REDD+ and Empowered Deliberative Democracy: Learning from Tanzania

World Development Vol. 59, pp. 199–211, 2014� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

0305-750X/$ - see front matter

www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddevhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.01.022

REDD+ and Empowered Deliberative Democracy:

Learning from Tanzania

IRMELI MUSTALAHTIUniversity of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, Finland

and

O. SAROBIDY RAKOTONARIVO *

Bangor University, Wales, United Kingdom

Summary. — This study was guided by the Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) discourse. We analyzed how the TanzanianCommunity Carbon Enterprise (CCE) model could reinforce the representation of disadvantaged groups in Reducing Emissions fromDeforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). The findings from Tanzanian suggest unmet conditions with disadvantages groups’representation in local decision-making and project implementation. We argue that mechanism to support horizontal accountabilitycould include audits and monitoring carried out by disadvantaged groups. This type of internal mechanism could for example allowcareful consideration of carbon responsibilities and to allow disadvantaged groups to influence service delivery and implementation.� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Key words — REDD+, EDD, benefit sharing, decision-making, accountability mechanisms, Tanzania

* This study is part of long-term research funded by the Academy of

Finland. The research team cooperated closely with the Responsive Forest

Governance Initiative (RFGI), a comparative research program on envi-

ronmental governance that focuses on enabling responsive and account-

able decentralization to strengthen representation of forest-based rural

populations. The RFGI is a project of the Council for the Development of

Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), the International Union

for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the University of Illinois at

Urbana-Champaign (UIUC). We would like to acknowledge the RFGI

research team for their valuable comments while planning this study. Our

special gratitude to Mkangamoja villagers, TFCG and MJUMITA’s Ex-

ecutive Directors, Charles Meschack and Rahima Njaidi, respectively. We

are especially appreciative of Someni Mteleka, Theron Brown, Betty Lu-

wuge, Raymond Nlelwa, and Andreas Scheba. Final revision accepted:

1. INTRODUCTION

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-dation (REDD+) is not primarily a governance reform but itcan or will be affected by decentralized forest governance. 1

REDD+ can present opportunities for improving decentral-ization but it risks also being undermined by existing gover-nance failures, such as corruption and elite capture (Larson& Petkova, 2011). Interventions related to REDD+ are there-fore intended to operate as an environmental governance re-form that benefits the poor and promotes local communities’rights, needs, and responsibilities (Kanowski, McDermott, &Cashore, 2011; Mustalahti, Bolin, Paavola, & Boyd, 2012;Thompson, Baruah, & Carr, 2011).

Rural communities’ livelihoods are deeply intertwined withforest use and forest ecosystem services (Sunderlin et al.,2008). In a similar way, forest governance decisions interactwith people’s livelihood strategies (Mustalahti et al., 2012).Social justice concerns over access to benefits from natural re-sources at community level have often been raised in forestgovernance decisions (e.g., in Cameroon by Oyono, Biyong,& Samba, 2012). This is also reported elsewhere where com-munities are lacking rights to make decisions over natural re-sources (Mustalahti & Lund, 2009; Ribot & Peluso, 2003).

Ribot (2009) argues that democratic decentralization, whichdevolves powers to locally elected authorities and increases lo-cal people’s participation in local decision making, could be asolution through increasing equity and efficiency in natural re-source management. Other scholars call these types of decen-tralized participatory governance reforms DeliberativeDemocracy (Evans, 2004) or Empowered Deliberative Democ-racy (EDD) (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 7) which “have the po-tential to be radically democratic in their reliance on theparticipation and capacities of ordinary people, deliberativebecause they institute reason-based decision making, empow-ered since they attempt to tie action to discussion”.

199

There is concern that severe conflicts and inequalities mayarise if the governance process in which REDD+ is imple-mented does not ensure credibility, reliability, transparency,participatory decision-making processes, and equitable benefitsharing (Ebeling & Yasue, 2008; Grieg-Gran, Porras, & Wun-der, 2005; Hirsch et al., 2011; Scheba, 2011). REDD+ calls fortransparent and accountable systems at village level, as well asat various levels of forest governance and among donors(Mustalahti & Tassa, 2011; Ribot, 2011). Further understand-ing of the implications of EDD related to natural resourcemanagement could advance conceptual and empirical under-standing of democratic practices in REDD+. 2

In this study, the implications of EDD include decision-making structures and allocation of rights and responsibilities.In this paper, we address these implications through an empir-ical study of the Tanzanian Community Carbon Enterprise(CCE) model as a contribution toward improved understand-ing of EDD in relation to REDD+ interventions.

January 20, 2014.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.01.022

200 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

In the next section we present our conceptual frameworkand understanding. In Section 3 we describe data collectionmethods. In Section 4 we introduce the case study called theCCE model. Finally, in Sections 5 and 6 we bring togetherthe main research findings, discussion, and conclusion in thecontext of decision making and accountability structure inthe case study area in order to answer or two main researchquestions: How do carbon responsibilities enshrined in theCCE model reinforce the representation of the disadvantagedgroups? And how effective is the CCE model at empoweringhorizontal accountability mechanisms?

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-dation (REDD) became prominent for first time at the 11thUN Conference of Parties (COP 11) in Montreal (2005). In2009 the Copenhagen Accord under COP 15 called for theestablishment of a mechanism to enable mobilization of finan-cial resources from developed countries. At the conclusion ofCOP 16 in Mexico 2010, a framework for REDD+ was de-fined in the “Cancun Agreement”. The agreement stipulatesa number of details (the suffix +) on goals, scope, scale, ele-ments, phases, as well as social and environmental safeguardsmeant to reward and encourage country efforts in forest con-servation and sustainable management (Thompson et al.,2011).

These details include the term democratic representation:who are the representatives in various decision-making pro-cesses and whose goals, scope, etc. are recognized in forestconservation and management? If citizenship is understoodas a social practice (Sian, 2010), democratic representationcan also be understood as a social practice within which lead-ers are accountable to their people and local people undertheir jurisdiction are able to hold them to account (Ribot,2003; Ribot, Chhatre, & Lankina, 2008). Democratic repre-sentation as a social practice should create and enhance socialjustice strengthened by equity, responsiveness, and account-ability (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Manor, 2004; Ribot, 2004;Speer, 2012). This occurs when people are able to participatein various discourses via Empowered Deliberative Democracy(EDD) as concluded by Fung and Wright (2001).

Mathie and Cunningham (2003, p. 475) define other EDDrelated terms as asset-based development; they argue thatdemocratization strengthens the capacity of people as citizensto claim their rights of access to assets. There are other con-ceptualizations that could have been usefully employed in thispaper such as social accountability. Social accountability andEDD are based on the same theoretical understanding that ifcitizens have access to information about their rights and qual-ity of services, they can influence service delivery and behaviorof the service providers. Joshi and Houtzager (2012) proposean alternative conceptualization which focuses on socialaccountability actions by viewing them as part of a long-termongoing political engagement of social actors.

Such a conceptualization is connected to understanding ofEDD in the context of decentralized forest management:Democratization is expected to strengthen the capacity of peo-ple as voting citizens to claim their right of access to forest re-sources. Because of this conceptual understanding, this studybuilds mainly on theories of democratic decentralizationdeveloped by Ribot and colleagues (Poteete & Ribot, 2011;Ribot, 2003, 2004; Ribot et al., 2008) based on long-termempirical studies in Africa. 3 Ribot (2003, 2004) asserted that

institutional arrangements necessary for bringing about actualdecentralization are rarely established in so-called decentral-ization reforms. The lack of downwardly accountable decen-tralization or power devolution is increasingly recognized asthe principal barrier to decentralized forest management insub-Saharan Africa (see Poteete & Ribot, 2011; Ribot et al.,2008). In this regard, careful consideration needs to be givento the question of whether a local institution is accountableto the people who depend on the resources it manages or toactors that facilitate its activities through knowledge, educa-tion, and material assistance.

Power transfers can take place among four main categories:elected local government; NGOs, or civil society organizations(CSOs); government agencies or administrative authorities;and private corporations (Ribot, 2004). In terms of EDD(Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 33), external actors and institutionalcontext can impose several limitations in power transfer anddecision making because the powerful participants may usetheir deliberative institutions only when it suits them. Thiscan also be a critical issue in the case of carbon rights andREDD+ benefits; the external actors will make “institutionalchoices” that can impact those who should have access to car-bon rights and benefits.

“Institutional choice” is also a critical issue in EDD forguiding the selection of locally accountable institutions withindecentralization. The measure of accountability is whetherinstitutions are subject to sufficient accountability mecha-nisms, such as elections, public meetings, public reportingrequirements, recall, and actions that encourage accountabil-ity such as magic, protest, etc. (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Rep-resentation is part and parcel of democracy, which can besubstantively defined as leadership that is accountable to thepeople (Moore, 1997). Representation also includes the means,powers, and abilities to transform popular needs and aspira-tions into responsive and accountable policy and ultimatelyimplementation of policy (see Boulding & Wampler, 2009;Devas & Grant, 2003). Representation can be subdivided intoresponsiveness and accountability (Ribot, 2004, p. 65). 4

Ribot (2011) strongly criticized REDD+ implementation atlocal level as a top-down approach not reflecting local people’sneeds and aspirations. In attempting to answer such concernsinternational and national agendas and scholars have sug-gested a number of principles to increase local people’s partic-ipation in REDD+ design. Such principles include generally aclear definition of land tenure and carbon rights and commu-nity representation in REDD decision making both interna-tionally and nationally. Ribot (2011) and Thompson et al(2011) explain further that for REDD+ to be an instrumentof justice (as well as conservation), it must be guided by andmonitored according to at least two clear standards: (i) demo-cratic representation of local people in all REDD+ decisionsboth internationally and nationally and (ii) local control overaccess to markets and other forest benefits. Although there areno “one size-fits all” standards for REDD+ local governance(Forsyth, 2009; Sandbrook, Nelson, Adams, & Agrawal,2010), such points merit consideration especially whenREDD+ is considered within the EDD perspective in the sit-uation where several national and international NGOs as wellas central and local government are interested in REDD+.

In the case of EDD, citizenship crystallizes around empow-ered citizens and responsive and accountable local representa-tives. It is with respect to the powers of local representativesthat citizens are motivated to become engaged in self-govern-ment and civil society as well as motivated to organize andapply influence. Although some scholars argue that the mass

REDD+ AND EMPOWERED DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: LEARNING FROM TANZANIA 201

of local people are politically ignorant, citizens actually havesuperior knowledge of local conditions, greater learningcapacities, and improved accountability concerning their pub-lic action (Fung & Wright, 2001, p. 37), but people do notorganize to influence authorities that cannot respond (Ribot,2004). The central assumption in REDD+ implementation isconsequently that empowerment of local institutions that arenot accountable to local populations may not produce the out-comes promised by decentralization, and creating accountablelocal representation without appropriate powers and abilitieswill prove to be useless. We take heed of this assumption tofocus on two core elements that the conceptual frameworktells will lead to EDD: (i) representation of the disadvantagedgroups and; (ii) horizontal accountability mechanisms.

3. RESEARCH METHODS

In Tanzania, collection of gray literature and preliminaryinterviews among national level actors and donor organizationwas carried out in June 2011. Based on these documents andkey informant interviews, the CCE model was selected as acase study intervention. We conducted an intensive literaturereview in February 2012 and February 2013 while field datawere collected in Tanzania from April to June 2012. Basedon our conceptual understanding of EDD in connection toREDD+, the following themes were selected as topics forinterviews:

a. Participation and roles of different actors in the decision-making processes: Questions related to institutional choices(institutional mapping).b. Representation and responsiveness: Questions related toempowerment of central and local governments and villageleaders so that i) they can be able to respond to local peo-ple’s needs and aspirations and ii) local people can be ableto act as citizens by influencing their leader’s decisions.Questions related to answerability of service providers aswell as donors and central government financing theiractivities.c. Accountability mechanisms: Questions related to mech-anisms that enforce accountability in benefit sharing andcreate local counter powers in decision-making.

The studying up approach via institutional mapping andin-depth interviews

Nader (1969) argues that researchers should study-up,down, and through simultaneously. 5 In this study, using astudying up approach, informants were identified by mappingthe institutional landscape. Initially, published and gray liter-ature (e.g., Tanzanian REDD+ national strategy, forest laws,village by-laws, and land use plan) was used to identify theexisting institutions related in one or another way to theCCE model and exercise of power. This included elected localgovernments, line ministry offices, district officers, customaryauthorities, user groups, NGOs, political parties, donor repre-sentatives, etc. This information was later completed throughdirect observation and interviews including snowball samplingto identify additional respondents.

Through this institutional mapping process a total of 50 keyinformants were selected to take account of all key actors’interests and their degree of participation in decision-makingprocesses. Semi-structured and in-depth interviews were con-ducted for all key informants. Of these, 20 informants weremembers of four existing village committees such as the Vil-lage Council (VC), the Village Natural Resource Committee

(VNRC), the Land Use Committee (LUC), and the REDD+Revenue Distribution Committee (RDC).

A further 20 informants were selected community membersincluding timber harvesters, charcoal makers, farmers, wo-men, youth, elders, disabled, most vulnerable groups, andschool children (who were also given trial payments throughtheir mothers). The remaining 10 informants were service pro-viders’ representatives (Tanzania Forest Conservation Groupand Community Forest Conservation Network of Tanzaniaknown, respectively, as TFCG and MJUMITA), districtauthorities, national REDD task force members, the Vice-President’s office, and donor representatives. A few informalinterviews were also conducted with randomly chosen villagersas a cross check of issues raised during interviews.

Some of the 20 informants in village committees were foundto be timber harvesters and charcoal makers, and conse-quently the semi-structured questions were designed to allowa greater degree of flexibility and redirect the course ofresearch according to their answers. To allow such flexibility,the focus was on themes rather than questions.

4. CASE STUDY: THE COMMUNITY CARBONENTERPRISE (CCE) MODEL

Tanzania has been at the forefront of advancing policies andpractices of participatory forest management (PFM), and thecountry has been similarly positioning itself as a key player inREDD+ since 2008. 6 Tanzania is one of three UN-REDDquick start countries in Africa under the UN-REDD pro-gramme designed to assist developing countries get “REDDready”. It is a focal country of Norway’s International Climateand Forest Initiative (ICFI) with up to NOK 500 million(USD 73 million) available for the development of a nationalREDD+ programme in Tanzania over a five-year period. 7

Tanzania is currently working to integrate REDD+ with theNational Forest Monitoring and Assessment (NAFORMA)programme, and to link these existing monitoring activitieswith a newly established National Carbon MonitoringCentre. 8

Tanzania’s government expects that REDD+ can furtherenhance PFM in Tanzania by enabling local communities toderive benefits from a new ecosystem service, the sequestrationof carbon dioxide (Blomley, Lukumbuzya, & Brodnig, 2011;Burgess et al., 2010). PFM was introduced into law inTanzania with the passing of the Forest Act of 2002. Thisact provided a clear legal basis for communities, groups, orindividuals across mainland Tanzania to own, manage, orco-manage forests under a wide range of conditions. Withthese radical policy changes Tanzania is widely considered tohave one of the most advanced and progressive legal frame-works for PFM in Africa. 9

We chose the CCE model for this study due to the promise ithas shown in developing and implementing a local carbonbenefit sharing approach. The CCE model is the proposedbenefit sharing scheme of a REDD+ pilot project entitled“Making REDD+ work for communities and forest conserva-tion in Tanzania”, which is a five-year partnership projectlaunched in September 2009 by the TFCG and MJUMITA.The project goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions fromdeforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania in ways thatprovide direct and equitable incentives to rural communities toconserve and manage forests sustainably. The trial carbonpayments were made in February 2012 to individuals and Vil-lage Councils in each of four participating villages that ful-filled necessary requirements such as village by-laws,

A B

A2A1High

importance B1A3


REDD+ benefit sharing by-laws, and land use managementplans.

The CCE model assumes that if REDD+ revenues are di-rectly channeled to communities and can be equitably distrib-uted within communities, they can cover the opportunity costsand the forest management costs of local communities. Theproject is one of Tanzania’s major and earliest REDD+ pilotprojects at local level. The scheme should give participatingcommunity forest villages the opportunity to market REDD+credits through the aggregation of voluntary emissions reduc-tions from different villages, which would then be traded onthe voluntary carbon market after being certified and verified(Kimbowa, Mwayafu, & Njaidi, 2011). The main advantage ofthis approach is that it reduces the transaction costs associatedwith small individual village emission reductions, which wouldprevent them from participating in carbon markets. The car-bon enterprises’ main responsibilities are thus to help commu-nities to monitor forests, compile, and submit monitoringreports for verification, organize and pay for verification,and market the resulting verified carbon credits.

This study was conducted in Mkangamoja village which isone the four participating villages in the CCE model underICFI and which was the first one receiving the trial paymentsand where the implementation of the CCE model hadsignificantly moved forward. The total population ofMkangamoja 10 was 798 in 2010 (137 adult men and 143 adultwomen) comprising 204 households. In Mkangamoja, over600 people of the total population in Mkangamoja can be con-sidered to belong to the disadvantaged groups such as poor,sick, or disabled women and elders, youth, and children. Inthis study, these people were considered disadvantagedbecause they did not have equal possibilities to participatefor example village meetings and decision-making committeesbecause of their life situation, economic reasons, or age.

After the new definition of forest had been adopted to in-clude regenerating areas older than 10 years, Mkangamoja vil-lage lands included about 1174 ha of miombo woodlandsmostly located on the western side of the village area. Thereare small patches of dense forests scattered in other areas.After the introduction of the MJUMITA/TFCG REDD+project, known locally as “Mkuhumi”, 645 ha of forest inMkankamoja were gazetted as village forest reserves (underCBFM), and this represents 55% of their total forests.

C D

Low influence High influence

B4

C1 B2

Low importance

B3

C3

C2

Index: Primary direct stakeholders

A1. Local communitiesA2. Village council and existing committees (VNRC, LUP, RDC)A3. Service providers (TFCG / MJUMITA)

Primary indirect stakeholders

B1. Donors (Royal Norwegian Embassy)B2. District authorities (DED, DFO, DNRO, DLUO, DAO)B3. National authorities (REDD+ task force, NAFORMA, National Carbon Monitoring Centre and National Trust Fund)B4. Vice Presidentís Office

Secondary stakeholders

C1. Project partnersC2. Other civil society organizations (such as Rights-Resources Initiatives or community groups) C3. Carbon buyers or project validators and registry - CCBA

Figure 1. Classification of stakeholders according to relative influence and

importance.

5. DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS FROM TANZANIA

In this section we seek first to understand the various inter-ests and roles of actors in the CCE model and then whetherthe decision-making structures allow locally elected represen-tatives to represent local people’s rights and lead to a moreequitable representation in REDD+. We also investigatehow effective is the CCE model at empowering horizontalaccountability mechanisms.

(a) Responsibilities and representation of the disadvantagedgroups

Although the question of responsibilities and representationrefers to all important actors, local community members areseen as the primary rights-holders in this study: they are themost likely to be vulnerable to rights infringements and arethe special focus of our analysis. Communities holding rightsover carbon will, however, have responsibilities in ensuringpermanence. Village governments are duty-bearers withrespect to village residents, but also rights-holders in the

national system. TFCG/MJUMITA and other project part-ners are duty-bearers (service providers as they are called inTanzania) with a responsibility for facilitating carbon pay-ments and seeking further rights realization with participatingcommunities in the project context. Local and central govern-ments are duty-bearers with respect to their constituents, butare also rights-holders with respect to global climate justice.In other words, rights-holders and duty-bearers are definedin relationship to one another, i.e., their respective rightsand responsibilities.

The actors who are involved in the CCE model are listed inthe Appendix A with a summary of their interests and anassessment of their impact on delivery of an equitable benefitsharing scheme. The actors are classified as follows:

� Direct primary actors are the main beneficiaries of theproject (local communities), the service providers whoplay a significant role in facilitating communities in deliv-ering project outputs (TFCG/MJUMITA), village coun-cil (VC) and village executive officer (VEO) who haveexecutive powers in the village.

� Indirect primary actors are not direct beneficiaries butwill affect or be affected by the CCE model (donorswho provide the funding, District officers (local govern-ment), Vice President’s Office, national REDD+ taskforce including National Carbon Monitoring Centre,the national trust fund, and the National Forest Moni-toring and Assessment (NAFORMA).

� Secondary actors are the remaining parties in the processwho are interested, such as project partners, civil societyorganizations (CSO), carbon buyers, project validators,and registries.

The actors listed in Appendix A were classified according totheir comparative importance and influence. This is shown inFigure 1. Importance is assessed in terms of their responsibil-ities in achieving the CCE model’s outputs and purpose. Influ-ence is judged in terms of the representation they can exert


over the project’s processes. Stakeholders who have highresponsibilities in the project but with low influence are shownin Box A in Figure 1. These include local community memberswho have a direct and significant stake in the project but maynot have enough power to influence the project’s processes andthus play minor roles in the decision-making processes.

Village Council and various existing committees in the vil-lage are also included because they make a valuable contribu-tion to project implementation by drafting by-laws andinfluencing local people’s decisions. They cannot however sub-stantially alter the manner in which the project is designed andimplemented because they are rather accountable to serviceproviders and not to the local community members whoelected them to be their representatives.

Box B indicates actors with a high degree of influence andimportance to the success of the project who are service pro-viders, donors, and national REDD+ task force. The serviceproviders particularly hold a lower degree of influence com-pared to donors because they can be dismissed if they proveto be non-performant in achieving main donor’s interests.The Vice President’s Office (VPO) and national REDD+ taskforce on the other is likely to have a very high influence on theproject because of the sets of power (legislative, executive, andjudiciary) they hold in favoring or hampering the project’sgoals.

The influential actors with less importance in achieving pro-ject purpose and outputs are grouped in Box D. These actorscan include the district authorities who provide limited sup-port to project implementation but have high influence on pro-ject’s processes. Their authority in approving the village forestmanagement plans and by-laws proves so.

The final group of actors given in Box C represents the leastimportant and least influential. These could be project part-ners and CSOs. Their interests need to be monitored to ensurethat (a) their interests are not adversely affected and (b) theirimportance and influence does not alter due to changed cir-cumstances.

Examination of documents and preliminary interviewsamong national level actors and donors show that the siteselection of REDD+ pilot projects under Norwegian fundingwas mainly driven by NGO preferences and interests: The pre-screening criteria used to access Norwegian funding was thatselected districts should be part of either Eastern Arc or coast-al forests and where the service provider organizations TFCG(Tanzania Forest Conservation Group) and later on MJUMI-TA (Mtandao wa Jamii wa Usimamizi wa Misitu, TanzanianCommunity Forestry Network) had been actively engaged(Namirembe & Ebeling, 2010). 11 Lindi Rural District inSoutheast Tanzania fulfilled these criteria for coastal forestincluding higher potential for implementing PFM and higherbiodiversity co-benefits (Kibuga & Samweli, 2010).

Kibuga, Nguya, Chikira, Luwuge, and Doggart (2011)argue that TFCG/MJUMITA made sure that social safe-guards were granted according to the Free Prior and InformedConsent (FPIC) criteria. Villagers should be given the right togive or withhold their consent to a proposed intervention thatmay affect the lands they customarily own, occupy, or other-wise use. Before the project implementation and throughoutthe whole process at village level, all the necessary informationshould be discussed in village meetings and committees andultimately, the village assembly (VA) 12 was to decide the ac-tion carried out by the service provider jointly with village rep-resentatives. However, it is important to distinguish betweenideas of participation seen through the lens of local people act-ing as citizens and exercising their rights as a social practice

and the modalities of democratic representation (see Ribot,2004; Sian, 2010).

The project’s first attempt at introducing REDD+ at theproject level was to reach out to as many people as possibleincluding the more disadvantaged groups. Typically the disad-vantaged groups include landless individuals (often dependenton labor income), poorer households, forest dependent indi-viduals, women, the elderly, and the disabled. The initial con-tact was made through a meeting conducted at sub-villagelevel. Village leaders were the first village actors approachedby the project staff who explained to them the benefits of theproject. Although community members were eventually giventhe chance to accept or reject the project, our interviews sug-gest that the way discussions and debates were carried outhad determined the acceptance of the project. These debateswere mainly shaped by power and information imbalancesamong the participants, that is interviewed respondents re-ported that village leaders (the service providers (TFCG/MJUMITA, village executive officer and village chairman)exercised convincing powers and significantly influenced the fi-nal decision. Carbon credits were not advertised as the solebenefits from REDD+, TFCG/MJUMITA also significantlyraised villager’s awareness about a different array of co-bene-fits accompanying carbon money such as livestock keeping,extension services to improve agricultural production, andtraining in other income-generating activities. Expectationsaround money and co-benefits triggered the project’s approvalalthough minimum villagers were still clearly lacking under-standing on what carbon is, what would be the requirementsthey will need to abide to if they decided to accept the project,and how and when these co-benefits would be delivered.

In addition, an examination of the attendance list compiledby the project staff (Forrester-Kibuga, Nguya, Chikira, Luw-uge, & Doggart, 2011, p. 21) suggests a low turnout rate atthe village assembly meeting where villagers were to acceptthe project. Only around 17% of the total population was pres-ent at the meeting. Considering the fact that around half of thepopulation are children, who were not present or counted atthe meeting, the percentage of adults increases. Neverthelessit remains firmly under 50%, which “calls into question theacceptance or rejection of the project” (Forrester-Kibugaet al., 2011, p. 36). Although final and legal approval of pro-jects could only be done in subsequent general village assem-blies, sub-village meetings were important to create generalacceptance and to initiate the process by selecting the VNRCmembers who are the village representatives carrying out dayto day responsibilities related forest management in the vil-lage. Consultation of minutes further revealed that a limitednumber of villagers also represented the whole community inthe design of by-laws and land use plans. While participationis almost universally articulated in terms of empowerment andenhanced self-determination, what is perceived in Mkangamo-ja village could amount to little more than the mobilization oflocal representatives for predetermined tasks.

Research findings in Mkangamoja village suggest that dis-advantaged groups may be less likely to be able to reinforcetheir representation because they lack assets, have fewerrights, or are less able to influence how benefits from REDD+are distributed. The CCE model principles (FPIC criteria) 13

and the CCE project reports do not necessarily reflect the real-ity on the ground: Facilitating participatory wealth profilingto identify poorer members of participating communitiescould have been carried out at the very start of the project ifits aim was to implement a pro-poor approach. Such a pro-poor approach could include: reviewing forest management


plans and by-laws by disadvantaged groups to reduce barriersto their representation; ensuring their greater representationon VNRCs and other decision-making structures; buildingthe capacity and voice of specific forest user groups who tradi-tionally originate from poorer members of the community.Fung and Wright (2001, p. 34) argue that if concern is notraised about whether deliberative arenas enable the powerfulto dominate the weak, deliberation might lead to domination.This is also a very relevant argument with regard to definingways to involve disadvantaged groups in the implementationof the CCE model: Even if representation of the most disad-vantaged groups are clearly defined on their documents, theirimplementation lead to unfair representation and dominationby powerful actors.

The view that the trial payment made no difference to theirwell-being was expressed by 20 villagers from the case studycommunity. A few of these respondents said that it was “betterthan nothing”, but was not sufficient to help encourage betterforest management since the benefits they could obtain fromforest resources were much greater. In a similar vein, thechoice of village development project (a dispensary) financedby the trial payments seems to reflect the representation ofonly a minority. Peskett & Brodnig (2011) suggest that thescale and timing of benefits that are shared in a REDD+scheme have obvious implications for economic opportunitiesfor small-scale farmers in REDD+. Observations and inter-views in Mkangamoja village suggest that the small-scale ben-efits from the trial payments were used for consumption onlyand may not have had any effect on productive activities. Sim-ilarly, payment timeframe has important implications for poorpeople, but not for everybody in the community. Here it isimportant to consider the heterogeneity of “community”(e.g., class, race, and gender) and the implications of the yearlyREDD+ payments envisaged in the CCE model. For example,research from cash transfer schemes suggests that when trans-fers do not arrive when expected, households often have totake credit and lose a proportion of their transfer in debt pay-ment when it eventually arrives (Slater, 2009). This could bealso expected in case of CCE model: Payments made in hungrymonths, as was the case in Ruhoma, another participating vil-lage in the CCE model in Lindi district, may be more likely tobe spent on food when it is most expensive; payments madewhen food prices are low, can free up cash for more productiveactivities or the cash could be spent on alcohol and otherunproductive uses. In order to have knowledge of this typeof behavior, it could be argued that the representation of thedisadvantages groups is highly needed from the very beginningof the project and throughout the implementation process.

(b) Empowering horizontal accountability mechanisms

The CCE model is at an early stage and REDD+ marketsand institutions are only starting to emerge. This makes diffi-cult the assessment of the full range of issues that encompasshorizontal accountability mechanisms. However, this casestudy shows that the CCE model has been led from the begin-ning by powerful external actors including donors and serviceproviders (TFCG/MJUMITA). The case further suggests thatthe CCE model empowers elected committee members(VNRC) to a limited extent only: Although representativesfrom communities were part of the planning process, the rep-resentation did not seem to support representation of the dis-advantaged groups in decision making as such becausemajority of the elected representatives presented wealthierhouseholds. It is noteworthy that devolution of powers tomake decisions and rules (legislative powers) without the

devolution of powers to enforce them (executive powers) canbe meaningless. For example, elected representatives fromthe village made their own by-laws to address changing situa-tions and try to improve their governance, but outside forces(village boundary inconsistencies, delay in by-laws approvalby local government and lack of financial incentives) stronglyimpact on or constrain effective application of these by-laws.Based on our interview data, this was particularly true in thecase of owners of permanent crops who were not compensatedand were not enabled to make their representatives account-able. Village leaders and other representatives were notresponsive to their people but rather to external actors and do-nors ideas related to establishment of new VLFR and imple-mentation CCE model. One elder man stated:

“My cashew nut trees have been our family’ saving account for yearsand it has been transferred from one generation to another one. Underno circumstances will I transfer its ownership to TFCG/MJUMITA onthe premise that it will benefit the whole community.”

Corbera, Brown, and Adger (2007) and Vatn (2010) havesimilarly commented that when nature or carbon is commod-itized into existing international markets, conflicts emergedand social justice and equity are rarely attained. The waythe CCE model is de facto implemented run the risk of weak-ening the grassroots base accountability and demand-drivenagenda of such initiatives financial aid without a clear under-standing of the responsibilities it entails and faulty account-ability mechanisms will eventually imbalance power byallocating more weights to the external service providers anddonors’ interests. We can argue that if disadvantaged groupsdo not have access to information about their rights and can-not hold their representatives accountable, future conflictsmay not be avoided, and lack of disadvantaged groups in rep-resentation may jeopardize CCE.

Interviews in Mkangamoja village show that althoughVNRC members are elected, these elections, however, do notmake them representative of or accountable to local popula-tions. In fact, the village assembly did not get to choose can-didates democratically. There is little competition in thevoting system which implies simply the approval or disap-proval by hand of some representatives from each sub-village.These representatives were nominated by sub-village chairper-sons who are members of the village council. These electionsdepend on how well these candidates are seen by communitiesto accomplish their duties and it is likely that they mostly rep-resent the more powerful and wealthiest groups. The chiefdrawback with such electoral system is that there is no guaran-tee that disadvantaged interests receive any electoral represen-tation. A respondent confirmed such hypothesis bycomplaining that sub-village chairman was nominating onlyhis closest acquaintances and there was no democracy in theway elections were held. In brief, the electoral institutions inthe CCE model do not seem to allow either a horizontalaccountability mechanism (where legislative, executive, andjudiciary powers are shared among different institutions) ora representation of the less powerful disadvantaged groups.

On the other hand, the CCE model could be claimed to im-prove horizontal accountability because the service providers(TFCG/MJUMITA) did raise villagers’ awareness about thepotential of selling carbon offsets credits in the internationalmarkets and in that case local communities should enjoy fullrights and can derive complete or at least substantial benefitsfrom carbon sales: Awareness was recognized during the inter-views in 2012 but also reported later on by a Tanzanian news-paper when conflicts related to villages’ boundaries started(The Guardian article 27.5.20013). Current VLFR by-laws


state that local communities can enjoy 100% legal rights toown, manage, and benefit from forest products and other for-est benefits (e.g., timber for domestic use, firewood collection)under some predefined rules. Since TFCG/MJUMITA treatcarbon rights as “other forest products”, this would imply thatlocal communities managing VLFR can also retain full rightsover carbon revenue. Therefore, communities would appear tohave relatively secure rights to carbon under the existing PFMframework (URT, 2003). They would not normally need toobtain a harvesting license from district authorities underthe Forest Act (URT, 2002) to sell carbon offsets.

This awareness is important if a national REDD+ schemewere to be adopted in Tanzania as it was stated in the nationalREDD+ strategy: Service providers consequently would notbe able to guarantee that local communities enjoy full rightsand can derive complete or at least substantial benefits fromcarbon sales if citizens do not have enough information abouttheir rights in order to make their representatives accountableas well as influence national level actors’ delivery and actions.Tanzania has not adopted to date any carbon rights legisla-tion. It is therefore rather unclear whether forest carbon rightswill be decoupled from tenure rights. The national task forcehas discussed these carbon rights issues and an outside groupwas assigned to analyze carbon rights by early 2012, but so farno official report or updates have been released.

Another current threat to the ability of communities to holdtheir representatives accountable is the cumbersome, expen-sive, and time-consuming procedure of PFM establishment(Lund & Treue, 2008; Mustalahti & Lund, 2009). The realityis that local communities cannot benefit from their village landforest reserve (VLFR) and thus from their carbon rights untilthe district council has approved and declared these VLFR asan official CBFM scheme. If a village fails to implement themanagement plan or fails in any of the required steps, the dis-trict commissioner will not declare the forest as a VLFR. Evenin cases where approval has taken place, the district commis-sioner and the director of forestry still have the right to with-draw communities’ rights to manage and own their VLFR(Mustalahti et al., 2012).

Given these considerations, it is clear that the practicalapplication of local REDD+ benefit sharing approaches is achallenging learning process. Experience with registering Vil-lage Land and ratifying PFM schemes attests that villagersmay experience long delays before fully benefiting fromREDD+ projects. Since local communities are struggling tomeet their short-term needs (on the basis of small-scale farmplots), such delay could be very harmful to the overall successof the REDD+ project and particularly for the most disadvan-taged groups. People who belong to the disadvantaged groups(poor, sick, or disabled women and elders, youth, and chil-dren) mainly work as labor force on family farms or provideservices for other community members. When communitieshave luck of funds or delays in external payments related toadditional income, disadvantaged groups will struggle to meettheir basic needs.

Many advocates are calling for a streamlined process thatminimizes transaction costs and allows communities to havedirect access to international carbon markets (Veit, Vhugen,& Miner, 2012). That has been the main purpose of the Tan-zanian CCE model through aggregating emission reductionsfrom many villages.

Such advocate relates to the second research question ofthis study: How effective is this type of model at empoweringhorizontal accountability mechanisms. The REDD+ revenuedistribution by-law was first edited by the REDD+ RevenueDistribution Committee (RDC) based on standard guidelines

provided by TFCG/MJUMITA. The by-law was first scruti-nized by the Village Council before being passed onto the vil-lage assembly meeting. The original scheme proposed was toallocate half of the trial payments to village developmentprojects, but community members expressed their wish to re-tain 100% of the payments for each eligible individual. Afterthe TFCG/MJUMITA had persuaded on the need to setaside some money for community development projects, thecommunity knowingly accepted provided that the serviceproviders (TFCG/MJUMITA) retained such funds lest Vil-lage Council members did not manage it in a transparentway. When our respondents were asked how well their inter-ests had been represented in the allocation of the money, amajority of our interviewees claimed that the procedurehad been non-democratic and that the idea of allocatingmoney to village development projects was externally im-posed.

This shows that village representatives could not be holdaccountable to their fellow villagers. And the CCE modelwas not effective at empowering horizontal accountability,what TFCG/MJUMITA had planned and what actually hap-pened on the ground are quite different. The service providerdid ask what villagers wanted and how they wanted to usetheir money in village assembly meeting but thereafter em-barked on a further education and awareness raising campaignto achieve their (TFCG/MJUMITA) desired outcomes. Theyconvinced villagers to set some money apart for developmentproject and also to enlarge the village forest reserve from 30%to 55%. In Mkankamoja, the decision to increase the area ofVillages Land Forest Reserve (VLFR) was criticized by somecommunity members, who claimed that their village leadersdecided to add another forest area, which was not agreed withor discussed at a Village Assembly. A group of women as-serted:

“We are very unhappy with the fact that TFCG/MJUMITA has ga-zetted other forest patches under VLFR without the village assembly’sconsent. We are thus eagerly waiting for higher payments to flow fromREDD+ otherwise, we cannot promise that we will keep our forests.”

The relevance of individual payments (e.g., 4 USD perindividual paid as test payment in 2012) for delivering effec-tive and equitable incentives to community members has gen-erated an important debate among other actors. The DistrictNatural Resource Officer (DNRO), who is the REDD+ focalpoint actor in Lindi Rural District, expressed his disagree-ment over such a scheme by arguing that cash is very vulner-able to rapid spending and that evidence from other villagesshows that men used it mainly for excessive drinking. Projectstaff on the contrary suggested that it is the best option toreach all villagers who should receive tangible benefits whichgo beyond policy oriented intervention such as land use plan-ning, CBFM or village development projects. TFCG/MJU-MITA representatives advocated that under individualschemes, communities can invest a portion of their funds indevelopment projects and that contributions would thereforecreate a sense of ownership of the development projects anda desire for accountability. According to ordinary commu-nity members, however, the individual trial payments indeedhelp them perceive direct benefits from REDD+, but theamount was too small to bring any significant change in theirlivelihoods. For village elders interviewed, receiving cash wasfelt to be more like giving up property rights; during inter-views an elder stated:

“Now that we have sold our land, one day these wazungu (Europeans)will come back to demand it and evict us from our farm”.


This case study could have generated limited empoweringhorizontal accountability between disadvantaged groups andvillage leaders (who may be representatives of the village exec-utive officer, village council, and other existing committees).Despite a considerable budget allocated to awareness pro-grams, most villagers interviewed did not seem to be awareof their rights over carbon sales and their responsibilitiesregarding forest management. Local communities appearedto unknowingly accept the REDD+ project that assumesresponsibilities for forest loss, or accept payments that under-value the true opportunity costs of the land use foregone. Suchfindings can be further confirmed by the inability of simplecommunity members to request that forest patrolling mustbe conducted by VNRC. Also, when by-laws and land useplans were brought to the village assembly for approval, smallchanges were made by village assembly meeting attendantsand no villagers who have had their permanent crops (e.g.,nut and fruit trees) incorporated into VLFR could prevent vil-lage leaders from doing so. From the EDD perspective, villag-ers did not seem to be given enough discretionary powers toact as citizens to influence their leader’s decisions.

Theoretically, committee members could devolve discretion-ary powers and increase accountability as a result of the com-munity being close-knit and involved in formulation andimplementation of forest by-laws (see the conceptual frame-work in the Chapter 2 based on e.g., Larson & Ribot, 2007;Manor, 2004; Mathie & Cunningham, 2003). However, thiswas not observed in Mkangamoja village. On the contrary,many committee members have created an ethical and socialdistance between themselves and those they represent regard-ing enforcement of forest by-laws. The social relations of someVNRC and council members within their communities wereperceived by study informants as having made them lessaccountable to local people to avoid being blamed by localcommunities for restricting land use. These committee mem-bers must live with the consequences of their decisions affect-ing people they know and who know them. This may influencetheir decision making and restrict the information they arewilling to share. Some ordinary villagers actually expressedconsiderable resentment with the forest by-laws for prohibit-ing shifting cultivation or any use of fire on the farm wherethere was no alternative to fire for weed control and ash forincreasing and maintaining soil fertility.

Another important accountability mechanism related toEDD in the CCE model is civic responsibility where local com-munities freely offer their labor for community benefits. How-ever, such civic responsibility has fallen short of expectation inthe ongoing construction of the village council office becausethe elected village council and committee members do notseem to strongly represent their constituencies and respondto local level needs. Indeed, local communities and especiallythe youth were motivated only at the early stages of the VCbuilding construction work, but later many opted out. Wheninterviewed, they claimed that there was technical inconsis-tency in the construction and lack of incentives have lessenedtheir enthusiasm individual contributions (e.g., labor andmoney) to construction of the dispensary was supposed tomotivate community engagement and help build a moreeffective downward accountability mechanism among villageleaders.

Administrative responsibilities and dependence may makeTFCG/MJUMITA accountable to district authorities throughDistrict Council approval of different village by-laws and theirsupport in land use planning and improved agricultural prac-tices. TFCG/MJUMITA should also be accountable to thevillage council: CCE roles in the aggregation of carbon offsets

from many villages will necessarily make them liable to VillageCouncil. With regard to such necessary downward account-ability, the lack of incentives and training of VNRCs is causefor concern and may limit their engagement with TFCG/MJUMITA. VNRCs appear currently unprepared and unableto notably engage with service providers and district authori-ties although they are the elected committee which shouldcarry out day-to-day activities related to forest managementand enforce carbon responsibilities at village level

With long-term commitment toward EDD, mechanisms canbe created through which village government can contractcompetitively with line ministries or other service providers.Such a strategy can create competition among service provid-ers and incentives for providing better services. In the CCEcontext, such an alternative is still absent and TFCG/MJUMI-TA is the only service provider to which village governmenthas access.

By contrast, district authorities have a relatively low level ofdownward accountability to village governments. Communi-ties witnessed the inability of district authorities to assist themin keeping wild animals from destroying crops and to helpthem with improved agricultural practices. District supportin combating illegal activities was also lacking. Villagers andVC members claimed that some district officers were also per-sonally involved in illegal tree cutting and were even transport-ing timber logs on their trucks on the main road withoutinforming the VC. These incidents have often resulted in mis-trust between district and village authorities and also in lesssupport from community members in reporting illegal activi-ties.

During the interviews and observations in 2012, we detectedno monitoring of the local situation by central government toensure service providers and district authorities were carryingout their responsibilities. Finally, central government inter-vened when land conflict started in 2013 as was reported bya Tanzanian newspaper (The Guardian article 27.5.20013).This is an important observation if we return to our theoreticalposition: given central government’s lack of ability or willing-ness to monitor local level interventions and authorities, mostof the local benefits from decentralization are believed to comefrom increased citizens’ participation, which in turn leads toincreases in democracy, efficiency, and equity (Agrawal &Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2003). Representative local authoritiesare a means for establishing permanent institutionalized andlarge-scale (extending over complete national territories) citi-zen’s participation. Representative local authorities can be amechanism by which the knowledge needs, and aspirationsof local people are brought into public decision-makingprocesses and translated into policy. Representation and hor-izontal accountability mechanisms are the mechanisms thatmake decentralized institutions responsible (Agrawal & Ribot,1999) and ensure EDD. However, if central government is notmonitoring that service providers as well as local governments(village and district) are ensuring EDD and are accountablealso for disadvantages groups, then the local benefits of decen-tralization may not be achieved.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Based on the conceptual understanding of EDD, we arguethat enhancing the representation of disadvantaged groupsrequires more than making information available or conduct-ing meetings at village and sub-village level. A key lessonfrom Mkangamoja village and the CCE model is that evenwhen service providers follow recommendations for FPIC


and other safeguards and their intervention is well designedon paper, implementation is often problematic. In the Mkan-gamoja case study, the representation of the disadvantagedgroups is limited despite increasing efforts to include themin the decision-making processes. The findings of this studytherefore caution against the model in which local represen-tatives are involved without explicit recognition of the rela-tive powers of the different actors and effective downwardaccountability mechanisms. If the disadvantaged groups areto become engaged in the CCE model they will need to ac-cess and understand the information and be part of a long-term ongoing political engagement and discourses aroundthe management of forest resources.

The CCE model in Mkangamoja village does not seem to beeffective at empowering horizontal accountability mecha-nisms. The electoral institutions in the CCE model did not al-low a horizontal accountability mechanism (where legislative,executive, and judiciary powers are shared among differentinstitutions). This is perhaps the most striking lesson from thiscase study synthesis, 14 and this is key limitation for EDD inthe current situation.

This study urges an early analysis of the CCE model atempowering horizontal accountability and reinforcing the rep-resentation of the disadvantaged groups. Similar careful anal-yses and clarity are needed in national REDD+ regulations inthe distribution of carbon responsibilities and benefits betweendifferent actors. 15 However, some concluding remarks thatmay be useful in the context of Tanzania and also globallyare discussed below.

First, the review of the CCE model shows that the deci-sion-making structures were not able to allow locally electedrepresentatives to represent local people’ needs and interestsdespite the remarkable efforts of the service providers ingaining their FPIC. Service providers significantly influencedthe process while local people’s influence on the design of

the CCE model and of REDD+ remained rather limited.In the future, the representation of the disadvantagedgroups (e.g., poor, women, elderly, and disabled people) willbe critical in order to ensure that the design of benefit dis-tribution schemes does not exclude them or impact themunfavorably.

Second, some accountability mechanisms in the CCE mod-el (e.g., discretionary powers in the hands of local communitymembers and third party monitoring by TFCG/MJUMITA)were implemented by locally responsive representation andcreated counter powers by local communities. Other account-ability mechanisms (such as electoral institutions, legal re-course, and transparency) need further support in order toenhance equitable benefit sharing schemes. Further, if finan-cial and technical support is to be provided to national, re-gional, and local institutions involved in administeringbenefit sharing, mechanisms should be clearly enforced toprovide greater transparency and downward accountabilityfrom central and district authorities to village representatives.The mechanism to support horizontal accountability couldinclude audits and monitoring carried out by disadvantagedgroups.

This type of internal mechanisms could for example: (i)allow better planning of the scale and timing of REDD+payments; (ii) allow careful consideration of carbon responsi-bilities and; (iii) to allow disadvantaged groups to influenceservice delivery and implementation. Development of thesemechanisms in early stages of the intervention could help im-prove accountability since beginning of the process: The CCEmodel is ambiguous and therefore the ability of disadvantagedgroups to act as citizens and influence their leader’s decisionsneeds mechanisms to access information about their rights,quality of the services they get, and expected outcomes ofthe interventions. Without such information, citizens cannotmake their representatives accountable and responsive.

NOTES

1. Cotula and Mayers (2009) define forest governance as “who gets todecide what about forests and how”. The main objective of good forestgovernance is to ensure forest sustainability, together with fair decisionmaking and benefit distribution (Larson & Petkova, 2011).

2. The two key pillars of EDD—transparency and accountability—havebeen a issue of concern even in participatory forest management (PFM)upon which REDD+ is intended to be built in many African countries(Blomley & Iddi, 2009; Mustalahti et al., 2012; Mustalahti & Lund, 2009)(Blomley & Iddi, 2009; Mustalahti & Lund, 2009; Mustalahti et al., 2012).

3. Although many African states have made tremendous progress indemocratization and decentralization and in devolving power and landtenure rights to local communities, evidence shows that increased value innatural resources may partly reverse these efforts and lead to increasedrecentralization (Agrawal, Nelson, Adams, & Sandbrook, 2010; Nelson &Agrawal, 2008). Several authors argue that communities have not beenempowered enough to defend their rights and their interests (Brockington,2007; Lund & Treue, 2008).

4. According to Ribot (2004, p. 65), responsiveness is the relationbetween signals and policies and accountability is the relation betweenoutcomes and sanctions: “A government is ‘responsive’ if it adopts policiesthat are signaled as preferred by citizens” and “governments are‘accountable’ if citizens can sanction them appropriately. . .”. Several

studies show that responsiveness and accountability are the basic elementsof representative local institutions and authorities in effective democraticdecentralization (e.g., Boulding & Wampler, 2009; Devas & Grant, 2003;Speer, 2012).

5. Studying down would imply interviewing those with less power, localelected authorities, disadvantaged people, and various social groups (e.g.user groups, women, etc.). Studying through places focus on connectionsbetween individuals and groups, on larger processes of change, and seeksto trace the ways in which power creates webs and relations betweenactors, institutions, and discourses across time and space (Nader, 1969, pp.295–296).

6. Currently, access to REDD+ finances through fund-based financingarrangements is expected to facilitate PFM processes and possibly reducethe high levels of deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania (URT,2012).

7. Tanzania has also received additional funding from the governmentsof Finland and Germany as well as from the UN-REDD program and theWorld Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership. The Vice President’s Office(VPO) is mandated to coordinate all climate change issues, including theiradaptation and mitigation. Furthermore, the government has put in placea National Climate Change Steering Committee (NCCSC) and NationalClimate Change Technical committee (NCCTC) to oversee and guide the


implementation of climate change activities. With the support of theNorwegian embassy, eight REDD+ pilot projects are officially underwayin collaboration with central and local government, academic institutionsand private sector, and NGOs.

8. A particular focus of the National Framework for REDD+ isdeveloping a REDD+ reference scenario based on historic carbonemissions and projections of future emissions.

9. In Tanzania more than 3 million hectares representing about 12% offorest land are currently under two main approaches of PFM arrange-ments (URT, 2012): (i) the Community Based Forest Management(CBFM) and (ii) Joint Forest Management (JFM). JFM is an agreementbetween concerned parties to manage national and local governmentforest reserves with adjacent communities. Under CBFM, the entiremanagement responsibility of forest resources is handed over to a VillageLand Forest Reserve (VLFR) or a Community Forest Reserve (CFR)where the community has executive rights to manage and hold the forestsand retain 100% of the revenue acquired from sales of forest products.However, forest management plans have to be prepared and approved byvillagers, local government, and the Director of Forestry before acommunity or a village can benefit from the CBFM arrangements.

10. The village was established in 1974 under the villagization program.No official statement on immigrants was found in the village. But anevaluation performed by MJUMITA/TFCG and the district team beforeREDD+ introduction showed that more than 95% of its population areoriginally from Mkangamoja whereas the remainder came from neigh-boring villages.

11. MJUMITA is a network of community groups involved in PFM.MJUMITA, initially supported by TFCG, started in 2000 and became anindependent NGO in 2007. The CCE model is initially being implementedin a certain number of villages which will increase in the future. Theprimary consideration in selection of villages was technical projectfeasibility, i.e., where verifiable and additional emissions reductions arepossible (leakage risks and opportunity costs).

12. According to Local Government Act URT 1982 (Art. 141), VillageAssembly consists of all village residents over the age of 18 and is thesupreme authority on all matters of general policy-making in relation tothe affairs of the village and responsible for the election of the VillageCouncil.

13. MJUMITA/TFCG uses Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) asthe principle that a community has the right to give or withhold its consentto proposed projects that may affect the lands they customarily own,occupy, or otherwise use. FPIC has been developed by Forest PeoplesProgram and is now as a key principle in international law andjurisprudence related to indigenous peoples. More information from:http://www.forestpeoples.org/guiding-principles/free-prior-and-informed-consent-fpic.

14. This brings us back the conceptual framework in Chapter 2 (e.g.,Larson & Ribot, 2007; Manor, 2004; Mathie & Cunnigham, 2003; Ribot,2009) about the need to devolve sufficient discretionary powers to localcommunities and strong downward accountability mechanisms fromcentral and local government to the village government and from villagegovernment to community members. The outcomes will be shaped bypower relations both between and within communities, central, local, andvillage governments and the private sector.

15. In Tanzania, benefits rights and various responsibilities of all actors(e.g., in Tanzania, central ministries, District Council and Village Council,private sector, NGOs and local communities) are still not clearly defined,for example, should the burden of responsibility also be placed on buyersor national government is unclear (for instance, in the event of forest fire).Also, capacity building for fire control requires financial support oftechnical staff from the District Council to work extensively with localcommunities yet local communities often need to work on their own (e.g.,extinction of forest fire or chasing up of wild animals) and cover relatedexpenses as getting the District council’s support would result in vainefforts.

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APPENDIX A. OVERVIEW OF STAKEHOLDER’S INTERESTS AND INFLUENCES ON PROJECT’S OUTCOMES

Stakeholders Key interests Importance toproject

Influence on project Participation

A. Primary directA1. Localcommunities

Ensure that they receive tangiblebenefits from the CCE model(carbon payments and co-benefitssuch as IGA, training on improvedagriculture and other usefultechnologies)Ensure that their needs andaspirations are fully considered inthe projectSecurity of rights (land tenure,resource access) and participationin decision making

High. need to givetheir consent for allstages of the projectAre directly involvedin all stages of theproject

Low. Do not havesignificant influenceon all aspects ofprojectimplementation(e.g., carbon rights)

Mainbeneficiariesof the projectThey will beconsulted andinvolvedthroughoutthe projectResponsiblefor by-lawscompliance

A2. Village counciland existingcommittees (VNRC,LUP, RDC)

Represent interests of localcommunities to service providersand district authoritiesIncentives: ensure that they arerewarded in one or another fortheir tasks

High. provideoverall leadership atthe village level

Medium. Haveinfluence on localcommunities’decisions but do notwield significantpower over districtauthorities andservice providers

Responsiblefor draftingor reviewingdifferent by-lawsResponsiblefor by-lawscompliance

A3. Serviceproviders (TFCG/MJUMITA)

Incentives for the services they areprovidingAdditionalitySocial and environmentalsafeguards

High. provide inputand facilitation at allstages of the projectfor 5 years

Medium.Responsible forproject outputs butcan be dismissed ifnon-performant

Responsibleforfacilitation ofthe process ofparticipatorycarbonaccounting,land useplanning,process ofcreditcreation,marketingand selling

B. Primary indirectB1. Donors (RoyalNorwegianEmbassy)

Effectiveness in project outputs(additionality), good governance atall levels (national and sub-national), accountability of serviceproviders and central government

High. providefinancial support

High. providefinancial supportand have influenceon all aspects of theproject

Consulted inall aspects ofdesign andpiloting

B2. Districtauthorities (DED,DFO, DNRO,DLUO, DAO)

Incentives: Ensure that they arerewarded for the services theyprovideEnsure that land use planning andmanagement by-laws comply withnational requirements

Medium. providesome support andinput into the project

High. If supportive,can facilitate projectsuccess but if not,can freeze projectimplementation(e.g., by notapproving by-laws)

Responsiblefor all districtland useplanning,

environmentalplanning andagricultural supportB3. NationalREDD+ taskforce—NAFORMA—National trust fund-National CarbonMonitoring Centre

Finance mechanisms(sustainability and predictability),technology transfer, Sustainabledevelopment, Carbon accounting,aggregationReduce leakage

Medium. primarilyresponsible forforestry policy andcoordination mattersand has written thenational REDDstrategy togetherwith VPO

High. They will haveinfluence on theoperationalization ofthe CCE model,selling of carboncredits and on theiraccounting andverification

Included inconsultativestructure(Members ofthe projectadvisorycommittee)

(continued on next page)


Appendix A (continued)

Stakeholders Key interests Importance toproject

Influence on project Participation

B4. Vice President’sOffice

Finance mechanisms(sustainability and predictability),technology transferCCE meets national requirements

Medium is thenational designatedauthority forUNFCCC

High. Provideframework ofcoordination fordonor programs andcan terminateprojects

Lessonlearning fromthe CCEmodelConsultedwherenecessary—Informedthroughregularupdates

C. SecondaryC1. Project partners Collaboration on joint processes

Learn lessons from the projectMedium. Provideinput on someaspects of projectimplementation

Low. Can onlycooperate butcannot significantlyintervene

Provide inputon use ofdonor fundsand somesupport onproject

implementationConsulted wherenecessary—Informed throughregular updatesC2. Other civilsociety organizations(such as Rights-resources Initiativesor communitygroups)

Inclusion and incentives Low. Will onlyprovide very limitedinput into project

Low to medium.They can influencethe delivery of socialand environmentalincomes but only toa limited extent

Consultedwherenecessary

C3. Carbonbuyers—projectvalidators andregistry-CCBA

Additionality—Verified emissionsreductions

Low. Do not havesignificant influenceon the success orfailure of projectimplementation

Medium. They haveinfluence on allaspects of the projectimplementation byimposing theirvarious standards

They willverify carbonoffsets andother socialand

environmentalstandards


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