This article was downloaded by: [Van Pelt and Opie Library]On: 21 October 2014, At: 18:58Publisher: Taylor & FrancisInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

International Journal of Sustainable Development &World EcologyPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsdw20

REDD+ and forest tenure security: concerns inNepal’s community forestryRishi R. Bastakotia & Conny Davidsena

a Geography Department, University of Calgary, Calgary, CanadaPublished online: 24 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Rishi R. Bastakoti & Conny Davidsen (2014) REDD+ and forest tenure security: concerns inNepal’s community forestry, International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology, 21:2, 168-180, DOI:10.1080/13504509.2013.879542

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504509.2013.879542

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose ofthe Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shallnot be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and otherliabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

REDD+ and forest tenure security: concerns in Nepal’s community forestry

Rishi R. Bastakoti* and Conny Davidsen

Geography Department, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada

(Received 3 October 2013; final version received 23 December 2013)

As one of the dominant large-scale mechanisms proposed to combat climate change, biodiversity loss, and rural poverty,REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) has added further complexity to the challenginggovernance of rights and resources in global forests. As REDD+ is commodifying carbon, concerns emerge about howcarbon ownership and its rights can be accommodated into the existing framework that governs local forest resource rights.The Nepalese government has formally entered into REDD+ policy preparations, but it lacks clear legal provisionsregarding key forest tenure rights such as carbon ownership, benefit sharing, and the political participation of communityforest user groups from national to local. As a result, Nepal’s policy process points toward performance-based carbonforestry in a way that may undermine and weaken existing community tenure rights and forest tenure security.This paper discusses Nepal’s potential impacts of new REDD+ and carbon ownership arrangements on forest tenure

security and community-based forest governance. In a threefold methodological approach, the paper presents three scenariosfor a REDD+-oriented tenure reform within the existing framework and assesses their concerns through in-depth qualitativeinterviews with key stakeholders, representatives, and advocates of Nepal’s community forestry system, complemented by areview of government documents and academic literature of REDD+ lessons so far. The analysis identifies critical concernsfor forest tenure security, state-community power relationships, and effective local institutions of the commons, and suggeststhat Nepal’s REDD+ process is taking place at a particularly consequential time for structural changes of the forestgovernance framework.

Keywords: carbon trade; community forestry; livelihoods; Nepal; REDD+; tenure rights

1. Introduction: REDD+, carbon rights, and foresttenure

Decentralized resource management has become one ofthe most significant and visible shifts in national forestpolicies over the past two decades (Agrawal & Ostrom2008). An estimated 200 million hectares of forest landwere transferred from state ownership to forest commu-nities between 1985 and 2002 (White & Martin 2002), andup to 27% of forests in the Global South are now managedby local forest communities (Sunderlin et al. 2008).Community-based forest management has become an inte-gral part of international forest regimes to help addressforest loss, environmental degradation, and negativeimpacts on rural livelihoods (Gilmour et al. 2004). It hasalso reduced the costs of protection and provided oppor-tunities for biodiversity conservation and other environ-mental services (Agrawal & Ostrom 2008; Phelps et al.2010).

Carbon as a resource commodity shifts the notion offorests from those of places of local livelihoods to forestsas zones of productivity for global environmental services.With carbon becoming a commodity, the question ofrelated benefits, control, and ownership over carbon – inother words, the allocation of carbon rights – will becritical (Basnet 2009; Dulal et al. 2012; Fairhead et al.2012). The commercialization of carbon adds not onlylayers of economic interests, but also of political interests

and problems which need to be carefully examined.Current preparations for REDD+ (Reducing Emissionsfrom Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus conserva-tion, the sustainable management of forests and enhance-ment of forest carbon stocks) around the world havealready expressed considerable concerns about the waysin which carbon rights can or will be incorporated intoexisting forest governance frameworks (Brockhaus et al.2012; Huettner 2012; Leggett & Lovell 2012; Macintosh2012; Mustalahti & Tassa 2012; Yasmi et al. 2012).

The concept of carbon rights as being partially relatedto, but yet quite distinct from, land and forest rights isrelatively new and will require time to consolidate anoverall system of forest rights (Fairhead et al. 2012). Thetranslation of carbon processes (services) into resourcesand commodities remains unclear and difficult, particu-larly the ways in which formal ownership of its variouscomponents can be translated into forest governance fra-meworks and the legal composition of forest rights.Accordingly, most countries have not fully defined carbonrights.

If REDD+ is turned into an operating market-basedsystem, this issue may quickly become urgent as problemsdevelop. The link between stored carbon and the ownershipor management of land and forests may make REDD+mechanisms susceptible to unfair practices and inequitabledistribution of benefits (Vhugen et al. 2012). In situations

*Corresponding author. Email: rrbastak@ucalgary.ca

International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology, 2014Vol. 21, No. 2, 168–180, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504509.2013.879542

© 2014 Taylor & Francis

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

where land resources are already subject to multiple orunclear forms of use, stewardship, and ownership, newlyadded revenues from carbon may aggravate uncertaintiesand tension among resource users even further.

More importantly, REDD+ is anticipated to reverse theformer decentralization trend of the past decades in forestgovernance. By offering new economic interests in inter-national carbon trade, it creates incentives for the state torevert forest authority back to the state (Sandbrook et al.2010), based on the argument that they are the rightfulentity to govern and protect national economic interests,thus bypassing communities and undermining formerlygranted local forest rights (Phelps et al. 2010).

Ironically, the process therefore has the potential toundermine the efforts of the past decades by leavingunaddressed one of the key institutional foundations ofcommunity forestry success: forest tenure security.Community-based resource management research hasfound – after decades of research and difficult lessonsfrom forestry practice – that forest rights and tenure secur-ity are particularly central components for successful col-lective forest governance and need careful attention forsuccess (FAO 2002; Pagdee et al. 2006; World Bank 2007;Sunderlin et al. 2008). Forest tenure security concerns thelong-term reliability and validity of community forest userrights, for example, whether the government may reclaimpreviously granted community rights at a later date foreconomic benefit: have the rights been granted perma-nently; can they be altered or withdrawn; and if so,under what conditions and timelines? The continuity ofthese forest tenure rights is now in the process of beingfundamentally altered through additional layers of carbonrights, ecological services, and new forms of commodify-ing forests.

In an analysis of a number of Readiness PreparationProposals (R-PPs) to the World Bank’s Forest CarbonPartnership Facility (FCPF), Dooley et al. (2011) foundthat although the World Bank has identified the recognitionof tenure rights as crucial to the effectiveness of REDDimplementation, questions of tenure were not addressed inthe R-PPs. Even where carbon rights and environmentalservices were discussed, land and territorial rights remainedinsufficiently addressed. Knox et al. (2010) argue that thelack of straightforward policies regarding tenure has furtherled to a systemic neglect of tenure risks in R-PPs due tocomplexity; even where risks are mentioned, there are noreal commitments to deal with them. Similar concerns wereidentified by the World Resources Institute’s review of R-PPs (Goers-Williams et al. 2011).

Globally, Nepal has become an outstanding example ofparticipatory forest management through a large structuralforest reform program which deeply embedded commu-nity-based forest governance into the country’s institu-tional framework. Community forests encompass about16 million hectares of land across the country, managedby more than 17,808 community forest user groups(CFUGs) which encompass an estimated 2.19 millionhouseholds and approximately 40% of the country’s

population (DOF 2012, August). Nepal’s community for-estry is part of a collective traditional system for domesticand small-scale forest use, which constitutes a broad andsignificant forest tenure category across the country withsubstantial importance for forest regions. Recently, Nepalhas begun preparing for the inclusion of carbon trade intoits forest framework since it ratified the Kyoto Protocol in2005. As an Annex II country, Nepal is now eligible toreceive financing from individuals and countries seekingcarbon credit. The government declared REDD+ anational priority as its strategy against climate changeand poverty, and is in the process of redesigning its entireforest governance framework around carbon trade (NPC2010), which calls for a careful understanding of thepossible consequences.

This paper discusses key concerns for forest tenuresecurity from Nepal’s current governance changes asREDD+ and carbon rights are introduced into the exist-ing forest governance framework, suggesting profoundchanges regarding carbon ownership arrangements,state-community power relationships, changing rights forlocal forestry institutions, and livelihood security of for-est-dependent people. Our theoretical approach viewsREDD+ as an already practiced form of governance,from a perspective in which all social and political inter-action can be analyzed by the means of governance inthe context of state, society, environment and market(Cadman & Maraseni 2012). As Thompson et al. (2011)describe, REDD+ constitutes a form of governance ‘thatvalidates and legitimizes specific tools, actors and solu-tions while marginalizing others’ (p. 100), as well as ‘ameans of aligning a diverse set of stakeholders aroundagreed-upon objects to be governed, tools of governance,and forms of environmental, economic and social knowl-edge’ (p. 102). This governance approach of REDD+ isembedded in a political ecology perspective which allowsus to focus especially on unequal power structures amongthe actors of forest- and livelihood-related managementand governance processes (Bryant 1992; Peluso 1992),and its more fundamental questions on the constructionsof nature, its social and ecological consequences andpolitical solutions (Escobar 1999; Castree 2001) asthese may arise as issues of conflict in the social andpolitical interaction of stakeholders of emerging REDD+systems.

1.1. Methodological approach

The research uses a qualitative approach focusing on theperspectives of those who may be among the most affectedand the most familiar with the system from forest govern-ance to tenure security: community forestry stakeholders(from local forestry practice to national governance plan-ning), community forestry advocates, and activists, as wellas the national head organization for Nepal’s most promi-nent community-level organizational unit in forest govern-ance, the local CFUGs. Based on a social constructivistframework, the stakeholders’ views are understood not as

International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 169

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

objective or absolute, but are rather to be understoodwithin their positionality, time, and context (Blaikie 2001).

The analysis builds upon three main methodologicalelements: (1) a legal exploration of possible tenure scenar-ios; (2) semi-structured qualitative interviews withNepalese community forestry representatives, collectedover a time period of two years (Table 1); and (3) aliterature analysis of Nepalese government documents aswell as academic studies for related lessons worldwide,complemented by personal observations of the first authorfrom his own professional experience of Nepal’s policyprocess over the past 10 years.

1.2. Structure of the paper

The paper first addresses the challenges of carbon rightsvis-à-vis Nepal’s community forestry tenure system in gen-eral (Section 2), then the country’s current policy processand politics specifically related to REDD+ (Section 3). Theanalysis outlines three potential scenarios for ways in whichcarbon rights may be incorporated into Nepal’s existingforest governance framework (Section 4). From there, wepresent in-depth interview data from our community for-estry interviewees (Section 5) as they identify their specificconcerns for forest tenure security from clashing agendasbetween global and local, from REDD+’s local benefits inpractice, and regarding impacts on hierarchical decision-making. Section 6 addresses the current challenges arisingfrom the timing of these policy changes and their structuralimplications for the national forest governance framework,leading to Section 7 with a brief overview assessment of thethreats of REDD+ to Nepal’s forest tenure security in lightof the current policy context.

2. Nepal’s forest tenure system, devolution, and thechallenge of carbon rights

Community forestry has come to constitute the mostimportant tenure category in Nepal’s forest governance

system. Prior to its emergence, the country’s forests hadbeen locked into a strongly centralized forest regime dur-ing the panchayat years since the 1960s, in a systemwhich could neither save the forest nor benefit the localcommunities. Nepal’s deforestation rate then became oneof the highest among many tropical countries of South andSouth East Asia (Thapa and Weber 1990), culminating in aHimalayan ecological crisis (World Bank 1979; Ives1989).

Tenure reforms in the 1980s attempted to reverse thistrend through participatory forest governance that soughtto reconnect forest communities with local user rights,stewardship responsibilities, and the long-term benefitsof sustainable forest use. A new Master Plan for theForestry Sector (MPFS), approved in 1989, particularlymarked a new era when it officially prioritized the devolu-tion of key forest tenure rights to local communities, aslong as these were willing and able to manage them(Bartlett 1992).

The 1993 Forest Act established different forest tenurecategories and management arrangements between thestate and the forest users, a system which remains largelyin place (see Table 2). Since then, as much as about 30%of the total area of Nepal’s national forests has beentransferred into various forms of local forest tenure (FAO2011).

As another key element of the 1993 Forest Act reform,CFUGs were introduced as the institutional governingbody for community forests. They constitute self-govern-ing, independent, autonomous, perpetual and corporateentities with full ownership, management, and revenuerights (Article 43, 1993 Forest Act of Nepal). Theseautonomous and indefinite forest rights have been thekey element to sustainable forests because they operateon the basis of long-term tenure security, thus motivatingthem to reverse forest deforestation and degradation forfuture benefit.

Community-held tenure, leasehold forestry and localmonitoring have been identified as significant drivers of

Table 1. List of interviewees.

Interviewee Affiliation Interview date

Ghan ShyamPandey

Coordinator of the Global Alliance of Community Forestry(GACF), and former national chair of FECOFUN

First interview in February, 2012, with severalfollow up through email and Skype

Shambhu Dangal REDD+ Expert and Executive Director of Kathmandu basedresearch NGO Natural Resources Institute (NRI)

First interview in February, 2012, with severalfollow up through email and Skype

Eak Rana Project Coordinator at a REDD+ pilot project led by theInternational Centre for Integrated Mountain Development(ICIMOD)

February, 2012

Bhola Bhattarai Civil Society Organization representative observer for FCPFREDD+ process, World Bank and Chair Person of NationalForum for Advocacy Nepal (NAFAN)

First interview in February, 2012, with severalfollow up through email and Skype

Bhola Khatiwada Chair person of the Community-Based Forestry Supporters’Network Nepal (COFSUN Nepal) and Secretary of newlydeclared Gaurishankar Conservation Area Struggle Committee

February, 2012

Indra Sapkota Former District Forest Officer, Chitwan (Currently PlanningOfficer at the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation)

December, 2013

170 R.R. Bastakoti and C. Davidsen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

forest regrowth in Nepal (Nagendra 2007). The country’sforest product supply was increased and ecosystems ser-vices sustainably improved, indicated for example by anecological improvement from a slowdown of deforestationper hectares to increased biomass per unit area (Branney &Yadav 1998; Gautam et al. 2004), and a positive socialeffect through the mobilization of forest community mem-bers for rural development and institutional building at thegrass-roots level (Kanel 2004).

Research over the past two decades indicates thatNepal’s community forestry has been relatively successfulin international comparison to other community forestryattempts (Kanel 2004; Kanel & Dahal 2008; Tachibana &Adhikari 2009). Especially clear, secure and devolvedforest tenure have come to be regarded as fundamentalrequirements for the sustainability of the forest and thelivelihoods of local populations, making it an issue thatneeds to be carefully treated in terms of modifications andamendments. Unsecured, unclear and unrecognized com-munity tenure rights can be the cause of conflict anddeforestation, not least because forests may be destroyeddue to short-run games (De Konig et al. 2008). Studiesfrom Nepal’s central Terai region, for example, found thatillegal felling and forest encroachment are more commonin collaborative forest or national forest area because theygrant less forest rights to the local population and offerless motivation to control the area effectively (GoN/MFSC2008).

By profoundly reshaping local forest benefit and live-lihoods in rural Nepal, CFUGs have grown into one of themost influential and widespread institutions in Nepal’sland and resource governance system. As a result of theirstrong establishment on the local level and beyond,CFUGs have turned into crucial local points of departure

for resource conservation, community development initia-tives, institutional capacity building and rural poverty alle-viation efforts (Kanel 2006). They have also become apowerful organizational tool for state–community interac-tion and policy implementation. For better cross-scalepolitical representation and access, the Federation ofCommunity Forest Users in Nepal (FECOFUN) was cre-ated as their national umbrella organization, which nowranks among the largest civil society organizations in thecountry and holds a key role in the advocacy of civicrights on natural resources and their sustainable use.Through this local-to-national network, CFUGs havebecome a powerful potential vehicle for strategic effortstoward millennium development goal, as an entry point forneoliberal approaches toward biodiversity conservational,and most recently for carbon trading mechanisms such asREDD+.

In this regard, climate change mitigation and globalcarbon frameworks pose significant challenges for exist-ing national forest governance regimes. Carbon-relatedrights increase the complexity of forest rights whichrequire new conceptualizations and legal mechanismsto address the emerging bundles of forest rights andramifications for forest tenure. Even without the addi-tional difficulty of carbon, forest tenure rights arealready difficult to delineate because they are integralcomponents of complex resource systems that areaffected by local, national and global processes, andreach across various types such as material good, non-extractive forest activities and ecological services.Tenure rights are often subject to further uncertaintyon the ground as differences arise between de jure(formal regulatory framework) and de facto rights (cus-tomary rules, enforcement practices).

Table 2. Tenure categories, their share and forest use rights.

Tenure category

Total area (% ofnational forestin hectares) Tenure period Forest use rights

GovernmentManaged Forests

3,673,981(58.65%)

Tenure period – unlimited StateManagement – defined by state

Community Forests 1,664,918(26.58%)

Tenure period – not defined by law 100% to local community forest user groups(CFUGs), based on the condition that theyinvest 25% of the forest income in forestdevelopment activities

Management – defined by 5 or 10 years planProtected Forests 887,000

(14.16%)Tenure period – unlimited StateManagement – defined by state

Leasehold Forests 26,900(0.43%)

Tenure period – 40 years with possibilityof extension for another 40 years

100% to local leasehold group

Management – defined by 5 or 10 years planCollaborativeForests

10,676(0.17%)

Tenure period – unlimited 75% to state, 25% to communityManagement – through annual scheme or5 years plan

Private Forests NA Tenure – unlimited Private ownerManagement – defined

Religious Forests NA Tenure period – unlimited 100% to local religious groupManagement – defined by 5 years plan

Sources: Forest Act 1993, Forest regulation 1995, Collaborative Forest Management Guidelines 2003, National Park and Wildlife Conservation Act 1973.

International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 171

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

Multilayered conflicts can emerge between stake-holders if benefit sharing and governance are not properlyaddressed from the beginning. Payments for environmen-tal services (PES) pose new challenges for forest rightsbecause they need to translate previously external, non-market environmental values into real financial incentivesto provide environmental services (Wunder et al. 2008).They create new economic mechanisms for ecosystemconservation and restoration across local and global scalesby enabling external beneficiaries of environmental ser-vices to channel direct contractual and conditional pay-ments to the forest owners and users (Wunder 2005).Poorly designed and underfinanced PES have been foundto create livelihood risks and external dependencies (Smith& Scherr 2002). Especially long-term forest dwellers – forexample indigenous groups and local famers – often havede facto access to forests, but face difficulties in foresttenure and livelihood security as their practical authorityover trees, timber and forest management remains oftenlimited in scope and unrecognized in law (WorldResources Institute 2005).

3. Nepal’s policy future: carbon rights, forestgovernance framework and REDD+

The Nepalese government has declared REDD+ to be thenew strategic cornerstone of its national forest policy frame-work (GoN 2008; GoN 2010; NPC 2007). The most recentthree-year National Interim Plan (2011–2013) explicitlypromotes low-carbon development strategies and the possi-bility of carbon trading. The forestry sector plan also iden-tified carbon trading as means toward sustainabledevelopment. The government is now trying to define car-bon governance links with community forestry and othercommunity based forestry programs with emerging globalcarbon policy for the post-2012 period (GoN 2010).

The flurry of activities surrounding REDD+ prepara-tions has formed a pivotal potential change particularlybecause it coincides with a larger federal restructuring ofthe Nepalese forest governance framework. The last MPFS(stemming from 1989) recently expired in 2009, and cur-rent plans point toward a larger redesign of forest govern-ance as an integral part of a new constitution. This mayenable major framework changes toward carbon tradingthrough REDD+, structural changes to the 1993 ForestAct – the legal corner stone of the past devolution shiftin forest governance – and as a result changes to the rolesof community forests in the existing tenure regime. Inshort, the current period marks a larger forest governancerevision in Nepal, which is now dominated by the struc-tural demands and economic opportunities of REDD+.The future governance framework will therefore – in alllikelihood – be fundamentally influenced by the concep-tual understanding of carbon rights and their legal inter-pretation into potentially altered state-communityrelationships.

How and to what extent these new requirements willtranslate into policy changes is unclear, particularly

concerning the integrity of complex bundles of rightssuch as forest use and long-term tenure security. Thegovernment of Nepal acknowledged in a forest policyreview that the lack of secure tenure for local communitiesis a major driver of deforestation in many developingcountries (GoN 2008). However, even where nationalREDD+ proposals acknowledge the need of tenure secur-ity, strategies to achieve these goals are typically notclearly laid out. Where unclear local arrangements meetstrict international requirements, REDD+ may add hard-ship to local forest populations by imposing new limita-tions on forest use (Larson et al. 2010). As a result, REDD+ has caused significant concerns about the future ofcommunity rights, for example: how will communityrights under REDD+ be administered? Will they be furtherlimited in the future? What rules for resource use will bedeveloped to meet carbon targets under REDD+? Whowill create and enforce these rules and how might theylimit community access to forests for livelihoods? If com-munities carry new burdens of carbon stock incrementlimiting forest use, will they be fairly compensated(Larson 2011)? For example, how to incorporate PESinto Nepal’s forest governance remains unresolved. Thestructural implications of environmental services – espe-cially forest carbon – are new to Nepal, and no provisionshave yet been made under legislation to clarify the emer-ging rights and consequences on existing bundles of forestrights. Even within a REDD+ system, global environmen-tal services can only work if the forest rights continue tobe clearly defined and if the payment mechanism is direc-ted to the local people who hold these rights (Cotula &Mayers 2009).

Based on Nepal’s ongoing REDD+ pilot phase vis-à-vis existing community forestry practice across the coun-try, our analysis finds several structural as well as practicalconcerns, which are outlined in the following sectionsfrom the possible tenure scenarios (Section 4) to the per-spectives of community forestry interviewees (Section 5).

4. Policy options and three scenarios: legal design ofcarbon rights vis-à-vis forest rights

Spanning across five carbon pools, carbon processes canbe linked to all ecological processes in the forest, categor-ized by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(2006) as aboveground biomass, belowground biomass,dead wood, litter and soil organic matter. Nevertheless,due to the interconnectivity of these ecological flows,carbon is not a resource that can be delineated as clearlyas other forests products; instead, it depends on the legaldefinition of specific attributes in order to measure andtrade carbon as a commodity. Questions also emerge overconcepts of carbon ownership, such as whether it could (orshould) be considered a separate proprietary interest, orwhether it should become linked to existing categories ofownership related to forest rights or land title.

As a result, carbon rights can be implemented invarious ways into the overall forest governance framework

172 R.R. Bastakoti and C. Davidsen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

and with varying consequences; for example, they couldbe defined explicitly by creating new laws, or they couldbe implicitly incorporated by extending existing laws onforests and land rights (Vhugen et al. 2012). One option isthat carbon rights could be added into the existing landand tenure system according to the way in which thephysical matter that holds the carbon is captured underdifferent forms of ownership. This may reduce potentialconflict, confusion and erosion of the commons that mightotherwise arise from the new system of ownership arisingfrom the commodification of carbon. If carbon is under-stood as a forest product, existing benefit-sharing mechan-isms based on currently prevailing practices could applyand be extended from the existing system. At the sametime, a mere extension of carbon rights into the existingsystem may not adequately represent the complexity of itsecological processes nor its scales and relevance from abenefit sharing perspective. Moreover, this approach couldeven result in unpredicted interest mechanisms – betweencommunities and the state, for example – which wouldundermine forest governance as a whole.

Based on these considerations, we explore three poten-tial scenarios for the incorporation of carbon rights intoNepal’s existing forest framework.

4.1. Differentiation between surface and subsurfacerights

This scenario follows the existing framework of the 1993Forest Act the most closely. Aboveground carbon rightsare passed on to the communities, while belowgroundcarbon is regarded as part of the land, i.e. under stateownership. This would loosely follow Nepal’s existing1993 Forest Act in how it distinguishes between the forestas a livelihood sphere (community rights) and the land as

state-owned territory which provides for its population.Moreover, this approach would implicitly allocate carbonrights in line with their carbon-related resources and theirlegally determined ownership. The Forest Act containsbasic delineations of forest rights for each specific tenurecategory, which may guide the interpretation of carbon-related forest rights beyond their original scope. Table 3summarizes the resulting ownership of carbon rights ifthese were indeed directly linked to their ecological coun-terparts in the existing forest tenure categories in Nepal’stenure system.

4.2. Differentiation between livelihood rights andecological rights

The 1993 Forest Act defines forest products as ‘all theproducts available in the forest including timber, leaf,branches, sand, soil, minerals, wild animals and water.’This definition suggests a broad and comprehensive cover-age of all potential resources found within the forest, butcarbon arguably transcends their intended focus on physi-cal elements, while ecological services or values are notmentioned. This would thus allow the state to treat carbonrights as a new legal category independently from theexisting framework. Instead, carbon rights can be allocatedindependently from resource ownership as defined by theForest Act. Given this definition, the second scenario doesnot regard carbon as an inherent extension of forest activ-ities, but rather distinguishes between livelihood rights –the conventional forest rights of the communities – and aseparate, explicitly new set of ecosystem rights related tocarbon (Vhugen et al. 2012). Within this new framework,all carbon rights are separated from forest user rights andfall under state control because they are not part of thelivelihood rights which were granted to the forest

Table 3. Current carbon ownership within existing tenure categories.

Ownership of carbon pool

Tenure regime Aboveground biomassBelowground

biomass Litter DeadwoodSoil organic

matter

Governmentmanagedforest

State State State State State

Protected forest State State State State StateCollaborativeforest

Joint ownership of state andcollaborative forest user group

State Collaborativeforest usergroup

Joint ownership of state andcollaborative forest user group

State

Communityforest

CFUG State CFUG CFUG State

Leaseholdforest

Leasehold forest user group State Leasehold forestuser group

Leasehold forest user group State

Religious forest Religious forest user group State Religious forestuser group

Religious forest user group State

Buffer zoneforest

Joint ownership of state andbuffer zone forest user group

State Buffer zone usergroup

Joint ownership of state andbuffer zone forest user group

State

Private forest Private owner Private owner Private owner Private owner Private owner

Sources: Forest Act 1993, Forest Regulation 1995, Collaborative Forest Management Guidelines 2003, National Park and Wildlife Conservation Act 1973.

International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 173

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

communities, but rather constitute a new and differentcomponent beyond the previous system. In this approach,the ownership of carbon is not automatically derived fromthe forest resources that hold or process the carbon.Moreover, the state could even define carbon as an entirelynew and separate natural resource, which would decouplecarbon from any established ownership notions of pre-viously defined forest commodities (Osafo 2010).

The above scenario would enable the state to maintainall control and benefit rights over carbon, or to offer jointownership with forest communities in some cases. Thisscenario would not offer any REDD+ benefits to the forestcommunities, but instead recentralize all forest carbonbenefits to the state, thus eroding the existing communityforest tenure security due to a loss of actual benefits andcontrol authority.

4.3. Devolution of all carbon rights as forest rights

This scenario extends, to their fullest extent, the assump-tions of current community-level forest rights (forest man-agement benefits) to carbon rights (ecosystem services).All carbon rights are treated as an inherent component ofexisting forest benefits, based on the view that the ecolo-gical ‘production’ of carbon results from community-based forest management. Here, carbon is treated as aninherent component of forest activities. It is recognized asan ecological process and the result of management offorest resources; in other words as an inherent ecosystemservice provided by the forest as an interdependent systemas a whole. This approach would also consider carbonsuccesses the result of community forest managementdecisions and thus the direct or indirect product of com-munity-based efforts. This scenario implicitly merges allcarbon rights with the current forest rights of forest com-munities (Vhugen et al. 2012), and therefore implies devo-lution of full carbon rights to the community level, in linewith Nepal’s strong community forestry framework.Community forest users would receive full carbon rightsand, consequently, full benefit from the carbon trade,which would strengthen the Nepalese community forestryuser groups and allow for the strongest forest tenuresecurity vis-à-vis REDD+ carbon trade efforts.

Between these different scenarios, the Nepalese gov-ernment has not confirmed yet on how carbon-relatedsolutions will be operationalized, and what implicationsthey anticipate for the affected local forest communities.Nepal’s 2010 R-PP, however, emphasizes a commitment tobuild upon the existing institutional structures, and that‘the framework for REDD+ implementation will establishthe regime for carbon rights based on the principleof linking it to the existing resource rights’ (GoN 2010,p. 45). Similarly, the Ministry of Forests and SoilConservation announced plans to build upon the 1993Forest Act in order to accommodate REDD+. This empha-sis may suggest the government’s preference for implicitlegal rights derived from existing laws that do not speci-fically mention carbon rights but nonetheless could govern

rights to benefit from REDD+. This would point towardthe first option in which carbon rights represent extensionsof government’s respective forest rights and follows theirdifferentiation between surface rights (community) andsubsurface rights (state).

5. Concerns and local perspectives: interviews withcommunity forestry representatives

5.1. Clashing agendas: fortress conservation versuslivelihood needs

One of the most central concerns that soon became evidentthroughout our interview data is the clash of objectivesand agendas between forest conservation and livelihoods.REDD+’s carbon stock increases can result in conflictwhen the livelihood needs of poor forest dwellers maybecome of secondary importance, pushed into the back-ground by the dominant agendas of the Global North(Griffiths 2009; Mustalahti et al. 2012). Ghan ShyamPandey, Coordinator of the Global Alliance ofCommunity Forestry (GACF), and former national chairof FECOFUN, for example, reports from his close engage-ment with REDD+ preparations in Nepal that the currentprocess does not reflect or support the interests of thecountry’s forest-dependent people, and has instead beenimposed primarily by international investors and conserva-tion agencies for their own benefit. Other intervieweesalso emphasized concerns that the national governmentmay align with foreign carbon investors to maximizeeconomic profits by focusing on high-level agreementsbetween international donors and the national governmentof Nepal. Current FECOFUN chair Apsara Chapagain issimilarly skeptical there will be local REDD+ benefits forthe community from stricter forest protection requirementsfor climate change mitigation (Chapagain 2012). Evenwhere forest conservation would increase the overall forestvalue, on short-time scales it may have a diminishingeffect on the user value because harvesting restrictionsundermine the local subsistence economy and livelihoodsecurity (Peskett et al. 2008).

Another concern is that policy will become morerestrictive toward extractive activities in order to increasethe carbon stocks and services of the forests (personalinterview, Global Alliance of Community ForestryCoordinator – Ghan Shyam Pandey; and REDD+ expertand Executive Director of Kathmandu based researchNGO Natural Resources Institute – Shambhu Dangal,February 2012). For example, a study from two REDD+pilot project sites in the Ludikhola watershed (Gorkha)and Kayarkhola watershed (Chitwan) indicates that thelife of the forest-dependent population was affected bynew restrictions that were prompted by REDD+ pilotefforts (Uprety et al. 2011; Patel et al. 2013). Their find-ings suggest that REDD+ may encourage restrictions onceit enters into performance-based (market-based) mechan-isms. Our interview with Eak Rana, Project Coordinator ata REDD+ pilot project led by the International Centre for

174 R.R. Bastakoti and C. Davidsen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), revealedthat even though pilot projects are typically not market-based nor require specific restrictions, CFUGs’ executiveshave already initiated stricter extraction limits in pilotproject areas to increase their forest carbon stock for amore positive future record (personal interview, February2012). The former District Forest Officer of Chitwan andcurrent Planning Officer at the Ministry of Forests and SoilConservation Indra Sapkota also has the same observationfrom REDD+ pilot area. Sapkota criticizes that REDD+benefits to the local level were presented in a very fabri-cated way by its proponents at the beginning of the pro-ject. As a result to the flawed process, local forestexecutives set harsh forest extraction limits in order toincrease their economic returns from the carbon stockhigher (personal communication, December 2013).

Rana further indicated that the first disbursement ofmost of the ICIMOD-led pilot project funds was usedabundantly on forest conservation and carbon emissionreduction-related activities, but barely spent on direct live-lihood-supporting activities (personal interview, February2012). This follows a protective carbon sequestration strat-egy which often keeps land off-bounds for livelihoodactivities, as opposed to a multiuse strategy which wouldallow for more local diversity from livestock, shiftingcultivation or firewood harvesting (Meinzen-Dick et al.2010). REDD+ only pays a small portion to the commu-nities for increased carbon stocks, but at the same time theproject guidelines forbid alternative livelihood initiativesof the CFUGs beyond 10 explicitly listed activities. Theseare insufficient in scope and flexibility to cover theimmediate needs of the forest population, let alone toreduce their dependency on forest extraction in the longrun (Skutsch et al. 2012).

On top of harvesting restrictions, interviewees alsoraise concerns over zero-use conservation efforts. In lightof an increasing global market for environmental services,the Nepalese government has declared a commitment toincrease forest cover to 40% of the total land (NPC 2010).Although community forestry activists are not per seagainst such conservation efforts, skepticism continuesagainst the government’s recent steps that have also beencriticized as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey2003, 2005).

Given the emerging revenues of REDD+, the govern-ment and environmental NGOs may have an incentive tofavor the creation of protected areas over the interests oflocal forest communities. For example, the Nepalese gov-ernment hastily declared three new protected areas justbefore the 2009 Copenhagen Summit to demonstrate itslevel of commitment to conservation (Paudel et al. 2013).Large parts of the newly declared protected areas had,however, either previously been established communityforests or were part of potential future community foreststhat had already been under consideration by the forestauthorities (personal interview, Ghan Shyam Pandey andBhola Khatiwada, February 2012). The government’sdeclaration even ignored international legal provisions

for the local communities and indigenous peoples (perso-nal interview, Ghan Shyam Pandey, February 2012) and,overall, gives an example of how vulnerable communityrights may be as outside interests increase (Chapagain2012). FECOFUN, several community forestry activistsand policy analysts strongly condemned the Nepalesegovernment’s decision, arguing that it undermines thenational role and international credibility of Nepal’s com-munity forestry as a successful sustainability instrument(Sunam et al. 2013).

5.2. REDD+ in practice: local benefit flow andimplementation

Studies around the world found that PES, despite theirprogram objectives, offer mixed outcomes for small andpoor land owners (Boyd et al. 2007; Pagiola 2008). Localpeople are offered limited economic incentives to partici-pate, and their involvement is often driven only by donorpriorities and project financing (Kandel 2007). Often, for-est-reliant communities are unable to benefit from PESparticularly due to the lack of legal recognition of landclaims (Boyd et al. 2007), high transition costs, poorgovernance and corruption (Sunderlin et al. 2009;Dermawan et al. 2011). Griffiths (2009) further showed aSouth American case that environmental payments andcarbon forestry even indebted the communities and lockedthem into in legal obligations which favored carbon for-estry companies. Overall, REDD+ appears to achieve localsuccess only if it offers clear financial benefits, full andreliable compensation for the loss of extractive forestbenefits. This includes nonmarketed goods and intangibleassets of local forests which would be affected understricter regulations, otherwise it is difficult to motivate achange in local forest use behavior in the long run(McNally et al. 2009).

The Nepalese government has also promoted REDD+as a tool for poverty alleviation, but whether or not andhow REDD+ benefits will actually reach local forest com-munities remain unclear (Bleaney et al. 2009). Market-based conservation initiatives are relatively new inNepal, and the country has already experienced top-downpressures during the pilot phases of PES and sustainableforest management certification processes (Kandel 2007).Environmental and social NGOs are particularly wary ofpotential for funding to subvert safeguards for indigenouspeople and good governance from REDD+ (Cadman &Maraseni 2012). Even though Nepal has entered into theREDD+ SES (Social and Environmental Standards)Initiative and the government has announced it wouldconduct a Strategic Social and Environmental ImpactStudy in its R-PP document, the implementation haslagged far behind and the government is still in the processof outsourcing (Khatri & Paudel 2013). The ICIMOD-ledpilot project tried to incorporate some social indicatorsbeyond carbon sequestration in its fund distribution, butit failed to properly address the needs of forest-dependentpeople. According to the Baseline Report 2010 of the

International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 175

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

ICIMOD’s Nepalese REDD+ pilot project, demand forforest products such as firewood in many cases alreadyexceeds the supply in many CFUGs, and they do not havealternatives to resort to. This situation may be furtheraggravated as REDD+ could complicate local pressures;our interviewees jointly emphasized that considerable dan-ger exists from local elites imposing stricter rules to gainmore benefit from the local carbon stock, thus affectingpoor people’s livelihoods even more. Some CFUGs havealready tightened their forest product-harvesting rules,which do not affect the rich families, but the poor forest-dependent families even more so (Uprety et al. 2011; Patelet al. 2013).

5.3. Top-down decision-making structures

Further critical issues arise not only from expected outcomesbut from the process itself. The scope of carbon trading andPES brings a new layer of nationally and internationallyimportant objectives, due to which our interviewees expressfears that these will overrun local forest management prio-rities and introduce stronger top-down decision-making.Participation and representation are, however, consideredcentral in order to avoid current gaps and marginalizationwhich would negatively affect forest tenure security (perso-nal interview, Ghan Shyam Pandey, Shambhu Dangal, BholaBhattarai and Bhola Khatiwada, February 2012). Even if alarge amount of funding flows from the Global North, it iscrucial that these resources effectively reach the forest depen-dent communities without undermining local institutions(Phelps et al. 2010). Doherty and Schroeder (2011), forexample, even suggest a global REDD+ framework as amechanism to warrant the participation and influence oflocal forest communities in the establishment of tenurearrangements at the national level.

In principle, the Nepalese government declared that itis committed to respecting the rights of forest-dependentpeople, to maintaining downward transparency andaccountability, and to clarifying the link between carbonownership and land/forest tenure before entering intoactive carbon trade (GoN 2010). However, communityforestry and policy activists are not convinced that thiscommitment can be implemented in practice. Across ourinterviews, many recent activities and projects were criti-cized as being top-down, donor-driven, and dominated bygovernment techno-bureaucrats and foreign donor organi-zations (personal interviews, Shambhu Dangal, GhanShyam Pandey, Bhola Bhattarai, February 2012). GlobalAlliance of Community Forestry coordinator and formerchair of FECOFUN Ghan Shyam Pandey, for example,particularly expresses concerns that international conserva-tion NGOs have become overly influential in Nepal’spolicy formulations, while civil society and media aretoo weak to provide a local counterbalance of voices andinterests. Accordingly, he argues, Nepal’s national REDD+policy-making needs to become more proactive in carefulregulatory planning and implementation of tenure rights,benefit sharing and political participation structures.

Otherwise, he argues, the country’s forestry frameworkmay lose consistency and relevance in its national futurefor livelihood security and sustainable development.

REDD+ guidelines stipulate that existing forest gov-ernance systems be used as a foundation for its efficient,effective and equitable implementation (Petkova et al.2010). However, a review of REDD+ plans submitted tothe World Bank in 2008 by various national governmentsshows that most plans were prepared with little or noconsultation with forest-dependent people (Griffiths2009). The review further warns that although REDD+itself is not a governing instrument, it does affect govern-ance as it becomes part of key decision-making structuresof forest-related priorities, authority and power (Griffiths2009). Similarly, although the Nepalese governmentclaims that their REDD+ R-PP documents were preparedin a consultative process (GoN 2010), our observation aswell as interviewee reports indicates that local forest com-munities’ level of knowledge and consultation about theemerging forest carbon offset mechanism, its process andconsequences, is very low, and most likely has beenthroughout the policy formulation process. According tothe REDD+ R-PP document:

Altogether 3,180 individuals were consulted throughworkshops and meetings. 57 workshops were held atnational (17), regional/district (13) and community (27)level with participation from a range of stakeholdersincluding indigenous people and local communities, forestdependent people dalit, women, civil society organiza-tions, government department, political parties, media,academia, international organizations, development part-ners and private sectors. Separate workshops were heldtargeting indigenous people (4), dalit (1) and women (3).(GoN 2010, p. 5)

Although it appears that the government conducted a con-sultative and participatory process, in fact, most of theworkshops and consultations were held either in the capi-tal or in other major cities, far from resource users. AsBushley (2010) for example reports, about 30% of theworkshops and 87% of consultations took place inKathmandu, and participants were counted double if theyattended more than one workshop. As a result, the numbercount does not necessarily represent wide participation byforest dependent stakeholders and the process insteadworked in favor of the interest of powerful actors in thecapital. NGOs and civil society representatives engaged inthe REDD+ policy planning events, but their participationdid not result in much influence because they were notproportionately represented in the policy forums (personalinterview, former General Secretary of FECOFUN andCivil Society Organization representative observer forFCPF REDD+ process, World Bank, February 2012).For example, the official REDD+ working group develop-ing the governance framework is comprised of nine mem-ber organizations: four government agencies, twointernational donor agencies and three from civil societyand federations representing local groups. As our

176 R.R. Bastakoti and C. Davidsen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

interview comments and observations suggest, local inter-ests are typically outweighed by the shared interests andpolicy goals of the national and international actors withtheir stronger share of votes.

Several Nepalese policy actors criticized various diffi-cult points in which the power and funding of externalcarbon trade allies may have an eroding effect on commu-nity collective action. For example, a REDD+ alliance ofpowerful global and national actors with local communityleaders could shift the local power balances of the com-munity profoundly, favor allied interests over those of themarginalized poor and undermine the communities’ estab-lished forest management, local governance, internalpower structure and balance of local decision-making pro-cesses (personal interviews, Shambhu Dangal, GhanShyam Pandey and Bhola Bhattarai, February 2012).REDD+ expert Shambhu Dangal goes on to add that

due to the power and access to new resources, local elitesalso support the agenda of powerful actors, thus leavingthe local poor more vulnerable. Unless international nego-tiations protect local user rights, REDD+ would not bringany benefit for forest dependent people – rather it wouldcentralize power and marginalize the local people.(Personal communication, February 2012)

Further, he explains that the complex REDD+ standardsoften need to rely on international experts, and this requiresconsiderable funds for external consultants, leaving lessfunds for local conservation activities. He argues thatthese high transaction costs may even exceed REDD+’sbenefits in current market prices. Global Alliance ofCommunity Forestry Coordinator Ghan Shyam Pandeyadds that REDD+ illustrates how the politics of climatechange serve to drive a new culture of external consultancyand ultimately encourage a new form of colonization.

6. Recentralization strategy and timing of largerforest framework

A growing number of scholars warn that if the nationalgovernment chooses to protect the forest for carbon credit,it could pose a threat to decentralized forest governanceand diminish its contribution to local autonomy, commu-nity livelihoods and development (Phelps et al. 2010;Sikor et al. 2010). Globalized market measures also posea threat to forest people because they create strong eco-nomic interests for the state to recentralize land andresource rights (Shiva 2000). The changing role and posi-tion of the state vis-à-vis tenure rights, benefit sharing andgovernance decision-making in recent forest carbon tradedesigns indicates that REDD+ enables the same centrali-zation trend (Lyster 2011). A large-scale analysis of forestcarbon trends and partnership facilities from 37 countriesincluding Nepal indicates similar trends of increased statecontrol over resources (Dooley et al. 2011).

Our interview data suggest not only a strong centrali-zation trend, but also deliberate strategy on the part of theNepalese government to push their own agenda. Several

key policy actors in Nepal agreed that the government isbelieved to be using the current REDD+ preparations andforest governance restructuring – with its political instabil-ity and power imbalances – as a political opportunity to arecentralize forest tenure rights – away from the people,and back to the state (e.g. personal interviews, GhanShyam Pandey and Bhola Khatiwada, February 2012).

To illustrate, as part of the pending revisions to the 1993Forest Act, the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservationthreatened to shift forest management from autonomouslocal forest decision-making back into comanagementwith the state with a number of restrictions on the autonomyand benefits of forest dependent communities (Bushley2010; Sunam et al. 2010). This proposed amendment billwould claim 50% of the CFUGs’ forest benefit income asnational revenue and prohibit forest harvesting for twoyears after the establishment of new community forests.As a result, the bill has been highly criticized as a regressivestrategy that has raised fears and the Nepalese governmentmay attempt to reverse its previous devolution process intoa centralized forest regime catering to the needs of othersaway from the local forest population.

Current forest policies and laws have clearly defined therights of forest management and use within different man-agement regimes, as discussed in the previous section. Undercommunity-based forest management regimes, local com-munities have clear rights over forest resources, but the own-ership of the land remains with the state. The best option todefine carbon rights is based on the ownership of carbon poolresources, if the state does not want to fully grant carbonrights to the communities. However, existing practices showthat the government repeatedly challenges the clearly grantedrights of communities by issuing different directives (Ojha2008). For instance, past directives have restricted the har-vesting of live trees and local forest officials have exercisedconsiderable discretion in interpreting the laws outliningmanagement and use rights. In this connection, some regardREDD+ as a new source of funding for their existing forestpolicy, as well as an opportunity to add carbon stock to theirprotected areas (Griffiths 2009). Government forestry offi-cials consider carbon rights as complex issue to define underREDD+ scheme. In an interview, the Planning Officer ofMinistry of Forestry Indra Sapkota stressed that carbon is anentity that should not be owned by a particular communitylike other forest products, and that its ownership shouldinstead remain associated with the national or at least at thesubnational level (personal interview, December 2013). Thishighlights considerable tension among the different actors onthe understanding of carbon rights. As many intervieweesindicate and our analysis suggests, it would come as nosurprise if the government treated carbon as public goodsand centralized the rights over carbon separate from forestuse right during policy reform.

7. Conclusion

Although carbon trade preparations are underway aroundthe globe, the implications for people whose livelihoods

International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 177

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

depend on forests have not yet been fully examined.REDD+’s focus on performance-based and incentive-oriented mechanisms poses numerous risks to local com-munities as it could encourage a recentralization of forestland and tenure authority with stronger state-and-expertcontrol mechanisms and top-down governance, imposeexclusionary carbon-focused forest conservationapproaches on previously livelihood-oriented forests,increase land speculation and land grabbing by reversingdecentralization and violate customary rights by introdu-cing formal restrictions on new forest-related rights. Thismay jeopardize the outcome of REDD+ for local forestcommunities in the Global South as the community andthe state may, in the long run, be driven by very differentinterest mechanisms that could ultimately boost or erodeexisting community forestry.

Our paper examines the case of Nepal for the potentialimpact of REDD+ on forest communities and suggests thatits community forestry success is now at stake becauseforest tenure security is jeopardized, the factor that thelocal commons most critically depend on. While Nepal’sforest communities have been thriving successfully overthe past three decades and established highly successfulsocial and ecological outcomes, their forest tenure securityis set on brittle grounds. The state has never fully trans-ferred land ownership (devolution) to the communities butmerely transferred the execution of land rights (decentra-lization) for decision-making and harvesting benefits.

Nepal’s community-based forest regime is nowfacing pivotal risks at a critical time. Nepal has enteredinto a process of fundamentally revising its forest gov-ernance framework to accommodate the requirements offorest and carbon-related rights for carbon trade. Despitesignificant efforts through Nepal’s National StrategyPlan and REDD+ R-PP, no legal provisions have yetbeen made toward the most critical issues such as car-bon ownership, benefit sharing and political participa-tion at the subnational and local level. The paperexamines these possible changes for state-communitypower balances under three potential scenarios of com-prehensive tenure reforms, and identifies several keyconcerns from conceptual to practical from the perspec-tives of community forestry stakeholders, local forestmanagement institutions and political activists for sus-tainable forest livelihoods.

AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank the associate editor and twoanonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on this manu-script. The first author, Rishi Bastakoti, is a Vanier Scholar andwould like to acknowledge Vanier Canada Graduate ScholarshipsProgramme for supporting his PhD research.

ReferencesAgrawal A, Ostrom E. 2008. Decentralization and community-

based forestry: learning from experience. In: Webb EL,Shivakoti G, editors. Decentralization, forests and rural

communities: policy outcomes in South and SoutheastAsia. New Delhi: Sage; p. 44–67.

Bartlett AG. 1992. A review of community forestry advances inNepal. Commonw Forest Rev. 71:95–100.

Basnet R. 2009. Carbon ownership in community managed for-ests. J Forest Livelihood. 8:78–84.

Blaikie P. 2001. Social nature and environmental policy in theSouth: views from verandah and veld. In: Castree N, BraunB, editors. Social nature: theory, practice, and politics.Oxford: Blackwell; p. 133–150.

Bleaney A, Vickers B, Peskett L. 2009. REDD in Nepal: puttingcommunity forestry centre stage? REDD-net [Internet]. [cited2012 May 29]. Available from: http://www.redd-net.org/posts/reddinnepalputtingcommunityforestrycentrestage

Boyd E, May P, Chang M, Weiga F. 2007. Exploring socio-economic impacts of forest based mitigation projects: lessonsfrom Brazil and Bolivia. Environ Sci Policy. 10:419–433.

Branney P, Yadav KP. 1998. Changes in community forest conditionand management 1994–1998: analysis of information from theforest resources assessment study and socio-economic study inthe Koshi Hills. Kathmandu: Nepal UK Community ForestryProject. Project Report G/NUKCFP/32.

Brockhaus M, Obidzinski K, Dermawan A, Laumonier Y, LuttrellC. 2012. An overview of forest and land allocation policies inIndonesia: is the current framework sufficient to meet theneeds of REDD plus? Forest Policy Econ. 18:30–37.

Bryant RL. 1992. Political ecology: an emerging research agendain third world studies. Polit Geogr. 11:12–36.

Bushley BR. 2010. Governance challenges of reducing emissionsfrom deforestation and forest degradation in Nepal. ReconDev. 1:1.

Cadman T, Maraseni T. 2012. The governance of REDD+: aninstitutional analysis in the Asia Pacific region and beyond.J Environ Plann Manage. 55:617–635.

Castree N. 2001. Socializing nature: theory, practice, and politics.In: Castree N, Braun B, editors. Social nature: theory, prac-tice, and politics. Oxford: Blackwell; p. 1–21.

Chapagain A. 2012 Jul 15. Forests can’t survive without com-munities. Down To Earth [Internet]. [cited 2013 Jan 30].Available from: http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/for-ests-can-t-survive-without-communities

Cotula L, Mayers J. 2009. Tenure in REDD: start-point or after-thought? London: International Institute for Environment andDevelopment.

De Konig R, Capistrano D, Yasmi Y. 2008. Forest related con-flict: impacts, links, and measures to mitigate. Washington(DC): Rights and Resources Initiative.

Department of Forestry. n.d. CFUG database. (Internal database;last cited August 2012).

Dermawan A, Petkova E, Sinaga A, Mumu Muhajir M,Indriatmoko Y. 2011. Preventing the risk of corruption inREDD+ in Indonesia. Jakarta and Bogor: United NationsOffice on Drugs and Crime and Center for InternationalForestry Research.

Doherty E, Schroeder H. 2011. Forest tenure and multi-levelgovernance in avoiding deforestation under REDD. GlobalEnviron Polit. 11:66–88.

Dooley K, Griffiths T, Martone F, Ozinga S. 2011. Smoke andmirrors: a critical assessment of the Forest CarbonPartnership Facility. Brussel: FERN and Forest PeoplesProgramme.

Dulal H, Shah K, Sapkota C. 2012. Reducing emissions fromdeforestation and forest degradation (REDD) projects: les-sons for future policy design and implementation. Int J SustDev World Ecol. 19:116–129.

Escobar A. 1999. After nature: steps to an antiessentialist poli-tical ecology. Curr Anthropol. 40:1–30.

Fairhead J, Leach M, Scoones I. 2012. Green grabbing: a newappropriation of nature? J Peasant Stud. 39:237–261.

178 R.R. Bastakoti and C. Davidsen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

Food and Agriculture Organization. 2002. Land tenure and ruraldevelopment. Land tenure study 3. Rome: Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Food and Agriculture Organization. 2011. Reforming foresttenure issues, principles and process. Rome: Food andAgriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Gautam AP, Shivakoti GP, Webb EL. 2004. A review of forestpolicies, institutions, and changes in the resource conditionin Nepal. Int Forest Rev. 6:136–148.

Gilmour D, Malla Y, Nurse M. 2004. Linkages between commu-nity forestry and poverty. Bangkok: RECOFTC.

GoN. 2010. Nepal’s readiness preparation proposal REDD 2010–2013. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal Ministry of Forestsand Soil Conservation.

GoN/MFS C. 2008. Readiness programme idea note (R-PIN) forreducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation(REDD). Kathmandu: Government of Nepal/Ministry ofForests and Soil Conservation.

Goers-Williams L, Larsen G, Lupberger S, Daviet F, Davis C.2011. Getting ready with forest governance: a review of theWorld Bank forest carbon partnership facility readinesspreparation proposals and the UN-REDD national pro-gramme documents. Washington (DC): World ResourcesInstitute.

Griffiths T. 2009. Seeing ‘REDD’? Forests, climate change miti-gation and the rights of indigenous peoples. Moreton-in-Marsh: Forest Peoples Program.

Harvey D. 2003. The new imperialism. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Harvey D. 2005. A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Huettner M. 2012. Risks and opportunities of REDD plus imple-mentation for environmental integrity and socio-economiccompatibility. Environ Sci Policy. 15:4–12.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2006. Good prac-tice guidance for national greenhouse gas inventories.Volume 4: agriculture, forestry and other land use(AFOLU). Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange.

Ives JD. 1989. Deforestation in the Himalayas: the cause ofincreased flooding in Bangladesh and Northern India? LandUse Policy. 6:187–193.

Kandel PN. 2007. Effects of forest certification towards sustain-able community forestry in Nepal. Banko Janakari.17:11–16.

Kanel KR. 2004. Twenty-five years of community forestry: con-tribution to millennium development goals. In: Kanel KR,Mathema P, Niraula DR, Kandel BR, Gautam M, editors.Twenty-five years of community forestry proceedings of thefourth national workshop on community forestry; 2004 Aug4–6; Kathmandu: Community Forestry Division, Departmentof Forests; p. 4–18.

Kanel KR. 2006. Nepal’s forest policies on community for-estry development: the government perspective. In:Gyamtsho P, Singh BK, Rasul G, editors. Capitalisationand sharing of experiences on the interaction betweenforest policies and land use patterns in Asia: linking peo-ple with resources, Volume 2. Kathmandu: SDC andICIMOD; p. 35–52.

Kanel KR, Dahal GR. 2008. Community forestry policy and itseconomic implications: an experience from Nepal. Int J SocForest. 1:50–60.

Khatri DB, Paudel N. 2013. Is Nepal getting ready for REDD+? Anassessment of REDD+ readiness process in Nepal. Discussionpaper series 12.2. Kathmandu: ForestAction Nepal.

Knox A, Caron C, Goldstein A, Miner J. 2010. The interface ofland and natural resource tenure and climate change mitiga-tion strategies: challenges and options. Paper presented at:The Expert Meeting on Land Tenure Issues for

Implementing Climate Change Mitigation Policies in theAFOLU sectors; 2010 Nov 15–17. Rome: FAO.

Larson A. 2011. Forest tenure reform in the age of climatechange: lessons for REDD+. Global Environ Change.21:540–549.

Larson AM, Barry D, Dahal GR. 2010. New rights for forest-based communities? Understanding processes of foresttenure reform. Int Forest Rev. 12:78–96.

Leggett M, Lovell H. 2012. Community perceptions of REDD+:a case study from Papua New Guinea. Clim Policy.12:115–134.

Lyster R. 2011. REDD+, transparency, participation and resourcerights: the role of law. Environ Sci Policy. 14:118–126.

Macintosh A. 2012. The Australia clause and REDD: a caution-ary tale. Clim Change. 112:169–188.

McNally R, Sage N, Holland T. 2009. Understanding REDD:implications for Lao PDR. Nepal and Vietnam: SNVNetherlands Development Organisation and IndochinaCarbon.

Meinzen-Dick R, Markelova H, Moore K. 2010. The role ofcollective action and property rights in climate change stra-tegies. Policy Brief Number 7 ~ February 2010. CollectiveAction and Property Rights (CAPRi).

Mustalahti I, Bolin A, Boyd E, Paavola J. 2012. Can REDD+reconcile local priorities and needs with global mitigation ben-efits? Lessons from Angai Forest, Tanzania. Ecol Soc. 17:16.

Mustalahti I, Tassa DT. 2012. Analysis of three crucial elementsof REDD plus in participatory forest management. Scand JForest Res. 27:200–209.

Nagendra H. 2007. Drivers of reforestation in human-dominatedforests. Proc Nat Acad Sci USA. 104:15218–15223.

National Planning Commission. 2007. Three Year Interim Plan:2007/08-2009/10. Nepal: National Planning Commission.

National Planning Commission. 2010. Three Year Plan: 2010/11-2012/13. Nepal: National Planning Commission.

Ojha H. 2008. Reframing governance: understanding deliberativepolitics in Nepal’s Terai forestry. New Delhi: Adroit.

Osafo Y. 2010. REDD-net case study. A review of tree tenureand land rights in Ghana and their implications for carbonrights in a national REDD+ scheme. REDD-net.

Pagdee A, Kim YS, Daugherty P. 2006. What makes communityforest management successful: a meta-study from communityforests throughout the world. Soc Nat Resour. 19:32–52.

Pagiola S. 2008. Payments for environmental services in CostaRica. Ecol Econom. 65:712–724.

Patel T, Dhiaulhaq A, Gritten D, Yasmi Y, de Bruyn T, PaudelNS, Luintel HS, Khatri DB, Silori C. 2013. Predicting futureconflict under REDD+ implementation. Forests. 4:343–363.

Paudel NS, Khatri DB, Khanal DR, Karki R. 2013. The contextof REDD+ in Nepal: challenges and opportunities.Occasional Paper 81. Bogor: CIFOR.

Peluso NL. 1992. Rich forests, poor people: resource control, andresistance in Java. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.

Peskett L, Huberman D, Bowen-Jones E, Edwards G, Brown J.2008. Making REDD work for the poor, poverty and envir-onment partnership (PES) Policy Brief. London: ODI.

Petkova E, Larson A, Pacheco P. 2010. Forest governance,decentralization and REDD+ in Latin America. Forests.1:250–250.

Phelps J, Webb E, Agrawal A. 2010. Does REDD+ threaten torecentralize forest governance? Science. 328:312–313.

Sandbrook C, Nelson F, Adams WM, Agrawal A. 2010. Carbon,forests and the REDD paradox. Oryx. 44:330–334.

Shiva V. 2000. Tomorrow’s biodiversity. London: Thames andHudson.

Sikor T, Stehl J, Enters T, Ribot JC, Singh N, Sunderlin WD,Wollenberg L. 2010. Will REDD-plus, forest people’s rightsand nested climate governance. Global Environ Change.20:423–425.

International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology 179

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4

Skutsch M, Karky B, Rana E, Kotru R, Karki S, Joshi L, PradhanN, Gilani H, Joshi G. 2012. Options for payment mechan-isms under national REDD+ programmes. ICIMOD WorkingPaper 2012/6. Kathmandu: ICIMOD.

Smith J, Scherr S. 2002. Forest carbon and local livelihoods:assessment of opportunities and policy recommendations.Bagor: CIFOR.

Sunam RK, Banjade MR, Paudel NS, Khatri DB. 2010. Canbureaucratic control improve community forestry govern-ance? An analysis of proposed Forest Act amendment.Kathmandu: ForestAction.

Sunam RK, Paudel N, Paudel G. 2013. Community forestry andthe threat of recentralization in Nepal: contesting the bureau-cratic hegemony in policy process. Soc Nat Res IntJ. 26:1407–1421.

Sunderlin WD, Hatcher J, Liddle M. 2008. From exclusion toownership? Challenges and opportunities in advancing foresttenure reform. Washington (DC): Rights and ResourcesInitiative.

Sunderlin WD, Larson AM, Cronkleton P. 2009. Foresttenure rights and REDD. In: Angelsen A, editor.Realising REDD+: national strategy and policy options.Bogor: CIFOR.

Tachibana T, Adhikari S. 2009. Does community-based manage-ment improve natural resource condition? Evidence from theforests in Nepal. Land Econom. 85:107–131.

Thapa GB, Weber KE. 1990. Actors and factors of deforestationin ‘Tropical Asia’. Environ Conserv. 17:19–27.

Thompson M, Baruah M, Carr E. 2011. Seeing REDD+ as aproject of environmental governance. Environ Sci Policy.14:100–110.

Uprety DR, Luintel H, Bhandari K. 2011. REDD+ and conflict: acase study of the REDD+ projects in Nepal. Kathmandu: TheCenter for People and Forest and ForestAction Nepal.

Vhugen D, Aguilar S, Peskett L, Miner J. 2012. REDD+ andcarbon rights: lessons from the field. Property Rights andResource Governance Project. Landesa, Seattle, WA: USAID.

White A, Martin A. 2002. Who owns the world’s forests?Forest tenure and public forests in transition. Washington(DC): Forest Trends & Centre for InternationalEnvironmental Law.

World Bank. 1979. Forestry in Nepal. Nepal development per-formance and prospects. Washington (DC): World Bank.

World Bank. 2007. Forest law and sustainable development.Washington (DC): World Bank.

World Resources Institute. 2005. The wealth of the poor – mana-ging ecosystems to fight poverty. Washington (DC): WorldResources Institute.

Wunder S. 2005. Payments for environmental services: somenuts and bolts. Bagor: CIFOR.

Wunder S, Engel S, Pagiola S. 2008. Taking stock: a comparativeanalysis of payments for environmental services programs indeveloped and developing countries. Ecol Econom. 65:834–852.

Yasmi Y, Kelley L, Murdiyarso D, Patel T. 2012. The struggleover Asia’s forests: an overview of forest conflict and poten-tial implications for REDD. Int Forest Rev. 14:99–109.

180 R.R. Bastakoti and C. Davidsen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Van

Pel

t and

Opi

e L

ibra

ry]

at 1

8:58

21

Oct

ober

201

4