Redacted Amended Consolidated Indictment · BADREDDINE7 (Mustafa BADREDDINE), also known as 'Sami ISSA', aimed at committing a terrorist act to assassinate Rafik Baha'eddine AL-HARIRI

PUBLIC

Case No:

Before:

Registrar:

Date:

Filing Party:

Original language:

Classification:

Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Norman Farrell

R287864

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BEFORE THE TRIAL CHAMBER

SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON

STL-11-01/T/TC

Judge David Re, Presiding

Judge Janet Nosworthy

Judge Micheline Braidy

Judge Walid Akoum, Alternate Judge Judge Nicola Lettieri, Alternate Judge

Mr. Daryl Mundis

12 July 2016

Prosecutor

English

Public

THE PROSECUTOR

v. SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,

HASSAN HABIB MERHI,

HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI &

ASSAD HASSAN SABRA

Redacted Amended Consolidated Indictment

Counsel for Mr. Salim Jamil Ayyash: Mr. Emile Aoun, Mr. Thomas Hannis & Mr. Chad Mair

Legal Representatives of Victims: Counsel for Mr. Hassan Habib Merhi: Mr. Peter Haynes, Mr. Mohammad F Mattar Mr. Mohamed Aouini, Ms. Dorothee Le Fraper

PUBLIC

I. PREAMBLE

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1. The Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, pursuant to the authority

stipulated in Articles 1 and 11 of the Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,

charges under Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute, and thereby under the Lebanese

Criminal Code 1 and the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the

penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle' 2 :

a. SALIM JAMIL AYYASH, HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI, ASSAD HASSAN

SABRA, and HASSAN HABIB MERHI each and together, with:

Count 1 - Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terrorist Act; and

b. SALIM JAMIL AYYASH with:

Count 2 - Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an explosive device;

Count 3 - Intentional Homicide (of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials;

Count 4 - Intentional Homicide (of 21 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials;

Count 5 - Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 226 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials; and

As translated from Arabic into English by the Languages Services Section of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

As translated from Arabic into English by the Languages Services Section of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

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c. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI, ASSAD HASSAN SABRA, and HASSAN

HABIB MERHI each and together, with:

Count 6 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Committing a Terrorist Act

by means of an explosive device;

Count 7- Being an Accomplice to the felony of Intentional Homicide (of

Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials;

Count 8 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Intentional Homicide (of 21

persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with

premeditation by using explosive materials; and

Count 9 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Attempted Intentional

Homicide (of 226 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of

Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials.

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II. THE ACCUSED

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2. Pursuant to Rule 68(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special

Tribunal for Lebanon, the names and particulars of the Accused persons on this

indictment are as follows:

4

6

a. SALIM JAMIL AYYASH 3 (AYYASH) was born on 10 November 1963 in

Harouf, Lebanon. He is the son of Jamil Dakhil A YY ASH (father) and Mahasen

Issa SALAMEH (mother). He has resided inter alia at: Al-Jamous Street, Tabajah

building, Hadath, in South Beirut; and at the A YY ASH family compound in

Harouf, N abatiyeh in south Lebanon. He is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese

civil registration is 197 /Harouf, and his social security number is 63/690790.

b. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI4 (ONEISSI) (also known as 'Hussein Hassan

ISSA') was born on 11 February 1974 in Beirut, Lebanon. He is the son of Hassan

ONEISSI (also known as 'Hassan ISSA') (father) and Fatima DARWISH

(mother). He has resided in the Ahmad Abbas Building, at Al-Jamous St, near the

Lycee des Arts, in Hadath, South Beirut. He is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese

civil registration is 7 /Shahour.

c. ASSAD HASSAN SABRA5 (SABRA) was born on 15 October 1976 in Beirut,

Lebanon. He is the son of Hassan Tahan SABRA (father) and Leila SALEH

(mother). He has resided at apartment 2, 41h floor, Building 28, Rue 58, in Hadath

3, South Beirut, also described as St. Therese Street, Hadath, in South Beirut. He

is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese civil registration is 1339/Zqaq Al-Blat.

d. HASSAN HABIB MERHI (MERHI)6 was born on 12 December 1965 in Beirut,

Lebanon. He is the son of Habib MERHI (father) and Latifa ABBAS (mother).

He has resided at the following address: Section 27, eastern fa<;ade, Real estate

number: 2501, Real estate zone: Bourj-El-Barajneh, District: Baabda,

In Arabic ~~ ~ ~

In Arabic ~ ~ ~ , the birth name 'ISSA' having been changed to 'ONEISSI' by judicial declaration on 12 January 2004.

In Arabic, 1..»"" ~ ~~

In Arabic 0-= ~ </'" y

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Governorate: Mount Lebanon, in South Beirut. He is a citizen of Lebanon. His

Lebanese civil registration is 1126/Zqaq-El-Blat.

3. The four Accused participated in a conspiracy with others, including Mustafa Amine

BADREDDINE7 (Mustafa BADREDDINE), also known as 'Sami ISSA', aimed at

committing a terrorist act to assassinate Rafik Baha'eddine AL-HARIRI (HARIRI).

Mustafa Badreddine was born on 6 April 1961 in Al-Ghobeiry, Beirut, Lebanon. He

was the son of Amine BADREDDINE (father) and Fatima JEZEINI (mother). His

precise address was not known, though he had been associated with the property of

Khalil Al-Raii, Abdallah Al-Hajj Street, Al-Ghobeiry, in South Beirut; and the Al

Jinan Building, Al-Odaimi Street, Haret Hreik, in Beirut. He was a citizen of

Lebanon. His Lebanese civil registration was 341/Al-Ghobeiry. The respective roles

of the four Accused and Mustafa Badreddine may be summarised as follows:

a. AYYASH, together with Mustafa BADREDDINE, coordinated: (i) the

surveillance of HARIRI in preparation for the attack; and (ii) the purchase of the

van which was used to perpetrate the attack. A YY ASH communicated with

MERHI in relation to the preparations for the attack including the false claim of

responsibility. AYYASH coordinated the physical perpetration of the attack.

A YY ASH participated in carrying out the surveillance and assassination of

HARIRI.

b. ONEISSI, prior to the attack and under the coordination of MERHI, participated

with SABRA in identifying a suitable individual, Ahmed ABU ADASS (ABU

AD ASS), who would be used to make a video-taped false claim of responsibility

for the attack. ONEISSI, prior to the attack and under the coordination of

MERHI participated in the disappearance of ABU ADASS for the purpose of

creating a false claim of responsibility. Immediately following the attack,

ONEISSI under the coordination of MERHI participated with SABRA in: (i)

disseminating statements falsely attributing responsibility for the attack; (ii)

ensuring the delivery of the video, with a letter attached, containing the false

In Arabic U:~..lll .J.ii w,...l ~

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claim of responsibility to Al-Jazeera; and (iii) ensunng the video would be

broadcast.

c. SABRA, prior to the attack and under the coordination of MERHI, participated

with ONEISSI in identifying a suitable individual, ABU ADASS, who would be

used to make a video-taped false claim of responsibility for the attack.

Immediately following the attack, SABRA under the coordination of MERHI

participated with ONEISSI in: (i) disseminating statements falsely attributing

responsibility for the attack; (ii) ensuring the delivery of the video, with a letter

attached, containing the false claim of responsibility to Al-Jazeera; and (iii)

ensuring the video would be broadcast.

d. MERHI, together with Mustafa BADREDDINE, coordinated the preparation of

the false claim of responsibility, and, at times, was in contact with A YY ASH in

relation to the preparations for the attack, including the false claim of

responsibility. MERHI, prior to the attack, coordinated the activities of ONEISSI

and SABRA in order to identify and effect the disappearance of a suitable

individual, ABU ADASS, who would be used to make a video-taped false claim

of responsibility for the attack. Immediately following the attack, MERHI,

coordinated the activities of ONEISSI and SABRA, who participated in (i)

disseminating statements falsely attributing responsibility for the attack; (ii)

ensuring the delivery of the video, with a letter attached, containing the false

claim of responsibility to Al-Jazeera; and (iii) ensuring the video would be

broadcast.

e. Mustafa BADREDDINE monitored and, together with AYYASH, coordinated: (i)

the surveillance of HARIRI in preparation for the attack; and (ii) the purchase of

the van which was used to perpetrate the attack. Mustafa BADREDDINE

monitored the physical perpetration of the attack. In addition, Mustafa

BADREDDINE monitored and, together with MERHI, coordinated the

preparation of the false claim of responsibility.

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III. A CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

A. OVERVIEW

4. On 14 February 2005, at 12:55 on Rue Minet el Hos'n in Beirut, Rafik HARIRI, the

former Prime Minister of Lebanon, was assassinated as a result of a terrorist act in

which a suicide bomber detonated a large quantity of high explosives concealed in a

Mitsubishi Canter van. In addition to killing HARIRI, the explosion killed 21 other

persons (listed in Schedule A) and injured 226 persons (listed in Schedule B).

5. Shortly after the explosion, Al-Jazeera news network in Beirut received a video with a

letter attached on which a man named Ahmad ABU ADASS falsely claimed to be the

suicide bomber on behalf of a fictional fundamentalist group called 'Victory and

Jihad in Greater Syria'. The video was later broadcast on television.

B. RAFIK HARIRI

6. HARIRI was born on 1 November 1944 in the city of Sidon, Lebanon. HARIRI

served as Prime Minister of Lebanon in five governments from 31 October 1992 to 4

December 1998, and from 26 October 2000 until his resignation on 26 October 2004.

7. From 20 October 2004 until his assassination, HARIRI was a Member of Parliament

and a prominent political figure in Lebanon. Upon resigning as Prime Minister in

2004, he started preparing for parliamentary elections to be held in 2005.

8. In the morning of 14 February 2005, HARIRI departed his residence at Quraitem

Palace, in West Beirut, to attend a session of Parliament, located at Place de !'Etoile,

Beirut.

9. Shortly before 11:00, HARIRI arrived at Parliament where he met with many

Members of Parliament, including his sister, MP Bahia HARIRI, and MP Marwan

HAMADEH.

10. Shortly before 12:00, HARIRlleft Parliament to go to Cafe Place de !'Etoile, located

nearby where he stayed for approximately 45 minutes.

11. At about 12:45, HARIRI left the Cafe and asked his security detail to prepare the

convoy to go back to his residence for a lunch appointment.

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12. At about 12:49, HARIRI entered his armoured vehicle accompanied by MP Basse1

FULEIHAN and the convoy then departed the Place de l'Etoile. His security detail

had planned to drive back to Quraitem Palace along the coastal road.

13. Approximately two minutes ahead of the convoy, the Mitsubishi Canter van slowly

moved towards its final position on Rue Minet el Hos'n. As the convoy passed, the

suicide bomber detonated the explosives.

C. PHONE NETWORKS INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK

14. Five interconnected mobile phone groups were involved m the assassination of

HARIRI. Four of these five phone groups operated as networks. A network is defined

as a group of phones with a high frequency of contact between the phones within that

group. The analysis of these networks included the use of Call Data Records and

attribution evidence, including the analytical technique of co-location.

a. Call Data Records are digital records of phone activity. The records contain

details of the originating (outgoing) number and recipient (incoming) numbers,

call duration as well as the international mobile equipment identity, international

mobile subscriber identity and Cell ID data for mobile phones. These records

therefore contain information such as time, date and duration of each phone call

and the cell mast activated by the call, which provides an indication of the mobile

phone user's location.

b. Attribution is evidence that supports the assertion that a SIM card (telephone

number) was used by a specific person (the phone user) during a particular time

period. Attribution evidence may include, but is not limited to: subscriber

information, witness statements, other forms of documentary evidence and

analysis of Call Data Records, including co-location analysis.

c. Co-location analysis is used as a form of attribution evidence where multiple

phones are attributed to a single user. It is an analytical technique designed to

determine whether an identified person consistently uses two or more phones, at

least one of which is a mobile phone.

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15. Each phone group has been colour-coded for ease of reference.

a. Red Network: a network consisting of eight phones which were used from 4

January 2005, until it ceased all activity two minutes before the attack on 14

February 2005. Red Network phones communicated almost exclusively with each

other and had no outgoing short message service (SMS) use. All eight Red

Network phones were used to observe HARIRI or locations connected with him

between 14 January 2005 and 12 February 2005. Six of the Red Network phones

were used by the assassination team, consisting of A YY ASH and five other

unidentified individuals (SS, S6, S7, S8, and S9), for carrying out the

assassination of HARIRI. The Red Network phones are listed below with their

short-names:

Red Network 3292572 3125636 3129652 3478662 3129678 3123741 3129893 3127946

Number

Short-name Red 572 Red 636 Red 652 Red 662 Red 678 Red 741 Red 893 Red 946

b. Green Network: a network consisting of three phones which were used from at

least 30 September 2004 to 14 February 2005. From 13 October 2004 until they

ceased all activity on 14 February 2005 about one hour before the attack, Green

Network phones communicated exclusively with each other and had no outgoing

SMS use. The Green Network phones were used to monitor and coordinate the

preparations for the attack, including the preparation of the false claim of

responsibility. The Green Network was also used to monitor the physical

perpetration of the attack. The three Green Network phones are listed below with

their short-names:

c.

Green Network 3140023 3150071 3159300

Number

Short-name

: a network consisting of 18 phones that were used between 18

October 2004 and 1 October 2005. 15 of these phones were used for preparations

for the attack including some for surveillance of HARIRI between 18 October

2004 and 14 February 2005. These 15 phones communicated almost exclusively

with each other and had almost no SMS use. Of these 15 phones, six were used by

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Blue Network Number

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the assassination team, who also used Red Network phones. The other three

phones (of the 18 phones) were 3085338, 3872349, and 3872354, and were

activated on or after 7 March 2005. The 15 Blue Network phones used in relation

to the attack are listed below with their short-names:

3071233 3043585 3197610 3067324 3197817 3198864 3071235 3079501

Short-name Blue 233 Blue 585 Blue 610 Blue 324 Blue 817 Blue 864 Blue 235 Blue 501

Blue Network 3067322 3193428 3196742 3020967 3196813 3198940 3846965 Number

Short-name Blue 322 Blue 428 Blue 742 Blue 967 Blue 813 Blue 940 Blue 965

d. Yell ow N ctwork: a network consisting of 18 phones activated between 1999 and

2003 and operational until 7 January 2005. Of these 18 phones, 13 were used

between 1 September 2004 and 7 January 2005. Four of the Yellow Network

phones were used by A YY ASH and three other members of the assassination

team for preparation of the attack including for surveillance of HARIRI. The call

activity of these four phones involved contact with other Yell ow Network phones

almost exclusively. The four Yell ow N ctwork phones used in relation to the

attack are listed below with their short-names:

e.

Yellow Nt:n'\'ura. 3205294 3345457 3971933 3712024 Number

Short-name Yellow 294 Yellow 457 Yellow 933 Yellow 024

: a group of three phones, which were used from at least 1 January

2003 untill6 February 2005. were used to communicate amongst

each other and to communicate with others outside the group.

were used to coordinate the false claim of responsibility. The

listed below with their short-names:

are

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Purple Phones 3598095 Number

Short-name Purple 095

3419018

Purple 018

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3575231

Purple 231

16. Some users of the network phones carried and used multiple phones on the different

networks. In addition to their network phones, personal mobile phones (PMPs) were

used. A YY ASH used PMPs in relation to the preparations for the attack. MERHI,

SABRA and ONEISSI used PMPs, colour-coded 'Purple Phones,' in relation to

preparations for the attack. Mustafa BADREDDINE used PMPs for contacting friends

and family and for business purposes. In addition, Mustafa BADREDDINE used five

'sequential mobile phones' (SMPs) between September 2004 and November 2005.

The phones were used in sequential order, meaning that each phone was used for a

period of weeks or months and then replaced by another. The number of phone

contacts was limited and SMS use was minimal.

17. There was a history of contact between ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI. In

particular, ONEISSI and SABRA were in contact with each other on their Purple

Phones 84 times between 12 January 2003 and 16 February 2005. SABRA has been

in contact 212 times with MERHI on Purple 231 between 7 January 2003 and 14

February 2005, and ONEISSI 195 times with MERHI on Purple 231 between 25

June 2003 and 26 January 2005. There was also a history of contact between

AYYASH and MERHI. Between 4 December 2003 and 6 February 2005, MERHI

on Purple 231 was in contact 32 times with AYYASH on PMP 165, PMP 935, and

PMP 091, and in particular seven times on PMP 091 between 23 January 2005 and 6

February 2005.

18. The table below sets out a list of all phones used by each of the Accused and the

unidentified others who used relevant

, or phones, or . Unidentified phone users have

been designated subject numbers, e.g., S6. In cases where one individual used

multiple phones, phones attributed to that individual at and around the material time

have been listed.

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Red Green Network Network

BAD RED DINE 3140023 Green 023

AYYASH 3123741 3159300 Red 741 Green 300

ONEISSI

SABRA

MERHI 3150071 Green 071

S5 3125636 Red 636

S6 3129678 Red 678

S7 3127946 Red 946

S8 3129893 Red 893

S9 3129652 Red 652

S10 3478662 Red 662

Sll 3292572 Red 572

S12

S13

S14

S18

S19

S23

n/a

n/a

n/a

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Blue Yellow Network Network

3071233 3205294 Blue 233 Yellow 294

3043585 Blue 585 3197610 3345457 Blue 610 Yellow 457 3067324 Blue 324 3197817 3971933 Blue 817 Yellow 933 3198864 3712024 Blue 864 Yellow 024

3071235 Blue 235 3079501 Blue 501 3067322 Blue 322 3193428 Blue 428 3196742

3020967

3196813

3198940

3846965

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Purple PMPs/SMPs Phones

3966663 (PMP 663) 3833354 (PMP 354) 3476683 (SMP 683) 3293944 (SMP 944) 3103195 (SMP 195) 3121486 (SMP 486) 3442593 (SMP 593) 3767165 (PMP 165) 3523935 (PMP 935) 3831170 (PMP 170) 3020091 (PMP 091)

3598095 Purple 095

3419018 Purple 018 3575231 Purple 231

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19. A diagram of the interconnected phone groups including the main phones attributed to

the accused appears below. In general:

a. The Green Network was a coordination network used exclusively by three co

conspirators- Mustafa BADREDDINE, AYYASH, and MERHI- to exchange

information regarding all aspects of the conspiracy and coordinate the acts done in

furtherance of the conspiracy. For example, the Green Network was used by

Mustafa BADREDDINE to monitor, and together with AYYASH, coordinate the

surveillance of HARIRI in preparation for the attack and the purchase of the van

that was used for the attack. Mustafa BADREDDINE also used the Green

Network to monitor the physical perpetration of the attack. In addition, the Green

Network was used by Mustafa BADREDDINE to monitor, and together with

MERHI, coordinate the preparation of the false claim of responsibility.

b. The Yellow, Blue or Red Networks were used by AYYASH to coordinate various

tasks related to the preparation of the attack against HARIRI and its perpetration.

A YY ASH also used network phones to participate in carrying out the surveillance

and assassination of HARIRI.

c. A YY ASH used PMPs to be in contact with MERHI. In particular, AYYASH on

PMP 091 was in contact with MERHI on Purple 231 in relation to preparations

for the attack on HARIRI, including the false claim of responsibility.

d. SABRA and ONEISSI communicated amongst each other and with MERHI

using the Purple Phones in preparation and carrying out of the false claim of

responsibility.

The diagram illustrates the different phone groups, their attribution to the Accused

and the links between the networks.

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ONEISSI

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Interconnected Phone Groups

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SIS

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D. CHRONOLOGY OF THE ATTACK

1. Preparations

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20. AYYASH, SS, S6, S7, S8, S9, SlO, Sll, S12, S14 and S23 observed HARIRI on a

number of days prior to the attack. These observations were preparatory steps for the

assassination.

21. Observations of HARIRI occurred on 10 days between 20 October and 10 November

2004. During that time, on 6 November 2004, AYYASH on Green 300 and MERHI

on Green 071 were in contact with Mustafa BADREDDINE on Green 023. Mustafa

BADREDDINE on Green 023 continued to be in contact with MERHI on Green

071 until 7 February 2005, and with AYYASH on Green 300 unti114 February 2005.

22. On at least 20 days between 11 November 2004 and 14 February 2005, AYYASH,

SS, S6, S7, S8, S9, SlO, Sll, S12, S14 and S23, communicating on their Blue

Network phones and/or Yellow Network phones, and/or as of 14 January 2005, their

respective Red Network phones, carried out acts in preparation for the attack

including observation and surveillance, in order to learn the routes and movements of

his convoy and the position of HARIRI' s vehicle within it. Surveillance occurred on

at least 15 days and in particular on 11 November 2004, 1, 7, 14, 20, 28 and 31

January 2005, and 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 February 2005. By doing so, AYYASH

and the assassination team determined the most suitable day, location and method for

the attack, which they then executed on 14 February 2005.

23. As part of the assassination preparations, between 22 December 2004 and 17 January

2005, ONEISSI, and SABRA under the coordination of MERHI were responsible

for locating a suitable individual who would be used to make a false claim of

responsibility, on a video, for the attack against HARIRI. With ONEISSI falsely

calling himself 'Mohammed', the person they chose was ABU AD ASS, a 22-year old

Palestinian man, found at the Arab University Mosque of Beirut, also known as 'the

Al-Houry Mosque'. The activity of ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI is illustrated

inter alia by the following:

a. On six days, being on 22, 29, 30, and 31 December 2004 and 3 and 7 January

2005, ONEISSI was in the vicinity of the mosque. On two of those days, on 22

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December 2004 and 7 January 2005, ONEISSI on Purple 095 was in contact with

MERHI on Purple 231. In addition, on three of those days, on 30 and 31

December 2004, and 7 January 2005, ONEISSI on Purple 095 was in contact

with SABRA on Purple 018.

b. On eight days, being on 30 and 31 December 2004 and 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 January

2005, SABRA was in the vicinity of the mosque. On two of those days, 1 and 4

January 2005, SABRA on Purple 018 was in contact with MERHI on Purple

231. In addition, on six of those days, 30 and 31 December 2004 and 1, 4, 6 and 7

January 2005, SABRA on Purple 018 was in contact with ONEISSI on Purple

095.

c. During this activity, MERHI on Green 071 was in contact three times with

Mustafa BADREDDINE on Green 023 on 23 and 27 December 2004, and 2

January 2005.

d. Between 12 and 15 January 2005, in the days preceding the disappearance of

ABU ADASS, MERHI on Green 071 was in contact six times with Mustafa

BADREDDINE on Green 023. Between 14 and 15 January 2005, MERHI on

Purple 231 was in contact three times with SABRA on Purple 018, and SABRA

was in contact two times with ONEISSI on Purple 095. On 16 January 2005, in

the morning ABU ADASS met ONEISSI calling himself 'Mohammed', MERHI

on Green 071 was in contact five times with Mustafa BADREDDINE on Green

023.

e. On 17 January 2005, ONEISSI was in the vicinity of ABU AD ASS' home and

used Purple 095 to contact MERHI on Purple 231. ONEISSI and SABRA

would later participate in ensuring delivery of the video for broadcast,

accompanied by a letter in Arabic, after the assassination. MERHI would

coordinate those activities in ensuring the delivery of the video for broadcast.

24. Between 1 January 2005 and 14 February 2005, often during activity by the

assassination team, Mustafa BADREDDINE on

with AYYASH on

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was in contact 59 times

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25. On 4 January 2005, S6 and S9 activated the eight Red Network phones in the Tripoli

area over a period of approximately 30 minutes. The Red Network phones were all

pre-paid and purchased without supplying subscriber information.

26. On 11 January 2005, AYYASH visited the area of Al-Beddaoui in Tripoli where

vehicle showrooms are located including the one from which the Mitsubishi Canter

van would be purchased on 25 January 2005. From the same area, AYYASH, on

Green 300, contacted Mustafa BADREDDINE twice on Green 023.

27. From 12 to 16 January 2005, MERHI on Green 071 and Mustafa BADREDDINE on

Green 023 were in contact on a daily basis for a total of 11 phone calls. In particular,

on 15 January 2005, MERHI on Green 071 called Mustafa BADREDDINE on

Green 023 at 18:51 for 31 seconds. At 18:52, MERHI on Purple 231 called SABRA

on Purple 018. [Redacted]. At 23:40, MERHI on Green 071 again called Mustafa

BADREDDINE on Green 023.

28. On 16 January 2005, at 06:19, MERHI on Green 071 was in South Beirut, and called

Mustafa BADREDDINE on Green 023. At that time, Mustafa BADREDDINE was in

the Faraya area. After this call, Mustafa BADREDDINE travelled to South Beirut. At

about 07:00, ABU ADASS left his home to meet with ONEISSI calling himself

'Mohammed'. At 07:40, MERHI again called Mustafa BADREDDINE who was now

located in South Beirut. MERHI on Green 071 called Mustafa BADREDDINE on

Green 023 three more times between 07:46 and 09:00. ABU ADASS has been

missing since that day.

29. [Redacted].

30. On 20 January 2005, HARIRI was scheduled to attend the Grand Mosque of Beirut in

the morning but instead attended the Imam Ali Mosque for Eid prayers. All active

phones operated for less than one hour in the vicinity of Quraitem

Palace and the Grand Mosque. A YY ASH, on

observations on that day. In the hours before the

, participated in the

observations, Mustafa

BADREDDINE on was in contact with A YY ASH on and,

subsequently, MERHI on

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31. On 23 January 2005, AYYASH on PMP 091 called MERHI on Purple 231 on two

separate occasions at 20:02 and 20:22.

32. On 25 January 2005, six relevant Blue Phones were active, including Blue 233

belonging to AYYASH who made 16 calls. In particular:

a. Between 14:41 and 14:59, AYYASH on Blue 233 in Beirut was in contact three

times with S6 on Blue 610 who was in the Tripoli area.

b. At 15:10, AYYASH on Green 300 called Mustafa BADREDDINE on Green 023

for 81 seconds.

c. Between 15:30 and 16:00, S6 on Blue 610, with another unidentified person, both

giving false names, purchased for $11,250 in cash a Mitsubishi Canter van with

engine block number 4D33-JO 1926 from a vehicle showroom in the Al-Beddaoui

area of Tripoli. The assassination team later used the vehicle to carry the

explosives in the attack.

d. At 15:37, S6 on Blue 610 during the purchase negotiations called AYYASH on

Blue 233 for 81 seconds.

33. On 28 January 2005, HARIRI stayed at Quraitem Palace throughout the day. The

assassination team, using the Red Network phones, including AYYASH on Red 741,

operated for more than six hours around Quraitem Palace and HARIRI' s residence in

Faqra.

34. On 31 January 2005, HARIRI was at Quraitem Palace before going to the Higher

Shiite Council, later returning to the Palace. The assassination team, using the Red

Network phones, were active for less than three hours covering the period before,

during and after HARIRI's movements. They were located around Quraitem Palace

and the Higher Shiite Council when HARIRI was present. In both areas and in the

same time-frame, A YY ASH used and . In particular,

on , he was in communication 11 times between 10:49 and 12:07 with

Mustafa BADREDDINE on

35. On 2 February 2005, S8, coordinating with AYYASH and S6, travelled to the greater

Tripoli area where they, over a 45 minute period, topped up the credit of the eight

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Red Network phones. In the same area, within 10 minutes of the top-up, S8 on Blue

817, called S6 on Blue 610. Later, while travelling back to Beirut, S8, on Blue 817,

was in communication three times with AYYASH in Beirut on Blue 233.

36. On 3 February 2005, HARIRI had a meeting close to his residence before going to the

St. Georges Yacht Club for lunch and later returning to Quraitem Palace. A YY ASH,

SS, S6, S7, S8, S9, and S10 were all active on their Red Network and/or Blue

Network phones around Quraitem Palace and/or the St. Georges Yacht Club at the

same time that HARIRI was having lunch there. In particular:

a. AYYASH, on Red 741, was around the St. Georges Yacht Club and in regular

contact with SS, S7 and S8.

b. Between 13:56 and 15:44, AYYASH had contact four times on Green 300 with

Mustafa BADREDDINE on Green 023.

c. Between the first and third Green Network call, Mustafa BADREDDINE

travelled from South Beirut to the area ofthe St. Georges Yacht Club.

d. By around 15:44, the time of the final call, AYYASH and Mustafa

BADREDDINE were both in the vicinity of the St. Georges Yacht Club and the

location that would be used for the attack on 14 February 2005.

37. On 4 February 2005, HARIRI departed Lebanon. MERHI on Purple 231 was m

contact with AYYASH on PMP 091 on 5 and 6 February 2005 for a total of five

phone calls. On 7 February 2005, HARIRI returned to Beirut. On the same morning,

both A YYASH on Green 300 and MERHI on Green 071 were in contact with


38. On 8 February 2005, HARIRI's movements and those of the assassination team are

similar to their respective movements on 14 February 2005, being the day of the

attack. HARIRI was at Quraitem Palace in the morning before attending Parliament

and afterwards returning to the Palace at around 13:45. AYYASH and the other

members of the assassination team were active on their and/or

phones around Quraitem Palace, Parliament and the routes normally used by

HARIRI to travel between both locations. In particular:

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a. AYYASH was active on Red 741, Blue 233, Green 300, and on his PMP 170 and

PMP 091, at relevant locations, in particular around Parliament and where the

attack would take place on 14 February 2005.

b. At 13:40 and 15:05, AYYASH on Green 300 was twice in communication with


2. The Attack

39. On 14 February 2005, AYYASH and the other members of the assassination team

positioned themselves in locations where they were able to track and observe

HARIRI's convoy from his residence at Quraitem Palace in Beirut to Parliament and

thereafter, travelling back to his residence, into the area of the St. Georges Hotel.

They kept in frequent contact with each other, first on their Blue Network phones and

later on their Red Network phones. In particular, there were 33 calls within the Red

Network between 11:00 and 12:53, mostly in the vicinity of Parliament and the St.

Georges Hotel. Significant calls included:

a. At 11:58, AYYASH, on Green 300, while positioned close to the area of the St.

Georges Hotel, contacted Mustafa BADREDDINE on Green 023 for 14 seconds.

The Green Network phones were never used again.

b. At 12:50:34, as HARIRI was leaving Parliament to drive home, S8 on Red 893

located near Parliament, called for five seconds to S7 on Red 946 located in the

vicinity of the St. Georges Hotel and near the Mitsubishi Canter van. Immediately

after, at 12:50:55, S8 on Red 893 then called AYYASH on Red 741 for 10

seconds who was located between Parliament and the St. Georges Hotel. At

12:51:32, S8 on Red 893 called S9 on Red 652 for seven seconds. At 12:52:02,

S9 on called SS on for 20 seconds. At 12:52:09, S8 on

called S6 on for 13 seconds. At around this time, from a location close to

A YY ASH, the van began moving towards the St. Georges Hotel. Through these

calls, S8 informed AYYASH, S7, S9, S6 and (through S9) SS of HARIRI's

departure from Parliament so that the van could move into its final position for

attack.

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c. At 12:53, the last ever call within the Red Network took place, from S9 on Red

652 to S6 on Red 678, while both were in the vicinity of Parliament. By that time,

all members of the assassination team had been informed of HARIRI's final

movements. The Red Network phones were never used again.

40. On 14 February 2005, at about 12:52, closed-circuit TV footage shows the Mitsubishi

Canter van move slowly towards the St. Georges Hotel.

41. On 14 February 2005, at about 12:55, a male suicide bomber detonated a large

quantity of high explosives concealed in the cargo area of the Mitsubishi Canter van

with engine block number 4D33-J01926, killing HARIRI as his convoy of six

vehicles on Rue Minet el Hos'n passed the St. Georges Hotel.

42. The explosion took place on a busy public street and was enormous and terrifying.

Forensic examination has established the quantity of explosives was equivalent to

approximately 2500 kilogrammes of TNT (trinitrotoluene). In addition to HARIRI,

eight members of his convoy and 13 members of the public were killed. Not

including the suicide bomber, the explosion killed a total of 22 persons. Due to the

size of the explosion, the attack attempted to kill a further 226 persons who were

injured, and also caused partial destruction of the St. Georges Hotel and nearby

buildings.

43. Fragments of the suicide bomber were recovered at the scene and forensic

examination has established both that the remains were: (a) of a male, and (b) not of

ABU ADASS. The identity of the suicide bomber remains unknown.

3. Delivery ofthe Video

44. MERHI coordinated the activities of ONEISSI and SABRA who acted together in

disseminating statements falsely attributing responsibility for the attack, ensuring the

delivery of the video and ensuring that the video would be broadcast. Starting about

75 minutes after the attack, ONEISSI or SABRA made a total of four calls to the

offices of the Reuters and Al-Jazeera news networks in Beirut. All four phone calls

were made using the same prepaid Telecard 6162569 from four different public

payphones. The sequence of events was as follows:

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PUBLIC

45.

46.

47.

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a. At about 14:03, MERHI on Purple 231 called SABRA on Purple 018. At

about 14:11, ONEISSI or SABRA claimed to Reuters that a fictional

fundamentalist group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria' executed the

attack.

b. At about 14:19, ONEISSI or SABRA uttered into the phone to Al-Jazeera a

claim of responsibility from 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria', a report of

which was broadcast shortly after.

c. At about 14:37, MERHI on Purple 231 called SABRA on Purple 018.

d. At about 15:27, SABRA called Al-Jazeera and gave information on where to

find a videocassette which had been placed in a tree at the ESCW A Square

near the Al-Jazeera offices at Shakir Ouayeh building, Beirut. ONEISSI was

watching the location to confirm receipt by Al-Jazeera of the videocassette.

e. At about 15:50, the videotape was picked up from the tree by an employee of

Al-Jazeera. On the video, ABU ADASS claimed responsibility for the attack,

that it was in support of 'Mujahidin' in Saudi Arabia, and that further attacks

would follow. Attached to the videocassette was a letter in Arabic which

stated inter alia that ABU AD ASS was the suicide bomber.

f. Between 15:53 and 16:02, MERHI on Purple 231 was in contact three times

with SABRA on Purple 018, and SABRA on Purple 018 was in contact five

times with ONEISSI on Purple 095.

g. At about 17:04, ONEISSI or SABRA demanded with menace that Al-Jazeera

broadcast the video, which was done shortly after.

At about 17:15, SABRA on

17:24, MERHI on

called MERHI on

called SABRA on

On 15 February 2005, MERHI's

On 16 February 2005, ONEISSI's

being used.

ceased being used.

and SABRA's

. At about

ceased

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E. THE CONSPIRACY

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48. AYYASH, ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI, together with Mustafa BADREDDINE

and others as yet unidentified, including the assassination team, agreed to commit a

terrorist act by means of an explosive device in order to assassinate HARIRI.

a. AYYASH and MERHI, together with Mustafa BADREDDINE, agreed to

commit a terrorist act by means of an explosive device in order to assassinate

HARIRI between 11 November 2004 and the morning of 14 February 2005 prior

to the attack.

b. AYYASH, as the assassination team coordinator, MERHI, as the coordinator of

the false claim of responsibility, Mustafa BAD RED DINE, as monitor/coordinator,

and the other members of the assassination team were early members of the

conspiracy.

c. ONEISSI and SABRA joined the conspiracy between 22 December 2004 and the

morning of 14 February 2005 prior to the attack. In the conspiracy, they

performed supporting tasks for the assassination, namely:

1. to seek a suitable individual, later identified as ABU ADASS, who would

be used to make a false claim of responsibility, on a video, for the attack

against HARIRI; and,

11. to ensure delivery of the video, with a letter attached, for broadcast after

the assassination.

49. All four Accused, as was Mustafa BADREDDINE, are supporters of Hezbollah,

which is a political and military organisation in Lebanon.

50. All who concluded or joined the criminal agreement were perpetrators of the

conspiracy against state security. AYYASH, Mustafa BADREDDINE, and the

assassination team were also perpetrators of the substantive offences of committing a

terrorist act, intentional homicide of HARIRI, and of 21 others, and attempted

intentional homicide of 226 others. Additionally, ONEISSI, SABRA, and MERHI,

were accomplices to the above substantive offences by preparing and delivering the

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false claim of responsibility in order to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from

justice.

51. The aim of the conspiracy, to which all conspirators knowingly agreed, was to

commit a terrorist act by detonating a large quantity of explosives in a public place, in

order to kill HARIRI.

IV. THE COUNTS

52. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 68(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the

Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Prosecutor charges the Accused persons with the

following counts:

COUNT ONE

Statement of Offence

53. Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terrorist Act,

a. pursuant to Articles 188,212,213,270, and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code,

and

b. Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the

penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and

c. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute ofthe Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Particulars of Offence

54. SALIM JAMIL AYYASH and HASSAN HABIB MERHI between the 11th day of

November 2004 and the morning of 14th day of February 2005 prior to the attack, and

HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA, between the 22nct

day of December 2004 and the morning of 14th day of February 2005 prior to the

attack,

a. together with Mustafa BADREDDINE and others unidentified,

b. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators with shared

intent,

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c. concluded or joined an agreement, aimed at committing a terrorist act intended to

cause a state of terror by a predetermined means liable to create a public danger,

d. namely by the assassination by means of a large explosive device in a public place

of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI,

e. which intentionally with premeditation should,

f. or they foresaw and accepted the risk would,

g. kill and attempt to kill others in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, and cause

the partial destruction of buildings,

h. and in so doing thereby together they committed a conspiracy against state

security.

COUNT TWO


55. Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an explosive device,

a. pursuant to Articles 188,212,213, and 314 ofthe Lebanese Criminal Code, and

b. Article 6 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for

sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and



56. SALIMJAMILAYYASH,

a. on the 14th day of February 2005,

b. with Mustafa BADREDDINE and others unidentified,

c. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators with shared

intent,

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d. committed a terrorist act intended to cause a state of terror by a means liable to

create a public danger,

e. namely by the assassination by means of a large explosive device in a public place


f. thereby bringing about the detonation at 12:55 on the 14th day of February 2005 at

Rue Minet el Hos'n, Beirut, Lebanon, being a public street, of explosives

equivalent to approximately 2500 kilogrammes of TNT,

g. and, it being an aggravating circumstance that, in so doing,

1. resulting in the deaths of Rafik HARIRI and 21 other persons, and

n. in the partial destruction of the St. Georges Hotel and nearby buildings.

COUNT THREE


57. Intentional Homicide (of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive

materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 212, 213, 547 and 549(1) and (7), of the Lebanese

Criminal Code, and

b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute ofthe Special Tribunal for Lebanon.


58. SALIMJAMILAYYASH,

a. on the 14th day of February 2005,


c. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators with shared

intent to cause Rafik HARIRI' s death and by knowingly bringing about the

detonation of a large explosive device resulting in his death,

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d. committed the intentional homicide of Rafik HARIRI,

e. in the aggravating circumstance of

1. premeditation, and

11. by knowingly bringing about the detonation at 12:55 at Rue Minet el

Hos'n, Beirut, Lebanon, of explosives equivalent to approximately 2500

kilogrammes of TNT that may cause death.

COUNT FOUR


59. Intentional Homicide (of21 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide ofRafik

HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189, 212, 213, 547 and 549(1) and (7) of the Lebanese

Criminal Code, and

b. Article 3(1)(a) ofthe Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.


60. SALIM JAMIL AYYASH,

a. on the 141h day of February 2005,

b. or subsequently as a result of injuries sustained on the 141h day of February 2005,

c. with Mustafa BADREDDINE and others unidentified,

d. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators,

e. by using a large quantity of explosive materials in a public place with shared

intent and premeditation to commit the intentional homicide of former Prime

Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI, within his motor convoy,

f. in addition, either intending to kill members of the said convoy and members of

the general public in the vicinity,

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g. or by reason of foreseeing and accepting the risk that deaths would occur within

the said motor convoy and among the general public in the vicinity,

h. by then knowingly bringing about the detonation at 12:55 at Rue Minet el Hos'n,

Beirut, Lebanon, being a public street, of explosives equivalent to approximately

2500 kilogrammes of TNT that may cause death,

1. thereby with shared intent,

J. and in the aggravating circumstance of


11. by bringing about the said detonation of explosive materials,

k. committed the intentional homicide, as named alphabetically in Schedule A,

1. of eight members of the said convoy, namely:

1. Yahya Mustafa AL-ARAB,

2. Omar Ahmad AL-MASRI,

3. Mazen Adnan AL-ZAHABI,

4. Mohammed Saadeddine DARWISH,

5. Bassel Farid FULEIHAN (who died on 18 April 2005 as a result of

injuries sustained on 14 February 2005),

6. Mohammed Riyadh Hussein GHALA YEENI,

7. Talal Nabih NASSER, and

8. Ziad Mohammed TARRAF.

m. and of thirteen members of the general public, namely:

1. Joseph Emile AOUN,

2. Zahi Halim ABU RJEILY (who died on 15 February 2005 as a result

of injuries sustained on 14 February 2005),

3. Mahmoud Saleh AL-HAMAD AL-MOHAMMED,

4. Mahmoud Saleh AL-KHALAF,

5. Sobhi Mohammed AL-KHODR,

6. Rima Mohammed Raif BAZZI,

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7. Abdo Tawfik BOU FARAH,

8. Yamama Kamel DAMEN,

9. Abd Al-Hamid Mohammed GHALAYEENI,

10. Raw ad Hussein Suleiman HAIDAR,

11. Farhan Ahmad ISSA,

12. Alaa Hassan OSFOUR, and

13. Haitham Khaled OTHMAN.

COUNT FIVE


61. Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 226 persons m addition to the Intentional

Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189,200, 201,212,213, 547, and 549(1) and (7) of the

Lebanese Criminal Code, and



62. SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,

a. on the 141h day of February 2005,


c. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators,

d. by using a large quantity of explosive materials in a public place with shared

intent and premeditation to commit the intentional homicide of former Prime

Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI, within his motor convoy,

e. in addition, either intending to kill members of the said convoy and members of

the general public in the vicinity,

f. or by reason of foreseeing and accepting the risk that deaths would occur within

the said motor convoy and among the general public in the vicinity,

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g. by then knowingly bringing about the detonation at 12:55 at Rue Minet el Hos'n,

Beirut, Lebanon, of explosives equivalent to approximately 2500 kilogrammes of

TNT that may cause death,

h. thereby, with shared intent,

1. and in the aggravating circumstance of


11. by bringing about the said detonation of explosive materials,

J. in so causing injury in the explosion to persons from the said convoy and general

public, attempted to commit the intentional homicide of 226 other persons, as

named alphabetically in Schedule B, which attempt failed to reach the intended

result due to circumstances beyond the control of the co-perpetrators.

COUNT SIX


63. Being an Accomplice to the felony of Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an

explosive device,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 219(4) and (5), and 314 ofthe Lebanese Criminal Code,

and

b. Article 6 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for

sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and



64. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI, ASSAD HASSAN SABRA, and HASSAN HABIB

MERHI

a. between the 22nd day of December 2004 and the 14th day of February 2005,

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b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the 141h day of February

2005 then did,

c. commit a terrorist act intended to cause a state of terror by a means liable to create a

public danger, namely by means of a large explosive device in a public place;

d. ONEISSI, SABRA, and MERHI knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to

commit the said terrorist act,

e. together with shared intent,

1. each bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an

accomplice to the terrorist act, and

11. each aiding and abetting the co-perpetrators of the felony,

f. agreed with the co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory to

the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, which

would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group, as follows:

1. as preparatory to the offence and/or acts to shield the co-perpetrators and

themselves from justice, by participating in the identification of and then using

a 22-year old Palestinian man named Ahmad ABU ADASS in order to create

a false claim of responsibility from him on video for the forthcoming offence

on behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria'; and

11. as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, by then

ensuring the video, with the attached letter, of the false claim of responsibility

would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon immediately after the said

offence.

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COUNT SEVEN


65. Being an Accomplice to the felony of Intentional Homicide (of Rafik HARIRI)

with premeditation by using explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 219(4) and (5), 547, and 549(1) and (7) of the Lebanese

Criminal Code, and




MERHI

a. between the 22nd day of December 2004 and the 141h day of February 2005,

b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the 141h day of February

2005 then did,

c. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide of

the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI;

d. ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to

commit the said intentional homicide of Rafik HARIRI,

e. together with shared intent,


accomplice to the intentional homicide of Rafik HARIRI, and


f. agreed with the co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory to

the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, which

would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group as follows:

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offence.

COUNT EIGHT


67. Being an Accomplice to the felony of Intentional Homicide (of 21 persons in

addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using

explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189, 219(4) and (5), 547 and 549(1) and (7) of the

Lebanese Criminal Code, and




MERHI


b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the 14th day of

February 2005 then did,

c. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide


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d. which in addition, as shown by the large quantity of explosive materials used,

they intended, or foresaw and accepted the risk, that this act would kill others in

the vicinity of the explosion,

e. and who thereby committed the intentional homicide of 21 others,

f. ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators

to kill others in addition to killing Rafik HARIRI,

g. together with shared intent,


accomplice to the intentional homicide of 21 others, and


h. agreed with the said co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts

preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves

from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist

group, as follows:









offence.

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COUNT NINE


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69. Being an Accomplice to the felony of Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 226

persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with

premeditation by using explosive materials,

a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189,200,201, 219(4) and (5), 547 and 549(1) and (7) of

the Lebanese Criminal Code, and

b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.



MERHI


b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the 14th day of February

2005 then did,

c. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide


d. which in addition, as shown by the large quantity of explosive materials used, they

intended, or foresaw and accepted the risk, that this act would attempt to kill

others in the vicinity of the explosion,

e. and who thereby committed the attempted intentional homicide of 226 others,

which attempt failed to reach the intended result due to circumstances beyond the

control of the co-perpetrators,

f. ONEISSI, SABRA and MERHI knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators

to attempt to kill others in addition to killing Rafik HARIRI,

g. together with shared intent,

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accomplice to the attempted intentional homicide of 226 others, and


h. agreed with the said co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts

preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves

from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist

group, as follows:


themselves from justice, by participating in the identification of and then

using a 22-year old Palestinian man named Ahmad ABU ADASS in order

to create a false claim of responsibility from him on video for the

forthcoming offence on behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in

Greater Syria'; and


ensuring the video, with the attached letter, of the false claim of

responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon

immediately after the said offence.

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Schedule A

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Below is an alphabetical list of 21 other persons intentionally or foreseeably killed as a direct

consequence of the public explosion on 14 February 2005 intended to kill the former Prime

Minister Rafik HARIRI, and who Counts 4 and 8 plead were each and collectively subject to

intentional homicide with premeditation.

In addition to Rafik HARIRI, eight members of Rafik HARIRI's motor convoy were

killed, (following in alphabetical order):

1. Yahya Mustafa Al-Arab, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death- burns

due to an explosion.

2. Omar Ahmad Al-Masri, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death - (not

provided on death certificate).

3. Mazen Adnan Al-Zahabi, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death- burns

to more than 90% of the body due to an explosion.

4. Mohammed Saadeddine Darwish, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death

-heart attack due to explosion of 14 February 2005 and burns to entire body.

5. Bassel Farid Fuleihan, [Redacted]. Mr. Fuleihan was a Member of Parliament who

was travelling with Mr. HARIRI. He initially survived the explosion but received

third degree burns to 96% of his body. He was flown to Paris for emergency

treatment. He remained in hospital in a coma for 60 days before he died on 18 April

2005.

6. Mohammed Riyadh Hussein Ghalayeeni, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause

of death - burns due to an explosion.

7. Talal Nabih Nasser, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death- burns due to

an explosion.

8. Ziad Mohammed Tarraf, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death- burns


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In addition, thirteen public bystanders were also killed (following in alphabetical order):

9. Joseph Emile Aoun, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death- crushed and

disfigured in explosion.

10. Zahi Halim Abu Rjeily, [Redacted]; died 15 February 2005, cause of death -

blockage of the respiratory tract as a result of the heavy accumulation of debris due to

an explosion in the St. Georges area.

11. Mahmoud Saleh Al-Hamad Al-Mohammed, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005,

cause of death - explosion leading to death.

12. Mahmoud Saleh Al-Khalaf, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death -

explosion leading to death.

13. Sobhi Mohammed Al-Khodr, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005.

14. Rima Mohammed Raif Bazzi, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death -

multiple injuries caused by the St. George's explosion.

15. Abdo Tawfik Bou Farah, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death -

explosion of the brain as a result of shattering of the skull due to a bomb explosion.

16. Yamama Kamel Damen, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death- bums


17. Abd Al-Hamid Mohammed Ghalayeeni, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of

death - injuries due to an explosion.

18. Rawad Hussein Suleiman Haidar, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death

- cardiac and respiratory arrest due to an explosion.

19. Farhan Ahmad Issa, [Redacted].

20. Alaa Hassan Osfour, [Redacted]; died 14 February 2005, cause of death- bums due

to an explosion.

21. Haitham Khaled Othman, [Redacted]; died 15 February 2005, cause of death -

[illegible] ... explosion.

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Schedule B

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Below is an alphabetical list of 226 persons 8 intentionally or foreseeably injured as a direct

consequence of the public explosion intended to kill the former Prime Minister Rafik

HARIRI and who Counts 5 and 9 plead were each and collectively subject to attempted

intentional homicide with premeditation.

1 [Redacted] [Redacted] [Redacted]
































This figure and the listed names are subject to change, as further evidence is gathered.

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r '

Documents

Redacted Amended Consolidated Indictment · BADREDDINE7 (Mustafa BADREDDINE), also known as 'Sami ISSA', aimed at committing a terrorist act to assassinate Rafik Baha'eddine AL-HARIRI