The Problem of Normativity inKants Philosophy of Logic

Rebecca Victoria Millsop

April 16, 2010

Submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for Honors in Philosophy

at the University of California, Berkeley

I want to express my gratitude to Professor John MacFarlane for being my advisor for thisproject; working with him has been an invaluable philosophical experience. I also want tothank the following individuals for their sustained support, advice, and comments on previousdrafts of this essay: Gus Holcomb, Eugene Chislenko, Yuan Wu, Laura Davis, Justin Bledin,Nathana OBrien, Devin Rusky, Lara Krisst, Paolo Mancosu, Branden Fitelson, Hannah Gins-borg, Daniel Warren, Markus Kohl, and my mom. I would also like to thank the audience inBranden Fitelsons Logic, Formal Methods, and Epistemology seminar, as well as BerkeleysUndergraduate Philosophy Forum.

Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 A Law as a Norm 4

3 Kants General Logic 7

3.1 Abstraction and Necessity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3.2 The Constitutive Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3.3 The Normative Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

4 The Moral Law and the Laws of Logic 22

4.1 Both Normative and Non-Normative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

4.2 The Two Standpoints and Relational Normativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

4.3 Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

4.4 Pure and Applied as Noumenal and Phenomenal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

5 Conclusion 38

A Appendix: Kants Transcendental Idealism 40

A.1 Cognitive Faculties and the Discursivity Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

A.2 The Two-Aspects Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

1 Introduction

Throughout his discussions on logic, Immanuel Kant claims that the laws of logic are norma-

tive for thought; in other words, logic as a science does not tell us how the understanding

is and does think and how it has previously proceeded in thought, but rather how it ought

to proceed in thought (Jasche Logic, 14), where the understanding is taken to be our

cognitive capacity for thought in general. If the laws of logic provide us with the correct way

to think, then it should be possible to think incorrectly, or deviate from those laws in some

way. Christine Korsgaard makes this claim clear when she states, There is no normativity

if you cannot go wrong (Korsgaard (1996b, 162)).

Thus, Kant must be able to explain how logical error is possible. This is a problem as he

also claims that the laws of logic are in some way essential to, or constitutive of, the activity

of thought, and essential laws cannot be violated in the way a norm can be violated. He

admits this problem in the following passage:

It is hard to comprehend how a power can deviate from its own laws, since itacts only according to certain laws. If these laws are essential, then the powercannot deviate from them[;] if, then, among the formal laws of the understandingthat logic expounds an essential one is possible, then the understanding cannotdeviate from it. (Vienna Logic, 824)

Error is only possible when the sensibility, which is the capacity (receptivity) for receiving

representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, (Critique of Pure

Reason, A19/B22) somehow interferes with the activity of the understanding. The under-

standing does not err in its own right, and our thought must, in some way, adhere to the laws

of logic. Otherwise, it cannot be considered a product of the understanding: A man can

never err completely and utterly . . . Total error would be a complete opposition to the laws of

the understanding. But then it could not arise from the understanding, which can produce

nothing that conflicts with its nature . . . (Vienna Logic, 825-6). Thus, any product of the

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understanding must comply with its own laws, which just are the laws of logic. But now it

seems that the laws of logic do not possess the desired normative force; it seems that there

are at least some laws of logic that describe how we do think because they are essential to

the act of thought itself.

We have run into what seems to be a serious problem for Kants claims regarding the

nature of logic. As described above, Kant makes the following claims:

(N) The laws of logic are normative for thought. (Jasche Logic, 14)

(ES) There are laws of logic which are essential for, or constitutive of, the act of thought.(Jasche Logic, 13)

(V) A law that is essential for the activity of the understanding (or any faculty by itself)cannot be violated. (Vienna Logic, 824)

And we also want to hold that

(ER) For a law to be normative, it must be possible to violate it in some way. In otherwords, an ought implies can err.

(V) and (ES) together imply that there are laws of logic which cannot be violated. This

along with (ER) implies that there are some laws of logic which are not normative for

thought, which contradicts (N). How are the laws of logic supposed to be normative if there

is no possible way of violating them?

The goal of this essay is to propose and evaluate an interpretation of Kants logic that

explains all four claims above while also explaining away the contradictory consequence that

apparently follows from the conjunction of these claims. My interpretation will focus on the

taxonomic distinctions that Kant makes throughout the Critique of Pure Reason and his

Lectures on Logic regarding the nature of the different kinds of logic.1 It is generally assumed

that the laws of logic that Kant describes as both normative and essential for thought are

1The Lectures on Logic are a collection of four texts from different periods of Kants career as a lectureron logic. The first three texts are transcripts from his lectures, and the fourth, titled the Jasche Logic, is thetextbook that he had a student compile based on the lecture notes he had accrued throughout his career.The last two parts, the Vienna Logic and the Jasche Logic, are the two I will use in this essay, as they werewritten near or during the periods of his more mature critical philosophy.

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those laws Kant defines as pure general laws of logic; however, I claim that this assumption

is not textually based and leads to the contradiction described above. Instead, I will argue,

the laws that Kant describes as normative for and essential of thought are the laws of general

logic; it is because we can then represent these laws as either pure or applied that these laws

have the dual nature described. The laws under the broader description of general can be

thought of as both normative and essential. In the end pure general and applied general logic

do not consist of two separate kinds of logic, rather they are two distinct ways of representing

the same laws. The pure general laws are strictly essential for, or constitute of, thought,

while the applied general laws are those that we can violate and those that Kant takes as

normative for thought. In the end, I claim that the normativity of the pure general laws of

logic is at best externally conferred, rather than essentially inherent (Tolley (2006), 375);

our nature as thinking human beings is such that the laws of pure general logic are essential

for thought yet our cognitive capacities allow for empirical-psychological rules to override

the laws of pure general logic while retaining the illusion of thought. It is because we are

beings with these different cognitive capacities which are in relation to one another that the

laws of logic are viewed as normative.

I will begin by explaining what is to be expected of a normative interpretation of such

laws, how a constitutive interpretation of Kants laws of logic does not meet these expecta-

tions, and then go on to discuss how different normative interpretations of Kants laws of

logic attempt to meet these expectations. I then go on to consider how the normative in-

terpretation may be justified in light of an analogy with Kants description of the moral law

as constitutive and normative for action. In making this analogy I will emphasize the two

standpoint view that Kant puts forth in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and

conclude that the moral law is not essentially normative but rather normative in relation

to certain kinds of beings, or relationally normative. My goal from that point on will be to

show how the two-standpoint view in the moral case is analogous to the distinction between

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pure and applied general logic, and explain how we can make sense of the normative claims

that Kant makes in light of this distinction. I will end the essay with a discussion of how this

interpertation allows for all four of the claims mentioned above to coexist while eliminating

the contradictory conclusion.

2 A Law as a Norm

If any normative interpretation of Kants laws of logic can be made sense of, the requirements

for a law being normative instead of descriptive must be set forth. A law that is descriptive,

for example, the law stating that the speed of light is 186,282 miles per second, simply

describes the way light is. The law doesnt make any normative claims about how fast light

should travel, it states how fast light does travel. In an attempt to get at what it is for a

law to be a norm on Kants account I will consider the two conditions that Clinton Tolley,

in his essay Kant on the Nature of Logical Laws, (Tolley (2006, 375)) suggests:2

(1) Error Any being subject to the law must both be able to succeed and be able to failto act (or be) in accordance with the law.

(2) Identity Even when a being subject to the law does not act in accordance with thelaw, the subject still identifies itself as being subject to the law regardless.

These are the conditions that he claims, on Kants account, give a law normative force;

such laws prescribe correct action to a being that is subject to the law. To illustrate these

conditions I will use the example of fidelity as a norm imposed on a subject in a monogamous

2Tolley provides a third condition, Bindingness: The laws must retain their validity or bindingness overtheir subjects regardless of the (lack of) actual adherence to the norms by their subjectsthough, to besure, there must be the possibility of such adherence (to uphold the traditional formula that ought impliescan)Tolley (2006, 375). I will not be using this condition because I do not see how it adds significantlyto the set of conditions, as much of what is important in this third condition is captured by the secondcondition. And there are several counterexamples to its validity. For example, consider the following law:all residents of Berkeley cannot leave Berkeley. But this law is only binding on people in Berkeley, thus ifyou leave you are no longer bound by the law. I believe there are ways of addressing this counterexample;however, the best way to address the issue is by referring to the second condition, identity. Thus, I willexempt this third condition from my discussion.

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relationship, that typically imposed by the bond of marriage. The cases I am discussing

are those in which two subjects have agreed that the law of fidelity is binding over their

relationship. The first condition, Error, is obviously met: either of the two subjects are

capable of an act of infidelity, while also capable of adhering to the law. A being who never

engages in a monogamous relationship will not be subject to the law of fidelity, just as

inanimate objects can never be subject to this law. This condition is the same one discussed

in the introduction; we can think of it as saying that ought implies can err.

The second condition, Identity, is quite clear in the case of fidelity; if one of the subjects

fails to act according to the law of fidelity, they feel guilt (to some degree) because they

still identify themselves as subject to the law. Although this condition clearly holds in the

case of fidelity, there are other cases where this is less clear; for example, the case of traffic

laws. Perhaps I am unaware of a specific traffic law; assume this is the law that says that I

must drive under 30mph on the city streets. It is difficult to say that I identify myself with

this law given that I am unaware that it is binding on me. It is clear that this law is still

normative for my action, as the content prescribes how fast I ought to drive, not how fast

I am driving. Thus, this seems to be a counterexample to the second condition. However,

even though I do not identify myself as being subject to this law, it is the case that I identify

myself as being subject to all of the pertinent traffic laws. As Tolley notes, this condition

is important, as it implies that evaluative ascriptions in light of norms (e.g., x as in or

out of accord) institute a division within some otherwise well-defined class (Tolley (2006,

375)). Given that I take myself to be subject to the traffic laws, when I disobey some law,

even those I am unaware of, my action is evaluated as being out of accord with the laws I

identify myself with.

There is a stronger response against the second condition, however. Instead of being

unaware of the law, I may consider myself above the law. In this case I am aware what the

law expects of me, but I do not identify myself with the law whatsoever. The law in this case

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is still binding over my action as a driver, and thus it seems like the law is still normative

despite my lack of identification with it. This seems like a clear case where a law is a norm

yet does not satisfy the second condition.

This examples brings out an important distinction between normativity in general and

normativity on Kants account; this distinction is further brought out by considering the

differences in the fidelity and traffic laws cases. In the fidelity case the subject has bound

themselves to the law and in that way the subject has internalized the law as a norm. In

the case of the traffic laws the laws are externally conferred on the subject, which is why

one can opt out of identifying with the law despite the fact that other people still view the

law as normatively binding on that subject. In a discussion of Kants account of the moral

law being normative, Korsgaard makes the following claims:

Here we come to an important distinction, between norms that are constitutiveof, and so internal, to the activities that they claim to govern, and norms that areexternal to those activities . . . External norms give rise to further questions, andspace for skeptical doubt. But if we can identify something as an internal norm,the question why you should conform to the norm answers itself. (Korsgaard(2008, 61))

Given this description, our example of traffic laws can be seen as external norms; the activity

of driving is not constituted by the traffic laws. Whereas the law of fidelity is constitutive of

a monogamous relationship. To be in a monogamous relationship is to identify yourself with

the law of fidelity, and in this way the law is internally normative. Thus, it seems that the

condition of identity is a condition of a law being a constitutive norm. And the goal of this

essay is to interpret Kants laws of logic such that they can be taken as both constitutive

of and normative for thought. So although the condition of identity is not a condition on

normativity in general, it is a condition for the kind of norm that we are considering given

Kants account. I shall therefore refer to these conditions throughout the rest of the essay

when considering the different interpretations of Kants laws of logic.

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3 Kants General Logic

Before addressing the constitutive and normative interpretations I want to briefly describe

the nature of Kants logic, as well as describe one of the two important taxonomic distinc-

tions that I will be focusing on throughout this essay: the distinction between general and

particular logics. The second distinction, the distinction within general logic between pure

and applied logic, will be discussed in detail in later sections of this essay. It is clear that

the laws of logic that Kant describes as both normative and essential for all thought are to

be of the general kind, not of the particular kind, as in all the relevant texts the important

claims he makes are all in regard to general logic. However, it is generally assumed that

when Kant discusses the laws of logic he is discussing pure general logic only, and that we

should set applied general logic aside because it is not really logic. As we shall see below,

I claim that the distinction between pure and applied is the most important for making

sense of a constitutive and normative interpretation of Kants logical laws. However, before

delving into that topic, I will first examine the general/particular distinction and try to get

at what is definitive of general logic. Through this examination the ambiguity in Kants

description of general logic as necessary will be illustrated; does he mean the laws of general

logic are necessary in an essential way, or in a normative way? It is not clear because he

never spells it out for us. I will walk through several passages in the Critique of Pure Reason

and the Jasche Logic in which he describes his distinction between general and particular

logics, emphasizing the ambiguity of the term necessary.

3.1 Abstraction and Necessity

Kant claims that general logic is distinguished from particular logic in that the former

abstracts away from all objects of thought. It is because of this abstraction that logic

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provides the necessary laws of thought.3 After having abstracted away from all objects of

thought whatever is left will be something that all acts of thought share without exception.

The only exception would come about because of a particular kind of content, which would

result in the use of the understanding that is particular. Kant states there is, for example,

a use of the understanding in mathematics, in metaphysics, morals, etc. (JL, 12). When

thinking about any one particular area, then, there are laws of a particular logic that are

applicable. But general laws of logic are applicable to all thought. His descriptions of general

logic are similar in both major texts:

Now logic in turn can be undertaken with two different aims, either as the logic ofthe general or of the particular use of the understanding. The former contains theabsolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understandingtakes place, and it therefore concerns these rules without regard to the differenceof the objects to which it may be directed. (Critique of Pure Reason, B76/A52)

If now we put aside all cognition that we have to borrow from objects and merelyreflect on the use just of the understanding, we discover those of its rules whichare necessary without qualification, for every purpose and without regard toany particular objects of thought, because without them we would not thinkat all. Thus we can have insight into these rules a priori, i.e., independent ofall experience, because they contain merely the conditions for the use of theunderstanding in general, without distinction among its objects, be that use pureor empirical. (Jasche Logic, 12)

Given his descriptions, there are two main features of general logic:

1) Abstraction from all content of thought.

2) Because of this abstraction, we are left with the necessary rules of the use of theunderstanding.

Thus, we must understand these two features in more detail, and how they are related to

one another.

The first thing to understand is exactly what Kant means by abstracting away from

the objects of thought. He describes the abstraction as leaving only the relations between

3Note that I will be using laws of thought synonymously with laws of general logic, as Kant does,unless otherwise stated.

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thoughts, or, as he describes this, the mere form of thinking (Critique of Pure Reason,

B78/A54). For example, if we abstract away from the content of the following inference:

All objects on the table are green.

This cup is on the table.

Therefore, this cup is green.

we are left with the relation of these thoughts to one another. This leaves us with a skeleton,

so to speak, which can be classified as a specific form of logical syllogism that can then be

analyzed. The content of these thoughts are the objects related to the concepts object on

the table, green, and cup. The understanding has related these contents to one another

according to the following form:

1) All F s are Gs.

2) S is a F.

S is a G.

Premise 1 is the major premise; in this case it is a universal proposition; premise 2 is the

minor premise; in this case it is an affirmative proposition. This is an instance of the first

figure of inference, from this the following rules for the three latter figures emerge (Jasche

Logic, 127).

Much of his discussion of general logic is put in terms of the formal aspects of thought,

and thus it is important to explain the relationship between Kants logic being general and

its being formal. This is discussed in detail in John MacFarlanes paper Frege, Kant, and

the Logic in Logicism, in which he argues that Frege and Kant can be considered as having

the same view of the nature of logic because they both claim that logic should be general ;

where general here is of a normative sort discussed below. In the process of providing his

argument, MacFarlane shows that the formality of Kants logic is actually a consequence of

the generality of logic, and not an independent feature. Thus, whenever we discuss the formal

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nature of logic, it is imperative to realize that this formality stems from logics generality.

Although we can separate them conceptually, it is not possible to have one without the other.

At this point we understand that general logic abstracts away from the content of thought,

and the laws of logic are in some way derived from this abstraction. However, this does not

further clarify our understanding of the way Kant uses the term necessary in his description

of general logic. Given different pieces of textual evidence we can interpret Kant as intending

to mean different things. Thus, at this point there are two ways to understand what Kant

means by absolutely necessary in the phrase absolutely necessary rules of thinking. There

is a stronger interpretation of necessary which suggests that every act of thought adheres

to these laws of logic; this coincides with the constitutive interpretation. If this is correct

then every thought is logical. As we shall see, this interpretation is supported by sections of

the texts where he claims that the faculty of the understanding, when considered by itself,

cannot think in opposition to its own rules. The weaker, normative interpretation takes this

necessity to imply that the laws of logic are normatively binding on the rational individual,

and given the conditions for a law being a norm this interpretation attempts to make sense

of logical error.

3.2 The Constitutive Interpretation

The constitutive, essential interpretation claims that thought must adhere to the laws of

logic if the action is considered thought at all. The term constitutive can be understood

as, in a sense, descriptive. Just as there is a law which states how fast the speed of light is,

the laws of logic, on this interpretation, describe how the understanding works. Thus, if the

understanding is in use it must be the case that the thought produced by the understanding

abides by, or adheres to, those general laws of logic. This is one way of explaining what it

means for rules to be necessary without qualification; in other words, this interpretation

takes the laws of logic to be necessary conditions for every act of thought. This interpretation

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takes Kants laws of logic as failing to meet the first condition of normativity, Error. Although

this interpretation may seem a bit extreme, and seems to go against what weve seen Kant

says about the normative nature of logic, it is supported throughout both the Critique of

Pure Reason and the Jasche Logic when he discusses how the understanding cannot err

because it necessarily adheres to its own laws:

. . . a total error would be a complete opposition to the laws of the understandingand of reason. But how could that, as such, in any way come from the under-standing and, insofar as it is still a judgment, be held to be a product of theunderstanding. (Jasche Logic, 54)

. . . it is hard to comprehend how error in the formal sense of the world, i.e., howthe form of thought contrary to the understanding is possible, just as we cannotin general comprehend how any power should deviate from its own essential laws.(Jasche Logic, 53)

hence neither the understanding by itself (without the influence of another cause),nor the senses by themselves, can err; the first cannot, because while it acts merelyaccording to its own laws, its effect (the judgment) must necessarily agree withthese laws. (Critique of Pure Reason, B350/A294)

The constitutive interpretation draws from these quotes that there are laws of logic that

cannot be violated in thought. The understanding acts according to the laws of logic, and

the resulting judgment must agree with them. This last quote is especially strong: the effect

is not just assessable by the laws, the result does agree with these laws.4 This interpretation

requires an explanation of what it is for thought to be untainted by the influence of other

faculties, and how it is that this purity relates to the strong necessity claim.

The constitutive interpretation of necessity thus makes sense of the textual claims that

Kant makes regarding error. However, it leads us to the unsatisfactory conclusion that logical

error is impossible. And, as we discussed above, if logical error is impossible the logical laws

4I draw this conclusion from Kants usage of the phrase must necessarily in the passage. It may beargued that this phrase could be taken deontically, so that the passages implies that judgment ought toagree with these laws. This would imply some sort of normative interpretation. However, if this were thecase, then there should be a deontic interpretation of can err in the preceding sentence. This does not seemcorrect at all, which is why I am taking must necessarily agree with these laws as a metaphysical necessity.

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do not meet the requirement for being a normative law. As the nature of logical error is

important to our discussion, I will briefly comment on Kants claims regarding the existence

of error. As pointed out above, the understanding itself cannot err, and neither can any

faculty alone err.

Instead, error is the product of some kind of interference with the use of the understand-

ing. In the discussion of truth and error in the Jasche Logic Kant claims that the ground

for the origin of all error will therefore have to be sought simply and solely in the unnoticed

influence of sensibility upon the understanding, or to speak more exactly, upon judgment

(Jasche Logic, 53-4). Sensibility is our capacity for taking in the world, and all cognition

requires input from sensibility and conceptual activity from the understanding. Thus, the

laws of logic only govern the use of our higher cognitive abilities, and our ability to think

badly stems not from any fault of the understanding itself, but rather from its interaction

with objects in the world. Another way of saying this is that error stems from how our

passive faculty of sensibility comes together with our active faculty of understanding. It

seems, then, given the connection we have been discussing between the ability to err and

normativity, it follows that the laws of logic are taken to be normative only insofar as there

is this possibility of this external interference. It could be that the seemingly normative

nature of the laws of logic stems from some relation between the different cognitive faculties

that beings like us possess.

3.3 The Normative Interpretation

Despite Kants claims about the laws of logic being essential for the activity of thought,

throughout the Lectures on Logic he makes several explicit claims regarding the normative

nature of these laws of logic. If this is the case then the laws of logic should meet the two

conditions for normativity. The most oft-cited quote is from the Jasche Logic, where in

describing the laws of general logic he makes the following claim:

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As a science of the necessary laws of thought, without which no use of the under-standing or of reason takes place at all, laws which consequently are conditionsunder which the understanding can and ought to agree with itself alonethe nec-essary laws and conditions of its correct uselogic is, however, a canon. (JascheLogic, 13)

This is the first place the word ought shows up in this text, and suggests that this ought

is a consequence of the necessity of the laws of thought. Here Kant also talks of the laws of

logic as also being conditions for the use of the understanding, and it is in terms of conditions

that he speaks of the correct use of the understanding. Thus, general logic consists of the

necessary laws of thought and from these laws the conditions for correct thought follow.

Unless Kant is using the term ought in some non-normative way, it must be possible to

make sense of the laws of general logic in some way to fulfill the two conditions provided

above for a law to be a norm.

Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that normativity is somehow essential to the

nature of general logic; the question at hand, however, is whether or not normativity is

definitive of generality. At this point it is worth noting that in the Critique of Pure Reason

Kant does not mention the normative nature of general logic explicitly, neither in the section

On Logic in General nor anywhere else in the text.5 If the generality being discussed were

inherently normative, meaning that this generality could be explained by normativity, it

could be expected to see use of the term ought in this discussion. However, in the Critique

he explains generality only in terms of abstraction, not normativity. This will only make

5By explicitly I mean the explicit use of the word ought. However, it could be argued that thenormativity is explicitly referenced in both texts on when Kant talks about the laws of logic being rules forthought. For example, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant describes these laws as the absolutely necessaryrules of thinking (Critique of Pure Reason, B76/B52). And in the Jasche Logic the laws of logic are thoserules which are necessary without qualification (Jasche Logic, 12). However, at the very beginning of theintroduction to the Jasche Logic Kant claims that Everything in nature, both in the lifeless and in theliving world, takes place according to rules . . . Water falls according to the laws of gravity, and with animalslocomotion also takes place according to rules. The fish in water, the bird in air, move according to rules(Jasche Logic, 11). The laws of gravity are not normative, they are descriptive, and the fact that Kant issuggesting that these laws are to be considered rules shows that we should not take Kants description ofthe laws of logic as rules to be indicating any sort of normativity.

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sense if we find that this abstraction is itself inherently normative.

Although it is left unclear exactly how these laws are also essential conditions for the

activity of thought, the normative interpretation views Kant as going on to further forge the

connection between necessity and normativity as inherent, as he claims in the Jasche Logic:

In logic, however, the question is not about contingent but about necessary rules;not how we do think, but how we ought to think . . . In logic we do not wantto know how the understanding is and does think and how it has previouslyproceeded in thought, but rather how it ought to proceed in thought. Logic is toteach us the correct use of the understanding. (Jasche Logic, 14)

Here we can interpret Kant as drawing a parallel between descriptive laws and contingency,

and normative laws and necessity. Thus, there is some connection between the laws of

general logic and how we ought to think, although it is not described explicitly any further

in his works.

The laws of general logic, then, are normative for thought in some way, yet it has not

been shown that this normativity is definitive of why general logic is to be thought of as

general. Why should the mere abstraction from all content of thought result in normative

rules? This normativity seems to be adding something to the idea of general logic, but Kant

never specifies what. Thus, in order for the normative interpretation of necessity to hold, it

must be able to explain how the nature of general necessity as abstraction from all content

of thought entails the normative claims that we find in the Jasche Logic.

3.3.1 MacFarlanes Normative Interpretation

John MacFarlane, in his paper briefly discussed above, titled Frege, Kant, and the Logic in

Logicism, advocates a version of the normative interpretation of Kants general logic. He

claims that normativity is definitive of Kants general logic: The generality of logic, for Frege

as for Kant, is a normative generality: logic is general in the sense that it provides constitutive

norms for thought as such, regardless of its subject matter (MacFarlane (2002, 35)). In this

14

section I will present and evaluate MacFarlanes claims regarding the normative generality

of logic, concluding that the outcome of his explanation of logical laws as constitutive norms

is attractive, but that it is does not fully account for the second condition of normativity

because it does not explain how the laws of logic are active in thought.

MacFarlane first presents and explains his distinction between descriptive laws and nor-

mative laws, and then goes on to explain that Kants logic must be of a normative generality

because Kants laws of logic are to be thought of as constitutive norms given the textual

evidence just discussed above. He distinguishes between the two types of laws as follows:

A normative law prescribes what one ought to do or provides a standard forthe evaluation of ones conduct as good or bad. A descriptive law, on the otherhand, describes certain regularities in the order of thingstypically those withhigh explanatory value. (MacFarlane (2002, 35))

Given this distinction, then, we can draw a parallel with the constitutive and normative

interpretations of necessity associated with generality. A descriptive characterization of gen-

erality is going to align with the constitutive interpretation, wherein the laws describe some

aspect of the process of thought which is necessary in that this description is of something

which always occurs. A normative characterization of generality is one in which the laws

are standards for the evaluation for some act in general ; in other words, in order to perform

such an act one must necessarily be assessable in light of those laws.

The laws of logic are general in this way, MacFarlane claims, in that to count an activity

as thinking at all is to hold it assessable in light of the laws of logic (MacFarlane, 37).

The laws that are normatively general in this way are to be taken to be constitutive norms.

MacFarlane provides an example of how the laws of physics are constitutive norms for making

judgments about the physical world:

[The laws of physics] have prescriptive consequences for anyone engaged in thegame of thinking about the physical world: such a thinker ought not make

15

judgments that are incompatible with them. Indeed, insofar as ones activityis to count as making judgments about the physical world at all, it must beassessable for correctness in light of the laws of physics. In this sense, the laws ofphysics provide constitutive norms for the activity of thinking about the physicalworld. (MacFarlane (2002, 37))

MacFarlane claims that the laws are constitutive because they are unconditionally binding

on the activity itself; in other words, the activity cannot be performed without those laws

as standards for evaluation of the activity. For example, if I begin to posit the existence of

flying pigs it is either that I have opted out of the activity of thinking about the physical

world, and thus am no longer assessable by the laws of physics, or I am having incorrect

thoughts about the physical world despite the fact that I am attempting to think correctly

because I consider my thoughts to be assessable by the laws of physics. Thus, constitutive

norms are also normative because it is possible to think incorrectly ; it is only necessary that

the thought be assessable in light of those norms.

MacFarlanes goal in his essay is to show how both Frege and Kant think of logic as

general in the normative sense, and most of his discussion of the normative characterization

of generality is in light of Freges claims. However, in the section titled Kants Charac-

terization of Logic as General, he quotes from Kant to support this claim. He quotes the

distinction in the Jasche Logic between general logic being necessary and particular laws

being contingent, where Kant describes the laws of general logic as those without which

no use of the understanding would be possible at all (Jasche Logic, 12), a quote which we

are now quite familiar with at this point. And, as we have seen, generality and necessity go

together on Kants account, although the nature of this necessity has been ambiguous. This

is the interesting move: MacFarlane assumes that Kants general necessity is normative.

The necessary rules are necessary, not in the sense that we cannot think con-trary to them, but in the sense that they are unconditionally binding norms forthoughtnorms, that is, for thought as such. (Compare the sense in which Kantcalls the categorical imperative necessary.) Similarly, the contingent rules of

16

the understanding provided by geometry or physics are contingent, not in thesense that they could have been otherwise, but in the sense that they are bindingon our thought only conditionally : they bind us only to the extent that we thinkabout space, matter, or energy. (MacFarlane (2002, 47))

Surely we can make sense of this interpretation, as the normative interpretation is attractive

for explaining the claims that Kant makes regarding the ought in the Jasche Logic, but

it is unclear still why we should interpret the necessity as normative. The main problem is

that MacFarlane does not go on to mention the other more explicit normative claims that

Kant makes about the laws of logic, nor does he go on to say anything else to support his

interpretation. If the necessity under discussion is normative, then this will make sense

of Kants claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as the Jasche Logic regarding the

normative nature of general logic. But further justification is not provided.

MacFarlanes idea of a constitutive norm is certainly an attractive one for explaining

the nature of Kants laws of logic. The laws have a constitutive component that makes

them unconditionally binding on the thinking subject, which, it could be argued, meets the

second condition of normativity, identity. His account definitely allows for error, which is

the first condition for a law to be a norm, because his concept of a constitutive norm is

defined in terms of assessibility. As mentioned above the laws of physics are normative

in that in thinking about the physical world the subjects thought is assessable in light of

the laws of physics. The laws of logic are unconditionally binding in that in order to be

considered thinking at all, one must be assessable by the laws of logic. Thus, MacFarlanes

interpretation assumes that the laws can be adhered to and not adhered to, which allows for

error.

However, it is not so clear exactly how MacFarlanes explanation accounts for the second

condition. At first, it seems he could meet this condition through some explanation of the

unconditional binding on the thinking subject; the laws of logic constitute the act of thought

and thus are internally conferred laws. Yet MacFarlanes explanation of this binding is in

17

terms of assessability, which is a passive notion. It is unclear how the notion of assessability

is supposed to make such a strong binding claim on the subject. Consider the case of the

law of fidelity; my action is surely assessable in light of the law of fidelity, but that is because

I identify myself as a being in a monogamous relationship. It is not that because my action

is assessable in light of the law of fidelity that I identify myself as a being in a monogamous

relationship. Assessability is a consequence of the two conditions of normativity, not the

other way around.

These norms should have the feature of being used in the assessment of whether or

not a logical law is abided by, but it is unclear how this assessment can be definitive of

the constitutive nature of the laws. In his explanation MacFarlane notes that the necessity

inherent in the laws of logic is to be taken as analogous to the necessity inherent in the moral

law. This suggests that the moral law is also unconditionally binding on action insofar as

action is assessed in light of the moral law. However, a being subject to the moral law is

not merely bound because their action is assessable by the moral law; the moral law actively

guides the subject. The way in which the moral law is active will be discussed in more

detail below. Given that MacFarlanes notion of assessability is a passive one, it does not

account for the active force that the necessary laws of logic should play in Kants account.

On MacFarlanes interpretation, every act of thought is to be assessable by these norms, but

Kants description of the use of the understanding requires that these laws be active. These

laws are constitutive of the activity of the understanding itself, thought, and the use of the

understanding is a spontaneous activity which imposes conceptual form onto all objects of

experience.

Kant describes the spontaneous nature of the faculty of the understanding throughout

his works, but most heavily in the Transcendental Logic of the Critique of Pure Reason:

If we will call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as itis affected in some way sensibility, then on the contrary, the faculty for bringing

18

forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding.(B75/A51)

Concepts are therefore grounded on the spontaneity of thinking, as sensible in-tuitions are grounded on the receptivity of impressions. (A68/B93)

. . . the combination of a manifold in general can never come to us through thesenses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensibleintuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and,since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, allcombination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a combinationof the manifold of intuition or of several concepts, and in the first case either ofsensible or non-sensible intuition, is an action of the understanding . . . which canbe executed only by the subject itself, since it is an act of its self-activity. (B130)

In all of these passages the understanding is contrasted to the sensibility, in that the faculty

of sensibility receives sensory input, which is why it is considered a passive faculty. The

understanding, on the other hand, is spontaneous ; it is an active combination of represen-

tations into concepts, judgments, and inferences. If the laws of logic are constitutive of the

use of the understanding, just as the moral law is for the use of practical reason, then these

laws must be guiding the act of thought.

Thus, although this notion makes sense of the normative claims that have been discussed,

there is something missing from MacFarlanes description; that something is an explanation

of the active normative force that Kants laws of logic seem to impose on all use of the

understanding. This notion of normative force is itself not clear, but it can been seen how

the necessity involved with Kants laws of logic, if they are to be considered constitutive

norms, must do more than act as passive standards from which all thought is assessed.

3.3.2 Korsgaards Normative Interpretation

Christine Korsgaard, in the chapter The Metaphysics of Normativity of her book Self-

Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, discusses a somewhat similar notion to Mac-

Farlanes constitutive norm, except her notion brings out the active nature of the laws of

logic that MacFarlanes discussion lacks. She describes the constitutive norm as uncondi-

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tionally binding because all actions under the power of these norms are necessarily guided by

the constitutive norms; not merely assessable in light of them. Korsgaard uses the concept

of a constitutive principle, which she describes as follows:

In these cases what we say is that if you are not guided by the principle, youare not performing the activity at all. In the case of essentially goal-directedactivities, constitutive principles arise from the constitutive standards to whichthey are directed. . . . To use a controversial example, it is a constitutive principleof thinking that you swerve when you see a contradiction looming ahead in yourpath. And in these cases, we can say that unless you are guided by the principlein question, you are not performing that activity at all. (Korsgaard (2009, 29))

On this account the principles are unconditionally binding, except we make sense of this in

terms of a kind of self-imposed intention towards always acting, or thinking, according to

those principles. In terms of Kants general laws of logic, we can see this as saying that

every act of the understanding strives towards adherence with the laws of logic. It is not

just that our thought is assessable in light of these laws, which is also certainly the case on

this interpretation, it is that the activity itself is guided by the intention of adhering to those

laws. Korsgaard provides an intuitive example of how to further understand this notion of

guided by :

The presence of both a noun and a verb in an English sentence is constitutive ofits being a sentence, that is, of its expressing a complete thought. Yet those ofus whose work includes grading papers have all encountered the verbless stringof words that wants to be a sentence and fails, and yet is not mere gibberish.There is such a thing as speaking English badly, and it is not quite the sameas not speaking at all, althoughimportantlyit tends in that direction. Forif you ignore the rules of English altogether, what you speak will simply not beEnglish. (Korsgaard (2009, 30))

The act of writing the incorrect yet not gibberish sentence involves striving towards a correct

sentence; when I am writing I am not actively aware of the grammatical rules of English, but

my action is guided by those rules in that I am writing a sentence in English. The rules of

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English grammar are not normative in that the product of the writing is assessable in light

of these rules, but that the activity of writing an English sentence is compelled by those

rules.

If the laws of logic are constitutive principles in Korsgaards terms then they should fulfill

the two conditions for being norms for thought. It is possible to think incorrectly, yet one

is compelled by the laws and is therefore identifying oneself with the laws while also being

bound by them. The advantage that Korsgaards account has over MacFarlanes is that is

provides the sense that the laws of logic are active in relation to thought, they play some sort

of role in creating the thought instead of being those laws that thought is merely assessable

in light of.

Despite this advantage over MacFarlanes interpretation, Korsgaard does not fully explain

how it is possible to err on her account. It is the case that to think you must be guided

by the laws of logic, but this notion of guided by is not made clear and this does not

seem to explain why the laws of logic meet the first condition, Error. The laws of logic

could constitute thought insofar as these laws guide the use of the understanding, while the

understanding always succeeds in adhering to the laws. Thus, this interpretation succeeds

in providing an account of the active nature of the laws of logic, but does not succeed in

explaining how and why the laws of logic meet the first condition for normativity.

My goal in this section has been to provide an example of the normative interpretation

of the general nature of Kants logic, show how it is inadequate as it stands, and go on to

suggest ways which this description could be improved upon. Towards this goal I presented

MacFarlanes account of Kants general logic as definitively normative, and then showed

how his interpretation, although plausible, is unsupported as it stands. I pointed out that

MacFarlanes notion of a constitutive norm is the kind of notion we need to interpret Kants

laws of logic so that the problem described in the introduction can be avoided. Thus, the goal

at hand is to find a way to further justify the existence of such constitutive norms for logic,

21

and how they stem from the general logic. I also pointed out that the notion of constitutive

norm we are searching for should be of an active sort, somehow explaining the normative

force that necessarily compels every thought towards logical adherence. MacFarlane draws an

analogy between the categorical imperative in Kants moral philosophy and the constitutive

necessity inherent in the laws of logic, and on Korsgaards account we find a similar analogy

as well. In the next section I will explore how the moral law on Kants account is to be

interpreted as normative, constitutive, or both with the goal of drawing the proper analogy

with the laws of logic.

4 The Moral Law and the Laws of Logic

4.1 Both Normative and Non-Normative

Kants moral philosophy is taken as a paradigm account of presenting a normative law. The

categorical imperative states that one must act only in accordance with that maxim through

which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (Groundwork of the

Metaphysics of Morals, 4:421).6 The categorical imperative is absolutely general in that it

is objectively necessary for all action without reference to another end. The normative

nature of the categorical imperative is that it is an imperative, which is defined by Kant in

the following way:

All imperatives are expressed by an ought and indicate by this the relation ofan objective law of reason to a will that by its subjective constitution is notnecessarily determined by it (a necessitation). They say that to do or to omitsomething would be good, but they say it to a will that does not always dosomething just because it is represented to it that it would be good to do thatthing. (Groundwork, 4:413)

6Throughout the rest of the essay I will abbreviate the title of this work as Groundwork.

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The moral law is an imperative for beings like us because our rational capacity, the faculty

of reason, does not infallibly determine the will (Groundwork, 4:412). The law is a norm

precisely because it fulfills the two conditions as described above. Human beings are imper-

fectly rational beings, which means that we do not always act in accord with the moral law;

thus, the moral law fulfills the first condition of Error. It is also the case that human beings

identify themselves as being subject to the moral law even when they disobey the law. This

is because humans are rational, albeit imperfectly rational, beings. This is an important

aspect of Kants moral theory because it is the sense of a free will that human beings have

because they have rational capacities that forces this identification with the moral law onto

the human subject.

So if there is an analogy to be drawn between the moral law and the laws of logic,

it seems that there will be a way for the normative interpretation of the laws of logic to

be justified. This seems to be good news for the normative interpretation. However, the

normative interpretation of the moral law is not completely safe itself. Throughout the

discussion above the moral law has been discussed as normative in relation to the kind of

beings that we are. But in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant presents us

with the possibility of a non-normative relation between the moral law and rational beings,

that of the divine will.

The relationship between the moral law and the human will is described in the following

passage from the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals :

. . . if reason solely by itself does not adequately determine the will; if the will isexposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not always inaccord with the objective ones; in a word, if the will is not in itself completely inconformity with reason (as is actually the case with human beings), then actionsthat are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and thedetermination of such a will in conformity with the objective laws is necessitation:that is to say, the relation of objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good isrepresented as the determination of the will of a rational being through groundsof reason, indeed, but grounds to which this will is not by its nature necessarily

23

obedient. (Groundwork, 4:413)

As discussed above, this quote is explaining how the moral law is normative for the human

will because humans are not constituted such that they always obey the moral law. The

human will is affected by inclinations, as Kant says: The dependence of the faculty of desire

upon feelings is called inclination, and this accordingly always indicated a need . . . This,

accordingly, is present only in the case of a dependent will, which is not of itself always

in conformity with reason; in the case of the divine will we cannot think of any interest

(Groundwork, 4:414). Even though the human will identifies itself with the moral law because

it is a rational being, it is not the case that this rationality constitutes the human will

completely. If this were the case then those actions cognized as objectively necessary would

be subjectively necessary as well. In the quote above Kant is explaining how the human will

can understand that a particular action is objectively necessary, or right, and still not feel

compelled to do this action because there is interference from the other faculties, making

the moral law subjectively contingent on the humans action.

However, a purely rational being, one that does not have any other subjective influences,

is one such that reason infallibly determines the will, the actions of such a being that

are cognized as objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary, that is, the will is a

capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination cognizes as practically

necessary, that is, as good (Groundwork, 4:412). Although such a being still has the capacity

to choose, the being will always choose to do the right thing. Kant goes on to make the

following important claim:

A perfectly good will would, therefore, equally stand under objective laws (of thegood), but it could not on this account be represented as necessitated to actionsin conformity with law since of itself, by its subjective constitution, it can bedetermined only through the representation of the good. Hence no imperativeshold for the divine will and in general for a holy will: the ought is out of placehere, because volition is of itself necessarily in accord with the law. Thereforeimperatives are only formulae expressing the relation of objective laws of volition

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in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being,for example, of the human will. (Groundwork, 4:414)

In this passage Kant explicitly states that the moral law is not normative for the divine will.

The moral law constitutes the action of the divine will. As Tolley states, the moral law does

not tell pure practical reason how it should, but might not, act. Rather, the moral law simply

expresses what pure practical reason is, in its very nature or essential constitution (Tolley

(2006, 378)). This leads to the conclusion that the moral law is not essentially normative,

rather it becomes normative when in relation to a will like that of a human beings will.

This leads to the question of exactly how a law could be normative only in relation to some

application of the law.

It may seem difficult at first to see the important difference between the essentially

normative and relationally normative accounts. Allen Wood, in his book Kants Ethical

Thought, makes the same sorts of claims regarding the divine will as we mentioned above:

If the will is perfect or holy, then normative law tells us what its self-determinedvolitions necessarily are; if it is finite and imperfect rather than holy, then thislaw is a categorical imperative, determining what its volitions ought to be. (Wood(1999, 174))

Just as discussed above, this quote explains that the law does not impose an ought on the

perfectly good will. Despite this, Wood goes on to make the claim that the laws of every

will must be normative... and the laws of a holy will, just because it is a will, have to be

normative, but they are not obligatory (Wood (1999, 379)). Woods account of the moral

law is one that is essentially normative, not relationally normative. The law is normative by

nature. I bring up Woods point to contrast the two views of normativity, but it is difficult

to understand Woods position. How can a law be normative and not obligatory? Certainly,

according to the conditions that I set out at the beginning of the essay, Woods interpretation

does not make sense. If the moral law is not essentially normative, how does the law retain

its normative force? The next section addresses this concern.

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4.2 The Two Standpoints and Relational Normativity

One question that can be raised about the content of the last section is how, exactly, does

the moral law fulfill the second condition of being a norm? Because we are beings that are

constituted differently from the divine will, and we have other influences on our action, how

does the moral law bind the human will at all? The answer to this question is found in

the two standpoints argument that Kant gives during his discussion of the moral law. And

from this, I claim, the explanation of how the moral law is normative only in relation to the

human will is found.

As mentioned above, human beings are constituted by the convergence of many different

faculties. And because of this we are able to identify, at the level of reflection, ourselves with

each faculty considered independently of the others. Although these faculties work together,

Kant claims that we have two standpoints from which we can consider ourselves as beings:

. . . a rational being must regard himself as intelligence (hence not from the sideof his lower powers) as belonging not to the world of sense but to the world of un-derstanding; hence he has two standpoints from which he can regard himself andcognize laws for the use of his powers and consequently for all his actions; first, in-sofar as he belongs to the world of sense, under the laws of nature (heteronomy);second, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which, being indepen-dent of nature, are not empirical but grounded merely in reason. (Groundwork,4:452)

I would like to take Kants talk of worlds here loosely, as I advocate a two-aspects version

of the two standpoints and not a two-worlds version.7 Thus, I interpret Kant as saying that

we can consider our action from the sensible or phenomenal standpoint, as well as from

the intelligible or noumenal standpoint. We are, however, in both standpoints at all times.

It is just that we can consider the standpoints separately when we consider how we are

constituted as beings from a meta-philosophical perspective.

7Please see Appendix A for a more in-depth discussion of Kants Transcendental Idealism and the two-aspects interpretation.

26

From the phenomenal standpoint everything is causally determined by the laws of nature,

and it is easy to see how the faculty of desire can be viewed from this standpoint. I need to

eat because I need to eat to survive. All of these needs are driven by the laws of nature and

are causally inescapable. Thus, when I consider my action from the phenomenal standpoint

I am observing myself as being pushed and pulled around the world by these determined

causes. I do not think that it is unrealistic that we can consider ourselves this way; in fact,

I think it is fair to say that individuals who do not believe they have free will are saying

that they believe there is no other way to view action correctly but from the phenomenal

standpoint.

Here is a personal example of a time when I observed myself as a phenomenal being: after

applying to graduate school programs I could not stop checking my email inbox constantly.

There would be times where I would be focusing on something else, say, writing my thesis,

and all of a sudden, without any way of stopping myself, I was compelled to check my email.

I felt as if someone else was forcing me to click on the inbox every time. Although I knew

that I should stop, my desire to receive an email regarding my graduate school applications

was so strong that it overruled any other reasons. Korsgaard describes the phenomenal

standpoint as follows: The person who acts from self-love is in a sense not actively willing

at all, but simply allowing herself to be controlled by the passive part of her nature, which

in turn is controlled by all of nature (Korsgaard (1996a, 168)). An individual who lived

their life purely from the phenomenal standpoint would never make a choice about how to

act, as the faculty of sensibility and desire (the lower faculties) would constitute the action

of the individual. Such a being would be pulled and pushed around the world without any

hesitation.

An important feature of my compulsive email checking example is that I felt as if I was

betraying my own reason every time I went to check for a new message. Even as I was in

the act of checking I was somewhat ashamed of myself for not controlling my own action. I

27

knew that I was capable of controlling my action because I am also a being constituted by

thought and reason; I did not stop being a thinking being when I went to check my inbox, I

was conflicted because two aspects of my nature as a being were in conflict.

This capacity for self-reflection and self-control stems from human beings as constituted

from the noumenal standpoint. As human beings we also possess higher faculties of under-

standing and reason, which are both law governing faculties. Given these capacities, human

beings can consider their action from the noumenal standpoint as well, and it is the idea of

freedom that allows the moral law to be binding on the human will. Kant states:

. . . the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world and conse-quently, if I were only this, all my actions would always be in conformity withthe autonomy of the will; but since at the same time I intuit myself as a memberof the world of sense, they ought to be in conformity with it . . . (Groundwork,4:454)

When we consider ourselves from the noumenal standpoint, we view ourselves as law-giving

creatures with the capacity to act and think. Because human beings have the ability to

consider themselves as rational beings abstracted away from the influence of the faculties

of sensibility and desire, we can see in ourselves the capacity for pure practical reason, that

of the divine will. From this noumenal standpoint the human being understands that the

world of the understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and so too of its laws,

and is therefore immediately lawgiving with respect to my will (Groundwork, 4:444)). As

a being that can take on the noumenal standpoint, I, as a human being, have (or at least

I feel that I have) the ability to influence what goes on in the phenomenal world; I do not

have to be pushed and pulled around by the laws of nature because I am a being such that I

can impose my own will onto the phenomenal world. In the example of my compulsive email

checking it was the case that I was able to choose to turn off the wireless on my computer

and give my phone to a friend so that I would be unable to continue to stop. In the end I

was able to use my ability to act to stop myself from being pushed to check my email.

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Korsgaard explains this as follows: You actually contribute we might say to the

rational, as opposed to the merely natural, ordering of the sensible world. The choice of the

moral maxim over the maxim of self-love may then be seen as a choice of genuine activity over

passivity; a choice to use your active powers to make a difference in the world (Korsgaard

(1996a, 169)). The divine will also has the ability to choose, it is just that the divine will

always chooses between actions that always accord with the moral law. The divine will is

always active. The human will, however, has the ability to choose to do the right thing or

the wrong thing because, as Kant says in the quote above, the human will also intuits itself

as a member of the phenomenal world.

The main point to be made here is that the ought emerges from the relation between the

two standpoints. The human will is rational and thus identifies itself with the moral law, but

is also sensible and realizes that it does not always act in accordance with that moral law.

Thus, the moral law becomes an imperative for the human will. Kant states: The moral

ought is then his [a human will] own necessary will as a member of an intelligible world,

and is thought by him as ought only insofar as he regards himself at the same time as a

member of the world of sense (Groundwork, 4:455). This notion of ought is relational; the

moral law is not essentially normative, but only takes up that role when placed in relation to

some opposing influences. The normativity is, in the words of Tolley once again, externally

conferred.

Before moving on to the analogy with the laws of logic, I will present an illustrative

example of relational normativity. We have the rules for the working of some kind of machine.

These rules explain exactly how the machine works and what it does. Perhaps the rules

describing the workings of the machine comprise an instruction set for a Turing machine,

which will continue to follow its instructions until they are completed, or the process simply

never terminates. In this case the rules are only constitutive, as we do not speak of how

Turing machines ought to work; these machines exist in the abstract, which excludes the

29

possibility of any interference. The rules in this case are not normative. This is analogous

to the case of the divine will and the moral law. However, suppose that we create a real

machine in the real world that works according to these rules. The machine will do exactly

what the rules tell it to do, unless something interferes with the ability of the machine to

adhere to the rules. Perhaps the machine runs out of power, or one of the parts of the

machine is destroyed by some natural cause. In this case the machine will malfunction, it

will not be working correctly. It is only because of the possibility of interference given the

nature of the overall setting with which the machine is in that we think of the machine as

working correctly or incorrectly. We do not think of the abstract Turing machine as working

correctly, we simply think of it as working. The rules are normative in relation to a situation

where it is possible for the machine to err. Just in this way, the moral law is normative in

relation to the kinds of beings whose nature is prone to err.

4.3 Analogy

If the laws of logic are normative in the same way that the moral law in relation to the

human will is normative, then there must be a way to delineate between two standpoints in

a similar manner, as well as explain the active component of the use of the understanding

to account for some sort of freedom in thought. The goal is to find a way to make sense of

the normative claims Kant makes in regard to the laws of logic, so it is important to make

sense of the laws of logic being relationally normative and not, as is the case with the moral

law and the divine will, merely constitutive.

4.3.1 The Divine Thinker

Kant himself brings out the analogy in a discussion of error:

Deviation from the rules of the pure will constitutes the morally evil, and thisarises only when and because other effects of other powers mingle with the oth-

30

erwise pure laws of the will. E.g.: The inclinations and affects. Just in this way,when foreign powers mingle with the correct laws of the understanding, a mixedeffect arises from the conflict of [this with] our judgments based on the laws ofthe understanding and reason. (Blomberg Logic, 102, my emphasis)

This quote suggests that deviation from the laws are caused in the same way, which further

suggests that the first condition for normativity, Error, should be similar in both cases. As

discussed above, the cause of moral error is the influence of the lower faculties of sensibility

and desire. In the case of logical error, Kant describes the cause as being sought simply

and solely in the unnoticed influence of sensibility upon the understanding (Jasche Logic,

53-4). So error is only possible through the influence of some other faculty, which explains

why Kant says that if we had no other power of cognition but the understanding, we would

never err (Jasche Logic, 53). The pure understanding can be thought analogously with the

pure will; thus, we can posit an analogous divine thinker.

The divine thinker always thinks in accordance with the laws of logic; every thought is

still spontaneous, as the understanding is an active faculty, it is just that it always thinks

logically. Kant states that what makes [logical] error possible, then, is illusion, in accordance

with which the merely subjective is confused in judgment with the objective (Jasche Logic,

54); just as we saw in the moral case, the divine thinker will never confuse the subjective

with the objective because the subjective necessarily correlates with the objective. Thus the

laws of logic constitute the thought of the divine thinker, not that of the human thinker, and

because the human thinker is influenced by other subjective conditions, the logical laws are

normative for the human thinker.

In this way, the laws of logic are normative in relation to the kind of beings that humans

are. As Tolley claims, The highest principles of each sphere (the law of contradiction and

the non-normative correlate of the categorical imperative, respectively) do not represent

prescriptions concerning what an understanding or practical reason should do (and yet

might fail to do), but rather an expression of what these capacities are (in their essence, as

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I have been calling it) (Tolley (2006, 389)). Thus, the laws of general logic are not essentially

normative, but, it seems, can be seen as normative in relation to the kind of beings that we

are, beings with different faculties that work together to create our judgments of the world

around us.

4.3.2 Pure and Applied General Logic

I now finally return to what I identified at the beginning of this essay as the important

distinction in Kants works on logic: pure general logic and applied general logic. The

laws of pure general logic are those that are constitutive of the divine thinkers thought.

However, the laws of general logic, which contains both pure and applied, are those that are

constitutive of the thought of beings that have the same collection of interwoven faculties

that human beings have. In contrast to the laws of pure general logic, the laws of applied

general logic are a representation of the understanding and the rules of its necessary use in

concreto (Critique of Pure Reason, B78/A54). The important point here is that the laws of

applied general logic are a representation of the general laws of logic in application, whereas

the laws of pure general logic are a representation of the very same laws in the abstract.

It is not the case that there are two sets of different laws, one set containing those pure

general laws and the other containing those applied general laws. There is one set of laws

that can be represented in two different ways. They are not two kinds of logic, but are rather

two different representations of the same logic. From this I argue that because the laws of

general logic can be represented either as pure or applied, and pure and applied are under

the umbrella of general logic that Kant makes the normative claim in the Jasche Logic. It

is important here to note that the explicit normative claim comes before Kant distinguishes

between pure general and applied general logics, and, as mentioned much earlier, Kant does

not make any explicit normative claims about logic in the Critique of Pure Reason. This

latter point may be attributed to the fact that right after Kant introduces the distinction

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between general and particular logics he goes on to distinguish pure general and applied

general logic, bypassing any claims about the nature of general logic more broadly.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant provides the following definition of pure general

logic: A general but pure logic therefore has to do with strictly a priori principles, and is

a canon of the understanding and reason, but only in regard to what is formal in their use

(Critique of Pure Reason, B77/A53). However, given the kind of beings that humans are,

the laws of general logic should be seen as the representation of the understanding working

ideally. Applied general logic, on the other hand, is to be seen as a representation of the

understanding as it is used by human beings:

What I call applied logic . . . is thus a representation of the understanding and therules of its necessary use in concreto, namely under the contingent conditions ofthe subject, which can hinder or promote this use, and which can only be givenempirically. It deals with attention, its hindrance and consequences, the cause oferror, the condition of doubt, of reservation, of conviction, etc., and general andpure logic is related to it as pure morality, which contains merely the necessarymoral laws of a free will in general, is related to the doctrine of virtue proper,which assesses these laws under the hindrances of the feelings, inclinations, andpassions to which human beings are more or less subject. (Critique of PureReason, B78/A54)

Applied general logic, it is important to note, is to be sure general insofar as it concerns

the use of the understanding without regard to the difference of objects (Critique of Pure

Reason, B77/A53). Here Kant makes it explicit that applied general logic is where we find

the cause of error. Thus, it seems that in any explanation of the normativity of the laws of

logic, the laws of applied general logic will play an important role. However, in the Critique

nothing more is said regarding the normativity of logic, which is why I now turn to the

Jasche Logic.

It is important to reiterate the structure of the first section in the Jasche Logic, which

is titled On Logic In General, as understanding how Kant sets up his discussion of logic is

crucial for my interpretation. The section begins with a broad discussion of how everything

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in nature, both lifeless and in the living world, takes place according to rules, (Jasche

Logic, 11) and then goes on to conclude that the faculty of understanding, which is itself

the source of rules, must also be guided by rules of its ownthe laws of logic. Then Kant

goes on to characterize the laws of general logic as that science of the necessary laws of the

understanding and of reason in general (Jasche Logic, 13), by providing five descriptions

of the nature of general logic. First, he explains that general logic is to be taken as the

propaedutic to all use of the understanding. Second, these laws cannot be used in the

creation of knowledge; the laws of logic are to be used as a universal art of reason for

making cognitions in general conform to the form of the understanding in general . . . which

serves of course merely for passing judgment and for correcting our cognition, but not for

expanding it (Jasche Logic, 13). This second point is interesting, as the laws of pure general

logic can be seen as those from which we pass judgment on our cognition, while those of

applied general logic can be seen as those with which we learn how to correct our cognition.

Given that Kant has not specified any distinction within general logic, this explanation

makes sense.8

The third point is the most important in light of our discussion, as this is where the

already much discussed explicit normative statement is found. The first paragraph states

that the laws of general logic, as a canon of the understanding, must contain nothing but

laws a priori, which are necessary and have to do with the understanding in general (Jasche

Logic, 14). Here I interpret Kant as saying that insofar as general logic provides a complete

list of those necessary conditions for thought, we must consider these laws as pure. In the

next paragraph he makes the normative claims:

In logic, however, the question is not about contingent but about necessary rules;not how we do think, but how we ought to think. The rules of logic must thusbe derived not from the contingent but the necessary use of the understanding

8I will not go into the details from the fourth and fifth descriptions, as they are not relevant to thediscussion at hand.

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. . . In logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and does think andhow it has previously proceeded in thought, but rather how it ought to proceedin thought. Logic is to teach us the correct use of the understanding, i.e., thatin which it agree with itself. (Jasche Logic, 14)

At this point we must recall our discussion of the ought and imperatives in the section on

the moral law. On Kants account, the ought can only be used in relation to imperfect

beings. If the laws of general logic tell us how we ought to think, then there is a way to

represent these laws from a non-pure standpoint. If this was not the case, if these laws could

only be represented as pure then the human thinker would be the divine thinker and the

ought would not apply. Thus, I take this quote to putting forth the relational interpretation

of normativity as I have been discussing it above. Because humans are beings that possess

many different faculties which often interfere with one another, the laws of general logic both

provide the laws that govern the pure thinker, as well as provide a way of how to use those

laws to best guide our thought in the correct manner.

After this section on logic in general follows the section titled Principal Divisions of

Logic, which is where we find the pure/applied distinction. Here Kant states:

In pure logic we separate the understanding from the other powers of the mindand consider what it does by itself alone. Applied logic considers the understand-ing insofar as it is mixed with the other powers of the mind which influence itsactions and misdirect it . . . In the end it admittedly says what one ought to do inorder to make correct use of the understanding under various subjective obstaclesand restrictions; and we can also learn from it what furthers the correct use ofthe understanding, the means of aiding it, or the cures for logical mistakes anderrors. (Jasche Logic, 18)

Within the umbrella of general logic we find these two ways of considering the laws of

general logic; one provides the constitutive laws for the pure understanding, and another

that takes these pure laws and relates them to the understanding of an imperfect being. I

claim that this talk of representing the laws as pure and applied is illustrated further when

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taken analogously to the noumenal/phenomenal distinction discussed earlier in this essay.9

4.4 Pure and Applied as Noumenal and Phenomenal

The laws of general logic can thus be considered noumenally or phenomenally, and, I ar-

gue, in his works on logic Kant uses the terminology of pure and applied towards this end.

Considered noumenally the laws of general logic are seen as constituting the faculty of un-

derstanding, and thus the laws of general logic are constitutive of or essential for the use of

the understanding. Although we are not constituted like the divine thinker, we do identify

ourselves with the workings of the understanding, and when we consider our capacity for

thought as abstracted away from our other capacitiesfrom the noumenal standpointwe

see ourselves as having the capacity for this perfection. And because this capacity for thought

is part of our constitution, every thought is guided by the laws of general logic. However,

we are also aware of the fact that we are fallible. We recognize this from our experience,

and we are aware that there are things that get in the way of our capacity for thought to

work perfectly. Thus, in thought there are other influences that effect the product of the

thought processsometimes we forget something pertinent, our minds can go blank, we get

distracted by a sensation, etc. All of these effects occur because we are also constituted such

that from the phenomenal standpoint our faculties are pushed and pulled by the lower fac-

ulties. When we consider our thought as being affected by these influences, we can analyze

the thought as represented through the lens of applied general logic.

And although these general laws of logic constitute thought such that we are beings

with the faculty of understanding, which actively imposes its laws on the action of thought,

these laws of general logic are also normative when we consider the relationship between the

pure laws and the kind of beings that we actually areimperfect ones. Because we can also

9I again direct the reader to Appendix A for a more in-depth discussion of the two standpoints as describedin Kants Transcendental Idealism as found in the Critique of Pure Reason. I will be referencing the appendixin the following section.

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consider these laws from the phenomenal standpoint, and because we are beings that possess

lower faculties, these laws become normative in application; when we consider our thought

from this phenomenal standpoint we see how these laws play the role of an imperative in our

thought processes. The laws of applied general logic are those that take into account the

interference from the sensibility and other faculties that may derail the understanding.

How does this solve the problem? The original problem is that Kant seems to say that

the laws of logic are normative for thought while also being constitutive for thought, which

results in the inability to err, which then results in these laws not being normative. Just to

reiterate the issue as stated at the beginning of the essay, Kant makes the following claims:

(N) The laws of logic are normative for thought. (Jasche Logic, 14)

(ES) There are laws of logic which are essential for the act of thought. (Jasche Logic, 13)

(V) A law that is essential for the activity of the understanding (or any faculty by itself)cannot be violated. (Vienna Logic, 824)

And we also want to hold that

(ER) For a law to be normative, it must be possible to violate it in some way. In otherwords, an ought implies can err.

The interpretation I have just provided makes sense of all of these claims. The laws of logic

are normative for thought because, given the kind of beings that we are, all of our thought

is effected by the relation between the noumenal and phenomenal standpoints. The laws of

logic are essential for thought insofar as we consider them only viewing them as pure, or

strictly from the noumenal standpoint; it follows from this that insofar as we are considering

the understanding from the noumenal standpoint, the und