Preface

I have been reading Wittgenstein since 1965, and the papers published in this collection have come out of that reading . There is an

obvious way to divide them: seven are explicitly about Wittgenstein ,and three about the philosopher who most strongly influenced him ;the other five , in which Wittgenstein is hardly mentioned , are aboutethics and are done in a way which reflects what I have learned fromhim . But in fact the papers are connected more closely than that suggests

. I found , in trying to make clear their relations to each other,that I was trying to show how the unity of Wittgenstein

's thoughthad been refracted through my own discussions now of this , now ofthat . So the difficulties of trying to write an introductory essay werein part those of understanding the development of Wittgenstein

'sthought and of presenting it so that what was central could be seenas such. The result has been two introductory essays. Both essaystake the change of perspective between Wittgenstein

's early and hislater work as pivotal ; both connect that change with what I call " therealistic spirit

" (and thus treat " Realism and the Realistic Spirit

" asthe central paper of the collection ); both are critical of the attempt tounderstand that change through the contrast between philosophicalrealism and antirealism . The first essay treats the change in perspective

as a change in the philosophical treatment of the mind and thusgives a reading of the collection as a whole as in philosophy of mind ,though perhaps in a queer sense. The second contrasts the realisticspirit with metaphysics and connects the papers of the collection tothe character of philosophy and the significance in it of the layingdown of philosophical or metaphysical requirements . The two essaysare poor bastards this way : they are not self-contained essays on thedevelopment of Wittgenstein

's thought ; nor are they neat, brief explanations of how fifteen essays of mine make sense together .

Of the fifteen papers, three have not previously been published .For the most part , I have made only minor stylistic changes in thepapers that have already appeared;

"Wright

's Wittgenstein" has been

shortened . I have added a postscript to "Throwing Away the Ladderll

commenting on a startling remark of Gilbert Harman 's. I have alsoadded something to Il Riddles and Anselm 's Riddle .1I Of the paperscollected here, that is the one that now seems to me most in need ofreworking . Every year for more than a dozen years I have taught anundergraduate class in philosophy of religion and have discussed An -selm's Proslogion. What changes most from year to year in that classis what I find I can say about Anselm and I Ithat than which no greatercan be conceived.1I One thing in the paper

's discussion of Anselm ,though , that still seems to me right is the connection between riddlesand Anselm 's understanding of what it is to speak about God . Hemakes the connection himself in the Monologion; and the fact that hedoes so might have found its way into my paper, had it not beenwritten while I was in Shetland, dependent on a few books which Ihad with me and the generous help of the library in Lerwick . I havenow added a short paragraph about the Monologion.

For several reasons I have not included in this volume some recentpapers of mine on ethics, nor two essays on Wittgenstein , essayswhich go on in different ways from where the papers in this volumeleave off . I I Rules: Looking in the Right Placell gives a reading of Witt -

genstein's remarks on rules and connects that reading with Rush

Rhees's discussions of Wittgenstein ; I I Ethics, Imagination and the

Method of Wittgenstein's Tractatusll considers the implications of

treating seriously Wittgenstein's claim in the Tractatus that besidesor -

dinary senseful propositions there is only plain nonsense.]

The papers reprinted here are not in chronological order; the order

corresponds roughly to the organization of the first introductory essay. But I should point out that two of the papers - I I Secondary

Sensell and "The Face of Necessityll - are very much earlier than therest and draw on a more limited reading of Wittgenstein

's work .I I Frege Against Fuzzll is later than I I Frege and Nonsensell and I I What

Nonsense Might Bell; its arguments imply that some of the points inthe two earlier papers need to be revised or hedged about with

qualifications .Several of the papers are critical responses to things I had read; two

were invited commentaries: Il Missing the Adventurell is a reply toMartha Nussbaum's II 'Finely Aware and Richly Responsible

' : MoralAttention and the Moral Task of Literaturell2 and I I

Having a RoughStory about What Moral Philosophy ISII was written as a discussionof several other papers in an issue of New Literary History on Literature

and/ as Moral Philosophy .3 I I Experimenting on Animalsll was

originally written for a symposium at a meeting in 1977 of the British

x Preface

Psychological Association and was rewritten for a collection addressed to a general audience.

For their comments and suggestions, I am very grateful to MarthaNussbaum, Richard Rorty, James Conant, and Anthony Wooz Iey. Iam indebted also to Judy Mitchell for preparing the bibliographyand to Anthony Wooz Iey for helping with computers, printers, andprograms.

Preface xi

Notes

1. "Rules: Looking in the Right Place" is in D. Z. Phillips and P. Winch, eds., Witt-genstein: Attention to Particulars (Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1989), pp. 12-34; "Ethics

, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus" is forthcoming inWiener Reihe 5 (1991).2. Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985) pp. 516-29, reprinted with revisions as " '

FinelyAware and Richly Responsible': Literature and the Moral Imagination" in MarthaNussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford, 1990) pp.148-167.3. Vol. 15 no. 1 (Autumn 1983).