cohesion and leading the mass forward. However, for a long time we used the word cadre ambigu- ously and the concept lacks scientific management dassifi- cations and its implication is not definite. This is an obstade to educating personnel and to the personnel management system. We should, through the reforms of the present cadre personnel system, establish scientific personnel management systems and change the single mode management of all Party and political personnel. We should establish a personnel management system which classifies different categories of personnel according to the different rules and principles of personnel development (Administration and Management Dictionary 1989).

Cadres tend to be, then, management and professional positions. Cadres are not necessarily Communist Party members, although many, if not most, are. In some ways, the cadres' role is like that of the administrative elite who ruled China for centuries. The term is more political than administrative.

Work Unit. Chinese workers are highly dependent on their work units and this has important impacts on reform. Walder (1986) offers two factors with which to measure the level of social and economic dependence. "The first is the proportion of the workers' needs satisfied (or potentially satisfied) at the work place" (Walder, 1986; 14). In China this is very high. "The sec- ond aspect of dependence...is the availability of alternative sources for the satisfaction of these needs" (p. 14). In China, this is very low. While free markets for some commodities are growing rapidly, many commodities and services are still available only through one's work unit. The most important is housing. Work units, not individuals, own cars, trucks, and other equipment; work unit members with the right connections can gain personal use of them. Even the right to leave one's work unit is controlled by the work unit.11

The work unit's role as the major allocation system has signif- icant consequences for CSR. Jobs which control allocation of




scarce resources, including jobs themselves, have a high value. People aspire to these positions for the power inherent in the position. Although this is true in the West as well, it is aggravat- ed in China by the lack of available alternative ways of satisfying needs. Therefore, merit systems threaten the power of those who now make those decisions based on guanxi and other non- merit criteria. We must also note that the Chinese find many ways to overcome these limitations. Various events, for example, may lead to empty apartments which can be used by people not assigned them. One couple we knew was living in the larger apartment of relatives on overseas assignment, freeing up their smaller apartment.

Equity. Equity is an important ideal of communism. The dangers of the old ruling class were seen as so great and the revo- lutionary zeal of the poorest were seen as so strong, that the Party went beyond leveling to give higher status to peasants and workers and to humble former landowners. Women, officially, are equal to men. While in practice inequities persist, women's lives are enormously improved. The position of intellectuals is ambiguous. Their high status and role in the ruling class of the old feudal system has been used to attack them.9

In the ideal of a classless society, the hierarchy of bureaucracy presents contradictions. Much of the worker support for the students in the spring of 1989 is attributed to the corruption of the highest level Party members (Link, 1992; 195). The market reforms are already causing problems as some people are begin- ning to amass fortunes. Civil service, based on the idea of merit, will also conflict with the idea of equity. We were told a top Party leader had questioned the civil service examination process on the grounds that it would give preference to intellectuals over peasants and workers (Interview, 1991).

Development Values Development values tend to be shared and understood by the

non-Chinese world: improving the quality of life through better health care, living conditions, and education. The most important development factor for China is size. It defies comprehen- sion. In Beijing, people literally squeeze into buses, body against body. That same pressure, though less visible, exists to get most services, such as housing, education, jobs, and train seats. No matter how much of anything becomes available, there are tens of millions still waiting. To be sure, most people are clothed and fed at a basic to decent level, but there are over one billion people. The Nation- al Population Census Office (1991) lists 56 different nationalities, ranging from the majority Han, which makes up 92 percent of the population, through 18 other nationalities with over one million members each, to the 2,312 Lhoba who live in Tibet. Even the Han from different regions cannot speak to each other in their mother tongues. Cantonese, Shang- hai, and Hunanese dialects are so dif-

IIn the ideal ofa classless society, the hierarchy of bureaucracy presents contradictions.

ferent from each other that people must use "the People's lan- guage," Poutunghua, known to Westerners as Mandarin, to converse. However, they can communicate in writing because Chinese characters are based on meaning, not phonetics. While this aids in communication across dialects, it is also much harder to learn to read and write. Size, more than anything else, affects ability to govern in China. How efficiently can one billion people be centrally governed?

Two other factors, low economic and low education levels, impact CSR strongly. The numbers in Table 1 give a statistical glimpse of this. The coastal cities are booming, especially compared to several years ago. However, the rural areas, where 75 percent of China's population lives, are not as well off ("When China Wakes," 1992; 4). The need to improve living standards has given impetus to the economic reforms and experiments with market incentives. Civil servants are keenly aware that even street vendors can earn more than they do. Salaries in other private enterprises can be ten or more times the salaries of high level civil servants. Yet pay increases for civil servants compete for scarce funds with more direct developmental projects. Although government positions still include security and perquisites which private sector jobs lack, the salary differential is so great that many of the best civil servants will leave, and the temptation offered by rich entrepreneurs cutting through government red tape will be harder to resist for those who stay. This increased economic activity has caused a sharp increase in inflation. Some Chinese government agencies are coping by setting up agency- owned enterprises to raise funds to increase salaries and improve facilities.

While there are many well-educated Chinese, there are far more with poor schooling. Of 8 million heads of governments, parties, people's organizations, enterprises, and institutions, the 1986 Statistical Yearbook of China (State Statistical Bureau, 1986) reported that only 6 percent were university graduates, 42 percent had only junior middle school educations, and 2 percent were illit- erate or semiliterate. Reformers will find a shortage of well-edu-

Table 1 Selected Statistics Comparing China to Other Countries (Compiled 1994)

Characteristic Country Population Literacy Per Capita Per Capita Inflation Life Infant People per

(millions) Rate GNP GDP CPI Expectancy Mortality Telephone China 1,194.0 73 435 2,413 18.9 71 31 65.4 Japan 125.2 100 35,000 19,642 .8 79 4 1.5 India 903.9 52 310 2,124 11.0 61 79 111.0 Mexico 86.3 90 4,195 7,356 7.2 70 27 7.6 Egypt 57.6 48 700 3,625 10.4 62 41 23.8 Note: GNP (Gross National Product) is in actual U.S. dollar amounts. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusts price differences between countries to provide a more accurate picture of national wealth. Source: Adapted from "Vital Signs" (Asiaweek, July 13, 1994) and "The Bottom Line' (Asiaweek, July 6, 1994).




cated Chinese to fill government positions. For those poorly educated office holders, the idea of merit is threatening. They can be expected to resist any moves that might jeopardize their jobs.

Conclusions Encountering another culture, one instinctively interprets

events by one's own cultural standards, resulting in misleading, if not completely wrong, conclusions. This article examines aspects of Chinese life and culture which we hope will give readers a more accurate basis for interpreting Chinese CSR. Ogden's (1989) model of three competing values underlying decisions of the Chinese government offers a useful structure within which to begin. Using her model, we find forces which support and forces which obstruct the implementation of civil service reform in China.

Merit-based selection rests comfortably within traditional Chinese values. However, early Chinese administrators had wide discretion, basing their decisions on their interpretation of Con- fucian philosophy on how to govern and live. This is much clos- er to ruling by interpretation of Marxist philosophy than to following a more narrowly defined rule of law. Confucian values of filial loyalty, reinforced by the tradition of guanxi, enmesh the Chinese in a complex net of obligations to family and friends, which raises strong value conflicts for officials charged with making decisions based on merit.

A merit-based, hierarchical civil service challenges the socialist value of red over expert as well as the ideal of equity. The whole government has been structured to insure key positions are held by people loyal to the Party. Reform was intended to eliminate this duplicative bureaucratic structure, but this would seriously weaken the control of the Party, as would selection based on technical merit alone.

Socialist centralized planning and allocation systems make workers highly dependent on their work units. Because a high proportion of Chinese workers' needs are satisfied through their workplace, and because of the lack of alternative sources for satisfaction of those needs, the pressures of guanxi are even stronger.

The market reforms reflect the developmental values of Deng Xiaoping's post Cultural Revolution government which initiated Chinese CSR. Early development success has created a tiny but

robust private sector. These free markets are already decreasing the social and economic dependence on work units by offering alternative sources of goods and services. But they are also causing sharp inflation and competition for qualified workers. Even with recent public pay increases, the pay gap between the private and public sector is enormous, conflicting with the socialist value of equity. Yet public pay increases compete with direct development projects for funding. The potential brain drain is exacerbated by China's low education level making it difficult to replace high quality workers. The low salaries and low education level also make civil servants increasingly vulnerable to corruption from a growing entrepreneurial class.

The U.S. Congress passed the Pendleton Act, establishing the federal civil service, in 1883, four years before Wilson published his essay on public administration. We forget the long, torturous route that led to today's still imperfect U.S. civil service system. China's reforms are moving rapidly compared to what happened in the United States over 100 years ago. However, the evolution of a modern civil service system in China is subject to the same unpre- dictability that marked civil service reform in the United States. Political events affect which of the three values we have highlighted in this article, Chineseness, socialism, and development, dominates at any particular time. The three values are constantly shifting in priority and interpretation, depending on how they further China's rulers' goals for China and the Communist Party, and how they impact their own political survival. The development of Chinese civil service reform will reflect this shifting of values and power.

Steven Aufrecht is associate professor of public administration at the University of Alaska, Anchorage. He has taught at the Chinese University of Hong Kong as a Fulbright Scholar. He has worked at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Municipality of Anchorage. His research interests focus on cross-cultural communication, values, and accountability.

Li Siu Bun is director of Hongda Trading and Industrial (Hong Kong) Limited, a People's Republic of China-Hong Kong joint venture and former department head at Wong's Electronic Company, Hong Kong. He is an adjunct lecturer at Hong Kong Baptist College and is completing his doctoral dissertation on par- ticipative management in Chinese state enterprises at Templeton College, Oxford University.

Notes We are indebted to many individuals and institutions. The Fulbright

Foundation and the Chinese University of Hong Kong, particularly the Department of Government and Public Administration, made everything possible. Wu Tonghui and Kong Zhenyuan of the China Training Center for Senior Civil Servants invited us to Beijing and dealt patiently with our igno- rance. Several scholars spent considerable time helping us grasp the concepts we discuss in this article: Zhang Cheng Fu, Wu Xun, Luan Jianping, and Yang Jiliangg. Lo Ho Fu and Ho Tat Kei performed vital translation and research work. Ralph Brower's comments were invaluable. Many government officials were gracious with their time and knowledge. We thank them all. If there are any errors or misinterpretations, we apologize; the fault is ours, not theirs. Finally, we dedicate this article to Professor Huang Daqiangg, who worked so hard to promote the serious study of public administration in China, and whose unexpected death in 1992 is a great loss.

1. Chinese names begin with the surname. When Chinese names are angli- cized, sometimes the Chinese custom is used (names of Chinese officials such as Deng Xiaoping) and sometimes the Western custom of surnames last is used (this appears to be the case of Chinese living in Western countries and Chinese authors of English publications). We follow the name order used by the individual. Thus, co-author Li Siu Bun's surname is Li. Because he lives in Hong Kong, the spelling of his name reflects the Can- tonese pronunciation.

2. See particularly Burns, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1989d; Li and Weiqiang, 1990; Cabestan, 1992.

3. There are Chinese words which have no exact English equivalent and interpreters use different English words to convey the meaning of the same Chinese word. This happens often with names of governmental departments. When exact translations exist, cultural context can distort




the meaning. One informant challenged our use of "Chinese characteristics." Rather than being used to justify borrowing foreign technologies, he argued that the term was used to water down the reforms. The ambigu- ity of the term gives Chinese administrators enormous discretion. Thus it can be used arbitrarily to adjust reform policies to suit an administrator. This is consistent with what we heard. We have not changed our article, but include this note, to reinforce the very point we are making. It is easy to misapply Western models to Chinese events. We discuss Chinese characteristics useful for foreigners studying Chinese CSR. We do not claim to present what Chinese leaders mean when they use the phrase 'Chinese characteristics."

4. Zhiling Lin (1994) writes that, [contemporary Chinese society represents the combination of three cultural currents." These three, nearly identical to Ogden's, are traditional culture, modernist culture, and party culture.

5. In a country the size of China, very little is universally true. What we say here has generally been the case, but the reader is cautioned that there are many exceptions, and that conditions are changing rapidly.

6. Cabestan (1992) chronicles the changes in the drafts from 1986 through 1991.

7. However, Chapter 14 allows the state to refuse to accept a resignation that is in the first three (five in some cases) years on the job. Also employees in some national security jobs and other important confidential positions do not have the right to resign ("Provisional Regulations for State Civil Ser- vants," 1993; 292).

8. To prevent nepotism, ancient Chinese administrators were not allowed to serve in their home provinces. In the modem reform, high level local officials "shall not assume office in their ancestral home towns" (Dai, 1993; 5).

9. Perry Link's (1992) Evening Chats in Beijing provides rare insight into the life of modern Chinese intellectuals.

10. For example: Bette Bao Lord's (1991) Legacies is a collection of such stories; Jung Chang's Wild Swans (1991) offers many examples; Houying Dai's (1986) novel, The Stones in the Wall conveys how people lived with their accusers after the Cultural Revolution.

11. We interviewed about 25 civil servants who were hired through experi- mental exams. Fearing they would be prevented from even applying, none of them had informed their old work units that they were taking the exams until they had passed and been offered positions. Even after getting these new positions, some found their old work units would not release them until ordered to by a court.

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Reform with Chinese Characteristics: The Context of Chinese Civil Service Reform