AN APPLICATION OF THE TOUlMIN MODEL TO '!'HE LEGlt.L

REASONING OF POLICE FREE SPEECH LITIGATION

by

CARROL RAY P~GGARD, B.B.A.

A THF.SIS

L~

SPEECH COMMUNICATION

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty cf Texas Tech University in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

Accepted

August, 197 5

c

ACKN OWLEDGNENT S

I am deeply indebted to Dr. Keith V. Erickson for his encouraga-

ment and guidance in the direction of this thesis, and for the pri-

vile~e of being his first thesis advisee. I wish to express my appre-

ciation to the other members of my committee, Dr. John F. Deethardt

and Mr. Vernon R. McGuire, for their assistance and suggestions.

For stimulating my interest in argumentation, I am deeply

indebted to 1-!r. Vernon R. McGuire, Mr. Douglas Andrews and Hr. Robert

A. Trapp of the Vniversity of Northern Colorado, Greeley, Colorado.

11

TABLE OF CONTEliTS

ACKNOWLEDGE>mNT S • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

I. TOOIMIN' S ARGUMml' MODEL • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Introduction • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

The Toulmin Model or Argument • • • • • • • •

Claim • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Data •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Warrant • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Backing • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

~il'ier • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Rebuttal • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Advantages or the Toulmin Model • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • Graphic Simplicity •

Material Validity • • • • • • • • • • •

Inclusion or Probability • • • • • • • •

Suggested Deficiencies and Proposed Extentions

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to Toulmin's Model • • • • • • • • • • • • • 11

Purpose or Study • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16

Methods and Procedures • • • • • • • • • • • 16

I.1mitations Imposed Upon the Study • • • • • 18

Previous Research • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 19

End Notes •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 20

II. POLICE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS • • • • • • • • • • • • 26

Public Emplo.yee Expression Rights • • • • • • 27

The Police Expression Controvers,y • • • • • • 29

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Page

The Balancing of Rights • • • • • • • • • • • 32

Departmental Criticism by Policemen • • • • • 33

Police Hairstyles • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Political Activity of Policemen • • • • • • •

Police Union Membership • • • • • • • • • • •

Summar:~ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

End Notes • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

III. GRAPHIC DISPLAYS OF LEGAL REASONING • • • • • • •

Muller v. Conlisk •• • • • • • • • • • • • •

Greenwald v. Frank • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Paulos v. Breier • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Ball v. City Council of the Cit7 of Coachella • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

End Notes • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Extentions to the Toulmin Model • • • • • • •

Sub-Arguments • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Chains • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Clusters • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Backing for Data • • • • • • • • • • • •

The Sufficiency of the Toulmin Model • • • •

Suggestions for Future Research • • • • • • •

Sunnary •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

End Notes • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

B IBLIOORAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

APPElfDIX • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Muller, Issue One • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Muller, Issue Two • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Muller, Issue Three • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Muller, Issue Four • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Huller, Issue Five • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Muller, Issue Six • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Greenwald, Issue One

Greenwald, Issue Two

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Greenwald, Issue Three • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Greenwald, Issu~ Four • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Greenwald, Issue Five • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Greenwald, Issue Six • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Paulos, Issue One • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Paulos, Issue Two • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Paulos, Issue Three • 4' • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Paulos, Issue Four •••••••••••••••

Paulos, Issue Five • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Ball, Issue <:ne, .Two, and Three • • • • • • • • •

Ball, Issue Four

Ball, Issue Five

Bal 1, Issue Six

Ball, Issue Seven

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Ball, Issue Eight, Nine-, and Ten • • • • • • • •

Ball, Issue Eleven • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

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CHAPTER ONE

TOULMIN' S ARGUMENT MODEL

Introduction

I may seem to quote overmuch. MY excuse is the desire to make manifest the truth, that back of what I write is the sanction of something stronger than my own unaided thought.

Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo (1921)

Marie Hochmuch Nichols asks the single most pertinent question for

the critic of argumentation: "Who can report on the logic of a case

without a language that is capable of r.recision and exactness in stat­

ing relationships?"! The dimensions of this inquiry are broadened in

Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric, 2 released

in 1958. In their introduction, the,r chide logicians for a 300-year

neglect of the stuqy of the methods of proof used to secure adherence.3

Noting the recent activity in this field, however, they observe:

Logic underwent a brilliant development during the last cen­tury when abandoning the old formulas, it set out to analyze the methods of proof effectively used by mathematicians. Mo­dern formal logic became, in this way, the study of the me­thods of demonstration used in the mathematical sciences. One result of this development is to limit its domain, ~ince eve~­thing ignored by mathematicians is foreign to it. Logicians owe it to themselves to complete the theory of demonstration obtained in this way by a theo~ of argumentation . • . Our f:i.eld of study is immense and it has lain fallow for centuries. We hope that our first results will incite other researchers to complete and ~erfect them.4

Working independently in 1958, the British logician Stephen E.

Toulmin offered an analytic alternative to the traditional syllogistic

study of logic in his iconoclastic book, The Uses of Argument. 5 Toulmin

questioned the sufficiency of the syllogism when "applied in the criti­

cal assessment of actual arguments."6 In his chapter 11 The Layout of

1

2

Arguments," Toulmin discusses four faults he finds associated with the

use of the syllogism: (1) the idea of 11universal premises," {2) the

notion of formal validity, (3) the peculiarities of analytic argu­

ments, and (4) s.yllogistic ambiguities.? With these indictments of

the syllogism, Toulmin advocates a system of logical analysis which,

he claims, is expressly capable of demonstrating the sources of argu­

mentative validity. 8

The s.rllogistic study of logic was developed by Aristotle. In his

discussion of the methods of proof utilized in persuasion, Aristotle

notes in the Rhetoric a relationship between the syllogism and the

courts argumentative process. He observes that in the courts, "non-

esbential" issues are not allowed, and he claims that the same is true

of the syllogism, 9 a geanetric system of analysis. Toulmin' s system

of logical analysis, however, is based entirely upon a legal analog.

Toulmin discusses the legal analogy in detail at five different points

in his book •10

In his comparison of logic and the courts, Toulmin

writes:

Logic is generalized jurisprudence. Arguments can be com­pared with law-suits, and the claims we make and argue for in extra-legal contexts with claims made in the courts, while the eases we present in making good each kind of claim can be compared with each other. A main task of jurispru­dence is to characterize the essentials of the legal process: the procedures by which claims at law are put forward, dis­puted and determined, and the categories in terms of which this is done. Our own inquiry is a parallel one: we shall aim, in a similar way, to characterize what may be called the 'rational-process,' the procedures and categories by 11 using which claims-in-general can be argued for and settled.

Toulmin feels that this is an :important distinction since: ". • • there

is one special virtue in the parallel between logic and jurisprudence:

it helps to keep in the centre of the picture the critical function

12 of reason."

3

Toulmin's rationale for the utilization of the legal analog lies

in the complexity of argumentation:

The analogy with jurisprudence • • • would naturally lead us to adopt a layout of greater complexity than has been customary, for the questions we are asking here are more general versions of questions already familiar in juris­prudence, and in that more specialized field a whole battery of distinctions has grown up. '~'Jhat different sorts of propositions,'~ legal philosopher will ask, 'are uttered in the course of a law case, and in what different w~vs can such propositions bear on the sound­ness of a legal claim?' This has been and still is a central question for the student of jurisprudence, and we soon find that the nature of the legal process can be properly understood only if we draw a large number of dis­tinctions. Legal utterances have m~. :-:y distinct functions. Statements of claim, evidence of identification, testimony about events in dispute, interpretations of a statute or discussions of its validicy, claims to exemptions from the application of a law, pleas in extenuation, verdicts, sen­tences; all these different classes of propositions have their parts to play in the legal process, and the differ­ence between them are in practice far from trifling. ifuen we turn from the special case of the law to consider ra­tional arguments in general, we are faced at once by the question whether these must not be analyzed in terms of an equally complex set of categories. If we are to set out arguments with complete logical candour, and understand properly the nature of the 'logical process' surely we shall need to ernplgy a pattern of ar~ent no less sophis­ticated than is reguired cy the law.

Toul.min, addressing the complexity of legal argumentation, notes here

the number of issues and their potential impact upon the final deter-

mination of litigation. He assumes that rational argumentation is

equallY complex and possesses a large number of issues, each var.ying

in degree of impact upon a final logical decision.

The rationale behind the application of a legal analogy to the

study of argument becomes evident upon examination of the judicial process.

4

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speaking to the nature of the logical

processes in the functioning of the courts notes: 11 • • • the language

of judicial decisions is mainly the language of logic. 1114

However, Toulmin does not deceive himself in believing a legal ana-

log will improve current judicial reasoning. Julius Stone concurs:

For ••• Toulmin ..• the philosophers' resort to the judicial model is in search of aid to their philosophical tasks, rather than with any claim that judicial tasks will thereby be made easy. Perelman has, indeed, expressly suggested that in domains such as law the logician should not tr,y to teach the specialist, but rather learn from them analysis in the arguments which specialists find useful for strength and weakness, relevance or irrelevance; and his general position suggests that this precept may be apt for philosophers workinr with rhetorics also. 1 5

The Toul.rnin 1-fodel of Argument

Anticipating the development of a schematic layout of arguments,

Toulmin considered the pragmatic concerns of applied logic:

Keeping our ~es on the categories of applied logic--on the practical business of ar~entation, that is, and on the notions it reouires us to empl~--we must ask what features logically car~id layouts of arguments will need to have. The establisr~ent of conclusions raises a num­ber of issues of different sorts, and a practical

6layout

will make allowance for these differences: ••• 1

P..ay ~ Anderson and C. David l-lortensen provided a partial answer to

the necessar,y ingredients of such a layout:

As a minimum requirement . • • the concept ought to make explicit the observable conditions allowing the critic to assert that the conclusion of an argument follo!; (analy­tically, probably, possibly) from its premises.

The Toulmin model of argument consists of six functional parts.

1. Pata (D) • • • the facts we appeal to as a foundation for the claim •••

2. Claim (C) ••• (the) conclusion whose merits we are seeking to establish • • •

5

3. Warrant (W) ••• its task being simply to register explicitly the legitimacy of the step involved (from data to claim) • • • ce~ifying the soundness of all arguments •••

Toulmin's elements do not vary from traditional logic, as "· •• he

changed the traditional term "minor premise" to "Data." Major premise

became "warrant" ••• and "conclusion" became "claim" ••• 19 Toulmin,

however, adds three elements which are not explicitly present in tradi-

tional s.yllogistic logic. Toulmin adds the features of:

4. Backing (B) ... Standing behind our warrants, ••• there will normally be other assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor curren~ • • •

5. Qualifier (Q) ... indicating the strength conferred by the warrant •••

6. Rebuttal (R) • • • conditions of exception • • . indicating circumstances in which the general auth~0ity of the warrant would have to be set aside.

The following is an explanation of the elements of the model. The

elements are explained with regard to: (1) an extention and explanation

of Toulmin's definitions of the component parts of the model, (2) their

relationship to traditional methods of logical analysis, (3) the rela­

tionship of the parts to each other within the model, and (4) a sample

argument schematically laid out.

Claim

The claim is known as the conclusion in traditional syllogistic

logic. It represents the contention that the arguer wishes to advance.

Toulmin's concept of claim is that of an assertion, based on evidence,

which the arguer is trying to establish. 21 The claim may stand as the

ultimate end of an argument, or it may, according to Douglas Ehninger,

serve as the data for the next argument. 22 In any case, the claim is

usually an explicit appeal.

6

Data

Toulmin's "data" is the minor premise in syllogistic logic. "If

the claim is challenged, we must be able to establish it • • • How is

this to be done? • • • we shall normal~ have some facts to which we

can point in its support; if the claim is challenged, it is up to us

to appeal to these facts, and present them as the foundation upon which

our claim is based."23 "Data" thus, takes the form of the conventional

modes of supporting materials of fact, opinion, or testimony, usually

f ed t "d 24 re err o as ev~ ence. Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede state:

11 Data may report historical or contemporary events, take the form of

a statistical compilation or of citation from authority. • • Further,

data represents the factual point of departure of an argument and, as

such, is an informative and substantive element.

Warrant

Toulmin's warrant corresponds to the major premise in syllogistic

logic. Toulmin sets the function of the warrant as being bridge-like

proofs which justif.y a leap from data to conclusion.26

Our task is no longer to strengthen the ground on which our argument is constructed, but is rather to show that, taking these data as a starting point, the step to the original claim or conclusion is an appropriate and legitimate one. At this point, therefore, what are needed are general, hypo­thetical statements, which can act as bridges, and authorize 27 the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us.

The warrant can be distinguished from the data, Toulmin claims, by

the questions that each of the elements answers. Data is concerned with

"what" supports an argument, whereas a warrant is concerned with "how"

an arguer reaches his conclusion. The data is explicit, whereas the

7

warrant is implicit. 28 The function of the warrant is to show how the

data supports the claim being advanced, thereby strengthening the re­

lationship between the data and the clatm.

Since it is Toulmin's assertion·that the syllogism is not sufficiently

complex, he adds three new dimensions to the traditional model. The addi-

tional elements are: backing, qualifier, and rebuttal.

Backing

Backing, according to Ehninger and Bre>ckriede, is "support for the

warrant,n29 required when the authority of the warrant is questioned;

it provides ligitimacy for the warrant.3° Toulmin observes:

In addition to the question whether or on what conditions a warrant is applicable in a particular case, we may be asked why in general the warrant should be accepted as having authority. In defending a claim, that is, we may produce our data, our warrant, and the relevant qualifications and conditions, and yet find that we have still not satisfied cur challenger; for he may be dubious not only atout this particular argument but about the more general question whether the warrant (W) is acceptable at all.31

The backing step is usually explicit, when present, and serves as

support, clarification, or rationale for the warrant. It is "introduced

when readers or listeners are not willing to accept a warrant at its

faee value."32

Qualifier

A qualifier denotes the degree of probability present in a claim.

Toulmin explains the function of the qualifier: "· •. we may need to

add same explicit reference to the degree of force which our data confer

on our elaim in virtue of our warrant. In a word, we may have to put in

a gualifier. n33 The qualifier registers the degree of force or the linli­

tations which the arguer believes the data eonfers on his claim. The

8

qualifier may be expressed in such terms as; "probably," "presumably,"

"possibly," "generally," "usually, 11 and "almost certainly. n

Rebuttal

The rebuttal is a reservation to a claim, as it contains cases of

possible exception to the general rule.34 In these exceptional cases,

the warrant would be set aside and the claim invalidated. The function

of the rebuttal, therefore, like the qualifier, is to account for the

element of probability. As such, the rebuttal may not emerge in every

argument. Ehninger and Brockriede note the role of the rebut tal in

Toulmin' s model:

It recognizes certain conditions under which the claim will not hold good or will hold good only in a qualified and restricted way. By limiting the area to which the claim may legitimately be applied, the A·~buttal anticipates cer­tain objections which might otherwise be advanced against the argument.35

Given these component parts of the model, Toulmin graphically il­

lustrates the layout of an argument:36

D (Data)

Since

w (Warrant)

CAl account of

B (Racking for warrant)

So, Q c (Qualifier) (Claim)

9

Advantages of the Toulmin Model

The Toulmin system is not a radically new reasoning process as

parts of his model constitute the elements of a syllogism. The Toulmin

construct has three inherent advantages over a syllogistic analysis of

arguments, however. Ehninger and Brockriede catalogue the model's ad-

vantages according to its: (1) graphic simplicity, {2) ability to exa-

mine material validity of an argument, and (3) introduction of the ele-

ment of probability which qualifies and limits the advanced claims.

Each of these advantages is considered independently.

Graphic Simplicity

The critic, employing the Toul.min model, may view the entire argu-

ment or chain of arguments in one unified construct, as any argument

may be fitted to the Toulmin construct. 37 Since, . • • "the format in

which the argument is placed is highly important to the clarity and

understandin~ of the case • • • , n38 Toulmin' s schematic provides a

graphic aid to the critic of argumentation. The value of such an aid

is ~tmmarized by Austin J. Freeley:

By laying out his arguments in the form of the structural model, the advocate gains an additional opportunity to analyze the whole complex of the argument and to select certain portions of the argument for further examination by the

3application

of appropriate test of evidence and reasoning. '

Thus, due to the visual nature of the model, the critic can view the ar-

gument in its entirety, or single out individual parts for additional

analysis.

The nature of the pictoral display simplifies assessing an argu-

ment's canpleteness. Robert C. Dick feels that Toulmin's model "tends

to simplif,y the argumentative process, as he makes the debater aware

10

of each vital element within an argument."40 Such an awareness allows

the critic to determine what, if anything, is weak or missing entirely,

the advantages of which are elaborated upon by Ehninger and Brockriede:

Whereas in the traditional analysis the division of argu-ments into premises and conclusions (as in the syllogism, for example) often tends to obscure deficiencies in proof, Toulmin's model assigns each part of an argument a specific geographical or spatial position in relation to the others, th~I rendering it more likely that weak points will be detected.

Thus, the Toulmin construct is graphically superior to the syllogism

in that it (1) allows an entire argument to be viewed as a unit,

(2) allows a critic to single out parts for further analysis, and

(3) tends to illuminate weaknesses of an argument.

Material Validity

The Toulmin construct emphasizes material validity as opposed to

formal validity stressed by logicians. This aspect of the model,

Jimmie D. Trent argues, adapts it to the field of speech more so than

other forms of analysis:

••• unlike logicians, speech teachers are less concerned with formal validity than th~ are with material validity . • • • The great appeal of Toulmin's model appears to be the emphasis on material valt~ity which is achieved by de­emphasizing formal validity.

Inclusion of Probability

Toulmin is concerned with the argumentation process as practiced in

da~ life. Since the arguer seeks acceptance of his claims, Toulmin is,

therefore, interested in the degree of probative force which the arguer

places upon various arguments.

The punter and the actuar,y, the physicist and the dice­thrower are as much concerned with degrees of acceptability and expectation as the meteorologist or the man-in-the-street:

whether backed by mathematical calculations or no, the characteristic function of our particular, practical probability-statements is tf3present guarded or qualified assertions and conclusions.

11

In order to induce "the guarded or qualified assertions, 11 Toulmin added

the element of probability to his model. The elements of qualifier and

rebuttal serve Toulmin' s purpose here in diminishing the force of the

claim advanced. By includinE probability Toulmin allows for an

audience's willingness to accept an argument.

Suggested Deficiencies and Proposed Extentions to Toulmin' s Hodel

Not ever.yone, however, agrees that the Toulmin system offers a

distinct advantage in the assessment of arguments. Toulmin's model

has been subjected to two types of criticism. First, that his oug-

gestions do nothing to advance the state of knowledge in the disci-

pline of logic, and secondly that his model is incomplete and in need

of expansion. Of the two criticisms, the former is currently argued

by logicians. The second criticism warrants investigation by the

rhetorical critic.

:Ehninger and Brockriede, in their initial treatment of Toulmin,

add two features to the model. First, "a claim may stand as the final

proposition in an argument, or it may be an intermediate statement which

serves as data for a subsequent inference. u44 They thereby create the

possibility of an argument presented in a chain of arguments. Second,

in their discussion of backing, they add that: "such credentials may

consist of a single item, or of an entire argument in itself complete

with data and claim. u45

12

These additional concepts account for the possibility of sub-

arguments occuring in the Toulmin construct, as noted by Russel R.

Windes and Arthur Hastings: "· •• there may be several sub-arguments

in the overall argument • • • These sub-arguments might be granted or

the.y might be questioned depending on the evidence and warrants which

16 suppo~t them."~ llininger elaborates this issue in his discussion of

arguments requiring more than one element of proof in order to secure

adherance.

Sometimes, however, the claim the author of an argument wishes to establish is of such a nature that no single unit of proof is equal to the task. When this situation arises, it becomes neces.·~ary to employ a series or chain of arguments or

47o group a number of arguments together

into a cluster.

Ehninger describes these forms by first discussing the notion of a

"chain of arguments":

When arguments are arranged in a series or chain, each unit of proof, save the first one, is preceded by a similar unit, the conclusion or claim statement of which serves as evidence for the arguments that follow. In this way, evidence in the form of facts or values that at first glance seem remote from the claim the arguer

8 wishes to establish may be brought to bear in its support.4

Ehninger further notes the role of the cluster in argumentation:

Sometimes the claim an arguer wishes to advance can be established neither by a single arrument nor by a chain of arguments ••• Under these circumstances, a number of independent ar~ents or chains of arguments may be grouped together into a cluster, or bundle of proofs, the cumulative effect of which is to support the claim in question • • • i/ithin argumentative clusters of this sort, individual arguments or units of proof, ••• retain their autonomous status, each acting ~s an inde­pendent element, contributes a certain measure of

credibility to the claim the arguer seeks to establish. Since, however, no one unit of proof is judged sufficient to establish the claim alone and unaided, it is joined with others of a similar or related nature.49

13

Ehninger•s addition of the concepts of chains and clusters recognizes

the possibility that more than one argumentative unit may be required

for an argument to support a final claim.

The inclusion of additional parts of the model to provide further

support has lead some scholars to examine and modify Toulmin' s layout.

Austin J. Freeley justifies modifications of the model:

The structural model of arrument expands and becomes increasingly cocplex as the argument develops. For example, further rebuttal may be introduced as refuta­tion of the orif,inal rebuttal; the claim may become the data in the next step of arrument, just as a conclusion in one argument may become a premise in another argument in a chain of entheymemes. 5U

With this rationale, Freeley illustrates an example of a potential laYout:51

0------------~--------------Q,----c 1 2 3

w R

w

B 1 2

Freele.y's adaptation includes provision for several elements of data in

an argument, as more than one element of proof may be ·required. In his

discussion of the requirements for utilizing data Perelman notes:

The utilization of data for argumentative purposes is impossible without a conceptual dev·elopnent which gives them meaning and makes them relevant to the progression of the discourse. A consideration of the aspects of this development--of this fonM1lation--helps us to grasp more clearly wh~t distinguishes argumentation from demonstration. 5

14

Those who argue that the Toulmin model is deficient do so in rela-

tion to the claimed lack of a "conceptual development which gives (data)

meaning." Glen Mills cites this deficiency in the Toulmin model thusly:

This model makes no provisions for either testing or backing the Data step. Thus one must say, "If • • • then, presum­ably ••• " But one who wants to make a stronger argument than "If • • • then" needs the equivalent of a Backing step under Data to verify the assertion that (serves as the data).53

Trent elaborates upon the problems that are presented by this omission:

When the information which led to the data statement was omitted, the portion of arguments on which speakers spend the most time was omitted. Same authors have tried to avoid this problem by SUffesting tt1t the data statement be established by prior proof. ~·hen this procedure works, it results in fragmentation of the argument. But this pro­cedure will not work in most cases because the prior proofs will be inductive, thus leading to a qualified conclusion for a data state~ent. Toulmin's model does not provide for a qualifier in the data statement. Nor does Toulmin 1 s model indicate the origin of the conclusion when it is contained in the backing or the warrant for the data. And finally, by separating the rebuttal from data and warrant, Toulcin's model conceals the sources of the uncer­tainty. Hore cor.1plex models will be required to correct these problems.54

Trent offers "a more complex model" by adding "backing for data." The

inclusion of this step manifests the origin of evidence supporting the

claim. The addition of this step, Trent believes, provides greater

clarity and support for the argument advanced, as now, data supporting

the claim may be documented. This allows for the existence of a claim

in the data step.

15

In sum, constructive criticism of the Toulmin model's deficiencies

are four in number. First, the claim may be a part of a series of

arguments, allowing for the possibility of chains. Second, the backing

step may have its own data-claim movement, thus supporting the backing

and recognizing the possibility of clusters. Third, the actual layout

may include more than one element in the data and backing steps, and

fourth, a lack of backing for data diminishes determination of the

evidence's origin.

However, modifications and adaptations of Toulmin's original lay-

out schematic are not perversions of Toulmin' s concepts. Toulmin,

himself, insisted that ". • • nothing in what follows pretends to be

final, and I shall have fulfilled my purpose if my results are found

suggestive." 55 As to his scher~tic layout (page B) Toulmin writes:

"This fo:nn may not be final ••• u56 His statements are taken by some

as a rationale for modifYing the codel, as Trent notes:

While Toulmin 1 s purpose did not motivate him to complete a model for argumentation, his model has served to put new emphasis on the importance of material validity. 'While most argumentation textbooks have long included material validity in the complete discussion of arguments, it has frequently been omit ted from argument models. \~bile Toulmin did not include all of the support useful in examining arguments, he did remind us of its importance.57

Be.yond the claims of incompleteness, J.C. Coole.y notes Toulmin's

"inadequate" treatment of his judicial analog:

He (Toulmin) makes no attempt to lay out a piece of legal reasoning and note just what the resemblances are as be­tween law and, say, natural science and this is a pity because such comparisons are interesting even if the resem­blances turn out to be superficial. Thus the force of his remark that we shall need, throughout logic, a pattern of analysis "at least as sophisticated as the law" hangs in the air.58

16

CuriouslY, no researcher has yet investigated the soundness of Toulmin's

analog or the theorized ententions to his model.

Purpose of the Study

This stuqy assumes, based on prior research, that the Toulmin model

has utility in the study of rhetoric in general and argumentation in

particular.59 The purpose of the stuqy is to demonstrate the sufficiency

of the Toulmin model in its application to legal reasoning. In addition,

certain criticisms and extentions to the model will be examined in light

of its application to the legal reasoning of the courts.

Specifically, the purpose of the study is to demonstrate the suf-

ficiency of the Toulmin model as applied to the legal argumentation of

the courts in police free speech cases. This purpose generated two

research questions:

1. To what extent, if any, is the Toulmin model deficient in application to legal reasoning?

2. To what extent, if any, may the Toulmin model be expanded or modified to best depict arguments in legal reasoning?

Methods and Procedures

The constitutional issue of police free speech was chosen as the

vehicle for a Toulmin analysis for several reasons. First, the encom-

passing area of free speech as a constitutional issue has a great diver-

gency of opinions, both in and out of the judicial branch. Second,

several approaches have been taken by the courts toward the issue of

expression rights which provides a broad spectrum of judicial thought

and reasoning.

Third, public employees, due to the nature of their employment,

face unique free speech problems which do not confront the average citizen.

17

Since they are •public servants:" the governmental agencies for which

the,y work often place restrictions upon their activities in an effort

to insure non-biased public service. Finally, as police freedom of

expression is a developing area of law, the number of cases having

reached the ad.~udication stage is limited, thereby allowing the entire

issue to be surveyed.

The areas of police expression rights selected for this study are

departmental criticism, grooming, political activity, and union membership;

currentlY the central issues of police free speech rights. A search of

the legal indexes indicates that the majority of police free spe~ch cases

are classified according to these issues. 60 The four cases to be

examined are: MUller v. Conlisk (1970),61 departmental criticism;

Greenwald v. Frank (1972)62 hair styling; Paulos v. Breier (1974), 63

political activity; and Ball v. City Council (1967)64 union membership.

The criteria emplqyed in selecting these cases were: (1) does the case

establish precedence for the respective issue? and (2) is the general

applicability of the case broad enough to warrant analysis?

Five methodological steps were employed in the study. First, the

issues of each case were separated in preparation for analysis. Next,

each issue was examined according to the canponent parts of the Toulmin

model. Each component part was fitted to the Toul min construct, and

where applicable, to appropriate extentions. Toulmin's chapter, "The

Uses or Argument" provided the basis for the l.routs. 65 Ehninger and

Brockriede's,66 and Trent's67 researeh vas consulted for extentions

or Toulmin's model.

18

FinallY, once each argument was graphically displayed, the pattern

of the layout was examined for the presence of extentions to the model

and their validity. Each of the layouts were independently verified by

two inspectors.

Limitations Imposed Upon the Study

Three major limitations were imposed on this study. First, only

the constitutional issue of police free speech rights was considered.

Issues involving interests other than the expression rights of police

officers may reveal differences in legal argumentation. Second, as the

law.yer's briefs, utilized in arguing before the courts, were unavailable,

the study was limited to the reasoning of the courts as deliniated within

written opinions. (The opinions of the court represent the argumenta-

tive reasoning of the justices in warranting their decisions.)

~ Third, because the cases examined are issues of police expression

freedoms, a developing area, the precedents examined are not examples

of Supreme Court adjudiciation. This resulted in two constraints upon

the study. First it limited the use of qualifying language, a feature

of the Toul.min construct. The Supreme Court, due to the "finality" of

its decisions must clearly delineate the impact of each decision, and

the policies it thereby establishes, upon the total body of the law.

Secondly, it limited the existance of rebuttal information. A non­

unanimous Supreme Court decision, for example, will usually have at least

one dissenting opinion. OrdinarilY, the majority opinion will comment on

wny the dissenter's reasoning was rejected.

19

Previous Research

The area of police free speech is relatively new, for not until

1967 did the courts recognize rights of public employees.6B Research

on police expression rights is limited mainly to legal analysis con­

cerned with the impact of the rulings.69 A historical account of the

cases and issues involvin£ the police free speech movement, through

the litigation process, is developed in Chapter Two.

Since Ehninger and Brockriede's application of the Toulmin model

to the field of speech,?O research investigating the model has proli­

ferated. A surve.y of the literature on the Toulmin construct revealed

six dissertations,?! ten master's theses,72 and numerous scholarly

articles,73 which either examined or employed the Toulmin model. Only

four studies have attempted to follow a contemporar.y theme throughout

several speeches.74 However, no investigation to date has applied the

Toulmin model to judicial reasoning, nor examined the proposed exten­

tions to the model. Cases of police expression rights also are lacking

in scholarlY investigation. Thus, it appears that research investigating

the applicability of Toulmin's judicial analog and its theorized exten­

tions is warranted. Toulmin's judicial analog, as applied to police

free speech litigation, is examined as: Chapter Two outlines the his~

tor,y of police free speech litigation; Chapter Three demonstrates the

Toulmin model applied to legal reasoning; Chapter Four discusses the

applicability of the legal analog and proposed extentions to the model,

together with suggestions for further research in legal argumentation.

20

END NOTES

1 Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism, (Baton Rouge, La:

Louisiana State University Press, 1963),-p: 76.

2 Chatm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-T)~teca, ~ ~ Pbetoric-­A Treatise .Q!! Arrumentation, trans. John ~'lilkinson and Purcell ~·Ieaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).

3 Ibid., l.

4 Ibid., 10.

5 Stephen E. Toulmin, The Uses of Ar~ent, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

6 Ibid., 3.

7 Ibid. ' 107-145.

8 Ibid., 94-95.

9 Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. II. Bhys Roberts (New York: The Modern Librar.y, 1954) 1354b, 1-24.

10 Toulmin, 7-8, 15-17, 41-43, 96, 141-142.

11 Ibid.' 7.

12 Ibid.' 8.

13 Ibid., 96, emphasis mine.

14 Oliver \•/endel1 Holmes, "The Path of Law, 11 10 Harvard Law Review, 465.

15 Julius Stone, Legal System and La~ers' Reasoning, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 318.

16 Toulmin, 95.

17 Ray 1Qnn Anderson and C. David lolortenson, "Logic and Harketplace

Argumentation, 11 Qgarter1y Journal £f. Speech, LII (April, 1967), 143-151.

18 Toulmin, 97, 100.

21

l9 Jimmie D. Trent, "Toulmin' s Model of Argument: An Examination and Extention," QJarterly Journal 21. Speech, LIV (October, 1968), 253.

20 Toulmin, 101, 103.

21 Ibid., 97.

22 Dou~las Ehninger, Influence, Belief and Argument, (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1974~p. 14.

23 Toulmin, 97.

24 Some authors on the Toulmin model substitute the word "evidence" for "data." See Erwin P. Eettinghaus, "Structure and Argument," in Perspectives 2n hr~mentation, ed. by Gerald R. Ydller and Thomas E. Nilson (Chicaro: Scctt, Foresman and Company, 1966), pp. 148-154; Douglas Elm:inger and ~layne l:rockriede, Decisi..2.!! bv Debate {rJew York: Dodd, 1-!ead and Company, 1963), pp. 98-107; :'layne C. Mirmick, The Art of Persuasion, 2nd ed., (Eoston: Hourhton l·:ifflin Cornpany, 1968), pp. 146-148. Douglas Ehninger, Influence, Eeliefs and Ar[U~ent, (Glenview Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1974), pp. lC-25; Hobert C. Dick, Argume~tation and Rational Debating, (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1972), pp. 35-57.

25 Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Thninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," Qlarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI, #1 (Februar,y, 1960), 44.

26 Toulmin, 98.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 100.

29 Douglas Ehninger and \'layne Brockriede, Decision ~ Debate, (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1963), p. 105.

JO Toulmin, 103 •

.31 Ibid •

.32 Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument, 11 45.

3.3 Toulmin, 101.

34 Ibid.

35 Brockriede and Ehninger, 11Toulmin on Argument, 11 45.

36 Toulmin, 101.

3? Robert C. Dick, Argumentation and Rational Debating, (Dubuque, Iowa: \~. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1972), p. 35.

22

3B Donald R. Terry, Hodern Debate Case Techniques, (Skokie, Illinois: National Textbook Company, 1970), p. 100.

39 Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate: Rational Decision ¥laking, 2nd ed., (San Francisco: ···iadsworth Publishing Company; 1966), p. U.J.

40 Dick, p. 35.

41 Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument, " 4 7.

42 Trent, 253.

43 Toulmin, 93.

44 Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument, 11 44.

45 Ibid.

46 Russel R. Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy, (New York: Random House, 1965).

47 Ehninger, Influence, Beliefs and Arguments, p. 15.

48 -Ibid., p. 14.

49 Ibid.

50 Freeley, 140.

51 Ibid., 141.

52 Perelman, 120.

53 Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controvers~: An Introduction to General Argumentation, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), p. 111.

54 Trent, 256.

55 Toulmin, 1.

56 Ibid., 104.

57 Trent, 259.

58 J .C. Cooley, "On ~1r. Toulmin 1 s Revolution in Logic," ~ Journal £f Philosoph~, 171, #7 (March, 1959), 314.

59 Ehninger and Brockriede, Decision £[ Debate; Freeley; Miller and Nilson; Hills; Edward P.ogre and James C. Ching, .;.dvanced Public Speaking (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Hilson, Inc., 1966) pp. 99-101; John F. Wilson and Carroll C. Arnold, Public Speaking~~ Liberal Art, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), pp. 139-142; ·,iindes and Hastings.

60 Index to Law Reviews and ~ournals, Vol. 18 through Vol. 24, 1968 to 1974.

61 Muller v. Conlisk 429 F.2d 901 (1970).

62 Greenwald v. Frank 334 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972).

63 Paulos v. Breier 371 F.Supp. 523 (1974).

64 Ball v. Cit~ Council of the City of Coachella 60 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967).

65 Toulmin, 94-145.

66 Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument," 44-53, and Decision Br Debate, pp. 98-110, 125-167.

67 Trent.

68 Kgyishian v. Board of Regents 385 U.S. 563 (1967).

23

24

69 See Linda Hoody, "Extending the Sheild of the First Amendment

to the Outspoken Policeman" Criminal Law Bulletin 8 (Fall, 1972) p. 170; Richard Halpert "The Policeman's Right to Free Speech," Indiana Law Journal 46 (SUir.mer, 1971) p. 538; Stephen Schroeder "Case Notes"Creighton Law Eeview 6 (Sprint:, 1972) p. 264; and Henry Nickel "The First Amendment and Public Employees--An Emerging Constitutional Right to be a Policeman." George \~ashington University Law Review 37 (1969) p. 409.

70 Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Arguments"

71 Arthur Claude Hastings, "A Reformulation of the Modes of Reason­

ing in Argumentation," Dis::>., Northwestern University 1962; Forbes Iverson Hill, "The Genetric ~ethod in P..ecent Criticism on the Rhetoric of Aristotle," Diss., Cornell University, 1963; ?..obert Gordon Smith, 11 The ArfUl!lents over Atolition Petitions in the House of P.epresentatives in December, 1935: A Toulmin .4.nalysis, II Diss.' rniversity of Hinnesota 1962; Holt Vandercook Spicer, "Stephen Tcul..·:1in 1 s Functional Analysis of Logic and Ethics and its Relation to ?.hetoric," Diss., University of Oklahoma l9t4; Jimmie Douplas Trent, "Stephen Toul.rnin 1 s Argument Hodel as an Instrument for Criticism of Forensic Speeches, 11 Diss., Purdue University 1966; Joseph E. Hellbank, "The Pses of Reason in Ethics: K.S. Brightman, C.I. Lewis, and S.E. Toulmin," Diss., Boston University 1965.

72 Jack A. Barwind, "Status of the Toulmin :Hodel of Logic in

Educational Debate," M.A. Thesis, Bowling Green State University, 1966; Vernon E. Coronen, "Consistency and Change in the Political Theory of John C. Calhoun: A Study of Arguments, 11 M.A. Thesis, Univer­sity of Illinois 1968; John B. Greg, 11The Er:theymeme in Modern American Argumentation and Debate Theory, 11 H.A. Thesis, ~'layne State University 1968; Raymond Heidt, 11Toulmin' s Argument Hodel as an Instrument for the Criticism of Speeches, 11 M.A. Thesis, San Jose State College 1968; James L. McDiermid, "..:.n Analysis of Selected Speeches by Herbert Hoover in the 1932 Presidential Campaign According to Stephen Toulmin's System of Logical Analysis, 11 H.A. Thesis, University of Nebraska 1968; Sandra E. O• Connell, 11The Developnent, Use and Evaluation of Class l'laterials Thlploying Toulmin' s Hodel of Argument," !LA. Thesis, University of Michigan 1964; Hichael Overking, "An Investigation of Effects of Instruction in two Argument Models Upon Critical Thinking Ability," M.A. Thesis, Olio University 1968; Ann L. Palmer, "A Toulmin Analysis of the Argumentation of the American Anarchist, Emma Goldman," M.A. Thesis, University of Kansas 1967; James W. Riley, "An Application of the Toulmin J.1odel to Selected Speeches of Robert F. Kennedy," M.A. Thesis, Texas Christian University 1970; ~'lilliam P.enry Verkamp, Jr., "An Application of the Toulmin Hodel of Logical Analysis," M.A. Thesis, California State College at Long Beach 1970.

73 Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument," Hector Neri Castaneda, "On a Proposed Revolution in Logic," Philosophy of Science, 27 (July 1960), 279-292; Cooley; J.L. Cowan, "The Uses of Argument--

25

An Apo1ot:Y for Lo~ic," llind, 73 (January 1964) 27-45; James C. McCroskey, "Toulmin and the Easic Course," The Speecb Teacher, 14 {March 1965), 91-100; Peter T. l-:anicus, "Ch Toulmin' s Contribution to Logic and Argumentation," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 3 {September 1966), 83-94; Trent, "Toulmin .Hodel of An Argument."

74 McDia~~d,· Palm Ril d V rk ·~ er; , ey; an e amp.

CHAPTER TWO

POLICE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS

It is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from total­itarian regimes. Accordinfly a function of free speech unde~ our system cf povernment is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its hi~~est purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissati.sfaction witr. conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.

Mr. Justice Douglas Terminiello v. Chicago (1949)

Ever,y American values tis rigtt of free speech, yet, paradoxically,

would sometimes curtail the speec~ of otters. Free speec~ rights are

frequently regulated or amended by law or policy. T~e Constitution man-

dates that the courts resolve challenges to such constraints. The

courts face an imposing dilemma, for on the one hand, absolute free

speech may lead to abuses, and on the other, suppressed speech may

weaken our concept of a democratic society.

Theoretically, the courts could avoid deciding issues of free

speech. Justice DouFlas and former Justice Black adhere to the "no law"

doctrine, arguing that the Constitutional provision that the "Congress

shall make no law ..• abridging the freedom of speech, • • • ul man-

dates acsolutely no interference with any form of expression. 2

Generally, however, the courts have ruled absolute freedom of speech to

be undesirable. Therefore, the courts have chosen to determine what

speech is protected and what speech is beyond Constitutional protection.

26

27

Public Employee Expression Rights

This concept is of primary inp ortance in the expression rights of

public employees, as two antithetical positions emerge: (1) individual

freedoms, and (2) governmental rights to curtail employee speech.

Initially, the courts took a hard line position on public employee

expression rights, as established by Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v.

Mgyor of New Bedford (1892):

The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police­man. There are few employments for hire in which the ser­vant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the ~plied terms of the contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.3

Thus, Justice Holmes, before the Massachusetts Supreme Court, estab-

lished the doctrine of "no right to public employment," a precedent

consistently adhered to for three quarters of a century, being re­

affirmed in 1902,4 1912, 5 1913, 6 1952,7 and 1958. 8

The arrival of the 1960's saw a new Supreme Court, both in compo-

sition and in the prevailing constitutional philosophy, as the Court

would "no longer accept the argument that the state has virtually un-

limited power to place restrictions upon the privilege of government

employment."9 By 1968, the Court had completely rejected Holmes'

reasoning in McAuliffe. In Meechan v. Macy (1968), 10

refusing to apply

·the reasoning of McAuliffe, the Court stated: "The constitutional

climate of today is different from that in 1892, when Justice Holmes

struck off his oft-quoted phrase. ull

In Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), 12 the Court totally

replaced the McAuliffe rationale with a new constitutional philosophy.

Pickering was dismissed from his job as a school teacher for writing a

letter to a local newspaper in which he criticized the school board

and superintendent for their allocation of funds between educational

and athletic programs. Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall

concluded:

To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's op~1on ••• suggests that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First Amendment rights • • • to comment on mat­ters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which th~ work, it proceeds on a pre­mise that has been unequivocally rejected ••• 13

However, the Court refused to deltmit the scope of protection in

fickering:

Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by teachers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors, against wtom the state­ments are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either an appropriate or feasible attempt to 1~ down a general standard against which all such state­ments may be judged.l4

The Court now faced the development of a new position regarding the

free speech rights of public employees. The balancing test was pro-

posed to harmonize the First Amendment and public emplqyment dilemma:

The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interest of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.l5

With the refusal to establish regimented standards for the determina-

28

tion of free speech rights of public emplqyees, and the proposed

balancing of rights, the Court opted for review on a case by case basis.

The basic tenet of such a review being that "the government's right to

restrict a public employee's speech will be upheld only where the for-

mer's interest as an emplqyer outweighs the need to protect the indi-

vidual ' s rights. nl6

The Police Expression Controversy

An especially important and often argued dimension of the public

emplqyee issue is police expression rights. Police as public emplqyees

often find their speech suppressed by agencies, municipalities, and

states. Restricting police expression rights, some argue, is justi-

fled as it insures fair, impartial and efficient law enforcement,

since policemen often formulate legal policies which effect the lives

of every American. Linda Moody informs us that:

Police policies determine how laws are enforced and how policemen themselves adhere to constitutional and other procedural restraints. Police regulations, therefore, have a more direct and critical impact on citizens than do statutes and court decisions; .•• 17

Discipline is closely tied to the police policy issue, since the

police have a monopolY on the legal use of lethal force in civilian

society. Same scholars compare them to the militar,r. 18 Those who

advocate this position would find agreement with Professor Skolnick:

Political involvement of the police • • • raises serious problems. First, aside from the militar,r, the police have a practical monopoly on the legal use of force in our society. For just such a reason our countr,y has a tradition of wari­ness toward politicization of its armed forces, and thus both law and custom restrict the political activities of members of the military. Similar considerations obviously apply to the police.

In some senses the police are an even greater source of potential concern than the a~ed forces because of their closeness to the day-to-day workings of the political pro­cess and their frequent interaction with the population. These factors make police abuse of the political process a more immediate prospect. For example, bumper stickers on squad cars, political buttons on uniforms, selective ticket­ing, and similar contacts with citizens quickly impart a political message.

A second factor which has led to restrictions on mem­bers of the a~ed forces is the fear that unfettered poli­tical expression, if adopted as a principle, might in prac­tice lead to political coercion within the militar,y.

29

Control over promotions and disciplinar,y action could make coercion possible, and pressure might be exerted on lower ranking members to adopt, contribute to, or work for a particular political cause. Thus, again, regulation (and sometimes prohibition) of certain political activities has been undertaken. For example, superiors are prohibited from soliciting funds from inferiors, and many political activi­ties are prohibited while in uniform or on duty. Such con­siderations again app~ to the police.l9

30

Perhaps the strongest argument for restricting police free speech rights

is advocated by James Wilson:

As an officer, he is not entitled to lead a private life according to his own whims, without re~ard to public reac­tion. • • • The public expects the officer to practice what he preaches and to conform rigidly to regulations imposed on others. He must, therefore, t,ive strict atten­tion to his conduct and reputation; since the public is hypercritical, he must not only avoid evil, but he must avoid the appearance of evil. In his social life he must avoid questionable associates and seek recreation in the company of persons of irreproachable character and repu­tation. He must avoid domestic difficulties more assid­uouslY than the average citizen.20

In combination, these arguments constitute a strong case for the

restriction of police free speech. Yet, free speech rights for the

police officer can also be convincingly argued. Several legal scholars

have advocated that the police should be given greater expression free-

dans, so that, they may better inform the public as to needed policy

changes. Such a position was noted in the New York University Law

Review in 1971 :

Where the speech is direct~ at matters closely related to his job, the policeman speaks as an expert with what is probably the best information available. Moreover, most issues of police polic.y and operations are matters of pub­lic concern. If these policies or operations are in need of change or investigation, the policeman's opinio~1is extremely relevant for the public's consideration.

The militar.y analogy, which some use to support a restriction of

police freedom of expression, is rejected by Oakland Police Chief

Charles Gain:

The militar.y analogy tends to make automatons of subor­dinates, to have them obey an order just because it was given. We don't want automatons in policing. We want, rather, sensitive, questioning policemen with the ability to identif.y problems, to analyze and solve them and with an eye toward new ways to improve police services. When orders are given, unless they are unlawful, of course, we want them followed without question at the moment. But afterwards, they should be critiqued, hopefully, in most cases, through an orderly internal process.22

Comparison of the two organizations provides further ground for rejec-

tion of the militar.y analogy. There are a number of fundamental dif-

ferences between members of the armed forces and the police officer.

Three of the most obvious differences center around the method of

entering and leaving employment. The police officer is not forced into

employment; however, an individual is subjected to the possibility of

.31

the draft. A police officer can quit at any time, whereas military

personnel are obligated for a fixed number of years. A police officer

can be terminated easily, whereas military personnel must go through

the legal proceedings of a court martial. Work requirements and

responsibilities also provide a basis for rejecting the military analogy.

The soldier almost always operates under direct orders, whereas the

police officer works under his own judgment most of the time. Emergenc.y

situations are as close as police officers come to working under direct

orders. Finally, the soldier is on duty twenty-four hours a day and

sleeps on militar.y property. The police officer, on the other hand,

when not on duty, is only subject to cal1. 2.3

The rejection of the military analogy, and the need for informed

comment upon police policy matters provides a compelling case for pro-

tecting police freedom of expression rights. In fact, a call has been

issued for greater police involvement in enunciating their needs:

No longer can the police remain silent concerning the laws under which the.y must operate. The ~tatus of a professional carries with it the responsibility to be articulate on pro­fessional matters; the police of this count~ must undertake and accept this responsibility without delay.24

The Palancing of Rights

The "strong case for the restriction of police free speech" and

the 11 compelling case for protecting police freedom of expression,"

however, creates a dilemma for the courts, as each position presents

a valid interest. The state realizes the need for the efficient and

effective enforcement of the law, and the police are faced with a need

to articulate law enforcement matters. fue to these two conflicting

issues, the courts are left to determine which position will prevail.

The Court in Pickerine provided the mechanism for this determination,

proposing a balancing of the two conflicting interests. The dilemma

is resolved when ". • • the state's interest in efficient police

operations • • • is balanced against the need to protect the indivi­

dual policeman in the exercise of his right of free speech."25 The

balancing of the two conflicting interests allows for the resolution

of the dilemma before the court.

The balancing of police expression rights with the needs of the

state is evident in recent decisions. Police free speech can be cate-

gorized in accordance with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the

Constitution's "no abridgment of the freedom of speech"26 ·to include

32

pure speech, e.g., verbal expression; speech plus, e.g., picketing;

and symbolic speech, e.g.,hair styles. This study concentrates upon

four areas of police free speech: departmental criticism, personal

grooming, political activity, and union membership. Criticism of

departmental regulations by police officers is considered pure speech.

Personal grooming and hair styling are considered symbolic expressions.

Police participation in political and union activities are considered

forms of speech plus as they regulate conduct as well as speech.

Generally, the Court has supported officer pure speech27 and ruled in

favor of departments in matters involving s.ymbolic and speech plus. 28

Departmental Criticism by Policemen

Recent police free speech rulings have been consistent with the

balancing doctrine, as the Pickering holding is the leading case on

public employment free speech issues. 29 ~~ller v. Conlisk (1970)3°

set the precedent involving police criticism of departmental regula­

tions or personnel. Officer Jack ~fuller was suspended from the Chicago

Police Department, having violated a departmental rule which forbade

"engaging in any activity, conversation, deliberation or discussion

which is derogator,r to the department or any member or policy of the

department.u3l In October, 1967, Muller discovered that members of an

auto theft unit had converted recovered stolen property for their own

use. He reported the facts to his Commander, who reported them to the

city-wide Commander of the Auto Theft Division. Arter five days of no

action, Muller presented written charges to the Superintendent of the

Police Department. Three weeks later, Muller was interviewed by tele­

vision news reporters. .IA.lring the interview, 1-iuller answered a

33

question about the Internal Inspection Division (liD), replying:

"'The liD is like a great bir: washing machine. Everything they put

into it comes out clean.u32 On another occasion, Muller had reported

an incident to the liD, which had not been resolved to his satisfac-

tion. Several months later, he was summoned before the Deputy Chief

of Detectives and orally reprimanded. MUller refused to accept the

reprimand and demanded a hearing before the department's disciplinary

board. The board found Muller to have violated departmental rules by

engaging in derogatory communication concerning the department. The

board ordered a reprirr~nd to be placed in Muller's file. The District

Court found that the violation of Muller's expression rights was so

"minimal" that it did not present a cause for action. The Federal

Court of Appeals, however, held that Muller's constitutional rigpts

had been significantly violated. In so holding, the court considered

three issues. First, the issue of standing. The court held that the

"mere threat of imposition of sanctions (on the exercise of freedom

of expression rights) is sufficient present infringement to justify

redress."33 Second, having determined that policemen are protected by

the First Amendment, the court held the rule to be unconstitutionally

overbroad as it prohibits speech protected under the First Amendment.

Further, the court noted that due to the nature of police work, their

freedom of speech, while it may not be totally denied, may be limited.

Finally, the court concluded that since the rule was unconstitutional,

the reprimand was to be expunged from Muller's file. 34

34

35

Police Hair Styles

An additional dimension of police free speech rights is personal

grooming, specifically hair styling. Greenwald v. Frank (1972)35 is

the controlling case for such issues. The case challenges a police

department's constitutional ability to limit the personal appearance

of its officers. Officer David Greenwald filed suit against the Nassau

County Police Department, contending that Rule 22 of the department's

regulations was arbitrar,y and capricious.36

In this case, six major issues were considered: First, Whether

the potential implications of Greenwald's actions for the entire Nassau

County force justified a declarator, judgment.37 Second, whether the

officer gave up a part cf his rights upon empl~ent (a throwback to

McAuliffe). The Court statoo:

Prior to a presumption of constitutionality of a governmen­tal rule or regulation being nullified, it must in the first instance be determined, not assumed, that the right of the public employee has not been qualified or waived by either the nature of the public employment or under the circum­stances under which it is being exercised.38

(Courts assume that a law is constitutional unless it is proven other-

vise.) The court is saying here that before they examine the consti-

tutionality or the rule, the,y must first determine if the officer gave

up a part or his rights as a condition of empla,yment.

The third issue involves the courts refusal to substitute its

judgment for that of an administrative agenc.y where its actions are not

arbitr&r7 or capricious. 39 The fourth issue concerns the degree of

rights enjoyed by police officers. The court concluded: "It does not

follow • • • that a policeman does not have the same constitutional

rights as a teacher or lawver to determine his own personal appearance,

while in uniform. u40 The court also noted the irony of this ruling:

"Though one of the important functions of a policeman is to protect

the constitutional rights of others, it is ironical that in the proper

performance of his job certain rights must be, of necessity, qualified

or restrained. "41

The fifth issue involves the justification of restraints placed

upon policemen. The court stated:

••• the right to wear one's hair at any length or in any desired manner is an ingredient of personal freedom pro­tected by the United States Constitution. Any regulation which limits this right must be sufficiently justified as furthering an important or substantial governmental interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and any incidental restrictions on the alleged First Amendment freedoms is no gre~ter than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.4

Finally, the court considered the balance between the two con-

flicting rights. The court found:

The private interest here, that of a policeman in uniform to determine his own personal appearance, is clearly off­set by the powerful countervailing interest of the police department and the general public. The maintenance of a disciplined and efficient police department in which the policeman in uniform maintaining a standard of appearance that connotes public confidence, acceptance and respect, constitutes powerful countervailing interest.43

Thus, in this case, the balance tipped in favor of the police depart-

ment as they had a "powerful countervailing interest" to determine the

policeman's personal appearance.

Political Activity of Policemen

.36

Police tree speech litigation also extends to the right of politi­

cal participation, Paulos v. Breier (1974)44 is of significance here.

On March 3, 1972, Douglas Paulos sent a letter to fifty-four fellow

37

policemen urging them to support a ceztain candidate for political

office. He signed the letter and added his title: "Detective,

Milwaukee Police Department." On March 31, 1972, he was charg-ed by

the Milwaukee Police Department with "using the influence of his office

for political reasons" in violation of Rule 29 sec. 31.45 He was

ordered to stand trial, and on April 6, 1972, found guilty of the

charges against him and received a suspension of five days.46

The two major issues in this case revolve around Paulos' conten­

tion that Rule 29 was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The court

noted that in 1947, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of

the Hatch Act, which limited the political activity of federal employees,

and sustained this holding in 1973.47 The court rejected Paulos' con­

tention that the rule was unconstitutionally vague, following the pre­

cedents of the Supreme Court.

The court also found that the rule was not unconstitutionally

overbroad. Paulos argued that the rule was so broad as to prohibit

activities that rightly should be protected. The court, however, could

find no circumstances in which the rule sanctioned actions where the

legitimate interest of the department was not apparent.48

Police Union l~embershiQ

Finally, litigation has occurred with regard to policy unioniza­

tion. In this area, the controlling precedent is Ball v. City Council

of the City of Coachella (1967).49 John Ball, Chief of Police for the

city of Coachella, California, was dismissed from his job for his

membership and participation in a union. Since his appointment as

38

Police Chief in 1962, he sought fruitlessly to solve grievances among

fellow officers concerning working conditions and hours. After repeated

rejections by the City Council, in Februar,y, 1965, Ball and many of his

officers joined the local chapter of the American Federation of State,

County, and Municipal Employees, Local no. 1239. Learning this, the

City Council asked for Ball's resignation, and when he refused, they

dismissed him.50

There are four issues in the case which are appropriate to our

study. First, the power to terminate employment of a public employee,

serving at the pleasure of the appointing authority, without cause and

without notice or hearing cannot be exercised arbitrarily in disregard

of the employee's constitutional rights.51 Second, continuance in

emplqyment of public employees serving at the pleasure of the appointing

authority may not be conditioned upon the employee's abstinence from

exercising a constitutional right to engage in political activity not

incompatible with the performance of his duties.52 Third, courts are

empowered to review the dismissal of a public employee, although he

may not have protected tenure, in cases which indicate that the dis-

missal resulted from the exercise, by the employee, of a constitutional

right.53 Fourth, that the Chief of Police of a general law city could

be dismissed without cause and without notice or hearing, did not give

the city the right to dismiss him because of his union membership and

participation in union activities.54

The crux of Ball's argument and the central theme that the court

accepted was that because a public employee serves at the will of his

governmental body, he may be fired only for just cause. The mere

exercise of his constitutional rights to engage in union activity

is not an adequate justification for his removal from office.

Summary

39

These four cases constitute the current status of police free

speech rights. The evolution of police free speech rights developed

from an initial position of "no right to public employment," as laid

down in McAuliffe, to the balancing of interests, as proscribed in

Pickering. With the exception of the Paulos case, the courts employed

the balancing test. Due to the nature of this case, the balancing

doctrine could have been applied to Paulos, had he chosen to so argue.

The findings of the court, however, do not indicate that a different

decision would have been reached had the balancing test been applied.

Thus, the balancing of the two conflicting interests, those of the

police officer to express his views, and those of the state in assuring

an efficient police orranization, provides the courts with an equitable

means of determining which of the antithetical positions most deserves

constitutional protection.

END NarES

1 U.S., Constitution, amend. I.

2 Rocco J. Tresolini, and l{artin Shapiro, eds., American Consti­tutional Law, 3rd ed. (New York: The MacMillian Compaey, 1970), p. 364.

40

3 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford 155 ~~ss. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).

4 People ex rel. Clifford v. Scannell 74 App. Div. 406, (1st Dep't) 77 N.Y.S. 704 (1902).

5 Commonwealth ex rel. Rotan v. Hasskari (Phila. C.P.) 21 Pa. Dist. 119 (1912).

6 Duffv v. Cooke 239 Pa. 427, 86 A 1076 (1913).

7 Beilan v. Board of Education 351 U.S. 168 (1952).

8 Lerner v. Casgy 357 U.S. 468 (1958).

9 Henry V. Nickel, "The First Amendment and Public Fmployees--An Einerging Constitutional Right to be a Policeman, 11 George Washington University Law 2eview, 37 (Winter, 1968-69), 411.

lO Meechan v. ~~cy (D.C. Cir.) 392 F.2d 822 {1968).

11 "The Policeman: to His First Amendment (May 1971), 536.

Must He Ee a Second-Class Citizen with Regard Rights?,'' New York University law Review, 46

12 .Pickering v. Board of Education 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

13 68 Ibid., at 5 •

14 6 Ibid., at 59 •

15 Ibid., at 568.

l~ New York University Law Review, 541.

17 Linda Alden l-loody, "Extending the Sheild of the First Amendment to the Outspoken Policeman," Criminal Law Bulletin, 8 (Fall, 1972), 186.

18 See Moody, Nickel and New York University Law Review.

41

l9 J. Skolnick, cited by Moody, 189.

20 James Wilson, cited by Moody, 188.

21 New York University Law Review, 547.

22 Charles Gain, cited by Moody, 186.

23 Ibid., 185.

24 Frank Carrinrton, "Speaking for the Police)." .Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 62 (Fall, 19rO), 245.

25 New York University Law F.eview, 547.

26 U.S., Constitution, amend. I.

27 Huller v. Conlisk (7th Cir.) 429 F.2d 902 (1970), Neechan v.

Y..acy (D.C. Cir.) J92 F.2c 822 (1968), Hieman v. Up;iegraff 344 u.s. 183 (1952), and Brukiawa v. Police Commissioner of Baltimore 257 Md. 364 (1970).

28 Greenwald v. Frank 334 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972), Slocum v. Fire and

Police Commission B Ill. App.3d 465 (1972), and Connelly v. Amico 72 Misc.2d 644 (1973).

29 Moody, 176.

30 Muller v. Conlisk (7th Cir.) 429 F.2d 902 (1970).

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Greenwald v. Frank 334 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972).

36 Rule 22 states, in part: "Members of the Force and Department shall be neat and clean at all times while on duty. Male personnel shall comply with the following standards unless excluded by their Commanding Officer due to special assignment: Haircuts--Hair shall be neatly cut and trimmed at all times while on duty. Hair styles shall be conserva­tive and not excessive in length. • • • 11 Ibid., at 682.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., at 686.

39 Ibid., at 687. 40 Ibid., at 685.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., at 688. 44

Breier 371 Supp. 523 (1974). Paulos v. F.

45 P.ule 29 sec. 31 states, in part: '~embers of the department

shall not solicit or make contributions in money or other thing, directly or indirectly, or any pretext for political purposes; nor shall they interfere or use the influence of their office for poli­tical reasons ••• "Ibid., at 524.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., at 525.

48 Ibid., at 526.

49 Ball v. City Council of the City of Coachella 60 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967).

50 Ibid., at 141.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., at 142.

53 Ibid.

54 Ib"d ~ ., at 143.

CHAPTE.tt THREE

GRAPHIC DISPLAYS OF LEGAL REASONING

The sufficiency of and extentions to the Toulmin model are presented

in the following twenty-four graphic displays of the litigation of four

police freedom of expression cases. Each display represents one of the

contested issues as delineated by the courts in their written opinions.

Muller v. Conlisk

~1ller y. Conlisk (1970),1 representing the issue of a policeman's

constitutional right to enga[e in departmental criticism, is considered

first. In its consideration of the case, the court delineated six issues:

1. hhether Huller had standing to sue, 2. whether the case was rip~ for adjudication, J. Whether the departmental rule was overbroad, 4. Whether policemen are protected by the First Amendment, 5. Whether policemen are unique pu~lic employees, 6. r~ether the reprimand was justi:ied.

Prior to considering the challenged rule, the court's first priority

was the issue of standing and the adjudicative nature of the case. The

court would not consider ~fuller's challenge if he lost either of these

two procedural issues.

In its consideration of the question or· standing, the court advanced

several concepts which determined 1·ruller's standing. A display of the

court's arfUmentation on this issue is found in Fi[Ure 1. This issue

clearly demonstrates a deficiency of the Toulmin model as advanced by

Trent. 2 Data in this issue is followed by what Trent has labeled,

"Rebuttal for data."3 Here, data consists of facts set out by the Dis-

trict Court's prior decision. The Court of Appeals, however, notes that

43

these "facts are not valid and must be dismissed. This is pictorally

demonstrated in the layout of the Court of Appeals' argument, placed

in brackets under the data. Since the Court of Appeals advances its

own argument, with respect to data, the rebuttal to data has its own

data set out by the lower court, this argument constitutes a rebuttal

to data rather than a part of a cluster or chain of arruments.

Ehninger's concept of cluster is evident, however.4 The bracketed

ar[Ument beneath the issue's claim represents a second data to claim

movement justifyinr tte oririnal claim advanced by the court. As this

is a separate argument, it is a part of a cluster which adds persuasive

force to the court's claim.

The issue of whether the case is ready for adjudication, the court

feels, is covered largely by the discussion of Muller's standing. 5

Thus, seeing no need for a complicated argument, the court's position

takes the basic Toulmin form of: Data, Warrant, so Claim, as seen in

Figure 2.

Since Muller was found to have brought an adjudicatable case to

bar, the remaining four issues represent the courts reasoning with

re;-ard to the rule's constitutionality. The issue of overbreadth,

Figure 3, was, in the court's view, "clearly beyond dispute. "6

This

argument likewise takes the basic Toulmin form.

A police officer's First Amendment protection was the fourth issue

considered by the court (Figure 4). The l~out of this issue takes the

basic Toulmin construct. This issue, however, adds two elements not

found in previous displ~s, a qualif,ying statement and multiple warrants.

':'he fact that "the court concluded that no e;eneral standard could be

fashioned in such situations, ••• "7 limits the degree of force placed

upon the constitutional rights of the police officer. Secondly, this

issue exemplifies more than one warrant justifying the leap from data

to clatm. Both warrant one and warrant two provide justification for

the leap. Warrant two, graphically displayed, is placed beneath

warrant one as the former is a specific example of the same concept

presented in warrant one.

The fifth issue considers the uniqueness of police officers as

public employees, as displayed in Figure 5. This issue documents the

concept of multiple claims stemming from the same data and warrant.

The court makes three claims which are integrally related, and a fourth

which is derived from the first three. Claim number one represents

the initial justification of the court's data. Claim two and claim

three are logical steps in the court's handling of the case. Here,

as in the example of multiple warrants discussed above, each of the

three claims could be considered as the final claim advanced by the

court, as each is complete in and of itself. Employing the three

claims as proof, the court advances a fourth claim, justified in

lirht of the preceeding three claims and their warrant.

Finally, the court considers the issue of the reprimand given to

Muller. This display is seen in Figure 6. Multiple claims are pre­

sent although only two emerge. The second claim grows out of the

first and is based upon the warrant implied in the original argument.

45

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esi

tate

d

to t

ake

in

to a

cco

un

t p

oss

ible

ap

plic

ati

on

s o

f th

e s

tatu

te i

n o

the

r fa

ctu

al

con

text

s b

esi

de

s th

at

at

ba

r.

• •

• T

he

ob

ject

ion

ab

le q

ua

lity o

f va

gu

en

ess

an

d o

verb

rea

dth

• •

• [

is d

ue

to

) th

e d

an

ge

r o

f to

lera

tin

g,

in t

he

are

a o

f F

irst

Am

en

dm

en

t fr

ee

do

ms,

th

e e

xist

en

ce o

f a

pe

na

l sta

tute

su

sce

pti

ble

of

swe

ep

ing

an

d i

mp

rop

er

ap

plic

ati

on

. C

t.

Ma

rcu

s v.

S

earc

h W

arr

an

t,

367

U.S

. 71

7,

733,

81

S

.Ct.

17

08,

1717

, 6

L.E

d.2

d 1

12

7.

Th

ese

fre

ed

om

s a

re d

elic

ate

an

d v

uln

era

ble

, as

w

ell

as s

up

rem

ely

pre

cio

us

in o

ur

soci

ety

. T

he

th

rea

t o

f sa

nct

ion

s m

ay

de

ter

the

ir e

xerc

ise

alm

ost

as

po

ten

tly

as t

he

act

ua

l a

pp

lica

tio

n o

f sa

nct

ion

s. C

t.

Sm

ith

v.

Ca

lifo

rnia

, ·s

up

ra,

361

U.S

. [1

47)

at

151-

154,

8

0 S

.Ct.

(21

5),

at

21

7-2

19

(4

L.E

d.2

d 2

05

); S

pe

ise

r v.

Ra

nd

all,

357

U.S

. 51

3, 5

26,

78 S

.Ct.

13

32,

2 L

.Ed

.2d

146

0.

Be

cau

se F

irst

Am

en

d­

me

nt

fre

ed

om

s n

ee

d b

rea

thin

g s

pace

to

surv

ive

, g

ove

rnm

en

t m

ay

reg

ula

te i

n t

he

are

a o

nly

wit

h n

arr

ow

sp

eci

fici

ty.

Ca

ntw

ell

v. C

on

ne

c­ti

cu

t, 3

10

U.S

. 2

96

,31

1,6

0 S

.Ct.

90

0,9

06

,84

L.E

d.

12

13

."

Fig

. 1.

Mu

ller,

Is

sue

One

.J:

'"' 0

'

D

C

Pla

inti

ff a

lleg

es

a p

rese

nt

Infr

ing

em

en

t o

f h

is r

igh

t to

sp

ea

k re

su

ltin

g

fro

m

the

m

ere

e

xis

ten

ce

o

f th

e

alle

ge

dly

ove

rbro

ad

ru

le a

nd

th

e t

hre

ate

ne

d

sact

lon

s fo

r It

s vi

ola

tio

n.

w

(Th

ere

fore

) C

ou

nt

II

do

es

rip

e f

or

ad

jud

ica

tio

n.

(Sin

ce)

Th

e S

up

rem

e C

ou

rt h

as r

ep

ea

ted

ly r

eco

gn

ize

d

tha

t be

caus

e "f

ree

do

ms o

f e

xpre

ssio

n

in g

en

era

l •

• •

are

vu

lne

rab

le t

o g

rave

ly d

am

ag

ing

ye

t b

are

ly

visi

ble

en

cora

chm

en

ts,"

B

an

tam

B

ooks

In

c.

v.

Su

lli­

van

, 37

2 U

.S.

58,

66,

83

S.C

t.

631,

9

L.E

d.2

d

584

(196

3),

the

me

re t

hre

at

of

the

im

po

siti

on

of

san

ctio

ns

is

suff

icie

nt

pre

sen

t in

frin

ge

me

nt

to

just

ify

red

ress

. S

ee

e.g

.,

Do

mb

row

ski,

su

pra

, 38

0 U

.S.

at

486,

85

S

.Ct.

11

16;

Ba

gg

ett

v.

Bu

llit

t, 3

77

U.S

. 36

0,

374,

84

S

.Ct.

13

16,

12

L.E

d.2

d

377

(196

4);

Ba

nta

m

Boo

ks,

sup

ra,

372

U.S

. at

67

, 83

S

.Ct.

63

1;

Bu

tto

n,

sup

ra,

371

U.S

. a

t 4

33

, 8

3

S.C

t.

32

8

an

d

Th

orn

hill

v.

Ala

ba

ma

, 31

0 U

.S.

88,

97-9

8,

60

S.C

t.

736,

84

L

.Ed

. 10

93 (

1940

).

Fig

. 2.

Mu

ller,

Iss

ue T

wo

.pre

sen

t a

con

tro

vers

y

~

-..J

D

C

It

ma

y no

lo

ng

er

be

seri

ou

sly

asse

rted

th

at

pu

blic

em

ploy

ees,

In

clu

din

g

po

lice

me

n,

have

no

ri

gh

t to

cr

itic

ize

th

eir

em

plo

yer.

w

(Th

ere

fore

) W

e t

hin

k It

cle

ar

beyo

nd d

isp

ute

th

at

the

ru

le i

s o

verb

roa

d.

In s

ubst

ance

, It

[R

ule

29,

§ 3

1)

pro

hib

its

a//

crit

icis

m

by p

olic

emen

of

the

de

pa

rtm

en

t.

Fig

. 3.

Mu

ller,

Iss

ue T

hre

e

~

D

Q

C

In P

icke

rin

g v

s. B

oa

rd o

f E

du

cati

on

; 39

1 U

.S.

563,

88

Th

e C

ou

rt c

on

clu

de

d t

ha

t n

o g

en

era

l (T

he

refo

re,

po

lice

me

n,)

lik

e o

the

r S

.Ct.

173

1, 2

0 L

.Ed

.2d

811

(1

968)

, th

e

Co

urt

d

ea

lt st

an

da

rd

cou

ld

be

fash

ione

d In

su

ch

situ

ati

on

s an

d p

ub

lic e

mp

loye

es,

en

joy

the

pro

-w

ith

th

e F

irst

Am

en

dm

en

t ri

gh

ts o

f p

ub

lic e

mp

loye

es

"th

e p

rob

lem

In

a

ny

case

Is

to

a

rriv

e

at

a ba

lanc

e te

ctio

n o

f th

e F

irst

Am

en

dm

en

t.

to s

peak

on

ma

tte

rs o

f p

ub

lic c

on

cern

re

lati

ng

to

th

eir

b

etw

ee

n t

he

In

tere

sts

of

the

te

ach

er,

as

a

citi

zen

, In

e

mp

loym

en

t an

d w

ith

th

e

rig

ht

of

the

st

ate

, as

an

co

mm

en

tin

g

upon

ma

tte

rs o

f p

ub

lic c

once

rn

and

the

e

mp

loye

r, t

o re

gu

late

th

e e

xerc

ise

of

such

rig

ht.

Th

e

Inte

rest

o

f th

e s

tate

, as

an

e

mp

loye

r,

In

pro

mo

tin

g

Co

urt

th

ere

was

fa

ced

wit

h

crit

ica

l st

ate

me

nts

m

ad

e

the

eff

icie

ncy o

f th

e p

ub

lic s

erv

ice

s It

p

erf

orm

s

by a

te

ach

er

con

cern

ing

th

e w

ay t

he

sch

ool

bo

ard

had

th

rou

gh

its

em

plo

yee

s."

391

U.S

. at

56

8,

88 S

.Ct.

at

h

an

dle

d p

ropo

sals

fo

r in

cre

ase

d s

choo

l re

ven

ue

. 17

34.

~

It

u I

-· . . '

. ;:

-. '!'

'

.~

,.'

r-~

~.,

.-"1

"•

·. ·~-:!

::~~

"';;:,:,

'1 ~ .. ...

w.

(Sin

ce)

Po

lice

me

n,

like

tea

cher

s, a

nd l

aw

yers

, a

re n

ot

rele

ga

ted

to

a w

ate

red

-do

wn

ve

rsio

n o

f co

nst

itu

tio

na

l ri

gh

ts.

Ga

rrit

y v.

N

ew

Je

rse

y, 3

85 U

.S.

493,

50

0,

87

S.C

t. 6

16,

620

17 L

.Ed

.2d

562

(19

67).

I w,

(Sin

ce)

Th

e C

ou

rt e

xpre

ssly

he

ld t

ha

t th

e s

tate

co

uld

n

ot

en

tire

ly

de

ny th

e

rig

ht

of

Its

em

plo

yee

s to

cr

itic

ize

th

eir

em

plo

yer.

391

U

.S.

at 5

68,

570,

88

S.C

t.

at 1

731.

Fig

. 4.

Mu

ller,

Iss

ue F

ou

r

$

0--

----

----

----

--T

----

----

----

-c.

----

----

----

----

----

----

--c,.

A

m

ain

p

ort

ion

o

f d

efe

nd

an

ts'

bri

ef

is

de

vote

d

to

dis

tin

gu

ish

ing

P

icke

rin

g

by

po

inti

ng

ou

t th

at

po

llee

­m

en

are

dif

fere

nt

tha

n

tea

ch

ers

a

nd

th

at

po

lice

d

ep

art

me

nts

are

qu

asi

-mili

tary

for

ces

de

pe

nd

en

t up

on

rig

id i

nte

rna

l d

isci

plin

e f

or

the

ir e

ffe

ctiv

en

ess

.

(The

refo

re>

We

ca

nn

ot

ag

ree

th

at

such

co

nsi

de

ra­

tio

n m

ad

e P

icke

rin

g i

na

pp

lica

ble

.

c,

Acc

ord

ing

ly,

the

d

istr

ict

cou

rt

err

ed

in

dis

mis

sin

g C

ou

nt

II.

We

ne

ed

no

t co

nsi

de

r p

lain

tiff

's

al­

tern

ate

co

nte

nti

on

th

at

Ru

le

31

is u

nco

nsti

tuti

on

al

for

va

gu

e-

Th

us,

It

is c

lea

r th

at

the

Fir

st A

me

nd

me

nt

wo

uld

ne

ss.

rea

ch

an

d p

rote

ct

som

e

spe

ech

b

y p

olice

me

n

wh

ich

wo

uld

be

co

nsid

ere

d "

de

rog

ato

ry t

o t

he

d

ep

art

me

nt.

"

col

Rul

e 31

on

its

fac

e p

roh

ibit

s a

ll su

ch s

peec

h, e

ven

pri

va

te

co

nve

rsa

tio

n,

an

d

Is

for

tha

t re

aso

n

un

avo

ida

bly

o

verb

ora

d

In

vio

lati

on

o

f th

e

Fir

st

Am

en

dm

en

t as

it

ap

plie

s to

th

e s

tate

s th

rou

gh

th

e

Fo

urt

ee

nth

Am

en

dm

en

t.

w

(Sin

ce)

the

ir

po

ssib

le e

ffe

ct

Is

no

m

ore

th

an

to

in

flu

en

ce t

he

ba

lan

ce w

hic

h

Pic

keri

ng

sa

ys

mu

st

be

str

uck

in

ea

ch

case

. T

o

the

e

xte

nt

tha

t b

ein

g

a p

olic

em

an

is

p

ub

lic e

mp

loye

me

nt

wit

h

un

iqu

e ·

char

­a

cte

rist

ics,

th

e

rig

ht

of

the

e

mp

loye

e

to

spea

k on

m

att

ers

co

nce

rnin

g h

is e

mp

loym

en

t w

ith

th

e f

ull

fre

ed

om

of

any

citi

zen

ma

y be

mo

re o

r le

ss l

imit

ed

. It

is

no

t h

ow

eve

r, d

est

roye

d.

Pic

keri

ng

, su

pra

, 39

1 U

.S.

at

568,

88

S

.C.t

. 17

31;

Ga

rrit

y,

sup

ra,

385

U.S

. at

50

0, 8

7 S

.Ct.

616

.

Fig

. 5.

Mu

ller,

Iss

ue F

ive

Vt

0

D

C,

~

Ha

vin

g d

ete

rmin

ed

th

at

Ru

le 3

1 Is

u

nco

nst

itu

tio

na

l on

Its

fac

e.

w

[Sin

ce t

ha

t w

hic

h I

s u

nco

nst

itu

tio

na

l is

un

law

ful

and

un

en

forc

ea

ble

.]

(Th

ere

fore

) It

fo

llow

s th

at

the

re

prl

-(T

he

refo

re)

Acc

ord

ing

ly,

we

do

no

t m

an

d g

ive

n p

lain

tiff

bas

es u

pon

an

reac

h th

e q

ue

stio

n r

aise

d In

Co

un

t I

alle

ge

d v

iola

tio

n o

f su

ch

rule

mu

st

tha

t th

e r

ule

is

u

nco

nst

itu

tio

na

l as

fa

ll an

d sh

ou

ld

be

exp

un

ge

d

fro

m

ap

plie

d t

o h

im.

We

see

no

need

fo

r h

is r

eco

rd

an

d

he

ld

to

be

o

f n

o

a h

ea

rin

g o

n th

at

Issu

e.

eff

ect

.

Fig

. 6.

Mu

ller,

Iss

ue S

ix

V'l

t--1

Greenwald v. Frank

The case of Greenwald v. Frank (1972)8 is the controlling case

with regard to police hair styles. The court considered six issues

in the adjudication of this case.

1. The histor.y of dress code challenges, 2. vfuether a policeman has the same rights as a citizen, 3. Whether restrictions upon hair styling are sufficient~

justified, 4. Whether policemen give up a part of their rights upon

employment, 5. Whether the court would substitute its judgment for the

department, 6. Whether the rule was unconstitutional.

The first issue, Figure 7, considered by the court involves pre-

52

vious cases challenging dress codes. As this is an historical account-

ing, the argument consists of extensive data leading to a claim.

Although each of the cases comprisinf the data could be cited as indi-

vidual data units, this does not improve the issue's understanding,

and as the court considers it to be a unit of proof supporting its claim,

the argument is laid out in that fashion. It does, however, demonstrate

Freeley's concept of multiple data. 9

The second issue concerns police and citizen rights with the court

concluding that policemen in uniform have different rights than ordinar,y

citizens. This argument takes the basic Toulmin form as demonstrated

in Figure 8. In justifying a restriction of police expression rights,

T 1 . ' 1" f. 10 b t . Firure 9, the court introduces ou m~ s qua 1 1er y no 1ng,

• • • the Court herein does not suggest that a policeman has less " constitutional rights than a student or any other citizen . • . nil

Beyond this, the issue takes the simple Toulmin layout. The fourth

issue, the voluntar,y curtailment of certain expression rights upon

employment, also constitutes the basic Toulmin format, as displayed

in Figure 10. In the fifth issue, the substitution of judgment, a

more complex structure of argumentation is employed (F'igure 11).

This issue illustrates an example of an argument progressing from

data to claim, then, due to a warrant, to a second claim. In this

issue, the first claim, c1 , serves as data for the extention of the

arFUment. The warrant in the extention is provided by the court.

This issue serves as yet another example of a claim serving as data

for subsequent claims.

The final issue, the private interests of the police officer,

adds another dimension to the Toulmin model, as seen in Figure 12.

In this issue, the court provides two independent warrants justif.ying

the advanced claim. Independent warrants are separated on the main

proof line and not placed in a vertical row as in prior examples.

The second warrant is established by its own data to claim movement,

with the claim serving as the second warrant. The issue also contains

multiple claims. These are placed in a vertical row as the second

claim, c2, is an extention of the first claim, cl.

53

Fo

r in

sta

nce

It

is n

ote

d t

ha

t th

e g

roo

min

g s

tan

da

rds

of

the

Na

ssa

u C

ou

nty

Po

lice

De

pa

rtm

en

t w

ere

th

e s

ub

ject

of

a p

rio

r A

rtic

le 7

8 p

roce

ed

ing

m

wh

ich

Mr.

Ju

stic

e L

evi

ne

in

the

Ma

tte

r o

f T

axt

er

v.

0 C

L

oo

ne

y, (

Na

ssa

u S

up

rem

e C

ou

rt I

nd

ex

No

. 1

38

98

-69

) d

ism

isse

d t

he

pe

titi

on

an

d s

tate

d m

pa

rt;

"Th

e l

imit

ed

re

str

ain

t Im

po

sed

by

un

ifo

rm g

roo

min

g

sta

nd

ard

s o

r ce

rta

in

ind

ivid

ua

l m

em

be

rs

wo

uld

ap

pe

ar

to b

e e

nti

tle

d t

o l

ess

co

nsi

de

rati

on

th

an

th

e o

vera

ll b

en

efi

t to

be

d

eri

ved

by

the

a

pp

ea

ran

ce o

f th

e d

ep

art

me

nt

as a

wh

ole

. S

imila

r re

gu

lati

on

s h

ave

be

en

im

po

sed

in

oth

er

sec­

tio

ns

of

the

co

un

try.

Th

e c

ou

rt c

an

no

t h

old

th

at

the

re

spo

nd

en

t w

as

arb

itra

ry o

r th

at

the

co

nst

i­tu

tio

na

l ri

gh

ts o

f th

e p

eti

tio

ne

r w

ere

vio

late

d."

Als

o,

in a

no

the

r re

cen

t N

ass

au

Co

un

ty

Su

pre

me

Co

urt

cas

e re

lati

ng

to

gro

om

ing

st

an

da

rds,

M

r.

Just

ice

Me

ye

r in

th

e M

att

er

of

Hu

nt

v.

Bo

ard

of

Fir

e C

om

mis

sio

ne

rs o

f M

ass

ap

eq

ua

Fir

e 0

1st

nct

. 6

8 M

isc.2

d 2

61.

327

N. Y

.S.2

d 3

6,

ren

de

red

a d

eci

sio

n h

old

ing

th

at

a re

gu

lati

on

w

h1ch

re

aso

na

bly

lim

its

the

fu

nd

am

en

tal

pe

rso

na

l ri

gh

t o

f a

pp

ea

ran

ce

of

a vo

lun

tee

r fi

rem

an

is

1n

val1

d Ju

st1c

e M

eye

r d

isti

ng

uis

he

d r

ule

s re

gu

lati

ng

a m

em

be

r's s

ide

bu

rns

an

d h

a1r

len

gtt

l o

f a

volu

nte

er

l1re

ma

n

fro

m t

ha

t im

po

sed

up

on

me

mb

ers

of

the

111

11ita

ry,

wh

ere

in t

he

co

urt

s h

ave

sta

ted

th

e1r

1 elu

cta

nc0

to

in

terf

ere

in

m

ilit

ary

m

att

ers

b

eca

use

th

ey

are

"i

ll-e

qu

ipp

ed

to

d

ete

rmin

e

the

1m

pact

u

po

n

dis

cip

lin

e t

ha

t a

ny

pa

rtic

ula

r in

tru

sio

n u

po

n m

ilit

ary

au

tho

rity

m1g

ht

ha

ve

."

(Wa

rre

n,

Th

e

B1l

l o

f R

igh

ts a

nd

th

e M

ilit

ary

, 37

N.Y

.U L

Rev

. 18

1, 1

87)

(An

de

rso

n v

. L

<w

d.

7 C

ir.,

437

F

.2d

912

, ce

rt

de

n.

404

U.S

. 8

65

, 92

S.C

t 68

, 30

L E

d.2

d

109;

D

oyl

e v

K

oe

lbl,

5 C

ir.,

434

F

.2d

1014

. c.

:!rt

de

n

402

U.S

. 9

08

, 91

S

.Ct.

138

0, 2

8 L

.Ed

.2d

649

; G

ian

ata

sio

v.

Wh

yte

. 2

C1r

., 42

6 F

2d

YO

tl.

cert

d

en

. 4

00

U.S

. 9

41

,91

S

.Ct.

234

, 27

L.E

d.2

d 2

44;

Ra

llerm

an

v.

Ka

ine

, 2

Cn

. 41

1 F

.2d

110

2. c

ert

dsm

d.

396

U.S

. 9

76

, 9

0 S

.Ct.

46

7.

24 l.

Ed

.2d

477

; K

on

n

v.

La

ird

. O

.C,

323

F S

up

p.

1,

Kr11

1 v

Ba

ue

r,

D.C

., 3

14 F

.Su

pp

. 96

5; s

ee S

mit

h v

R

eso

r,

2 C

ir.,

406

F 2

d 14

1;

Byr

ne

v.

Re

sor.

3

C1r

.

412

F 2

d 7

74

.)

Mr.

Ju

stic

e M

eye

r fu

rth

er

sta

ted

(p.

266

, 32

7 N

.Y.S

.2d

p

42):

"On

an

alo

gy

to

the

milit

ary

cas

es

an

d

in

lig

ht

of

the

p

ara

mili

tary

n

atu

re o

f th

e

pol1

ce

forc

e.

reg

ula

tio

n o

f th

e l

en

gth

of

ha

ir a

nd

sid

eb

urn

s w

orn

by

po

lice

me

n h

as

be

en

su

sta

me

d.

Ow

en

v

Ba

rry,

33

6 F

.Su

pp

. 48

7 (M

ISh

ler,

C.

J.,

E.D

.N.Y

., 1

1/8

/71

). M

att

er

of

Ta

xte

r v

Lo

on

ey

ILe

vme

. J.,

N

ass

au

Co

un

ty

Su

p.C

t.,

Ind

ex

No

1

38

98

/69

). a

nd

se

e P

eo

ple

ex

rei

Gu

me

y v

Va

len

tme

, 27

4 N

.Y.

331,

8

N.E

.2d

88

0;

Pe

op

le e

x.r

el

Ma

ste

rso

n

v.

Fre

nch

, 11

0 N

Y

494.

18

N

E

133;

M

att

er

of

Wie

gm

an

n v

. B

rod

eri

ck,

27 A

.D.2

d 7

34,

279

N Y

.S.2

d 1

56

)."

Mo

re r

ece

ntl

y M

r.

Just

ice

De

rou

nia

n

in

the

M

att

er

of

Ols

zew

ski

v.

Co

un

cil

of

He

mp

ste

ad

F

ire

D

ep

art

me

nt,

S

up

.,

70

Mis

c.2

d

603,

60

9,

334

N.Y

S.2

d

504,

at

50

9.

up

he

ld

a l1

re

de

pa

rtm

en

t's

dre

ss c

od

e s

tati

ng

:

·'It

is

th

e j

ud

gm

en

t o

f th

is c

ou

rt,

ba

sed

on

th

e

reco

rd

in

this

tn

al.

th

at

the

d

efe

nd

an

ts

ha

ve

de

mo

nst

rate

d a

pa

ram

ou

nt

an

d c

om

pe

llin

g g

ove

rnm

en

tal

an

d p

ub

lic i

nte

rest

su

ffic

ien

t to

su

sta

m

the

co

nsti

tuti

on

al

va

lidit

y o

f th

e b

y-la

ws

in q

ue

sti

on

."

Th

e

mo

st

rece

nt

de

term

ina

tio

n

ma

de

b

y a

Ne

w

Yo

rk

Ap

pe

llate

C

ou

rt

was

th

at

of

Au

stin

v

Ho

wa

rd,

39 A

.0.2

d 7

6, 3

32 N

.Y.S

.2d

434

, in

wh

ich

, b

y a

div

ide

d c

ou

rt,

sust

ain

ed

a f

ind

mg

ag

ain

st

a cit

y f

ire

ma

n w

ho

wa

s fo

un

d g

uilty

of

cha

rge

s th

at

he

ta

iled

to

com

ply

wit

h t

he

dre

ss r

ule

of

the

fi

re d

ep

art

me

nt.

Th

e m

ajo

nty

he

ld t

ha

t (p

. 79

, 33

2 N

.Y.S

.2d

p.

436)

: "U

po

n a

co

nsi

de

rati

on

of

the

w

ho

le

reco

rd

as

it

reve

als

th

e

att

itu

de

a

nd

co

nd

uct

o

f th

e

pe

titi

on

er

an

d

the

re

qu

ire

me

nts

o

f d

iscip

lin

e

an

d

rule

e

nfo

rce

me

nt

in

a la

rge

q

ua

si-

milit

ary

o

rga

niz

ati

on

su

ch

as

the

B

uff

alo

F

ire

D

ep

art

me

nt,

th

e

de

term

ina

tio

n

of

the

C

om

mis

sio

ne

r a

nd

th

e

dis

cip

line

im

po

sed

w

ere

e

nti

rely

w

arr

an

ted

an

d d

id n

ot

con

stit

ute

an

ab

use

of

his

dis

cre

tio

na

ry p

ow

ers

." T

he

dis

sen

tin

g o

pin

ion

1n

no

wa

y re

late

d t

o t

he

qu

est

ion

of

co

nsti

tuti

on

alit

y.

It w

as m

ain

ly p

red

ica

ted

up

on

th

at

the

req

u1re

d w

eig

ht

wa

s n

ot

giv

en

to

th

e a

rbit

rato

r's r

ep

ort

, w

ho

was

a

pp

oin

ted

p

urs

ua

nt

to t

he

te

rms

of

an

em

plo

ym

en

t a

gre

em

en

t b

etw

ee

n t

he

Cit

y a

nd

th

e F

ire

Fig

hte

rs'

Ass

oci

ati

on

Fig

. 7.

Gre

en

wa

ld,

Issu

e O

ne

( T h

ere

lore

) W

ha

t h

as

sta

rte

d

as

a m

ild

ra

sh

o

f ca

ses

mvo

lvm

g

cha

llen

ge

s to

d

ress

co

de

s sh

ow

s si

gn

s o

f g

row

ing

m

to e

p1

de

mic

pro

po

rtio

ns.

"" .J:'-

D

C

Sin

ce

the

ti

me

th

at

Ju

sti

ce

O

live

r W

en

de

ll

Ho

lme

s,

spe

aki

ng

fo

r th

e S

up

rem

e J

ud

icia

l C

ou

rt o

f M

ass

ach

use

tts,

sta

ted

In

1

89

2,

tho

ug

h

a p

olice

ma

n

"ma

y

ha

ve

a

co

nsti

tuti

on

al

rig

ht

to

talk

p

oliti

cs,

bu

t h

e

ha

s n

o

con

stit

uti

on

al

rig

ht

to b

e a

po

lice

ma

n."

(M

cAu

liffe

v.

Cit

y o

f N

ew

Be

dfo

rd,

155

Ma

ss.

216,

22

0,

29

N.E

. 51

7),

the

re

has

been

a

lon

g o

verd

ue

ch

an

ge

in

th

e

po

siti

on

or

In

the

d

ete

rmin

ati

on

s o

f th

e

Co

urt

s,

so

tha

t In

th

e

Ma

tte

r o

f G

arr

ity,

et

al.

v.

Ne

w J

ers

ey,

38

5 U

.S.

493,

50

0,

87

S.C

t.

616,

620

, 17

L.E

d.2

d 5

62

(196

7),

the

Su

pre

me

Co

urt

sta

ted

: "W

e c

on

clu

de

th

at

po

lice

me

n,

like

te

ach

ers

a

nd

la

wye

rs,

are

no

t re

leg

ate

d t

o a

wa

tere

d-d

ow

n v

ers

ion

of

con

stit

uti

on

­al

ri

gh

ts."

In

th

at

Inst

an

ce t

he

Co

urt

w

as

de

alin

g

wit

h

a re

stri

ctio

n

up

on

th

e

po

lice

ma

n's

ri

gh

t to

a

sse

rt

the

ve

ry

imp

ort

an

t a

nd

o

the

rwis

e

com

mo

nly

ac

cept

ed

fun

da

me

nta

l p

rivi

leg

e o

f "s

elf

-in

cir

min

ati

on

", a

nd b

y a

five

to

fou

r vo

te

the

Co

urt

de

cla

red

th

e r

est

rict

ion

to

be

un

con

stit

uti

on

al.

w

(Th

ere

fore

) H

ow

eve

r, t

ho

ug

h t

he

Su

pre

me

Co

urt

he

ld t

ha

t a

po

lice

ma

n

sho

uld

ha

ve

the

sa

me

con

stit

uti

on

al

rig

ht

to

asse

rt

the

p

rivi

leg

e

of

self

-In

crim

ina

tio

n

as

a te

ach

er

of

law

yer,

It

does

no

t fo

llow

, a

nd

th

e C

ou

rt s

o h

old

s h

ere

in,

tha

t a

po

lice

ma

n

does

no

t h

ave

th

e

sam

e co

nst

itu

tio

na

l ri

gh

t as

a t

ea

che

r o

r la

wye

r to

de

term

ine

his

ow

n p

ers

on

al

ap

pe

ara

nce

wh

ile i

n u

nif

orm

.

•

(Sin

ce)

Th

ou

gh

o

ne

o

f th

e

Imp

ort

an

t fu

ncti

on

s

of

a p

olic

em

an

Is

to p

rote

ct t

he

co

nst

itu

tio

na

l ri

gh

ts o

f o

the

rs,

It Is

Iro

nic

al

tha

t In

th

e p

rop

er

pe

rfo

rma

nce

of

his

jo

b c

ert

ain

ri

gh

ts m

ust

be,

of

nece

ssity

qu

alif

ied

or

rest

rain

ed

.

Fig

. 8.

Gre

en

wa

ld,

Issu

e T

wo

: -·

..

v.

v.

D

Q -

----

----

----

----

C

Th

e

Co

urt

ha

s m

ad

e

an

ext

en

sive

re

vie

w o

f a

nu

mb

er

of

case

s re

lat­

Ing

to

th

e c

on

stit

uti

on

al

rig

ht

of

a p

ers

on

to

d

ete

rmin

e

his

o

wn

p

er­

son

al

ap

pe

ara

nce

an

d,

tho

ug

h

it

ap

pe

ars

to

be

cl

ea

r th

at

" '[

t]h

e

rig

ht

to

we

ar

on

e's

h

air

a

t a

ny

len

gth

or

in a

ny

de

sire

d m

an

ne

r Is

an

in

gre

die

nt

of

pe

rso

na

l fr

ee

do

m

pro

tecte

d

by

the

U

nit

ed

S

tate

s C

on

stit

uti

on

.'

Bre

en

v.

K

ah

l,

419

F.2

d 1

034

(7 C

ir.

1969

) ce

rt.

de

nie

d,

39

8 U

.S.

93

7,

90

S

.Ct.

1

83

6,

26

l.E

d.2

d 2

68

(197

0).

An

y re

gu

lati

on

w

hic

h

lim

its th

is

rig

ht

mu

st

be

's

uff

icie

ntl

y ju

stif

ied

' as

fu

rth

eri

ng

an

'im

po

rta

nt

or

sub

sta

nti

al

go

vern

­m

en

tal

inte

rest

',

wh

ich

'is

u

nre

lat­

ed

to

th

e

su

pp

ressio

n

of

fre

e

exp

ress

ion

' a

nd

a

ny

'inci

de

nta

l re

­str

icti

on

o

n

the

alle

ge

d F

irst

A­

me

nd

me

nt

fre

ed

om

s is

no

g

rea

ter

tha

n

is

ess

en

tial

to t

he

fu

rth

era

nce

o

f th

at

inte

rest

.'

Un

ite

d

Sta

tes

v.

O'B

rie

n,

391

U.S

. 3

67

, 3

77

, 88

S

.Ct.

16

73,

1679

, 20

l.

Ed

.2d

67

2 (1

96

8).

" E

lko

et

al.

v.

McC

are

y,

D.C

., 3

15 F

.Su

pp

. 88

6, 8

88 (

1970

).

w

Th

at

up

on

a

n

an

aly

sis

o

f th

ese

ca

ses

the

C

ou

rt

no

tes

tha

t th

e

ove

rwh

elm

ing

m

ajo

rity

re

late

d

to

so-c

alle

d h

igh

sc

hool

st

ud

en

t h

air

­cu

t ca

ses

an

d,

tho

ug

h

the

Co

urt

h

ere

in

do

es

no

t su

gg

est

tha

t a

po

lice

ma

n

has

less

co

nst

itu

tio

na

l ri

gh

t th

an

a

stu

de

nt

or

an

y o

the

r ci

tize

n.

(Sin

ce)

Fo

r, a

s w

as h

eld

by

the

Co

urt

In

Elk

o e

t a

l. v.

M

cCa

rey,

s:.

~pra

, p.

88

8:

''Wh

ile

th

e

bu

rde

n

of

just

ific

ati

on

fo

r su

ch

a re

gu

lati

on

Is

's

ub

sta

nti

al',

th

ere

ma

y be

'd

iffe

ren

t ju

stif

ica

tio

ns'

fo

r th

e r

eg

ula

tio

n o

f th

e h

air

sty

les

of

ad

ult

s, s

uch

as f

ire

me

n,

tha

n t

he

re a

re f

or

stu

de

nts

of

a h

igh

sch

ool.

Bre

en

v.

Ka

hl,

su

pra

, 41

9 F

.2d

at

10

36

."

Fig

. 9.

Gre

enw

ald,

Iss

ue T

hre

e

(Th

ere

fore

) It

doe

s su

gg

est

th

at

the

cr

ite

ria

to

be

a

pp

lied

In

d

ete

rmin

­in

g

wh

eth

er

or

no

t a

po

lice

ma

n

in

un

ifo

rm

ma

y d

ete

rmin

e h

is

ow

n

pe

rso

na

l a

pp

ea

ran

ce i

n

vio

lati

on

o

f a

gro

om

ing

ru

le

of

the

p

olle

e

de

pa

rtm

en

t is

n

ot

ne

cess

ari

ly

the

sa

me

in

so

far

as

a h

igh

sc

ho

ol

stu

de

nt's

p

ers

on

al

ap

pe

ara

nce

in

vi

ola

tio

n o

f a

scho

ol g

roo

min

g r

ule

.

Vt

0'

An

a

na

lysis

of

the

h

air

cu

t ca

ses

wo

uld

se

em

to

in

dic

ate

th

at

as t

he

Co

urt

s h

ave

re

pe

ate

dly

su

sta

ine

d

the

co

nst

itu

tio

na

l ri

gh

t o

f a

hig

h

sch

oo

l st

ud

en

t to

w

ea

r h

is h

air

at

such

le

ng

th a

s h

e s

o d

ete

rmin

es,

ju

st

as

the

re

stri

ctiv

e

ph

rase

olo

gy

of

Just

ice

H

olm

es

In

McA

ulif

fe h

as s

erv

ed

as

the

ba

sis

ove

r a

nu

mb

er

of

yea

rs

for

rest

rict

ing

th

e r

igh

ts

of

pu

blic

e

mp

loye

es,

th

ere

no

w

ap

pe

ars

to

b

e

a sit

ua

tio

n

de

ve

lop

ing

w

he

rein

hig

h s

choo

l st

ud

en

t h

air

cut

case

s a

re

be

ing

us

ed a

s th

e p

rece

de

nt

in p

ub

lic e

mp

loye

es'

ca

ses

to

sub

sta

nti

ate

th

e p

rop

osi

tio

n t

ha

t ru

les

an

d r

eg

ula

tio

ns

•

D

C

pro

mu

lga

ted

In

a s

cho

ol

se

ttin

g a

re a

pp

lica

ble

to

th

ose

ad

op

ted

In

th

e p

ub

lic s

ect

or

in w

hic

h n

ot

on

ly

the

In

div

idu

al,

b

ut

the

en

tire

p

ub

lic

ha

s a

vit

al

inte

rest

an

d c

on

ce

rn.

So

tha

t n

ow

, so

me

re

ce

nt

de

cisi

on

s h

old

th

at

me

rely

up

on

th

e a

sse

rtio

n

tha

t a

fun

da

me

nta

l p

ers

on

al

rig

ht

of

a p

ub

lic

em

plo

yee

is

In

volv

ed

, Im

me

dia

tely

th

e p

resu

mp

tio

n o

f th

e c

on

sti­

tuti

on

ality

o

f a

go

ve

rnm

en

tal

rule

is

n

ullif

ied

. (L

ind

qu

ist

v. C

ity

of

Co

ral

Ga

ble

s, D

.C.,

323

F.S

up

p.

11

61

.)

w (T

he

refo

re)

Th

e C

ou

rt

do

es

no

t a

gre

e w

ith

th

at

pro

po

siti

on

.

(Sin

ce)

Pri

or

to

a p

resu

mp

tio

n

of

con

stit

uti

on

alit

y o

f a

go

vern

me

nta

l ru

le

or

reg

ula

tio

n

be

ing

n

ulli

fie

d,

it m

ust

in

th

e f

irst

in

sta

nce

be

de

term

ine

d,

no

t a

ssu

me

d,

tha

t th

e r

igh

t o

f th

e

pu

blic

e

mp

loye

e h

as n

ot

been

qu

alif

ied

or

wa

ive

d b

y e

ith

er

the

na

ture

of

the

pu

blic

em

plo

yme

nt

or

un

de

r th

e

circ

um

sta

nce

s u

nd

er

wh

ich

it

is

b

ein

g

exe

rcis

ed

. T

ho

ug

h

the

1

4th

A

me

nd

me

nt

spea

ks

of

"rig

hts

" g

en

era

lly,

it do

es n

ot

mea

n th

at

the

re a

re n

ot

cert

ain

cir

cum

sta

nce

s w

hic

h w

ou

ld j

usti

fy a

d

isti

nct

ion

be

ing

ma

de

, o

r as

th

e U

nit

ed

Sta

tes

Su

pre

me

Co

urt

has

h

eld

in

M

att

er

of

Fu

en

tes

v.

Sh

evi

n,

et a

l.,

407

U.S

. 67

, 92

S.C

t.

1893

, 32

L

.Ed

.2d

55

6,

rece

ntl

y d

eci

de

d

on

Jun

e

12,

1972

, in

volv

ing

th

e a

pp

lica

tio

n

of

the

14

th

Am

en

dm

en

t to

st

ate

sta

tute

s re

lati

ng

to

th

e

ext

rao

rdin

ary

re

me

dy

of

rep

levi

n,

and

spe

cifi

cally

co

nce

rnin

g

exc

ep

tion

al

situ

ati

on

s w

hic

h

wo

uld

ju

sti

fy

the

se

izu

re o

f a

cha

tte

l w

ith

ou

t th

e n

eed

of

giv

ing

n

oti

ce o

r o

pp

ort

un

ity

for

a h

ea

rin

g.

Th

ou

gh

th

e

Co

urt

sta

ted

(p

. 90

, 92

S

.Ct.

19

99):

"I

t is

no

t th

e b

usi

ne

ss o

f a

cou

rt

ad

jud

ica

tin

g

du

e

proc

ess

rig

hts

to

ma

ke i

ts o

wn

cri

tica

l e

valu

ati

on

of

tho

se c

hoic

es a

nd

p

rote

ct o

nly

th

e o

ne

s th

at,

b

y its

o

wn

lig

hts

, a

re

'ne

cess

ary

' ",

it

is

o

f n

ote

th

at

the

Co

urt

cit

ed

p

rio

r o

pin

ion

s re

lati

ng

to

wa

ive

r a

spe

cts

in w

hic

h i

t w

as h

eld

: "

'Th

at

the

he

ari

ng

re

qu

ire

d b

y d

ue

pro

cess

is

sub

ject

to

wa

ive

r, a

nd

is

no

t fi

xed

in

fo

rm d

oes

not

aff

ect

its

ro

ot

req

uir

em

en

t th

at

an

ind

ivid

ua

l be

giv

en

an

op

po

rtu

nit

y fo

r a

he

ari

ng

be

fore

he

is

de

pri

ved

of

an

y si

gn

ific

an

t p

rop

ert

y in

tere

st,

exc

ep

t fo

r e

xtra

ord

ina

ry

situ

ati

on

s w

he

re s

om

e v

alid

go

vern

me

nta

l in

tere

st i

s a

t st

ake

th

at

just

ifie

s p

ost

po

nin

g t

he

he

ari

ng

u

nti

l a

fte

r th

e e

ve

nt.

'"

(In

re

Ru

ffa

lo,

390

U.S

. 54

4 at

55

0-5

51

,88

S.C

t.

1222

at

12

25

-12

26

,20

L

.Ed

.2d

117

; B

od

die

v.

Co

nn

ect

icu

t, 4

01

U.S

. 37

1 at

378

-379

, 91

S

.Ct.

780

at

786,

28

L.E

d.2

d 1

13

.)

(em

ph

asi

s su

pp

lied

)

It

is

of

furt

he

r n

oti

ce

tha

t M

r.

Just

ice

W

hit

e,

in

his

d

isse

nti

ng

o

pin

ion

in

d

iscu

ssin

g

an

d

de

term

inin

g w

he

the

r o

r n

ot

a m

att

er

co

mp

ort

s t

o th

e d

ue

p

roce

ss p

rovis

ion

s o

f th

e 1

4th

A

me

nd

me

nt,

sta

ted

(p

. 82

, 92

S.C

t. p

. 19

95):

"I

n c

on

sid

eri

ng

w

he

the

r th

is r

eso

luti

on

of

con

flic

t­in

g i

nte

rest

s is

un

con

stit

uti

on

al,

mu

ch d

ep

en

ds

on o

ne

's p

erc

ep

tio

ns

of

the

pra

ctic

al

con

sid

era

tio

ns

invo

lve

d.'

' Fig

. 10

. G

ree

nw

ald

, Is

sue

Fo

ur

Vt

-.J

D

c.

Cz

Th

e C

ou

rt

no

tes

he

rein

th

at

the

e

vid

en

ce c

lea

rly

est

ab

lish

es

tha

t th

e

gro

om

ing

ru

le I

s u

nlf

orm

lly a

pp

lied

th

rou

gh

ou

t th

e

po

lice

d

ep

art

me

nt

an

d t

ha

t th

ere

are

no

alle

ga

tio

ns

by

the

pe

titi

on

er

tha

t a

ny

me

mb

ers

of

the

de

pa

rtm

en

t h

ave

bee

n p

en

aliz

ed

fo

r fa

ilure

to

co

nfo

rm t

o t

he

ru

le.

(Th

ere

fore

) H

ow

eve

r,

the

C

ou

rt

do

es

no

t b

elie

ve

th

at

po

lice

ma

n

sh

ou

ld

ha

ve

to

p

urp

ose

ly

pla

ce

him

self

In

jeo

pa

rdy

In o

rde

r to

te

st

the

co

nst

itu

tio

na

lity

of

the

ru

le.

w

(Th

ere

fore

) T

he

se

ma

tte

rs o

f d

ress

a

nd

g

roo

min

g a

re

be

st

left

to

a

de

term

ina

tio

n o

r an

a

gre

em

en

t b

e­

twe

en

th

e p

olic

e c

om

mis

sio

ne

r a

nd

th

e m

em

be

rs o

f th

e d

ep

art

me

nt,

or

the

ir r

ep

rese

nta

tive

s, r

ath

er

tha

n t

o

litig

ati

on

.

(Sin

ce)

Th

e C

ou

rt h

as

co

nsis

ten

tly h

eld

th

at

It w

ill

no

t o

rdin

ari

ly

sub

stit

ute

Its

ju

dg

me

nt

for

tha

t o

f an

a

dm

inis

tra

tive

bo

dy,

h

ow

eve

r,

It

will

do

so

w

he

re

the

a

dm

lnls

tra

t lve

d

ete

rmIn

ati

on

is

a

rbit

rary

, ca

pri

cio

us

and

un

rea

son

ab

le.

Th

e

Co

urt

no

tes

tha

t,

In

ad

dit

ion

to

an

a

na

lysi

s o

f th

e l

ate

st c

ases

, It

also

has

re

vie

we

d n

um

ero

us

dres

s co

des

ad

op

ted

by

polle

e d

ep

art

me

nts

th

rou

gh

ou

t th

e c

ou

ntr

y, I

ncl

ud

ing

th

ose

w

hic

h

the

P

olic

e C

om

mis

sio

ne

r st

ate

d

he

too

k In

to

con

sid

era

tion

In

p

rom

ulg

ati

ng

th

e r

ule

and

te

lety

pe

ord

er

of

the

Nas

sau

Co

un

ty P

olle

e D

ep

art

me

nt.

H

ow

eve

r,

pa

rtic

ula

rly

sinc

e th

e

polle

e co

mm

issi

on

er

ind

ica

tes

tha

t th

e d

ress

cod

e is

co

nst

an

tly

un

de

r re

vie

w

for

po

ssib

le

revis

ion

s,

the

C

ou

rt

ca

lls

to

his

a

tte

nti

on

th

e

Oa

kla

nd

P

olic

e

De

pa

rtm

en

t co

de w

hic

h w

as a

dopt

ed s

ub

seq

ue

nt

to t

he

Nas

sau

Co

un

ty

Pol

ice

De

pa

rtm

en

t ru

le,

pa

rtic

ula

rly

in

reg

ard

to

th

e r

eg

ula

tion

w

hic

h

pe

rmit

s "s

ide

bu

rns

to e

xte

nd

to

th

e b

ott

om

of

the

ea

r."

Fig

. 11

. G

ree

nw

ald

, Is

sue

Fiv

e

~

())

D

~

Th

ou

gh

th

e p

art

ies

rais

e

(Th

ere

fore

) H

ow

eve

r,

wh

eth

er

the

th

e I

ssu

e o

f co

nstl

tu-

test

ap

plie

d b

e t

ha

t o

f P

icke

rin

g v

. tl

on

allty

, th

ey

do

n

ot

Bo

ard

o

f E

du

cati

on

, 39

1 U

.S.

563,

sp

eci

fica

lly

Ide

nti

fy

the

8

8

S. C

t.

17

31

, 2

0

L. E

d. 2

d

811

am

en

dm

en

ts

up

on

(1

96

8).

w

he

rein

th

e d

ue

pro

ce

ss

wh

ich

th

ey b

ase

th

eir

cla

use

as

a

pp

lie

d

to

the

F

irst

con

ten

tio

ns.

W

. \A

I A

me

nd

me

nt

wa

s In

vo

lve

d,

or

as

1 -

YY

t -

ap

plie

d

to

the

F

ou

rte

en

th

Am

en

d-

(Sin

ce)

Fo

r as

th

e

Su

pre

me

C

ou

rt

sta

ted

In

th

e

Ma

tte

r o

f S

tan

ley

v.

Sta

te o

f Il

lino

is,

sup

ra (

pp.

650,

92

S

.Ct.

p.

1212

):

"In

co

nsi

de

rin

g

this

p

roce

du

re

un

de

r th

e D

ue

Pro

cess

Cla

use

, w

e re

cog

niz

e a

s w

e h

ave

in

oth

er

case

s, th

at

du

e p

roce

ss o

f la

w

does

n

ot

req

uir

e

a h

ea

rin

g

"in

e

very

co

nce

iva

ble

cas

e o

f g

ove

rn­

me

nta

l im

pa

irm

en

t o

f p

riva

te

in­

tere

st.'

C

afe

teri

a a

nd

R

est

au

ran

t W

ork

ers

U

nio

n

etc

. v.

M

cElr

oy,

36

7 U

.S.

886,

894

, 81

S

.Ct.

174

3,

1748

, 6

L.E

d.2

d 1

230

(196

1 ).

Th

at

case

exp

lain

ed

th

at

• [t )

he

ve

ry

na

ture

of

du

e p

roce

ss n

eg

ate

s

an

y co

nce

pt

of

infl

exi

ble

p

roce

­d

ure

s u

niv

ers

ally a

pp

lica

ble

to

e

very

Im

ag

ina

ble

si

tua

tio

n'

an

d

firm

ly e

sta

blis

he

d t

ha

t 'w

ha

t p

ro­

ced

ure

s d

ue

pro

cess

ma

y· r

eq

uir

e

un

de

r a

ny

giv

en

se

t o

f ci

rcu

m­

sta

nce

s m

ust

be

gin

w

ith

a d

ete

r­m

ina

tio

n o

f th

e p

reci

se n

atu

re o

f th

e g

ove

rnm

en

t fu

nct

ion

in

volv

ed

as

w

ell

as

of

the

pri

vate

in

tere

st

tha

t ha

s be

en

aff

ect

ed

b

y g

ov­

ern

me

nta

l a

ctio

n.'

I d

., a

t 89

5,

81

S.C

t. a

t 17

48;

Go

ldb

erg

v.

Ke

lly,

397

U.S

. 25

4, 2

63,

90 S

.Ct.

101

1,

1018

, 25

L.E

d.2

d 2

87 (

19

70

".

D

C

In t

he

cas

e o

f P

icke

rin

g v

. B

oa

rd o

f E

du

cati

on

(s

up

ra,

p.

568,

88

S

.Ct.

p

p.

1734

-173

5),

the

Su

pre

me

Co

urt

st

ate

d:

''th

e

pro

ble

m

In

an

y ca

se

Is

to

arr

ive

at

a b

ala

nce

b

etw

ee

n

the

in

tere

sts

of

the

te

ach

er,

as

a ci

ti­

zen,

in

co

mm

en

tin

g u

pon

ma

tte

rs

of

pu

blic

co

nce

rn a

nd

th

e i

nte

rest

o

f th

e S

tate

, as

an

e

mp

loye

r,

In

pro

mo

tin

g

the

e

ffic

ien

cy

of

pu

blic

se

rvic

es

It

pe

rfo

rms

thro

ug

h I

ts e

mp

loye

es.

I'

Ap

ply

ing

th

e t

est

se

t d

ow

n

by

the

S

up

rem

e C

ou

rt I

n P

icke

rin

g (

sup

ra),

a

nd

su

bst

itu

tin

g

the

rein

th

e

wo

rd

"po

lice

ma

n"

for

"te

ach

er"

, an

d w

ith

fu

ll co

nsi

de

rati

on

b

ein

g

giv

en

to

th

e d

iffe

ren

ce b

etw

ee

n t

he

op

er­

ati

on

o

f sc

hool

s a

nd

th

e

op

era

tio

n

of

a p

olice

de

pa

rtm

en

t,

an

d

the

g

ove

rnm

en

tal

bo

dy'

s in

tere

st

in

a d

isci

plin

ed

a

nd

e

ffic

ien

t p

olic

e

de

­p

art

me

nt,

a

nd

th

e

dir

ect

co

ncer

n a

nd

in

tere

st

of

the

g

en

era

l p

ub

lic

the

rein

(s

ee

B

rukie

wa

v.

P

olle

e

Co

mm

issi

on

er

of

Ba

ltim

ore

, C

ou

rt

of

Ap

pe

als

o

f M

ary

lan

d,

257

Md

. 36

, 26

3 A

.2d

210

) 1

(Th

ere

fore

) th

is C

ou

rt h

old

s t

ha

t b

ein

g

a p

ol i

ce

ma

n

Is

tha

t o

f a

pu

blic

em

plo

yee

w

ith

u

niq

ue

ch

ar­

act

eri

stic

s a

nd

h

is

rig

ht

to

de

ter­

min

e h

is o

wn

p

ers

on

al

ap

pe

ara

nce

m

ay

be

limit

ed

, in

th

at

no

t o

nly

Is

It

a

con

cern

o

f th

e

po

lice

d

ep

art

­m

en

t in

th

e m

ain

ten

an

ce o

f d

isci

p­

line

, b

ut

it is

a p

osi

tion

in

wh

ich

his

p

ers

on

al

ap

pe

ara

nce

w

hile

in

u

ni­

form

has

a d

ire

ct r

ela

tio

nsh

ip t

o th

e

pu

blic

in

tere

st I

conc

ern

and

con

fi­

de

nce

as

dis

tin

gu

ish

ed

fr

om

th

e

tea

ch

er

In

the

P

icke

rin

g c

ase

In

w

hic

h t

he

Su

pre

me

Co

urt

he

ld t

ha

t h

is e

mp

loym

en

t is

on

ly t

an

ge

nti

ally

an

d in

sub

sta

nti

ally

in

volv

ed

in

th

e

ma

tte

r o

f th

e

pu

b I i

c sta

tem

en

ts

ma

de

by

th

e

tea

che

r so

th

at

the

C

ou

rt

con

clu

de

d

he shoul~

be

re­

ga

rde

d a

s no

m

ore

th

an

a m

em

be

r o

f th

e g

en

era

l p

ub

lic.

Fig

. 12

. G

ree

nw

ald

, Is

sue

Six

me

nt

In

the

M

att

er

of

Sta

nle

y v.

S

tate

o

f Il

lino

is,

405

U.S

. 64

5,

92

S.C

t.

1208

, 31

L

.Ed

.2d

55

1,

1972

, w

hic

h

invo

lve

d

the

E

qu

al

Pro

tec­

tio

n

cla

use

, th

e

Na

ssa

u

Co

un

ty

Po

lice

De

pa

rtm

en

t d

ress r

ule

In

­vo

lve

d h

ere

in i

s co

nst

itu

tio

na

lly v

a­lid

.

Cz

(Th

ere

fore

) T

he

p

riva

te

Inte

rest

h

ere

, th

at

of

a p

olic

em

an

In

u

ni­

form

to

de

term

ine

his

ow

n p

ers

on

al

ap

pe

ara

nce

, is

cle

arl

y o

ffse

t b

y th

e

"po

we

rfu

l co

un

terv

aili

ng

In

tere

st"

of

th

e

polle

e d

ep

art

me

nt

an

d

the

g

en

era

l p

ub

lic.

Th

e m

ain

ten

an

ce o

f a

dis

cip

lin

ed

an

d e

ffic

ien

t p

olle

e

de

pa

rtm

en

t In

w

hic

h t

he

po

lice

ma

n

In

un

ifo

rm

ma

inta

inin

g

a st

an

da

rd

of a

pp

ea

ran

ce

tha

t co

nn

ote

s p

ub

lic

con

fide

nce

, ac

cept

ance

an

d r

esp

ect

, co

nsti

tute

s a

''p

ow

erf

ul

co

un

ter­

vaili

ng

in

tere

st''.

"" ~

Paulos v. Breier

Paulos v. Breier (1974)12 sets the precedent for police political

activity.

1.

2. 3. k.

5.

In this case, five issues were considered:

Whether the judgment, Whether the Whether the Whether the overbroad,

case should be treated as a motion for summar.y

city of Milwaukee was a proper defendant, departmental rule was unconstitutionally vague, departmental rule was unconstitutionally

Whether the application of the rule might cause future infringements.

60

The first issue, Figure 13, as it is not a contested issue, required

only the basic Toulmin display. The second issue, however, adds a new

concept to Toulmin's model as demonstrated in Figure 14. This issue

includes a sub-areument consisting of data to claim movement within

the backing of the main argument. The claim of the sub-ar~ent pro-

vides support for the warrant. The data and warrant of the sub-argument

provide the origin and support for the claim. Sub-arguments in backing

were first noted by Brockriede and Ehninger in their initial interpreta-13

tion of the Toulmin model.

The third issue, Figure 15, the vagueness of the rule in question,

structurally deviates from Toulmin's original construct. This issue

contains two independent warrants, either of which provides a leap

from data to claim. Warrant one, w1 , provides the historical precedent

upon which the claim is based. Warrant two, w2, howev~r, provides an

independent justification of the claim by rejecting the alternative to

the advanced claim. w2 is established throurh a sub-argument whose

data is a possible alternative. The warrant indicates that the position

established by the data has been modified, justifying the claim's

rejection of the data's position. The overall effect of w2 supports

the claim as it rejects the possible alternative reached by the court.

The court is thus justifyinp: its leap from data to claim through both

a positive (W1 ) and negative (W2 ) rationale.

The claim of the sub-arfUment is also justified by a sub-argument

reaching the same conclusion as the claim. This illustrates yet

another example of Ehninger's "cluster. 1114

The fourth issue, overbreadth of the rule, varies only slightly

from Toulmin's basic model (Figure 16). Again, a cluster of arguments

is evident with a sub-argument justifying the original claim advanced

by the court.

The final issue in the case, future applications, illustrates a

combination of several extentions previously discussed (Figure 17).

First, the data has its own sub-argument. This sub-argument serves two

61

functions: first, it demonstrates the origin of the data, and secondly,

it qualifies the data. The court's claim that "this is strong medicine 1115

provides a limitation, thereby qualifying the data used to support the

ultimate claim.

The issue of future application is established by the court's use

of multiple warrants, both vertical and horizontal varities, each

possessinf a data to claim movement. Warrant one, w1, represents the

lefal requirements facinr the court. This sub-arrumerit establishes the

legal basis for the claim. After an examination of the lefal require-

ments, the court concludes that the rule is not overbroad. Further,

the court offers additional support, warrant two, w2, in making its

claim. Here the court applies the legal principles advanced in w1•

Warrant two is a rationale for why the police department's rule is not

overbroad. Warrant three, w3

, provides an independent justification of

the court's claim and rejects an alternative to its claim. The sub­

argument in w3 advances the idea that policemen, in their official

capacities, are subject to certain restrictions not required of other

public empl~ees. Thus, by rejecting the alternative, the court pro­

vides the leap from data to claim in \·13•

62

D

C

Be

fore

co

nsi

de

rin

g t

he

su

bst

an

ce o

f d

efe

nd

an

ts'

Ru

le

12(b

)(6)

mo

tio

n,

seve

ral

pro

ced

ura

l q

ue

stio

ns

mu

st b

e d

ea

lth

wit

h.

Fir

stly

, p

lain

tiff

arg

ue

s th

at

un

de

r R

ule

1

2(b

) o

f th

e

Fe

de

ral

Rul

es

of

Civ

il P

roce

du

re,

the

m

oti

on

to

dis

mis

s sh

ould

be

tre

ate

d a

s a

mo

tio

n

for

su

mm

ary

ju

dg

me

nt

wit

h th

e p

art

ies b

ein

g

giv

en

fu

rth

er

op

po

rtu

nit

y to

pre

sen

t m

ate

ria

l.

w

Th

ere

fore

, th

e

pre

sen

t m

att

er

sha

ll be

tr

ea

ted

as

a

mo

tio

n t

o d

ism

iss

and

no

t as

a

mo

tio

n

for

sum

ma

ry

jud

gm

en

t.

(Sin

ce)

Ne

ith

er

pa

rty

has

sub

mit

ted

an

y a

ffid

avi

ts o

r d

ep

osit

ion

s fr

om

w

hic

h

the

co

urt

co

uld

m

ake

a

sum

ma

ry j

ud

gm

en

t.

Fig

. 13

. P

aulo

s, I

ssue

One

e;

0 C

T

his

Is

an a

ctio

n b

rou

gh

t u

nd

er

the

Civ

il R

igh

ts A

ct I

n w

hic

h t

he

p

lain

tiff

, a

de

tecti

ve

In

th

e

M I

I wa

uke

e

Po

llee

D

ep

art

me

nt,

co

mp

lain

s o

f a

five

-da

y su

spe

nsi

on

wh

ich

he

re

ceiv

ed

up

on

ord

er

of

the

de

fen

da

nt

Ha

rold

A

. B

reie

r,

Pol

lee

Ch

ief

of

the

C

ity

of

Milw

au

kee

.

Pla

inti

ff s

eeks

mo

ne

tary

da

ma

ge

s fo

r th

e p

eri

od

of

tim

e

he

was

su

spe

nd

ed

an

d a

dd

itio

na

lly a

sks

for

a d

ecl

ara

tio

n t

ha

t R

ule

29,

§

31,

is u

nco

nst

itu

tio

na

l a

nd

th

at

the

de

fen

da

nts

be

en

join

ed

fro

m

en

forc

ing

sa

id r

ule

. T

he

Cit

y o

f M

ilwa

uke

e i

s in

clu

de

d a

s a

pa

rty

de

fen

da

nt

in t

his

act

ion

.

[1]

At

the

ou

tse

t, I

mu

st d

ete

rmin

e i

f th

e C

ity

of

Milw

au

kee

is

a p

rop

er

de

fen

da

nt

In a

§ 1

983

act

ion

. W

I m

ust

, th

ere

fore

, g

ran

t th

e

mo

tio

n

of

the

d

efe

nd

an

t C

ity

of

Milw

au

kee

to

dis

mis

s th

is a

ctio

n a

s to

lt.

(Sin

ce)

base

d on

th

e r

ece

nt

de

cisi

on

of

the

Un

ite

d S

tate

s S

up

rem

e C

ou

rt

In

Cit

y o

f K

en

osh

a v

. B

run

o,

412

U.S

. 50

7, 9

3 S

.Ct.

222

2, 3

7 L

.Ed

.2d

109

(19

73),

It

has

bec

ome

cle

ar

tha

t m

un

icip

alit

ies

are

no

t "p

ers

on

s"

for

pu

rpo

ses

of

juri

sdic

tio

n u

nd

er

28 U

.S.C

. §

1343

an

d 4

2 U

.S.

C.

§ 19

83.

D

In

Mo

nro

e

v.

Pap

e,

365

U.S

. 16

7,

81

S.C

t.

473,

5

L.E

d.2

d 4

92 (

1961

), t

he

Un

ite

d S

tate

s S

up

rem

e C

ou

rt

he

ld t

ha

t a

mu

nic

ipa

lity

is n

ot

a "p

ers

on

" w

ith

in t

he

m

ea

nin

g

of

42

U.S

.C.

§ 1

98

3.

Th

e

Co

urt

, a

fte

r e

xam

inin

g t

he

le

gis

lati

ve h

isto

ry o

f §

1983

, co

ncl

ud

ed

:

''Th

e r

esp

on

se o

f th

e C

on

gre

ss t

o t

he

p

rop

osa

l to

m

ake

mu

nic

ipa

litie

s lia

ble

fo

r ce

rta

in

act

ion

s b

ein

g

bro

ug

ht

wit

hin

fe

de

ral

pu

rvie

w b

y th

e A

ct o

f A

pri

l 2

0,

18

71

, w

as

so

an

tag

on

isti

c

tha

t w

e

ca

nn

ot

be

lieve

th

at

the

wo

rd '

pe

rso

n'

was

use

d in

th

is p

ar-

B

(Bec

ause

) C

ti

cula

r A

ct i

n in

clu

de

th

em

. •

• •"

365

U.S

. at

191

, 81

S

.Ct.

at

486.

Su

bse

qu

en

t to

th

is,

seve

ral

cou

rts

he

ld t

ha

t th

e r

ulin

g

of

Mo

nro

e w

as

limit

ed

to

act

ion

s fo

r d

am

ag

es,

a

nd

th

at

whe

n e

qu

ita

ble

re

lief

was

so

ug

ht

mu

nic

ipa

litie

s w

ere

p

rop

er

de

fen

da

nts

u

nd

er

§ 1

98

3.

Se

e,

for

exa

mp

le,

Ad

am

s v.

C

ity

of

Pa

rk R

idg

e,

293

F.2

d 5

85

(7th

C

ir.

1961

); S

chne

ll v.

C

ity

of

Ch

ica

go

, 40

7 F

.2d

10

84 (

7th

Cir

. 19

68);

Ha

rkle

ss v

. S

wee

ny I

nd

ep

en

de

nt

Sch

ool

Dis

tric

t, 4

27 F

.2d

319

(5t

h C

lr.

1970

).

w T

he

refo

re,

the

C

ity

of

Milw

au

kee

is

n

ot

a p

rop

er

pa

rty

an

d m

ust

be

dis

mis

sed

.

(Not

a "

pe

rso

n")

(Sin

ce)

Re

cen

tly t

he

Iss

ue o

f th

is d

ua

l a

pp

roa

ch t

o t

he

sco

pe

of

§ 19

83

was

la

id

to

rest

b

y th

e

Un

ite

d S

tate

d S

up

rem

e C

ou

rt I

n C

ity

of

Ke

no

sha

v.

Bru

no

, 41

2 U

.S.

507,

513

-518

S.C

t. 2

222,

222

6,

37 L

.Ed

.2d

109

(19

73),

th

e C

ou

rt s

tate

d:

"We

fin

d

no

thin

g i

n th

e

leg

isla

tive

his

tory

dis

cuss

ed

in

Mo

nro

e,

or

In

the

la

ng

ua

ge

act

ua

lly

used

by

Co

ng

ress

, to

su

gg

est

th

at

the

ge

ne

ric

wo

rd

'pe

rso

n'

in §

198

3 w

as

inte

nd

ed

to

ha

ve a

b

ifu

rca

ted

ap

plic

ati

on

to

mu

nic

ipa

l co

rpo

rati

on

s d

ep

en

din

g o

n th

e n

atu

re o

f th

e r

elie

f so

ug

ht

ag

ain

st t

he

m.

Sin

ce,

as t

he

Co

urt

he

ld I

n M

on

roe

, 'C

on

gre

ss d

id n

ot

un

de

rta

ke t

o b

rin

g m

un

ici­

pal

corp

ora

tio

ns

wit

hin

th

e

am

bit

o

f'

§ 19

83,

[365

U

.S.)

at

18

7 [8

1 S

.Ct.

at

48

4],

the

y a

re

ou

tsid

e o

f it

s a

mb

it f

or

pu

rpo

ses

of

eq

uit

ab

le r

elie

f as

we

ll as

fo

r d

am

ag

es.

•

• •"

Fig

. 14

. P

au

los,

Iss

ue T

wo

"' .r:-

D

C

w,

Ru

le

29

, §

31

, re

str

icts

p

olle

e

off

ice

rs

fro

m

"ln

terf

er [l

ng

] o

r u

s(ln

g}

the

In

flu

en

ce o

f th

eir

off

ice

fo

r p

olit

ica

l re

aso

ns.

"

(Sin

ce)

In U

nit

ed

Pu

blic

Wo

rke

rs v

. M

itch

ell,

330

U.S

. 75

, 6

7 S

.Ct.

5

56

, 91

L

.Ed

. 7

54

(1

94

7),

th

e

Un

ite

d

Sta

tes

Su

pre

me

C

ou

rt

up

he

ld

the

co

nst

itu

tio

na

lity

of

the

H

atc

h

Act

of

1939

, 5

U.S

.C.A

. §

7324

(a

)(2)

, w

hic

h

pro

hib

its

all

fed

era

l e

mp

loye

es,

w

ith

th

e

exc

ep

tion

o

f a

few

to

p-l

eve

l o

ffic

ials

, fr

om

ta

kin

g

"an

y a

ctiv

e p

art

In

p

olit

ica

l m

an

ag

e­

me

nt

or

In p

olit

ica

l ca

mp

aig

ns.

"

Th

ere

fore

, p

lain

tiff

's c

laim

th

at

the

w

ord

ing

of

Ru

le 2

9, §

31,

re

nd

ers

It

un

con

stit

uti

on

ally

va

gu

e

In

Its

en

­ti

rety

mu

st f

all.

0-;~~:

:::::-

------

---r--

------

---~~V

V.~t~-

--~.~

(Sin

ce)

C

Pla

inti

ff c

ite

s th

e

case

o

f H

ob

bs

v.

Th

om

pso

n,

448

F .2

d 45

6 (5

th C

ir.

1971

), I

n w

hic

h t

ha

t co

urt

fo

rce

fully

a

rgu

ed

th

at

the

ra

tio

na

le o

f U

nit

ed

Pu

blic

Wo

rke

rs v

. M

itch

ell,

su

pra

, h

as

be

en

cle

arl

y

ero

de

d

by

the

d

eve

lop

me

nt

of

the

co

nst

itu

tio

na

l d

oct

rin

es

of

ove

r­b

rea

dth

an

d v

ag

ue

ne

ss.

(Th

ere

fore

, th

e L

ett

er

Ca

rrie

rs)

ho

ldin

g I

s co

ntr

olli

ng

h

ere

.

w

(Sin

ce)

Re

cen

tly,

ho

we

ver,

th

e

Un

ite

d

Sta

tes

Su

pre

me

C

ou

rt

stro

ng

ly

rea

ffir

me

d

the

M

itch

ell h

old

ing

, a

nd

in

Un

ite

d S

tate

s C

ivil

Se

rvic

e C

om

mis

sio

n v

. N

atio

na

l A

sso

cia

tion

o

f L

ett

er

Ca

rrie

rs,

413

U.S

. 54

8,

556,

93

S.C

t.

2880

, 28

86,

37

L.E

d.2

d 7

96

(197

3),

he

ld

tha

t C

on

gre

ss c

an c

on

stit

uti

on

ally

fo

rbid

fe

de

ral

em

plo

yee

s fr

om

:

·' *

* *

org

an

izin

g

a po

iLtlc

al

pa

rty

or

clu

b;

act

ive

ly

pa

rtic

ipa

tin

g

In

fun

d-r

ais

ing

ac

­ti

vit

ies f

or

a p

art

isa

n c

an

did

ate

or

po

litic

al

pa

rty;

be

com

ing

a p

art

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n c

an

did

ate

fo

r, o

r ca

mp

aig

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or,

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e p

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ive

ly m

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e c

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te f

or

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blic

off

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; in

itia

tin

g o

r ci

rcu

lati

ng

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art

isa

n n

om

ina

tin

g p

eti

tio

n o

r so

licit

ing

vo

tes

for

a p

art

isa

n

can

did

ate

fo

r p

ub

lic

off

ice

; o

r se

rvin

g

as

a d

ele

ga

te,

alt

ern

ate

or

pro

xy t

o a

po

litic

al

pa

rty

con

ven

tio

n.

* *

*".

In a

dd

itio

n,

the

Co

urt

exp

ress

ly h

eld

th

at

the

Ha

tch

Act

w

as

no

t lm

pre

mls

slb

ly

vagu

e.

Le

tte

r C

arr

iers

, su

pra

, a

t 57

9, 9

3 S

.Ct.

288

0.

Fig

. 15

. P

aulo

s, I

ssue

Th

ree

D

C

Rul

e 29

, §

31,

forb

ids

the

in

terf

ere

nce

by

me

mb

ers

o

f th

e d

ep

art

me

nt,

or

use

of t

he

ir i

nfl

ue

nce

by

wa

y of

th

eir

off

ice

, ''f

or

po

li­tic

al

rea

son

s.''

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he

refo

re)

It l

eave

s litt

le

do

ub

t th

at

Ru

le 2

9, §

31,

is

n

ot

so

va

gu

e

tha

t "m

en

of

co

mm

on

in

tel­

lige

nce

m

ust

n

ece

ssa

rily

g

ue

ss a

t it

s m

ea

nin

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on

na

lly v

. G

en

era

l C

on

-str

ucti

on

Co

., 2

69

U.S

. 38

5,

391,

46

S

.Ct.

12

6,

127,

70

L.E

d.

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(192

6).

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ce)

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e l

an

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ag

e o

f th

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up

rem

e C

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ett

er

Ca

rrie

rs,

sup

ra,

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pp

lica

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re:

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* "

the

re a

re l

imit

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th

e E

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lish

la

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w

ith

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spec

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b

ein

g

bo

th

spe

cific

a

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m

an

ag

e­

ab

ly

bri

ef,

a

nd

it

se

ems

to

us

tha

t a

lth

ou

gh

th

e

pro

hib

itio

ns

ma

y n

ot

satis

fy t

ho

se i

nte

nt

on f

ind

ing

fa

ult

at

an

y co

st,

the

y a

re s

et o

ut

in t

erm

s th

at

the

o

rdin

ary

per

son

exe

rcis

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ina

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om

mo

ng

sen

se

can

suff

icie

ntl

y u

nd

ers

tan

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om

ply

wit

h,

wit

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t sa

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to

the

pu

blic

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tere

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* *

*" 4

13 U

.S.

at 5

78-5

79,

93 S

.Ct.

at

2897

.

o-­

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C

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s th

at

the

po

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ule

29

Se

c. 3

1,

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ere

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un

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ove

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ad

th.

w

(Sin

ce)

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e g

en

era

l ru

le I

s th

at

ove

rbre

ad

th a

pp

lies

wh

en

•••

• •

a s

tatu

te l

en

ds

Itse

lf t

o a

sub

sta

nti

al

nu

mb

er

of

Imp

erm

issi

ble

a

pp

lica

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su

ch

tha

t It

Is

cap

ab

le

of

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terr

ing

p

rote

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d c

on

du

ct,

wh

en

th

e a

rea

aff

ect

ed

by

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e c

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llen

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d

law

su

bst

an

tia

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lve

s fi

rst

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en

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en

t in

tere

sts,

a

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w

he

n

the

re

Is

no

t a

valid

co

nst

ruct

ion

w

hic

h

avo

ids

ab

rid

ge

me

nt

of

firs

t a

me

nd

me

nt

inte

rest

s."

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ite

d S

tate

s v.

De

llin

ge

r, 4

72 F

.2d

340,

357

(7

th C

ir.

1972

), c

ert

. d

en

ied

410

U.S

. 97

0, 9

3 S

.Ct.

144

3, 3

5 L

.Ed

.2d

706

(19

73);

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obs

v.

Bo

ard

of

Sch

ool

Co

mm

issi

on

ers

, 49

0 F

.2d

601

(7th

Clr

., 1

973)

.

Fig

. 16

. P

aulo

s, I

ssue

Fo

ur

(Th

ere

fore

) S

uch

a si

tua

tio

n I

s n

ot

pre

sen

t h

ere

.

D

C

Th

e

po

rtio

n

of

Ru

le

29,

(Th

ere

fore

) T

his

doe

s n

ot

sec.

31,

ch

alle

ng

ed

sta

tes

len

d

itse

lf

to

a su

bst

an

­th

at

"Me

mb

ers

o

f th

e

tia

l n

um

be

r o

f im

pe

rmls

­D

ep

art

me

nt

sha

ll n

ot

* *

sib

le a

pp

lica

tio

ns.

*

inte

rfe

re

or

use

th

e

Infl

ue

nce

o

f th

eir

o

ffic

e

for

po

litic

al

rea

son

s."

w

(Sin

ce)

It cl

ea

rly

pro

hib

its

cert

ain

co

nd

uct

b

y m

em

­be

rs o

f th

e M

ilwa

uke

e P

olic

e D

ep

art

me

nt.

It

pro

hib

its

Inte

rfe

ren

ce w

ith

po

litic

al

org

an

iza

tion

s b

y p

olic

em

en

an

d us

e o

f in

flu

en

ce

of

the

p

olic

em

an

's

off

ice

fo

r p

olit

ica

l re

ason

s.

0'

0'

0----------------~----------------~-------------C (PI..,.IH may -lqe Role 29 -· 31 oue to potanllal .cllueltcat10n Oue to luture v101• tiOna.)

o--~--c II plaontoll alleges (Therefore) The e•· voolat•on of a ltrst e»p~oon tor the first -drnent riQflt, he amenOment area 11 allowed to chat- lrom the tr.Onoon~

lqa the llatute no1 rut• ol stanOong 11 on the bu1s lllal lloa llrong mediCine

rtQhtl have - • llrldQad out oacuase ol a tuelicoal -ump-tiOn t!IM the llatute·s 8PI)t!CA01hty to othan not oatore the oaun may causa tllatr con-llllut-ly l)rOiact·

ed "II"" ot speech or expresseon to be compromo.O Oom· browskt v Pf•ster. 310 U S. 47'9. 815 S. Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.:bl 22(11115).

w tSonce) It •s .- -I"QIY and only as a IAII .- Oomllro-1 v Pl•ller. supra, at 491. 815 S.Ct 1116; Un1tecl SCates v Th1ny-Seven PtlotoQtaptls, 402 U.S. 363. 91 S.Ct 1400. 28 L.Ed.2!1122 (1971 l

8 ta.:au-1 The Un1tad SCates Supreme Coun ••ad 1n 8roadr1ek v Olllahoma. 413 U.S 1101. 115. 93 S.Ct 2908. 2911. 37 LEd 2d 830 (1173). handed Oown the same O.y aa Leuer Carroan:

.. ; • • But the plan omgort ot our cases os. at the_, 1-. that l&lal o-bruclth adtudl· ~., tl _. exc:ept•on to our trachllonal rules of praeuee and that ttl lunet1on. a limited one at the outset. attenuates aa the otherw1se ..,prolect.O l:lehavoor that 1t lor01dS the State to MnettOn moves from pure speed"~ ~'warda

c:anduCt and that conduct- 11 e•pressove­falls w•trun the scope of otnenwese val•d cr•m•nal 1aws that reflect leg•temate state •nt••s '" maanta.ntng c:ompren.,s•ve con· trots .,.,. ,_mlul. const1tutoonalty unprotect· ad conduct 41th0ugh suen laws. '' too oroad· ly -rded. may deter protected speeell to some unknown atent. there com• a oo•nt where that effect-at oest a prediCtlon­ca'\not. w•th confidence. Juattfy •nvaltdateng a ••ute on ots l&e and so protu11tt1ng a Slate "- aniOfCI"Q the statute aga1n11 conduct .,.. 1.1 admtt1edly wtthtn tts power to pro­KfiOe. Cl Alderman v Untt.O States. 394 u.s 1815. 174-175 [811 s Cl 961. 966-967. 22 L.Ed 20 176) (1919! To put lhe matter _,_ way. ~oc:utarly where conduct and not merely Sl)eCII IS 1nvotvad. we Oel•eve lhat the ~-h of a ltatu1e must not only be real. Oul tullstantoal u well. Judged on retatoon to the statute's p1a1nly leQ111mate _..... .

w, (Since)

o----.---c In order 10 overturn (Therefore) I cannot thiS regulation 1 must lond any such sub-ftnd that •ts over- stanuallty of over-breadth •s substan- breadth t1a1 tudged 1n rela· tlon to tts platnly legitimate scope

w (Since) It appears that the portion ol Rule 29, § 31. hereon consodered lalla woth1n the cauogory where pr1mar1ly conduct IS regulated and not marely s~ It makes no difference that the aet1on tor wh1eh the pla1ntill was suspended was the wrotlng of a letter to hl1y­lour polocemen urg1ng them to support a certa1n political candidate an aet1on 0order1ng on ·s~ " Sonee I hnd that the regulatoon '" questiOn pr.martly proacnbes conduct

B IBeeauM) The pl81nly 1eg1t1mate scope ot Rute 29. § 31. !tears d11CuSS1ng Firstly. '' pro­ten bel policemen from appropnat.ng thetr badges. vehtcles. or uniforms tor pollt•tal

purposes A pOitCO offtcer appear~ng '" unr­torm on televiSIOn and endorsong a partoc:ular polttlc.al candtdate or tt'N wrtt '"Q ot a tetter of endorsement on offtctal stattonery are ea­amples of thts

SeeonOiy. Rule 29 § 31. proh10ots otltcoers from ~propr.at•ng thetr c:oet'Ctve pawers of search. tnterrogatton and arrett. or theer protecttve pawers for polttlcal r-.,ns Ex­~ples of ttus .auld be the fa.lure of ..., offtcer to respond to a caJI for pot1ce a1d from a merchant or naras!ment ot !''I@ same merchant beCause ne 'MOUld not DIKe 1n nts w1ndovw a pOI1t1C.I poster supper11n; a certa•n eand1date

Thordly Rule 29. § 31 prev""" olltcers to use the1r oos•t•ons w1th1n the department ..... s-a-v•• other offtcers ..,.,,,,," the depart"'-'' tor poltt•~l reasons

o ----.----c Thus a delect•ve or a sergeant cannot ap­propriate I'HS pOSition of autnor1ty over those tower than rum tn rank to order them to support a particu­lar POI•t•cal can­d•date He l1kew1se could never threaten a patrolman .... ,,, lOSS of rank over the pa­trolman·s pol•t1tal philosophy I note that tne pta1nt1lt '" thos matter 1S a d&­tec:ttve and conse­

quently stood '" a pos1t10n of authertty over those patrotmet"'' whO reeeoved lhe let· ter

1Theretore1 I fond that Rul~ 29. § 31. *IS wrl!ten to pre­... ent !uth a s•t ua11on

o-----c Rule 29. § 31. 11 <l&- iTheretoret Thera-ttgned to regulate t1ona1e beh1nd the pouce offtcen •n as requtaflon •s mantfest evenhanded and and of utmost 1m-neutral a m•nnet' ae penance to our so-popoOie c1ety

w~ (Since)

o'--...,....--c reeo<Jnlze that the

tssue of govern­mental regulation ol the conduct of 1ts employees, especial­ly 11 forst amendment right I were involved, has oeen recently sub1ec!ed to close JUdicial exammatton Key ISh oan v BoarO ot Reg""ts. 385 U s 589. 87 S Ct 875, 17 l.Ed 2d 629 11967); P1ckenng v Un1ted States. 391 U.S. 563. 88 S.Ct. 1731. 20 lEO 2d 811 11968) I hkew•se realtze that poltcemen share as pnvate cit1zens the tru1ts ot the first a­mendment

w

(Therefore) However, I lind that polteemen aetong on their olhelal capactttes stand 1n a dollarent position than most other pull­lie employees.

IS•nce) With •ncreas1ng stress on adm~ntstra­toon ot the law '" the Unot.O States and the pecu+•ar pos•t•on wh•ch policemen possess '" re1a11onsrup to tne law, the ctt1zens of th11 countrv demand and d8'1ef'Ve an admtnlstr• tton or jUSIIC8 (Including the tUdtCiary), Which 1s both etrect•ve .• mpartlal. and fa" The ot11c•at parfltiOat•on or policemen and tudges '" tl'le OOIII!cal prcxess would not only reduce tl'le ettect•veness of the admlntstratton of tusttee but would ;really decrease tl'le per­ce•ved tmpart•allty and ta•r,ess of tl'le tudiCial and 1aw-enforc.no •nshtuflons See generally M_,an v Maey 129 US App 0 C. 217. 392 F 2d 822 119681

•

Fig. 17. Paulos, Issue Five

(therefore! In conclu­sion, I finO that Rule 29, t 31, 11 neither unconatltutlonally vague nor overbroad unOer the doctrines recently laiO Oown in Broadrick v Okla/loma. 413 U.S 601. 93 S.Ct. 2908. 37 L.Ed.2d 830 11973), and C1v11 Service Com­miSSion v National Association ol Letter earners. 413 U.S. 5<68, 93 S Ct. 2880. 37 l. Ed.:bl 791 (1973).

67

Ball v. City Council of the City of Coachella

Ball v. City Council of the City of Coachella (1967)16 involves

police participation in union activities. In this case, eleven issues

were considered by the court:

1.

2.

J.

4. 5. 6.

~

( . 8.

9.

10.

ll.

Whether a non-tenured employee can be dismissed without regard for his constitutional rights, Whether continuance of employment can be conditioned on abstinence of exercise of the right to join a union, Whether courts can review the dismissal of non-tenured employees, Whether a police chief can be dismissed for union activities, Whether a writ of mandate was the appropriate remedy, wnether a judge who fails to disqualify himself still has authority, \~ether an amendment concerning disqualification was applicable in this case, Whether the servin~ of the findings is a necessary requirement to a proper decision, Whether a failure to serve the findings prior to signing in­validates the decision, \~ether a failure to object to the lack of receipt of the findings now invalidates that challenge, ~~ether the awarded pay was justified.

The court due to the similarities in issues one, two and three

considered these issues in one argument (Figure 18). The court pro-

vided two warrants justifYing its claims. Each of the warrants has its

own data to claim movements. Each of the warrants establishes the idea

that, while the police chief may be non-tenured, he cannot be fired

for exercising his constitutional rights. These warrants provide the

justification for claim one. The court then notes a qualified claim

two based on claim one. •

In the fourth issue, Figure 19, the court employs three related

warrants in justifying its claim. In warrant one, w1, the court rejects

the position advanced by the Appellants in the data. The sub-argument

provides ample justification for rejectinf the Appellant's claim,

but does not advance a positive position for the court. A positive

position is provided in warrant two, w2, the function of which is to

establish the controlling case for the issue. In warrant three, w3,

the court rejects the position of the Appellants raised in the data,

that a writ of mandate was not a proper remedy. This sub-argument

is an extention of the logic advanced by the court in w1 and w2.

The fifth issue, Figure 20, that of the appropriateness of the

remedy, illustrates the basic Toulmin form with a second claim derived

69

from the first. Sere the court finds, in claim one, that the Appellant's

claims are invalid, therefore, in claim two, the court accepts the claim

o: the Respondent. ~ere, the warrant is the implied: if it is not A

then it must be B.

Issue six, Firure 21, and issue seven, Figure 22, are, in the

court's view, simplistic ar£Uffients easily settled. As no complex

argumentation was required, the basic Toulmin form emerged in the

graphic displ~vs of these issues.

Issues eight, nine and ten were considered as a unit by the court,

and are present as one argument in Figure 23. Here, Toulmin's model

has the addition of a second claim, which is an expansion of the first,

and therefore follows it. Secondly, this issue presents Toulmin's

17 concept of "Rebuttal." The rebuttal performs the task of providing

an exception to the general rule as set down in the claim. Here, the

court reco~nizes the possibility that "· •• where such ommission

. rt 1 b . d "18 prejud1ces a pa y, reversa may e requ1re , ••• thus providing

an exception to the rule as laid down in the instant case.

The final issue, of Ball's back pay, was agreed to by both parties

in the case, thereby not requiring arr.umentation. This issue is

displayed in Firure 24.

70

D

C.

Q

Cz

Th

e c

ou

rt f

ou

nd

th

at

resp

on

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nt

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s te

rmin

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d b

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se o

f h

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ers

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a

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In

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nio

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ivit

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an

d

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d t

ha

t th

e a

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f th

e c

ity

cou

nci

l w

as

arb

itra

ry

an

d

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ga

l In

th

at

It

de

pri

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spo

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nd

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Go

vern

me

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Cod

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sect

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350

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t se

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jud

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as e

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w

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t a

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qu

iry.

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) C

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rts

are

e

mp

ow

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Alt

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the

th

e

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l co

urt

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to r

evi

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blic

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, In

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at

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d p

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he

e

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loye

e o

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con

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al

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itie

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(Ro

sen

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Ma

lco

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sup

ra;

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p

loye

e o

rga

niz

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on

. S

tan

ton

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um

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64

Ca

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19

9,

205-

207,

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Ca

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ptr

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0, 4

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8.)

w.

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pu

blic

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loye

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the

ple

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re

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t it

does

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t fo

llow

th

at

the

po

we

r to

te

rmin

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o

f th

e a

pp

oin

tin

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uth

ori

ty m

ay

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a "

ve

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se

rvic

es

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an

u

nb

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ee

o

f a

ll

leg

al

rig

ht

to r

eta

in h

is e

mp

loym

en

t.

rest

rain

ts.

D

Rec

ent

de

cisi

on

s h

ave

dis

cre

dit

ed

th

e n

oti

on

th

at

the

p

ow

er

to

dis

mis

s a

pu

blic

e

mp

loye

e

wit

ho

ut

caus

e in

clu

de

s th

e p

ow

er

to d

ism

iss

for

an

y ca

use.

D

it

has

been

h

eld

, as

a

pp

ella

nt

urg

es,

th

at

a p

ub

lic

em

plo

yee

se

rvin

g

at

the

p

lea

sure

o

f th

e

ap

po

inti

ng

a

uth

ori

ty

ma

y

be

te

rmin

ate

d

wit

ho

ut

cau

se

an

d

wit

ho

ut

no

tice

or

he

ari

ng

(H

um

be

rt v

. C

ast

ro

Va

lley

Co

un

ty

Fir

e

Pro

tect

ion

D

ist.

, 21

4 C

ai.

Ap

p.2

d

1,

13,

29

Ca

i.R

ptr

. 15

8;

Co

zzo

lino

v.

C

ity

of

Fo

nta

na

, 13

6 C

ai.

Ap

p.2

d 6

08,

611,

289

P.2

d 24

8;

Ha

ckle

r v.

Wa

rd,

105

Ca

i.A

pp

.2d

615

616

-617

, 23

4 P

.2d

170;

Ch

am

be

rs

v.

Cit

y o

f S

un

nyv

ale

, 56

C

ai.

Ap

p.2

d

438,

44

1,

132

P.2

d 8

49

.),

~

c T

hu

s,

co

nti

nu

an

ce

In

e

mp

loym

en

t,

eve

n

of

on

e

serv

ing

at

the

ple

asu

re o

f th

e a

pp

oin

tin

g p

ow

er,

ma

y n

ot

be

con

dit

ion

ed

up

on

the

e

mp

loye

e's

a

bst

ine

nce

fr

om

e

xerc

isin

g

a co

nst

itu

tio

na

l ri

gh

t to

e

ng

ag

e

in

po

litic

al

act

ivit

y n

ot

inco

mp

ati

ble

w

ith

th

e

pe

rfo

rm­

ance

of

his

du

tie

s.

(Ba

gle

y v.

W

ash

ing

ton

T

ow

nsh

ip

Ho

spit

al

Dis

t.,

sup

ra;

Ro

sen

field

v.

Ma

lco

lm,

sup

ra.)

w3

c

the

p

ow

er

ma

y

no

t b

e

exe

rcis

ed

a

rbit

rari

ly

in

dis

reg

ard

o

f th

e

em

plo

yee

's

con

stit

uti

on

al

rig

hts

. (B

ag

ley

v.

Wa

shin

gto

n

To

wn

ship

H

osp

ita

l D

ist.

, 65

C

al.

2d

4

99

, 55

C

ai.

Rp

tr.

40

1,

42

1,

P.2

d

40

9;

Ro

sen

field

v.

M

alc

olm

, 65

C

al.2

d

559,

55

C

al.

Rp

tr.

505,

42

1 P

.2d

697)

of

sta

tuto

ry

rig

hts

. (I

nte

rna

tio

na

l A

ssn.

of

Fir

e F

igh

ters

, et

c. v

. C

ou

nty

of

Me

rce

d,

204

Ca

i.A

pp

.2d

387

, 39

5, 2

2 C

ai.

Rp

tr.

270.

)

Fig

. 18

. B

all,

Issu

es O

ne,

Tw

o a

nd

Th

ree

~

....,

~-~~·-

0--------------------~-----------------C ... ltll .... "-1•-ure .,...., ........ 10, - 4, t~le I of tile ao-Wit Clollll 1111•• 1WI, dl IW4. p. 41411 In -.............. _,..,.,.._""'_ ..... ·- In pultllc _,.,.. througllout .... Male by .>ro"ldtng a uniform Dill I tor

................ r1Qitt ol pultllc -""'­.. 111n .._.,..,. ol tlleor own dlooce

- 1D lie .__,., by """' or-ll• UOfta In their employment ratauona 11 .ao • - . <low Code; ...,, __ Fire

"vfft_,., Inc v City ol lDO Angel•. 80 Col.al 21'1. 2M-2W. l2 Col Rctlr. 130. liM ~ 2d 151.) The Kt granu to public

-""'-- "tile rttM 10 lonn. lOin --'W:1P111 tn tM ICtlvttl• of ~~.,. ..

---- of ,,.., own -ng 11 88. <low Code.) 'Puollc: wnptoy•· "-W .ny ......... -"otoyed by .ny puOtiC

_..., -•no ·--· .. _.,by ~ *• • IPC)Otnted to othoe by the

a.-- of """ ••e II 3&01. IUIId .,,, <low. Code. I "Employee or-ouuon" 11 Cllltlned u "eny organtza11on •h•ch Include~ emptoyHI of a public: agency enCI wf\tch hu u one ot ttl primary ~ ~ti"QI IUd'\ .-nptoy .. '" - ................. public: - .. It 31101, IUIICI Ia). <low. Code.) For '"­prol-=tiOn of ,,. .-npk)y- 1ft thre ···­'*- ol thl rtgrtt1 grWit•t the l.egtllMure _., , ... "Pullllc: _,.,.. - .,..

.,_ oro-uut10na ll\all I"'It tntwtwa Mtt1. •ntlm~•- ,..,.,,, coerce Of "'• ettmtnate ec181ftll public IITtQioyHI

-of ... ....,.. of,,.., rtgtltl­_ .... :1102 ... "JIIOII. Gov.Code.)

Aopettent contenda, however. that tf\a -'IICI"'-"t ol ~- 10, cltvteeon •- tllll 1 of ttw Govwnmlnt Code. •• not tntMd­., tv ,.,k:l tf\e po..- ot a City c:oune11 of a ow--• ._ d1y to t...-m•nala ..,...,..c. ot "- oltlcwl 01 tmpiO~ .,..,,"0 • ,,... pt ... ura ot tha council appellant cantenda that tha pettt1on for •"' of ,..,... t•tad 10 ••• A C8UM of act .. •d tftat Oblect•ona lhould have ~en .,..,., to ,,.. lntroducuon ot ..,,oenoe ,....tng to the ,_..,.., tor rwoon_,t ·a -

w, D iSI-1 c ---......,....----

In _,W:ut•, app.Miant reU• upon the lolt-•no provo""" of Go-n'!*'t CQd,, IICtK..n 3600: ''Nothing contalnecf'ftWatft aftall be dMmecl to supartada the provtalona ot U.IMing ..... taw .nd the c:Nirt•a. ordlnanoM ltld rul• of local publiC agenc••• which aatabllah and regulate 1 ,...n or c1v11 eervk::e system or wtuctt provtOe tor otn• methOdl of a;jmtn••••no .-npt,.,.-..empiOyee ret• tl()na

w

tTherafora) It Ia apparent from the toragcung tft• appell.nt'a contention th• ..,,Cience relati"Q to the ,....,, or

motive tor re~C)Gndenft t•mlnauon wu lnadmllltble 11 llkawlle untenable. t-fleld v Moic:olm. oupro. 85 Col 2tl 568. 56 Coi.Rctlr 506, '21 P.2tl tlfll.)

($4nc.) The Quotad prov111on wu obv~UIIy •ncluded to 8VOki MY poutbla c:onatrucuon that the statute..,.. •ntanded to supplant any ••tatlng dvll terVIce ayltam, m«lt pllf'l, Ol oth• ~ regu1•10n1 0M11ng wtth .,ployer..eml)fOvM ratat:'C)nl Thla •s made e•pltell by the ensu•ng tentfW'IOI ol -=tiOft 3600. wt'IICh r..os 'Thll ch•ar •• .ntanded, 1nstead. to strengthen merit, c1v11 ..,vtca and other methods of ldm1n11tenng employer-.mt»ov• relatiOns ttlrough the •abltlhm.,t of unlfOtm and Of'derly m•hodl ot mmmun.catkWI t.t_,.., emoloy- md the pubUc -oenc1• by .nld't ttlay are eml)foyed ·

I w1

0-------T--------C In lnttrnattaona .uan of Ftre Flgnt..-. etc ., County of Merctld. tupra. 3M Col t.pp 2tl l87. 22 Col Rpcr 270. a d•K:harged county flrehol'lt• havtnQ no CIVIl SlfVICI statui IOUQhl I Wrlf8 Of IT\Wio.te to mmoet ... .,,.. .. ement •tea­lno 1"'- ,~, t•m•~tOn wu oceu'Ofteld by '"' actJVJt••• on bat'lall of a l~re­hgMan' uniQn 5«110f"l 1910 111 teQ • ot ,,. i...ltlor Coot. IOdad In 1Q59 (Stltl

1959 c:h 723. § 1, p 2711,, r8COQn1ZI tne ruj~nt of f~rehgtuen to jotn labOr oro•u~.on• and to pt....,, guav.,cae c:onoern•no •eo-. hourt .nd work1ng condt1 •ons to the govwntnQ I)Ody through Sf..ICh Of"pt'IZMO'l TN trl .. CIDUt1 found thAI the ampeor- 1 d•M'I•_. • ., not due tO hiS lolf'IOI'I ICtiVItl- lind oet'I1ICI

1ha writ On -oCJIMI. no...,.,. '' .., neld tha the tr~ CX)Ur1 I hndt"Q llirU

not IUOQOniCI by SUO.Itltl• _...~danCe

and the JuGgment •u rever teo Wllh "lriCIJOnl to tfta mal c:our1 of a:ruhn1te 'the reason• achancad for (the am­

OIOv• tl dllll'lcarga. -"' 11 ,,. ,.....,.,,~ non ot hit amc:Uoymant wu elrectad r.::auae Of IIQIIU'T\MI ICttvlh- - Gefln­ad twwn on bef'l•l of ,,.. torm•IOf'l of the union ..... 11\ould be reonStateel lnt..-n.IIQI\al ~ of Ftra FtOftt•• etc v County of .....,._,, eupra • p. 316. 22 Col Rpcr • p 21'1

w

(T"1erefora) That uaa 11 panuallva authOrity tor uphotdtnQ the Judgment 1n ttw .n .. ant cue

(Sine.) a..t• 10. dlvii'On •• tttll I of tfta Govern"*"' Coda IKtanc:ll to ell OUbUC employ"' lub11ant1ally tna tame rtgntt 11 thoM pravtouety granted to the lkeftght .. under IIICUon 1110 • MQ . of tf'la LJIDor Code In -=ttOI' l508 of the aov.mmant Coda. • tn lecttOn 1910 of the UlbiW CoOl. ouDite -oenc•• 1111

profttbtt.:l trun 1nt•ter1no •flh tne ••arc•• ot 1na oro-n•uuonal and reor...,t~ ttoft MQI'Itl ot puDhc -"P'OY- In tact. '"• llnQUIQe of Mellon 31506 aopMA •rof'IO• lnd mora POIIC1t lftln uw a.,~~ of the c:omc:-atNa Labor Code .:tton ,...,no to llreiiQIIIen 1

B S.Oian 11110 of '"" ,__ Code prow- - '"" 11•e - ony county. CIOftttc81 IUOdtvtSIOI'I tncorporMed aty. town. nor any otftlr muntca• awpor•tton lhlll prohibit. deny or ol*r\M:I the rtghl of flreftgN .. to totn .,Y Dona ttdlt tMlor

QI"'WW~k)n of tiWir own cnc11ce ·

I w3

0-------r--------C ,...lent ret• upon Stanton v Dumke. oupro. 64 Col.2d 1IJII, 48 Coi.Rpcr. 380. ., p 2d 108, tor '"" _, .... '""' the OMitton tor Mit of mandala tn the ., .. .,. CMII t•l«~ to aueoe facts tutti· ~~ to c:onMituta a cauM of KIICW'I In ill-on. ~.,.., ,....,.,, • Son

JoN State Collaoe 10ught • """ of mandata to compel the Chancellor ol eteta collagn to rHtore tftem to tne recutty Petltlonan. •"o .ould have acquwed t.,wa rtm they been reem­ployed tor tN toun• ,_. -e notofted by llle college pr-t '""' they ..,uld not be r.,..piOyed. In "*' PllltiiOn tor .... ~ ot -e ..... ,_,.,. otleged tn.l the ret...- 10 re.mploy them wu Daa.d u,on non-acadamtc rea.ana

dueling •- octl•lt• on -ilf of o teecnen' union A demurrer to the

,."""' - -·-· - ,,. ldton - dfwno_, On- tile I~ ---· w

(Tlwelorel "" tN Suprwne CGun ,..., tn Roaenf•eld v Malcolm. suora. 85 t. C ot ~e 808. 56 Cot Rptr 506. •21 P 2d 897. tn dtsttngutll\tng Stanton v. Dumke, supra. abMnt the tranKrtPI of tna procaedtnga of tfte n-•no• befOte the cn~kJr the t*•llon tor wrn or mal\data tn Stanton would have st•ed 1 valid caute of Ktlon In tl'le •natant case a 1n Roaenh_.CI. tupra. r~n­dent wu not IICQ)rdlld notk::e of I\Mf1ng.

tllnOeltn ,..., c.e. -· ,_H_. 1\011 --to'""'' ,_It ton tor • ""It of -e . ,,.,_,,. of .... -·n•••• ... -10 oondu<:led by .... Cit-lOr 1ftQUWI,. Into '*"IOI'IIf'l' d8tm tft• the fattw. to rehire them ._ bMed IOfaty Ullllft ~k: r...,...l. The lrMID'1Pt re¥Mted tf\M l)lllitlonen ..-a afforded a full lftd flltr ldmtn+Mr•tw "-r•ng anc1 tne raaord IUOpor1ed tl'le Ctlenceuor·e ftndtngl tnar ,.....,_. uniOn Klllvtll• nor an., otner non.....:..dlemtc raMOnl entwed Into ttte deetl6on not to riM'Iploy pel111onan In aftlrm1ng lha ludQment, the e»urt •••: ''Pt•ntUf1: could • no mora then an OJ)t)Or1untty to praaant thetr cn•o• of WllttrWy denlot of IIUCfl rtQIIto • o lotrly oonclucted •-tng or wflldt r•e ,_,d ..._,tile _._, of '"" ~·no outhO<tty - ••• .,..,ng •• oooorded ro ,._,"--e. and,... ,_,d..._,, IN-·-· we,_ not f..,.... eaptore, a< ed~e. tiled- -nutlonalo..,. ·

Fig. 19. Ball, Issue Four

72

D

c. CL

A

pp

ella

nt

do

es

no

t b

ase

It

s

co

nte

nti

on

o

n

the

ex

iste

nce

of

a st

atu

te o

f a

city

ord

ina

nce

or

reg

ula

tio

n .

e

sta

blish

ing

a c

lea

rly d

efi

ne

d p

roce

du

re "

for

the

su

bm

issi

on

, e

valu

atio

n a

nd r

eso

lutio

n o

f co

mp

lain

ts"

by a

n e

mp

loye

e w

ho c

laim

s to

ha

ve b

een

wro

ng

fully

d

ism

isse

d.

(See

R

osen

field

v.

M

alc

olm

, su

pra

, 65

A

.C.

p.

60

3,

55 C

ai.

Rp

tr.

50

5,

421

P.2

d 6

97

.)

It

me

rely

dir

ect

s o

ur

att

en

tio

n t

o t

he

fo

llow

ing

pro

visi

on

of

th

e B

row

n A

ct:

"No

thin

g c

on

tain

ed

in

this

ch

ap

ter

shal

l be

co

nst

rue

d t

o p

reve

nt

the

le

gis

lati

ve b

od

y *

*

(Th

ere

fore

) A

pp

ella

nt'

s co

nte

n-

(Th

ere

fore

) R

espo

nden

t h

avi

ng

alle

ge

d a

nd

th

e C

ou

rt

tlo

n t

ha

t re

sp

on

de

nt

faile

d

to

ha

vin

g

fou

nd

o

n

su

bsta

nti

al

evid

en

ce

th

at

his

e

xha

ust

h

is

ad

min

istr

ati

ve

rem

-d

ism

issa

l w

as

In

vio

lati

on

o

f ri

gh

ts

gra

nte

d

to

him

e

die

s is

lik

ew

ise

wit

ho

ut

me

rit.

u

nd

er

the

Go

ve

rnm

en

t C

od

e,

ma

nd

am

us w

as

the

* fr

om

h

old

ing

e

xecu

tive

ses

sion

s *

• *

to

con

sid

er

the

ap

po

intm

en

t, e

mp

loye

me

nt

or

dis

mis

sa

l o

f a

pu

blic

off

ice

r o

r e

mp

loye

e o

r to

h

ea

r co

mp

lain

ts

or

char

ges

bro

ug

ht

ag

ain

st s

uch

off

ice

r o

r e

mp

loye

e b

y a

no

the

r p

ub

lic

off

ice

r,

pers

on

or

em

plo

yee

u

nle

ss

such

off

ice

r o

r e

mp

loye

e r

eq

ue

sts

a p

ub

lic h

ea

rin

g. ''

[Em

ph

asi

s su

pp

lied

.) (

Sec

tion

5495

7, G

ov.

Co

de

.)

w

(Sin

ce)

Th

e u

nd

ers

core

d p

rovi

sio

n d

oes

not

pro

vid

e a

p

roce

du

re f

or

ad

min

istr

ati

ve m

ea

nin

g;

It o

nly

gra

nts

an

o

ffic

er

or

em

plo

yee

th

e

rig

ht

to

have

a

ma

tte

r p

ert

ain

ing

to

h

is

em

plo

yme

nt

cons

ider

ed

pu

blic

ly

rath

er

tha

n i

n an

exe

cutiv

e s

essi

on. Fig

. 20

. B

all,

Iss

ue F

ive

-....

.. ·;.

•·

ap

pro

pri

ate

re

lief.

(B

ag

ley

v.

Wa

shin

gto

n

To

wn

ship

H

osp

ita

l D

ist.

, su

pra

, 65

C

al.2

d

499,

55

C

ai.

Rp

tr,

401,

42

1 P

.2d

409;

R

osen

field

v.

M

alc

olm

, su

pra

, 65

C

al.

2d

5

59

, 55

C

al.

R

ptr

. 5

05

, 42

1 P

.2d

6

97

; In

tern

ati

on

al

Ass

n. o

f F

ire

Fig

hte

rs e

tc.

v.

Co

un

ty o

f M

erc

ed

, su

pra

, 20

4 C

ai.

Ap

p.2

d 3

87,

395,

22

Ca

i.R

ptr

. 27

0.)

~

D

C

Ap

pe

llan

t co

nte

nd

s th

at

the

ju

dg

me

nt

Is v

oid

be

cau

se

the

tri

al

jud

ge

fa

iled

to

dis

qu

alif

y h

imse

lf o

n a

mo

tio

n

un

de

r se

ctio

n

17

0.6

of

the

Co

de

of

Civ

il P

roce

du

re.

Th

e c

hro

no

log

y o

f th

e e

ven

ts g

ivin

g r

ise

to

th

is I

ssue

Is

as

follo

ws:

O

n

Ap

ril

29,

1965

, an

a

lte

rna

tive

wri

t a

nd

o

rde

r to

sh

ow

caus

e w

ere

Is

sue

d.

As

a re

turn

a

pp

ella

nt

de

mu

rre

d t

o t

he

pe

titi

on

. T

he

de

mu

rre

r w

as

he

ard

a

nd

o

verr

ule

d

by

Jud

ge

B

row

n

wit

h

lea

ve

to

an

swe

r, a

n a

nsw

er

was

fi

led

an

d t

he

ma

tte

r w

as s

et

to b

e h

ea

rd o

n th

e m

eri

ts o

n Ju

ly 6

. T

he

pa

rtie

s w

ere

a

pp

are

ntl

y d

uly

n

oti

fie

d t

ha

t th

e c

ase

h

ad

b

ee

n

assig

ne

d t

o D

ep

art

me

nt

· • B

'',

the

de

pa

rtm

en

t in

w

hic

h J

ud

ge

Bro

wn

no

rma

lly p

resi

de

d.

Wh

en

Ju

dg

e

Bro

wn

ca

lled

th

e c

ase

on

July

6,

ap

pe

llan

t m

ad

e

a m

oti

on

to

dis

qu

alif

y h

im u

nd

er

sect

ion

170

.6.

On

July

9

Jud

ge

Bro

wn

de

nie

d t

he

mo

tio

n a

nd

th

ere

aft

er

trie

d

the

cas

e on

th

e m

eri

ts.

He

ma

de

fin

din

gs

an

d e

nte

red

ju

dg

me

nt

on A

ug

ust

2.

If a

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»>D NOTES

1 Muller v. Conlisk 429 F.2d 901 (1970).

2 .Timmie D. Trent, "Toulmin Model of Argument: An Examination and

Extension." Quarterly :Journal g.!: Speech, 54 (October, 1968), 252-259.

3 Ibid.

4 Douglas Ehninger, Influence, Belief and Argument (Glenview, Illinois: Soctt, Foresman and Canpany, 1974), p. 14.

5 Muller v. Conlisk 429 F.2d 901, at 903.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., at 904.

8 Greenwald v. Frank 334 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972).

9 Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 2nd ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Compa.ny, Inc., 1966), p. 1.41.

10 Stephen Toulmin, ~ Uses £! Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 101.

11 Greenwa1d v. Frank 334 N.Y.S.2d 680, at 685.

12 Paulos v. Breier 371 F.Supp. 523 (1974).

13 Douglas :Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, "Toulm.in on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," QlarterlY Journal 2f Speech, 46, 11 (February 1960), 45.

14 Ebninger, Influence, p. 15.

15 Paulos v. Breier 371 F.Supp.523, at 527.

78

16 Ba11 v. City Council of the City of Coachella 60 Cal.Rptr.l39 (1967).

17 Toulmin, p. 101.

18 ~1 v. Citr Council 60 Cal. Rptr. 139, at 145.

CHAP':'ER FOU?.

SU1<EAP..Y AND CONCLUSIONS

Stephen Toulmin, in his chapter "The Layout of Arguments," reflects

on the complexity of the argumentative process and its systematic ana-

lysis, observing:

Certainly the same argument may be set out in quite a number of different forms, and some of them •.• will show the validity or invalidity of an arr.ument more clear~v than others, and make more explicit the grounds it relies on and the bearing of these on the conclusions.l

In his consideration of the different forms arguments may take, Toulmin

concludes that the syllogism is inadequate to demonstrate the validity

of arguments. Therefore, Toulmin offers a method of analyzing argu-

ments based on a legal analog, which he believes better demonstrates

the logical validity of ar~ents.

Toulmin's iconoclastic indictment of the syllogism has been greeted

with mixed response. The discipline of speech greeted Tculmin' s con-

struct favorably, although his collearues in philosophy have been far

less generous. 2 Speech scholars readily adapted the Toulmin construct

to rhetorical criticism. The process of adapting the logical model to

the study of rhetoric necessitated several codifications and extentions.

The extent~cns to t~e mode~ are principally variations in Toulrr.in's

format which maintain Toulmin's basic component parts. Two critics,

however, have sugpested that the model is structurally deficient and

advocated the addition of another component feature. 3

This study was undertaken to determine an answer to the question:

to what extent, if any, is the Toulmin model deficient in its application

79

to legal reasoning, and, if found deficient, what necessary extentions

or modifications are required in order to depict legal reasoning. The

question and subsequent research stenmed from Toulmin's comparison of

logical argumentative analysis and the judicial reasoning process.

In demonstrating the Toulmin model as applied to legal reasoning,

each of the arT~ments, as set out by the courts, were fitted to the

Toulmin construct, and where applicable, to the appropriate extention.

Extentions to the Toulmin Hodel

In la.,ving out twenty-four leral arguments according to Toulmin' s

construct, four major extentions to Toulmin's model emerged: sub­

arguments, chains, clusters, and backing for data.

Sub-Arguments

Sub-arguments emerged as support for backing (Figure 14), warrants

(Figures 12, 15, 17, 18 and 21), and other sub-arguments (Figures 15,

and 17). Their function was to provide an explanation of the original

item, or the origin of initial proof. The existence of sub-arguments

provides additional support to the argument. Sub-arguments emerf,e

in cases where the court felt that additional proof, of an independent

nature, was required in order for the particular point in question to

be accepted.

Chains

Ehninger's chains of arguments4 surfaced in two~istinct forms.

The concept of a claim serving as data for a further claim appears in

Figures 5, 6, 11, 18 and 19. The concept of a chain of arguments also

emerges with the appearance of arguments possessing multiple claims in

a vertical column. (Firures 5, 12, 18 and 23) These chains occur

80

when secondary levels of claims are logical extentions of prior claims.

Chains of this sort can be differentiated from the former type of

chains as subsequent claims are not based upon an initial claim, i.e.

they do not serve as data for subsequent claims; rather, they are

independent claims reached by employing the original claim's data and

warrant. Chains of this sort occur when the court provides further

elaboration upon an original claim, as they were not advancing a new

position, merely expanding upon the original claim.

Clusters

Ehninger's cluster of arguments5 emerges in three different forms.

The concept of several independent arguments used to justif,y a given

claim appears in Fi~1res 1 and 16. Each of these arguments provides

further support for the claim advanced by the court.

81

The appearance of multiple warrants also may be considered a

cluster of arguments by Ehninfer's definition. Multiple warrants

appear on two different levels, emerging both as a vertical column of

warrants (Firures 1, 17 and 21), and across the main proof line

(Figures 12, 15 and 17). The distinction between multiple warrants is

determined by their purpose. If a warrant supports the same concept as

the original warrant, e.f., explains or gives a specifi~ example of,

then the warrants are placed in a vertical column indicating that these

warrants justify only one basis for the claim. However, when the

warrants provide separate justification for the advanced claim, they

are separated on the main proof line to indicate that each is a separate

justification for the claim.

Backing for data

The applic~tion of the Toulmin model to legal reasoning generated

two examples of probability statements in data. In Figure 1, the con­

cept of rebuttal of data emerfed. In that issue, the rebuttal to data

refuted the positions established by the data,· as the court questioned

the holdings of a lower court's decision. Probability was also intra-

duced by the court in qualifyinr the data. In the fifth issue cited

by Paulos, Figure 17, the court noted that while the data was valid,

it was a seldom used point of law, thereby limiting the force of the

evidence used in support of the claim.

The Sufficiency of the Taulmin Model

In light of the above mentioned extentions to Toulmin's original

model, a discussion of the model's sufficiency is appropriate. Eight

of the displays require only the basic data, warrant, so claim, layout

to demonstrate the court's reasoning (Figures 2, 3, 8, lC, 13, 21, 22,

82

and 24). Two other layouts added Toulmin' s "qualifier, 11 Figures 4 and 9.

One display required the addition of Toulmin's rebuttal to the basic

layout, see Figure 23. Thus, almost one-half of the displays of Toulmin's

model clearly demonstrated the court's reasoning.

An analysis of the extentions to Toulmin's model further illuminates

the model's sufficiency. Three extentions to Toulmin's model--sub-•

arguments, chains, and clusters--do not represent a major deviation in

Toulmin's construct. Each of these concepts is but a variation in the

model's format and does nothing to change the components of the construct.

These concepts, therefore, do not constitute a major flaw in Toulmin's

analysis; only his failure to predict complex arguments containing

these elements.

The final extention, backing for data, is, however a new concept

not provided for by Toulmin. Criticisms of Toulmin's omissions are

advanced by both Mills6 and Tr;nt.7 The objection raised by these

scholars is that the data step contains no provision for verifying

data.

The verification of data is particularly important to the courts,

as they precede on the basis of prior experience. Chaim Perelman notes

the role of verification of data for the purposes of the rule of justice:

For the rule of justice to serve as the basis of a rigorous demonstration, the objects to which it applies ought to be identical, that is, completely interchangeable. However, this is never the case. These objects always differ in some respect, and the great problem, which gives rise to most con­troversies, is to decide whether the observed differences are negligible or not, or, in other words, whether the objects differ in essential characteristics, that is in the only ones which must be taken into account in the administration of justice. The rule of justice recognizes the argumentative value of what one of us has called formal justice, according to which ~eings in the same essential cateror,y should be treated in the same way. Formal 2ustice does not tell when two obj~cts belong to the eame caterory; neither doee it specify the treatment they should be given. Indeed in every concrete situation a prior classi:ication of the objects and the existence of the precedents as to the manner of treatL~g them is indispensable. The rule of justice furnishes the foundation which makes it possible to pass from earlier cases to future cases. It makes it possible to present ~he use of precedent in the form of a quasi-lorical arftiment.

An example of the courts failure to verifY data, which resulted in

an overruling of a precedent, is evident in the present inquiry concerning

police expression rights. In 1892, Justice Holmes, speaking for the

~~ssachusetts Supreme Court stated in McAuliffe v. ~~yor of New Bedforg

(1892):

The petitioner may have a constitutional ri~ht to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police­man. There are few employments for hire in which the ser­vant does not a[ree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of the contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms offered him. On the same principle the city rna .. , impose any reasonable condition upcn holding office within its ccntrol.9

For seventy-five years, the initial phrase of Holmes' quotation was the

prevailinr constitutional philosophy, with the courts ignorin£ the

(underlined) qualif.yin; statement. Richard Halpert, writing in 1972,

stated: ". • • in Keyishian v. Eoard of F..egents (1967), 10 the court

overruled the idea that public employment may be subject to any con­

siderations regardless of how unreasonable."11 He notes further that

84

"it is now recognized that the public employee, including the policeman,

is no longer forced to for~o constitutional rights in order to take

12 public employment."

During the issue's historical development, jurists failed to verify

their interpretation of Holmes' position: Holmes did not suggest that

public employees have no rights, only that "reasonable" controls may

be placed upon the public employees. This issue documents historically

the problem faced in the courts when data is not subjected to verification.

The verification of data is available for the courts use, and the same

process should be utilized in the assessment of argumentation, for, to

quote Toulmin, "· •• surely we shall need to employ a pattern of argu­

ment no less sophisticated than is required in the law. ul3

Suggestions for Further Research

This study indicates that Toulmin's judicial analog model, with

the extention of backing for data, is adequate for the disection of

the legal reasoning of the courts on the subject of police expression

rights. Clearly, the mcdel should be applied to other areas of litiga­

tion in order to determine the ?eneral applicability of the legal

analogy. Investigation of the legal analog is also warranted with

respect to adjudication before the Supreme Court, since that body's

decisions are more likely to possess Toulmin's qualifiers and rebuttal.

Also, mo~e complex arruments are presented at this level. Further,

the argumentation and logic of the court could be profitably examined. I

85

The results of such investigaticn might reveal errors in judicial logic,

as in the example of the blind adherence to the McAuliffe position of

no rights for public employees.

Finally, the vast majority of the issues herein diagramed

are advanced by the courts on the basis of explicit evidence and warrants,

sometimes found lacking in oral discourse. A comparison of the methods

of support utilized in written, oral and legal discourse should provide

further lumin of the judicial analor,y.

86

Stoo'u\EY

Overall the Toulmin model proved to be a sufficient analytic model

for investigating court argumentation with regard to the adjudication

of police expression rights. Eleven arguments fit directly into the

model as presented by Toulmin. An additional eleven issues fit the

Toulmin concept with minor extentions. Two arguments, however, intro­

duced backin~ for data, unaccounted for by Toulmin.

Therefore, even though Toulmin's purpose was to provide a systema-

tic means of demonstrating the logical validity of arguments, he appears

to have stopped short. The results of this study appear to coincide

with the observation of Bernard Bosanquet: 11 There is no such thing

as an antecedent scheme prescribing, so to speak, a set of schedules

in one or other of which ever,y argument can be written out merely by

filling up the blanks. u14 Thus, although Toulmin sought a model of

argumentation sufficiently complex tc demonstrate the validity of

arguments, this study indicates that, in the words of Toulmin, 11 This

form may not be final . . .

END NOI'ES

1 Stephen Toulmin, ~ Usea ~ Ar~~nt, (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1968) pp. 94-95.

2 The only negative review discovered in the speech journals was written by a philosopher--Peter T. Manicas, "Ch Toulmin's Contribution ot Logic and Argumentation," Journal of the American Forensic Associa­tion, 3 (1966), 83-94. B.y contrast, generally unfavorable reviews in philosophy journals include Hector Neri Castendeda{ "On a Proposed Revolution in logic, 11 Philosophy .2f Science, 27 (1960 J, 279-292; J. C. Cooley, "On Mr.· Toulmin 1 s Revolution in Logic, 1' Journal of Philosophy, 56 (1959), 279-319; and Joseph L. Cowan, "The Uses of Argument--An Apology for Logic," Mind, 73 (1964) 27-45.

3 Glen Mills, Reason in Controversy: On General Argumentation, 2nd ed., (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), p. 111; and Jimmie

87

D. Trent, "Toulmin 1 s Model of Argument: An Examination and Extention," Quarterly Journal ~ Speech, 54 (October, 1968), 252-259.

4 Douglas Ehninger, Influence, Belief a)d Argument (Glenview, n1inois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1974 , p. 14.

5 Ibid., p. 15.

6 Mills, p. lll.

7 Trent, 254.

8 Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbfechts-Tyteca, !ha HeK Rbetoric--A Treatise m1 Argpmentati on. trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969).

9 McAuliffe v. Maior of New Bedford 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).

1° Kexishian v. Board of Regents 385 U.S. 589 (1967_).

11 Richard L. Halpert, "The Policeman's Right to Free Speech: Muller v. Conlisk." Indiana Law Journal, 46, #4 (Summer 1971), 538-543.

12 Ibid.

l3 Toulmin, p. 95.

88

14 Bernard Bosanquet, Logic, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), P • 197 •

15 Toulmin, p. 104.

'

BIBLI(X}P.APHY

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89

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90

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Jahnige, Tanas P., and Goldman, Sheldon eds. The Federal Judicial System: Readings in Process ~ Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. , 1968.

Jensen, O.C. The Nature 91, Legal Argument. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957.

Kroger, Arthur N. Classified Bibliography of Argumentation srui Debate. New York: Scarecrow Press, 1965.

!1'burg, Henry E., Jr. Probability i!!lS! Inductive Logic. New York: Macmillan and Company, 1970.

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McBath, James H., ed. tices. New York:

Argumentation ~ Debate: Principles and Prac­Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963.

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New York: Macmillan Com~, 1964.

91

Mendelson, Wallace. Justices Black and Frankf'urter: Conflict in the Court. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

Miller, Gerald and Nilsen, Thomas, eds. Perspectives on Argument. Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Co., Inc., 1968.

Mills, Glen E. Reason in Controvers;r: !ill Introduction to General Argumentation. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1960.

Natanson, Maurice, and Johnston, Henry W. Jr., eds.. Philosophy, Rhetoric and Argumentation. University Park, Pennsylvania: the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965.

Northrop, F.S.C. The Logic .2f the Sciences and the Humanities. New York: The World Publishing Canpaey, 1947.

O'Neill, James M., Laycock, Craven, and Scales, Robert L., Argumentation and Debate. New York: Macmillan Canpany, Inc., 1917.

PaJmieri, L.E. Lapguage ~ Clear Thinking. Lincoln, Nebraska: Jensen Publishing Company, 1960.

Perelman, Chaim. The Idea ~ Just ice ~ the Problem £f. Argyment. trans. John Petrie~ New York: Humanities Press, 1963.

Perelman, Chaim; and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. The New Rhetoric. trat}s. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969.

Philbrick, Frederick A. Language and the Law--~ Semantics g! Foren­~ English. New York: Macmillan Canpal'\Y, 1949.

Posey, Rollin Bennet. American Government. Patterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1960.

Pritchett, Her.man C. American Constitutional Issues. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962.

Ramaswa.my, M. The Creative Role .2f. the Supreme Court S2I. ~ United States. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1956.

Resnik, Michael D. Elementaey Logic. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.

Salmon, Wesley C. Logic. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

Schechter, Alan H. Contemporar:y Constitutional Issues. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Canpany, 1972.

Scheidel, Thomas M. Speech Communication J:rul Human Interaction. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Canpany, 1972.

Schmidhauser, John R. ed. Constitutional Law in ~he Political Process. Chicago: Rand-Kc:Hally and Compaey, 1963.

92

9.3

Smull.yan, Arthur. Fundamentals£!. Logic. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962.

Stone, Julius. Legal System~ Lawter's Reasonings. stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964.

Swmners, Marvin. Free Speech and Political Protest. Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1967.

Suppes, Patrick, Introduction 1.Q Logic. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957.

Thanpson, Wayne N. Modern Arro.unentation and Debate Principles and Practices. New York: Harper and Ros, 1971.

Thouless, Robert H. Straight and Crooked Thinking. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1932.

Toulmin, stephen E. An Examination 2f the Place 2f Reason in Ethics. Landon: Cambridge University Press, 1961.

Toulmin, Stephen E. Foresight ~ Understanding. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1961.

Toulmin, Stephen E. Reason in Ethics. -...;;.o::::.;:;.,;;~ - .=.;;;;..;; ............ -.

London: Cambridge University Press, 1964.

Toul min, Stephen E. Th~ Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­versity Press, 1958.

Tresolina, Tocco J., and Shapiro, :tl.artin. American Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. New York: Macmillan Canpany, 1970.

Trueblood, David E. Logic 2f. Belief. New York: Narper and Row, 1942.

Wasserstrom, Richard A. Legal Justification. Press, 1961.

The Judicial Decision; Toward s Theory of Stanford, California: Stanford University

Windes, Russel, and Hastings, Arthur. Ar~entation ~ Advocacy. New York: Random House, Inc., 1965.

Zelermyer, William. ~ Process 2!, Legal Reasoning. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963.

Periodicals

Bardwind, Jack A. and Blaubaugh, Jon A. ·"The Status of the Toulmin Model of Logic in Educational Debate in High Education." Ohio Speech Journal, (1967), 51-54.

Bieker, R.R. "Some Considerations About Using Toul.min 1 s Structure of Argument in Coaching Debate." Kansas Speech Journal, 27 (Februar,y, 1966), 96-101.

Bird, Otto. "The Rediscovery of the Topics: Professor Toulmin' s Inference-Warrants." Mind, 70 (July, 1961), 534-539.

Broadies, Alexander. "The Practical Syllogism." Anal.ysis, 29 (October, 1968), 26-28.

Broekriede, Wayne, and Elninger, Douglas. "Toulmin on Argument: an Intell'reta.tion and Application." Q,larterly Journal of Speech, 46 (1960)' 44-53.

94

Carrington, Frank. "Speaking for- the Police." The Journal of Criminal 12!, Criminology and Police Science, 64 (1970~244-279.

Casteneda, Hector K. "On A Proposed Revolution in Logic." Philosophy gl Science, 27 (Ju~, 1960), 279-292.

Cooley, J. C. "<:n Mr. Toulmin' s Revolution in Logic. " Journal £f. Philosophy, 56 (1959), 297-319.

Douglas, Justice 0. New York Times (June 4, 1963), 3:1:2.

Halpert, Richard L. "The Policeman's Right to Free Speech: Muller v. Conlisk. 11 Indiana law Journal, 46, #4 (Summer, 1971), 538-543.

Kelsen, Hans. "Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics." American Political Science Review, 42 (October, 1948), 906-914.

Washington UP! Release (Lubbock, Texas), 22 June 1975.

Manieas, Peter T. "On Toulmin's Contribution to Logic and Argumentation." Journal of the American Forensics Association, 3 (September, 1966), 83-94.

Marsh, Patrick. "A Model for Arguing Directive Propositions." Journal ot the American Forensic Association. 6 (Winter, 1969), 1-11.

McCroskey, James. "Toulmin and the Basic Course. 11 Speech Teacher, 14 (March, 1965), 91-100.

Miller, ~rald R. "Some Factors Infiuencing Judgments or the Logical Valid1.ty of Arguments: A Research Review." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 45 (October, 1969) 276.

Mills, Glerm E. and Petrie, Hugh G. "The Role or Logic in Rhetoric." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 34 (October, 1968), 260-267.

Mooqy, Linda Alden. "Extending the Shield of the First Amendment to the Outspoken Policeman." Criminal law Bulletin, 33 (1972), 170-205.

New York University Law Review. "The Policeman: Must He Be a Second­Class Citizen with Regard to his First Amendment Rights?" 46 (May, 1971), 536-559.

95

Nickel, Henry V. "The First Amendment and Public Employees--An &ergillg Constitutional Right to Be a Policeman?" George Washington law Review, 37 (1968-1969), 409-424.

Petrie, Hugh G. "Does Logic Have Any' Relevance to· Argumentation?" Journal £f the American Foren~ Association~ 6 (Spring, 1969), 55-6o.

Schroeder, Stephen K. "Case Notes." Creighton~ Review, 6, #2 (1972-73), 264-275.

Shepard, David W. "Rheto~ic and Fonna.l Argument. n Western Speech, 30, #4 (Fall, 1966), 24-247.

Simons, James R. "The Nature of Argumentation." Speech Monographs, 27 (November, 1960), 348-350.

Swabb, Joe S. "Toulmin on Probability." Cbio Speech Journal, 6 (1968), 27-32.

Trent, Jirnmi e. Extension. n

"Toulmin Model of Argument: An Examination and Quarterly Journal of Speech, 54 (October, 1968), 252-259.

Wakter, Otis M. "On Views of Rhetoric, Whether Conservative or Progressive." Quarterly Journal of Speech, 49 (December, 1963), 367-382.

Wild, John. "Natural Law and Modem Ethical Theory. n Ethics, 63 (October, 1952), 1-13.

Unpublished Haterials

Baker, Kenneth Wayne. "Oral Advoca~ for Pre-Law Students: A BehaTioral Approach," M.A. Thes1.s. Texas Tech University, 1973.

Barwin, Jack. Debate."

11 Status of the Toulmin Model of Logic in Educational ~!.A. Thesis. Bowling Green State University, 1966.

Cronen, Vernon E. "Consistency and Change in the Political Theory of John C. Calhoun: A Study of Arguments." M.A. Thesis. University of Illinois, 1968.

Cypher, Patricia. "An Empirical Test of Contemporary Definitions of the Enthymeme: Believed :tvf.ajor Premises and Truncation." M.A. Thesis. Wayne State University, 1967.

Feezel, Jerry D. "The Hystery of the Epichoireme." Paper presented at the Speech Association of America Convention, 1964.

Greg, John H. "The Enthyrneme in Hodern American Argumentation and Debate Theory.'' M.A. Thesis. Wayne State University, 1963.

Hastings, Arthur C. Argumentation."

"A Reformation of the Nodes of ReasoninE in Ph.D. Diss. Northwestern University, 1962.

96

Heidt, Raymond. "Toulmin' s Argument Hodel as an Instrument for the Criticism of Speeches." N.A. Thesis. San Jose State College, 1968.

Hill, Forbes I. "The Genetic Hethod in Recent Criticism on the Rhetoric of Aristotle." Ph.D. Diss. Cornell Vniversity, 1963.

McDiarmid, James L. "An Analysis of Selected Speeches by Herbert Hoover in the 1932 Presidential Campaign According to Stephen Toulmin' s System of Logical Analysis." M.A. Thesis. University of Nebraska, 1968.

Morrow, Richard. "Aristotle and Stephen Toulmin: A Comparison." Paper presented at the Speech Association of America Convention, 1964.

O'Connell, Sandra E. "The Developnent, Use and Evaluation of Class Material in Elnploying Toulmin' s Model of Argument." M.A. Thesis. University of ~·lichigan, 1964.

Overking, Nichael. "An Investigation of Effects of Instruction in Two Argument Hodels Upon Critical Thinking Ability." M.A. Thesis. University of Michigan, 1964.

Palmer, Ann Leffer. "Toulmin Analysis of the Argumentation of the American Anarchist, Eimna Goldman." H.A. Thesis. University of Kansas, 1967.

Riley James W. "An Application of the Toulmin Model to Selected Speeches ~f Robert F. Kennedy. 11 M.A. Thesis. Texas Christian University, 1970.

97

Smith, Mary J. "A Study of Argumentation in Selected ~·arks in Argumenta­tion and Debate." H.A. Thesis. University of Alabama, 1967.

Smith, Robert G. 11The Ar[Uments over Abolition Petitions in the House of Representatives in December, 1835: A Toulmin Analysis." Ph.D. Diss. University of Hinnesota, 1962.

Spicer, Holt V. "Stephen Toulmin's Functional Analysis of Logic and Ethics and Its Relation to Rhetoric." Ph. D. Diss. University of Oklahoma, 1964.

Trent, Jimmie D. "Stephen Toulmin' s Argument Model as an Instrument for Criticism of Forensic Speeches. 11 Ph.D. Diss. Purdue Lniversity, 1966.

~:erkamp, t'/illiam H., Jr. "An Application of the Toulmin l-1odel of Logical Analysis." H.A. Thesis. California State College at Long Beach, 1970.

Wise, Charles l·i. Ph.D. Diss.

"An Investiration of Choice Amonr. Hodes of Reasoning. 11

University of Oklahoma, 1968.

Court Cases

Adler v. Eoard of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).

Badgett v. Eullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).

Ball v. City Council of the City of Coachella, 60 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1967).

Eeilan v. Board of Education,. 352 U.S. 168 (195~).

Boulware v. Eahaglia, 327 F. Supp. 368 (1971).

Erukiewa v. Police Commissioner, 257 Md. 36, £63 A.2d 210 (1970).

Burback v. Goldschmidt, (Or. App.) 521 P.2d S (1974).

Commonwealth ex rel Rotan v. Hasskarl, (Phila. C.P.) 21 Pa. Dist. 119 (1912).

Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1~61).

Duffy v. Cooke, 239 Pa. 427, 86 A. 1076 (1913).

Owen v. Earrr, 483 F.2d 1126 (1973).

Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).

Flynn v. Giarusso, 321 F.Supp. 1295 (1971).

Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).

Greenwald v. Frank, 334 N.Y. 521 680 (1972).

In re Gioelio, 104 N.J. Super.88, 248 A.2d 570 (1968).

In re Quaries, 158 r .S. 532 (1895).

Ke,vishian v. Board of ~egents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

Lerner v. Casev, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).

Lentine v. VanCleave, 483 F.2d 966 (1973).

~Auliffe v. ~~yor of New Bedford, 155 ~~ss. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).

Meehan v. ~~cy (D.C. Cir.) 392 F.2d 822 (1968).

Muller v. Conlisk, (7th Cir.) 429 F.2d 901 (1970).

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).

Paulos v. Breier, 371 F.Supp. 523 (1974).

People ex rel. Clifford v. Scannell, 74 App.Div.L.Ot, (lst Dep.) 77 N.Y.S. 704 (190~

Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

98

Police Officers' Guild, National Union of Police Officers v. Washington, 369 F.Supp. 543 (1973).

Sloehower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).

§tradley v. Andersen, 478 F.2d 188 (1973).

Swaaley v. United States, (Ct.Cl.) 376 F.2d 857 (1967).

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 V.S. 1 (1949).

United Public Workers v. ~~tchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).

APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF LIDAL TERMSl

actionable: furnishing legal ground for an action; a term describing the kind of conduct by one person that furnishes another with legal ground for bringing an action against him in court.

a fortiori: with stronger reason; all the more so.

appellant: one who makes an appeal from one court to another, bscause he is dissatisfied with the judgment of the first court.

appellee: one against whom an appeal is taken.

brief: a written or printed document prepared by counsel to serve as the basis of the argument he is prepared to make in an appellate court. It embodies the points of law he desires to establish, his arguments, and the legal authorities upon which he rests his contentions.

_sertiorari.J writ of: a writ issued by a superior court requiring an inferior court to send it the record of a case. The Supreltle Court of the United States gets most of its cases in any given term by issuing this writ (upon a party's petition).

comity: a term designating the practice by which one court follows the decision of another court on a like question, although not bound to do so.

controlling: a term indicating that one case is "controlled" by another; i.e. the decision in the one is determined by the decision in an earlier ease.

count: a charge of a distinct offense, appearing as one part of an indictment.

dec lara tor;r judgment: a judgment by a court that merely declares the rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law, without ordering anything to be done. Hence, a party who asks for a declarator.y judgment usually asks for an injunction as well.

dicta: abbreviation of obiter dicta, or dictum. Literallf, words (word) by the way, or in passing. The legal usage means some­thing said in an opinion that is not necessar.y to the decision of the case.

equity, equitable relief: a s.ystem of jurisprudence collateral to, and in some senses independent of, law, properly so called, the object of which is to render justice by affording relief where courts of law are not competent to give it--for example when a

99

money judgment is not an appropriate remedy for the wrong done. Oririnally, equity was administered by a separate system of courts (courts of chancer,y), but today law and ~quity juris­diction are usually combined in the same courts. (See the Constitution, Art. III, Sec 2.) In the cases in this volume, equitable relief usually takes the form of a writ of injunction.

100

holding: the actual decision of a court; what the court held in a case.

instant case: the case currently at bar.

in re: concerning. This is the usual name of a judicial proceeding in which there are no adversary parties, but merely some thing or object (such as a bankrupt's estate) concerning which judicial action is to be taken.

jurisdiction: the authority by which courts take cognizance of and decide causes. Lower federal courts have only that jurisdiction which Congress gives them, and Congress can give them jurisdic­tion only in those "cases and controversies" specified in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. This is also true with the Supreme Court, except that it has an "original jurisdiction" in some cases that derives directly from the Constitution (see Art. III, Sec. 2, No. 2).

petitioner: one who presents a petition to a court asking ("praying") for relief (in the form of an injunction, for example). The per­son against whom relief is prayed, or who opposes the prayer of the petition, is called the respondent.

pleadings: the written alle~ations of the respective parties in the suit, the purpose of which is to narrow the field of controversy until there is a single point, affirmed on one side and denied on the other, called the "issue, 11 upon which the parties then go to trial.

remand: to send back, as, for example, to send a case back to a lower court with instructions to carry out the judgment of the higher court.

respondent: see petitioner. .

standing (to sue): the doctrine that before a court will hear a com-plaint of a person that a statute is unconstitutional or that a government official has acted unlawfully, the person must show that he has been injured in some way by the statute or the official's conduct.

stare decisis: to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases--i.e., to follow precedent.

supra: literally, above. A term used as a citation, referring readers to a previous part of the book, article, or, as in this volume, opinion.

U.S.C.; U.S.C.A.: United States Code; United States Code Annotated. The Code (U.S.C.) is an official compilation, arranged by sub­j ect and divided into fifty "titles," of the public "general

101

and permanent laws of the United States in force." The Annotated Code (U.S.C.A.) is a privately published edition of the United States Code with digests of judicial opinions and of the inter­pretations by the attorneys general of each section of the Code.

1 Adapted from: Walter F. Berns, Constitutional Cases in American Government (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963).