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REFORM OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH: CREATION OF THE CGIAR FUND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT NETWORK DECEMBER 8, 2009 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

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Page 1: REFORM OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL ...documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/... · national research and development programs, advanced research institutes, UN agencies,

REFORM OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH:

CREATION OF THE CGIAR FUND

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT NETWORK

DECEMBER 8, 2009

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Table of Contents ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ....................................................................................... 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................... 4

I. Background .............................................................................................................................. 7

II. The Rationale for Change ...................................................................................................... 10

III. The New CGIAR ................................................................................................................... 12

IV. Expectations for Fund Contributions ..................................................................................... 18

V. Meeting Challenges and Managing Risks ............................................................................. 18

VI. Next Steps ............................................................................................................................. 20

VII. Annexes ................................................................................................................................ 21

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ARD Agricultural Research for Development

CGIAR Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research

GAFSP Global Agriculture and Food Security Program

GCARD Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development

GFRP Global Food Crisis Response Program

DGF Development Grant Facility

FIF Financial Intermediary Fund

HR Human Resource

ISPC Independent Science and Partnership Council

IT Information Technology

LICUS Low Income Countries Under Stress

MDG Millennium Development Goal

MDTF Multi Donor Trust Fund

MP Mega Program

NARS National Agricultural Research Systems

NGO Non Governmental Organization

R&D Research and Development

SRF Strategy and Results Framework

UN United Nations

VPU Vice Presidency Unit

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Success of the CGIAR. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) has produced high returns since its inception in 1971, with overall benefits far exceeding costs. Estimates of the benefits from CGIAR research since 1989 alone range from nearly US$14 billion to more than $120 billion.

2. Challenges and Way Forward. The Independent Review of the CGIAR in 2008 identified the principal challenges facing the CGIAR System. These included: (a) stagnating resources; (b) increasingly restricted funding, with smaller grants; and (c) less strategic funding. A new partnership model that was developed to address these challenges was adopted at the Annual General Meeting in Maputo, Mozambique in December 2008. The principles of the new model were articulated in a reform titled A Revitalized CGIAR: A New Way Forward, which proposed to strike a more effective balance between donor sovereignty and donor harmonization, and between the autonomy of the respective Centers and the larger strategic coherence of the System. A new, more programmatic and integrated approach will be made operational through an overarching multi-year Strategy and Results Framework (SRF). The SRF will be further developed through an inclusive process to identify partnership opportunities with national research and development programs, advanced research institutes, UN agencies, NGOs, and the private sector. The process includes sub-regional and regional meetings leading to a biennial Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development (GCARD) attended by all donors and stakeholders. The new CGIAR aims at increasing agricultural productivity annually by 0.5 percent across all regions.

3. Alignment. World Bank investment in the CGIAR is closely aligned with both the Bank’s larger development agenda and with its engagement in agriculture and rural development, and in a number of related sectors including environment, social development, and other areas that relate to poverty reduction and human development – health and nutrition in particular. With respect to the Bank’s work on agricultural development, its investment in the CGIAR relates strongly to both the vision of Agriculture for Development that was set forth in the 2008 World Development Report and to the objectives set forth in the World Bank Group Agriculture Action Plan for 2010 to 2012.

4. The Proposed CGIAR Fund. The CGIAR reform program adopted at the Annual General Meeting in December 2008 introduces a new organizational architecture and governance model. The new CGIAR will be governed by two mutually reinforcing pillars, one responsible for funding and one for operations. The CGIAR Fund is designed to serve as an efficient, multi-year funding mechanism to ensure increasing support to priority agricultural research areas through “Mega Programs” (MPs) delivering international agricultural public goods as developed in the SRF. The operational pillar of the new CGIAR will be a new Consortium created by CGIAR Centers. A number of mechanisms will bridge the two pillars

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including an Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) that will advise the Fund on issues relating to the quality and relevance of CGIAR research.

5. Structure of the Fund. The new CGIAR Fund will consist of a Fund Council, a Trust Fund, and a Fund Office. The Fund Council will be a consensus decision making body and will allocate resources in response to the proposals that are presented by the Consortium. It will consist of 22 members and will be chaired by the World Bank, which will have a dedicated seat. The other members will consist of an equal number of donor countries and representatives of developing countries. Multilateral organizations and foundations that have a mandate on food security and development will also be on the Council. In addition to its role as chair of the Fund Council, the World Bank will also serve as Trustee of a Trust Fund that will receive and transfer resources. The Fund Office will be located at World Bank Headquarters. In addition to the Fund Council a biennial Funders Forum will be attended by Fund donors, all bilateral donors that contribute at least $0.5 million annually, and all countries that host the headquarters of the CGIAR Centers and the Consortium.

6. The Roles of the World Bank. As donor and member of the Fund Council, and consistent with principles of harmonization, the Bank will receive from the Consortium common, regular monitoring and evaluation reports, as well as independent evaluations. The Bank, as a Trustee, will: (a) hold in trust the funds transferred by Fund Donors under Trust Fund Administration Agreements; (b) serve as an agent of the Fund Council disbursing Fund resources to the Consortium on instruction from the Fund Council and through Fund Transfer Agreements; and (c) provide regular reports on its Trustee activities to the Fund Council and the Consortium. The Bank will not be responsible for supervising the use of funds received by the Consortium.

7. The Role of the Consortium. As the operational pillar of the new CGIAR the Consortium will be responsible for developing the SRF. It will also specify how the CGIAR will work to achieve its vision through the development of tangible objectives, effective partnerships, and measurable results. The Consortium will be constituted as a separate legal entity and will have fiduciary responsibility for the funds. The Centers will continue to be legally independent institutions and the locus of research expertise and research management. Under performance agreements signed with the Fund Council, the Consortium will be responsible for overseeing the implementation of the SRF through the MPs. The Consortium will be composed of: (a) a decision making Consortium Board; and (b) a Chief Executive Officer heading a Consortium Office. It will have defined structural relationships to the CGIAR Centers.

8. Strategy and Results Framework and Mega Programs. The Strategy and Results Framework will be the overarching umbrella linking the Fund and the Consortium. It will define how the CGIAR plans to achieve its three strategic objectives Food for People, Environment for People, and Policies for People. It will be discussed at the biennial GCARD and endorsed every

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six years by the Funders Forum. The Framework includes intermediate objectives, expected outcomes arising from outputs, related performance indicators, and defined timelines. The Mega Programs are intended to make the SRF operational. They will be formulated in collaboration with the Centers and with national agricultural research systems, agricultural research institutes, civil society organizations and partners in the private sector. Once completed, the Consortium Board will submit them as proposals to the Fund Council for approval.

9. The Report of the Strategy Team, Towards a Strategy and Results Framework for the CGIAR, identifies a number of prospective themes for the Mega Programs. The Strategy and Results Framework and a set of Mega Programs will be the subject of further stakeholder consultations. These will culminate in the first GCARD in March 2010, and will be endorsed by the first Funders Forum.

10. Strategic Financing. The CGIAR Fund will finance the Mega Programs under the Strategy and Results Framework. These will be implemented through the Consortium by the Centers and partner institutions. In 2010, support to the new CGIAR through the CGIAR Fund is expected to be approximately $250 million or about half of the CGIAR current total funding. This is expected to grow as an increasing number of donors join, and as donors transition from bilateral project funding into programmatic funding. The Fund is expected to generate donor momentum around funding harmonization, which is a critical element of the CGIAR reform. Incentives have been designed to encourage bilateral donors to join the CGIAR Fund.

11. World Bank contribution. The World Bank, which has contributed $50 million to the CGIAR annually through the Development Grant Facility (DGF), has a critical role to play in helping to mobilize additional funding. The reform aims at a funding target of $1billion per annum by 2014. During 2010 the Bank will explore alternative Bank financing mechanisms outside the DGF.

12. Monitoring and Evaluation. A monitoring and evaluation framework will provide the basis for rigorous and regular assessments of the performance of the CGIAR Partnership, including periodic independent evaluations of Mega Programs commissioned by the Fund Council through an independent evaluation arrangement.

Action requested. Approve the establishment of the CGIAR Trust Fund as in the attached report.

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I. Background

13. History of Success. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) has produced high returns since its inception, with overall benefits far exceeding costs. An independent assessment in 2008 reaffirmed that for every dollar invested in the CGIAR, $9 worth of additional food has been produced in the developing world, generating substantial additional “multiplier effects” for poor producers and consumers in the process. Estimates of the benefits from CGIAR research since 1989 alone range from nearly US$14 billion to more than $120 billion. The CGIAR has contributed significantly to crop genetic improvement in particular. Among the world’s 10 most important food crops, 65 percent of the cultivated area is planted with improved varieties. Sixty percent of that area is cultivated with varieties that have CGIAR ancestry. CGIAR genetic improvement research has particularly benefited wheat, rice and maize, fueling yield growth of between 0.7 and 1.0 percent annually. The average annual economic benefit from CGIAR research on these three crops has been estimated at $2.5 billion for wheat, $10.8 billion for rice in Asia only, and between $600 and $800 million for maize.

14. The International Development Context. Prompted in part by the World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development, the international community has recognized the nexus between investment in agriculture and alleviating poverty and has pledged to increase investments in agriculture.

15. A reformed and strengthened CGIAR will provide necessary support for medium and long term development objectives in agriculture, through an increased focus on long term investments in research aimed at productivity increases and sustainable natural resource management. Following the success of the Bank’s Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP), nations at the G8 summit in L’Aquila and at the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh called on the World Bank to build on the short- and medium-term GFRP with a medium and long term multi donor trust fund - the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP). A new CGIAR multi donor trust fund located at the World Bank would complement the Bank’s short to medium term food crisis programs through the GFRP, and the proposed medium and longer term focus of the GAFSP.

16. The role the CGIAR Centers in supporting National Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) through technology and knowledge generation and capacity building remains critical owing to the insufficient investment and slow progress in strengthening national agricultural research capacities in many developing countries over past decades. The new CGIAR will increase focus on capacity building and partnerships in order to ensure greater complementarity between the CGIAR Centers and NARS.

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17. Across the international agricultural research system, the CGIAR is widely recognized as having a number of unique assets which include: a critical mass of scientists with multidisciplinary knowledge of key agro-ecosystems; extensive global research infrastructure; global or regional research networks with strong links to national agricultural research and innovation systems and global collections of genetic resources held in trust for the world community. These assets have the potential to benefit all actors in the international development arena, and most particularly poor farmers and consumers.

18. Alignment with World Bank Goals. The World Bank has financed the CGIAR since its inception in 1971. This investment remains seamlessly aligned with the World Bank’s development agenda in general, and with the vision of Agriculture for Development that was set forth in the 2008 World Development Report in particular. The Report pointed to the vital need for increased investment in agricultural research in order to increase productivity and manage natural resources sustainably. More recently still, in 2009 the World Bank Group Agriculture Action Plan for 2010 to 2012 maintained that “agricultural productivity is dependent on reversing the slowdown in spending on research and development to generate new yield enhancing technologies.” World Bank investment in the CGIAR is also highly consistent with the Bank Group’s projections to increase investment in agriculture from $4.1 billion to $6.2 billion annually over the next three years.

19. The links that tie CGIAR research to the Bank’s agricultural portfolio are extensive. A recent analysis of agricultural projects in eastern Africa for instance demonstrates that the availability of suitable research outputs such as disease resistant cassava was a key factor in enabling many projects to receive satisfactory evaluations. Recent calls by the G8 and G20 to increase investment in agriculture and food security demonstrate how widely the Bank’s recognition of the importance of agriculture is shared throughout the international community. Agricultural development is an imperative for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, for reducing the sector’s massive ecological footprint and transforming it into a provider of environmental services, and for reducing poverty. The importance of the role of research in the agricultural innovation systems that will make dramatic gains in smallholder productivity possible cannot be overstated.

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Box 1: The CGIAR’s Track Record of Sustainably Improving Livelihoods of the Poor

Since its inception, the CGIAR has been associated with some phenomenal successes—most notably the large increases in the productivity of Asian cereal systems. Global and regional evaluations suggest that investments in the CGIAR have paid for themselves by a wide margin, generating plausible impacts of hundreds of billions of dollars and providing rates of return well in excess of 40 percent. Considerable evidence also points to large pro-poor impacts of international agricultural R&D. Principal outputs and outcomes of CGIAR research include:

• improved varieties of crops that are grown in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Half of modern varieties grown on these continents today contain germplasm that was developed through CGIAR research. The yield-enhancing and yield-stabilizing modern varieties have increased cereal yields by 0.7–1.0 percent annually, reduced world grain prices by about 20 percent, and prevented 13–15 million children from being malnourished.

• widespread use of CGIAR knowledge products, including tools for participatory analysis of local governance systems, spatial mapping of land and water resources, and new poverty maps for informing national strategies.

While the impacts of CGIAR research in Sub-Saharan Africa had been lower than in other regions, there have been notable recent successes related to maize, beans, cowpeas, and potatoes. The economic benefits of successful CGIAR work on biological control of the cassava mealybug and green mite in this continent has been estimated at more than $4 billion, an amount sufficient to cover almost the entire costs of CGIAR research conducted so far for Africa.

Policy-oriented research has also affected large numbers of people at the country level through improved policies on prices and marketing, encouraging smallholder dairy production, and reducing deforestation. CGIAR research on trade and public investment strategies has informed policy making at the global level as well.

International research generates spillover knowledge relevant to countries other than those where the research takes place. This knowledge produces nonmarket benefits that are often underestimated but may have substantial impacts on the global policy agenda, as did timely analysis of the 2008 global food crisis or strategic inputs to the international treaty on crop genetic resources.

Sources: CGIAR System-wide External Review, 2008, and documents of the CGIAR Standing Panel on Impact Assessment.

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II. The Rationale for Change

20. External and internal factors combined to create both the impetus and the opportunity for reform. The 2008 food crisis was the result in part of declining growth in food crop yields, compounded by rapidly growing populations and incomes, changing dietary expectations, and the volatility of energy and financial markets. The crisis served to underscore the central importance of investment in agriculture for food security and poverty alleviation.

21. In 2008 an analysis of the CGIAR’s potential to deliver if increased investment was available and key “best bets” programs were scaled up, found that millions more people would benefit if annual public spending on agricultural research, including investment in the CGIAR, substantially increased.1 At the same time, an independent review of the CGIAR2

22. It became clear at the CGIAR Annual General Meeting in Maputo in December 2008, where the reform was endorsed, that the CGIAR Centers need more resources and, in particular, more unrestricted funds in order to achieve major impact. It also became clear that donors are unlikely to provide those increased resources without greater assurance of strategic effectiveness and performance. Capacity building and improved partnerships are critical to the success of the new CGIAR. A new Agricultural Research for Development (ARD) system is proposed which places poor producers and poor consumers as both the drivers of demand for agricultural products and technologies and as the ultimate beneficiaries of agricultural for

, identified numerous challenges requiring attention, including: (a) stagnating resources, i.e., funding for the Centers has not grown after inflation for more than a decade; (b) increasingly restricted funding, with a proliferation of smaller, targeted grants; and (c) less strategic, more dispersed funding. The authors of the independent review found these trends to be adversely affecting the programmatic coherence of the CGIAR System. The CGIAR concurred with the Panel’s overall assessment. The practices of CGIAR donors had been changing, moving away from the unrestricted or core funding that had previously afforded the Centers substantial flexibility and discretion in how funds could be used. A number of Centers have experienced considerable difficulty in adapting to the requirements of more restricted funding. The CGIAR’s loose structure, which emphasized donor sovereignty and Center autonomy, had served the System well in its formative years by facilitating inclusive growth as the number of Centers grew from 4 to 15, and the number of donors grew from 18 to 64. Over time, however, these characteristics led to organizational complexity, overlapping research mandates, and high transaction costs. The rationale for reform became more compelling as these realities were more widely recognized. The need to increase strategic coherence, focus on results, reducing organizational complexity and thereby attracting increased investment, became a matter of broad consensus.

1 Source: International Agricultural Research for Food Security, Poverty Reduction, and the Environment: What to Expect from Scaling Up CGIAR Investments and “Best Bet” Programs. IFPRI, 2008 2 Source: Bringing together the Best of Science and the Best of Development, Independent Review of the CGIAR System, November 2008

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development processes. NARS, sub-regional and regional organizations will participate in the formulation of the new CGIAR research agenda.

23. The CGIAR aims to increase agricultural productivity annually by 0.5 percent across all regions. This would require an increase of investment for agricultural R&D for developing countries from the current US$5.1 billion to US$16.4 billion in 2025.3

24. The potential for cost savings and efficiency gains are an additional major driver of reform. The conclusion from a synthesis of data on system costs before and after the reform is that, in gross terms, the proposed reforms would lead to efficiency gains and cost savings. Efficiency gains from direct costs could be in the range of $16-21 million per annum. Additional gains are likely from planned introduction of shared services (HR, IT, Communications) across the centers, not all of which have had the detailed work completed to assess savings. Currently, a substantial amount of staff time is spent by the Centers in donor relations and reporting, as well as responding to donor-commissioned project or center reviews. In the new CGIAR, it is expected that most of these activities will take place at the Consortium level, thereby saving senior staff time at the Centers (allowing more time for research). The analysis also shows that spillover benefits to the donors could be in the range of $ 3-3.5 million per annum, resulting from elimination of annual business meetings and acceptance of a common monitoring and evaluation framework in lieu of individual donor-commissioned evaluations.

Applying the current 10 percent share of this investment going to international agricultural research would represent an investment of US$1.6 billion. This would entail tripling the current level of funding of the CGIAR over this period. A CGIAR with $1billion in funding is the intermediate goal of the reform.

3 Source: Report of the Strategy Team: Towards a Strategy and Results Framework for the CGIAR, Nov 18, 2009.

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III. The New CGIAR

25. The new CGIAR is taking shape through five principal documents, all of which were approved at the CGIAR Business Meeting in Washington, DC on December 7 and 8, 2009:

• CGIAR Joint Declaration (Annex 1, Chapter 1) • Consortium Constitution (Annex 1, Chapter 2) • Framework for the CGIAR Fund (Annex 1, Chapter 3) • M&E Framework for the New CGIAR (Annex 1, Chapter 4) • Towards a Strategy and Results Framework for the CGIAR (full text at link

http://intresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/cgiar_bus_mtg_2009_srf-mp.pdf and the Executive Summary at Annex 2)

26. The objectives of the CGIAR reform are to: • give greater emphasis to achieving results through the SRF and agreed Mega Programs, • open the system through ore effective partnerships, • simplify structures and reduce transaction costs, and • harmonize and maximize unrestricted funding for priority research areas.

27. To this end, the roles of funders and implementers (“doers”) of research are being clearly defined and separated. On the funding side, a new, harmonized fund (the CGIAR Fund) will be established with a priority on funding that can be collectively allocated to Mega Programs, as opposed to funding that individual donors designate to specific Centers or smaller projects or programs. A Fund Council will be established to represent the CGIAR Fund donors in allocating these harmonized funds and serving as the focal point of activity and implementation on the funding side. On the implementation side, a new Consortium will be established by the Centers as a legal entity to oversee and coordinate the “doers” of research. The Centers will still have primary implementation functions in delivering on the Strategy and Results Framework (SRF), but the Consortium will serve as the focal point with fiduciary responsibility for CGIAR Fund resources on the implementation side. The key components of the new CGIAR Partnership are shown in Figure 1.

28. Coherence of the Two-Pillar Approach. There will be no single management or governance umbrella in the new CGIAR, but rather two overarching mechanisms, through the SRF and the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, linking the “doers” and the funders. In addition there are a number of bridging mechanisms including for example, Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development, the Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) that will advise the Fund Council and may serve in a complementary advisory role vis-à-vis the Consortium; a Fund Council observer seat on the Consortium Board and an intention to

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operate on the basis of common standards and policies agreed between the Consortium Board and Fund Council. These elements are described in the overarching CGIAR Joint Declaration.

Figure 1

CONSORTIUM FUND

TRUSTEE

BOARDFUND

COUNCIL

RESEARCH CENTERS

FUND OFFICE

CONSORTIUM OFFICE

Strategy and Results Framework

Independent Science and Partnership Council

Performance Agreements

GLOBAL CONFERENCE ON AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH FOR DEVELOPMENT

DONORCONTRIBUTIONS

BILATERAL PROJECT FINANCING

MA

NA

GE

ME

NT

OV

ER

SIG

HT

New CGIAR Structure

FUN

DER

S FO

RU

M

Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

29. The CGIAR Joint Declaration sets out a number of detailed action steps intended to effectuate the four core principles propelling the reform effort. The CGIAR Joint Declaration positions both the funders (primarily through the Fund Council) and the doers (primarily through the Consortium) with mutual shared expectations to each other. The Consortium together with the Centers are responsible for delivering high-quality science and technology products and services as agreed in performance agreements with the Fund Council and the Centers. The Fund Council is responsible for an aligned provision of Fund resources to support the generation of research output, as agreed in the performance agreements with the Consortium. The Joint Declaration was endorsed at the CGIAR business meeting in Washington DC on December 7 and 8, 2009, and will serve as the primary baseline for implementation of the reform and as an aspirational benchmark for future evaluation of progress and success.

30. The SRF will define the CGIAR research focus in order to achieve its strategic objectives. It will be discussed at the biennial Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development (GCARD) and endorsed every six years by the Funders Forum. The MPs will be formulated with inputs from the Centers and partners (National Agricultural Research Systems, private sector and civil society) and submitted by the Consortium Board to the Fund Council for approval. Stakeholder consultations are continuing with regard to the SRF and the MPs for

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agricultural research, and will culminate in the March 2010 meeting of GCARD and expected endorsement of the SRF by the Funders Forum immediately thereafter (April 1, 2010).

31. Towards a Strategy and Results Framework. The Strategy and Results Framework defines the CGIAR objectives and intended outcomes. The framework will be operationalized through a portfolio of Mega Programs of research (See Box 2). The CGIAR Strategic objectives are:

• Create and accelerate sustainable increases in the productivity and production of healthy food by and for the poor. (Food for People)

• Conserve, enhance, and sustainably use natural resources and biodiversity to improve the livelihoods of the poor in response to climate change and other factors. (Environment for People)

• Promote policy and institutional change that will stimulate agricultural growth and equity to benefit the poor, especially rural women and other disadvantaged groups. (Policy for People)

The SRF intended outcomes have been defined as:

• An increase in annual agricultural productivity by an additional 0.5 percentage points to help farmers meet the food needs of the future world population and to help reduce poverty by 15 percent by 2025, as part of an overall global agricultural R&D strategy.

• A reduction of hunger and improved nutrition in line with Millennium Development Goal 1 (MDG 1) targets, cutting in half by 2015 (or soon thereafter) the number of rural poor who are undernourished, with a focus on contributing to a reduction in child under nutrition of at least 10 percent.

• A reduction in the impacts of water scarcity and climate change on agriculture through improved land, forestry, and water management methods that increase yields with 10 percent less water, reduce erosion, and improve water quality by maintaining ecosystem services.

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Box 2: A Portfolio of Mega Programs

The proposed Mega Programs form clusters of results-oriented innovation activities whose impact is greater than the sum of their parts because of synergies and system-wide cooperation. They are described in Towards a Strategy and Results Framework for the CGIAR and their broad themes are outlined here. They are likely to be further broken down into more operational programs as part of the next round of consultations. Detailed proposals, with business plans for implementation will be developed during 2010 following further consultation with stakeholders. 1. Agricultural Systems for the Poor and Vulnerable—Research that integrates promising crop, livestock, fish, and forest production with innovative policy and natural resources interventions to improve food security in those domains that are home to high concentrations of the world’s poor and that offer agricultural potential.

2. Institutional Innovations and Markets—Knowledge to inform institutional changes needed for a well-functioning local, national, and global food system that connects small farmers to agricultural value chains through information and communications technologies and facilitates efficient policy and institutional reforms.

3. Genomics and Global Food Crop Improvements—Joint genomics research in the CGIAR serving all crops and animal products, providing for the needed innovation capacity of the CGIAR and genetic improvement of the world’s leading food crops (rice, wheat, maize) that builds on the success of the CGIAR with commodity research, including its crucial role in conserving genetic resources.

4. Agriculture, Nutrition, and Health—Improvement in the nutritional value of food and diets, enhanced targeted nutrition and food safety programs, and changed agricultural commodities and systems in the medium term to enhance health outcomes.

5. Water, Soils, and Ecosystems—Harmonization of agricultural productivity and environmental sustainability goals through policies, methods, and technologies to improve water and soil management.

6. Forests and Trees—Technical, institutional, and policy changes to help conserve forests for humanity and harness forest ecosystem services, including forestry and biomass production potentials, for sustainable development and the poor. 7. Climate Change and Agriculture—Diagnosis of the directions and potential impacts of climate change for agriculture and identification of adaptation and mitigation options for agricultural, food, and environmental systems.

32. The Consortium. To lead the “doers” pillar, the new Consortium will be constituted as a separate legal entity able to be the grantee recipient of all funds from the CGIAR Fund and designed to provide leadership, strategic direction and coordination to CGIAR Centers. The Consortium will not, however be positioned as a parent company to the Centers, and the Centers

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will continue to be legally independent institutions. The Consortium Constitution4

33. Framework for the CGIAR Fund. To lead the funders pillar, the new CGIAR Fund will be governed by a Fund Council composed of an equal number of donors and representatives from developing countries. Multilateral and global organizations, and foundations will also be on the Fund Council. This Fund will, subject to Board approval, be administered by the Bank acting as a pass-through trustee to receive and transfer funds without programmatic responsibility for fund use (i.e., as a financial intermediary fund or FIF). The Bank will provide additional support on the funders side through a Fund Office located at World Bank Headquarters, which will provide administrative support to the Fund Council. The cost of this office will be covered by the CGIAR Fund. This support will include putting on the Funders Forum, a biennial event open to all Fund donors, all countries hosting CGIAR Centers headquarters, and any bilateral donors that contribute more than $0.5 million to the Centers annually. The new CGIAR fund will initially supplement and later replace the existing pass-through Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) administered by the Bank through which donors can now direct funds to designated Centers.

sets forth both the expected purpose and structure of the Consortium and the Consortium’s relationship to the CGIAR Centers. While the Consortium will have a number of structural and operational rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the Centers, the Centers will in turn have a number of governance and operational rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the Consortium. In addition, performance agreements between each of the Centers and the Consortium will further define individual Center rights and responsibilities for delivery of the MPs, including in their roles as Lead Centers for MP implementation. The Consortium is expected to consist of a Consortium Board and a Chief Executive Officer heading a Consortium Office. The strength and competence of the Consortium Board will be critical to the success of the new CGIAR, including in fulfilling the following roles: (a) developing and overseeing implementation of the SRF, including the MPs; (b) assume fiduciary responsibility for the MP and Consortium office; (c) setting common criteria, policies, and standards for CGIAR Center performance and efficiency; (d) reviewing the performance and efficiency of CGIAR Centers; (e) reviewing the general alignment of CGIAR Centers’ activities with the SRF; and (f) advising CGIAR Centers on best practices in areas of common interest, including governance, risk management and supporting functions.

34. The Fund Council will be a representative body that will make funding allocations from the CGIAR Fund’s resources based on proposals presented by the Consortium. The Consortium and other sources will provide the Fund Council with an overview of the CGIAR’s strategic impact, quality and relevance of programmatic performance, managerial and governance performance, and its financial performance and resource mobilization. The Fund Council will not have responsibility for the institutional health or management of the research Centers, but

4 The Constitution document is currently in draft. Primary responsibility for finalization lies with the Alliance of Centers with input from donors and other parts of the CGIAR.

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will rely on the Consortium for those areas, including as part of the Consortium’s acceptance of fiduciary responsibility for use of CGIAR Fund resources. A Bank Vice President nominated by the President of the World Bank will chair the 22 seat Fund Council. As a donor, the Bank will have a designated seat on the Council. As the Trustee, the Bank will be invited to attend as an observer.

35. As is often the case with Bank engagement in partnerships, the Bank will have multiple roles in the new CGIAR. The Bank’s role as donor will continue to be central to the Bank’s ability to contribute to and help shape the CGIAR’s impact and contributions to agricultural research for development. As a substantial donor, the Bank has been allocated a designated seat on the Fund Council and is expected to have decisive input as part of this consensus decision making body. In addition, the Bank’s current role as Chair of the entire CGIAR will transition to ongoing leadership of the funding pillar as Chair of the Fund Council. The Bank will also initially chair the inaugural Funders Forum, which will have the following crucial start-up functions: (a) endorse the SRF proposed by the Consortium; (b) provide feedback on its implementation; (c) review resources available for Mega Programs; and (d) agree on a shared approach to cost recovery. As Trustee of the new FIF trust fund, the Bank will: (a) hold in trust the funds transferred by Fund Donors under Administration Agreements; (b) serve as agent of the Fund Council in disbursing Fund resources to the Consortium on instructions from the Fund Council and through performance agreements and other transfer Agreements; and (c) provide regular reports on its Trustee activities to the Fund Council and the Consortium. The Bank will not be responsible for supervising the use of funds once they are disbursed to the Consortium, but will have management responsibility for and oversight of Trustee and Fund Office activities. The Bank will have full cost recovery from the donors to the CGIAR Fund in its roles as Trustee and Fund Office.

36. M&E Framework for the New CGIAR. A strong monitoring and evaluation framework will provide for rigorous and regular assessments of the performance of the CGIAR Partnership. The Consortium Board will be responsible for monitoring performance of MPs. It will also commission Center-specific and/or thematic evaluations as it deems appropriate. The Fund Council will be responsible for commissioning periodic independent evaluations of MPs (and cross-cutting themes) as it deems appropriate, through an independent evaluation arrangement that is currently being designed. An independent evaluation of the CGIAR Partnership as a whole is expected to occur every 6-7 years undertaken by a reference group constituted for the purpose in which both the Consortium and the Fund Council will be represented. In addition to providing advice to the Fund Council on investment proposals, the ISPC would commission in partnership with Consortium ex-post impact assessment of the development effectiveness of CGIAR investments.

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IV. Expectations for Fund Contributions

37. In the short term, support to the new CGIAR will include both bilateral funding direct to the CGIAR Centers and harmonized funding through the CGIAR Fund. Current total CGIAR funding is $530 million. According to an initial analysis of donor’s intentions, contributions to the Fund in 2010/2011 are expected to be approximately $250 million or about half of the CGIAR current total funding. This is expected to grow as an increasing number of donors join, and as donors transition from bilateral project funding into programmatic funding. Incentives have been designed to encourage bilateral donors, whose contributions are mostly restricted, to join the CGIAR Fund. The reform aims at a funding target of $1 billion per annum by 2014.

38. Implications for World Bank Funding. The World Bank, which has historically provided leadership to the CGIAR, has a critical role to play to help mobilize new and additional funding for the CGIAR Fund. It has contributed $50 million annually through the DGF since 1994. The Bank will explore alternative Bank financing mechanisms outside the DGF during 2010. Alternative models could include funding from IBRD Net Income or a special budget line item as in the State and Peace Building Fund or Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS).

V. Meeting Challenges and Managing Risks

39. Implementation. The implementation itself leaves considerable room for risk, in addition to many opportunities and avenues to manage those risks. For all the progress made on the restructuring to date, extensive work is still to come, in terms of fully developing the details necessary to implement the restructuring, the implementation work itself, and the complex, iterative, multi-faceted, multi-stakeholder theatre of transition steps to be orchestrated. For all its many roles in the current and new CGIAR, the Bank is but one of many players and will need to be proactive and persuasive in making sure the new CGIAR gets off on solid footing in line with Bank needs and intentions.

40. Influence and Effectiveness of the Consortium Board. The authority of the Consortium Board is expected to be more on a contractual than on a structural basis. The Consortium will have fiduciary responsibility vis-à-vis the Fund Council and will enter into performance contracts with the Fund Council. Under this approach, if the Centers do not perform, it is expected that the principal sanction available to the Consortium (and to the Fund donors) will be to withhold funding. This carries reputational risks for the CGIAR as a whole and is, therefore, unlikely to be resorted to except in the most egregious circumstances. However, depending on its chosen leadership, the Consortium could wield considerable moral or persuasive authority, which would be consistent with past practice where the rare threat to cut off funds motivated necessary change. In addition, a mediation / resolution procedure is being prepared in consultation with donors to resolve disputes around performance, among other

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issues. A financial management review of the Consortium’s financial and fiduciary capacity is expected to be conducted by the Fund Council. Risks regarding such capacity for this start-up entity are mitigated because of the central role Centers will still play in implementing CGIAR work. The Bank’s experience with the Centers is a long one and their capacity to manage funding in the past is well known. They will continue to be subject to rigorous evaluations, through and along with the Consortium. The Consortium is also expected to play an increasing role in standardizing Centers’ approaches to financial management and procurement.

41. Harmonization and Sustainability of Funding. The CGIAR Fund is expected to generate donor momentum around funding harmonization, which is a critical element of the reform. The internal partnership review process has taken place within the Bank, paving the way for completion of the trust fund review and establishment. A major incentive for donor participation in the CGIAR Fund is expected to be the Fund Council’s role in reviewing Consortium proposals for MPs and other SRF research with a significant opportunity to shape CGIAR activities and Center effectiveness. It is therefore expected that as the SRF and a portfolio of MPs are fully developed and endorsed by committed donors, other donors will join the Fund. A common Fund/Consortium communication strategy will also be developed to ensure that the MPs are well publicized and reported on as a way to attract both traditional and non-traditional donors over time.

42. Conflicts of Interest. Notional conflicts of interest identified in the past CGIAR structure will be more effectively addressed in the new partnership model. The Bank's current role as chair of the CGIAR and as DGF donor had raised questions of a potential conflict in the past. For example, there was concern about the ability of the head of the VPU representing the Bank as donor to objectively assess on behalf of the Bank whether CGIAR Centers deserved DGF funding when he or she, as CGIAR Chair, also had oversight authority of Center performance in the CGIAR system. To address this concern, the Bank's Chief Economist was appointed to have an oversight role in DGF matters relating to CGIAR. The new governance structure will remove the original conflict of interest concern by putting distance between funding and implementation and creating two pillars: the Fund Council and the Consortium. Oversight of program implementation by Centers and Center health will fall to the Consortium. Since the Fund Council will not supervise research implementation or the Centers, the Bank's potential conflict of interest will be significantly diminished.

43. Alignment between Bank Policies and Partner Expectations. In the new CGIAR, the Bank will provide only limited fiduciary functions as Trustee and will not otherwise as Chair of the Fund Council or Fund Office be involved in assessing the merits of proposed programs or their implementation. As donor and decision making member of the Fund Council, the Bank will have a programmatic, substantive role, but will not want to act unilaterally when it has committed to harmonization through this collective donor approach.

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VI. Next Steps

44. The CGIAR Business Meeting in Washington, DC on December 7 and 8, 2009 approved the new CGIAR structure. The Consortium Board Chair and Vice Chairs were named, and the rest of the Board will be nominated by January 2010.

45. Following the Board approval of the CGIAR Trust Fund, work will continue with existing CGIAR donors to finalize agreement on the CGIAR Fund and individual donor contributions to the Fund. The Trustee will enter into an Administration Agreement with each donor to the Fund. Timing of the establishment of the CGIAR Fund depends in large part on creation of Consortium, finalization of the MPs, and agreement of all parties to the relevant documents.

46. A first meeting of the Consortium Board is scheduled to be held in early 2010. The composition of the Fund Council, based on past contributions to the CGIAR was approved at the CGIAR Business Meeting held in Washington, DC on December 7 and 8, 2009 and an inaugural meeting will be held in February 2010.

Action requested. Approve the establishment of the CGIAR Trust Fund.

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Annexes

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Annex 1

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Chapter 1

The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Joint Declaration

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Foreword Our Commitment to Agricultural Research for Development We know the power of agricultural research to change the world. For nearly four decades, the CGIAR has delivered $9 worth of additional food in developing countries for every $1 invested in our research. We know that the CGIAR has contributed significantly to crop genetic improvement and that for the world’s 10 most important food crops, more than half the land growing improved varieties, is growing varieties with CGIAR ancestry. We know that our breakthrough work on better land use, water, livestock, fish and forestry management has already changed the lives of millions of small farmers, foresters and herders throughout the developing world. But in recent years, declining growth in food crop yields, rapidly growing populations, changing dietary expectations and the volatility of energy and financial markets led to a food price crisis that reaffirmed the centrality of agriculture in alleviating poverty. The crisis was a forewarning of the challenges ahead, drawing our collective attention to the fact that if we are to feed 9 billion people by 2050 in a world of water shortages, increasingly erratic rainfall patters and changing climates, we must double agricultural production. The crisis confirmed our need to step up to the challenges of the 21st Century and better harness the power of agricultural research for poverty alleviation, economic growth and environmental sustainability. It confirmed our commitment to re-imagining our institutions and approaches, and ensuring that we have the best possible structure and systems in place to get the best possible results from our knowledge and resources for the poor and hungry. And we know that as the world changes, our past success is not sufficient to meet the challenges of the future. We need more -- and better -- investment in the CGIAR. Our new CGIAR will harmonize and maximize funding for priority research areas, simplify structures and reduce transaction costs and give greater emphasis to achieving results through agreed research Mega Programs. Roles of funders and implementers of research are clearly defined and separated. The 15 CGIAR Centers will come together to establish a Consortium, recognizing that

collectively they can be stronger advocates and do better research than they can individually. Funders will harmonize their funding and reporting requirements, and agree to focus on

essential research to boost agricultural productivity and reduce pressure on natural resources in the face of climate change, water scarcity and other threats.

The CGIAR researchers will create priority Mega Programs that draw on the CGIAR’s

strengths -- improving major food crops for added resilience and nutritional value and enhancing the management of crops, livestock, trees, water, soil and fish -- while reaffirming the importance of gender and capacity building and maintaining a clear focus on improving the livelihoods of the poor.

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An Independent Science and Partnership Council will provide sound advice on scientific issues.

External stakeholders will be ever more valuable partners in agricultural research for development.

The new CGIAR is as much about changed culture and approaches as it is about changed structure. The way funders work together with implementers, primarily working together as the Fund Council and the Consortium, and the way we engage stakeholders, will determine our success. These changes must be built on a solid, common foundation. It is for that reason that I commend to you this CGIAR Joint Declaration and the principles it sets out. Our commitment to act in accordance with these fundamental principles is critical. If we resolve to harmonize our approach to funding and implementing agricultural research; to manage for results; to ensure effective governance and efficient operations and to collaborate and partner with all users of our research, the possibilities for change and impact are endless. Together, we can do this. The past has proven it. The future demands it. The one billion people who go to bed hungry every night are at the center of our endeavor. We can never forget the urgency of our work.

Katherine Sierra Chair, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research December 2009

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The new CGIAR is a global research-for-development partnership consisting of a consortium of international agricultural and natural resources research centers and its funders working with partners to implement an agreed Strategy and Results Framework consistent with this Joint Declaration. This Joint Declaration is a nonbinding statement of aspiration and intent that describes the fundamental principles unifying the CGIAR participants, as well as the roles and responsibilities flowing from those principles.

******* Statement of Resolve We, the funders and implementers of international agricultural research for development, share a common vision: To reduce poverty and hunger, improve human health and nutrition, and enhance ecosystem resilience through high-quality international agricultural research, partnership and leadership. We recognize our mutual accountability to our primary goal: To benefit all users of our research, including farmers and consumers. We share a commitment to three strategic objectives:

• Food for People: Create and accelerate sustainable increases in the productivity and production of healthy food by and for the poor.

• Environment for People: Conserve, enhance, and sustainably use natural resources and biodiversity to improve the livelihoods of the poor in response to climate change and other factors.

• Policies for People: Promote policy and institutional change that will stimulate agricultural growth and equity to benefit the poor, especially rural women and other disadvantaged groups.

In restructuring the CGIAR to achieve our common vision, primary goal, and strategic objectives, and in the spirit of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, we resolve:

1) To harmonize our approach to funding and implementing international agricultural research for development through the CGIAR Fund (the Fund) and the consortium established by the Centers (the Consortium), respectively;

2) To manage for results in accordance with the agreed Strategic Results Framework (the SRF) and the Mega Programs that derive from the SRF;

3) To ensure effective governance and efficient operations in the provision and use of our resources; and

4) To collaborate and partner with and among funders, implementers, and users of SRF research, as well as other external partners supporting the SRF.

Principles We resolve to uphold a set of core principles and strive to act consistently with those principles. Principle 1 – Harmonization 1.1 Funding and implementation of CGIAR agricultural research is harmonized through adherence to the

SRF and support of this Joint Declaration. 1.2 Funding and implementation of the SRF is (i) to the extent possible through the Fund and (ii) based

on a common framework for processes, reporting, monitoring, evaluation and other operational aspects set by the Fund Council in agreement with the Consortium Board (the common operational framework).

1.3 The Fund and the Consortium are exclusively for implementation of the SRF.

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1.4 The Fund Council strengthens its functions by seeking input from the Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) and the biennial Funders Forum and other donor dialogues, and the Fund Council and Consortium Board also seeks to ensure full stakeholder engagement in performing their respective functions.

Principle 2 – Managing for Results 2.1 The Consortium, Centers, all CGIAR funders (meaning donors to the Fund (Fund donors) and direct

funders of the Centers) and their respective partners have shared responsibility for managing toward outcomes, i.e., uptake of outputs resulting in longer-term improvements of livelihoods of end users.

2.2 The Consortium, Centers, and Fund donors are mutually accountable for Mega Program outputs financed by the Fund.

2.3 The monitoring system for research under the SRF is the overall responsibility of the Consortium Board and provides real-time information about program outputs and outcomes to the Consortium and Centers.

2.3 The evaluation system provides periodic objective assessments of the extent to which Mega Programs and other CGIAR aspects are likely to or have achieved the stated objectives under the SRF and this Joint Declaration.

2.4 Evaluation of performance to achieve the SRF and governance of the CGIAR follow international best practice and include evaluations that are independent and impartial to the policy-making process and delivery and management of programs.

2.5 Monitoring and evaluation of progress toward and achievement of tangible and measurable results, outputs and outcomes under the SRF are accurate, comprehensive, verifiable, timely and harmonized.

Principle 3 – Effective Governance and Efficient Operations 3.1 All CGIAR funders, the Consortium and Centers strive toward common, streamlined arrangements

and simplified, cost-effective operations without unnecessary complexity. 3.2 Resources used for the CGIAR, including research programs, decision-making bodies, and advisory

functions, are allocated, implemented and reported on in a transparent manner. 3.3 The CGIAR is structured to create incentives and fair cost structures in support of the principles and

actions set out in this Joint Declaration. 3.4 The Centers implement the SRF, while the Consortium Board oversees and coordinates SRF

implementation. 3.5 The Trustee administers the Fund, while the Consortium Board has responsibility for use of Fund

resources financing SRF implementation. 3.6 Any work undertaken by a Center does not compromise either the ability of that or any other Center

to fulfill its obligations to deliver on the SRF or the reputation of the CGIAR. Principle 4 – Collaboration and Partnership 4.1 The CGIAR funders and implementers promote active engagement and partnership with

stakeholders, including national agricultural research systems (NARs), to optimize research effectiveness and efficiency, strengthen capacity and country ownership, and fully utilize CGIAR research for achieving development impacts.

4.2 The perspectives and priorities of end users are essential to the SRF, as well as Mega Program and all other proposal development, funding, implementation, and results monitoring and evaluation to implement the SRF, and are sought in various ways, in particular through the GCARD.

4.3 The CGIAR is premised on a strong Consortium Board and a strong Fund Council as collaborative counterparts and complementary pillars through which other elements of the CGIAR, including the

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Centers, all other CGIAR funders and other stakeholders, can support the principles and actions set out in this Joint Declaration.

4.4 CGIAR operations are informed by the views of participants and other stakeholders through a series of periodic and regular interactions.

4.5 Research partnership and innovation for implementation of the SRF are encouraged to ensure high-quality research.

4.6 All CGIAR participants seek to resolve differences arising within the CGIAR through common resolution mechanisms, unless otherwise specified in performance and other implementing agreements.

The actions intended to promote and operationalize these principles are set out in the following Annex.

***** This Joint Declaration, including its Annex, is intended to be an overarching framework for the CGIAR that will inform implementation of the restructuring. It recognizes the importance of allowing all CGIAR funders and implementers to rely on each others’ commitments to proceed on the basis of mutually shared expectations, without being directly binding on any CGIAR participant or stakeholder. Any binding commitments pertaining to the CGIAR will be as defined in other contractual or legal arrangements operationalizing the CGIAR. This Joint Declaration may be referenced in such other arrangements, but would do so only in a way that clearly states the respective parties’ intentions as to the relative binding or nonbinding nature of any of the principles or actions set out herein.

*****

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Annex Conduct In order to adhere to the principles set out in this Joint Declaration, we will strive to act in the following manner: Principle 1 – Harmonization 1.A. All CGIAR funders will

(i) seek to provide adequate and predictable funding for implementation of the SRF, (ii) convene and collaborate through the Funders Forum, (iii) fund all costs associated with CGIAR-wide functions based on a cost structure and financing plan developed by the Consortium Board in conjunction with the Fund Council and endorsed by participants in the Funders Forum, (iv) respond to Consortium requests to address over- and underfunding, (v) join the Fund if, when, and to the extent possible, and (vi) seek to refrain from providing any funding for the SRF outside the common operational framework.

1.B. In addition to 1.A., funders contributing to the Fund will, through those resources,

(i) finance the SRF primarily and increasingly with funding allocated by the Fund Council, (ii) seek to increase the proportion of their funding for Centers from funding directly to Centers to funding through the Fund, and (iii) fund the costs associated with the Fund, including operations of the Fund Office and Trustee.

1.C. In addition to 1.A., funders contributing directly to the Centers will, for those resources, (i) primarily support initiatives that implement the SRF, (ii) finance activities to implement the SRF at full cost recovery, (iii) complement funding being provided through the Fund, and (iv) limit any reporting, monitoring or evaluation beyond the common operational framework to the absolute minimum necessary.

1.D. The CGIAR Fund Council will (i) be responsible for approving program content of Mega Programs based on Consortium proposals, (ii) provide funding to the Consortium based on Consortium Mega Program proposals and other request for funding, including with respect to over- and underfunding (iii) seek the advice of the Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) in making Fund allocation decisions about Consortium proposals to implement the SRF, including for Mega Programs, and (iv) in discharging its responsibilities, have an overview of the CGIAR’s strategic impact, quality and relevance of programmatic performance, managerial and governance performance, and financial performance and resource mobilization, based primarily on information from the Consortium.

1.E. The Consortium Board will (i) oversee and coordinate the design by the Centers of the SRF, in consultation with stakeholders, including end users, for endorsement by participants in the Funders Forum, (ii) oversee and coordinate the design by the Centers of the Mega Programs, in consultation with stakeholders, including end-user representatives, for approval by the Fund Council, (iii) provide sufficient programmatic and financial information to enable the Fund Council to effectively allocate Fund resources,

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(iv) ensure collaboration among and compliance by Centers in implementing Mega Programs and other proposals to implement the SRF, including with respect to funding directly to Centers, (v) seek to ensure that research conducted by the Centers will be primarily under, and in any case consistent with, the SRF, as such scope is determined by the Consortium Board, and (vi) avail itself of high-quality scientific advice, including from ISPC.

1.F. The Centers will

(i) engage in research primarily to implement the SRF, (ii) engage in non-SRF research only at full cost recovery from funding sources for such research, (iii) follow the common operational framework for all implementation of the SRF, and (iv) have joint responsibility with the Consortium Board for resolving any disputes related to Center obligations to deliver on the SRF or Center behavior that could compromise the CGIAR’s reputation.

Principle 2 – Managing for Results 2.A. All CGIAR funders will rely on a common results-based monitoring and evaluation framework as

part of the common operational framework.

2.B. The Fund Council will (i) be responsible for an aligned provision of Fund resources to support the generation of research outputs, as agreed in performance agreements between the Fund Council and the Consortium, (ii) regularly appraise the performance of the Consortium in meeting its obligations as defined in performance agreements, (iii) monitor the efficacy of Fund allocation mechanisms, (iv) be the principal monitoring body of ISPC, and (v) commission periodic independent evaluations of Mega Programs, which may include validations of findings from external evaluations commissioned by the Consortium Board.

2.C. The Consortium Board will

(i) establish and manage a reliable and harmonized performance monitoring system for the Centers and research under the SRF, including Mega Programs, (ii) be responsible, together with the Centers, for high-quality science and technology products and services, as agreed in performance agreements between the Fund Council and Consortium, (iii) commission periodic external evaluations of Mega Program subcomponents and/or cross-cutting issues, (iv) commission periodic evaluations of Centers, which are not duplicative of Mega Program evaluations, to evaluate their governance, management and financial health, (v) facilitate institutional and other learning for continuous performance improvement and improved results as informed by monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

2.D. The Centers will seek to use a common system for reporting performance information to the Consortium so as to minimize duplication and enhance consolidation and comparison of data.

2.E. The Fund Council and Consortium Board will jointly commission a special-purpose reference

group to undertake an independent evaluation of the CGIAR following each SRF. Principle 3 – Effective Governance and Efficient Operations

3.A. The Consortium and Centers will agree on the relationships amongst themselves, including

parameters for defining Center and Consortium status and governance relative to each other.

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3.B. The Consortium Board will have primary responsibility, and will rely on Center cooperation, for (i) keeping track of all funding to implement the SRF and seeking adjustments to over- and underfunding of SRF implementation, (ii) consolidating financial and progress reporting of individual SRF implementation activities financed by the Fund and funding directly to Centers, (iii) providing shared services and coordinating the use of Lead Centers for Mega Program and other SRF implementation, and (iv) through the CEO of the Consortium and Chair of the Consortium Board, acting as the public face of the CGIAR in international fora and in so doing collaborating closely with the Chairs of the Fund Council, the Funders Forum and ISPC, as well as the Centers in their own public relations.

3.C. The Fund Council will provide oversight of the use of Fund resources, based in part on reporting,

audits and other assurances of due diligence regarding use of such resources provided by the Consortium.

3.D. Fund donors, the Consortium and Centers will adhere to the terms of their respective performance and other implementing agreements.

3.E. The Trustee will have fiduciary responsibility for Fund resources prior to their disbursement from

the Fund, receive instructions from the Fund Council to commit and disburse available Fund funds, but have no responsibility for monitoring or supervising use of those funds once disbursed.

3.F. Upon the receipt of Fund funds, the Consortium will have fiduciary responsibility (i.e., to monitor

and confirm the intended use of funds) and programmatic responsibility (i.e., to ensure implementation by Centers and partners and confirm their achievement of results) for those funds.

Principle 4 – Collaboration and Partnership 4.A. The Consortium and Centers will build and enhance the partnerships necessary to (i) ensure full

stakeholder engagement in the design of the SRF, (ii) optimize research effectiveness and efficiency, (iii) strengthen the capacity of NARs and other research partners in developing countries, and (iv) fully utilize CGIAR research for achieving development impacts.

4.B. A Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development (GCARD) will provide an

opportunity to engage stakeholders in SRF and Mega Program design, assist in open identification of demand-driven research opportunities and partnership development, and provide public visibility of CGIAR programs and development impact to its partners and users, such that the Consortium Board, Centers and Fund Council will consider recommendations of the GCARD in their decisions.

4.C. ISPC will primarily provide independent advice and expertise to the CGIAR through services to the

Fund Council and in support of the Funders Forum, as well as serve as an intellectual bridge between CGIAR funders and implementers, thereby seeking to improve the productivity and quality of CGIAR science, catalyze the partnering of the Consortium and Centers with other institutions of international agricultural research, and support the CGIAR by serving as an honest broker in relevant international fora.

4.D. The Consortium Board and Fund Council will, in consultation with other stakeholders, agree on a

common dispute resolution mechanism for the CGIAR.

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Chapter 2

Consortium Constitution

Draft for information at Business Meeting

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Preamble The Alliance commissioned the Boston Consulting Group to develop the first draft of the Consortium Constitution. ExCo 16 requested various amendments to this first draft. The Alliance used an iterative process to address ExCo 16’s requests. Amendments were discussed internally within the Alliance (by a reference group of Board Chairs and Directors General) and with a CGIAR Member Reference Group (Australia, Canada and Norway). This iterative process led to the current Draft Constitution, submitted to ExCo 17. The Alliance has now instructed its legal counsel to formulate the Constitution in appropriate legal language while maintaining the substantive content and meaning of the current text. As part of this revision, matters such as nominations for Board members and detailed terms of reference for the CEO will be moved to a separate document on Consortium Board rules and procedures. The Consortium Board will have the responsibility to obtain international legal status for the Consortium. Up until the time this status is obtained and a host country agreement is signed, the Consortium will function as a contractual joint venture, under the legal umbrella of one of the Centers. Every Centre will obtain legal advice on how the Consortium Constitution (in its legal version) aligns with its own constitution and host country agreement and will sign a Consortium Establishment Agreement upon deciding to join the Consortium. Guido Gryseels and Stephen Hall Alliance Board Chair and Alliance Executive Chair

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Consortium Constitution1,2

Article 1: Establishment, name, and legal status

1.1 Establishment [To be tailored to legal and host country requirements] The Consortium of CGIAR-supported (Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) Centers (hereinafter referred to as “the Consortium”) shall be established and shall operate as an autonomous organization, international in character, in accordance with the provisions of this present Constitution. 1.2 Name [To be tailored to legal and host country requirements] The Consortium shall, by the aforesaid name, be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. 1.3 Legal status [To be tailored to legal and host country requirements] The Consortium is organized exclusively for charitable, educational, and scientific purposes. It has international status and shall be operated and maintained as a nonprofit, autonomous international agency, nonpolitical in management, staffing, and operations. The founding members of the Consortium (hereinafter referred to as “Member Centers” or “the Member Centers”) are:

• ...[list of founding members] Article 2: Vision, purpose, and scope 2.1 CGIAR Vision The vision of the CGIAR is to reduce poverty and hunger, improve human health and nutrition, and enhance ecosystem resilience through high-quality international agricultural research, partnership, and leadership.3

2.2 Purpose of the Consortium The purpose of the Consortium is to provide leadership to and coordinate activities among Member Centers and, where consistent with the Consortium’s

1. This draft constitution represents guidelines and recommendations for the Consortium governance structure, but may not conform to the final legal standards that govern the Consortium. The final constitution should be reviewed and prepared in conjunction with appropriate legal counsel. 2. Terminology for specific entities (e.g.,"CGIAR," “Strategic Results Framework,” “Mega Program”) may be adapted based on future changes to names and structures in the system. 3. From the Maputo reform proposal, 2008.

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4 Consortium Constitution

scope, other Partners, to enable them to enhance their individual and collective contribution to the CGIAR vision, through

• Fostering a more conducive international policy environment for agricultural research for development and increasing CGIAR relevance and effectiveness within the international development institutional architecture;

• Enhancing Member Center research impact through common strategic objectives, programmatic convergence, concerted action, and fostering of innovation;

• Together with the CGIAR Fund Council, significantly expanding the financial resources available to the Member Centers to conduct their work;

• Managing the allocation of funds to meet priorities identified in the Strategy and Results Framework, and serving as a central point of fiduciary and operational accountability for all funds that pass to it from the Fund;

• Improving the cost-efficiency of each Member Center and of the CGIAR system as a whole through the provision of advice, world-class shared functions and research platforms, and other means; and

• Identifying and promoting to the Member Centers opportunities to achieve gains in relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness.

Article 3: Consortium Office, shared services units, offices [to be refined and detailed in Phase II]

• The principal location of the Consortium Office shall be at ..., ..., or at such other place in ... as may be mutually agreed upon by the Government of ... and the Consortium.

• Nothing in the preceding provisions of this Article shall preclude cooperation and collaboration in a less formal manner between the Consortium and other countries or organizations.

Article 4: Financial means [To be tailored to legal and host country requirements] It is envisioned that the Consortium shall seek primary funding from the Fund. It may accept other funds from other sources as the Consortium Board determines are consistent with the purpose of the Consortium, as defined in Article 2.2, and the current CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework. Article 5: Structure and governance The organs of the Consortium are

• The Consortium Board (the “Board”) including its Officers (Chair, Vice-Chair)

• The Board Committees

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• The Consortium Office headed by the Consortium CEO

Member Centers are legally independent bodies whose relationship with the Consortium entails the rights and responsibilities described in Article 9. The Member Centers shall be the locus of research expertise and implementation in the CGIAR.

Article 6: Board 6.1 Objectives The primary objective of the Consortium Board shall be to lead, coordinate, and support the Member Centers in collective pursuit of the CGIAR vision. It shall provide leadership, strategic direction, and harmonization in areas of common interest among the Member Centers and serve as the focal point of activity and responsibility for the Fund. The Board will oversee the development of the CGIAR strategy, Strategic Results Framework, Mega Programs, and organizational framework, and collaborate with the Fund Council and Funders Forum to gain agreement and secure funding. It will also, with the support of the Consortium Office, oversee the performance of Mega Programs and of Member Centers as set forth in this document and relevant performance agreements. 6.2 Membership and eligibility 6.2.1 Nominations of Board members Initial Board members will be selected by a search and selection committee following a process approved by the Alliance of CGIAR-supported Centers. Subsequent Board members will be selected via a nomination process described herein:

• If a Board seat is known to be coming open with any timing other than the expiration of a normal term, the Chair shall give notice of the vacancy to the Nominations Committee;

• Once a Board vacancy is posted, the Nominations Committee shall seek nominations in an open and transparent process;

• Advised by the Nominations Committee, the Board shall propose nominee(s) (one per unfilled position) to the Member Centers;

• Each Member Center shall have one vote for or against each nominee; nominees are elected by a 3/4 super-majority of the Member Centers in favor;

• If a nominee fails to gain the required number of votes in favor, the Nominations Committee must propose a new nominee for that vacancy;

• If three subsequent nominees for a given vacancy each fail to gain the required number of votes in favor, any following nominees are elected by a simple majority of the Member Centers voting in favor, following the process as above. Nominees who failed to gain a 3/4 super-majority in

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6 Consortium Constitution

favor may be, at the discretion of the Consortium Board, proposed again for the simple majority vote.

Initial Board members will serve two or three-year terms to ensure a staggered transition, with a maximum of six years of consecutive service. Subsequent Board members will serve three-year terms, with a maximum of six years of consecutive service. This nomination process does not apply to the Board’s observers. 6.2.2 Composition The Consortium Board composition will be competency-based, ensuring a balanced skill set and with regard to gender and diversity. It will consist of 10 members and 2 observers:

• Nine voting members selected on individual merit and not to represent certain bodies or organizations:

o Membership should reflect policy, science/research, and financial/managerial backgrounds;

o No members may concurrently be an officer, a trustee, or an employee of a CGIAR-supported Center, office, or program;

o No members may concurrently be an officer, a trustee, or an employee of any organ of the Fund; and

o At least four members at any given time must not have been affiliated with the CGIAR in the three years prior to joining the Consortium Board.

• One voting ex officio member: the Consortium CEO • Two nonvoting, nonmember observers: one representative of Member

Center leadership, as agreed and appointed by the Member Centers, and one representative of the Fund Council, as agreed and appointed by the Fund Council.

6.2.3 Officers (Chair, Vice-Chair) In the inaugural Board, the Chair and Vice-Chair shall be selected by the search and selection committee following a process as approved by the existing Alliance of CGIAR-supported Centers. Subsequent Chairs and Vice-Chairs will be selected by the Board from among the Board’s members (unless otherwise agreed upon by the Board). The primary role of the Chair is to further the CGIAR vision and the purpose of the Consortium in close collaboration with the Board and the CEO. The Chair shall determine, in consultation with the Consortium CEO, the agenda for each Board meeting, and preside over each meeting. The Vice-Chair shall perform these duties in the event that the Chair is absent.

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The terms of the Chair and Vice-Chair will begin at the meeting in which they are elected. Terms will last for a minimum of a two-year period, unless pre-empted by the end of the Board member’s Board term or decided otherwise by the Board for exceptional reasons. 6.2.4 Secretary The Chair shall appoint a Secretary of the Board. The Secretary shall attend Board meetings and perform such recording and record-keeping functions as requested by the Board. 6.2.5 Voting Board decisions will be made by consensus to the maximum extent possible. As a last resort, where a clear decision is required and consensus is not achievable, the members of the Board shall each have one vote. In case of a tie, the vote of the Chair (or the Vice-Chair if the Chair is absent) shall be the deciding vote. Vote by proxy via another Board member is possible, if communicated to the Chair prior to the meeting. Decisions will be made by simple majority vote unless otherwise specified and provided a quorum is present. 6.2.6 Secret ballot The Chair will propose to conduct an open ballot by default. The Board may decide to conduct a secret ballot without restriction. 6.3 Meeting frequency and interaction 6.3.1 Frequency The Board shall meet and interact as deemed necessary to function effectively. At a minimum, there should be two in-person Board meetings per year. It is anticipated that, in addition to the aforementioned in-person meetings, there will be at least bi-monthly additional conference calls and regular electronic updates as requested by the Chair. Board members are expected to adequately prepare for all Board and relevant Committee meetings; a significant time commitment is expected. Beyond the commitment of Board members, the Chair will be expected to devote as much additional time as is necessary to ensure the effective functioning of the Board. A meeting of the Board will be convened by written notification from the Chair, or by the Consortium CEO at the direction of the Chair.

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6.3.2 Special meetings Special meetings include any Board meetings outside those that are regularly scheduled. They may be called at the request of the Chair, 3/4 of the Board members, or 3/4 of the Member Centers. 6.3.3 Participation Board members shall make every reasonable effort to participate in all meetings. Board members may not appoint an alternate to serve in their stead. In the event a Board member does not attend more than two consecutive meetings, the membership of such a Board member may be reassessed by the Chair, who may request the Board member’s voluntary resignation or recommend to the Board that the member be removed. 6.3.4 Quorum A Board meeting shall not be held unless over one half of all members are present. This rule applies to all regular and special meetings of the Board, including teleconferences. 6.3.5 Notice and communications The Consortium Office, in collaboration with the Chair, shall prepare the agendas and materials for Board meetings. The agenda and materials shall be circulated to Board members electronically at least two weeks prior to each regular meeting and one week prior to any special meetings. All advice and recommendations of the Board will be recorded in minutes of the Board meetings, which shall be copied to all members of the Board, to be approved and retained in the permanent records of the Consortium Office. Confirmed minutes of each meeting will be communicated to all Member Centers and the Fund Council and made available to the general public within 10 business days of their confirmation. The Consortium Office shall support the Board by providing the required documents and by coordinating communications as required. Communication with Board members and the Consortium Office may be conducted by mail, fax, electronically, or by other appropriate means. In addition to other communications, the Consortium Board shall produce, with the support of the Consortium Office, an Annual Report in such a form as required by applicable law. The Annual Report shall, at minimum, be distributed to the Member Centers, Fund Council, and Partners, and shall be made available to the general public.

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6.4 Roles and responsibilities Although the Board is ultimately responsible for all roles and responsibilities stated below, it may delegate tasks to the Consortium CEO and Office as it deems appropriate. Concerning strategy development, resource mobilization, and funds allocation the Board will

• Oversee the development of, and review and endorse, the CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework and submit it to the Funders Forum for approval. The Strategy and Results Framework shall be developed together with Member Centers and with the input of a broad range of donors and Partners;

• Develop a framework for funding, including a resource mobilization strategy, in cooperation with the Fund Council, to structure funding flows to address programmatic and structural financing needs;

• Engage in fund raising together with the Fund Council; • Take ultimate financial and operational responsibility for all funds

received by the Consortium from the Fund, including full authority to enter into related agreements and enforce agreed-upon provisions as relevant vis-à-vis Member Centers and any others receiving funds from the Fund via the Consortium; and

• Decide on allocation of funding across Member Centers and programs, in any case where funds are given to the Consortium for allocation.

Concerning Mega Programs the Board will

• Set such common criteria, policies, and standards for Mega Program execution as are helpful in ensuring Mega Program effectiveness and are consistent with the Consortium purpose described in Article 2.2;

• Review and endorse Mega Program proposals from Member Centers, which shall address at minimum project leadership and management structure, allocation of work and funds across participants, budget, performance measures, progress-tracking, and the reporting process;

• Submit proposals for Mega Programs and the allocation of funds across Mega Programs to the Fund Council for consideration, taking into account proposals submitted to the Consortium by Member Centers; enter into performance agreements with the Fund Council for Mega Program implementation;

• Review and authorize fund allocation within Mega Programs, on the basis of proposals submitted by Mega Program participants;

• Enter into performance contracts with Member Centers and Partners involved in execution of the Mega Programs; and

• Oversee the monitoring of Mega Program performance and take appropriate remedial actions with participants when necessary to ensure the use of funds for intended purposes and the success of the Mega Program. The Consortium’s performance management role vis-à-vis Mega

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Programs shall address development impact as well as financial and operational performance.

Concerning Member Centers outside of those roles specific to Mega Programs, the Board will

• Set such common criteria, policies, and standards for Member Center performance and efficiency as are consistent with the Consortium purpose described in Article 2.2;

• Review the performance and efficiency of Member Centers; • Review the general alignment of Member Centers’ activities with the

CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework; • Review the current and potential structural organizations of and among the

Member Centers, and decide on appropriate actions including any opportunities for Member Center or field asset realignment; such a review shall be based on thorough analysis and shall include appropriate involvement of Member Centers;

• Advise Member Centers on best practices in areas of common interest, including governance, risk management, and supporting functions; and

• Review and endorse plans for, and, together with the CEO, oversee, shared functions and research platforms [to be detailed in Phase 2].

Concerning reporting and external relations, the Board will

• Update the Fund Council on its activities. The Board shall report at least annually to the Fund Council, in a form mutually agreeable to the two parties, and as otherwise agreed upon in performance and related agreements with the Fund. This reporting shall address performance vis-à-vis the Strategy and Results Framework, financial reporting with respect to use for intended purposes, operational performance of the Mega Programs and Member Centers, actions taken by the Consortium Board with regard to Member Center operations and common services, and any other Consortium and Member Center activities relevant to the Fund Council’s investment.

• Work with the Fund Council to establish common standards for reporting on Mega Program and Member Center performance, in order to reduce the overall reporting burden on Member Centers.

• Support the Consortium CEO and Consortium Office in advocacy, public relations, and communications efforts.

In addition, the Board will oversee the Consortium Office as a business entity, and in so doing, will

• Develop, maintain, and as needed, update the strategic and operating plans of the Consortium Office;

• Approve the operating budget of the Consortium Office and Consortium Board; and

• Select, hire, conduct performance reviews for, and determine the continued employment or removal of the Consortium CEO.

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Finally, in its governance role, the Board will

• Assume financial and operational accountability for Mega Programs and the Consortium Office, including shared services and research platforms;

• Initiate periodically external reviews of Consortium functioning and performance;

• Determine criteria for membership in the Consortium, and as warranted, nominate prospective Member Centers for membership; this nomination must be approved by the current Member Centers; see Article 9.9;

• Propose amendments to this Constitution to Member Centers, in consultation with the Fund Council;

• Seek to resolve conflicts among Member Centers and between the Consortium and any Member Centers; and

• Design mechanisms for risk management and compliance and oversee their implementation.

6.5 Compensation Inaugural Consortium Board members shall be compensated for their services as proposed by the Search and Selection Committee and approved by the Alliance of CGIAR-supported Centers. On an ongoing basis, Board members shall be compensated as proposed by the Consortium Board and approved by the Member Centers. Additionally, Board members shall receive reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. 6.6 Resignation and removal policies Any Board member may resign at any time by delivering written notice to the Chair, or by giving oral notice at any meeting of the Board. Any such resignation shall take effect at the time specified therein, or if the time is not specified, upon receipt by the Chair or CEO. Gross negligence of duties, fraud, and/or criminal activity shall be grounds for Board member removal. A unanimous vote of the voting Board members, the Board member being removed excluded, or a 3/4 super-majority vote of the Member Centers is provision for removal. Article 7: Committees The Board shall establish a Nominations Committee and an Audit Committee and may establish such other Committees, working groups, advisory panels, and other similar groups it deems necessary to advise and carry out the business of the Board efficiently and effectively. These bodies may be composed of Board members and/or non-Board members. Committees will be established with

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defined terms of reference and deliverables. Committees will operate under this Constitution and any specific committee rules and regulations as may be adopted and amended by the Board. The Chair shall recommend a qualified candidate to chair a Committee, taking into account the purpose and mandate of the Committee, and present the candidate to the Board for approval. Article 8: Consortium Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Consortium Office 8.1 Consortium Chief Executive Officer (CEO) The Chief Executive Officer of the Consortium shall be selected by the Board. The CEO will be both a public face of the CGIAR system and the leader of the Consortium Office staff, which will be recruited and appointed by the CEO. The performance of the CEO shall be reviewed by the Board annually. The internal roles and responsibilities of the CEO shall include

• Contributing to the development of and implementing the overall CGIAR strategy, Strategy and Results Framework, and portfolio of Mega Programs, in close cooperation with Member Centers and Partners;

• Leading the implementation and ongoing renewal of the Strategy and Results Framework;

• Working closely with the Consortium Board in developing common policies and standards for Mega Programs and Member Centers, as described in Article 6.4;

• Managing the development of proposals, budgets, and performance contracts to implement the Strategy and Results Framework, including those for Mega Programs, with involved Member Centers and Partners;

• Providing day-to-day oversight of the role of the Consortium in managing and monitoring the performance of Mega Programs and any other programs implementing the Strategy and Results Framework;

• Managing, directly or through staff, the Consortium Office functions and dissemination of best practices across Member Centers in common areas such as governance, human resources, financial management, and risk management;

• Leading the Consortium Office in gathering the information needed from Member Centers in order for the Consortium Board to fulfill its reviewing and oversight roles as described in Article 6.4;

• Identifying and setting up such shared functions and research platforms as may be needed to optimize Consortium and Member Center effectiveness and efficiency, and managing, directly or through staff, the organization needed to provide shared functions and research platforms;

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• Developing an annual Consortium Office budget for Consortium Board approval, and ensuring adherence to this budget and prudent spending as is deemed appropriate for a development organization;

• Establishing an effective system for liaising with Member Centers to ensure coordination and alignment;

• Supporting the Consortium Board to enable it to execute its roles and responsibilities effectively and liaising regularly with its Chair and members; and

• Supporting Member Centers to enable them to execute their roles and responsibilities effectively.

The external roles and responsibilities of the CEO, which may at times be carried out together with the Consortium Board Chair or other members of the Consortium Board, shall include

• Representing the Consortium in negotiations and other interactions with the Fund Council, Trustee, Fund Office, and if needed to further the Consortium purpose or requested by the Fund Council, individual donors;

• Partnering with members of the Fund Council in raising funds for the CGIAR;

• Building strategic collaboration and relations with external Partners, including private sector institutions and relevant nongovernmental organizations, advanced research institutes, and national agricultural research systems, to further the pursuit of the CGIAR vision and Consortium purpose, as described in Article 2; and

• Conducting advocacy efforts to expand the CGIAR’s positioning and brand, including representing the CGIAR at top-level international fora and other relevant meetings.

The CEO role shall also include such other activities as the CEO may find necessary or useful to further the Consortium’s purpose. 8.2 Consortium Office The Consortium Office shall consist of a professional staff responsible for carrying out the day-to-day operations of the Consortium. The powers, duties, and processes of the Office shall be defined in directions as shall be provided by the Board and CEO. The CEO shall manage the Consortium Office and shall report on its activities to the Board as and when required by the Board, but at a minimum twice per year, as determined in directions as shall be provided by the Board. The Consortium Office shall not directly conduct agricultural research.

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Article 9: Consortium Member Centers 9.1 Role of Member Centers The Member Centers are the locus of research expertise and research management within the CGIAR. Within the framework of this Constitution, the Consortium shall aim to support the Member Centers in discharging their research and management roles. Correspondingly, the Member Centers shall aim to support the Consortium Board and CEO in executing their roles and responsibilities, as defined in Articles 6.4 and 8.1 of this Constitution, and consequently shall accept the authority of the Consortium Board and CEO in decisions regarding these roles and responsibilities. 9.2 Responsibilities of Member Centers The responsibilities of Member Centers include

• Adherence to this Constitution and to Consortium Board decisions; • Partnership with each other and the Consortium Board, and support of the

Consortium Board in fulfilling its roles and responsibilities (Article 6.4); • Execution of high-quality research in accordance with performance

contracts as may be entered into with the Consortium; • Operating in alignment with the CGIAR’s overall Strategy and Results

Framework; • Operating efficiently; and • Reporting on research impact and efficiency to the Consortium, on the

basis of common criteria, processes, and standards set by the Consortium Board and/or CEO.

9.3 Rights of Membership The rights of membership conferred upon Member Centers, subject to the provisions of Article 9.8, include

• Being consulted by the Consortium Board for advice and feedback; • Submitting research proposals to implement Mega Programs or other

aspects of the Strategy and Results Framework to the Consortium Board for consideration and potential funding from the Fund; and

• Receiving a copy of all required reporting from the Consortium Board and Consortium Office provided to the Fund Council.

Additional rights may be conferred to Member Centers individually by contract or agreement or collectively through Consortium Board decisions.

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9.4 Rights and Responsibilities of Member Centers in Securing Bilateral Funding In addition to acquiring the rights of membership, Member Centers maintain their existing right to secure bilateral funding, provided that such funding includes full overhead costs for the funded activities. Additionally, all bilateral-funded projects shall be included in Member Centers’ financial and activity reporting to the Consortium. 9.5 Member Center Rights in Consortium Governance Member Centers shall have the following governance rights, each of which requires the Consortium Board’s prior nomination or proposal:

• Electing nominated Consortium Board members, following the process described in Article 6.2.1;

• Approving proposed amendments to the Consortium Constitution; • Approving proposed Consortium Board member compensation; and • Admitting nominated Member Centers.

Member Centers shall have the following additional governance roles, which do not require a prior nomination or proposal from the Consortium Board,

• Electing an observer to the Consortium Board from among the Member Centers;

• Convening special Consortium Board meetings; • Casting a "no confidence” vote; such a vote shall serve as a public

expression of severe disagreement with Consortium Board performance, decisions and/or behavior, but shall not be formally binding on any specific actions of the Board including its resignation;

• In exceptional cases, removing individual Consortium Board members; and

• Approving Consortium continuity per the sunset clause, as defined in Article 13.3.

9.6 Member Center Voting In all cases requiring a vote of Member Centers, each Member Center shall have a single vote. All votes of Member Centers in Consortium governance shall require a 3/4 super-majority to pass unless otherwise specified. 9.7 Partnership and Mediation It is expected that the Consortium Board will work in close partnership with Member Centers, including their boards and executive leadership, and with the

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Fund Council, and that Consortium Board decisions will be made, to the extent possible, in such a manner and with such a result as is agreeable to all parties. If the Consortium Board and a Member Center board cannot agree, either may request that a third-party mediator be appointed. The identity of the mediator shall be agreed upon by both parties. [Additional detail regarding mediation to be fleshed out during legal review and harmonized with any systemwide mediation mechanisms] 9.8 Member Center Compliance with Consortium Board Decisions In the event that a Member Center does not fulfill its responsibilities as described in Articles 9.2 and 9.4, or is not compliant with a decision of the Consortium Board made within the scope of the Consortium Board’s roles and responsibilities described in Article 6.4, the Consortium Board may take actions it deems appropriate, within the parameters described in this section. Whenever possible, the first action of the Consortium Board shall be to consult with the board of the Member Center to discuss necessary remedial actions. If the two parties cannot agree, either may request mediation, as described in Article 9.7. If remedial actions are agreed upon, the Consortium Board shall allow reasonable time for their completion. In the event that the Member Center board is unable or unwilling to take the necessary actions, the Consortium Board may take further action, including excluding the Member Center from consideration for future funding, withholding current funding (as allowable within any applicable agreements or contracts), and/or withholding any or all of the rights of membership described in Article 9.3. The Consortium Board may not withhold a Member Center’s right to secure bilateral funding (Article 9.4) or any other Member Center rights not conferred by virtue of membership in the Consortium. The Consortium Board also may not withhold a Member Center’s right to discontinue membership voluntarily (Article 9.9) nor may it withhold a Member Center’s rights in Consortium governance (Article 9.5) so long as the Member Center remains in membership. 9.9 Addition or Expulsion of Member Centers The Consortium Board shall establish general criteria for admission to the Consortium and shall nominate prospective Member Centers for membership. Prospective Member Centers shall be admitted by a 3/4 super-majority vote of the Member Centers. In the extreme case that its options as described in Articles 9.7 and 9.8 have been exhausted and have not produced a resolution satisfactory to the Board, the Consortium Board may hold a vote to expel a Member Center. A decision to

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expel a Member Center must be supported by a 3/4 super-majority vote of all Consortium Board members. It is expected that decisions regarding addition or expulsion of Member Centers will be made in consultation with the Fund Council. Independent of the actions of the Consortium Board, Member Centers individually maintain the right to discontinue voluntarily their membership in the Consortium. Article 10: Conflicts of interest [To be included if legally advisable and if so, tailored to legal and host country requirements] Article 11: Relationship with other organizations In order to achieve its objectives in the most efficient way, the Consortium may enter into agreements for close cooperation with relevant national, regional, or international organizations, foundations, and agencies. Member Centers retain autonomy to engage in any agreements with third parties provided they do not conflict with Member Center responsibilities and obligations set forth in this Constitution. Article 12: Rights, privileges, and immunities [To be tailored to legal and host country requirements]

• The Consortium shall make arrangements with its host country to ensure that the Consortium, its staff members, and official visitors shall enjoy in the territory of the host country the same rights, privileges, and immunities as customarily accorded to other international organizations, their officials, staff, and official visitors. Such rights, privileges, and immunities shall be specifically defined in a Consortium Office Agreement with the host country.

• Similarly, the Consortium may enter into agreements with other countries in which it works for the purpose of granting the Consortium, its officials, and staff such privileges and immunities as are required for such work.

• The privileges and immunities referred to in the preceding paragraphs are to be provided solely to ensure in all circumstances the unimpeded functioning of the Consortium, and the complete independence of the persons to whom they are accorded.

Article 13: Amendment, bylaws, and dissolution [To be tailored to legal and host country requirements] .

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13.1 Amendment [It is envisioned that any amendments to this Constitution must be discussed with the Fund Council and approved by 3/4 of the members of the Consortium Board, and then by 3/4 of the Member Centers. Specific language will be tailored to legal and host country requirements.] 13.2 By-laws The Board may adopt by-laws and other internal guidelines, which will include financial and audit regulations and which shall be subject to … 13.3 Sunset clause Ten years after the formal establishment of the Consortium, the Board shall commission a review of the value and sustainability of the Consortium. The Member Centers, Fund Council, Trustee, and Partners shall be consulted as part of this review and shall receive the review findings and conclusions. The Consortium will be dissolved if the Member Centers approve both the dissolution of the Consortium and

a transition plan, each by a 3/4 majority, provided that the transition plan also has the approval of any other parties whose approval is needed for the transition plan to take effect.

13.4 Dissolution and Liquidation If the Consortium is unable to continue its activities, the Board shall notify the Member Centers of the situation of the Consortium. The Consortium may be dissolved in accordance with Civil Code. The Board shall carry out the liquidation unless it designates another party to act as a liquidator. In the event of liquidation of the Consortium, its remaining assets shall [...destination of assets...].

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1

Chapter 3

Framework for the CGIAR Fund

This chapter describes the main features of the new CGIAR Fund and the roles, responsibilities, relationships, and accountabilities of its components.

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2

A. INTRODUCTION

The CGIAR approved extensive reforms in 2008, introducing a new organizational architecture and governance model. The unitary oversight model of the old CGIAR is being replaced by two separate but mutually reinforcing pillars, one on operations (the new Consortium of CGIAR Centers) and the other on financing (the new CGIAR Fund), with several new mechanisms forming a bridge between the two pillars. This two-pillar structure provides a clear separation between the “doers” and the “funders.” The Consortium of CGIAR Centers is a new legal entity being established by the international Centers that are part of the CGIAR to lead, coordinate, and support the Centers. The CGIAR Fund is a new multidonor, multiyear funding mechanism set up to provide strategic financing to support priority agricultural research areas. These two pillars are joined through four bridging mechanisms:

1. Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) setting common goals (in terms of development impacts), strategic objectives, and results (in terms of outputs and outcomes) to be jointly achieved by the Fund, the Consortium, and bilateral funders to the Centers within a certain time frame;

2. Performance Agreements for Mega-Programs between the Fund and the Consortium—for operationalizing the agreed SRF;

3. A Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Framework—for institutional learning and promoting accountability.

4. Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC)—for enhancing and promoting the quality, relevance, and impact of science and science partnerships in the CGIAR.

B. DESCRIPTION

1. The CGIAR Fund The CGIAR Fund (the Fund) will finance Mega Programs under the SRF for implementation by the Centers and their partner institutions. It is intended to facilitate harmonization of donor support by providing a single entry point for financing, initially through three designated funding “windows.” 1.a Funding “Windows” Under the new funding model the counterpart of the Fund on the “doer” side is the Consortium. Thus, all funds would be channeled from the Fund under agreements with the Consortium. To ensure flexibility, performance agreements can also be used for funding of proposals covering critical activities that are vital for successful implementation of the SRF that have been approved by the Fund Council. In the case of Mega Programs, this would be in the form of program performance agreements, with performance criteria based on the approved program proposal. In the case of institutional support, only a "light"

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agreement would be needed, requiring that the funds are to be used subject to agreed common standards and for implementation of activities under the SRF. Donors contributing to the Fund (Fund Donors) may designate use of their funds in three ways in the following order of preference to support coordination and harmonization:

1. Window 1: To the entire CGIAR program portfolio. Window 1 funds would be allocated by the Fund Council to Mega Programs, as well as to proposals from the Consortium for support to other critical activities that are vital for successful implementation of the SRF.

2. Window 2: To one or more of the approved Mega Programs.

3. Window 3: To one or more Centers. This Window is intended to be transitional. After a two year transition period, the Fund Council will set a date for its closure in dialogue with the Consortium.

1.b General Guidelines By participating in the Fund, Fund Donors agree that

1. They would adhere to the principles laid out in the CGIAR Joint Declaration as adopted at the 2009 Business Meeting;

2. The Fund is an instrument for harmonizing their approach to funding international agricultural research through the CGIAR;

3. They are financing the approved CGIAR SRF through one or more of the three funding windows, preferably through the unrestricted funding window;

4. If they were to provide bilateral funding these should be for activities within or consistent with the agreed SRF;

5. They will rely on the judgment of the Fund Council, as the decision-making body of the Fund, for collective decisions on behalf of all Fund Donors, including allocation decisions on unrestricted funds (Window 1), following review of funding requests from the Consortium;

6. In supporting a move to program funding, the Fund Council will ensure the continued existence of appropriate funding mechanisms for mission critical items such as gene banks and essential capital improvements;

7. All outflows from the Fund to the Consortium from Windows 1 and 2 would be based on proposals received and approved by the Fund Council;

8. All inflows to the Fund will cover costs associated with Trustee and Fund Office operations. All inflows to the Fund and any other funds flowing to the Centers to support the SRF (bilateral funding) will cover costs associated with system-wide functions (including the Consortium budget, shared Consortium services, ISPC and evaluations).

9. The World Bank, as Trustee, would serve as the agent of the Fund Council in effectuating program performance agreements between the Fund and the Consortium;

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10. Fund Donors intending to contribute to Window 2 agree that, in the event their preferred program(s) appear to be overfunded based on initial funding indications, the Fund Council could advise them to channel part of their resources to underfunded programs;

11. They will rely on the independent evaluation and performance monitoring mechanisms established by the Fund Council and the Consortium and refrain from conducting additional, duplicative evaluations of Mega Programs or Centers;

12. The costs of the Fund Council and Fund Office and the trust fund administration fee charged by the World Bank will be financed by the Fund Donors.

13. Rights and remedies regarding fiduciary and programmatic responsibility are as negotiated with the Consortium and reside with the Fund Council, as a collective, on behalf of all Fund Donors.

1.c Fund Allocation Process: A Preliminary Description Context. The Mega Programs are expected to be financed through four possible sources of funding:

Source 1: Window 1 funds allocated by the Fund Council; Source 2: Window 2 funds designated by individual Fund Donors for Mega

Programs; Source 3: Window 3 funds designated by individual Fund Donors for a Center,

with the expectation that part of such funds may, in the Center’s discretion, be allocated to Mega Programs;

Source 4: Bilateral funds (resources provided outside the Fund framework) for financing a project or activity that is part of that Mega Program .

Because of the complexities involved in balancing supply and demand for funds, the fund allocation process needs to be iterative rather than linear. Program design and financing need to be adjusted and fine-tuned in an iterative manner in order to arrive at a portfolio of programs that has sufficient funding.1

Program Review and Approval. The responsibility for approving individual Mega Program proposals rests with the Fund Council, based on program criteria set by the Fund Council in consultation with the Consortium. The Consortium is required to follow these criteria in the preparation and submission of each Mega Program proposal to the Council. In addition to the program content, each Mega Program proposal will include a financing plan. The Fund Council reviews first the program content of the proposal, with advice from ISPC and other experts (as needed). If a proposal does not pass the program criteria established by the Fund Council, it is rejected. The Consortium has the right to submit a revised proposal. The Fund Council reviews financing plans of only the Mega Program proposals that pass the program content criteria. The Fund Council informs the Consortium of any mismatch 1 See also Section E

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between the financing plans proposed by the Consortium and available Window 1 and Window 2 funds. Mega Programs that have no mismatches in financing may be approved by the Fund Council and proceed to preparation of performance agreements. Where there are mismatches, the Consortium has the opportunity to propose a modified proposal and matching financing plan that could be fully funded. The Council reviews the modified proposal and financing plan and makes a decision to approve or reject the proposal. The following flow chart illustrates the envisaged process.

STEP 3a Program proposal

meets criteria

STEP 3b Program proposal does not meet criteria and is rejected

STEP 4a FC reviews financing plans

STEP 4b Consortium may

submit revised proposal (BACK TO STEP 1)

STEP 5 FC may interact with Donors on

financing

STEP 7a Consortium may submit modified proposal and

financing plan (BACK TO STEP 1)

STEP 7b FC and Consortium enter into program performance

agreements

STEP 6 FC and Consortium hold

dialogue on Mps with financing gaps

STEP 6b Mega Programs with full

financing are approved by FC

STEP 2 FC reviews program content of

proposal with advice from ISPC and others

STEP 1 Consortium submits Mega Program

proposal to Fund Council (FC)

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1.d Entities and Events Associated with the Fund The CGIAR’s new governance structure includes new entities and events. Principal among these are the following:

• Funders Forum • Fund Council • Fund Office • Trustee • Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) • Consortium • Centers

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relationships among these entities in terms of agreements and flows of funding and information.

2. Funders Forum Objectives and Functions

Funders Forum is a biennial event providing a platform through which the participants

• discuss and exchange views about the CGIAR; • endorse the SRF proposed by the Consortium every six years; • review and endorse the proposal on cost structure and financing plan for system-

wide functions developed by the Consortium in conjunction with the Fund Council;

• provide feedback to the Consortium and the Fund Council on the implementation of the SRF based on progress reports received from them and on the mid-term reviews of the SRF; and

• review shortfalls or imbalances in resources available for Mega Programs, so that individual donors could consider adjusting their allocations.

Participants All countries and organizations that are Fund Donors, members of the Fund Council, or countries hosting the headquarters of a CGIAR Center or the Consortium are automatically invited to participate in the Funders Forum. In addition, participation in the Forum is open to all bilateral donors making a minimum financial contribution of US$500,000 in the prior calendar year to support implementation of the SRF. The Chair of the Forum, in consultation with donor participants, will identify and invite representatives of CGIAR’s internal and external stakeholders who are not members of the Fund Council, including potential donors, to participate in the Forum.

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Meetings The Forum will be convened every two years, synchronized with the biennial meeting of GCARD in such a way as to ensure feed-in of GCARD recommendations to the Forum. In addition, in the off years CGIAR donors would be invited to have dialogue with the Consortium and the Centers in events linked with the Fund Council meetings, according to a format agreed by the Consortium and the Fund Council. The inaugural meeting of the Forum will be chaired by the Chair of the Fund Council. The Fund Council will propose options for chairmanship of subsequent meetings for discussion and decision at the inaugural Forum. The Chair provides leadership to the deliberations of the Forum, interacts with the Fund Council, the Consortium, and Funder Forum participants, and provides guidance to the Fund Office on Forum matters, such as the follow-up of Forum recommendations on the SRF. Support to the Forum and its Chair is provided by the Fund Office.

3. Fund Council

Objectives and Functions

The Fund Council is the Fund's decision-making body, representing the Fund Donors. The Council has the following specific responsibilities2

:

1. In discharging its responsibilities, the Fund Council has an overview of the CGIAR’s strategic impact, quality and relevance of programmatic performance, managerial and governance performance, and its financial performance and resource mobilization, based primarily on information from the Consortium.

Overview:

2. Providing oversight on the use of funds from the Fund, based in part on reporting, audits and other assurances of due diligence regarding use of such funds provided by the Consortium.

3. Setting criteria, standards, formats, and processes for funding Mega Program proposals from the Consortium, in consultation with the Consortium.

Mega Program and Institutional Support:

4. Reaching a results-based program performance agreement with the Consortium on each Mega Program,3

2. Annex table 1 illustrates the new program cycle in the CGIAR, including the roles and responsibilities of various actors.

on the basis of advice from the ISPC on Mega Program

3. The Fund Council and the Consortium would have an umbrella agreement defining mutual roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities in funding, implementing, monitoring, and evaluation of individual Mega Programs. This agreement would also cover standard provisions that would apply to individual Mega Program agreements.

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proposals received and subsequent revisions, if any, of the proposal based on the reaction of the Fund Council.

5. Recognizing the Consortium Board’s core responsibility for resource mobilization, the Fund Council will contribute to the development and implementation of a joint resource mobilization strategy for the Fund, so as to provide adequate and predictable funding for Mega Programs.

Resource Mobilization:

6. Ascertaining that the Consortium has in place effective accounting and control systems and processes to ensure that funds transferred to the Consortium are used for their intended purpose.

Fund Allocation:

7. Allocating Window 1 funds. 8. Reconciling funding requirements and availability for individual Mega Programs in the

program portfolio, based on information provided by the Consortium.

9. Appraising the performance of the Consortium in meeting its obligations as defined in performance agreements, relying on accurate, comprehensive, timely, and harmonized information provided by the Consortium, and taking corrective action such as withholding funds in exceptional circumstances.

Monitoring and Evaluation:

10. Commissioning periodic independent evaluations of Mega Programs (and cross-cutting themes) as deemed appropriate, including with a view to validating findings from external evaluations commissioned by the Consortium, to provide independent validation of the findings of the self-evaluations commissioned by the Consortium.

11. Self-monitoring the efficacy of its fund allocation mechanism. 12. Monitoring the performance of the ISPC and the Fund Office.

13. Appointing the Chair of the Fund Council and proposing arrangements for the Chair of the Funders Forum.

Governance:

14. Appointing the Chair and members of the ISPC and approving its program and budget. 15. Leading an international competitive process to identify the head of the Fund Office

for the World Bank to appoint, and, when needed, suggesting a replacement. 16. Providing conflict of interest guidance for the Fund. 17. Approving the Fund Office work program and budget.

18. Based on information provided by the Consortium, informing (i) Fund Donors on the utilization of their funds and the achieved results and (ii) the Funders Forum on the implementation of the SRF and imbalances in funding Mega Programs.

Reporting:

19. Reporting to Fund Donors on future funding prospects.

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Membership The Fund Council is a representative body of Fund Donors and other stakeholders, composed of donor countries, multilateral and global organizations and foundations, and representatives of the South.

• Donor Countries are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the four constituencies used for Council membership purposes are: Europe, North America, Asia and the Pacific;

• Multilateral and Global Organizations and Foundations are multilateral organizations contributing to the Fund, foundations contributing to the Fund, and the Global Forum for Agricultural Research (GFAR);

• Developing Countries and Regional Organizations serving the South comprises representatives for the following constituencies: (i) Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA), (ii) Asia, (iii) Pacific, (iv) Central, West Asia and North Africa (CWANA), (v) Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), and (vi) the Regional Fora (of agricultural research constituted by countries in each developing country region).

While there is no minimum for contributions to the Fund, the minimum contribution required to become a Fund Donor eligible for representation in the Fund Council is USD 500,000. For the inaugural Fund Council this would be based on the average of the last two years for which data are available (2007-2008). It would include both restricted and unrestricted contributions and would apply to all donor countries, developing countries and foundations. The Fund Council may adjust eligibility requirements for Council membership, including in view of actual contributions to the Fund.

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The inaugural Fund Council will have 21 seats, and proposed allocation of seats among the foregoing groupings and constituencies is as follows: Proposed Composition of Inaugural CGIAR Fund Council

Number of Seats

Donor Countries

Europe 4

North America 2

Asia 1

Pacific 1

8

Developing Countries & Regional Organizations

SSA 2

Asia 2

Pacific 1

CWANA 1

LAC 1

Regional Fora 1

8

Multilateral and Global Organizations & Foundations

World Bank 1

IFAD 1

FAO 1

Foundations 2

GFAR 1

6

Total 22

sub-total

sub-total

sub-total

The following underlying principles are embedded in Fund Council membership:

1. Donor country seats will take into account recognition of share of their funding (not exact proportionality), and regional balance. This will recognize, over time,

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the value of unrestricted or program funding, whether supporting the SRF or its component programs.

2. The Council will maintain North-South balance in its membership. 3. Constituencies are free to rotate their seats according to their own rules (which

should shared for information with the Fund Council in the interest of transparency, not decision).

4. In the event that a Southern constituency does not have a qualifying Fund Donor, a regional organization should be asked to manage a process that will decide on a Fund Council representative to serve until a qualifying member emerges.

5. If a major foundation wishes to join the Fund and contributes significant funding, the Fund Council could consider adding an additional seat to the Foundations constituency.

6. Members will be expected to disclose and manage conflicts of interest. 7. Effectiveness of the initial Fund Council will be reviewed as part of the external

review of the System in three years, and suggested revisions might be proposed to change Fund Council composition. In this case, a special meeting including all Fund Donors will be called to decide on any changes (as needed).

The term of membership for the inaugural Fund Council is three calendar years for all members, unless otherwise agree by the Fund Council. Chair and Executive Secretary The Fund Council Chair will be nominated by the World Bank President from among the Vice Presidents of the World Bank, after informal consultation with the Fund Donors. The Chair leads the conduct of the Fund Council’s business, chairs the Fund Council meetings, and represents the CGIAR Fund in external fora. The Executive Secretary of the Fund manages the Fund Office and assists the Chair in the conduct of Council business and represents the Council in external fora. The Chair, Executive Secretary, and the Fund Council are supported by the staff of the Fund Office. Meetings The Fund Council meets face-to-face twice a year. Additional meetings can be held as necessary. Meetings are preferably hosted by a Fund Donor or Center, as designated by the Fund Council Chair. The Fund Council may also conduct business electronically between meetings. All meetings of the Fund Council are open to any Fund Donor as observer. Representatives of other stakeholders may be invited to participate in a Council meeting as observers. The Fund Council will determine its own internal rules and procedures, including rules for managing potential conflicts of interest. It has the option to convene Executive Sessions.

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Decision Making Decisions by the Fund Council will be made by consensus of its members. The Chair articulates the consensus view. If consensus is not possible, then the proposed decision will be postponed or withdrawn. Whenever a decision must be made by the Council that cannot be postponed until the subsequent Council meeting, and no special meeting is called, the Chair may seek to have the decision made on an electronic “no-objection basis.” The Fund Office will keep track of the decisions made on a no-objection basis. The Council will make its decision processes transparent, through timely and accurate reporting to all Fund Donors, and periodic governance reviews of the Fund Council. It will provide clear instructions to Trustee regarding funding allocations and agreements with the Consortium on Mega Programs.

4. Fund Office Objectives and Functions The CGIAR Fund Office is the support unit of the Funders Forum, the Fund Council, and their respective Chairs. Fiduciary responsibility for the Fund resides with the Fund Council. The Fund Office does not have fiduciary, monitoring, or oversight roles regarding the use of Fund funds. The Fund Office has responsibilities in the following four areas:

1. Support to Fund Council.

a. Managing relations with Fund Donors;

The Fund Office assists the Council and its Chair in the conduct of the Council’s business. Examples include:

b. Drafting background notes and papers as requested by the Fund Council; c. Setting up and maintaining data bases; d. Developing draft Fund Council procedures and guidelines; f. Analyzing the Consortium’s compliance with performance agreements, based on

information submitted by the Consortium; and g. Support to the Fund Council in resource mobilization efforts, in close collaboration

with the Consortium.

2. Support to Funders Forum

. The Fund Office assists the Chair of the Funders Forum in organizing the Forum.

3. Liaison with the Trustee, Consortium, and ISPC

. The Fund Office assists the Fund Council in maintaining its business relations and dialogue with the Trustee, Consortium, and ISPC on day-to-day operational matters.

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4. Meeting Support and Communications.a. Organizes and backstops the regular meetings of the Funders Forum and the Fund

Council;

b. Coordinates the Forum’s and the Council’s nomination and election processes (such as for ISPC);

c. Coordinates communications on behalf of the Fund and its Chair; and d. Maintains the Fund’s archives and manages its information activities.

Staffing and Budget The Executive Secretary of the Fund Council leads the Fund Office and is identified through an international recruitment effort for appointment by the World Bank. The Fund Office is a team of high-level professional staff with expertise in the areas of responsibility of the Office. The Fund Office is located in the World Bank headquarters and its staff are employed by the World Bank. The work program and operating budget of the Fund Office are subject to approval by the Fund Council and are financed through the CGIAR Fund. The Fund Office operates under World Bank policies.

5. Trustee

The World Bank will serve as the trustee of the CGIAR Fund, under its trust fund policies. The Fund Donors would enter into Trust Fund Administration Agreements with the World Bank with common provisions for all donors. The World Bank, as trustee, will provide the following limited trustee functions:

a. it will hold in trust the funds transferred by Fund Donors under Trust Fund Administration Agreements;

b. it will serve as an agent of the Fund Council in disbursing Fund resources based on specific instructions from the Fund Council and through Fund Transfer Agreements between the World Bank and the Consortium;

c. it would provide regular reports on its Trustee activities to the Fund Council, Fund Donors, and the Consortium; and

d. it would not be responsible for supervising use of funds nor any other form of supervision.

6. Independent Science and Partnership Council

ISPC is a critical advisory entity associated with the Fund. It is an independent standing panel appointed by the Fund Council whose overarching purpose is to provide independent advice and expertise to the funders of the CGIAR through services to the Fund Council and the Funders Forum. It also serves as an intellectual bridge between the funders and the Consortium. ISPC reports to the Fund Council. The Consortium may seek

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advice from ISPC in areas that do not create a conflict of interest for either party. See Annex 1 outlines the ISPC roles and responsibilities.

C. Responsibilities of CGIAR Donors

All CGIAR donors are encouraged to endorse the CGIAR Joint Declaration and resolve to uphold the set of core principles it describes and strive to act consistently with them. Donors providing institutional funding through the CGIAR Fund should take measures to shift their funding to Windows 1 or 2 before Window 3, which is intended to be transitional, is closed. All CGIAR donors should refrain from conducting separate reviews of the Mega Programs and individual Centers.

D. Responsibilities of the Consortium

Responsibilities of the Consortium will be defined in the Consortium Constitution and agreed in agreements for the receipt of CGIAR Fund funds

E. Responsibilities of CGIAR Centers

The primary responsibilities of Centers are defined in the Consortium Constitution. In addition, however, there are responsibilities relating to accepting funding from outside the Fund. These are:

• Centers should inform the Consortium of any non-Fund financing. • avoid funding that would compromise either the ability of that Center or any other

Center to fulfill its obligations to deliver on the SRF or compromise the reputation of the CGIAR.

• ensure and certify that all funding covers the full economic costs of the activity. The sharing of information on non-Fund financing is necessary because the Fund Council would not be able to effectively allocate funding to Mega Programs from the CGIAR Fund without information about the amounts of bilateral funds also being channeled to each Mega Program.

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Figure 1. CGIAR Fund Flow Chart

Fund Allocation

CGIAR Consortium* Fund Council

Fund Office

Trustee (World Bank)

Fund Donors

Performance Agreements on Mega Programs and other SRF funding

Transfer Agreements

Trust Fund Administration Agreements

Select

Reporting on Performance Proposal Submission

ISPC

Inform Advise Appoint

* Funds may flow directly to Centers

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Prog

ress

R

epor

t

Funding and Performance Agreements

Fund Council

Fund Office

Funders Forum

Reporting on Performance

Strategy and Results Framework

Trustee

Figure 2. SRF Implementation Flow Chart

Rep

ortin

g on

Per

form

ance

an

d In

stitu

tiona

l Hea

lth

Funding and Performance Agreements

Center 15

Center 1

Funding and Project Agreements

Parti

cipa

te

CGIAR Consortium

Bilateral Donors

ISPC

Inform Advise Appoint

Feed

back

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Table 1. CGIAR Program Cycle Steps and Roles of Principal Actors

Consortium Centers and

Partners

Independent Science and Partnership

Council Funders Forum Fund Council

Step 1. Develop SRF

Lead development

Collaborate in development, particularly through GCARD

Provide advice during development Endorse SRF Collaborate in

development

Step 2. Develop Individual MP Proposals

- Develop proposal - Negotiate contract - Mobilize resources Provide progress reports

Collaborate in proposal development, particularly through GCARD

Review proposals and make recommendations to Fund Council

Receive progress reports from Consortium

- Mobilize resources - Seek advice from ISPC - Approve MPs

Step 3. Implement Agreed Programs

- Contract with Centers and partners - Coordinate program implementation using results-based management

Implement contracted programs and program components

Provide advice as requested Receive progress

reports

Step 4. Monitor Achievement of Agreed Targets

- Monitor progress by Centers and partners - Take corrective action (as needed)

Self-monitor progress

Provide advice to Consortium as requested

Receive progress reports from Consortium

- Review progress by Consortium (using agreed result indicators) - Take corrective action (as needed)

Step 5. Evaluate Program (every four years)

External or self- evaluation as necessary; promote learning and performance enhancement

Coordinate through Consortium

Provide advice as requested Receive evaluations

- Commission independent evaluations - Take corrective action (as needed)

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Independent Science and Partnership Council

Annex 1 Independent Science and Partnership Council Roles and Responsibilities The Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) will be a standing panel of world-class scientific experts. The Council’s overarching purpose is to provide independent advice and expertise to the funders of the CGIAR through services to the Fund Council and the Funders Forum. It will also serve as an intellectual bridge between the funders and the Consortium of CGIAR Centers. The ISPC plays a vital role for the CGIAR to strengthen science, to improve productivity and quality of science, to catalyze the partnering of CGIAR science with other institutions of international agricultural research and to support the important role of the CGIAR as honest broker in various global debates. In providing its advice, the ISPC will ensure alignment of programs with the Strategy and Results Framework. As part of a learning organization, the ISPC will capitalize on previous evaluations and seek to provide its learning to evaluations being done by the peer review process and eventual ex-post evaluation. ISPC’s specific tasks will be: 1. Commission and oversee evaluations of the scientific quality, relevance, partnership

arrangements and likely development effectiveness of the investment proposals submitted by the Consortium to the Fund Council and make recommendations concerning their investment worthiness.

2. In undertaking the role described in 1 above, the ISPC will also provide feedback and guidance to the Consortium on any areas of concern regarding the quality of the proposed research and partnership arrangements contained in submitted investment proposals and on any deficiencies in the ex ante impact assessments provided by the Consortium in support of them.

3. Provide the Fund Council and the Funders Forum with foresight advice on trends and emerging issues, as well as potential strategies of addressing them related to the CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework. In undertaking this role the ISPC will act as commissioner and coordinator of any required foresight studies, drawing on expertise within the Consortium and beyond, as appropriate, to undertake them.

4. To complement the GCARD process, in consultation and partnership with the Consortium and GFAR, convene periodic high-level scientific dialogues on high priority issues that will inform the scientific deliberations among CGIAR scientists and their research partners and help catalyze partnerships of the CGIAR with other global science communities.

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5. Improve strategic investment decisions and help increase the rigor and the reach of impact assessment studies within the CGIAR by commissioning, in partnership with the Consortium, ex-post impact assessment of the development effectiveness of CGIAR investments. The evaluation of the Mega Programs and system review will be undertaken by an independent evaluation arrangement, which will in turn avail itself of the lessons learnt from the ISPC’s work.

6. Provide the Fund Council with independent advice on other matters upon request.

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Chapter 4

M&E Framework for the New CGIAR

This chapter defines a set of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) principles, and describes key characteristics of the new M&E system for the CGIAR guided by international good practice in M&E of global programs.

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1. Introduction The funders and implementers of the CGIAR’s international agricultural research for development share a mutual accountability to all users of that research, and together with partners, have a shared responsibility for getting CGIAR research into use to achieve development outcomes. The CGIAR accountability lies in four main areas:

■ Strategic Impact ■ Quality and Relevance of Programmatic Performance ■ Managerial and Governance Performance ■ Financial Performance and Resource Mobilization

A key element of good accountability practice is Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), as both learning and control mechanisms at the levels of the Centers, the Consortium, the Mega Programs, the Fund, and the Partnership as a whole.

Monitoring and evaluation in the CGIAR has been evolving since the CGIAR was established in 1971. The Review mechanisms currently include External Program and Management Reviews (EPMRs) of Centers, Center Board–commissioned external reviews (CCERs), Inter-Center thematic stripe reviews, donor commissioned center and/or program reviews, and the annual Performance Measurement (PM) System.

While these mechanisms have been strengthened in recent years and the culture of monitoring and evaluation is strong, a primary objective of the reform process was to streamline review processes, clarify core responsibilities and reduce duplication. The new M&E Framework is

Definitions

Monitoring - A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified

indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing (development) intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and

progress in the use of allocated funds.

Evaluation - The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and

sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients and donors. Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy or program. An assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of a

planned, on-going, or completed (development) intervention.

Source: OECD-DAC, “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results,” Paris, 2002.

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M&E Framework for the New CGIAR 3

designed to achieve these objectives while also strengthening M&E outputs and meeting fiduciary requirements of the Fund and the Consortium.

2. A New M&E Framework for the CGIAR The new Monitoring and Evaluation Framework will support the successful execution of the SRF and help translate the CGIAR vision into tangible results. It will reflect a new accountability framework in which the Consortium is responsible for high quality monitoring and evaluation of Centers and their contribution to the Mega Programs, and the Fund Council regularly appraises the performance of the Consortium. In addition, an independent evaluation arrangement will be established to avoid conflicts of interest.

2.1. Principles of M&E in the CGIAR (1) Evaluation of performance to achieve the Strategy and Results Framework and

governance of the CGIAR will follow international best practice and will include evaluations that are independent and impartial to the policy-making process and delivery and management of programs.

(2) The Consortium, Centers and CGIAR Fund donors are mutually accountable for Mega Program outputs financed by the Fund. As agreed in the performance agreements, (i) the Consortium and Centers are accountable for high-quality science and technology products and services, and (ii) fund donors are accountable for an aligned provision of funds to support the development of research outputs.

(3) The monitoring system for research under the SRF is the overall responsibility of the Consortium and is designed to provide real-time information about program outputs and outcomes to research managers in Centers and the Consortium. This information also serves as a basis for regular progress reports of the Consortium to the Fund Council, and thus for annual performance reviews by the Fund Council. A common system and set of metrics will be used for reporting program performance information to the Consortium and the Fund Council.

(4) The evaluation system provides periodic objective assessments of the extent to which Mega Programs and other aspects of the CGIAR are likely to or have achieved their stated objectives, as articulated in the SRF and the CGIAR Joint Declaration.

• The Consortium Board commissions periodic External Evaluations of Mega Programs components and/or cross-cutting issues. These evaluations feed into the independent evaluations of Mega Programs.

• The Consortium Board also commissions External Evaluations of Centers every five years to evaluate Centers' governance, management and financial health. The broad objective of a Center evaluation is to provide the Consortium Board with an external and rigorous assessment of the institutional health of Centers. The evaluation of Centers programmatic performance is incorporated in the evaluation of Mega-Programs.

• The Fund Council commissions Independent Evaluations of Mega Programs every four years focusing on the extent to which its outputs and outcomes are likely to

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achieve, or have achieved, stated objectives. The evaluations are implemented through an independent evaluation arrangement and may include validation of findings from external evaluations commissioned by the Consortium.

• An Independent Evaluation of the Partnership is carried out every six to seven years. It is commissioned by a Reference Group constituted for the purpose, in which all relevant parties will be represented. The evaluation will assess (i) the efficacy of the Consortium, the Fund, the ISPC (including their support units), and the relationship with GCARD; and (ii) the effectiveness of the research conducted by the Partnership in light of the CGIAR Vision and Strategic Objectives.

• All evaluations will be carried out in the context of this framework, i.e., all CGIAR

Fund Donors and Centers will to the extent possible and unless otherwise approved by the Consortium Board, rely on this evaluation framework and refrain from conducting additional, duplicative evaluations of Mega Programs or Centers. All evaluations are publicly disclosed.

2.2 Performance Monitoring Key characteristics of the new monitoring system follow:

• A reliable and harmonized performance monitoring system for Centers and Mega Programs will be established and managed by the Consortium.

• This Integrated Planning and Results Measurement System1

• Performance in the four areas of accountability will be monitored: (i) Strategic Impact (SI), (ii) Quality and Relevance of Programmatic Performance (PP), (iii) Managerial and Governance Performance (M&G), and (iv) Financial Performance and Resource Mobilization (FP& RB).

will provide streamlined information on Mega Program plans, status of implementation, results, finance, and partnerships. It will provide access to project and program monitoring information at different aggregation levels for monitoring purposes by Centers, Consortium, and Fund.

• The Fund Council will regularly appraise the performance of the Consortium in meeting its obligations as defined in the performance agreements.

• The Fund Council is the principal performance monitoring body of the Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC).

• The Fund Council may review the performance of the Fund Office and Trustee.2

• The Fund Council monitors the efficacy of its fund allocation mechanism.

Table 1 describes the new monitoring system.

1. Possibly developed based on the current EasyMTP/CGMap, Performance Measurement System, and the Financial Information System (FIS). 2 Management and oversight of the Fund Office and Trustee of the Fund rests with the World Bank. Any performance reviews by the Fund Council of the Fund Office or Trustee would be conducted in coordination with the Bank and could advise the Bank in its management and oversight capacities.

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M&E Framework for the New CGIAR 5

Table 1: Performance Monitoring in the CGIAR

Monitoring body

Performance dimension1

Area of accountabilitya

Methodology and indicators Frequency

Consortium

MP subprograms • outputs • intermediate

outcomes

PP • Performance Measurement of Programs, i.e., comprehensive monitoring of achievement of MP subcomponent outputs and intermediate outcomes

Ongoing

• institutional and financial health of Centers

FP&RB M&G • Performance Measurement of institutional and financial health indicators

Annual

MP Performance Agreement • Results

SI and PP • Measurement of core output and outcome indicators as defined in the SRF

Annual

• Progress and Corporate Risks

FP&RB M&G • Implementation ratings, disbursement rates

• measures of (i) partnership quality and relevance, (ii) stakeholder perceptions, (iii) cost of consortium administration relative to cost of research, (iv) compliance to fiduciary good practices

Fund Council

Performance Agreements • Rights and

obligations defined in performance agreements

• Resource mobilization and efficacy of fund allocation

SI PP M&G FP&RB

• Based on Consortium report, performance/compliance reviews of performance agreements

• Adequate funding flows • Leveraging complementarities with

national programs and bilateral technical assistance programs

Annual ISPC • Results • Client

orientation

PP M&G FP&RB

• Achievement of work plan • Satisfaction survey

Fund Office

Bank Accountability • Achievement of work plan • Satisfaction survey

a. Strategic Impact (SI); Quality and Relevance of Programmatic Performance (PP); Managerial and Governance Performance (M&G); Financial Performance and Resource Mobilization (FP& RB)

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2.3 Performance Evaluation Key characteristics of the new evaluation system:

• Performance evaluation in the new CGIAR will comprise (i) external evaluations of Mega Program components commissioned by the Consortium Board on a regular schedule, (ii) independent evaluations of Mega Programs and/or cross-cutting themes commissioned by the Fund Council and which may inter alia validate findings of Consortium-commissioned evaluations, and (iii) independent evaluation of the CGIAR Partnership as a whole commissioned by a Joint Fund Council/Consortium Reference Group.

The latter two types of evaluation will be conducted by an independent arrangement on a regular schedule. The various evaluation products will be aligned in scope to avoid duplication and inefficiencies while ensuring rigor and credibility. 3

• Evaluations will assess performance in the four areas of accountability: (i) Strategic Impact (SI), (ii) Quality and Relevance of Programmatic Performance (PP), (iii) Managerial and Governance Performance (M&G), and (iv) Financial Performance and Resource Mobilization (FP& RB).

• Each institution and Partnership body would be required to obtain 360 degree feedback of their performance as part of its own learning and improvement plans.

• Adequate involvement of stakeholders in the evaluation process is considered essential.

• All CGIAR Fund Donors and Centers will rely, to the extent possible and unless otherwise approved by the Consortium Board, on this evaluation framework and refrain from conducting additional, duplicative evaluations of Mega Programs or Centers.

Table 2 describes the evaluation system for the new CGIAR.

3. An “external” evaluation is an evaluation conducted by entities and/or individuals outside the donor and implementing organizations. An “independent” evaluation is an evaluation carried out by entities and persons free of the control of those responsible for the design and implementation of the program. Independence implies freedom from political influence and organizational pressure (OECD-DAC, “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management,” Paris 2002).

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M&E Framework for the New CGIAR 7

Table 2: Performance Evaluation in the CGIAR Commissioning body Evaluation producta,b,c Frequency

Consortium Board

• External evaluations of each Center 5 years

• External evaluation of MP components and cross-cutting issues

• External evaluation of Consortium Office, including shared services

4 years

Fund Council • Independent evaluation of

Mega Programs and cross cutting issues

4 years

Joint Consortium/Fund Council Reference Group

• Independent Partnership Review d 6 to 7 years

a. In addition each entity will conduct 360° assessments and/or stakeholder perception surveys on a regular basis (i.e., 2–3 years), b. The independent evaluation of Mega Programs and the independent Partnership Review will be conducted by an independent evaluation arrangement. c. Brief definitions of the various evaluation products can be found in the glossary. The scope of Center evaluations will be limited to governance, management and financial health of the Center. d. Purpose-built management structure in which both the Consortium and the Fund share control and all CGIAR donors share cost. It is formed for the specific purpose of commissioning and receiving the CGIAR Partnership Review and will be dissolved upon completion of the review.

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2.4 “Mutual Accountability for Outputs” and “Shared Responsibility for Outcomes” In the new CGIAR, two concepts are being introduced that are being addressed by the M&E framework:

■ “mutual accountability for outputs,” which is the relationship between entities within the new CGIAR, where the Consortium and Centers can be expected to be held fully accountable for high-quality science and technology products and services within an agreed time, and mutually, the Fund Donors would be held accountable for an aligned provision of funds to support the development of research outputs as agreed in the performance agreements.

■ “shared responsibility for outcomes,” where both Consortium and CGIAR donors together with their partners have a shared responsibility for managing toward outcomes, i.e., demonstrating sustainable influence and uptake of outputs by clients and longer-term improvements of livelihoods in developing countries.

■ Within this shared responsibility for outcomes, the Consortium together with the Centers are expected to be accountable for engaging with partners, aligning the research agenda with developing countries’ priorities, advocating research needs and achievements, monitoring outcomes based on agreed indicators, and monitoring global trends.

■ The CGIAR donors, in turn, are responsible for harmonizing and aligning their policies and for making an effort to effectively leverage complementarities between CGIAR research and their national programs (developing-country donors) or their bilateral technical assistance programs (multilateral organizations and developed-country donors).

Annex 1 illustrates an example of a possible logical results-monitoring framework in the context of the SRF (including indicators) incorporating the concepts of “mutual accountability for outputs” and “shared responsibility for outcomes.

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M&E Framework for the New CGIAR 9

2.5. Learning and Performance Enhancement In order to make the M&E system most effective, clear follow-up principles, processes, and responsibilities will be defined for the various M&E products described in this framework, to ensure best possible learning and improvements in performance by the different entities. For instance, an evaluation both evaluates the effectiveness of research conducted by the Consortium through its Member Centers, and also enhances institutional learning through an effective feed-back loop from the evaluation to policy makers, researchers, and research managers as well as partners. Moreover, the Fund needs to put in place a process for reviewing the M&E information on the Mega Programs and to take corrective action where necessary.

3. Impact Assessment In the new CGIAR, the Independent Science and Partnership Council (ISPC) will provide independent advice and expertise to the Fund Council. In addition part of the ISPC’s terms of reference is to “improve strategic investment decisions and help increase the rigor and the reach of impact assessment studies within the CGIAR by commissioning, in partnership with the Consortium, ex-post impact assessment of the development effectiveness of CGIAR investments.” To this end the Standing Panel on Impact Assessment (SPIA) will maintain its current form as an independent panel with the Chair of the Panel functioning as an ex officio member of the ISPC.

4. Independent Evaluation Arrangement The new independent evaluation arrangement will be finalized in its design in 2010 and become operational in 2010/11 or as required. Its design and governance should be in accordance with international best practice and follow standards of “independence” as defined by the OECD/DAC Network of Development Evaluation, based on guidance provided by the Fund Council in consultation with the Consortium Board.

“Independence and Impartiality is a Prerequisite for the Credibility of Evaluations”

The Sourcebook for Evaluating Regional and Global Partnership Programs, Indicative Principles and Standards, published by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank and the DAC Network on Development Evaluation, identifies the organizational independence of the evaluation function as a key good practice in evaluation governance.

The sourcebook states that “the members of an evaluation unit or team should not have been directly responsible for setting the policy, design, or overall management of the program, nor expect to be in the near future. Members of an evaluation unit or team evaluating a Global and Regional Partnership Program should report to a unit separate from program management. This would normally be the commissioner of the evaluation, usually the governing body. Members of the unit or team should be insulated from political pressures from either donors or beneficiary groups and should not participate in political activities that could affect independence.”

Source: Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank and the DAC Network on Development Evaluation, Sourcebook for Evaluating Regional and Global Partnership Programs, Indicative Principles and Standards, Washington, DC 2007, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOREGPARPRO/Resources/sourcebook.pdf.

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Additional key considerations in exploring an independent evaluation arrangement are ■ To limit added bureaucracy;

■ to leverage already established good practices and capacity in evaluation through tapping new networks of evaluation experts in agricultural research and development;

■ to enhance evaluation professionalism in the CGIAR;

■ to retain institutional memory and promote institutional learning;

■ to stimulate methodological advancement in the evaluation of the “Research-Development Continuum”;

■ to leverage potential synergies in agricultural research outcome evaluation, i.e., interventions leading to uptake of technologies and other research outputs by partners and stakeholders that are in common;

■ to support harmonization efforts in light of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.

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M&E Framework for the New CGIAR 11

5. Annex

Annex 1: Ilustrative logical results monitoring framework incorporating the concepts of “mutual accountability for outputs” and “shared responsibility for outcomes”

CGIAR Vision

Shared

To reduce poverty and hunger, improve human health and nutrition, and enhance ecosystem resilience through high-quality international agricultural research, partnership, and leadership Results criteria: Food security increase (reduction in malnutrition); Area-weighted productivity increase. Indicator: Calorie deficiency; Yields per hectare

Accountability of Consortium and Centers: • Monitoring global trends • Reporting on results indicators

Accountability of Fund Donors: • Compliance with the Paris

Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action

Strategic Objective

Shared Example: “Food for People” Results criteria: Hunger reduced. Indicator: % undernourished, % children underweight, Income < $1 day

Accountability of Consortium and Centers: • Engagement with partners and

stakeholders • Alignment of research agenda

with developing countries’ priorities

• Monitoring outcome indicators • Reporting on shared outcomes • Gap analysis

Accountability of Fund Donors: • Harmonize and align policies • Demonstrate efforts to effectively

leverage complementarities of CGIAR research with national programs and bilateral technical assistance programs

• Independent evaluation of Mega Programs

• Ex post impact assessment of the development effectiveness of CGIAR investments

Mega Program/Strategic Intermediate Objective

Shared

Example: Increase Productivity of Crop and Livestock Systems Outcome 1 / Core Result 1: The use of drought-tolerant maize has significantly improved livelihoods of poor farm households in Africa Outcome Indicator 1: % of land under maize cultivation in Africa use drought-tolerant variety by 20XX. Target: x% of land under maize cultivation in Africa use drought-tolerant variety by 20xx

Intermediate Outcome

Shared Example: National Agricultural Research System in country X incorporates new drought-tolerant variety into their its program Intermediate Outcome 1 Indicator 1: NARS countries x, y, z release new high drought-resistant maize variety to farmers by 20XX

Output

Full

Example : New high drought-resistant maize variety available Annual target and indicator: • Community-based varietal testing completed

in x, y, z communities • New phenotyping protocols for crop water

status defined for maize

Accountability of Consortium and Centers: • Achieving outputs • Monitoring and reporting on

outputs • Ensuring Center systems in place

to monitor and report on results • Ensuring institutional and

financial health

Accountability of Fund Donors: • Aligned and adequate funding

Shar

ed R

espo

nsib

ility

M

utua

l Acc

ount

abili

ty

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Annex 2

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viiIntroduction

towards a strategy and results framework for the Cgiar

Joachim von Braun (chair) Derek Byerlee Colin Chartres Tom Lumpkin Norah Olembo Jeff Waage

November 18, 2009

Page 2

Fast-tracking of the Strategy is recommended, but is not advisable to do so with a few selected Mega Programs. Fast tracking just a few selected Mega Programs could undermine the potential synergies among the Mega Programs in the systems context. Still, fast tracking the portfolio can be done because all Mega Programs have elements that can be fast tracked. We expect that the strategizing will specifically continue in the context of GCARD processes and with guidance of the Consortium Board. It will require strategic leadership by the Consortium Board with advice by independent bodies and reviewers to move the Strategy and Results Framework to coherent implementation by the Centers. Best wishes, Joachim von Braun Director General, IFPRI

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xiiiIntroduction

The recent food crisis — combined with the global financial crisis, volatile energy prices, natural resources depletion, and emerging climate-change issues — undercuts and threatens the livelihoods of millions of poor people and destabilizes the economic, ecological, and political situation in many developing countries. Progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (such as halving hunger and poverty by 2015) has been delayed significantly; in fact, as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) reports, the number of undernourished people actually increased in the past two years. These challenges require coordinated, multifaceted, science-based technological, economic, and policy approaches. The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) has a key role to play in addressing these challenges.

The CGIAR vision is to “reduce poverty and hunger, improve human health and nutrition, and enhance ecosystem resilience through high-quality international agricultural research, partnership, and leadership.” By creating and facilitating innovative technologies, exploiting vast germplasm resources, marshaling public and private research through a broad network of partnerships, and pointing the way to policy and institutional innovations, the international research Centers of the CGIAR are well positioned to contribute to the global effort to foster food production, sustainably manage natural resources and the environment, increase access to food, and reduce poverty and hunger in both rural and urban areas.

The CGIAR system will effectively address these global challenges with a new results-oriented strategy and an improved organizational design, which will attract the additional funds the CGIAR needs to fully exploit its potential for enhancing global food security and environmental sustainability. An ongoing change process is addressing organizational design and funding. This paper aims to develop a comprehensive new strategy for the CGIAR, spell out its programmatic focus, and examine what can be expected from a scaled-up CGIAR.

The aim here is to articulate a strategy that promises to get the job done — that is, a strategy oriented to results at scale. The Strategy Team is pursuing a results orientation not only at the system level, but also at the level of identified Mega Programs (MPs) — major research efforts reaching across CGIAR Centers and their partners that promise to make an important difference to achieving global development goals. Developing a results-oriented research system — in contrast to, for instance, a results-oriented development program — requires due attention to be paid to the unpredictable outcomes of research undertakings and the tendency of science to be full of surprises. Freedom of research and space for “blue-sky” innovation and experimentation are needed to tap the creativity of researchers.

exeCutive summary

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Towards a Strategy and Results Framework for the CGIARxiv

There can be no doubt about the strong role of agricultural research, in concert with other development investments, in poverty reduction and growth: investments in agricultural research typically rank first or second in returns to growth and poverty reduction, along with investments in infrastructure and education. Fortunately, a new and broad based consensus is emerging that investment in agriculture and in related, research-based innovations must be accelerated. This new consensus raises several obvious questions: on what and where should research be focused, by how much should this investment be accelerated, and what can be expected from it?

In developing the Strategy and Results Framework, the approach taken here is toconsult broadly with research communities inside and outside the CGIAR and to use related systematic ■

surveys; draw on comprehensive modeling and mapping, employing the best tools on hand; and■

communicate with leaders in related professions and noted visionaries. ■

This report documents a preliminary Strategy and Results Framework. The strategy presented here is for the CGIAR as a whole. It is being developed on the basis of evidence and expected outcomes in support of the CGIAR vision. The Strategy Team respects interests of research communities and stakeholders; it expects that a process of consultations that factors in opinions and interests will follow, and it did not aim to pre-empt that process. The Strategy Team has operated openly, making all of its sources publicly available. It has also paid attention to the legitimacy of process, building on the approved CGIAR vision, mission, and objectives and drawing on earlier CGIAR and partners’ initiatives, such as long-listings of potential programs, rather than creating new ones from scratch. Furthermore, as a public good, the team is documenting the tools it uses for aggregation and judgment to facilitate the CGIAR’s capacity to strategize as a system and to provide a useful toolbox for future CGIAR strategizing.

Worldwide, more investment in agricultural research is clearly needed. To determine how much more, the Strategy Team uses a scenario analysis based on a global model to assess the future threats to people and ecologies and the opportunities for agricultural research and development (R&D). Under a business-as-usual scenario that includes climate change, production and crop yields will increase too slowly and food prices are expected to increase significantly. Accelerated R&D investment — combined with plausible increases in other development investments — will make a big difference to agriculture, global and regional food security, and child nutrition. The results suggest, for instance, that when compared with the baseline scenario, a high-investment comprehensive scenario with improved research efficiency, irrigation, natural resources management, and market access could reduce the price of maize by 22 percent in 2025, wheat by 17 percent, and rice by 13 percent. By lowering the prices of food staples for the poor, such a scenario, compared with the baseline, would reduce the number of undernourished children in developing countries by 17 million in 2025. Expanded R&D investment in agriculture is critical for preventing future global food crises and human suffering.

A coherent global and regional strategy is needed for scaling up and improving the efficiency of agricultural R&D in general, and the role of the CGIAR in particular. To increase agricultural productivity annually by 0.5 percentage points across all regions until 2025 (the desired level estimated for a food-secure world) would require a massive expansion of investment above the current levels in public agricultural research in developing countries, including the CGIAR. Beyond just spending more, however, two other actions need to be taken: increase the efficiency of R&D and allocate investments more optimally. Combining these three actions has large impacts on the reduction of poverty. Poverty (defined as living on $1.25 a day) would be reduced by 401 million people by 2025. Most of the poor earning less than $1.25 a day live in South Asia (698 million people) and Sub-Saharan Africa (365 million people). Reducing poverty thus means allocating a significant share of R&D investment to those regions. At a global scale, public agricultural R&D for developing countries would need to increase from the current US$5.1 billion to US$16.4 billion in 2025. This figure includes the investment needed for international public goods, as well as national public agricultural research. The underinvestment in

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xvIntroduction

international public goods in general, and in agricultural research in particular, is well documented. Holding constant the share of international public goods R&D of total public R&D spending (which is currently about 10 percent) seems to be a conservative assumption. Thus, applying this 10 percent share to the total needed public agricultural R&D investment of US$16.4 billion suggests we would need to aim for a CGIAR of US$1.6 billion — in other words, tripling its current size by 2025.

To address specifically where the CGIAR should focus its investments, the Strategy Team used comprehensive and innovative mapping to complement the modeling as it developed the Strategy and Results Framework and the MPs for research. This approach brings together for the first time information on poverty, production and market access opportunities, and ecosystems challenges in spatially disaggregated ways. In particular, this approach helps to identify subregional and domain priorities and hot spots for R&D actions in the various proposed MPs. The detailed mapping of multiple, overlaid categories of information can contribute to the regional consultations of the Global Forum on Agricultural Research (GFAR) and others.

A large-scale survey of scientists on research opportunities has been completed, and the Strategy Team has used it to explore MP opportunities. About 400 scientists participated, suggesting more than 500 research opportunities. Each of the MPs will be further scrutinized in view of these bottom-up ideas. The findings will also be of use for upcoming regional consultations by the GFAR.

a framework for the whole Cgiar system

The Strategy and Results Framework serves the overall CGIAR system goal and builds on the three CGIAR system objectives (subgoals):

Create and accelerate sustainable increases in the productivity and production of healthy food by and for the 1. poor. (Food for People)Conserve, enhance, and sustainably use natural resources and biodiversity to improve the livelihoods of the 2. poor in response to climate change and other factors. (Environment for People)Promote policy and institutional change that will stimulate agricultural growth and equity to benefit the poor, 3. especially rural women and other disadvantaged groups. (Policy for People)

For that, ambitious but realistic results on timelines are being defined. Investors should know what they can expect when they invest in the CGIAR. The expected outcomes at the system level, arising from the research outputs in the Strategy and Results Framework, are defined as system-level results, which at this stage of the development of the Strategy and Results Framework (SRF) are only partly quantified in the following ways:

Lift productivity and reduce poverty1. . An increase in annual agricultural productivity by an additional 0.5 percentage points to help farmers meet the food needs of the future world population and to help reduce poverty by 15 percent by 2025, as part of an overall global agricultural R&D strategy.Contribute to reduction of hunger and improved nutrition2. . A reduction of hunger and improved nutrition in line with Millennium Development Goal 1 (MDG 1) targets, cutting in half by 2015 (or soon thereafter) the number of rural poor who are undernourished, with a focus on contributing to a reduction in child undernutrition of at least 10 percent. Contribute to sustainability and resource efficiency3. . A reduction in the impacts of water scarcity and climate change on agriculture through improved land, forestry, and water management methods that increase yields with 10 percent less water, reduce erosion, and improve water quality by maintaining ecosystem services.

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Towards a Strategy and Results Framework for the CGIARxvi

Furthermore, gender and capacity-strengthening indicators are being factored into each of these results-oriented indicators.

The development of the SRF with the Mega Programs (MPs) is an iterative process. The preparation of individual MPs will provide significant additional information that may also change the overall results indicators in the process.

seven interlinked mPs

The building blocks of the Strategy and Results Framework are a set of seven interlinked MPs and two platforms — gender and capacity strengthening — that serve cross-cutting purposes for all MPs. Using the analysis tools already described, but noting that there exists no model to “produce” MPs, the Strategy Team went through a process that began with long-listing of MPs produced by CGIAR and GFAR teams and moved toward assessments and short-listing of concept notes for MPs, as reported here.

The Strategy Team carefully considered alternative options for structuring MPs, including a commodity-by-region approach. Given that value chains are rapidly changing, even for low-income people, but recognizing that commodity chains do matter for some commodities at the global level (rice, wheat, maize) and for others at the agroecosystem level, the Team decided to integrate commodity approaches inside MPs, where relevant, especially in MPs 1 and 3 (see below).

The seven MPs are indeed “mega” — large — and while they are clearly distinct, they form clusters of results-oriented innovation activities whose impact is greater than the sum of their parts because of synergies and systemwide cooperation. The proposed MPs will not be of equal size. The identified MPs follow (with indicative percentage shares of an overall CGIAR investments in parentheses, were we assume that the CGIAR would grow to a budget of about US$ one Billion in coming years):

Agricultural Systems for the Poor and Vulnerable1. — Research that integrates promising crop, livestock, fish, and forest production with innovative policy and natural resources interventions to improve food security in those domains that are home to high concentrations of the world’s poor and that offer agricultural potential. (28 percent)Institutional Innovations and Markets2. — Knowledge to inform institutional changes needed for a well-functioning local, national, and global food system that connects small farmers to agricultural value chains through information and communications technologies and facilitates efficient policy and institutional reforms. (11 percent)Genomics and Global Food Crop Improvements3. — Joint genomics research in the CGIAR serving all crops and animal products, providing for the needed innovation capacity of the CGIAR and genetic improvement of the world’s leading food crops (rice, wheat, maize) that builds on the success of the CGIAR with commodity research, including its crucial role in conserving genetic resources. (21 percent)Agriculture, Nutrition, and Health4. — Improvement in the nutritional value of food and diets, enhanced targeted nutrition and food safety programs, and changed agricultural commodities and systems in the medium term to enhance health outcomes. (8 percent)Water, Soils, and Ecosystems5. — Harmonization of agricultural productivity and environmental sustainability goals through policies, methods, and technologies to improve water and soil management. (18 percent)Forests and Trees6. — Technical, institutional, and policy changes to help conserve forests for humanity and harness forest ecosystem services, including forestry and biomass production potentials, for sustainable development and the poor. (6 percent)Climate Change and Agriculture7. — Diagnosis of the directions and potential impacts of climate change for agriculture and identification of adaptation and mitigation options for agricultural, food, and environmental systems. (7 percent)

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xviiIntroduction

A large share of the overall MP investments is for the further development and innovation in the traditional strength of the CGIAR in crop and animal production and productivity (about 40 to 50 percent), with a new focus on results at the level of poor people and communities.

Actions to specifically address gender issues and to strengthen the research capacity of national agricultural research systems (NARSs) will be deeply embedded in each MP. Furthermore, these MP activities will be supported by cross-system “platforms” to help MPs deliver

increased involvement and income of women in agriculture in production, marketing, and processing, and ■

reduced disparities in their access to productive resources and control of income; andenhanced participation of national scientists in global research networks and strengthening of NARSs to be ■

more effective, independent research partners.

Figure 1 gives a stylized overview of the Strategy and Results Framework and its elements.

Implementation of these systemwide activities will be a task of the Consortium Board. The Strategy Team proposes that detailed proposals, with business plans for the implementation of each MP, be developed once lead Centers are identified for the task. Outlines for MP concept notes appear in this report and can serve as a basis for the suggested MP proposals with business plans.

FIGuRe 1. THE STRATEGy AND RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND ITS ELEMENTS

Executive Summary 7

Results Framework). Although the Strategy Team has considered several alternatives, it proposes that the Consortium not manage individual MPs, but rather that one or more Centers of the Consortium be accountable for delivering on results for each MP.

To move forward, the Strategy Team provides suggestions for transition management, including the appropriate inclusion of current Systemwide and Challenge Programs. Supporting platforms for gender and capacity strengthening will be coordinated by Consortium-based units.

Some institutional support for the participating Centers is required to effectively deliver on the MPs, especially for core functions, such as germplasm collections. Centers of the CGIAR tasked with delivering on the Strategy and Results Framework and the MPs will, at the same time, remain free to pursue their strategic agendas, as long as these activities are executed with full cost coverage from other funding sources. Figure 1. The Strategy and Results Framework and its Elements

CGIAR VISION To reduce poverty and hunger, improve human health and nutrition, and enhance ecosystem

resilience through high-quality international agricultural research, partnership, and leadership.

SYSTEM-LEVEL RESULTS CRITERIA

Lift productivity and reduce poverty

Contribute to hunger reduction and improved nutrition

Contribute to sustainability and resource efficiency

MEGA PROGRAMS

Platform on Gender in Agriculture Platform for Capacity Strengthening

Institutional Funding of Core Functions

The Strategy and Results Framework–driven CGIAR will reach billions of people. A reformed and efficient CGIAR will not only help increase productivity, improve the natural resources base, and strengthen policy and institutions through its own research, but also better link with partners, the private sector, and end users, especially farming communities and women.

MP3: Genomics and Global Crop Improvements

MP4: Agriculture, Nutrition, and Health

MP2: Institutional Innovations and Markets

MP1: Agricultural Systems for the Poor and Vulnerable

MP5: Water, Soils, and Ecosystems

MP6: Forests and Trees

MP7: Climate Change and Agriculture

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Towards a Strategy and Results Framework for the CGIARxviii

hard ChoiCes

Pragmatically, hard choices may need to be made among the programs proposed if the funding for a get-the-job-done strategy cannot be mobilized. In that case, three options can be considered: reduction at the goal level of the CGIAR (“drop a goal”), reductions in favor of a limited set of global public goods (“drop some MPs”), or some reductions in all MPs (“cut across”). The third option would be the least strategic and not advisable.

imPlementation of the strategy and results framework

Implementation of the Strategy and Results Framework and the MPs is proposed here to take place largely through the CGIAR Centers. The envisioned CGIAR Consortium Board will oversee coordination of the MPs and the delivery of system results (based on the Strategy and Results Framework). Although the Strategy Team has considered several alternatives, it proposes that the Consortium not manage individual MPs, but rather that one or more Centers of the Consortium be accountable for delivering on results for each MP.

To move forward, the Strategy Team provides suggestions for transition management, including the appropriate inclusion of current Systemwide and Challenge Programs. Supporting platforms for gender and capacity strengthening will be coordinated by Consortium-based units.

Some institutional support for the participating Centers is required to effectively deliver on the MPs, especially for core functions, such as germplasm collections. Centers of the CGIAR tasked with delivering on the Strategy and Results Framework and the MPs will, at the same time, remain free to pursue their strategic agendas, as long as these activities are executed with full cost coverage from other funding sources.

The Strategy and Results Framework — driven CGIAR will reach billions of people. A reformed and efficient CGIAR will not only help increase productivity, improve the natural resources base, and strengthen policy and institutions through its own research, but also better link with partners, the private sector, and end users, especially farming communities and women. The result will yield high payoffs for development investments, food security, and poverty reduction.