Reconsidering Sophistic Rhetoric in Light of Skeptical Epistemology

8/13/2019 Reconsidering Sophistic Rhetoric in Light of Skeptical Epistemology

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Reconsidering Sophistic Rhetoric in Light of Skeptical EpistemologyAuthor(s): George L. PullmanSource: Rhetoric Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 50-68Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/465779.

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GEORGEL. PULLMAN Georgia tateUniversity

ReconsideringophisticRhetoric nLightofSkeptical pistemologyThe latest ehabilitationf the sophists, egunby Hegel and carried utwith ncreasing edication uring his centurysee Crowley, nos, Guthrie,

Hunt,Jarratt, erferd, oulakos,De Romilly, chiappa, Untersteiner),asimproved ur understandingf rhetoricalheorynd history. espite, nd insome waysbecauseof,the nebulous uality f what theyhave leftus, thesophistshave become mportant rimarily ecause theypredatePlato andAristotle nd thus would seem to offer t least a fragmentarylimpseofrhetoric rior o its hypostatizationn the classical period.The traditionalthinkings that Platonic and Aristotelian hetoricalheory isciplined hesophists' xtravagantractices,ubstantiatedheir nsubstantiatedlaims, ndtransformedheir ithyrambic,ythic, agical, oetic iscoursento logical,rational theoryof argumentation.n other words, Plato and Aristotletransformedythosnto ogos; thus heywere he fathers frhetoricnsofaras rhetoric as a respectableechno or heproductionfreasonable iscourse.The philosophers ejected ophistic hetoricn the grounds hat t had nophilosophical oundationsromwhich ts principles ouldbe logically erivedand safely aught. hus they et aboutconstructingsound,philosophicallybasedrhetoricy inkingtcarefullyo,whiledividingt ustas carefullyrom,absolute knowledgeepisteme). n both the Platonic and the Aristotelianrhetoricalchemes, pisteme rovides he limits f rhetoric.n the Platoniccase, absoluteknowledges a prerequisiteor the application f rhetoricallore-one must mploy ialecticnthe ervice f absolute rutheforenemayuse rhetoric o disseminate hetruthPhaedrus265-66). In the Aristoteliancase, rhetoricalore mustbe based on the first rinciples fpersuasion, utmustnot be employedwhenknowablemattersre discussed-the closeronegets o fundamentalrinciples,hefurthernegetsfromnthymemes,nd thusthe furtherne getsfrom hetoricn the direction f scientific nowledge(Freese 1359b). If knowledge rovides he limitsfor rhetoricalheoryndpractice, hen,n Platonic nd Aristotelianerms, ithout othknowledgenda theory fknowledge,ystematichetorics impossible. his is why theydismissedophistichetoricnthegroundshatt ha[d]no rational ccount ogiveof thenature f the various hingswhich toffer[ed]Gorgias465) andthat tpresentednot n artbuttheresults f an art Forster 83b).Because50 Rhetoric eview,Vol.13,No. I, Fall 1994

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Reconsideringophistic hetoric 51

the sophists id not profess ither transcendentalr a logicalepistemology,bothPlato and Aristotle eld that hey ossessedno concern orknowledgetall. And thus hey ismissed ophistic hetorics epistemologicallynadequate.Indeed, o underscorehedistinctionhathe wished o drawbetween ophisticpractice nd his owntheory, ristotle sserted hatwhen he arrived n theintellectualcene, there . . already existed much [rhetorical]materialenunciatedn thepast,whereasregardingeasoning we had absolutely oearlierwork o quote Forster 84b5, mphasis dded).Because the Westernintellectualradition as tended o lionizePlato and Aristotlend thepositiveepistemologieshey ostered,he sophistsn general nd sophistic hetoricnparticular ave been muchmaligned,whilePlatoand Aristotle ave largelyremained hefirstndthe astword nlegitimatehetoric.Lately,however, istorians f rhetoric ave returnedo the sophistswithrenewed interest.The displacement f positive epistemology,whetherdialectical r ogical, ynegativendrelativepistemologiesassuggestedhatperhaps lato'sand Aristotle'siewsofknowledgewere so narrow hat heyfailedto graspthephilosophical ignificancef theirpredecessorsnd thattheirfailure ersisted ecauseof thepersistencef positive pistemologies.Equippedwith lternativepistemologiesndalert o thepossibilityhatPlatoand Aristotlemight ave overstatedheir laim to superiorityn the fieldofrhetoric,ontemporaryhetoricianseturned o the sophistic ragmentsnddiscovered hat the sophistshad in factthoughtbout the possibilities fknowledge nd that heir hetorics ere based on whatwe todaywould callrelative nd negative pistemologiesEnos, The Epistemologyf Gorgias'Rhetoric ;Gronbeck;Jarratt; ayne). Thus they arguedthat the sophistsdeserve prominentlace nthehistoryfrhetoric,ot s theoriginatorsf aprotorhetoric,n inferiormodel of whichphilosophical hetoricwas theperfection,ut s providersf an alternativehetoric,nethatwas a plausibleresult f careful houghtboutthepossibilitiesfknowledgen the realmofhuman xistence.While completelygreethat hesophists eserve primary lace in thecanon and while I agree that Westernphilosophyn the PlatonicandAristotelian raditions as done as much to obscure rhetoric s it has toilluminate t, the triumph f positive epistemologies annot be solelyresponsible or the eclipse of sophisticrhetoric. he second-centuryEPyrrhoneankeptic extusEmpiricuswas a relativistnd a nihilistndyetheopenlyeschewedrhetoric,which means that the negativeand relativeepistemologieshatwethinkf as integralosophistichetorican also lead toan antirhetoric.his suggestshat herelationshipetweenpistemologyndrhetorichat Plato and Aristotlemade so muchof, and thatwe too haveemphasizednourreclamationfthe ophists, eedsreconsidering.



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52 Rhetoric eview

In this ssay willusethefragmentsf Protagorasnd Gorgias, s well ascurrent rguments ased on thesefragments,o show how sophistic hetoriccan be, and has been,understoods a plausible esult f relative nd nihilisticattitudesoward hepossibilityf knowledge.willthen roviden overview fSextusEmpiricus's yrrhoneanr practical kepticismo showhow t clearlyresembles ophismn its attitudesoward nowledge ut ustas clearly ejectsrhetoric. will also provide cursory verview f theopinions ssociatedwithPyrrho f Elis (360-270 BCE), the man whose namehas come to signifypractical kepticism.will do thisprimarilyo suggest hat mpiricuswas nota roguephilosopher ut an exemplar f an antirhetoricalraditionhat, ikesophism, egan nAncient reece.While nhistoricalverviewf the ife ndtimes of Sextus Empiricuswould help illuminatehis attitudes owardknowledgend rhetoric,he details of his life are entirely bsentfrom urhistorical ecord, nd thedetails fhisperiodwouldunnecessarilyroaden hescopeofthe rgumentwish o make t thispoint.What haveto offer ere snot a full-scale istory ut rather pair of sketches, ne sophistic nd onePyrrhonean, hich ogetheruggest hatrelative nd negative pistemologiesare notnecessarilyundamentalosophistichetoric.Sophism ndRhetoricDefining ophistic hetorics a complicatedask.The phrase he ophistsdoes notrefero a group fclosely lliedthinkers,ordoessophism efer oadistinctchoolofthought.hemen o whomwe most ypicallylludewhenweuse thephrase he ophists-ProtagorasfAbdera,HippiasofElis, Gorgias fLeontini, nd Prodicus fCeos-actually have little n common xcept hatthey ll charged eesforpublic ectures; heywere ll usedbyPlato and to amuch esserextent yAristotles foilsforphilosophy; nd they hared hesame political space in that they were active during the politicaltransformationsromligarchico democraticule hatmany ftheGreek ity-states nderwentn the fifth-centuryCE. Whatthesefigures ctually aughtand believedwe can only urmise rom ragmentaryvidence,much f whichwas indirectlyeported.SextusEmpiricuss one ofour nformants.) e canalso reconstructheir pinions nd attitudes rom he Platonicdialogues nwhich hey igure,utthis s a potentiallyangerous ractice,ikecalling heplaintiffs a character itness or hedefendant.o, in a very ealsense, hesophists efersmore o a contemporaryntellectualonstructionhan tdoes toa known istoricalntitySchiappa, Oasis orMirage ).To make mattersven moreobscure, he sophists uite possiblynevertaughthetoric.f t s true, s Schiappahas argued ProtagorasndLogos40-49), that latocreatedheword hetoricnorder odenigrate hat he ophistsactually id teach, henpolitikos ogos might e a betterwayofreferringo



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what Protagoras,Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodicus taught. Nevertheless,contemporaryhetoriciansave constructedut of the fragmentsttributedoProtagorasnd Gorgias n particularn understandingf rhetorichat an becalled sophistic hetoric. hus, as withthephrasethesophists, he phrasesophistic hetorics at least as much contemporaryntellectualonstructionas it is an historical ntity, espite hefact hatProtagoras nd Gorgiasnodoubt aughtomethinghatwe wouldnothesitate o call rhetoric, erewe ableto witnessheir eaching,lthoughwewouldbe thefirst o admit hat t was avery ifferentind frhetoricrom hat romotedyPlato nd Aristotle.Despite lacunae in the historical ecord nd the difficultynherent nisolating n apparentlyistinctntellectualradition rom ts more nfluentialand pervasive uccessors,t is possibleto make somegeneralobservationsabout ophistichetoric.ophistic hetorics a nonrationalrocess fdiscourse(Enos, Greek Rhetoric eforeAristotle 5). It seeksnot the truth ut theimpositionfthe rhetor's pinion n the minds fthe audiencebymeansofdeception, r else it seeks an intrasubjectiveonsensusbased on a sociallyconstructedealityhat hanges easelessly. he primaryoncepts fsophisticrhetoric re perhapskairos, or timing, nd to prepon, or appropriateness(Carter;Poulakos; Scenters-Zapico 62). Neither f these concepts an betaught: oucan tellsomeone hat ertain opics re appropriateor funeraloration, utyou cannot each omeonehow to seize theday,especiallyftheday nquestion ppears obe ustanother ay n theplaceofassembly. hussophistic hetoricalractice annotbe reduced o first rincipleshat nyonecan learnby memorizing rulebook there rethree indsof soul and threekinds f speech ppropriateor achkind f soul, o paraphrase oth lato ndAristotleimultaneously).ne can learn ophisticrhetoricnlyby practicingandobservingthers ractice. hereare sometechniqueshatwe knowwereoffered: orgias s said to have suggestedhatone combat eriousnesswithlaughter nd laughter ith eriousnessFreese 1419b3); Protagorasdvisesusthat here realways wosidesto anycase (Hicks 2.9.51). The sophistsmayhave offered great ealmorepracticaldvice,butwe lackpositivevidence.Nevertheless,e can surmise hat ophistichetorics based on thebelief hatlanguage s flexible nd that ealitys either nknowable rknowable nly nhumanterms, hese terms eing culturally ependent. here is no absolutecriterion,ivine r human,withwhich o measure ny aspectofreality; hustheres no certaintyeyond hecertaintyhat he world s known ifferentlyfrom lace to place.As the nonymousuthor ftheDissoi Logoihas it, TheMassagetes utuptheir arentsnd eatthem,ndthey hink hat obeburiedin their hildrens themost eautifulrave maginable,ut nGreece fanyonedid such a thing, e would be driven utof thecountrynd woulddie anignominious eathforhaving ommitteduch disgracefulnd terribleeeds(Sprague,Dissoi Logoi 2.14). Sophisticrhetoric s performanceentered,



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54 Rhetoriceview

relativistic,nd antifoundational.t is also democratic,r at least t might eseen as interwoven ith he fabric fdemocracyn that the success of theSophistswas linked n every espectwith hesurgeofAthenian emocracy(Lloyd 25-26).When Plato and Aristotle omplainedthat the sophists offerednosystematic ccount of their rhetorical ractice, he philosophers ailed tomention hat a performance-centeredratherthan principle-centeredndthereforeystematic)hetoric as consistent iththe primary eliefs f itsoriginators. rotagorass said to have offered ne of the firstrecordedagnosticisms:Concerninghegods, cannot now itherhat heyxist r thatthey o notexist;for heres much opreventne'sknowing; heobscurityfthesubject nd the shortness fman's ife Sprague,ProtagorasB4). Thisclaimneither sserts ordenies he xistence fgodsbut uggestsnstead hatan absolute nsweras regardsdivinitys humanly mpossible. ecause hebelieved umanityasincapable fknowing hetherr not herewas a divineplan to existence, t would make sense that Protagoraswould offer nalternativexplanation orhow theworldwas constructednd whatrulesorprocedures hould governhuman existence see Schiappa,Protagoras ndLogos 143-48).

Protagoras'smost famous saying s Of everythingnd anything hemeasure s [trulys] humanity:f thatwhich s, that t s the ase; ofthatwhichis not, hat t is not thecase. (Schiappa's ranslation,rotagoras nd Logos121).Thisfragments obviouslymbiguous nd therefore idelynterpretable.The Greekwordmetron, hich s here translated s measure,may also betranslateds criterionnd suggestsomemeans, nstrumentalrmethodical,for describing n object. In this case metron uggests ome means fordetermininghat hingsxist ndwhat hings o not xist.Themajor roblemof interpretationingeson whetherman is to be takenas individual r asspecies Guthrie 188). The peoplewhohave interpreted anas individualhavetended odismiss rotagorass a solipsistGuthrie, esky nd, accordingto Guthrie, veryonewith common ense n189). The people who haveinterpretedan s humanityGuthrie oints oZeller nd Gomperz 188) havetended o champion rotagorass the first erson o placehumanityt thecenter f theknowable niverse. ne semialternativenterpretation,ttributedbyGuthrie o Untersteinermong thers,s thatwhenProtagorasaid man sthemeasure, e was thinkingf the individual, ut the distinction asprobablyotpresento hismind Guthrie 189). Regardlessf which fthesethree xplicationsne findsmost onvincing,ll three uggesthat rotagorasbelievedhumanity whether ollectively r individually) eterminedhecontentsfrealityor tself.Protagorass also said tohaveargued haton everyssue there re twoarguments pposedto each other Sprague B6a). This couldmean nothing



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more han hatwhenever ouhavetwoopposing rguments,ouhave an issue,or thatyou an make n issueofsomethingyfindingwo onflictingpinionswithin n apparentlynified pinion.t couldalso be a normativerescriptionto make n issue out of any singular pinion an antifoundationalrinciple,fsuch a thing s possible).Gorgias eemsto assert hat ucha prescriptionsviablewhenhe announces t thebeginning f his Encomium f Helenthat Ishall refute hosewho rebukeHelen,a woman boutwhom here s univocaland unanimous estimonymong hosewho have believed hepoets ndwhoseill-omenedname has becomea memorial f disasters Kennedy284.2).However, y arguing hat here re alwaystwo sides to an issue, Protagorasseems oargue gainst hepossibilityfsingular ruths,r at leastto advocateantitheticaleasoning, hich ould ead to thekindof relativismxemplifiedby heDissoi Logoi. fone were o prescribehat eople lways ppose quallyvalid antitheticalpinions, ne would be encouraging eople to underminetheir aith n received pinions:god exists;god doesn't xist. f antithesissunderstoods a process hat oes notresolve ifferentpinions ut implyaysthem ut ideby ide,Protagorasouldeasilybe accusedofpromotingboulia,a psychologicaltate nwhich t is impossibleo makedecisions,nd thusofcorruptinghe youth.That Protagoras's nderstandingf antithesised toradicaland unresolvable elativisms suggested y thosewho argue thathebelieved all sense mpressionsnd opinions re true ndthat ruths a relativething Bury,Against heLogicians1.60).But De Romilly as argued hatProtagoras nderstoodntithesiss theagonistic ispute f forensic hetoric. wo viewsare set outsidebyside, thestrong rguments ith the weak on bothsides, and thenthrough arefuldisputationoncerningll the vidence vailable t the ime hedecision astobemade, hesuperiorityf one argument illbecome pparent. ccordingothis nterpretation,ntithesiseads to euboulia,the verykeyto theartofmaking ood decisions Lloyd 85). Whatwe getout of sucha rhetorics ahuman ecision, erhaps n all-too-humanecision, ut hat s all we'vegottogo on.Moreover,ecauseboth ideshave been taken nto ccount ndall theevidence quallyweighed,t eastwehaveprovided fairhearing.f weacceptthe latterview, and underscore rotagoras's elief that no criterion anguarantee hat the bestopinionwill always win, thenwe can arguethatProtagoras aught n ethically ound (from relativist osition)decision-making rocess.Gorgiasseems to have agreedthat therewas no absolute riterionfjudgment,uthis viewofknowledgemoves romgnosticismnd relativismonihilism, hichmakes tevenmore isturbingo thosewhobelieve nabsolutetruthr universal eason.nthefragmenteportedySextus mpiricus, n theNonexistentr on Nature,Gorgias rguesthreepoints.Nothing xists; f itcouldexist,wecouldnotknow t;andeven f wecouldknow,twecouldnot



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56 Rhetoriceview

communicatet.This piecehas been nterpreteds nothingmore han joke ora parody f seriousphilosophyGuthrie 93), as a reductio d absurdum fEleatic ogic 194), andas serious ontributiono philosophyKerferd).t hasalso beenusedto construct viewofknowledge romwhich very owerful,perhaps frighteninglyowerful,hetoric erives. he last two points f thethree rekey.As Enos saysofthe second: for thing o be comprehendedtmustbe understoodhrough he humanmedia of understanding;.e., sense-perceptions?77-78). Man's finite ense imitations,owever, estrict im toperceptionsasedupon optimum apacity f his senses, nd in thisrespectthoughts eyond ositivisticxperience ave no referentialxistence eyondthe maginativextrapolationsfthethinker?78-79) The EpistemologyfGorgias'Rhetoric 7). For Gorgias, s for thersfhis time, enseperceptionsoffer uronly vidence bout heworld,ndanyunderstandinge derive romthems two teps emovedromhe ctualworld thing, erception,ord).Letussay,for xample, ou ee a roundish,range, irm,weet-smellinghing ndyoutaste t.Atfirstt is bitter,ut t getsbetter. ou can call thisthing norange nd use theword range, ut heword snot he hing. his eads to thethird oint,which s thatknowledges incommunicable.o matter ow wellyou describeyourorange,no matter ow precise yourvocabulary r howhungry our udience, ourwords emain nlywords.Cece nest pas unepipe,as Magritte howed s and Foucault eminded s. As Sextus eported orgiassaid, Forthatbywhichwe reveal s logos,but ogos is not substancesndexisting hings. herefore edo not eveal xisting hingso ourneighbors,utlogos,which s somethingther hansubstances Sprague,Gorgias B3.83).We do notcometoknowreality hroughanguage. anguage,n fact, reatesan llusion hatwemay ake rmistake or eality.Wecansensereality,utwecanonly alk boutwhatwe sense.Knowledgeftheworld oes not xist, venthoughwe live n a sensibleworld. or all we know ndcan express, othingexists.With hisnihilisticpistemologynmind,heEncomiumfHelen seems otellus whatGorgian hetorics. The argumentfthispiece s thatwe shoulddefendHelen,orat least someone hould, ecauseno one has. The defensesbasically hat ny explanationne couldoffer orher actions bsolvesherofblame. fshe wasfated oleave,then hefault estswith hegods. fshewasabducted,hen he blame s her abductor's.f she left or ove,she cannot eblamed, or ove s a diseaseof human rigin nd an ignorancef the soulthat shouldnot be blamed as a mistake, ut regarded s a misfortune(Kennedy 88.19). Ifshewaspersuadedoleave, till he s not oblame. t isthisargument,f course,whichrhetoricians ake so muchof. Howmanyspeakersnhowmany ubjects avepersuadedthers nd continue opersuadeby molding falsespeech? feveryone,n every ubject, admemoryf thepast ndknowledgefthepresentndforesightfthefuture,peechwouldnot



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do what t does; but s thingsre, t s easyneithero rememberhepastnor oconsider hepresent or to predict hefuture;o that n most ubjectsmostpeopletakeopinion s counselor o the soul.Butopinion, eing lipperyndinsecure, aststhose elyingn it nto lipperyndinsecure ortune286.1 ).In theabsenceofknowledge, e are guidedby opinion nd therefore,Thepower of speechhas the same effect n the condition f the soul as theapplicationfdrugspharmaka]o the tate fbodies, orustas differentrugsdispelldifferentluids romhebody, nd somebring nd end todisease butothers nd life, o also somespeeches ause pain,somepleasure, omefear;some instill ourage, omedrugand bewitch he soul with a kind of evilpersuasion 287.14). Thus it is the persuaderwho does wrong,not thepersuaded. rom hispassagepeoplehaveconcluded hatGorgias's hetoricsbased on deception,or ll whopersuade o so by molding false rgument,and rhetoric s as powerfuls a drug. f one is willingto be a Gorgianrhetorician,hen, ne s willing o use this ower f deception.We can sanitize hisviewofrhetoric y goingback to On theNonexistentand arguing hatgiventhisepistemology,rhetoricfdeceitfulower s allthatanyone has. The divine truth f Plato and the probable pinionsofAristotle re mere llusions. To Gorgias,rhetorical eception s necessaryepistemologicallyGronbeck 5). Therefore,thepower f speechwas itselfamoraland dependedupontheethicsof the user (Enos, EpistemologyfGorgias'Rhetoric 9). The difficultyormanywho follownPlato'sfootstepsis that pparently orgiasdid notteachvirtue,ndifwe takePlato'sword orit, he did not especially ee the need to, unlesshe was presentedwithaparticularlygnorant tudentGorgias 460a). So this sophistic hetoric sstrictlyrhetoricfpower, ut t s not hereforethically orruptccordingoitsownways fthinking.ecausetruths unavailable,here s noway o udgeaccurately etween onflictingpinions.One couldtry o deludepeople ntothinkinghatone has found n accuratemeans of udgment,s Plato andAristotle id, or one could takeon the world ne issue at a time ndmake apowerful ame foroneself, mass wealth, dmirers, restige nd power,surround neselfwith hefinesthings, iscoursewith he finest eople, ndleave toposteritygolden tatue foneself.While ll ofthe ophists pparentlylived lives of material uxury,Gorgias was apparently he first o presentposterityith gilded mageofhimself sogreatwas theprofitromeachingthe rt foratory Sprague,GorgiasA7) .If this econstructionfsophisticeliefs boutknowledges plausible,henwe can answer hecharges ought yPlato andAristotle.fsophistic hetorichad offered rational ccount f tspractice,tmight ave sounded omethinglike this:Becausewe cannotdecide whetherr notthe godsexist,we mustjudge for ourselveswhenever pinionsconflict. ut becauseknowledgesalwaysrelatively etermined,ronlydeceptivelyrue, here s no universally



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58 Rhetoric eview

acceptedhuman criterion y which to judge between onflictingpinions.Things in themselves re unknowable nd any claim to knowledge s anarrogantie. Thus sophistic hetorics theonly peacefulway we can makedecisions nd persuade ther eoplewithout aving o pretendhatwe knowabsolutelywhereofwe speak.This rhetoricmay be a balancing, ntitheticalreasoning romwhich elatively ood decisionsmaybe made,or it maybe akind of mood-alteringrug. A personcould take this drug nnocentlyndbecome n instrumentf the rhetor's ill. Or a person ould take thisdrugwillingly, ware that the rhetor s manipulatingmotions y constructingpowerfulictions,ut ontentobemoved ytherhetor'skillbecause here reno rationaltruths, nly compelling ictions. ophisticrhetoric s alwayschanging ecause circumstancesre alwayschanging.t cannotbe fully ndcompletelynalyzed; hereforetcannot e rule-based.So, orso itwould eem,Plato ndAristotle erewrongo a certain xtent.While t s apparenthat ophistichetoric as notrational,t was not hereforeirrational. he sophists houghtbout knowledge, oncluded hat t did notexist n anyabsolute orm,nd constructedheir hetoricsccordingly.ftheydid notoffer rational ccount f their ractices,hat s becausefromwithintheir elative nd nihilistic nderstandingsf humanknowledge, ationalitywas a lie. Moreover, espitewhatPlato wouldhave had us believe, ophisticrhetoric asethicallyound. f the ruthfanyparticular atter ereknown revenknowable,hen nless herhetor new hetruthndwaspreparedo actcorrectlyn accordancewith hetruth,ophistic hetoric ould be unethical.But neither rotagorasorGorgiasbelieved hat ruth ashumanly vailable,and thus theywere not advocating omething nethicalfromtheirownperspectives.ftheres no absolute ruthywhich oalways udge accuratelybetween ompeting pinions, hen what else can a peacefulpersondo butmasterhepower f anguagendgoafter hatevereemsbest t a given ime?Skepticismnd Antirhetoric

The pointsof contact etween ophism nd skepticism re remarkablynumerous. he phrasethe skeptics, ike the phrasethe sophists, s a broadgeneralization.Much of the earliestmaterial ssociatedwith the skepticaltradition xistsonlyas hearsay nd fragmentaryvidence.The manwhosenamehas become ynonymousith racticalkepticism,yrrhofElis (c. 360-270 BCE), left o writtenecords. iogenesLaertius laimsthat yrrho eganadult ife as a painter utsoonabandoned isualrepresentationn searchofphilosophical epresentation.e traveled nd studied xtensively;e evenforgatheredith he ndianGymnsophistsnd with heMagi (Hicks 2.9.61).This mayor maynotbe true Laertius s notorious ornot etting istoricalveracitynterfereith good anecdote), utthere re elementsoPyrrhonean



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skepticismhat remore ypicallyastern hanWestern. yrrhoelieved thatthere s nothing eallyexistent, ut custom nd convention overnhumanaction; ornosingle hingn tselfs anymorehis han hat Hicks2.9.61). Healso distrusted ense perceptions. s a result of his attitude owardthepossibilityfeither eterminingrperceivinghe ctualnature fthings, e issaidto havepracticed steadyndifferenceo theworld round im.Unlike hesophists e ived simple,scetic ife.Tradition as tthat isbelief thathereisnothing eally xistent ausedhim o doubt verythingo thoroughlyhat ewanderedhe treetsndifferento physical arm, isfollowers aving iterallytofollow im round, ulling imoutofharm'sway Hicks2.9.62).But this sprobably othingmorethan an amplificationasedon misunderstanding.fDiogenesLaertius s right, ractical kepticismdmits the pparent acts flife Hicks 2.9.103) but suspendsudgment boutthe actualnature f thosefacts ecausecertaintybout hems impossible. aertius sserted hatPyrrhosuspendedudgment only n cases where t is a question f arrivingt thetruth, ut not n matters f life Hicks 2.9.109). This suggests hatPyrrho'sdoubtswere pistemologicalather hanpractical. ndeed, t s highly nlikelythatPyrrho'suspensionf udgmentould haveproduced ompletenactionbecausehewasconsiderednunparalleledpeakerndwas so greatlydmiredand respected yhis native ity hattheymadehima high priest Hicks2.9.63).Thustheridicule hat yrrhondthekind fskepticismhat earshisnamehas suffereds unfair,s unfairs the idiculehat he ophists uffered.The most ompletendextensive orkwe have onpracticalrPyrrhoneanskepticism as writtenn the second enturyE bySextusEmpiricus. romthisworkwe candevelop slightlymoredetailed ketch fwhatPyrrhoneanskepticismas tosayabout hepossibilitiesfknowledgendrhetoric.extusEmpiricus efineskepticisms an ability r mental ttitude, hich pposesappearanceso udgmentsnanywaywhatsoever,ith heresulthat, wing othe quipollence ftheobjects nd reasons hus pposed,wearebroughtirstlyto a state of mental uspense nd next to a state of 'unperturbedness'rquietude Bury,Outlines .4.8-9).Notethat mpiricus efers oskepticismsan ability r mental ttitudeather han s a theory.racticalkepticisms notso much schoolofthoughts it s a process fthinkingesigned o eadto aparticular ayof iving.t s importantokeep nmind hefact hat mpiricusis outliningn ability ather han a theory ecause if one interprets hatEmpiricuswrote rom philosophical erspective,ccording o the rules ofnoncontradictionnd carefulategorization,racticalkepticism,ikesophism,appearsfoolish t worst, izarre t best. t is also importantokeep n mindthatpractical kepticisms criticalrather hanconstructiveHicks 2.9.74;Stough 35). Outlines of Pyrrhonism, gainst the Logicians, and Against theProfessorsre dedicated oovercomingcceptedwaysofreaching onclusionsaboutthe world.Relativismnd a persistentefutationfpositive ssertions,



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nihilism,reused to destroy hilosophy,ut,havingpromoted elativismnddenied hepossibilityfany riterionftruth,mpiricus oesnotoffero buildanythingnphilosophy'sow vacant pace.Nordoeshe construct rhetoricrofferdvice abouthow to argue. n fact,he argues nAgainst he Professors(Book 2) that rhetoric oes not exist. It is interestingo note that n hisrefutationf themain doctrines f Rhetoric, mpiricus evermentions nysophists 2.113). WhileEmpiricus vails himself fsophistic ttitudesowardknowledgen order o overthrowheepistemologyhatwe suspect verthrewsophistic hetoric,mpiricus oes not ndup affirmingsophistichetoric.nfact, e rejects llrhetoric.

According o Empiricus,Themainbasic principle f the keptic ystemsthat f opposing o every ropositionn equal proposition Outlines1.6.12).Thus, antithesiss a primarymeans by whichone opposes ppearances ojudgments. ppearancesmeanssensory erceptions-theight, mell, aste,and feel fanorange, or xample.Judgmentsre nferencesrom erceptions:statementsbout the natureof things-orangeness. mpiricus's kepticismdenies hepossibilityfcertainudgmentsnd eavesappearancesntact s theonly means bywhichhumanityan function ith ntegrity.ecause he wasadvocating practiceor an attitude ather han a theory f knowledge,Empiricusdid not offerfundamentalropositions.nstead, following heskeptical radition,e offered set of antithetical orms alled modesofperplexity Hicks 2.9.88) or tropes Outlines 1.14.36-163).These modeswere ntendedodisprovehepossibilityfpositive nowledgebout heworld.In all there re fifteen odesdividednto negroup f ten nda group f fivewhichEmpiricus ayscome from the aterSceptics Outlines1.15.164-77).Below is a paraphrasefthetenmodesor tropes ssociated pecifically ithPyrrhoneankepticism,hich offers a sample.

1. Sense impressionsre unreliable ecausewhat causes oneanimalpain is pleasant o another. uails live on theveryhemlockhat illsmen.Moreover,ome nimals erceiveheworldvia one dominant ense while othersrely almostentirelyna differentense.Hawks ee theworldwhiledogssmell t. Because no one receives he same mpressions,heonlyproper esponseo sensedatum s tosuspendudgment.2. No twopeopleperceiveheworld like.What shotfor omeis cold for thers. omearealways hirstyhen thers ouldwalkformiles n the sun without ater. The samewaysoflife are injurious o one man butbeneficialo another, sDiogenesLaertius ays Hicks 9.2.81). Thus udgmentmustbe suspended.



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3. All objectsof senseperception re differentepending nwhat ense s employed. banana does not taste he way tlooks. Thus what appears s no more this than that ougallon).4. Because appearances are contextuallyperceived, noperceptions reliable. or every ssertion , notP is readilyavailable.5. Customsnd awsareculturallyelative.What s beautifulosome is disgustingo others. In buryingheirdead, theEgyptiansembalm them; the Romans bum them; thePaeonians hrowhemnto akes.As towhat s true, hen,etsuspension f udgment e ourpractice Hicks9.2.83).6. Nothing s pure n and of tself; ll things artake f others.Thereare no essential ualities.A stone hat akes wo mento lifton land one man can lift n water.Therefore ofinherentropertiese knownothing Hicks9.2.88).7. Perspectivereates isual llusions, utno singleperspectiveoffers hecorrect imensions fan object.The sun s largerupon rising nd setting hanat noon. Because we cannotobserveobjects acontextually, e cannotknowtheirtruenature.8. Similarly,the qualities and quantitiesof things varycontextually.mall amounts f a drug maybe beneficial,large uantitiesoxic.Thusdrugs rebeneficialoxins.9. Things restrange nlywhen heyre rare.Themost izarreevents ecomenormalwith epetition.10. Andfinally,elative ttributesre also perspectival. hat son the efts not eft ynature utbyvirtuef someoptionalreferenceoint. Allthings re relativeoour mind. Hicks9.2.88)

These modes are clearly uspectfrom logical pointof view.Just sGorgiaswas ridiculed or rguinghatnothing xisted,ustas Protagoras asaccusedofsolipsism,ndtheanonymousuthor f theDissoi Logoi could beaccused f ncoherence,o Empiricus'smodes ouldbe ridiculed s illogical, snothingmore han ophisticalefutations.utto criticize hemodes s illogicalis to miss the point.The modes are no more illogical than a koan isunanswerable. ust s a koan is a technique hatopenlymasquerades s aquestion, o themodesare actually xioms thatmasquerade s propositions.Theyare notdesigned o be tested utrather o frustratehevery ctivityftesting,ustas a koan s notmeant o be answered ut o frustratehe endencytoanswer uestions. hemodes fperplexityredesigned o eadpeople way



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62 Rhetoric eview

from pistemologicaludgments,wayfrom hevain earch or ssences, ndtoconcentratenstead n theappearances f things. hemodes re not the onlyaporetic techniques employed by practical skepticism. n Outlines ofPyrrhonismndAgainst heLogicians, mpiricus ttemptedo demolish ll ofphilosophy's ethodsfproofdefinition,ivision,ollection,igns, ausation,probability, otion, ddition, ubtraction,tc.) and even thevery ossibilityfabsoluteproof s an abstract rinciple, aying ultimatelyhat proof s arelative hing,nd relativesre conceived nly nddo notreally xist AgainsttheProfessors.453).Because therewasnoabsolute, onrelativeriterion ithwhich o measure ruth, ecausetherewas no reasonableway to establish hesuperiorityne opinion ver nother,mpiricus elieved hat ne must uspendjudgment.Wheneverny vidences offereds tothenature ressence f something, he practical keptic s readywith refutationhat s designed o leadbacktoaporiaand thus o the uspensionf udgment.While omeone ngagedin argumentations we tendto practicet will refute xisting rgumentsnorder ocreate n aporiaso thathe or shemayredirectheargumentjust asone mustbring moving bjectto rest beforepushing t in the oppositedirection), mpiricuswould bring n argumento restand then resist nyattemptoset t n motiongain.

Because practical kepticisms basedon antithesis,t closelyresemblessophism. he modes fperplexity ertainlyemind ne of theDissoi Logoiand seemtoleadtonihilismndrelativism. he connectionetween racticalskepticismnd sophism s underscored y Empiricuswhen he recountsProtagoras'sman-measurerguments a refutationf the possibilityf anonrelativeruthriterion:Seeingthatno impressions received partfromcircumstances,achman must e trustedegardinghose eceived n his owncircumstancesAgainst heLogicians1.63), and,becausenocircumstanceanbe udged superior,he unatic ndthedreamerre no betterudgesofrealitythan hesaneandtheconscious1.60-63).Empiricuslso addsGorgias o thelist fthosewho abolish he riterion, rovidinghe ummaryf Concerningthe Non-Existentr on Nature fromwhichcontemporaryrgumentsboutGorgias's pistemologynd rhetoricre derivedAgainst heLogicians1.65-87). BecauseEmpiricus ever ctuallysserts is ownopinions, xceptn sucha waythat they re virtuallyanceledbythemselves Outlines1.7.15),wecannot e certain hathe alignshimselfwithProtagorasndGorgias, utwecan infer hathe does. At the end ofthesection n whichhe recounts heopinions f thosewhoabolishthecriterion,e quotesMetrodoruss saying,Weknownothing,ordowe evenknow hevery act hatweknownothing(Against heLogicians 1.88).Thisphrase s echoed ndamplifiedn Outlines(1.23.197),which s theclosest hingwegetto a positive ssertion egardingtheopinions hat mpiricusndorsed. o it seemsthatEmpiricus greedwith



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Protagoras nd Gorgias that therewas no absolute criterion or udgingstatementsoncerninghenature r essence fthings.But practicalskepticism id not quite abolish all criterion. aertiusannouncesthat the apparent s the Skeptic'scriterion Hicks 2.9.107).Empiricus oncurs: Wedonotoverthrowffectiveense-impressions....Ourdoubt does not concern the appearance,but the account given of theappearance Outlines .10.19-20).notherwords, mpiricus idnotdeny hatreality ppeared o exist;he only efutedny ttemptoaccount or ealitynaparticular ay.Empiricusbserved,Honeyppears o us to be sweetandthiswe grant, orwe perceiveweetness hroughhe senses), utwhethert s alsosweetnessence s for s a matter f doubt, incethis s not n appearance uta judgmentregarding he appearance Outlines 1.10. 9-20). As far asEmpiricuswas concerned, eonlyperceivehings;wedo notknow hem,ndgiven he ack of agreementmong eople oncerninghe ppearance fthings,evenappearancesmust e considered elative. Westatewhat ppears o us,he said, and do notmakeany positive eclarations s to the real nature fexternal bjects Outlines .28.208).Critics fpractical kepticismsserted hat uchpervasive oubt eads toindifferencer ntellectualaralysis, ence he tories fPyrrho andering r.Magoo-likenand outofharm'sway;but he riticschieved his onclusion yassuming hat ne must redicateational ecisions ncertain ralmost ertainpropositionsrgrounds. mpiricus,n theotherhand,claimedthat kepticsachieved state ftranquillityalledataraxia, hroughherealizationhat nooneoftheconflictingudgments akesprecedencefanyother s beingmoreprobable Outlines1.4.10-13).Just s philosophersry o gain quietude ymeans of a decisionregardinghedisparityf theobjectsof sense and ofthought Outlines .12.29), o do skeptics,s far s Empiricus as concerned.Butrather han chieving decision ydogmaticallyssertinghat neopinionregardingn object ra thoughts true r even truer han nother, he kepticsimply uspendsudgment, and we found hatquietude, s if by chance,followed Outlines1.12.29).Rather hanbeingperturbedythe houghthathe could neither enynorconfirmnystatement,mpiricus sed thefact hathe couldnotknow ositivelyrnegativelys a wayofachieving equipollenceor tranquillity.f Empiricusmaintained ither he transcendental,latoniccriterion,rtherealist riterion,utwereunable o discoverertainruth,henhe wouldbeparalyzed. yabandoninghe riterionfabsolute ruth,owever,he was free o actin theabsenceofabsolute nowledge. hus he couldrefuteany bsolute laim s to the xistencefgodswhile t the ame time ffirmingundogmaticallyhatGodsexist Outlines .3.1-12).Thegoalof thepracticalskeptic,s far s Empiricuswas concerned, as not naction utuncertainty.Once one had discovered hat ne can never ct with omplete ssurance fbeing right, ne is free o act and more ikely o act prudently.t is worth



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rememberinghat Empiricuswas a physician nd Herodotus's uccessor sHead of the School Outlines li). If he was paralyzed y doubts, e wouldnot ikely ave risen o thisrank,ust as Pyrrho imself ouldnot ikely avebeen a high riest.So even thisquickcomparison f sophism nd Pyrrhoneankepticismreveals hat hetwomovements,orneither an be calleda schoolof thought,have much n common. he proponentsf both ed socially ignificantives.They practiced ntithetical easoning nd arguedthat because truths rerelative,here s no absolutewayofdetermininghat ne opinion s superior oits opposite.They argued hatwe have no absoluteknowledge f things n

themselvesnd, herefore,hat s far s we know, othing xists part rom urunderstandingfit. Theybelieved hat he existence f gods can be neitherabsolutelyffirmedordenied. hey rgued hat uman onventionather handivinerule governs uman xistence.And theybothoffered ractices atherthan theories, lthoughboth also clearly displayedattitudes owardtheimpossibilityf knowledge. hus it seems fairly ikely that sophismandskepticismhare nepistemologicalerspective,r at east hat heynswer hesamequestionsnsimilarways.ButwhilebothPyrrhond Empiricus ppear ohave agreedwith he ophistshat o absolute riterionf udgment xists, heyemphaticallyejectedhetoric.Pyrrhoneankepticismuggestshat nykind frhetorichould e deeplydistrusted ecauseit can deludepeople intoacceptingmere mpressionssundeniable ruths:We must ot ssume hatwhat onvinces s is actuallyrue.For the same thingdoes not convince very ne,nor even thesame peoplealways.Persuasivenessometimesepends n external ircumstances,n thereputationf the speaker, n his ability s a thinker,rhis artfulness,n thefamiliarityr thepleasantnessf thetopic Hicks2.9.94).Thusanyone oundusingrhetorichould e closely uestioned,nyrhetoricalrgumenthouldbeclosely ead nd tscogencyarefullyefuted,hile veryonehould e alertedto the subtlemeansbywhichpersonal mpressionsre presenteds naturalfacts r undeniable ruths.t s worthememberingnthis ontext hat ratylus(the Heracletianswere in many ways forerunnersf skepticism), avingdiscovered he impossibilityf speakingthe truth, bandoned anguagealtogether.mpiricus, oo,rejectedexternaleason, rspeech ecause t wasa hindranceothe cquisitionfvirtue Outlines .14.73).In thesecondbookofAgainst heProfessors,mpiricus efuteshetoricdirectly.AgainstheRhetoricianss as splendido readas it s unconvincing,and there s a passagetoward heend worth uoting t length ecause t isexemplarynform nd content.

But since thefact thatthe ust is just and the advantageoussadvantageousnd thatthe noble s noble s established y proof,



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and proofs nothing, eitherwillrhetoric, hich s composed fthese parts,be anything. hat proof s nothings shown morepreciselyn ourNoteson Scepticism,nd we shall now establishtmoreby wayofa noteorreminder.f speech s nothing, eitherdoes proof xist, eing kindofspeech;butspeech s nothing,swe have established, ecause t subsists eithern utterance or nincorporealekta; thereforeroof oes not exist,- Further,f itexists t is either vident rnon-evident.ut tis nonevident,ndbecause f this s disputable,s everythingndisputes nonevident.... Thereforeno proofexists. 113)

And thus rhetoric oes not exist either. For over a hundred ines,Empiricus efuteshe main doctrines f rhetoric:t is not an art 2.16); itinjures hepeoplewho use it (2.30); it is sociallyuseless 2.26-27); it has nopurpose 2.61); it s opposed opersuasion ecause t advisespeopleto do theopposite f what smost onvincing-namelyct 2.74-80).There s also some ndirectvidencenadditiono this extualvidence osupport he opinion that Empiricusrejectedrhetoric.n both Greek andEnglish, s withmany ndo-Europeananguages, he opula, heverb o be, isused to assert dentityetween subject nd predicate: oney s sweet.Thecopula s whatmakesmetaphor ossible ecause t enablesus toassertdentitybetween isparate hings: time s money. ut thecopulaalso enablesus toforget hat anguage nd theworld re separate ealmsbecause n Greek ndEnglish, o be (a grammaticaldentity)ndtoexist an ontologicaldentity)refrequentlynterchangeable.t is thispotentialonfusion f to be and to existthat nabledGorgias oassert hatnothingxists: Insofar s [thenonexistent]is understoods nonexistent,t will not xist, ut nsofars it s nonexistenttwill, on the otherhand,exist B3.67). By switching grammaticaldentitywith n ontological ne, a piece of egerdemainhat he ccident f thecopulaassists,Gorgias ouldsaythat he nonexistentxists.Metaphorworks ythesame means.Time snotmoney,utwecangrammaticallyssert hat t s andbecausetimecan be commodified,t can be exchanged ormoney; husthegrammaticalo be becomes heontologicalo exist.Ourlanguage as well asGorgias's)has so manysuchhypostatizationsf metaphorhat there s arhetoricalerm or t: catachresis-the eg of a chair; heheadofa pin. Chairsandpinshaveneither eadsnor egs,butour anguageno longer ermitss tosay thisdirectly ecausethemetaphor ecamethename.By insistinghatappearances lone should be asserted nd that udgmentshouldalwaysbeundercut, y saying hathoney eemssweet,butI do not knowthat t is,Empiricus effectivelyegislates against metaphor,against exchanginggrammatical ossibilities or ontological ealties. f all one can say is thatsomethingeems obe one kind fthing ather han nother ut nly ohimor



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her, hen hetorics impossible.f onecannotmakepronouncementsbout henature f things r theessences f things,f all one cando is self-report,henone cannot tryto convince othersexcept to say this is sweet; try t.Confirmationf experience lone is persuasive.Words are mere tokens,counterfeitokenst that, nd so areunsatisfactoryor ommunication.orgiaswas right bout he llusory elation etween anguage ndreality. rotagoraswas right o practice ntitheticaleasoning.And yet heir hetoricsf power,whethereceptive r fairly alanced,were thically nacceptable.

So we have two relativeand nihilisticways of thinking bout thepossibilities,rrather he mpossibilities,fknowledge hat ead to activewaysof ife.But n the absenceofknowledge,he sophists ppear o have assertedrhetoricsfpowerwhile Empiricus ollowed yrrhon teaching eoplethatspeechwas antitheticalo virtue ndthus hat ne should uestionhepower flanguage nd resist he urge to explainthe world. t seems,therefore,hatnihilism ndrelativisman end n either super-rhetoricr an antirhetoric,nantitheticalesult hatought o please bothsophists nd skeptics like.Thedifferencehat eads either o the affirmationr restraintf thepoweroflanguage,othe ophists'r the keptics' aysof iving,sperhapshe xtent fone's doubts. mpiricus otonlydoubted verything,e doubted is doubts swell. This is probablywhy he accused both Gorgias and Protagoras fdogmatism,or ach seemed osuggesthathe hadfound netruth,ither hatall truthsrerelative r that o truthxists. erhaps hese ntifoundationalirstprincipleseadProtagorasnd Gorgias longslightlyifferentaths o ive thesophisticalife ofpoliticalpower.Alternatively,owever,we might ntirelyrethinkwhatwe have called sophistic hetoric. f Schiappa is correct nassertinghatPlato created hewordrhetoric,henwe maybe completelywrongncallingwhat he ophistsaught hetoric,ndthefact hat mpiricusnevermentionsny sophistsn his refutationf rhetoric nd alignshimselfwiththe sophists n what todaywe wouldcall epistemologicalssues maysuggest hathe did notthink f them s rhetoriciansither. erhaps ophisticrhetoricwas actually politikos ogos. That is to say, perhaps sophisticrhetoric,ikepracticalkepticism,as a wayofthinkingesigned olead to away f iving. erhapsGorgias ndProtagoras ere ntheir wnseparatewaystryingounderminenivocalwaysofthinkingn order opromoteemocraticinstitutions.f onepromotesntitheticaleasoningr deniesthepossibilityfabsolute udgments,hen one instills profoundense of the futilityndarroganceof single-minded nterpretationsf the world. Hierarchicalassumptionsboutthoughtnd social organizationsre called intoquestion,and multiple oices are granted qual consideration.uch a wayofthinkingandliving ouldeasilyhave eadtothebreakdownf theAthenian egemony,hencetheAthenianuspicion f thosewhotaughtwhatPlato calledmisology.



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In otherwords, erhaps ophistic hetoric as obscured orpolitical easons,outoffear hat t wouldfoster nstable overnments.erhaps ntifoundationalepistemologiesngeneral re formsfrhetoricalracticen the ense hat hey.are ways f talkingndwriting esigned o change heworld ather hanwaysoftryingo describe t.This couldexplainwhy ophism nd skepticism averecurrentutdiscontinuousistories:heir ortunesise nd fall s a functionfresistanceo acceptedwaysofthinking.If nothing lse, I think his study uggests hatwe needto redraw hesophistic raditionn greater etail, romXenophanesoEmpiricus,nd thenreread lato andAristotles reactingoa currentfthoughthat lowed astthem. erhapswehavefailed o reread he ophists ccurately ecausewehavemaintainedhePlatonic ndAristotelianbsessionwithknowledgeven s wehave rejectedor inverted ositive epistemology. t any rate,we can bereasonably ure that the triumph f positiveepistemology as not solelyresponsibleor he clipse fsophistichetoricecause venwhennihilismndrelativismpposedpositivism,hetoric as distrustedndrestrained.

NoteI would ike o thank ichard eo Enos andEdward chiappa ornsightfulritiquesf n earlierversion f his aper.WorksCitedAristotle.he Art f Rhetoric. rans.John enry reese. oeb vol. 22. Cambridge: arvard P,1982.

. TheRhetoricnd Poetics. rans. hysW.Roberts. ew York:Modem ibrary,954.Bury, . G., trans.extus mpiricus. oeb.4 vols.Cambridge: arvard P, 1949-59.Carter, ichael. Stasis ndKairos:Principlesf Social ConstructionnClassicalRhetoric. hetoric

Review (1988): 97-111.Crowley, haron. Of Gorgias nd Grammatology. ollege Compositionnd Communication0

(1979): 279-84.Enos, Richard eo. Aristotle,mpedocles,ndtheNotion f Rhetoric. n Search ofJustice:TheIndianaTraditionnSpeechCommunication.d. ThomasD. Clark tal. Amsterdam:odolpi1987. 1-21.. The Epistemology f Gorgias' Rhetoric:A Re-examination. outhern SpeechCommunication2 (1976): 35-51.. GreekRhetoricefore ristotle.rospect eights J:Waveland,993.

Forster,. S.,trans. ristotle: n Sophistical efutations.oebvol.3.Cambridge:arvard P, 1978.Groarke,eo. Greek cepticism: nti-Realistrends n Ancient hought. ontreal: cGill-Queen's

UP, 1990.Gronbeck, ruce E. Gorgiason Rhetoric nd Poetic: A Rehabilitation. outhern peechCommunication8 (1972): 27-38.Guthrie, . K. C. TheSophists. ambridge:ambridge P,1971.



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Hamilton,dith, nd Huntingtonairns, ds. and trans. he Collected ialogues of Plato. PrincetonNJ: rincetonP, 1961.Harkness, ames,rans. his s Not Pipe. Michel oucault. erkeley: ofCalifornia, 1982.

Hegel, G. W. Lectures on the Historyof Philosophy. Trans.J.Sibree. London: G. Bell, 1914.Hunt, verett ee. Plato nd Aristotlen Rhetoricnd Rhetoricians. uarterly ournal fSpeech6

(1920): 35-56.Jarratt,usan C. Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured.Carbondale: Southern llinois

UP, 1991.. Toward Sophistic istoriography.REITEXT (1987): 10-26.

Kennedy,George A. Aristotleon Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. New York: Oxford UP,1991.Kerferd,eorge . The ophisticMovement.ambridge:ambridge P,1981.Laertius, iogenes. ivesof he hilosophers. . D. Hicks, 2ndVol. Cambridge: arvard P, 1979.

Payne,David. Rhetoric eality nd Knowledge:A Re-Examinationf Protagoras' oncept fRhetoric. RhetoricSocietyQuarterly16 (1986): 187-97.

Poulakos, John. Hegel's Reception of theSophists. WesternJournal of Speech Communication 54(1990): 160-71.

Toward Sophistic efinitionfRhetoric. hilosophynd Rhetoric 6 1983): 35-48.Romilly, Jacqueline de. The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens. Trans. Janet Lloyd. Oxford:

Clarendon,922.Scenters-Zapico,ohn.TheCasefor he ophists. hetoric eview (1993): 352-67.Schiappa, Edward. Protagoras and Logos: A Study n Greek Philosophyand Rhetoric. Columbia: UofSouth arolina , 1991.. Sophistichetoric: asisorMirage. hetoriceview 0 1991):5-18.Sprague, Rosamond Kent,ed. The Older Sophists: A Complete Translationby Several Hands of the

Fragments in Die FragmenteDer Vorsokratiker dited by Diels-Kranz-with a New Edition ofAntiphonnd ofEuthydemus.ndprinting.olumbia: ofSouth arolina , 1990.Stough,Charlotte . GreekSkepticism:A Study nEpistemology.Berkeley:U of CaliforniaP, 1969.Freeman, athleen,rans. heSophists. arioUntersteiner.xford: asilBlackwell,954.Untersteiner,ario.The ophists. rans. athleen reeman.xford: asilBlackwell,954.

The authors an assistantrofessorn theEnglish epartmentt Georgia tateUniversityherehe teaches raduate nd undergraduateoursesnrhetoricndcomposition.is interestsre in thehistorynd theory f rhetoricnd in rhetoricalermeneutics.e has an essay forthcomingn theJournal fAdvanced ompositionn rhetoricndhermeneuticsnd s editing collectionfarticleson that opic for he ournal Studies in the Literary magination,due out in fall 1995.

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Reconsidering Sophistic Rhetoric in Light of Skeptical Epistemology