Record No.

IN THE

599!! ;i

111965 ·l! IV E1h 1

Supreme Court of Appeals o trgtHfiD. VIRGINIA

AT RICHMOND ~ ,o~ - ~~

W. W. CRANDALL, Plaintiff in Error,

versus

WILLIAM -w. WOODARD, JR., ET AL., Defendants in Error.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR.

GEORGE E. ALLEN ALLEN, ALLEN, ALLEN & ALLEN

4020 West Broad Street Richmond, Virginia

Counsel for Plaintiff in Error.

INDEX TO PETficrON

Record No. 5990. Page

I. Brief Statement of Proceedings in the Court Below. 2• II. Assignment of Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2*

III. The Question Involved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3* IV. Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3* V. Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7•

The agreernent between plaintiff and defendants pro­viding .for the leaving of the property on the prem­ises constituted a bailment and the defendants were estopped fr'Om denying plaintiff's title. Moreover, no such d.efense as want of, title was claimed in the gro'tvnds of defense. In any event, plaintiff had an equitable interest in the properly which the defend­ants had no right to destroy.

1. Defendants estopped to deny plaintiff's title . . . . 7* 2. The defense of want of title was not set forth in

the grounds of defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15* 3. Plaintiff had an equitable interest in the property

which the defendants had no right to destroy .... 17*

VI. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18* VII. Statements Required by the Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18*

. Table of Oases.

Bell Storage Co., Inc. v. Harrison, 164 Va. 278, 180 S. E. 320 ...................................... 8•, 9, • 1o•

Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Osborne, 154 Va. 477, 153 S. E. 865 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16•

City of Erie, .Appeal of, 46 A. (2d) 592 ................. 17• Parker v. Iowa Mutttal Tornado Ins. Assoc., 260 N. W.

844 ............................................ 17*

Textbooks.

8 Am. Jur. (2d) Bailments .......................... 10* 52 Am. Jur.; Constructive Possession ................ 12•

R1tles and St.atutes.

Rule 3:18 15*

Other References

Transcript: Opinion

IN· THE

Supreme ·Court of Appeals of Virginia AT RICHMOND

Record No. 5990

W. W. CRANDALL, Petitioner,

versus

WILLIAM W. WOODARD, JR., AND LE-WOOD HOMES, INC., Defendants.

PE.TITION FOR APPEAL.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia:

; Your petitioner, W. W. Crandall, respectively represents unto Your Honors that he is aggrieved by a certain final judg­ment of the Law· and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, rendered on the 1st day of May, 1964, sustaining a motion of the defendants to strike the evidence and entering sum­mary judgment for the defendants. The original Record is filed with the Cler~ of this Court at Richmond, and will be exhibited with this Petition.

Your petitioner, who was the plaintiff in the court. below, will be referred to as plaintiff, and William W. Woodard, Jr., and Le-Wood Homes, Inc., who were defendants in the court below will be referred to as defendants.

2• I. BRIEF STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT BELOW .

. Plaintiff filed his Motion for Judgment against the defend­ants, William W. Woodard, Jr., and Le-Wood Homes, Inc., for damages for the destruction by the defendants of valuable

2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

personal property belonging to the plaintiff. The defendants filed a joint and several answer to the motion simply denying the allegations of the motion. A jury was impaneled to hear the evidence, with Judge Alexander H. Sands, Jr., presiding. At the conclusion of all the evidence the defendants made a motion to strike the evidence upon the ground that it did not

· create a submissible issue. The motion was granted and summary judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants and the case was dismissed upon the ground that plaintiff did not have any interest in the property sued for.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.

The sole assignment of error is that the court erred in striking the evidence of the plaintiff and awarding judgment for the defendants, since the evidence was entirely sufficient to require the court to submit the issue of liability to the jury.

3* *III. THE QUESTION INVOLVED.

The sole question involved is whether the evidence created a submissible issue and thus required the court to submit the case to the jury.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS.

On November 20, 1961, the Small Business Administration held a public auction sale of property of the Crandall Cor­poration of Virginia, at Doswell, Virginia. The sale was had

~ under the terms of a deed of trust given to secure notes pay­

'J ~ able to the Agency by the Crandall Corporation. At the sale fl -~\( plaintiff bought certain items of valuable personal property

.A'--{ Y for the sum of $6,330.00 and paid 25% cash in accordance with r~ :j)h. the terms of the sale, the reJnaining 75% to be paid within

W 24 hours after the conclusion of the sale. On January 18, 1962,

f. an additional $750.00 was paid on account of the purchase

price and accepted by the Agency. The property, at the time of the. purcha~e, ~~s in a bui!di'!lg owned by the Crandall Cor­poration of V1rgt.n1a. The building was sold and purchased ·by

v the defendants at the same time plaintiff purchased the per-

f; sonal property. ~'\4* *Prior to the purchase of the personal property by the

. \JI ; plaintiff, he conferred with the defendants and asked I j them if they purchased the real estate and plah1tiff purchased

W. "\V. Crandall v. "\Villia·m W. Woodard, Jr. 3

the personal property, whether they would permit the per­sonal property to remain on the premises until plaintiff could make arrangements to move it. Defendants agreed that the property might be left on the premises, saying they would not need use of the premises for some time.

The property purchased consisted of a continuous lami­nating press with necessary accessories and attachments to bond wood together. It bonds three layers of wood together 18 feet long, glued together under pressure so that all come out as one piece. The process was duly patented. The press was a large and heavy machine. The product was of interest to builders of small homes of the type Le-W ood Homes, Inc., was building, because its use cut the labor cost almost in half. In addition, the use of this product resulted in a more stable flooring for houses than the standard flooring. 1\tir. Woodard particularly seemed interested in the process as it was ex­plained to him how it might be of interest to his company, since it was in the business of building prefabricated 'homes and the wood made on the press might be used in these

homes. 5• *Following the sale, plaintiff attempted time and again

to get in touch with the defendants about removing the property, but without avail.

On February 28, 1962, the defendants, without notice to the plaintiff, dismantled the machine into many parts, thus completely destroying it, and placed the parts in the yard to the building in mud and water. The machine could have been removed without being torn to pieces or destroyed.

In the meantime, between the date of the sale and the date the machine was destroyed, plaintiff was endeavoring to raise the money to pay the balance of the purchase price. On De­cember 13, 1961, (defendants' Exhibit #13) plaintiff was in conference with Edwin J. Slipek, counsel for the Small Busi­ness Administration, discussing 'his plans to raise the money to pay the balance of the purchase price of the property, stating that he was endeavoring to refinance a mortgage with a bank for the purpose of securing the necessary funds. Slipek stated to petitioner that, before the Agency "could even con­sider whether it would be willing to look for the proceeds from the loan on the house, it would first have to know how long it would take to get our money.'' On January 2, 1961, Crandall advised the Small Business Administration (de­fendants' Exhibit #14) that he was seeking to expedite the

matter of the proposed loan. The Agency then told Cran-6* dall that the •real property formerly owned by Crandall

Corporation would change hands on January 3rd, that

\~. )0 '~

\

4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

the Trustee was somewhat restive and anxious to. close the machinery sale and that time was fast approaching when Mr. Crandall's petitions for more time could not be hee'ded. The memorandum of this conversation is dated January .4, 1962, (defendants' Exhibit #14). On January 22, 1962, the Small Business Administration ''informed Mr. Crandall that we were proceeding to sell the property and that if he could re­mit the balance due on any of the items he bid in prior to the time said property was disposed of by this Agency, delivery of the same would be made to him; however, nothing short of a full cash payment by certified check would suffice.''

On November 20, 1961, the Trustee, who sold the property, wrote Mr. Crandall as follows:

''In further ~onnection with the balance of $4,748 due on your bid of $6,330 made· at the auction sale of the captioned property on November 20, 1961, please take notice that not having received your remittance in the amount of $4,748 as demanded in our lette:r of November 22, 1961, your writer, as Trustee, will proceed to again offer for sale the machinery previously bid. in by ·you~

''In the everit your '$1.,532. deposit and the net amount re­ceived at a resale of the property does not equal the $6,330. amount of your bid,. denia:nd UpOn you for the paymen't of thP difference will be require·d. '' · ·

7• "'No sale of the property was ever had until after it was destroyed by the defendants, when it was sold a.s junk

for the paltry sum of $60.00. It so happened that on the very day that the property was destroyed, plaintiff received thC' proceeds from the mortgage on his home, amounting to $5,-977.00, which he coUld have used in payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property. Moreover, he could have sold a part of his library for $20,000.00, if necessary.

V. ARGUMENT.

· ·The·a..qreement b~tween plaintiff amd defendamts providing fo.r·tke leavin,g of the property on the premis'es constituted a. bailment· and the defendants were estopped from de'YIIJiiri_q plaintiff'..c; title. Moreover, no suah defense as want of title was' claimed in the grounds of defense. In a'WJI event, .vlaintiff ha'd an equitable interest in the prop·erty which the defendants ha~ no. ~igh~ ·~o destroy. ~

W. "\V. Crandall v. William W. "\Vooda.rd, Jr. 5

1. Defenda;nts .. estopped to deny plaintiff's title.

It will be observed that plaintiff, prior to the purchase of the personal property in question, conferred with the defend­ants and the defendants agreed that if they should purchase the building and the plaintiff should purchase the personal

property therein, the plaintiff would be permitted to al-8*' low the personal •property to remain in the building, as

the defendants did not anticipate any use for the space for some time. The plaintiff having paid one fourth of the purchase price in cash on the day of the sale in accordance with the terms of the sale, undertook through various nego­tiations to raise the money to pay the balance. These nego­tiations were acquiesced in by the creditor and plaintiff was indulged from time to time in his efforts to raise the balance of the purchase price. Even as late as January 22, 1962, plain­tiff was informed by the creditor (Small Business Adminis­tration) that, while the creditor expected to proceed to resell the property, if plaintiff could remit the balance due at any time prior to the actual sale, the sale to him would be con­summated. So, the plaintiff actually had constructive pos­session of the property until it was destroyed by the defend­ants on February 28, 1962.

In Bell Storage Oo., Inc. v. Har-rison, 164 Va. 278, 180 S. E. 320, a married woman stored household goods with a ware­houseman. The warehouseman wrongfully disposed of the goods and it was held that the warehouseman was estopped to deny the married woman's title either on the ground that the goods belonged to her husband or thaf her husband's ·e·xecution creditors claimed the lien thereon. Mr. Justice Chinn, in discussing the question involved, said:

9*' "" (2) It is next contended by the appellant that the court erred in setting aside the decree of December 10,

1932, and dismissing the bill of interpleader, because the law presumes that the goods stored by Mrs.- Harrison belonged to· her husband, and as Mrs. Harrison did not affirmatively prove to the contrary, she, therefore; has no interest in the property and no right to ask for a rehearing. The contention i-s not sound. While it is true that iri a contest between the wife· and the creditors of her husband the· burden rests Ullori the \rife to prove that property she has acquired during cov­erture in fact J)elongs to her (Yates ·v. La!W, 86 Va. 117; '9 S: E. '508; Fir~t Nat. Bank v. HO'USe, 145 Va. 149, t3~ .. s. ~:

6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

664), as between the warehouse company and Mrs. Harrison, the case in judgment presents no such question. As between these parties, the issue presented by the pleading·s is whether the sale made by the warehouse company is valid. and whether the said company had a right to file a bill of interpleader under the circumstances. The evidence shows that Mrs. Har­rison made the contract for the storage of the goods, and the receipt from the warehouse company was issued in her name as the owner of the goods.

''In 27 R. C. L. p. 955, it is said:

'' 'In accordance with the well settled general rule that a bailee is estopped to deny his bailor's title, a warehouseman with whom goods have been deposited is estopped, in the absence of the intervention of a paramount title, from dis­puting the title of the depositor.' Twncil v. Seaton, 28 Gjl'at. (69 Va.) 601, 26 Am. Rep. 380; Dows v. Nat. Ea;oh. Bank, 91 U. S. 618, 23 L. Ed. 214; Yokohama Specie Bank v. Geo. 8. Bush ct Co., 121 Wash. 272, 209 P. 676, 212 P. 583; Blackorby v. Friend, Crosby & Co., 134 Minn. 1, 158 N. W. 708, Ann. Cas.

1918E, 1199; notes, L. R. A. 1918B, 662; 43 A. L. R. 153. 10• •"It is true that the rule that a bailee is estopped

from denying his bailor's title is subject to the excep­tions that the bailee is excused for nondelivery of the prop­erty when he can show that he has surrendered it to the rightful owner, or where the bailee has been dispossessed of the subject-matter of the bailment by legal process, or where he can show he has been authorized to defend the title by the person in whom it is invested, or where the bailor parts with his title during the bailment. But it is said, 'the true ground on which a bailee may set up the .ius tertii is that the estoppel ceases when the bailment on which it is founded is determined by what is equivalent to an eviction by title paramount.' 3 R. C. L. p. 88, §16; pp. 89, 90, §§17, 18, and 19, and cases cited.

''That the case at bar does not com.e within the principle of any exception to the general rule seems obvious. The ware­house company, therefore, cannot shield itself from the con­sequences of the invalid ,sale of the goods on the ground that because the execution creditors of Mrs. Harrison's husband claim a lien thereon she has no interest in the goods, and no right to contest the validity of the sale whereby she has been de-prived of the possession of them. Under its contract with Mrs. Harrison as bailor of the goods, the warehouse company

Vl. W. Crandall v. William W. Woodard, Jr. 7

is estopped from disputing her right to assert her title thereto in these proceedings.'' (at p. 322, 180 S. E.)

The whole subject is thoroughly discussed under the head­ing of Bailments in 8 .Am. Jur. (2d), pages 17 throngs 21, from which we quote :

11* *''§75. General rule.

''It is a well-settled principle that when the bailee receives the property by virtue of the bailment, 'he admits the right of the bailor to make the contract of bailment, and cannot set up a want of title in the bailor as an excuse for his refusal to redeliver the bailment, or, as it is usually stated, he is estopped to deny tha.t his bailor had title to the property at the time of the bailment, and delivery of the property. This principle is legal, as distinguished from equitable, in its nature, and follows logically from a consideration of the con­tract of bailment, which necessarily admits the right of prop­erty in the bailor t:tnd the bailee's obligation to return the article to the bailor at the end of the term of bailment. In other words, a bailee, when he receives the property by virtue of the bailment, legally admits the right of the bailor to make the contract of bailment, and after this subservient relation with respect to the property is established, the law forbids him to dispute the title of the bailor, where the apparent pur­pose is to gain some advantage for himself. While some of the earlier authorities state this rule of estoppel without quali­fications, according to modern authorities the admission by the bailee of the bailor's title is not necessarily to be regarded as conclusive, but is subject to a number of well-defined ex­ceptions, designed to alleviate injustices which developed from a strict application of the early rule. In view of these exceptions, it has been said that it would be a more accurate statement of the modern rule to say that the bailee may not, for his own benefit, deny the title of the bailor or avail himself of the title of a third person, even though that person may be

the true owner. 12* ""''The general rule applies even though the subject

matter of the bailment is property found by the bailor, and the bailee is precluded from denying his bailor's title, • "" .,,

And, in 52 Am. Jur. at pag\/53, it ·is said in reference to Constructive Possession: ,: · ·

g Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

'·'If the plaintiff. in an action of trespass for the taking or injuring of chattels did not have .actual possession. when .the wrong was committed, he must have had constructive pos­session or the action will not lie. The term 'constructive pos­session,' as used in this connection, designates the right of a general owner of a chattel in the possession of another to re~ claim possession of the property at any time, the person ~. possession not being entitled to retain it against the will of the general owner, who is considered as having sufficient pos­session to enable him to maintain an action of trespass for injury· to the chattel.''

And, on page 854:

. '' • * • an interference by the general owner with goods i~ the possession of one who has a special property therein and right of possession thereto is an injury to such possession, and trespass by him who has a special property in goods wil~ lie against him who has the general property. Thus, it is ap­parently well settled th~t a conditional vendee in possession has a sufficient interest in the goods to recover from a third person for damages thereto or destruction thereof, or to maintain trover ~gainst a third party for conversion of the property, and one purchasing from a C<?nditional vendee merely his intere.st in the subject of the. sale has the same right. Conve~sely, a conditional vendor, when the time for payment by the vendee has not elapsed, cannot maintain tres­pass against one taking the subject of the sale from tl1e· pos­session of the vendee.'' ·

13* ··· •Practically the entire evidence of th:e defendants . constituted an attack on plaintiff's title based upon the

ground that he had not consummated his purchase -by the payment of the balance of the purchase price. Plaintiff ob­jected and excepted time and again to the introduction of such testimony upon the ground that the defendants were estopped from denying plaintiff's title. The court overruled plaiJ:ltiff's ol1jections until the conclusion of the case. The views of the court are clearly exnressed in it~ opiniqn on ,pages 232 to 242 of the Transcript. The c'rux of the matter js sta.teil at pages 2iJ8. 239, 241 and 242, from which we quote:

''The possessory right thus acquired1 qual~ed plaintiff, as a ·person ~ntitled ·to hail ·the property. Whether be .did hail it

1at the sale.

W. W. Crandall v. William· W. "\Voodard, Jr. .9

or· not would be a Jury. question in view of the conflict i.iJ. the testimony, and upon this motion it must be, and is assumed that the bailment between plaintiff and the d_efendants was created as plaintiff has testified that it was. The bailment thus created continued so long as plaintiff retained the pos­sessory interest created by his successful auction bid. ··Unless terminated prior to the destruction of the property, plaintiff has the right to go to the Jury upon the question of liability and damages. If at the time of destruction the plaintiff~s pos­sessory interest in the property had been terminated, how.:. ever, the bailment no longer existed, and the defendants' mo­tion to strike must be sustained.'' ( pp. 238, 9)

"It is felt that by communication of November 29, 1961 SBA made a final election to assume complete posses-

14- sion and resell the •property, and that this action was confirmed by Slipek's statement to plaintiff on January

22. It is the Court's opinion that all possessory rights which had previously existed in plaintiff were unequivocally ter­minated as of November 29, 1961, as a matter of law, by af­firmative action of SBA, and that thereafter the plaintiff had no interest in the property upon which could be founded any continuation of the bailment.

''It is not felt that this election which has been made bv SBA was affected by any subsequent negotiations or conve;­sations or communications between the two relating to some plan or subsequent payment which never actually were con­summated or turned out in any way, and since the plaintiff had no interest in the property at the time of its de.struction, he has no actionable claim against the defendants, and the motion to strike plaintiff's evidence must therefore be sus­tained." (at pages 241, 2)

It is respectfully submitted that the Judge was in error in holding that the plaintiff had no interest in the property at the time of its destruction. While the Small Business Ad­ministration had notified the plaintiff of its intention to 'resell the property, it had not been resold at the time it wael de­stroyed. Indeed, the very notice contained the expressed wjll-:-. ingness of the SBA to accept pavment of the balance·. of the. purchase price at any time before the actual sale. 'Under, these circumstances, how can it be contended with any show of reason or law, that the plaintiff was deprived of al~· in~·

terest in ·the property before it was destroyed? 15• •There was no sale by the SBA until after the prop-

erty was destroyed. In the meantime,' before the·· salf:~,

10 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia

the defendants had destroyed the property so completely that the property which the plaintiff bid in at $6,330.00 sold for only $60.00. The evidence shows that the property was actual­ly worth many times more than the amount of plaintiff's bid.

2. The .defense of want of title was not set forth in the gro'ltnds of defense.

The Motion for Judgment alleges that the defendants will­fully and maliciously destroyed the personal property of the plain tiff in question. No pleas 'vere filed on behalf of the defendants. They relied upon a statement of grounds of de­fense provided for in Rule 3:5. The grounds of defense con­stitute nothing more nor less than a general denial of the allegations of. the Motion for Judgment. There is no mention of any defense that the plaintiff lacked ~sufficient title to main­tain the action.

Rule 3 :18 provides, ''Every pleading shall state the facts on which the party relies in numbered paragraphs, and it shall be sufficient if it clearly informs the opposite party ·of the true nature of defense.'' There is nothing in the grounds of defense which informs the plaintiff of the real grounds of

defense which were interposed in this case.

16"" *In Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Osborne, 154 Va. 477, 153 S. E. 865, the Court said, at page 873 of Southeast-

ern:

'' * * *In the instant case the railway company has ·filed its grounds of defense, and is limited in its defenses to the ground there stated. Section 6091, Code 1919, Oeters v. Knights of Honor, 98 Va. 201, 35 S. E. 356; Carolina C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Clinch Valley Lbr. Co., 112 Va. 540, 72 S. E. 116, 117; City Gas Co. v. Poudre, 113 Va. 224, 74 S. E. 158; Duncan v. Carsotlt, 127 Va. 306,103 S. E. 665, 105 S. E. 62; Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, 133 S. E. 781.

''In Carolina., C. <t 0. Ry. Co. v. Clinch Valley Lbr. Co., supra, the court says : 'The defendant pleaded non a.ss'UIInpsit, and filed with its plea a specification of defenses under section 3249 of the Code. As ground of defense it relied on the al­leged agreement between the parties for the minimum car load rates, without regard to the actual weight of the lumber hauled; ·SO that, under the authorities. the defense must be confined to that single issue', i.e., whether such contract was valid and binding- or void as opposed to public policy, as de­clared by the statutes.

W. vV. Crandall v. 'Villiam vV. vVoodard, Jr. 11

"In City of PortsmouJh v. Weiss, 145 Va. 94, at page 111_, 133 S. E. 781, 786, the court says : 'We have repeatedly said that every litigant is entitled to be told by his adversary in plain and explicit language what is his ground of complaint or defense.' ''

The rule on this subject is too well settled to require further citation of authority.

17• *3. Plaintiff had an eq~~itable interest in. the property which the defendants had no right to destroy.

It has been well said that an equitable interest is one having its origin in principles and rules developed by courts of chan­cery, and one which can be sustained or made effective "'here available in a court of equity. Appeal of City of Erie, 46 A. ( 2d) 592, 596.

It has generally been held that a mortgagor's right of re­demption is an equitable interest in the property and, in Parker v. lo'Wa Mutual Tornado lnsurwnce Association, 260 N. W. 844, it was held that this equitable interest constituted an insurable interest in property. vVe do not think any ex­tended citation of authority is required. to ·show that, where one purchases property at a public auction sale and makes a substantial cash payment on the purchase price, 'he has an equitable interest in the property until there is a foreclosure proceeding divesting him of this interest. Without waiving either of the other contentions made in this brief, but insist­ing upon the same, it is respectfully submitted that the plain­tiff had an equitable interest in the property which he pur­chased at the auction sale; t.ha.t, as long as he had the right to pay the purchase price and get the property, he had an equitable interest in it and, that anyone who destroyed this int~rest is liable to him in damages.

•VJ. CONCLUSION.

It is respectfully submitted that the learned trial court erred in striking the evidence and rendering summary judg­ment for the defendants.

For the foregoing reasons, your petitioner prays that an appeal from the judgment complained of ·may be awarded to him.

12 Suprenw Court of Appeals of Virginia

VII. STATEMENTS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.

The name of the appellant is W. W. Crandall, and the name of his attorney is Geo. E. Allen, whose address is 4020 West Broad Street, Richmond, Virginia. The name of the appellees are William W. Woodard, Jr., and Le-Wood Homes, Incor­porated, and the names of their attorneys are Merhige, Byrne, Montgomery & Baber, whose address is 810 Insurance Build­ing, Richmond, Virginia. · This petition is adopted as and in lieu of the opening brief.

Counsel does not desire to state orally the reasons for granting this petition.

A copy of this petition was mailed, postage prepared, to Merhige, Byrne, Montgomery & Baber, 810 Insurance Build.;. ing, Richmond, Virginia~ counsel in the trhil court, on the 23rd day of July, 1964.

This petition will be filed with the Supreme Court of Ap­peals of Virginia at Richmond.

W. W. CRANDALL By GEO. E. ALLEN

(Allen, Allen, Allen a.nd Allen) 4020 West Broad Street Richmond, Virginia, Attorney for the plaintiff.