Rebecca Richards Challenging the Ideal Traditional Governance and the Modern State in Somaliland-libre

7/27/2019 Rebecca Richards Challenging the Ideal Traditional Governance and the Modern State in Somaliland-libre

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Challenging the Ideal? Traditional Governance and

the Modern State in Somaliland

Rebecca Richards

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the

requirements for award of the degree of PhD in the

Faculty of Social Sciences and Law.

Department of Politics

January 2009


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ABSTRACT

Increasing attention paid to state-building and reconstruction of post-conflict stateshas highlighted significant deficiencies in the practice of state-building, largely

brought on by a lack of knowledge and expertise, but also because of a narrow andintrusive view of what a state can and should be. By examining assumptionsunderlying much of the literature on weak, fragile and failed states, the myth of theideal state is highlighted; through this it is possible to understand, and also critique,the expectations for state formation or state-building and what a state should be. Anidea case study for this, and thus the focus of this thesis, is Somaliland, anunrecognised state in the Horn of Africa. For all pretences, Somaliland is a separateentity from its southern neighbour, and is often referred to as the model of state

formation in Africa. However, Somaliland deviates from the normative valuessurrounding successful statehood in its inclusion of traditional authority in the centralgovernment. Whilst the hybrid government in Somaliland was created to establish

peace and stability in the territory, pressure for democratisation of governmentinstitutions is creating tensions between the old Somali style of governance and thenew democratic government in the territory; tensions which are becoming more

apparent and problematic. This thesis examines these tensions and relates this casestudy to larger questions of not only state-building but also state formation; namelythe impact and consequences of international norms of statehood on stability withinnew or democratising states. Somaliland shows the absence of international state-building projects and the ability to closely tailor the project to the specific case canfacilitate the creation of the state, particularly in contrast to the ongoing succession offailed projects in Somalia, resulting in a project that reflects both internal and externaldemands and desires. In addition to highlighting and examining the successes of andobstacles to Somalilands state formation project, this thesis comments on deficiencies

in international intervention in developing, forming or re-building states as well as inthe normative frameworks or blueprints concerning how to be a state.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks go to the numerous people who have helped and guided me throughout theprocess of writing this thesis, from the proposal stage to completion. It is impossible

to mention everyone by name, but I would like to acknowledge the support providedby family, friends, academics, organisations and many many individuals.

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Mark Duffield, who hasconsistently provided invaluable advice, comments, critiques and seemingly endlesssupport. He fought some fights that we could have never anticipated, and alwaysaccommodated crazy schedules, distance and 2 AM emails. His crucial support andguidance were instrumental throughout the course of my research.

The politics department staffs at both Bristol and Lancaster Universities deserve muchthanks. The staff at Bristol, especially Dan, Beth and Elaine, graciouslyaccommodated my many requests as I learned my way around, always withoutcomplaint. Thanks also to Mark Wickham-Jones for finding me teaching that providedmuch needed funds. At Lancaster, thanks go to Susan, Clare and Chris for support andfor very often looking the other way.

Thanks much also be given for receiving Overseas Research Scheme Funding. Thanksalso to Adam Morton for his continued support, and to Will Reno, I.M. Lewis andespecially Mark Bradbury for all their assistance and guidance in planning fieldwork.

In Somaliland I would like to give special thanks to everyone at the Academy for

Peace and Development. Mohammed Gees, Bobe Yusuf Duale and especiallyMohammed Hassan Gani, my Somali supervisor, deserve special thanks. Theirsupport and assistance were very much unexpected but overwhelmingly accepted.Thanks to task-master Gani for teaching me how to ambush and for the endless chats.and to Abdi for being my chauffer, tour guide and friend. Thanks also need to go to allthe men of the Somaliland Guurti. They called me the walking contradiction at firstbut accepted me as one of their own at the end. Special thanks at the Guurti must goto Abdullahi Habane and his staff for all their assistance and document retrievals.

Thanks must also go to Ulf Terlinden and Genti Miho for everything. Hotel Ulf and

Genti was again unexpected but very much appreciated. Thank you for taking me in,

feeding me and in general helping me learn about Somaliland.

Finally, unquantifiable thanks must go to Mom and Dad for being my rock. Theynever (or rarely) questioned why I was still a student and always understood when tonot ask hows the work going. They may be far away, but their overwhelming

support and love kept me going. Thanks also to Robert, who danced with me throughthe good times and held my hand through the bad. His understanding, support andlove has guided me through.


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To Mom and Dad


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I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with therequirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for ResearchDegree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academicaward. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is thecandidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of,others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those ofthe author.

SIGNED: ............................................................. DATE:..........................


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CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1

THE IDEAL MODERN STATE AND INDIGENOUS GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 5SITUATING SOMALILAND 9CHAPTER STRUCTURE 13METHODOLOGY 17

CHAPTER 2: STATE FAILURE, STATE FORMATION AND STATE UTILISATION

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FROM WESTPHALIA TO GOVERNANCE 30

FROM JURIDICAL TO EMPIRICAL 31FROM IDEOLOGY TO ACTION 36FAILED STATES,OR FAILED IDEALS? 38FAILING THE NORMS OF STATEHOOD? 45THE POLITICS OF THE BELLYAND EXTRAVERSION 53CONCLUSIONS 59

CHAPTER 3: NORMS, IDEALS AND MODERN STATE FORMATION IN DE

FACTO STATES 61

TAUGHT AND LEARNED STATEHOOD 63

CREATING IDEAL STATES? 66CREATING A PIPELINE? 70THE CASE OF THE DE FACTOSTATE 75STATE FORMATION IN THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 82CONCLUSION:THE CASE OF SOMALILAND 89

CHAPTER 4: SOMALIA: THE BUILD-UP TO BREAKDOWN 91

THE SOMALI 92THE BASIS FOR ALL:THE SOMALI CLAN SYSTEM 94IDENTITY 95

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 97LAW AND JUSTICE 99CO-EXISTENCE 100CONFLICT RESOLUTION 102CLAN ELDERS:THE HOLDERS OF TRADITION 104COLONIAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES 106THE BRITISH SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE 107ITALIAN SOMALIA 113SOMALI UNIFICATION AND DISINTEGRATION 117THE ACTS OF UNION,DEMOCRACY AND CLAN POLITICS 118SIAD BARRE,THE MANIPULATION OF THE CLAN AND BEYOND 122THE CURRENT STATEOF SOMALIA 125

CONCLUSIONS 128


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CHAPTER 5: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW STATE 130

THE 1960ACT(S)OF UNIFICATION AND NON-UNIFIED SOMALIA 130MOHAMMED SIAD BARRE,THE OGADEN WAR AND THE ISAAQ ISSUE 135THE RISE OF THE SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE FALL OF SIAD BARRE 139

GOING IT ALONE:THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THESTATE 144REJECTING ANARCHY:PEACE,RECONCILIATION AND MAKING SOMALILAND 147CODIFYING THE HYBRID: THE CONSTITUTION AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 154AREMARKABLE PROCESS AND A UNIQUELY SOMALILAND STATE 160CONCLUSIONS 163

CHAPTER 6: THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE TRADITIONAL 166

THE CLAN AND THE COUNCIL OF ELDERS:APILLAR OF THE SNM 167THE SOMALILAND NATIONAL CONFERENCES:TRADITIONAL PEACEMAKING AND

MODERN STATE-MAKING 175THE BERBERA CONFERENCE 178THE BURCO CONFERENCE 179THE BORAMA CONFERENCE 181THE HARGEISA CONFERENCE 183THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUURTI 186THE MODERN:THE LEGISLATIVE BODY 188THE TRADITIONAL:REPRESENTING THE CLAN SYSTEM 189THE BRIDGE:MEDIATOR AND ADVISOR 192CONCLUSIONS 196

CHAPTER 7: SOMALILAND AT THE CROSSROADS? 201

LAW 19AND THE CONTROVERSIAL SELF-EXTENSION 203THE PRESIDENT VS.THE HOUSE VS.THE HOUSE VS.THE SUPREME COURT 208LINES DRAWN IN THE SAND 210MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 213ELECT THE GUURTI 215MODIFY IN THE FUTURE 218BEYOND THE CROSSROADS? 221CONCLUSIONS 225

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 229

STATE-BUILDING AND ITS DISCONTENTS 230D.I.Y.STATE-BUILDING 235LEARNING FROM SOMALILAND 239THE ROAD LESS TRAVELLED 245

APPENDIX 247BIBLIOGRAPHY 249


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TABLES AND FIGURES

FIGURE 4.1: Structure of the Clan Family 97

FIGURE 6.1: Key Somaliland National Conferences 186

FIGURE 6.2: Clan and Sub-Clan Distribution of Voting Members

in the Guurti 188

FIGURE A.1: Distribution of Clan Families 248

FIGURE A.2: Ethiopia and Somalia Colonial Divisions 249


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Source: Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development, A Self-Portrait of Somaliland (1999)


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Chapter 1: Introduction

While many of the existing territorial states in Africa remain fragile and prone tocollapse, these conditions have not always given way to anarchy. On the contrary,in a few cases, the breakdown of large, arbitrary state units has given way to morecoherent and viable (though not always more benevolent) political entities.1

The 1991 failure and collapse of the state in Somalia ushered in what was to become a

long-term and largely unsuccessful effort aimed at internationally driven post-conflictstate reconstruction and state-building. Since 1992 Somalia has been the subject of

numerous peace conferences and a succession of attempts at re-establishing the state

apparatus and a government. The current government in Somalia continues to be

plagued with difficulties, not only from within the government itself but also from

various factions within society. The return of Somalias government from more than a

decade in exile in Kenya was not met with jubilation in the streets, but rather the

continuation of violence so intense in the capital city of Mogadishu that the returning

government opted to base itself in Baidoa, nearly 160 miles away. Todays unstable

and unpredictable situation in Somalia leads one to question the sustainability of the

current incarnation of the government and, more broadly, of an externally created

government within the archetypal failed state that is synonymous with anarchy.

Despite the persistent failures at re-building the state, the international community and

Somalias neighbours continue their endeavours aimed at building a stable and

accountable Somalia. Where the international community is absent, however, pockets

of locally created governance have emerged. In the northeast province of Puntland, a

long-standing regional government offers basic services and security to the

population.2 In many areas outside the major cities, clan governance continues to

1I. Spears, Reflections on Somaliland and Africas Territorial Order, in H. Adam, e t. al. (eds.), WarDestroys, Peace Nurtures: Somali Reconciliation and Development (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red SeaPress, 2004), pp. 179-192: pp. 179-180. In this, Spears is referring to Virginia Lulings Come BackSomalia? Questioning a Collapsed State,Third World Quarterly 18.2 (1997), pp. 287-302.2Although the constitution of Puntland stipulates that the government will be chosen through

democratic elections, this has yet to take place. Instead, the 66 member legislative council, chosen by acouncil of clan elders, elects the president. Puntland Regional Government, Transitional Constitutionof Puntland Regional Government, (July 2001); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),


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provide social and physical stability and security to the people. And in the northwest

territory of Somaliland, the most organised and developed of these pockets of

governance, a new state that exhibits the central democratic government that has so

far eluded the south is emerging. It is here that an extraordinary project of state

formation is taking place within the larger failure of Somalia.

Throughout the literature on failed states and that of state-building, the on-going

project in Somalia is a constant point of reference. Within these studies the self-

declared independent territory of Somaliland is often referred to as a rebel region or as

a deviant breakaway territory that refuses to engage with the wider project of

reconciliation and rebuilding. Whilst it is true that there is a refusal on the part of both

Somalia and Somaliland to engage with each other in negotiations or discussions on

the nature of Somalilands status, the attachment of the rebellious or deviant label

creates a situation in which the causes for Somalilands secession and the successes in

creating a state are not acknowledged. Instead, the existence of an independent

Somaliland is problematic for the long-standing goal of re-establishing a government

able to exercise its power throughout the entirety of Somalia. The insistence on the

territorial integrity of Somalia coming from the West as well as strongly from the

African Union ensures that very little official attention is paid to the state formation

process in Somaliland. It therefore remains conspicuously absent from much of the

state-building policy, practice and literature.

The insistence on an externally-led project of creating a central democratic state in

Somalia reflects the current development trend of promulgating a universally applied

style of state. Indeed, state-building in Somalia, as the first post-Cold War state-

building project informed by the idealistic New World Order, marked the start of the

promotion of an idealised modern democratic state through state-building and

development projects. With a flux of new Eastern European states creating increased

competition for investment and development assistance from the West, the message

Grassroots democracy strengthens local government in Puntland, UNDP Press Release (4 March2008), available at http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2008/august/grassroots-democracy-strengthens-local-government-in-puntland.en; IRIN News, Women in Puntland Demand Greater Rolein Government, Somalia News Report (3 December2008), available at http://www.irinnews.org;

Puntland Ministry of Planning and Statistics, Puntland Facts and Figures, Statistical Report for theWorld Bank (2003), available athttp://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOMALIAEXTN/Resources/PuntlandFigures.pdf.


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portrayed to African states seeking support regarding what was needed to obtain

support became clear. As Dowden recollects:

Europe and America gave African governments three conditions for theircontinued, if diminishing support: pursue free market policies, as laid down in the

Washington consensus, respect human rights, and hold democratic elections bywhich they meant multi-party democracy.3

This emphasis on conforming to the dominant international norms informs state-

building projects that began with the project in Somalia in 1993 as well as

development and reform policies.4The response to what are seen as financial, political

social and security concerns or problems is a prescribed one size fits all approach5

to modern idealised statehood in order to create stability in not only the state in

question, but also the international system of states. This ideal state conforms to

liberal notions of acceptable statehood, exhibiting not only a democratic government

and a secure territory, but also exercising good governance, providing public and

political goods to the population, engaging in the international economy through

liberal policies and eager for political interactions with other states and international

institutions. In other words, the ideal state is one in which political, economic and

security threats are eliminated and the practices, policies and structures of the state are

familiar and easily accessible to the international community, particularly the West.

The ideal state, therefore, is an extension of liberal intervention and as such subject to

the control or subjugation of powerful states and international institutions. It does not

reflect an already existing state structure, but rather comprises a wish list of sorts; it is

a composition of factors that together would make the perfect acceptable or successful

state not only for security, but also for political and economic relationships with

powerful actors in the international community. The promulgation of the ideal state is

more a liberal tool than an achievable reality.

Although the ideal state is a reflection of desires rather than a recreation of an existing

state structure, this rubric of statehood is exhibited in policy as the desired outcome of

interventionist actions. It extends far beyond active development or state-building

3R. Dowden, An Alien Inheritance, Prospect (September 2008), pp. 42-45: p. 43.4 Whilst the United Nations entered Somalia under the guise of a peacekeeping mission in 1992(UNOSOM I), the state-building project began in March 1993 with the start of the highly ambitiousUNOSOM II mission. United Nations, Resolution 814 (26 March 1993), Security Council

Resolution.5

See S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff and R. Thakur, Introduction: Making States Work, in S.Chesterman, M. Ignatieff and R. Thakur (eds.), Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis ofGovernance (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2005), pp. 1-10: p. 4.


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policy, however. The dominance of this style of state in the normative liberal

framework guiding international relations also creates an environment in which

alternatives to or deviations from this blueprint of statehood and the path through

which to reach it are not trusted, regardless of any success that may be exhibited. As

such, international norms of what it means to be a state also direct domestic policy

within developing states and, in particular, unrecognised states. For the latter,

conforming to these acceptable standards of statehood is considered vital to achieving

international recognition. By exploring conceptions of the acceptable or ideal state it

is possible to understand, and also critique, the expectations for modern state

formation. An ideal case study for this is Somaliland. For all pretences, Somaliland is

a separate entity from its southern neighbour, Somalia, and is often referred to as the

model of state formation in Africa: on empirical grounds it fulfils the principle

criteria for statehood and ticks the boxes of what a stable, modern state should be.6

By all pretences it is a state, albeit one that lacks international recognition of

sovereignty. A 2005 report commissioned by the World Bank, however, unveils a

perceived problem with the state in Somaliland: a deviation from the liberal blueprint

in the inclusion of traditional authority in the de facto states central government.7

The stated goal of creating a modern state is the same in both Somalia and

Somaliland, but Somaliland has taken a drastically different path to achieving this and

has set about creating a state on its own. Its exclusion from international involvement

in the state formation process, however, has meant that the territory has been

subjected to little direct interference from the international community. This isolation

has allowed for Somaliland to create its own path to statehood and to define its own

conditions for the introduction of demands for modern statehood, including

democracy, in the governing structure and practices of the territory. The formation of

the state in Somaliland reflects not only the normative dominance of the idealised

acceptable or successful modern statehood, but also adapts these demands to

Somaliland society. What is being created is a hybrid state that is inclusive of both

6M. Bryden, The Banana Test: Is Somaliland Ready for Recognition? Unpublished manuscript(2003).7

A. Hashi, The Implication of Traditional Leadership, Guurti and Other Non-State Actors in LocalGovernance in Somaliland, Study Report for the Community Empowerment and Social InclusionProgram of the World Bank Institute (June 2005).


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familiar traditional governance structures as well as the newly introduced modern

democratic government.

The hybrid government in Somaliland was integral to establishing peace and stability,

but as the state continues to grow and develop this hybridity is being tested from

within Somaliland itself. With domestic pressure for modernisation of government

institutions, tensions between the old Somali style of governance and the new

democratic government in the territory are becoming more apparent and problematic.

This case study will examine state formation through the context of the normative

framework of the ideal state. This thesis will consider the normative framework

surrounding the creation of the ideal state and how this is enabled on a domestic level

and in accordance with local political structures and priorities within the non-

recognised state of Somaliland. This thesis will also examine the tensions between the

old and the new resulting from this reconciliation between the two parallel

governing structures. This introductory chapter provides an overview of research on

the state formation process in Somaliland and its linkage to the wider discourse on the

modern acceptable state. It will also briefly outline the key conceptual framework of

the research, the chapter structure of the thesis and the methodological approach

taken.

The Ideal Modern State and Indigenous Governance Structures

Within literature and policy on state failure, state-building and state development the

successful or acceptablethe idealstate is portrayed as one that complies with the

normative framework of the modern state. As Berger notes, the growing body of

literature concerned with failed and failing states attempts to facilitate the

formulation of policies that will reverse this trend and create a world order of stable,

economically dynamic and secure nation-states.8 This is also reflected by the

technocratic Ghani and Lockhart in the subtitle of their book, Fixing Failed States: A

8M. Berger, States of Nature andthe Nature of States: the fate of nations, the collapse of states and thefuture of the world, Third World Quarterly 28.6 (2007), pp. 1203-1214: p. 1203.


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Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World.9 Failed, fragile, weak or collapsed

states are seen as states in crisis and as such are threatening to the cohesiveness and

stability of the international system of states. Because of this there is a perceived

incompatibility of failed states and the international system of states, thereby forcing

the system to seek a way to strengthen its weaker chains. As Weiner indicates, weak,

failed or fragile states create the threat of a bad neighbourhood, with the problems of

one state quickly spreading to impact upon the others in its proximity. In line with

this, failed, weak, fragile or collapsed states can be seen as crudely akin to a crack

house in a residential neighbourhood: the malignant force of a failed state threatens

the stability of a surrounding area and therefore must be addressed.10Since removal of

the entity is unfathomable under current rules of the international system, the response

is a prescriptive remedy similar to an urban regeneration scheme that would be

established to address a problematic neighbourhood. Berger associates this increased

prescriptive attention with an emerging crisis of the nation-state system, with states

failing to meet the rigorous demands of modern statehood threatening the stability of a

system built on and dependent upon the functioning or legitimate sovereign states.

However, the current means of addressing these problems itself are problematic in that

the impending crisis is not one which can be addressed by technocratic prescriptions

for the creation or stabilisation of particular collapsing or failing nation-states or the

rehabilitation of the nation-state, but rather the international community must

reconsider the dictate of what is acceptable in the modern state.11

As models of development have largely been dictated by the dominant discourses of

the period, policies such as the push for political reform based on democracys third

wav, the economic sector oriented Washington Consensus and increased awareness of

and concern for social and human security within sovereign states have significantly

informed todays development policy and therefore the normative framework for

acceptable statehood.12Modernisation of state institutions and practices is integral to

9A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).10M. Weiner, Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows,International Security 21.1 (1996), pp. 5-42.11M. Berger, States of Nature and the Nature of States, op. cit., pp. 1203 -1204.12J. Williamson, In Search of a Manual for Technopols, in J. Williamson (ed.), The Political

Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), pp. 9-28; A.Yannis, State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction, in J. Milliken(ed.), State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 63-82; T. Carothers,


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this framework; backwards traditional, indigenous or non-democratic structures and

procedures are not efficient or effective in meeting the ideals being presented. Thus,

modernisation of political and economic structures through democratisation, good

governance practices and liberal economics becomes a vital component of the state.

Even though an definitive statement of ideal statehood does not exist, policies such as

Structural Adjustment Programmes and aid conditionality, together with the

promotion of good governance and modernisation of institutions and government

support the perception of an ideal, preferred, or acceptable state. In other words,

within this literature and policy there exists a notion of the type of state that is

preferred by the international community; a type of state that viewed as secure and

stable and is preferable to engage with on an investment, development or financial

assistance level. In addition to a liberal economy and democracy, the ideal state

exhibited within this discourse is one that provides what Jackson terms empirical

statehood and what Rotberg identifies as public and political goods. Amongst these

are key components of Weberian statehood such as security, but also more socially

orientated provisions such as education and health care, the maintenance of physical

infrastructure and respect for human rights.13 Whilst there are no specifically stated

parameters for this state, the popular characteristics defined by developed states and

presented in literature and policy create a picture of the ideal that developing states

should strive to become and what the international community should build through

state-building interventions.

For those entities aspiring to legally recognised statehood, however, creating the ideal

state can become more than just conforming to a normative model of statehood; it can

become the perceived path to recognition and therefore to the political, social and

Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 2004). See also, United Nations, Report of the International Conference onFinancing for Development (Monterrey Convention), Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002.13R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990); R. Jackson, Surrogate Sovereignty? Great Power Responsibilities

and Failed States, University of British Columbia Institute of International Relations Working Paper

No. 25 (November 1998); R. Jackson, Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory:International Jurisprudence and the Third World, International Organization 41.4 (1987), pp. 519-49;R. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, in R. Rotberg (ed.),Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003),pp. 1-28; R. Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair,in R. Rotberg (ed.), Why States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2004), pp. 1-50; R. Rotberg, Strengthening Governance: Ranking Countries Would Help, TheWashington Quarterly 28.1 (2004-2005), pp. 71-81; R. Rotberg, The New Nature of Nation-StateFailure, The Washington Quarter ly 25.3 (2002), pp. 85-96.


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economic interactions and benefits that accompany legal statehood. In reference to the

enlargement of the European Union, Ghani and Lockhart paint a picture of a

structured path for aspiring member states, with the accession to the EU being the end

reward for following the pre-determined rules and regulations for membership.14In a

similar manner, the benefits of recognised statehood are the carrot being dangled in

front of those territories wanting to be states. In the context of what Jean-Franois

Bayart identifies as a strategy of extraversion,15or actively seeking external sources of

financial benefit, creating the ideal state with the aim of gaining recognition of

statehood can become a means through which a territorial entity can benefit from

interaction with the international community; the state becomes a strategic tool.

Through the medium of legally recognised statehood, de facto states endeavour to

gain access to those areas largely reserved for states, such as legal financial

frameworks and developmental assistance through international organisations. The

process of creating an ideal modern state, therefore, can be a means to a financially,

politically and socially beneficial end.

The concern here, however, is the uniform approach to creating stable or successful

states using the blueprinted framework of the ideal state, particularly within non-

Western or traditional societies. How are local structures and dynamics

accommodated in the creation or formation of a state, particularly within territories or

entities with little or no experience of the modern or democratic state? The model of

modern acceptable or successful statehood discounts the centralisation of indigenous

or traditional governance structures, particularly in Africa, as they are believed to be

backwards, corrupt, unpredictable or unstable. Although indigenous structures are

viewed as useful when engaging locally in governance or development projects, their

exclusion from the central state creates a situation in which the expectation is the

creation of a modern and acceptable state in varied social or political contexts. As a

result, modes of social and political organisation that are specifically tailored to the

territory and society, yet do not follow the Western model of statehood, are often the

target of reform by external donors and institutions as those unfamiliar alternatives do

not conform to the ideal and trusted picture of the successful state.

14

A. Ghani and C. Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, op. cit., pp. 30-31.15See J-F. Bayart, Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion, African Affairs 99.395 (2000), pp.217-267; J-F. Bayart, The State in Africa : Politics of the Belly (London: Longman, 1993).


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Somaliland is such a case. Outwardly, the outcome of the state formation process in

Somaliland appears to be a modern democratic state albeit an unrecognised one

and the modern practices of the state are widely referred to in Somalilands quest for

international recognition of sovereignty. The imposition of modern democracy within

the complexities of Somalilands political and social environmentwas not as simple as

just creating a democratic government and modern state practices, however, and was

viewed as potentially destabilising by the founders of Somaliland. Because of this, a

compromise was reached between clan governance and modern democracy, resulting

in a deviation from the model of the modern state with the formation of a hybrid

government in Somaliland. The government being formed is thus a product of

reconciliation between old traditional structures and the new democratic structures

and practices, thereby creating a central government inclusive of and dependent upon

both. This thesis will examine the creation of such a state, asking why a modern

democratic state was created, why the traditional was included in this state, and how

the complex relationship between the old and the new functions in the formation, the

growth and the future of the state. This thesis will also consider what the implications

of the success this hybrid government are for not only for Somaliland, but for the

broader picture in the context of the discourses on state formation and state-building.

Situating Somaliland

Somaliland proves an interesting case in that what is occurring in the territory is state

formation that whilst informed and guided by international norms and standards of

statehood, is also proceeding as an indigenous process with minimal direct external

intervention. In contrast to the fraught filled long-term international state-building

project taking place in Somalia, Somaliland is an oasis of calm in the chaos of the

archetypal failed state. Although Somaliland appears to conform to the standards and

requirements of acceptable statehood, despte its declaration of independence in 1991 it

is not recognised as an entity separate from Somalia. Because of its inability to access

international structures and institutions that are reserved for sovereign states,

achieving recognition of statehood has become a primary goal of the government in

the territory, with the creation of a democratic state at the centre of Somalilands


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strategy. Whilst on the surface the state does exhibit the characteristics of a successful

modern state and the government engages in an aggressive international public

relations campaign advertising and espousing its success, it does deviate from the

ideal statehood mould in that it has incorporated traditional Somali forms of

governance in the central state structure in the form of a house of parliament. Whilst

there is no conspiracy to hide the traditional nature of this body, its promotion as a

primarily legislative body downplays those functions of the institution that are

associated with the indigenous clan governance structure.16 With the objective of

obtaining recognition of sovereignty in order to be capable of fully participating in the

international system of states, and with the structure and function of the state

apparatus appearing to conform to the acceptable state framework, the question must

be raised of why a traditional institution was included in the government of this

aspiring state? Indeed, without the inclusion of this traditional element from the

beginning of the state formation process, the territory would not exhibit the level of

peace and stability that exists today; and without peace and stability the introduction

of a modern, yet foreign, democratic governing structure would have encountered

significant difficulties. Whilst the inclusion of the traditional was essential to the

initial stages of state formation, however, its continuance in the growing and evolving

central government has begun to be questioned by elements within the Somaliland

government and society. In order to maintain the uniquely Somaliland structure that

has ensured stability, re-negotiating the relationship between the old Somali

governance system and the new democratic structures and practices in the hybrid

government is the focus of the next phase of state formation in the territory.

For purposes here it is important to distinguish between state-building and state

formation projects. The term state-building is predominately used in reference to

externally propelled and controlled re-building or re-creation of state institutions in

legally recognised and sovereign states. State-building projects are generally based on

the pre-existence of a state apparatus in some form; in literature and practice, state-

building typically refers to the re-building of a collapsed, failed or post-conflict state

16

Interviews with author, August-September 2006, Hargeisa. It is very common to be told that thetraditional inclusion in Somalilands government, the Upper House of Parliament, is comparable to theUnited States Senate.


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or a previously autonomous territory within that state.17State formation, on the other

hand, is not commonly referenced in association with contemporary states. Rather, it

is most often used in association with the creation of European states. 18 It is the

emergence or creation, rather than the re-building or even imposition, of a new state.

State formation is the process in which a new state, including its governing apparatus,

is domestically created rather than the externally-led restructuring of a pre-existing

state structure; it is generally an indigenous process that is starting from scratch or

close to it. State formation does not discount the pre-existence of a nation or a sense of

nationality, but rather is primarily concerned with the more legal, technical and

structural aspect of obtaining recognised sovereignty, as well as creating the

governing structure that maintains the Weberian condition of monopoly of force and

the modern demands good governance such as social provision and responsibility.

State formation, therefore, is creating a new state entity from within rather than

externally re-building a pre-existing state. Put simply, state-building is an externally

led project aimed at rebuilding state structures and strengthening state functions,

whereas state formation is predominantly an internally devised process aimed at

creating new structures and functions. Whilst what is taking place in Somalia is an

international project of state-building, what is taking place in the northwest territory of

Somaliland is an example of state formation.

With the ideal democratic state being the end goal in state-building and development

projects, as well as modern state formation projects, a set of guidelines for statehood

17J. Dobbins, et. al., The UNs Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA:RAND Corporation, 2003), p. 3. Two exceptions to this may be East Timor and Bosnia. Although theinternational actors directed the creation structures within a new state, they are often referred to asstate-building projects as the international community intervened after independent sovereignty was

recognised. Also, although Kosovo was not a sovereign state at the time of international intervention,the project there was not aimed at creating a sovereign state but rather re-building and stabilising theautonomous region and is therefore commonly identified as a state-building project rather than stateformation.18For more on European state formation, see C. Tilly (ed.), The Formation of National States inWestern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); A. Morton, The Age of Absolutism:capitalism, the modern states-system and international relations, Review of Internationa l Studies 31.3(2005), pp. 495-517; J. Hall (ed.), The State: Critical Concepts (London: Routledge, 1994); C. Tilly,War Making and State Making as Organised Crime, in D. Evans, et. al. (eds.), Bringing the StateBack In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169-191; T. Aston (ed.), Crisis in Europe,1560-1660: Essays from Past and Present (London: Routledge, 1965); M. Ayoob, State Making, StateBreaking and State Failure, in C. Crocker, et. al. (eds.), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of ManagingInternational Conflict (Washington DC: US Institute for Peace, 2001), pp. 127-142; R. Cooper, The

Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2004);Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: The Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 2006).


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and a blueprint of the good or strong state have been put forward. Whilst

Somaliland follows this to an extent in that what is being created in the territory is a

democratic state exhibiting many desired attributes of acceptable governance, the

divergence in the inclusion of indigenous or traditional rule in the government sets

Somaliland apart. This inclusion still puts Somaliland on the path towards democracy,

but it does so in a way not defined by the international community but rather by

Somaliland itself. The state being created in the territory is one that makes democracy

work by tailoring the ideal to fit and therefore be possible in Somaliland. Because of

the deviation, however, the success of the Somaliland challenges the dominant

acceptance of the acceptable modern state. In balancing a desire for recognition of

sovereign statehood with the need to create a stable governing structure in Somaliland,

the shapers of this government have also created an interesting case of state formation

for study. The case of Somaliland raises interesting questions concerning not only

dominant state-building and state formation discourse, policy and practice, but also

questions the cookie cutter approach commonly found in both literature and policy.

With that said, it should be noted that whilst the approach to state formation taken by

Somaliland has been successful, it is not the intention of this thesis to suggest that the

territorys distinctive experience should be carbon copied by other territories or states.

What has worked for Somaliland is a tailored fit. Its importance is not that it has

created a new blueprint for non-Western state formation or state-building, but that

what has been created works for Somaliland and has been successful in creating a

strengthening stable state within the remnants of chaotic Somalia. Somaliland is an

example of how the model of acceptable statehood fails to acknowledge the

importance of local social and political dynamics in contributing to the stability and

success of a developing, re-building or forming state. It is because of this that the

examination of the government in Somaliland in this thesis focuses on the deviation

that has proved to be the foundation for stability in the forming state: the inclusion of

the indigenous traditional governance structures into the Somaliland government. It

must also be noted that it is not the purpose of this thesis to assess Somaliland through

the discourse of right to self-determination. The complexity surrounding the

international communitys response to and policy regarding Somalilands declaration

of independence is best saved for a separate project. However, it would be misleadingto present the assumption that the inclusion of traditional authority in Somalilands


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government is the sole reason for lack of recognition. Whilst the power of the clan

authority in the government has been noted as a concern, issues regarding

Somalilands placement within Somalia and expressed policy protecting territorial

integrity in the region are also considerable obstacles to recognition. Until Somalia is

stabilised, Somaliland is unlikely to be recognised. The isolation due to this, however,

has been beneficial to Somaliland as the territory has been granted the time and space

to go it alone.19

Overall, examining Somalilands state formation experience is valuable on many

levels. The territory provides an excellent platform for the study of contemporary state

formation, particularly how this is shaped or reactive to normative values of statehood.

The territory also proves interesting in examining the interaction between Western

ideals and traditional practices and structures. Somaliland is relatively untouched by

either researcher or practitioner, making its virtual isolation an interesting test tube in

which the indigenously created state and its strategies for recognition, its interaction

with the modern acceptable state and its adaptation of the ideal can be studied.

Chapter Structure

This thesis examines the process of state formation in Somaliland in the context of the

acceptance of the ideal state. In doing this, the concept of this acceptable style and

functions of the state must be examined, and will be done through a review of

literature on the ideas surrounding the contra of state failure. This, combined with

theory of extraversion proposed by Jean-Francois Bayart and ideas surrounding

building or reforming governance, such as that of the governance state put forward by

Graham Harrison, forms a framework through which to understand particular

conformities in contemporary state formation, particularly focusing on the deviation

from the norm in the inclusion of traditional authority in the central government.

Concluding the thesis will be an assessment of the dominance and application of

accepted normative values in contemporary state formation and state-building.

19G. Prunier, Somaliland Goes it Alone, Current History 97.619 (1998), pp. 225-228.


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This thesis is comprised of two key components: a theoretical overview and literature

review pertaining to state failure, political development, state-building and state

formation; and an explanation of the case of Somaliland and its process of creating

and developing a hybrid state. Whilst the former is informed by literature that is

widely available, the latter is dependent upon information obtained during field

research in Somaliland. The purpose of this section is to outline the structure of the

thesis and offer a summary of the chapters being presented.

Chapter 2 explores the evolution of perceptions of the state in order to assist in

developing an understanding of the ideal acceptable or successful state. The

concept of the state and what it means to be a state has expanded from the juridical

and territorial security importance emphasised in the Weberian definition of the state

to the significance of empirical statehood evident in contemporary policy. The

emphasis on the acceptable or successful state in literature and policy does not go

unnoticed by states or territories seeking increased interaction in the international

community, and this chapter addresses that specifically in regard to Africa with an

explanation of Jean-Franois Bayarts strategies of extraversion. Far from reducing

African states to political or economic chameleons, Bayarts theory of extraversion

relates to interactions and relationships rather than explicit or implicit direction and

therefore offers an explanation in which the agency of the African state is not

excluded. With the model of the successful state as an ideal, states and territories are

able to utilise the medium of the style of state as a means through which political or

financial benefit can be attained through improved relationships within the

international community, thereby linking the style of state presented with strategies of

extraversion. In utilising Bayarts theory of strategies of extraversion, this chapter

offers an explanation as to why many non-Western states may accept or at least

exhibit Western-style democratic state structures.

Chapter 3 continues the exploration of acceptable statehood with a more in depth

analysis of normative values of modern statehood found in literature and policy.

Whereas Chapter 2 demonstrates one way in which agency is maintained by state

actors in seeking out relations with the West, Chapter 3 outlines one way in which

these interactions are taking place by offering a more detailed picture of the ideal statebeing created. This includes not only an examination of literature and policy,


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particularly that pertaining to state failure, fragile states and state-building, but also an

explanation of one such framework commonly applied in Africa. Utilising Graham

Harrisons contribution of the governance state as an overview of the interactions

taking place between African states and the West, this chapter examines how the

normative values of acceptable statehood are reflected in the practice of both

international institutions and states themselves. From this, the chapter also examines

de facto states, such as Somaliland, as state-like actors taking on the normative

expectations of statehood by conforming to the models available in creating their own

acceptable states.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide the histories of Somalia and Somaliland. Chapter 4 offers a

social and political history of Somalia up to 1991. This chapter focuses on pre-

colonial Somali social and governing structures, the colonisation of British

Somaliland and Italian Somalia, post-colonial unification of the two former colonies

and the long term rule of Dictator Siad Barre. This pre-1991 history gives an overview

of the breakdown of the state of Somalia. This chapter also includes an explanation of

the Somali clan system and its pervasive role in governance in Somali society.

Following that, Chapter 5 addresses on one outcome of the collapse and failure of

Somalia by focusing specifically on Somaliland and its divergence from the failed

Somalia. This chapter examines reasons for the territorys separation from the south as

well as explaining its liberation struggle. Unlike the previous chapter, Chapter 5

continues beyond 1991 in examining and explaining the creation of a seemingly

acceptable state in Somaliland.

The historical explanations of Somalia and Somaliland, and the examination of the

creation of the state in Somaliland are followed by a description of the hybridity of the

Somaliland state, with Chapter 6 specifically considering the inclusion and purpose of

the traditional institution in the central government. This deviation from the ideal sets

Somaliland apart not only because of its individually tailored nature, and but also due

to its methods for creating the environment necessary for the introduction of

democracy and modern state practices. Whilst control by traditional authorities is not

uncommon and can be found in states such as Sudan and Afghanistan, the inclusion or

institutionalisation of these authorities in a central government is less common,particularly in states that have been re-built or reformed through international


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intervention.20The institutionalisation of traditional authority in a central government

and dependence on that authority to legitimise and supplement the modern state in

Somaliland makes this case an unusual process of state formation in the context of

international norms of acceptable statehood. In outlining the three key roles of the

traditional clan institution as a legislative body, as a representation of the clan

system, and as a mediator and advisor the contribution of the centralised body to the

overall stability of the government and the territory becomes apparent.

Whilst Somaliland has demonstrated considerable success in its state formation

project, the process is not without problems. The penultimate chapter, Chapter 7,

probes the compromise between the old and the new by addressing domestic

problems and concerns stemming from the inclusion of a traditional body in a

modernising government. As the state formation process continues and as the

government strengthens, the once vital roles of the old are beginning to clash with the

modernisation project of the new, bringing forth calls for a re-examination and

renegotiation of the hybridity of the democratising Somaliland government. The

juxtaposition of these two governing structures is currently under debate in

Somaliland; a debate that is explored in this chapter.

Finally, the thesis concludes with a critical re-examination of not only the hybrid

government in Somaliland, but also the ideal acceptable state and its impact on

Somalilands state formation process. In this, the concept of extraversion is re-visited

20See, for example, L. Ntsebeza, Democratic Decentralisation and Traditional Authority: Dilemmas ofland administration in rural South Africa, The European Journal of Development Research 16.1(2004), pp. 71-89; H. West and S. Kloeck-Jenson, Betwixt and Between: Traditional Authority and

Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Mozambique, African Affairs 98.393 (1999), pp. 455-484;T. Mennen, Legal Pluralism in Southern Sudan: Can the Rest of Africa Show the Way?Africa Policy Journal3 (2007), pp. 49-73; M. Hhne, Traditional Authorities in NorthernSomalia: Transformation of Positions and Power, Max Planck Institute for SocialAnthropology Working Paper 82 (Halle: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 2006); W.Linder and G. Lutz, Traditional Structures in Local Governance for Local Development, World Bank

Institute Desk Study (Berne: University of Berne, January 2004); N. Garrigue, Commented Review ofthe Desk Study Titled: Traditional Structures in Local Governance for Local Development, Report

for the World Bank Institutes Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Learning Program(Geneva, July 2004); P. Englebert, Born-again Buganda or the Limits of Traditional Resurgence inAfrica, Journal of Modern African Studies 40.3 (2002), pp. 345-368; United Nations EconomicCommission for Africa, Relevance of African Traditional Institutions of Governance, UNECA

Report (New York: United Nations, 2007); United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ADF IV

Traditional Governance Focus Group Issues Paper, African Development Forum, Addis Ababa, 11-15October 2004; S. Shivakumar, The Place of Indigenous Institutions in Constitutional Order,Constitutional Political Economy 14.1 (2003), pp. 3-21: p. 6.


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as an entrenched and lasting political and structural change and adaptation. In

addition, the conclusion addresses the potential impact of the creation of the

Somaliland state on state-building and reform discourse and policy. The constant

evolution and renegotiation of the hybrid Somaliland state, processes which have

maintained stability thus far, pose significant challenges for discourse and policy that

outline specific guidelines and offer blueprints for the development of effective

governance and political reform necessary to meet the requirements of the modern

acceptable state. Most significant of questions to pose is can the dominant mould

realise and accept differences and challenges to the norm in the study and practice of

development and state-building?

Methodology

All research into political issues forces the researcher to consider issues of balance,

judgment, and assessment during data and information gathering. These concerns are

especially prevalent when conducting research in an unfamiliar foreign environment.

In pursuing research in the developing world, the researcher must be aware of

potential difficulties that can be encountered during information gathering in such an

environment, such as issues of ethnocentrism, preconceived truths relating to the

subject matter, cultural misunderstandings, historical legacies and grievances and

barriers arising from religious or cultural practices. However, awareness of these

issues does not warrant charitable treatment or even moral judgment, and researchers

must be cautious in finding a balance in order to present an accurate picture. For

example, too much sympathy because of an areas tragic history or negative

circumstances can place the researcher in a biased position. Disregarding history,

however, excludes contextual information necessary to provide analysis, particularly

in regards to political occurrences or structures. It is impossible to conduct research in

a contextual vacuum, and because of this it is vital that the researcher be aware of this

need for balance. For purposes here, only the reader can judge to what extent this has

been achieved.


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The original design of this project was centred on the different modes of social and

political organisation providing social stability and cohesion within Somalia.

However, due to continued political instability and security concerns within the state,

the focus of the project moved away from organisation within the south of the country

and was altered to examine the relationship between political organisation and social

organisation in the process of state formation in Somaliland. Because of the

unfounded success of this territory within the epitome of a failed state, and because of

the uncertain position Somaliland holds in the international system as a whole, this

specific case study offers numerous research opportunities that have yet to be

explored.

Although a comprehensive anthropological and historical record exists for Somalia,

the basis of this record is the work of I.M. Lewis.21As such, any work on the history

or society of Somalia or its component parts is dependent upon his plentiful

contributions. As for Somaliland, whilst a small amount of literature on the territory as

a separate entity is available, much of it is agenda-driven and focused on the successes

of Somaliland in an argument supporting the territorys case for recognition.

Somaliland is also mentioned in the discussion of de facto states or, to use the

terminology of Kingston and Spears, states-within-states. Some post-1991 history is

available but it is predominantly focused on the post-conflict peace process or

Somalilands existence as a state-within-a-state. Even publications from within

Somaliland such as the Somaliland Academy for Peace and Developments 2005

Rebuilding Somaliland fall short of offering much on the state formation process, with

Rebuilding Somaliland instead focusing on the Academys research entry points such

as gender inclusion and agriculture policy. It was not until Bradb urys 2008 Becoming

Somaliland that an in depth examination of the process of creating the state was

offered.22Whilst Bradburys book offers a broad explanation of how stability has been

21Lewis most influential and therefore pervasive works are: The Modern History of Somaliland: FromNation to State (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965) and the fourth edition of this text, AModern History of the Somali (Oxford: James Currey, 2002); A Pastora l Democracy (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1961); and Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville,NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1994).22See P. Kingston and I. Spears (eds.), States-Within-States: Incipient Politica l Entities in the Post-Cold War Era (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Somaliland Academy for Peace andDevelopment (APD), Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea

Press, 2005); M. Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland (Oxford: James Currey, 2008). For arguments forrecognition, see also, M. Bryden, State-Within-a-Failed-State: Somaliland and the Challenge ofInternational Recognition, in P. Kingston and I. Spears (eds.), States-Within-States: Incipient Political


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maintained in Somaliland and how the state was created, this thesis aims to contribute

to this in three key areas: first, addressing the question of why Somaliland was

created; second, and in relation to the first, how Somaliland is placed within the

context of state-building and creating acceptable states; and third, identifying and

examining the inclusion of the traditional authority in the central government as one

key component of this process not only in its role in the Somaliland state but also in

relation to international norms. Whilst what is available on Somaliland, particularly

Bradburys work, is invaluable, this thesis seeks to expand on this by examining

Somaliland in the context of international norms and expectations as they relate to the

state being created.

The scarcity of research and documentation on this emerging state within what is

perhaps the most recognised failed state extends beyond the academic realm and also

exists in policy; Somalilands unrecognised status excludes it from significant

interaction with or assistance from international development and financial

institutions. The minimal assistance that is received is predominantly undertaken

within the pretext of a unified Somalia, thereby bypassing Somaliland as a separate

entity in favour of viewing the government as little more than regional governance

within Somalia. Somaliland is discussed in policy or institutional research on Somalia,

such as the World Banks Somalia re-engagement plans, but these documents focus on

establishing a peaceful and unified Somalia. Somaliland is also addressed by opinion

reports such as the Othienos paper for the ODI which argues that the case of

Somaliland can prove useful to developing a new model for interactions with fragile

societies. DfID and ODI also produce reports on the results of their involvement in

capacity building and infrastructural support in Somaliland, and reports by

international election monitors provide evidence on the establishment of democratic

elections. The most useful institutional research on Somaliland is that done by Matt

Bryden of International Crisis Group; ICG reports comment on Somaliland as an

Entities in the Post-Cold War Era, op. cit. pp. 167-88; K. Menkhaus, Somalia: Political Order in aStateless Society, Current History 97.619 (1998), pp. 220-224; J. Drysdale, Stoics Without Pillows: AWay For ward for the Somalilands (London: HAAN Associates, 2000); H. Adam, et. al. (eds.), War

Destroys, Peace Nurtures: Somali Reconciliation and Development (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red SeaPress, 2004); H. Adam and R. Ford (eds.), Mending the Rips in the Sky: Options for SomaliCommunities in the 21stCentury (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1997).


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individual entity rather than a component of Somalia.23 Apart from reports on the

limited donor involvement however, there is little documentation on economic and

political developments or occurrences within the territory other than what is available

from the government itself, a Somaliland research centre and the few media sources in

the territory. Due to infrastructural weaknesses, including the lack of a postal service,

much of the information concerning the government and the formation of the state that

is held by institutions within Somaliland is only accessible in Hargeisa. Information

and documentation obtained during fieldwork will contribute to discussion on

domestic actions and actors and complement those findings and comments by

international organisations and NGOs.

With these problems identified, this project depends heavily on two methodological

approaches: a theoretical literature review on state failure, state weakness and state re-

building or development; and fieldwork carried out in Somaliland. Whilst it is

recognised here that at some point in Somali history the clan system was created, most

likely as a means of societal control, and that it has been altered throughout history, it

is not the position of this external, non-Somali researcher to identify or define what

Somalis hold as traditional. As such, the explanation and definition offered by

political and social leaders, as well as clan elders will be used: the traditional in

Somali society is the clan system and all that it entails.

Whilst the first half of this thesis is informed by literature and policy statements, the

second half is based on fieldwork conducted in Somaliland in August and September

2006. The aim of this fieldwork was to increase knowledge of the functions of the

central government in Somaliland as well as gain insight into the history of its

formation and the relationship between the various branches. The field research also

created the possibility to obtain documentary evidence, including legislation, media

23See, for example, UK Department for International Development (DfID), Country Engagement Planfor Somalia, (London: DfID, 2005), available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/somaliaep04.pdf;UK Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Politics and Governance Research Programme,http://www.odi.org.uk/programmes/default.asp; USAID Somalia Programme,http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/somalia/index.html; World Bank SomaliaProgramme, http://www.worldbank.org/somalia; United Nations and World Bank Somalia Joint NeedsAssessment Programme, http://www.jna-somalia.org; International Crisis Group Somalia Reports,http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1232&l=1, particularly Somaliland: Democratisation

and its Discontents, Africa Report No. 66 (July 2003) and Somaliland: Time for African UnionLeadership, Africa Report No. 110 (May 2006); T. Othieno,A New Donor Approach to FragileSocieties: The Case of Somaliland, ODI Opinion 103 (2008).


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reports and in-country reports and working papers that are not readily available

outside of Somaliland. The overall goal of this research was to better understand how

the government was created, what adds stability to the government of Somaliland, and

how this stability was obtained.

As Warwick points out, a researcher must be aware of the political context of the

country being studied, the level of political polarisation in that country, and how far

the research project is linked to those points of polarisation.24 In researching the

traditional authority in the Somaliland government this precaution became prevalent

as field research was undertaken at the crux of what was domestically perceived to be

a constitutional crisis centred on the traditional authority. Whilst this timing was

invaluable in terms of research potential and opportunities, it also made me as the

researcher aware of the centrality of my research subject in the crisis as well as my

position within the debate as someone studying this institution. Because of this, every

precaution was taken to appear neutral and outside of the debate, although I am fully

aware the debate greatly informed and benefited my research.

Fieldwork undertaken in Hargeisa was done through a multifaceted approach and

enabled me to obtain information from numerous sources and factions both within and

external to the government. Government archives, media sources and locally

conducted research reports were readily available and relatively easy to access in

Hargeisa. Whilst these documentary sources provided excellent insight into the

practices of the government, ethnographic research was unavailable and not

permissible in the time and with the resources available for the fieldwork, meaning

analysis has been limited to focus on the government and not society. Media sources

in Somaliland are known to be antagonistic towards the government and were both

problematic and beneficial: the unbalanced media response to government action,

whilst analytically informative, was used cautiously. The information reported by the

media, however, did provide background and contextual knowledge and, in many

cases, names of important actors involved in ongoing debates. Whilst the editorial

content of many media reports could not fairly be used, the nature of the reporting and

the factual information provided was useful. Locally conducted research reports,

24D.P. Warwick, The Politics and Ethics of Field Research, in M. Bulmer and D.P. Warwick (eds.),Social Research in Developing Countries (London: UCL Press, 1993), pp. 315-330.


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although detailed and informative, are also often agenda based. The primary research

institute in Somaliland, the Academy for Peace and Development, is externally funded

yet was founded by the government. As a result, the research produced by the

Academy is often constructively sympathetic to the government whilst at the same

time fulfilling the peace and democracy-promoting purpose of their donor. Also, as a

prominent actor in facilitating dialogue within the government, the Academy can

position and present itself favourably in the resulting reports. Although the research

done by the Academy is informative, thorough and balanced, any researcher utilising

their reports must be mindful of the position of the research institution.

Interviews were another fundamental method for gathering information during

fieldwork. In all interviews conducted the purpose of the research was explained and

anonymity was guaranteed if it was desired. All interviewees understood that the

information they provided would be used solely for the specific purpose of this

research project. Detailed notes were taken during all interviews and when expressed

consent was given, interviews were recorded. A few structured interviews were

conducted with the most senior members of government, but the majority of

interviews with current and previous members of the government as well as

Somalilands three political parties were semi-structured. Interviews were also

conducted with members of Somalilands civil society. A small number of interviews

were multi-participant sessions. Whereas an obvious concern with this type of

interview would be an element of groupthink, in these instances the opposite was the

case. Multi-participant interviews proved valuable in that open and candid discussions

and debates took place and a varied assortment of opinions were brought forth that

may not have emerged in single participant circumstances. Following the multi-

participant interviews, follow-up individual interviews were sought with each of the

participants when appropriate, with most agreeing to additional meetings. The purpose

of the interviews was to gain a better understanding of the placement and functions of

the traditional authority in the government as well as the relationship between the

traditional institution and the democratically elected institutions. As Somalilands

government is still young, many of the people interviewed were involved in the

founding of the government in some way, or at the very least were involved in the

liberation movement. Those who were not involved, mainly those who had left theterritory during the civil war and so were members of the diaspora community


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returning primarily from Europe, were invaluable interviews as they brought to light

the tension between traditional Somali governance structure and modern democratic

practices. A total of thirty-nine interviews were conducted with thirty individuals.

Informal conversations also contributed to the information obtained.

Another important component of the field research was participation in community

meetings and parliamentary sessions. A total of three parliamentary sessions were

attended as an observer. One community civic forum on the topic of co-existence

between political parties was also attended, with the researcher giving a short

presentation of co-habitation between political parties within the United States. Whilst

the legislative sessions were informative in that they showed how the parliamentary

bodies work as well as the current debates in the two houses, the civic forum was

invaluable in that exposure to a broad range of opinions was possible. Although the

topic of the forum was political parties, the discussion quickly descended to open

debate on co-habitation between the traditional and the modern components of the

government as well as between the old guard of the executive and the new guard of

the newly elected House of Representatives. In addition to members of government

and other politicians who were present, the wide range of participants, including

media personalities, local staff from numerous NGOs, leading women and youth

rights activists, students, businessmen and other highly respected community leaders,

allowed for exposure to opinions of those outside of the government and political

community in Somaliland.

Research in Somaliland was greatly assisted by the Somaliland Academy for Peace

and Development. In addition to facilitating access to government officials and

government archives, the Academy made available its extensive library and archives

in which historical information pertaining to the creation of the state and ongoing

development in the state was obtained. Access to government archives allowed for the

collection of important primary documents that are not available outside of

Somaliland. In addition to assistance with access, the Academy also provided essential

logistical assistance, such as translation and security services which greatly assisted

the field research. Somaliland politics is an interesting creature, with debate and

opposition expected and even welcomed. Within the Academy itself, a diversity ofopinions are displayed, with former well-respected government ministers and


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liberation movement leaders working closely with those involved in civil society,

diaspora returnees, female researchers, students, the sons of members of the

governments traditional institution, former soldiers and relatives of members of the

elected house of parliament. All three political parties and a variety of clans are

represented. The primary purpose of the Academy is research and education. Whilst

the institution is funded by the War-Torn Societies Project, this primarily impacts

upon the subjects addressed (peace, democratisation and development) rather than a

research outcome limited to the agenda of the donor. Whilst it was known that I was

associated with the Academy, the long-standing official political neutrality of the

research institution and the unique openness of Somaliland politics meant that my

position as an independent and neutral researcher was not significantly compromised.

Maintaining neutrality was cautiously self-monitored throughout the fieldwork project

as I was very aware that the subject of my research was unfolding around me.

Withholding opinions on the debate, even when repeatedly asked for an assessment,

contributed to my neutral stance.

As with any research project, problems during the research process were encountered

that must be acknowledged. In addition to a scarcity of information available outside

of Somaliland, particularly pertaining to the traditional authority in Somalilands

government, some logistical problems were encountered during the fieldwork

experience. Access to members of the government in Somaliland is not problematic,

and interviewees are remarkably candid and openly opinionated. As a young female

researching the male-only traditional institution, gaining the respect of those being

interviewed was initially a concern. Credibility was quickly obtained, though,

meaning interviews were no longer a slightly painful process and the depth of

information provided increased. Knowing that the background of a researcher can

potentially impact upon the power relationship or information given during

interviews, I was very careful to not relay my nationality and instead to only provide

institutional affiliation. Because of the small and close-knit nature of those involved in

the Somaliland government and politics, however, my nationality quickly became

known and did not prove problematic. Amongst researchers and within

methodological literature it is often noted that many interviewees are hesitant to

provide opinions or sensitive information when record is being taken of the


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interview.25 Whilst this problem was anticipated, it proved to be unfounded as only

one interviewee requested an off the record interview, with the subject primarily

interested in ensuring their personal opinions were not confused with the opinions of

the institutions or organisations they work for. Contrary to the expectation for

hesitancy, many of the interviewees in Somaliland were very open to being on the

record, and it became standard for the person being interviewed to periodically pause

so that detailed notes could be taken during the interview itself. This is evidenced in

many of the recordings of the interviews; long pauses are often taken to allow for

catch-up in note taking.

Most significant of the problems encountered were those pertaining to security

concerns. Even though Somaliland is relatively peaceful, it is still a territory within

Somalia and is therefore subject to the struggles over control of the state. At the time

of fieldwork, the Union of Islamic Courts became a powerful actor in the struggle for

control of Somalia and conflict was spreading throughout the southern and eastern

parts of the state. Towards the end of September 2006, the Islamic Courts had become

influential in neighbouring Puntland and all UN and NGO workers in the territory

were evacuated due to threats in the region. With the possibility of these threats also

impacting upon Somaliland, a second trip to Hargeisa was not possible as security

became a primary concern. This did not have a significant impact upon the amount of

research conducted, however, as contact was maintained and information gathered

through other means including electronic communication and contacts within the UK.

All research inevitably reflects the obligations and interests of the researcher, and that

must be acknowledged here. Research on Somaliland is dominated by those

committed to activism or awareness of self-determination. Although my personal

25Background information on methodology was obtained primarily from I. Armakolas, A Field Trip toBosnia: The Dilemmas of the First-Time Researcher in G. Robinson and M. Smyth (eds.),Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues (London: Pluto Press,2001), pp. 165-183; S. Ellis and J. MacGaffey, Research on Sub-Saharan Africas UnrecordedInternational Trade: Some Methodological and Conceptual Problems, African Studies Review 39.2(1996), pp. 19-41; E. Osaghae, The Role and Function of Research in Divided Societies: The Case ofAfrica, in G. Robinson and M. Smyth (eds.), Researching Violently Divided Societies, op. cit., pp. 12-33; M. Smyth, Introduction, in G. Robinson and M. Smyth (eds.), Researching Violently DividedSocieties, op. cit., pp. 1-11; E. Gallner, Cause and Meaning in the Social Sciences (London: Routledge,

1973); M. Bulmer and D. Warwick (eds.), Social Research in Developing Countries (London: UCLPress, 1993); R.G. Burgess (ed.), Field Research: A Sourcebook and F ield Manual (London: Allen andUnwin, 1982).


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research interests did not originally include those issues, it would be impossible to

leave Somaliland without an opinion on its non-recognition. Whilst I have made a

concerted effort to not take a strong public stance on Somalilands self-determination

debate, I must recognise that my opinion invariably informs my research in some

manner. I hope that by moving away from issues pertaining to right to self-

determination and by viewing another component of the emergence of Somaliland I

am contributing not only to the record of Somalilands state formation process, but

also to the broader discourse and debate on what it means to be a state.


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Chapter 2: State Failure, State Formation and State

Utilisation

States have historically derived from various specific and by no means universallyrealised conditions, and the global political system has until recent times comprisedareas under the control of states, areas regulated by other forms of governance, andareas with no stable government at all.1

The rise and fall of states is nothing new. From the time of Westphalia and European

absolutism, states have come and gone in the historical processes of state formation,

failure and collapse.2 The modern Western state has taken centuries to reach what is

exhibited today, with a Darwinistic survival of the fittest approach contributing to the

evolution of the membership of the international community of states: the modern

Western state is the product of a lengthy process rather than a unitary declaration or

act. United Nations Plenary Session 864 (1960) and Resolution 2621 (1970), however,

altered the exclusive club of statehood and as a result the number of states in the

international system increased drastically.3 The bestowing of sovereignty and

therefore statehood upon the former colonial territories, the majority of

Documents

Rebecca Richards Challenging the Ideal Traditional Governance and the Modern State in Somaliland-libre