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Appendix
Figure A1 Russia´s geographical distribution into federal districts and federal subjects
Table A1 Market entries modes by former Soviet or Western European headquar-
ter country
Greenfield Joint Venture Acquisitions Total
N
Western Countries 1199 418 70 1687
Former Soviet Countries 134 93 7 234
Total 1,333 511 77 1,921
��
�Siberia
Far East
UralVolga
Central
South
North C.
Northwest
© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020M. Hagemeister, The Impact of Sub-National Institutions on Foreign Firms’ Market Entry, BestMasters, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-27827-4
104 Appendix
Table A2 Market entry modes by country of corporate headquarter
Greenfield Joint Venture Acquisitions Total N
Netherlands 240 65 15 320
Germany 163 56 8 227
Great Britain 133 55 14 202
Italy 115 69 3 187
Finland 97 17 6 120
France 80 31 6 117
Switzerland 70 23 1 94
Sweden 65 23 4 92
Austria 40 19 0 59
Belgium 42 13 0 55
Luxembourg 38 11 4 53
Belarus 28 24 0 52
Spain 37 9 3 49
Czech Republic 29 17 0 46
Denmark 37 9 0 46
Poland 17 13 3 33
Estonia 16 10 1 27
Latvia 21 4 0 25
Ireland 16 5 1 22
Lithuania 8 11 0 19
Norway 9 1 3 13
Ukraine 4 7 1 12
Turkey 4 2 1 7
Bulgaria 4 2 0 6
Malta 3 3 0 6
Slovenia 3 3 0 6
Slovakia 2 4 0 6
Hungary 2 1 2 5
Liechtenstein 1 2 1 4
Serbia 4 0 0 4
Croatia 1 2 0 3
Republic Moldau 3 0 0 3
Greece 1 0 0 1
Total 1,333 511 77 1,921
Appendix 105
Table A3 Market entry modes by size of the parent company
Greenfield Joint Venture Acquisitions Total N
Very big firms 734 221 57 1012
Big firms 350 140 9 499
Medium sized firms 249 150 11 410
Total 1,333 511 77 1,921
106 Appendix
Table A4 Market entry modes by industrial sector
Green-
field
Joint
Venture
Acquisi-
tions Total N
Wholesale and Retail Trade 602 200 12 814
Manufacturing 224 121 26 371
Professional, Scientific and
Technical Activities 148 50 6 204
Information and Communication 72 27 4 103
Transportation and Storage 58 38 4 100
Real Estate Activities 68 12 3 83
Construction 40 15 2 57
Administrative and Support
Service Activities 41 11 1 53
Financial and Insurance Activi-
ties 28 9 7 44
Mining and Quarrying 12 4 7 23
Accommodation and Food Ser-
vice Activities 12 7 2 21
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 7 6 1 14
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air
Conditioning Supply 2 5 2 9
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste
Management and Remediation
Activities
6 2 0 8
Human Health and Social Work
Activities 4 2 0 6
Arts, Entertainment and Recrea-
tion 3 2 0 5
Other Service Activities 5 0 0 5
Education 1 0 0 1
Total 1,333 511 77 1,921
Classification is adapted from Eurostat. RAMON - Reference And Management Of
Nomenclatures: Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European
Community, Rev. 2 (2008). Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/
nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_NOM_DTL&StrNom=NACE_REV2&StrL
anguageCode=EN&IntPcKey=&StrLayoutCode=&IntCurrentPage=1
Appendix 107
Table A5 Industry sectors and their technological advancement
Industry sectors Industry technology
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 14 0 0 0 0 14
Mining and Quarrying 23 0 0 0 0 23
Manufacturing 0 0 63 295 13 371
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Condi-
tioning Supply 9 0 0 0 0 9
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Man-
agement and Remediation Activities 8 0 0 0 0 8
Construction 57 0 0 0 0 57
Wholesale and Retail Trade 814 0 0 0 0 814
Transportation and Storage 87 13 0 0 0 100
Accommodation and Food Service
Activities 21 0 0 0 0 21
Information and Communication 0 103 0 0 0 103
Financial and Insurance Activities 0 44 0 0 0 44
Real Estate Activities 83 0 0 0 0 83
Professional, Scientific and Technical
Activities 0 204 0 0 0 204
Administrative and Support Service
Activities 41 12 0 0 0 53
Education 0 1 0 0 0 1
Human Health and Social Work Activ-
ities 0 6 0 0 0 6
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 0 5 0 0 0 5
Other Service Activities 5 0 0 0 0 5
Total 1,162 388 63 295 13 1,921
108 Appendix
Table A6 Market entry modes by federal districts
Greenfield Joint Venture Acquisitions Total N
Central 973 351 36 1,360
Northwest 267 89 19 375
Volga 73 43 6 122
South 18 23 6 47
Ural 2 4 3 9
Siberia 0 1 4 5
North Caucasus 0 0 2 2
Far East 0 0 1 1
Total 1,333 511 77 1,921
Figure A2 Market entry modes by their year of market entry
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Greenfield Joint Ventures Acquisitions
Appendix 109
Figure A3 Market entry modes by federal districts
Figure A4 Institutional indicators from BEEPS across federal districts
a) Access to infrastructure
0200400600800
1000120014001600
Greenfield Joint Ventures Acquisitions
.51
1.5
2
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012year
110 Appendix
b) Administrative barriers
c) Rule of law
0.5
11
.52
2.5
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012year
1.8
22
.22
.4
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012year
Central Far East
North Caucasus Northwest
Siberia South
Ural Volga
Appendix 111
Tab
le A
7 E
xte
nd
ed c
orr
elat
ion
mat
rix,
par
t 1
/3
(1
) (2
) (3
) (4
) (5
) (6
)
Co
ntr
ol
Va
ria
ble
s
(1)
Ind
ust
ry t
ech
nolo
gy
1
.000
(2
) N
atu
ral
reso
urc
e in
du
stry
-0
.095
***
1.0
00
(3)
Siz
e p
aren
t 0
.038
*
-0.0
17
1.0
00
(4
) S
ize
sub
sid
iary
0
.086
***
0.0
76
***
0.2
20
***
1.0
00
(5)
Sovie
t par
ent
-0.0
31
-0.0
29
-0.2
13
***
-0.1
05
***
1.0
00
(6
) M
osc
ow
-0
.227
***
-0.0
64
***
0.1
11
***
0.0
25
-0.1
30
***
1.0
00
Ind
epen
den
t V
ari
ab
les
(7
) A
cces
s in
fras
truct
ure
0
.032
-0.0
05
0.0
15
0.0
48
**
-0.0
16
-0.1
08
***
(8)
Ad
min
istr
ativ
e b
arri
ers
0.0
18
0.0
21
0.1
08
***
0.2
23
***
-0.0
69
***
-0.0
51
**
(9)
Ru
le o
f la
w
-0.0
34
-0.0
31
-0.0
72
***
-0.1
61
***
0.0
38
0.1
16
***
Mo
der
ato
rs
(10
) G
reen
fiel
d
-0.0
87
***
-0.0
55
**
0.0
95
***
-0.0
78
***
-0.0
98
***
0.1
14
***
(11
) Jo
int
ven
ture
(JV
) 0
.060
***
0.0
01
-0.1
31
***
0.0
16
0.1
11
***
-0.0
79
***
(12
) A
cqu
isit
ion
0.0
68
***
0.1
26
***
0.0
72
***
0.1
48
***
-0.0
19
-0.0
89
***
Inte
ract
ion
s
(13a)
In
fras
tr *
Gre
enfi
eld
0
.036
0.0
21
0.0
16
0.0
56
**
0.0
13
-0.0
98
***
(13b
) In
fras
tr *
JV
-0
.005
-0.0
05
-0.0
04
0.0
12
-0.0
60
***
-0.0
49
**
(13c)
In
fras
tr *
Acq
uis
itio
n
0.0
21
-0.0
97
***
0.0
16
-0.0
23
0.0
19
-0.0
06
(14a)
Ad
min
bar
r * G
reen
fiel
d
0.0
34
0.0
15
0.0
85
***
0.1
90
***
-0.0
42
*
-0.0
37
(14b
) A
dm
inbar
r * J
V
-0.0
15
0.0
51
**
0.0
65
***
0.1
21
***
-0.0
69
***
-0.0
49
**
(1
4c)
Ad
min
bar
r * A
cquis
itio
n
-0.0
15
-0.0
98
***
0.0
16
0.0
12
0.0
05
0.0
32
(15a)
Ru
leL
aw
* G
reen
fiel
d
-0.0
27
-0.0
14
-0.0
61
***
-0.1
35
***
0.0
40
*
0.0
91
***
(15b
) R
ule
Law
* J
V
-0.0
21
-0.0
37
-0.0
42
*
-0.0
90
***
0.0
08
0.0
69
***
(15c)
Ru
leL
aw
* A
cquis
itio
n
-0.0
03
0.0
02
-0.0
01
-0.0
15
0.0
04
0.0
25
Dep
end
ent
Vari
ab
le
(16
) P
erfo
rman
ce
0.0
07
-0.0
20
0.2
29
***
0.2
18
***
-0.1
40
***
0.0
71
***
* p
< 0
.1,
** p
< 0
.05
, *
** p
< 0
.01
112 Appendix
Tab
le A
7 E
xte
nd
ed c
orr
elat
ion
mat
rix,
par
t 2
/3
(7
) (8
) (9
) (1
0)
(11
) (1
2)
(13a)
(1
3b
) (1
3c)
(1)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6)
(7)
1
.000
(8)
0
.197
***
1.0
00
(9
)
0.3
41
***
-0.7
18
***
1.0
00
(10
)
-0.0
18
0.0
18
-0.0
05
1.0
00
(1
1)
0.0
00
-0.0
19
0.0
15
-0.9
06
***
1.0
00
(12
)
0.0
42
*
0.0
01
-0.0
21
-0.3
08
***
-0.1
23
***
1.0
00
(1
3a)
0
.836
***
0.1
64
***
0.2
61
***
-0.0
06
0.0
06
0.0
02
1.0
00
(13b
)
0.5
10
***
0.1
13
***
0.1
84
***
-0.0
01
0.0
01
-0.0
00
0.0
00
1.0
00
(1
3c)
0
.204
***
0.0
11
0.1
40
***
-0.0
60
***
-0.0
24
0.1
96
***
0.0
00
-0.0
00
1.0
00
(14a)
0
.164
***
0.8
37
***
-0.5
97
***
0.0
06
-0.0
06
-0.0
02
0.1
96
***
-0.0
00
-0.0
00
(14b
) 0
.113
***
0.5
15
***
-0.3
87
***
0.0
24
-0.0
27
0.0
03
-0.0
00
0.2
21
***
0.0
01
(14c)
0
.012
0.1
86
***
-0.1
02
***
-0.0
01
-0.0
00
0.0
03
0.0
00
-0.0
00
0.0
58
**
(15a)
0
.276
***
-0.6
31
***
0.7
91
***
-0.0
01
0.0
01
0.0
00
0.3
30
***
0.0
00
0.0
00
(15b
)
0.1
70
***
-0.3
61
***
0.5
52
***
-0.0
19
0.0
21
-0.0
03
0.0
00
0.3
33
***
-0.0
01
(15c)
0
.109
***
-0.0
72
***
0.2
63
***
0.0
23
0.0
09
-0.0
75
***
-0.0
00
0.0
00
0.5
33
***
(16
)
-0.0
64
***
0.0
48
**
-0.0
83
***
0.0
78
***
-0.0
94
***
0.0
28
-0.0
50
**
-0.0
37
-0.0
16
* p
< 0
.1,
** p
< 0
.05
, *
** p
< 0
.01
Appendix 113
Tab
le A
7 E
xte
nd
ed c
orr
elat
ion
mat
rix,
par
t 3
/3
(1
4a)
(1
4b
) (1
4c)
(1
5a)
(1
5b
) (1
5c)
(1
6)
(1)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10
)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(13a)
(13b
)
(1
3c)
(14a)
1
.000
(14b
) 0
.000
1.0
00
(1
4c)
-0
.000
0.0
00
1.0
00
(15a)
-0
.754
***
-0.0
00
0.0
00
1.0
00
(1
5b
)
-0.0
00
-0.7
01
***
-0.0
00
0.0
00
1.0
00
(15c)
0
.000
-0.0
00
-0.3
88
***
-0.0
00
0.0
00
1.0
00
(16
)
0.0
50
***
0.0
09
0.0
04
-0.0
64
***
-0.0
35
-0.0
50
**
1.0
00
* p
< 0
.1,
** p
< 0
.05
, *
** p
< 0
.01
114 Appendix
Table A8 Multinomial logit regression 3-way comparison
Greenfield Joint Venture Acquisition
Access to infrastructure 0.000 -0.021 0.392**
Administrative barriers 0.000 0.024 -0.379**
Rule of law 0.000 0.049 -0.351**
Size parent 0.000 -0.282*** 0.518***
Industry technology 0.000 0.133*** 0.272***
Natural resource industry 0.000 0.382 2.257***
Soviet parent 0.000 0.519*** -0.028
Moscow 0.000 -0.262** -0.728***
Constant 0.000 -0.492** -4.448***
Pseudo R2 0.041
Chi-squared 114.829
Acquisition Joint Venture Greenfield
Access to infrastructure 0.000 -0.413** -0.392**
Administrative barriers 0.000 0.402** 0.379**
Rule of law 0.000 0.400** 0.351**
Size parent 0.000 -0.799*** -0.518***
Industry technology 0.000 -0.138 -0.272***
Natural resource industry 0.000 -1.875*** -2.257***
Soviet parent 0.000 0.547 0.028
Moscow 0.000 0.465* 0.728***
Constant 0.000 3.956*** 4.448***
Pseudo R2 0.041
Chi-squared 114.829
Joint Venture Acquisition Greenfield
Access to infrastructure 0.000 0.413** 0.021
Administrative barriers 0.000 -0.402** -0.024
Rule of law 0.000 -0.400** -0.049
Size parent 0.000 0.799*** 0.282***
Industry technology 0.000 0.138 -0.133***
Natural resource industry 0.000 1.875*** -0.382
Soviet parent 0.000 -0.547 -0.519***
Moscow 0.000 -0.465* 0.262**
Constant 0.000 -3.956*** 0.492**
Pseudo R2 0.041
Chi-squared 114.829
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Appendix 115
Table A9 Moderated regression analysis 3-way comparison
Model (base category) Model 1 Model 2
Model 3 Model 3 Model 3
(Greenfield) (Joint
Venture) (Acquisition)
Control variables
Industry technology -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
Natural resource indus-try
-0.397 -0.415 -0.341 -0.341 -0.341
Size parent 0.363*** 0.364*** 0.351*** 0.351*** 0.351***
Size subsidiary 0.248*** 0.252*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.263***
Soviet parent -0.435*** -0.442*** -0.423*** -0.423*** -0.423***
Moscow 0.115 0.121 0.086 0.086 0.086
Independent variables
Access to infrastructure
-0.057 -0.124* -0.040 0.302
Administrative barriers
-0.110 0.021 -0.209 -0.357
Rule of law
-0.137* -0.003 -0.162 -0.547***
Moderators
Greenfield
base 0.257*** 0.238
Joint venture
-0.257*** base -0.019
Acquisition
-0.238 0.019 base
Interactions
Infrastr*Greenfield
base -0.084 -0.426*
Infrastr*Joint venture
0.084 base -0.342
Infrastr*Acquisition
0.426* 0.342 base
Adminbarr*Greenfield
base 0.230 0.378
Adminbarr*Joint
venture -0.230 base 0.148
Adminbarr*Acquisition
-0.378 -0.148 base
RuleLaw*Greenfield
base 0.160 0.544**
RuleLaw*Joint venture
-0.160 base 0.384
RuleLaw*Acquisition
-0.544** -0.384 base
Constant -4.950*** -4.972*** -4.906*** -5.162*** -5.144***
Adj. R2 0.088 0.094 0.097 0.097 0.097
F 31.932*** 23.012*** 13.155*** 13.155*** 13.155***
