Real Time Evaluation IFRC Response to the Syria Crisis · 12/10/2014 · The IFRC’s Planning and Evaluation Department is committed to upholding the IFRC Framework for Evaluation

Real Time Evaluation IFRC Response to the Syria Crisis 2012-2014

FINAL REPORT December 10 2014

Real Time Evaluation Team Simon Lawry-White, Team Leader Martina Schloffer

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Real Time Evaluation of the IFRC Syria Crisis Response, 2012-2014

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The IFRC’s Planning and Evaluation Department is committed to upholding the IFRC Framework for Evaluation. The framework is designed to promote reliable, useful, ethical evaluations that contribute to organizational learning, accountability, and our mission to best serve those in need. It demonstrates the IFRC’s commitment to transparency, providing a publicly accessible document to all stakeholders so that they may better understand and participate in the evaluation function. Planning and Evaluation department International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Case postale 372 1211 Genève 19 Suisse Tel: +41 22 730 4222 Fax: +41 22 733 0395 http://www.ifrc.org/MandE Disclaimer The opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect those of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the author(s). Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by the IFRC of the opinions expressed.

http://www.ifrc.org/MandE


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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VI

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 1

2.1 RTE PURPOSE 1 2.2 RTE QUESTIONS 2 2.3 RTE COVERAGE 2 2.4 RTE TIMING 2 2.5 RTE MANAGEMENT 3

3 METHODOLOGY AND REPORT STRUCTURE 3

3.1 METHODOLOGY 3 3.2 LIMITATIONS 4 3.3 REPORT STRUCTURE 4

4 FINDINGS 4

4.1 SCALE OF THE IFRC RESPONSE 4 4.2 IFRC APPEALS 5 4.3 USE OF IFRC STANDARD HUMANITARIAN TOOLS 5 4.4 THE MOVEMENT ADVISORY PLATFORM (MAP) 5 4.5 IFRC SECRETARIAT-ICRC COOPERATION 6 4.6 PNS FUNDING AND COORDINATION 7 4.6.1 PNS BILATERAL FUNDING AND SUPPORT 7 4.6.2 PNS CONSORTIA 7 4.6.3 PNS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST 8 4.7 SECURITY 8 4.8 GENDER AND GBV 9 4.9 HUMAN RESOURCES AND THE IFRC CULTURE 9 4.10 HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY 10 4.11 REPORTING AND INFORMATION PRODUCTS 10 4.12 MOVEMENT WIDE INITIATIVES 11 4.12.1 MOVEMENT WIDE COMMUNICATIONS 11 4.12.2 THE COMMON NARRATIVE 12 4.12.3 MOVEMENT WIDE REPORTING 12

5 DISCUSSION 12

5.1 MODELS OF IFRC SUPPORT 12 5.2 APPLYING THE LEAD AGENCY CONCEPT 13 5.3 SECRETARIAT MANAGEMENT OF THE SYRIA CRISIS RESPONSE 14 5.4 SECRETARIAT ROLE DEFINITION 16 5.5 RESOURCING FOR THE ZONE OFFICES 17 5.6 REGIONAL VERSUS COUNTRY PLANNING AND APPEALS 17 5.7 GLOBAL DISASTER RESPONSE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPS) 18 5.8 MAINTAINING RESOURCES FOR THE SYRIA CRISIS RESPONSE 18 5.9 CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 19 5.10 UNITED NATIONS RESPONSE AND PLANNING 20 5.11 EXTERNAL COORDINATION 20


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6 CONCLUSIONS 21

6.1 STRATEGIC DECISIONS FOR THE IFRC 21 6.2 THE CRISIS RESPONSE HAS BEEN STRONG BUT VARIABLE IN SCALE 21 6.3 CONFLICTING ASSUMPTIONS HAVE WEAKENED THE IFRC APPROACH 21 6.4 THE MAP PROCESS IS IMPORTANT AND SHOULD BE SUPPORTED STRONGLY 22 6.5 IFRC PLANNING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 22 6.6 THE IFRC NEEDS A WAY TO PREDICT RESPONSE CAPACITY 22 6.7 PARTNER NATIONAL SOCIETY BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IS SET TO INCREASE 23 6.8 RESOURCE MOBILISATION HAS HAD SOME SUCCESS BUT NEEDS TO ADJUST 23 6.9 INNOVATIONS 23 6.10 COMPARISONS WITH OTHER RTES 24

7 RECOMMENDATIONS 25

7.1 COUNTRY SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 25 7.2 SYRIA CRISIS REGIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 27 7.3 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS PROMPTED BY THE RTE 29

ANNEX 1 – TERMS OF REFERENCE 30

ANNEX 2 – DOCUMENTS CONSULTED 40

ANNEX 3 – SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS 43

ANNEX 4 – COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS - SYRIA 47

ANNEX 5 – COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS - LEBANON 51

ANNEX 6 – COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS – JORDAN 54

ANNEX 7 – COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS - TURKEY 57

ANNEX 8 – RESOURCE MOBILISATION HISTORY 60

ANNEX 9 – COMPETING MODELS OF FEDERATION RESPONSE 63

ANNEX 10 – SECRETARIAT LEADERSHIP 66

ANNEX 11 - THE MOVEMENT ADVISORY PLATFORM (MAP) 68

ANNEX 12 – PNS CONSORTIA 70

ANNEX 13 – RAISING STANDARDS IN IFRC PLANNING 72

ANNEX 14 - THE OBSERVER ROLE OF THE FEDERATION 73


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Abbreviations and Key words

ACAPS Assessment Capacities Project

CBHFA Community based Health and First Aid in action

CTP Cash transfer programme/ing

DREF Disaster Relief Emergency Fund

ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office

EPOA Emergency Plan of Action

ERU Emergency Response Unit

FACT Field Assessment and Coordination Team

Federation The Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent National Societies

HNS Host National Societies, i.e. the NS of countries affected by the Syria

crisis

HR Human Resources

IASC Inter-Agency Steering Committee

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

JRC Jordan Red Crescent

KPI Key performance indicator

LRC Lebanon Red Cross

MAP Movement Advisory Platform

MENA Middle East and North Africa

NFI Non-Food Item

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NS National Society

OCAC Organizational Capacity Assessment and Certification

OCHA United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PMER Planning Monitoring Evaluation and Reporting

PNS Partner National Societies

P&R Principles and Rules of Humanitarian Assistance

Region Refers to Syria and surrounding countries affected by the crisis

RCRC Red Cross Red Crescent

RDRT Regional Disaster Response Team

RTE Real Time Evaluation

SARC Syrian Arab Red Crescent

Secretariat The Secretariat of the Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies

(S)GBV (Sexual and) Gender Based Violence

SMCC Strengthening Movement Cooperation and Coordination

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

TOR Terms of Reference

TRC Turkish Red Crescent (Turk Kizilayi)


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Context

In October 2014, there were 6.5 million IDPs and 10.8 million people in need inside Syria,

plus some 3 million registered refugees outside Syria, and many more unregistered. The

armed conflict and displacement in Syria, together with the situation of Syrian refugees in

surrounding countries, is the largest humanitarian crisis today and the most significant for at

least the past decade. The crisis is not over. On the contrary it is deepening, while world

media and donor attention have been drawn away to Ebola and other crises. The International

Federation of the Red Cross Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) faces the challenge of keeping

Syria high on the international agenda and continuing to mobilise resources.

The RTE

This Real Time Evaluation (RTE) of the IFRC response to the Syria crisis (2012-2014) was

commissioned by the USG for Programme Services at the IFRC Secretariat. The RTE comes

almost three years into the crisis, much later than normal for an IFRC RTE1, but still valid as

a one of the evaluation tools applicable for use in a long running crisis.

According to the TOR, the core questions for the RTE were:

1. How well did the IFRC secretariat coordinate its response internally and with other

Red Cross Red Crescent Movement actors?

2. What were the challenges and opportunities of a multi-country (multi-zone)

response?

3. How has the IFRC dealt with and learnt from a long-term, chronic crisis of this

nature?

The main focus of the evaluation is on the IFRC Secretariat, and on Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey

and Syria, where the RTE team made visits. The Host National Societies in region2, and the

ICRC, were informants to the evaluation, rather than objects of the evaluation.

The Response

The extensive operation by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) inside Syria has given both

itself and the Movement strong credibility for the crisis response as a whole. The SARC is

reaching more than 3 million people each month, which still leaves perhaps the same number

again without the assistance they need. The Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) has responded

strongly and at scale to the needs of refugees in 23 camps, including reaching 250,000 people

each month with e-card food assistance. Both SARC and TRC have major partnerships with

UN organisations from which they receive substantial resources. Less than 10% of SARC

crisis responses resources have come via the IFRC, while the equivalent figure for the TRC is

2%. In Lebanon and Jordan, medical, relief and cash assistance to refugees and local

communities is more modest in scale but growing in both countries.

Models of IFRC response

The IFRC’s Syria crisis response has been complicated by competing assumptions about how

the IFRC as a whole should respond to the crisis. Some partners consider that the IFRC

should maximise the response to the crisis, using capacity from across the RCRC network

where there are opportunities to reach vulnerable people beyond the capacities of the Host

1 The norm is for IFRC RTE’s i to be carried out within three months of disaster 2 Throughout this report, ‘region’ refers to Syria plus neighbouring countries affected by the crisis in Syria. (It is

not a reference to IFRC zones)


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National Society (HNS). Others favour scaling the crisis response to fit the capacity of the

HNS, while working at the same time to expand its response capacity gradually, and in line

with the wishes of the HNS. The second model is the dominant one in the region, which is

one of the main reasons for the relatively small scale RCRC response in Jordan and Lebanon.

The adoption of the second model for the Syria crisis has profoundly affected the IFRC’s

response, influencing every aspect of how the HNS, IFRC Secretariat and PNS have

responded, and may continue to affect the IFRC response into the future. The Secretariat has

not succeeded in providing a middle way that respects the role of the HNS, while also

delivering significant additional response capacity in parallel to the HNS, using the

Secretariat and PNS resources.

Resource Mobilisation

Since 2012, the CHF110 million has been raised against three separate emergency appeals for

Syria, Turkey, and Iraq-Jordan-Lebanon, out of a total of CHF187 million requested.

Significant additional resources have come via bilateral channels but consolidated figures are

not available. All predictions are of a tight funding environment for 2015. Meeting the

Movement Advisory Platform commitment to a 50% expansion of activities across the Syria

crisis response will be challenging and will need high quality funding proposals targeting

both humanitarian and development funding sources, going well beyond the standard

emergency appeal system.

IFRC Response Tools

Apart from the Appeals, only moderate use has been made of standard IFRC response tools.

The field hospital for Azraq camp in Jordan has been the only ERU deployment, while non-

standard use has been made of other standard IFRC tools; Heads of Emergency Operations

and Field Assessment and Coordination Teams. There was two DREF releases, one each for

Armenia and Bulgaria. Otherwise, there was little call for the use of the standard IFRC

response tools, which are, in any case, not well suited to the long-term chronic nature of the

Syria crisis.

Secretariat Decentralisation

Previous IFRC evaluations have highlighted how the Secretariat decentralisation to Zone

offices has not been implemented in a way that readily allows for the IFRC to mobilise its

global network of national society resources in a coordinated response. This has again proved

a challenge in the Syria crisis. Coordination between zone offices has been limited and it is

likely that an over-reliance on zone offices to coordinate the global IFRC response has not led

to the optimal use of either the Secretariat or PNS resources.

Movement Advisory Platform

The MAP has overseen coordination and cooperation for the Movement’s response. Since

2012, it has held a series of largely ineffective meetings but has created a political momentum

towards increasing Movement cooperation and communication. The MAP Steering Group is

leading a process for the planning of the expansion of the overall response by 50% in 2015

and for the development of Movement-wide country plans, which could be an important step

forward, with the potential to create a more coherent RCRC approach to the Syria crisis, and

so the process should be well supported.


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Summary Recommendations

The RTE report provides three sets of recommendations, largely addressed to the Secretariat:

1) for the four countries reviewed, 2) for the Syria crisis response at a regional level, and 3)

general recommendations drawn from the RTE, but not specific to the Syria response.

Only the regional3 recommendations are summarised below4. Section 7 of the main report

includes the full text of the regional recommendations, plus the country specific and general

recommendations.

1. With regard to the Movement Advisory Panel process:

a. IFRC Secretariat (with the ICRC) should provide high-level technical support

to HNS to develop 3-year movement-wide country plans, in accordance with

the decisions of the ‘mini-MAP’ meeting of October 2014.

b. The plans for, and progress of, the MAP process (including the Steering

Group and mini-MAP) should be circulated more widely.

c. The MAP process should conclude movement wide country plans by March

2015 and a regional chapeau by June 2015.

2. The Secretariat should institute a series of measures to improve internal coordination,

communication and support across the Syria crisis response, as follows:

a. The Secretariat should improve its internal communication and coordination

for the Syria crisis by, for example, instituting biweekly teleconferences for

the Secretariat across the region, including HQ

b. The Secretariat should convene a teleconference, perhaps every 6 weeks, for

each country, at senior working level, with the individual HNS

c. The MENA Zone office, with the Europe Zone office, should issue a written

communication on the respective roles and responsibilities of the Syria team

and Syria crisis team, to clarify how they relate to each other

d. The Secretariat in Geneva should appoint one designated focal point for the

Syria crisis

e. The two Directors of Zone concerned should call for additional technical

support from Geneva HQ, especially for those areas where they have no

specialist

f. By end April 2015, the two Directors of Zone should send a short progress

report on this set of recommendations (a-e) directly to the Secretary-General.

3. As far as possible, the current MENA Zone strategic planning exercise should

encompass:

a. The development of a 3-5 year DM development strategy for the countries of

the Zone.

b. Developing greater clarity on the nature of the leadership the HNS and PNS

expect from the Secretariat zone and country offices.

c. How to maintain sufficient human resources to support the Syria crisis

operation, while at the same time providing the rest of the Zone with the

support it requires.

d. Engagement of Geneva HQ on how to address the general under-resourcing

of the Zone Office.

3 ‘region’ and ‘regional’ are used throughout the report to refer to Syria and neighbouring countries affected by the

crisis in Syria. Region does not refer to Secretariat zones. 4 The Management Response to the evaluation should base itself on the text in Section 7, not the summary listed

here


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4. The IFRC, led by the Secretariat, should develop a regional resource mobilisation

strategy for the medium term, adopting a resilience approach and seeking out

development funding sources, not just traditional humanitarian donors.

5. Alongside the regional resource mobilisation strategy, each country in the region

should develop, with technical support, a mobilisation plan to raise resources in-

country, via embassies, local donor representation, UN agencies and the private

sector.

6. The Secretariat should ensure that IFRC participation in inter-agency fora is more

regular and is equipped to exert greater influence, strengthen the perception of the

RCRC role and relevance, and learn from the situation analysis and strategies of other

actors.

7. The Secretariat should build on current good practices to reflect bilateral plans and

contributions in the EPOA and the Emergency Appeal.

8. It is proposed that the ICRC Director-General and the IFRC Secretary-General send

internal communications to their staff in the region, spelling out their intent for closer

cooperation between the organisations, and highlighting particular areas where

cooperation is to be strengthened.

9. Working with Secretariat HQ, the zone offices should invite PNS (traditional and

non-traditional) to provide or fund senior technical support for the following:

e. Movement wide country plans, in line with the on-going MAP process

f. A Syria region resource mobilisation strategy, and country strategies

g. An Humanitarian Diplomacy Strategy, building on the work already done in

devising the Movement Communications Strategy.

10. The Secretariat should convene the HNS at operational level, to share practical

lessons (as proposed by SARC). The Secretariat should first test the interest level of

the NS concerned.


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1 Introduction

The conflict in Syria continues with no end in sight. The situation of armed conflict and

displacement in Syria, together with the situation of Syrian refugees living in surrounding

countries, is the largest humanitarian crisis today and the most significant for at least the past

decade. It is estimated that more than 200,000 people have been killed.

The crisis is not over; on the contrary, it is deepening and humanitarian needs are increasing

in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq. The numbers of displaced, both IDPs and

refugees, is growing, increasing the burden on states and on host communities. In Syria, food

supplies, hospitals and medical centres, water and power supply, schools and livelihoods have

been destroyed. People suffer psychological harm from bereavement and the effects of the

unpredictable and volatile security situation.

Humanitarian actors and donor governments for ways to maintain humanitarian assistance to

the affected communities but financial resources are stretched as more recent crises take the

headlines, especially Ebola, but also other crises (Libya, Iraq, Gaza, South Sudan etc.).

National Societies of the countries affected have been responding from the beginning of the

crisis. The IFRC Secretariat has been supporting NS in both Europe and MENA zones. The

first appeal responding to the emerging crisis was for the MENA Civil Unrest operation from

July 2011. Further appeals in support to SARC and the NS in neighbouring countries were

launched in 2012.

According to the UN, at the time of writing, there were 6.5 million IDPs and 10.8 million

people in need inside Syria, plus some 3 million registered refugees outside Syria5. As coping

strategies are exhausted and resentment against the long-term stay of refugees grows in the

neighbouring countries, the chances of inter-community tension grow. Domestic economies

are under strain. The drivers of resentment against refuges are common across the hosting

countries; increased competition for jobs, depressed wages, higher rents and shortages in

housing6.

Even though, governments and the humanitarian community, including the IFRC, have

mounted very large relief operations, there are gaps in provision in all four countries reviewed

by the evaluation team.

2 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

2.1 RTE Purpose

According to the TOR, the purpose of RTE is as follows:

“This real time evaluation (RTE) will assess aspects of the IFRC’s response to the

Syria Crisis. It will inform the on-going support to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent

(SARC) operations in Syria and the support to operations in the surrounding countries

of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. As with other RTEs, the evaluation will also

inform future global emergency response operations and approaches. Particular

5 The RTE team was informed in all countries visited that the actual number of refugees is much higher, though

precise figures are not available. For example, while there are just over 1 million Syrians accorded temporary

protection in Turkey, the Red Crescent puts the number at nearer 1.5 million. Syrians without valid passports

cannot be registered. 6 based on Dialogue and local response mechanisms to conflict between host communities and Syrian refugees in

Lebanon, Search for Common Ground, May 2014


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emphasis will be placed on looking at the opportunities and challenges in such a

complex Movement response over an extended time period, and how Movement

coordination / cooperation can be best applied to provide flexible and optimal support

to the National Societies involved. The RTE will also be asked to scope out future

directions and opportunities for the on-going response and contingency planning.”

The individual Host National Societies in region affected, and the ICRC, were not the target

of the RTE. They are informants to the evaluation, rather than objects of the evaluation.

While this RTE is being undertaken during an on-going emergency rather than in response to

a sudden onset crisis, the purpose of providing real time feedback to the on-going operation

remains the same. The RTE is formative and aims to contribute to the strengthening of the

response to the on-going crisis in the short to medium term, as well as providing lessons for

future responses.

2.2 RTE Questions

According to the TOR, the core, high-level questions for the RTE were:

1. How well did the IFRC secretariat coordinate its response internally and with other

Red Cross Red Crescent Movement actors?

2. What were the challenges and opportunities of a multi-country (multi-zone)

response?

3. How has the IFRC dealt with and learnt from a long-term, chronic crisis of this

nature?

2.3 RTE Coverage

Geographically, the evaluation has focused on the countries visited: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon

and Turkey. The TOR asked for Iraq to be covered as well (without a visit) but this has not

been achieved. Given the very rapidly evolving situation in Iraq7, the RTE might have been

less relevant there, in any case.

The RTE covered the period July 2012 to present day8, taking account of the RTE of the

MENA Civil Unrest operation that preceded it. A timeline of events has been included in the

new emergency appeals for some countries but the RTE team has not had sufficient resources

to develop a complete timeline of events from the start of the crisis for all countries. Instead,

it has focused on the situation ‘as is’, on proposals for the future of the Syria crisis operations,

and on lessons for IFRC crisis response for the long term9.

2.4 RTE Timing

This Real Time Evaluation was carried out between mid September and mid November 2014.

The Secretariat has been trying to commission this RTE for more than a year. It has been

subject to a number of delays, including difficulty in agreeing the Terms of Reference.

Despite this, for a number of reasons, the timing of the RTE is opportune because:

The Movement Advisory Platform process has started to address practically the

development of Movement-wide country plans for the countries of the region, which

the RTE may be able to inform

7 A visit to Iraq was excluded from the outset. Information gathered on Iraq is very limited. The Federation

Representative for Iraq was interviewed. 8 Several interviewees have asked why the RTE has taken place more than two years into the current operations,

given that according to the IFRC guidance it should take place a few months in. The guidance could usefully be

modified, as there is no set timing for a RTE. As long as an RTE can provide useful feedback in real time, it can

be carried out at any phase of an operation. 9 The RTE team requested support from the Secretariat to plot trends of funding and to summarise data on RCRC

accomplishments in the Syria crisis but this was not available.


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HNS are interested to increase their engagement with Movement partners, which was

not the case for all at the beginning of the crisis

The RTE can inform the new Secretary-General’s decision-making concerning IFRC

disaster management for major crises, including conflict situations

The Strengthening Movement Cooperation and Coordination (SMCC) process due to

conclude in 2015 will hopefully be informed by the RTE

The new spirit of cooperation developing between the IFRC Secretariat and the ICRC

can hopefully be strengthened by the RTE

On the down side, the RTE comes too late to influence the first versions of the new IFRC

appeals for Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, but it can still inform the revision of the Syria Complex

Emergency Appeal due at the end of 2014.

2.5 RTE Management

The RTE was commissioned by Secretariat Under Secretary-General for Programme Services.

An Evaluation Management Team, comprising members of the Geneva Secretariat and

Europe and MENA Zone offices, oversaw the management of the evaluation.

3 Methodology and Report Structure

3.1 Methodology

The RTE methodology has included:

Inception Phase. An inception report was finalised on September 25 2014, building

on the Terms of Reference, setting out the process and timetable for the RTE,

following the first RTE team visit to Geneva and a teleconference of the Evaluation

Management Team. Document review. A comprehensive set of background documents was assembled to

inform the evaluation, much of which has been studied by the RTE team. A schedule

of documents consulted is included as Annex 2.

Data. The RTE has included a review of financial data in particular on the appeals

and with regard to levels of funding versus requests and which donors have been

most prominent. Where possible, data on outputs has been triangulated against

perceptions of progress made in the operations.

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). In all, 120 interviews were conducted with the

Secretariat HQ, zone offices, country delegations, with the four HNS in countries

visited, with 12 PNS at HQ, regional and country levels, with the ICRC at HQ and

country level, and with UN partners in-country and in Geneva. Government officials

of the countries affected, NGOs, and other external commentators were not

interviewed. Interview guides were developed for the KIIs and included in the

inception report. A list of those interviewed is included in Annex 3.

Field visits. The evaluation team undertook field visits of between 2-4 days each to

Amman, Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus. The RTE team did not travel beyond the

capital cities10 and there was no interaction with beneficiaries.

On-line survey. An online survey was developed and issued to PNS, as it was not

possible to interview all those that had contributed to the Appeals. However, only 12

out of 40 responses were received, and the responses have been used in the general

analysis without generating a separate analysis of the survey results.

Feedback and Consultation. The RTE team provided only limited feedback on its

preliminary observations in the countries visited, due to time constraints, more

limited than the team would have liked.

10 which, in any event, would not have been possible in Syria and Turkey.


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3.2 Limitations

The RTE has been subject to certain limitations:

The evaluation team was only two instead of the planned 3-4 team members

The budget for the RTE was inadequate for a multi-country evaluation of this

complexity and importance. Individual country situations have been analysed

sufficiently to draw general lessons for the IFRC but not to the accuracy and depth

that country based readers will be anticipating and the recommendations for

individual countries may have missed important topics.

Given the multi-country nature of the evaluation, the RTE has little hard data about

the quality or success of individual programmes. Where there was a consensus about

successes or failures of particular interventions, these are highlighted.

From the outset, it became clear that the evaluation was politically sensitive within

and beyond the Secretariat. The strong feelings and contradictory narratives have left

the RTE team with few obvious points of consensus from which to form clear

judgements. The report aims to be constructive and forward looking.

3.3 Report Structure

In order for the main report to keep within the designated 10,000 words for the main report,

important material has been included in the Annexes, including a summary analysis for each

of the four countries Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (see Annexes 4-7). Section 7 of the

main text includes country-specific recommendations.

Other Annexes of material significance to the evaluation include:

Annex 8 Resource Mobilisation

Annex 9 Competing Models of IFRC Response

Annex 10 Secretariat Leadership

Annex 11 The Movement Advisory Platform

Annex 12 PNS Consortia

Annex 13 Raising standards in IFRC Planning

Annex 14 The Observer role of the IFRC

4 Findings

4.1 Scale of the IFRC Response

The scale of the RCRC response in Syria and Turkey has been in the same order of magnitude

as the humanitarian needs generated by the crisis. At the same time, in both countries there

are considerable needs not being met. In Turkey, the TRC has largely focused on large-scale

assistance to refugees, in line with its designated role under national disaster law,

In Jordan and Lebanon, the IFRC response has been smaller and not on the same scale as the

needs, but the response is expanding gradually in both countries. The capacity of these

National Societies was quite well understood by the IFRC Secretariat and by those PNS with

a long-term presence in the country. That the JRC and LRC would be in a position to mount

relatively small operations should have been understood from the outset.

There are constraints to scaling up RCRC response in the countries of the region:

Auxiliary role. As auxiliaries to government, some NS are given specific roles to

play by government beyond which they cannot go, unless they advocate for an

expanded role, with or without Secretariat support11.

11 The evaluation team did not meet with host government departments, so no further detail is available on this

point


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Security. Security risks are very high in parts of Syria and front lines are shifting and

multiplying. In Lebanon, the equilibrium is being disrupted by violence in some

parts of the north and east of the country.

Resourcing. The IFRC appeals have been underfunded, meaning that activities and

human resources are below the levels planned.

4.2 IFRC Appeals

(See Annex 8 for further discussion)

The IFRC launched three appeals for the Syria crisis, as follows:

Syria Complex Emergency; the Appeal total stands at CHF 97 million and is 75%

covered

Turkey Population Movement; the Appeal total stands at CHF 41 million, including

bilateral contributions, and is 87% covered.

Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon Population Movement; the Appeal stood at CHF 49 million

including bilateral contributions, and was 37% covered before it was divided into

three separate country appeals.

4.3 Use of IFRC standard humanitarian tools

Apart from IFRC Emergency Appeals, the standard IFRC response tools have been little used

during the Syria crisis. Where they have been, it has generally been in non-standard ways.

Only one Emergency Response Unit (ERU) has been deployed, the field hospital in

Azraq camp in Jordan. From early on, it was clear that the hospital would not follow

standard procedures and would stay for much longer than the standard 4 months. It

was re-designated as a district hospital by the Consortium managing the ERU

deployment.

The FACT deployment to Jordan early 2013 to support JRC in the feasibility of

establishing the Hallabat Camp for Syrian Refugees in Jordan was given a non-

standard and narrow remit.

All three HQ based Heads of Operations (HEOps) were deployed during the crisis,

some more than once, but did not have the coordination of the Federation

international support to the operations, as per their standard TOR.

The IFRC Emergency Appeal system has been well used during this crisis. The

appeals have been somewhat underfunded, yet, by the time of the RTE, they had

mobilised a total of over CHF110 million.

In the evaluation period, two disbursements were made from the Disaster Relief

Emergency Fund (DREF). In October 2013, CHF 172,726 was allocated to the

Bulgarian RC to respond to the needs of 1,500 mostly Syrian asylum seekers. In

January 2014, the Armenian RC received CHF 138,746 for winterization support for

1,000 Syrian Armenian refugees.

The nature and evolution of the emergency is part of the explanation for the limited and non-

standard use of standard tools. The long-term nature of the crisis does not match well with the

short-term nature of the standard response tools. ERUs would not, in any case, fit well with

the regional approach of the IFRC, which has been to work exclusively through the

developing capacities of the HNS. The ERU hospital in Azraq, Jordan, responded to a

request from the JRC and the Government for a hospital deployment. UNHCR supported the

offer to ensure the secondary health facility services in the camp. Otherwise, ERUs were not

requested by HNS and therefore fell outside the scope of the response planning.

4.4 The Movement Advisory Platform (MAP)

(See Annex 11 for further discussion).

Since December 2012, there has been a series of Movement conferences for Movement

partners to discuss the Syria crisis response, under the heading of the Movement Advisory


6

Platform (MAP). The consensus amongst interviewees is that these meetings have been

generally ineffective because they were too big and not well enough prepared. However, the

MAP has created political momentum for a Movement wide approach to the Syria crisis that

could yet produce results.

The MAP meeting in May 2014 in Beirut agreed to an expansion of 50% in Movement

activities for the Syria crisis and established a Steering Group, which in turn organised a

‘mini-MAP’ meeting in Geneva in October 2014.

The mini-MAP agreed that12:

Movement wide country plans should be developed for Syria and each of the

neighbouring countries13 by early 2015, with a further mini-MAP meeting to be held

in Q1 2015. The format of the plans will be tailored to country context as needed.

MENA Zone Office and ICRC Beirut are to develop Terms of Reference for resource

person(s) who will be made available by IFRC/ICRC to support the National Society

in the development of country plans.

A further attempt will be made to advance Movement-wide reporting, taking Lebanon

as a model.

The need for results based planning and movement wide reporting was acknowledged

by the participants.

The Movement Communications Strategy was given renewed impetus.

The MAP process, including the development of country plans and a regional chapeau to

those plans, represents a major opportunity that should not be lost. Well managed, the MAP

process could provide improved planning and strategy for the Syria crisis over a 3 year term,

a cogent set of plans for response across the Movement, and a consensus on the way forward

between HQ, region and country levels. The Emergency Plans of Action underpinning the

new country appeals for Lebanon and Jordan show a more coordinated approach between

Movement partners, which is a promising start towards the development of country plans.

Reducing the size of the MAP meetings for planning purposes is sensible but the process has

become rather too closed. Communications before the mini-MAP were kept to a tight circle,

such that most stakeholders had no idea what was taking place. From here on, even if MAP

participation is limited, the process itself needs much better and wider communication across

Movement actors to make sure the process and outcomes envisaged are understood, and all

partners are consulted and take ownership of the results.

4.5 IFRC Secretariat-ICRC Cooperation

The two organisations are making genuine efforts to improve movement cooperation, and this

is bearing some fruit in the Syria crisis response, even if both organisations find the

engagement challenging. At working level, there is practical cooperation between the two

organisations concerning the Syria crisis in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. At management level,

interaction is less consistent.

At the same time, some interviews showed how old prejudices persist, with typical comments

being ‘the ICRC just wants to take over’, from the Secretariat and ‘in the end we have to do it

(capacity building) because the Federation won’t deliver’ from the ICRC. If the heads of the

two organisations were able to communicate more clearly their intent to cooperate more

closely, and the shape this cooperation will take, this would help to strengthen cooperation at

field level.

12 based on verbal feedback from the meeting. The minutes of the meeting may not be published before the RTE

report is finalized. 13 National Societies of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt, plus the Palestinian Red Crescent


7

In Syria, according to the tripartite agreement of 2012, ICRC is the ‘primary operational

partner’ of the SARC. The ICRC therefore has expressed its disapproval to the IFRC of its

having a large operation14 and objected in particular to the large food component of the IFRC

appeal for Syria, which has been an irritant in ICRC-IFRC relations in Syria. (See also

Annex 4).

4.6 PNS Funding and Coordination

4.6.1 PNS Bilateral funding and support

In the Syria crisis, multilateral support via the IFRC Appeals has lost ground as more PNS

have taken the bilateral funding route15. Significant resources have been provided via bilateral

channels but consolidated figures are not available.

A cost benefit analysis of bilateral versus multilateral funding is beyond the scope of the RTE.

What is evident, however, is that the many PNS perceive advantages 16 in the bilateral

approach, compared with multilateral funding, including:

Better attention to back-donor requirements regarding reporting, accounting, and

audit

Lower overhead costs than working via the Secretariat17

Greater confidence in more timely implementation.

Greater PNS visibility

The IFRC Appeal still offers the preferred route for funding where the PNS has no presence18,

by choice or by the decision of the HNS, and the Secretariat can provide a measure of

oversight and reporting for their funds, or support the HNS in performing its accountability

functions. The Secretariat has been successful in this role in Syria, Turkey and in the Jordan

Cash Transfer Programme. PNS are ready to pay the charges levied by the Secretariat where

the Appeal is the best, or only, funding channel.

The PNS that traditionally support the multilateral approach stated that if the Secretariat were

more effective in their view, they would pass more funds through the IFRC Appeal. The

Secretariat response is that if more funds went via the Appeal, it could be more effective.

This circular, and old, argument can only be broken by the Secretariat generating quality

products, in particular, emergency needs assessments, plans, appeals, and reports’, and taking

a more proactive stance in coordination, in order to win back confidence.

Whatever the advantages for the PNS, bilateral support can also increase the burden on HNS

as the Lebanon case illustrates par excellence, with 16 PNS present in one country. (See also

Annex 5).

4.6.2 PNS Consortia


The concept of the PNS consortium is not new. The Syria crisis response has given rise to a

number of PNS consortia, in various forms, including:

14 IFRC and ICRC appeals for Syria were broadly similar in scale in 2014 15 For some PNS, bilateralism is the only route, as their back-donors do not accept accountability via Federation

reporting. 16 Beyond the remit of the RTE, a cost analysis of bilateral versus multilateral funding, including the role of PNS

consortia, could be a valuable addition to the current SMCC process. 17 Avoiding the Secretariat 6.5% Programme and Services Support Recovery (PSSR) is an important factor in PNS

preferring bilateral funding. 18 Bilateral assistance can also be provided where the PNS has no presence, eg German and Netherlands RC

support to the Turkish RC


8

The Norwegian and German RCs formed a close partnership for their work with

SARC. With a joint representative in-country and a limited number of delegates, the

two NS have combined their considerable bilateral funding into one programme with

SARC.

The ‘Hospital Consortium’ of four PNS (Finnish, German, Norwegian and Canadian

RC) was assembled to provide sufficient capacity to provide a hospital for 130,000

people. The Finnish RC signed the ECHO contract and is the sole partner responsible

to ECHO19.

In 2013, the Secretariat was asked to take the lead in coordinating an ECHO

application for the neighbouring countries and to act as contracting partner for ECHO

but this did not go forward 20 and the French RC took on the leadership of the

consortium. Within Syria, the Danish RC took the lead of the Danish RC, German

RC, Norwegian and Federation consortium.

In other less visible PNS consortia, ‘silent partners’ are adding their funds into other

bilateral NS projects, such as Austrian RC adding funds to the Swiss RC CTP

investment in Jordan and to the Netherlands RC programming in Lebanon.

The trend towards consortia, as a modified form of bilateral funding, is significant and can be

seen as the PNS re-inventing multilateral programming as an alternative to the IFRC Appeal.

Some PNS would prefer to fund via a more effective, but less costly, Secretariat.

4.6.3 PNS from the Middle East

For the Syria crisis, PNS from the wider region have made a substantial contribution to the

RCRC response. The Iraqi RC is implementing a US$10 million programme in Syria,

Lebanon and Jordan in favour of Syrian Refugees and IDPs, in cooperation with the

respective HNS. The Qatari RC is providing assistance in northern Syria and health and

psychological services in Jordan, and is active in cross border operations from southern

Turkey. The Kuwait RC is working in Lebanon and Jordan, and has contributed to the

Turkey appeal. The United Arab Emirates RC runs a refugee camp in Al Halabat, Jordan,

with UNHCR. The financial investment of Kuwaiti RC and UAE RC is reported to be

considerable but information is not available. Some of these interventions are not fully

coordinated with the respective HNS.

An attempt was made to set up a ‘Gulf Forum’, supported by the IFRC Regional

Representative, but this did not come about. The Secretariat has engaged a consultant to

develop a strategy for engaging more fully with the NS from the Gulf. This should be a

priority for the Federation given the potential for greater financial assistance and for more

cooperation between the Gulf NS.

4.7 Security

Security management emerged as a specific concern during the evaluation. For Syria and

Lebanon, responsibilities for security management lie somewhere between the HNS, that is

‘leading’ on security, with the IFRC and ICRC sharing responsibility in some way. Some

countries did not appear to have written roles and responsibilities for security. The limited

19 ECHO is a key donor for support to the Syria crisis response. It wants to see one application from the RCRC per

crisis, not several, which has driven to some extent to move to consortia 20 This did not work as the Secretariat was not ready to reduce its 6.5% PSSR share (which would have left 0.5%

for the PNS from the 7% overhead allowed by ECHO). For ECHO funding, if the Federation is not the leader of

the consortium, the PNS lose the benefit of the Federation being regarded as an International Organisation by the

EU, which brings with it simpler reporting requirements.


9

number of delegates in Syria is in part due to Geneva HQ concerns about security, whose

security advisers are not satisfied with security arrangements for Syria, in particular21.

For Lebanon, a country not in conflict but still not stable and presenting security risks, the

security setup is also unclear. The MENA zone security advisor, though working in a zonal

responsibility, is personally tracking the field trips of IFRC and PNS delegates within

Lebanon and to and from Syria. Past and present delegates raised concerns about the lack of

a more formalized security system. Even though the IFRC has written security procedures,

PNS delegates have come up with work-around solutions (joining an NGO security network

and/or the security umbrella provided by their own embassies). They seemed unaware of the

IFRC evacuation procedures. The currently blurred roles of LRC, IFRC Secretariat and the

ICRC need to be clarified and measures introduced for delegates to conform to security

measures, which seem to be treated too casually at the moment.

4.8 Gender and GBV

Gender issues receive limited attention in IFRC planning documents and reports. and was

only mentioned occasionally in interviews conducted for the RTE. This is somewhat in

contrast to the 2011 MENA Civil Unrest RTE, which was positive about the handling of

gender issues, at least for Tunisia.

The fact that there is no longer a gender advisor in the MENA zone office may be a

contributing factor to the relative absence of gender analysis or programming. There are some

positive examples however. The current IFRC appeal for Syria contains the provision of

women’s emergency kits in Syria, as will the revised appeal for 2015, with distribution by

CBHFA volunteers, trained on GBV and reproductive health messages. PNS bilateral

assistance for Turkey is includes hygiene kits. Gender is reportedly being addressed as a cross

cutting issue in the Cash Transfer Programme in Jordan and in the CBHFA programme,

where the Secretariat and the JRC decided to recruit a gender balance cadre of volunteers for

the CBHFA programme. Gender focal points for the offices are members of a MENA Gender

Network. While the MENA Zone has no gender advisor, a senior officer continues to act.

Seminars/workshops conducted on gender related issues. However, attention to gender is not

consistent across the various country operations.

Measures to address Gender Based Violence (GBV) are hard to identify in IFRC appeals and

reports, while external reports make it clear that GBV is major issue in the crisis22. In Jordan,

funding has been allocated to GBV training, under CBHFA23. The latest EPOA for Lebanon

makes reference to SGBV and ‘intimate partner violence’ but includes no strategies to

address it. Overall there is little action on GBV.

4.9 Human Resources and the IFRC Culture

The RTE team noted that a proportion of Secretariat zone and country based international

staff are on short contracts, sometimes as little as a few months. Short-term appointments, and

gaps in filling posts reduce the effectiveness of the Secretariat’s engagement with the long-

21 No particular observations were made concerning security arrangements in Turkey. Security risks appear to be

lower than in Lebanon and Jordan but were reported to be increasing. Currently IFRC has only one delegate in

country. If this presence were increase, a separate security assessment would be justified. Superficially, security

arrangements at the office buildings visited in Ankara were generally more stringent than those in the other capital

cities visited 22 see for example, http://www.unicef.org/lebanon/emergency_8401.html; ‘Intimate partner violence, threat of

sexual violence, early marriage and survival sex are identified by adult women and adolescent girls as the main

forms of violence currently experienced by women and girls since arriving in Lebanon’. 23 The IFRC defines violence as: the use of force or power, either as an action or omission in any setting,

threatened, perceived or actual against oneself, another person, a group, a community that either results in or has a

high likelihood of resulting in death, physical injury, psychological or emotional harm, mal-development or

deprivation.


10

term crisis, and the long-term capacity development approach the Secretariat is pursuing with

the HNS requires delegates to be in post for an extended period in order to build credibility

and trust. Delegates also require fuller technical briefings and handover than they typically

receive.

The RTE team was struck by how much the morale of interviewees varied from being

energised by particular interventions on one hand, to disempowered and disappointed that the

Secretariat had not lived up to the challenge of the Syria crisis, on the other.

Both the PNS and HNS observed that the quality of Secretariat staff/delegates was very

variable. The HNS are only interested in receiving more delegates with high levels of

technical skill and experience, with an appropriate, culturally attuned attitude.

Representing the IFRC and managing the relationship with NS that allows the IFRC to

support but also influence in a tactful, constructive way requires wisdom, interpersonal skills,

and knowledge of the RCRC at a high level. As the crisis continues for several years to come,

the IFRC will need to continue to look across its networks to ensure a continuity of quality

leadership that can manage these relationships. There is also a case for better codification and

training for how to manage the IFRC representative–HNS senior leadership relationship,

which is perhaps, the critical IFRC-HNS relationship.

4.10 Humanitarian Diplomacy

The goals of the IFRC’s Humanitarian Diplomacy (HD) Policy include influencing decision

makers to address the interests of vulnerable people and maintaining the public visibility of

the RCRC24.

To boost its effort in HD, the MENA Zone recently appointed an HD coordinator into the

Syria crisis team. According to the Job Description, the purpose of the position is to ‘ensure

greater value to membership and enhance Red Cross Red Crescent coordinated response in a

complex operation…’.

The highly sensitive environment in and around Syria places restrictions on what public

statements from the RCRC can say, in order to avoid compromising the HNS, or its

beneficiaries and volunteers. Even so, the IFRC and the ICRC have been active in increasing

the visibility of the RCRC and, in particular, promoting the neutral role of the SARC in the

Syria crisis, using press releases and other briefings, which has been seen as successful both

internally and by UN partners. A number of PNS have been very active in promoting the

Syria crisis at home, and have raised its public profile and funds.

The SARC would like to see the IFRC play a more intensive and strategically planned role in

Humanitarian Diplomacy. Overall, the IFRC has placed more emphasis on the Movement

actors and less on promoting the interests of the 13 million people made vulnerable by the

crisis, which should become the core of the communications strategy from here on.

4.11 Reporting and Information products

In response to demands for up-to-date information on the progress and impact of response

activities, challenges and opportunities experienced in the field, the MENA Zone have

developed a number of information products in addition to the regular Operations Updates,

including ‘Facts and Figures’, key messages, ‘Who does What Where and When (4Ws)’, and

24 The six HD goals of the HD policy are: 1) More frequent consideration by decision makers and opinion leaders

of the interests of vulnerable people; 2) Greater access to and influence with decision makers; 3) Greater

humanitarian access and space for National Societies and the International Federation; 4) Strong visibility for and

public understanding of Red Cross and Red Crescent activities; 5) Stronger capacity to mobilise all relevant

resources; and 6) facilitation of effective partnerships when responding to the needs of the vulnerable.


11

infographic presentation of an overview of the Movement’s response in MENA Zone, plus

Turkey. MENA Zone office is unique amongst zone offices in having an information

management officer and has made a significant effort to improve the presentation of

information from the Syria crisis countries.

For Syria, information is collected from SARC information management officers and

consolidated into monthly reports by SARC. This information contains data on IFRC

supported items as well as data from all other SARC partner agencies. For the other countries,

the respective reporting delegates compile reports using information from the NS.

Some NS and IFRC country offices expressed concern that information they provide can get

stuck at zone level and may only appear in reports well after it is useful, sometimes months

later. Operations Updates as a standard are only produced quarterly, and by start December

2014 the latest 4Ws infographic on the IFRC Syria-crisis site covered data from January to

April. The Secretariat is aware that more needs to done to improve the timeliness and

regularity of data.

Users of the infographics find their presentation eye-catching and useful to a point. They also

said that they need more management information on trends, developments and obstacles.

One Geneva based interviewee stated that, in the absence of a technical counterpart in the

MENA Zone office, technical updates had to be taken from public Operations Updates.

4.12 Movement Wide Initiatives

4.12.1 Movement Wide Communications

After a slow start, communicators from across the Movement have made a considerable effort

to improve the RCRC communication on the Syria Crisis, resulting in a ‘Joint Movement

Communication Strategy for the Syria Crisis’ adopted in November 2013. Alongside the

strategic and tactical objectives25, the strategy aims to increase the joint production of written,

audio-visual and other public communication materials and on joint activities.

Progress has not been achieved without challenges, firstly to change perspective from

focusing on RCRC positioning to the issues of the affected population. This in turn requires

data on the needs of the population. In a progress report on Syria crisis communications to the

MAP meeting in Beirut 2013, a series of challenges was listed, amongst them the requirement

to improve communications and data gathering capacities within the NS, harmonizing and

improving data collection and statistics from Movement components and improved common

analyses and positions on key humanitarian issues of shared concern. The HNS in the region

have not been used to generating such analysis.

Much of the communications strategy remains to be implemented. The segmentation of

different audiences, the messages they are to receive, how they will be reached, and by whom

is not well developed. This would be a valuable addition to the IFRC’s forward planning for

the Syria crisis at a time when public interest and funding are at risk of flagging.

A further advance in Movement wide communication has taken place with the recent launch

of the www.redforsyria.org website, which aims to reflect the contributions of all Movement

actors to the Syria crisis response.

25 1. Increase public awareness of the humanitarian impact of the Syria crisis. 2. Position the Movement as the

leading and most effective humanitarian responder to the crisis. 3. Enhance the Movement’s influence on

unimpeded and safe access to those most in need. 4. Develop the Movement’s communication and advocacy

around the increasing humanitarian needs of Syrians who have fled Syria and their host communities. 5. Project an

external image of a strong, united and global humanitarian movement speaking with one voice.

http://www.redforsyria.org/


12

4.12.2 The Common Narrative

The MAP meeting of December 2012 established a small working group of IFRC Secretariat,

ICRC, Netherlands and German RC representatives to work on the development of the paper

for a Common Narrative. The Syria crisis common narrative was one of the first joint

communications on the priorities, focus and activities of the Movement to a specific crisis26 in

recent years. The narrative aimed to capture the totality of all Movement actors in each

country.

The first issue of the common narrative was published in July 2013, and with some difficulty.

Figures to be included had to be negotiated, and it was not possible to agree text on operations

strategies or advocacy messages beyond the need for recognition of the unique role of the

Movement, with consequent delays in publication27. There have been only two updates to the

common narrative since the original. RTE informants supported the idea of a common

narrative but found its practical value limited because information was not kept up to date.

4.12.3 Movement wide reporting

To construct an overview and improve communication of the Movement’s overall response to

the Syria Crisis, the MAP decided to introduce Movement wide reporting. While IFRC-wide

reporting has been adopted for other contexts (Haiti), the joint effort with the ICRC, and the

multi-country nature of the reporting are new elements.

There has been limited success in Movement wide reporting. One of the challenges has been

to give due acknowledgement to the individual parties within a document which reports

achievements only at Movement wide level. The recent mini-MAP meeting decided to revive

the concept using Lebanon as a pilot.

While the concept paper behind movement-wide reporting focused on the agreement of

common indicators, movement wide reporting is only likely to become consistent when it has

to report on movement-wide goals and targets. The partners will only have sufficient

incentive to contribute information to the corporate progress when there are jointly held

objectives to work towards. These do not yet exist but should be made to emerge from the

MAP-led movement wide country planning process.

The MENA Zone 4Ws database provides a detailed mapping of activities of all movement

partners, except ICRC, and has been used as the source for the 4Ws-infographic mentioned

above. The value this vast collection of information is reduced because it is not complete, and

in any case, the 4W process does not ask for financial data, which would be required for the

most meaningful reporting of movement wide activity.

5 Discussion

5.1 Models of IFRC Support


A dominating feature of the Syria crisis response, and the part played in it by the Secretariat,

are competing sets of assumptions about how the IFRC as whole should respond to the crisis.

There are strong differences of opinion about the approach to be taken within and between

HNS, PNS, and the Secretariat.

26 The common narrative covers Syria and the surrounding countries. 27 By the time of this evaluation the latest issue of the common narrative (March 2014) was more than 6 months

old (of March 2014).


13

In the first model, all parts of the Movement are mobilised to mount a response that comes as

close as possible to meeting the humanitarian needs of the populations affected, in those

sectors in which the IFRC is competent. The end goal is the maximum assistance to the

maximum number of people affected, in coordination with other actors, leading to an exit

when needs decline. (In conflict settings, ICRC would coordinate any PNS contributions in

cooperation with the HNS).

In the second model, National Society capacity and intentions determine the IFRC response.

Parallel responses mounted by other actors of the IFRC are not considered and are not seen as

appropriate. The IFRC response is scaled to fit within the capacity of the HNS, while, as far

as possible, working to expand the response capacity of HNS, according to the wishes of

HNS leadership. The end goal is gradual, sustainable growth in HNS capacity, including for

the crisis response.

In reality, no part of the IFRC engaged in the Syria crisis is working purely to one model or

the other. However, the clear emphasis is on the second of the two models, which has

profoundly affected many aspects of how the HNS, IFRC Secretariat and PNS have

responded, and will affect the IFRC response into the future. The table below illustrates the

key differences in the two approaches

Function

Required for an ‘at

scale’ response?

Required for response

based on HNS

capacity?

Country-wide, multi sector needs assessment Yes No

Analysis of driving forces behind the conflict Yes No

Overarching strategic RCRC approach Yes No

Mapping of other organisation activities and resources Yes No

Analysis of service gaps Yes At local level

Determination of RCRC competence to close gaps Yes Limited

Coordination with organisations in same sectors Yes Partial

Reporting of gaps Yes No

Regional strategy for RCRC response Yes No – HNS lead strategy

Advocacy with government Yes No

Advocacy with HCT Yes No

5.2 Applying the Lead Agency Concept

While the Seville Agreement of 1997 represented a major step forward in delineating the

Movement Lead Agency for conflicts and major disasters, the simple delineation of roles

between the IFRC and the ICRC for whole countries has been modified for a number of cases,

especially where the emergency is part conflict, part disaster (eg Pakistan, Philippines).

Where no Lead Agency has been designated, for example, in Lebanon, but conflict pertains in

parts of the country, the ICRC and IFRC take on different tasks.

The Syria crisis has tested the SA/SM28; ‘We are in uncharted waters’. With regard to the

conflict in Syria, the SARC is formally the Lead Agency, in part because of the government

decision to give SARC responsibility for the oversight of all foreign assistance. In the

neighbouring countries, the HNS have the lead by default. The ICRC carries out activities

according to its mandate, and provides significant financial and technical support to the

SARC, LRC and JRC to increase their response capacity, which overlaps with the IFRC’s

capacity building activities.

28 Seville Agreement and its Supplementary Measures


14

As a result, the clean delineation of roles set out in SA/SM has not been applied, and there has

been considerable discussion, some of it uneasy, between Movement partners about who

should be doing what. For some RTE informants, ‘Seville is dead’ and it is time to pilot new

creative alternatives, or interpretations of the SA/SM. However, the SA/SM remain in force

until the current SMCC process determines whether and how to change them. Whatever the

delineation of roles on paper, for the Syria crisis, the political reality is that the HNS are in

control (or ‘sovereign’) and act according to their preferences, within the mandates

designated to them in their auxiliary role to governments, and the resources available.

5.3 Secretariat management of the Syria Crisis response

The RTE received widespread positive comment about the contribution of the Secretariat, in

partnership with PNS, in assisting SARC to develop its capacity, both before and during the

Syria crisis response. The SARC itself sees the Secretariat as a close partner, while also

acknowledging the major support of the ICRC. At the same time, many interviewees

expressed concern that that the IFRC Secretariat did not move quickly enough to offer some

organising framework for the various parts of the IFRC membership to work together in

support of the various HNS.

The capacity of the MENA Zone office to manage the Syria crisis operations has grown

considerably in recent months, as it has added the so-called 'Syria Crisis team', expanded the

'Syria team'; and added a Lebanon Operations Manager position from June this year29. (See

Figure 1 below). The RTE team found some confusion within and beyond these teams on the

respective roles and responsibilities of the Syria team and Syria crisis team30. The MENA

Zone office should issue a written communication on the respective roles and responsibilities

of the Syria team and Syria crisis team, to clarify how they relate to each other, if it has not

already done so.

The need to strengthen the structure has been evident for at least the last 18 months and it is

difficult to unpick the precise reasons for the delay in doing, given the varying narratives on

the matter, but they lie somewhere between a lack of funding, lack of strategic planning to

justify the proposed structures, and a lack of response to vacancy announcements.

Europe Zone office, with its smaller part of the operation, did not scale up its structure in

response to the crisis, apart from sending one delegate to Turkey. The one-person zonal

Disaster Management Unit appears rather stretched but is managing and no particular

concerns were brought up regarding the Europe zone office’s capacity to manage its support

to the Syria crisis response.

For Geneva HQ, the lack of a large, scaled-up response in Jordan and Lebanon needed serious

attention, while for the MENA Zone office, the goal has been to support HNS capacity to

develop from its current level. Even now, there is no resolution between the two approaches.

(See also Annex 9).

The Geneva Secretariat HQ has tried more than once to create a ‘hub’ for the management of

the Syria crisis. The Secretariat HQ proposed that the hub be located at HQ, according to the

draft SOPs for response to the largest disasters, and also made proposals for scaling up the

crisis response, including through a ‘master plan’ (a plan was drafted in 2013). Neither of

these proposals found with the zone offices, however.

29 Oddly, having now strengthened the structure, the MENA Zone office is receiving some criticism for having too

much resource devoted to the Syria crisis compared with the other countries in the zone. 30 .For example, does the Syria crisis team have a decision making role with regard to Syria itself and what is the

relationship between the Federation Representative and the head of the Syria crisis team, who have a different

reporting lines.


15

Given the scale of the crisis, the gaps in some of the Movement’s crisis response and

unresolved HQ-zone positions on future direction, deserve the direct intervention and

leadership of the IFRC Secretary-General, at least until strategic direction for the Secretariat’s

role in the crisis has been confirmed as it is, or has been reset.

Some PNS are frustrated by what they see as a lack of ‘leadership’ from the Secretariat in the

Syria crisis, while, in the region, both the Secretariat and the PNS themselves at country level

are primarily in the mode of following the requests of the HNS. (See also the Model A/Model

B discussion in Annex 9 and Secretariat Leadership Annex 10).

The MENA Zone office needs to regain the confidence of some of the PNS and HNS, and to

gain the confidence of the non-traditional PNS, including by leading the implementation of

the regional recommendations set out in Section 731. In time, this would attract greater human

and financial resources either to the IFRC Appeal or by placement of delegates with the Zone

office. At the same time, the MENA zone office deserves to be allocated more core resources

to make the core zone structure more stable, given the scale of the current and potential crises

in the zone.

The MENA Zone Office is currently undertaking a strategic planning exercise using an

external consultant. Ideally, this exercise will include a 3-5 year DM development strategy

for the countries of the Zone. It is essential that this exercise takes into account the findings

of this evaluation, including:

The nature of the leadership the HNS and PNS expect from the Secretariat (see

Annex 10)

How to maintain sufficient human resources to support the Syria crisis operation,

while at the same time providing the rest of the Zone with the support it requires.

Engaging Geneva HQ on how to address the general under-resourcing of the Zone

Office compared with the current and possible future scale of crises in the zone.

Several staff in the MENA Zone office felt that there was a need for more information sharing

in the office. There did not appear to be regular meetings or platforms for internal

information exchange and coordination for the staff concerned with Syria Crisis response32.

The MENA and Europe Zone office disaster management coordinators have kept in touch

informally during the crisis but there is no formal coordination between the two zone offices.

With most of the attention focused on the MENA Zone office, Europe zone office has often

been left out of discussions. In particular, it is not part of the MAP steering committee.

Information flow between the country - zone – HQ levels needs to be improved. Staff are not

sufficiently aware of what is happening at the other levels and gaps in communication risk

fragmentation, both actual and perceived. Regular regional coordination meetings are

required, including Turkey and the Europe Zone Office33.

31 At least, those recommendations accepted by management in the Management Response 32 Some staff have themselves introduced informal coffee talk in the cafeteria to keep each other informed. 33 a simple step towards improved internal information would be to update the office structures shown in the

FedNet, to help readers understand the zonal organization and the appropriate contact persons.


16

Figure 1 - Extract from the Organisation Chart for the Secretariat MENA Zone office, for the Syria Crisis

Operation team for neighbouring countries and the Syria team

5.4 Secretariat Role Definition

The roles and responsibilities of Geneva versus the zones has been debated since the Zone

structure was created in 2007. The Haiti RTE highlighted the challenges to effective

Secretariat disaster management presented by the decentralised structure. The Syria crisis

response has been affected by continuing uncertainties over the respective roles and

responsibilities of the Secretariat HQ and the Zone offices following decentralisation. Even

though the issue is well known, the IFRC Secretariat leadership has not addressed the issue of

how the zone and HQ work together optimally.

Secretariat zone offices and country representatives are better attuned to the country context

and the capacities and wishes of the HNS than is the Geneva Secretariat. Almost three years

into the conflict, whether this has led to a better response overall is a moot point.

In the case of the Syria crisis, many disaster management and other technical staff in Geneva

HQ have felt out of touch with the response. It is likely that the technical capacity of HQ has

not been made the best use of during the crisis. Greater use could be made of Geneva

Secretariat HQ advisers, especially for technical sectors where there is no or limited capacity

in the Zone or country offices.

Behind the HQ-Zone sense of dislocation lies a more important question, namely: ‘What job

exactly, is the IFRC Secretariat in the zone and country there to perform during a major

crisis? The zone office is walking a fine line, especially in this region, between the more

passive role of responding to the requests of the HNS, and, as the PNS and Secretariat HQ


17

expect, playing both a facilitation, coordination, advisory role, as well as a ‘challenge’

function, where needed, so that the crisis response can reach the most beneficiaries possible.

There is no clear idea of what Secretariat ‘leadership’ means in this region, at least, not one

shared across the IFRC. The Secretariat management has not acted to clarify it and the HNS

and PNS concerned have not requested a clarification from the IFRC Secretariat.

5.5 Resourcing for the Zone Offices

The RTE team was told severally by the MENA Zone Office that there was a lack of

resources, financial and human, to provide stronger support to the crisis response. There are

several factors at play:

Reportedly, the MENA Zone office is under-resourced with core resources, compared

with other zone offices and considering the humanitarian caseload and unrest in the

region34. A number of posts in the zone office are directly supported by individual PNS.

It has taken time to assemble a team (or teams) with sufficient capacity dedicated to the

Syria crisis. It has taken more than a year to fill the post of Syria crisis coordinator. By

the time of the RTE visits, it was too early to tell the impact of the enlargement of the

Syria team and Syria crisis teams.

There are still key gaps in the MENA zone office. There are Secretariat health delegates

in Jordan and Syria but there is no Regional Health Delegate, an important gap that needs

to be closed. The zone Disaster Management Coordinator left the post in October and the

post is yet to be advertised.

Responsibility for the management of the Secretariat’s contribution to the Syria crisis

response has lain squarely with the MENA and Europe Zone offices. Yet, in the early stages

of the response, the MENA Zone office was left under-resourced, and in transition from

Amman to Beirut when key decisions about the IFRC response were being made. The

leadership of the IFRC crisis response was left squarely with the zone offices, probably too

much so, given the huge scale of the crisis that unfolded and the need to engage resources

from across the RCRC network, whatever the designated role of the Zone offices under the

decentralised model.

5.6 Regional versus country planning and appeals

Until recently, the IFRC Appeals for the Syria crisis were 3-fold: 1) Syria, 2) Turkey, and 3)

Regional (for Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon). Revised appeals have recently been prepared on a

country basis, not regional. Whether to have regional or country appeals has been the subject

of debate, and not all are happy with the decision for country appeals. The country approach

allows more control of resource at the country level and recognises the great variation

between country contexts, the HNS, and operational needs. It is generally agreed that country

level planning is required but not all agree that this should have been translated to country

level appeals. It is not yet clear how back-donors will respond to country-by-country appeals.

There is certainly a case for presenting an IFRC (and if possible, Movement) wide approach

to crisis as a whole. Donors do not expect the same activities across all countries but, rather,

that the RCRC presents a regional strategy for themes that are common across the countries

(for example, the potential for civil unrest in countries with major refugee influx), and

coordinated action amongst IFRC partners in response. Simply assembling country plans into

one document will not achieve this. It is not a matter, therefore, of regional versus country

plans but regional and country plans.

34 The two zone offices interviewed were concerned that the Secretariat in Geneva is growing in size, rather than

resources going to equip the zones and countries.


18

The MAP process should deliver, latest by May/June 201535, a regional presentation and

chapeau that brings all the country plans into a cogent whole, and with resources for regional

coordination and communications activities also specified.

5.7 Global Disaster Response Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

The Secretariat has developed draft SOPs for the categorisation of disasters (yellow, orange,

red), and for the decision-making structures and the procedures to be followed at various

stages of the response according to severity. The SOPs have been in late draft stage for more

than a year. The RTE team understands that it has not been possible to agree the SOPs

because of the question of who is in charge of Secretariat management of the response –

Geneva HQ or the Zone – for the most severe disasters. The zone directors do not accept that

Geneva HQ should take the lead role in the management of the Syria crisis response, which

would certainly be classified as ‘Red’ under the SOPs, ie an ‘organisation-wide priority’.

Some RTE informants consider that if the SOPs had been in place for the Syria crisis, the

IFRC response would have been more effective. It might be true that via the specific actions

and timelines set out in the draft SOPs, a faster and more systematically managed IFRC

response would have resulted but on the question of ‘who leads’, the SOPs, as drafted, would

probably not have helped. The cumbersome mechanism proposed in the draft SOPs36 for

making this decision would probably mean delay and internal debate, as per the Syria crisis,

instead of a rapid and clear decision being reached on the locus of Secretariat leadership.

The RTE team proposes instead that the Secretary-General should make the decision on

leadership based on the advice of senior manages from the zone and HQ, and issue a written

instruction valid for a set period.

5.8 Maintaining resources for the Syria crisis response

The Secretariat is concerned that funding for the Syria crisis may decline. Most humanitarian

agencies report funding shortfalls for Syria and surrounding countries, with predications of

further shortfalls in 2015. WFP, in particular, signalled likely significant shortfalls for 2015.

The recent Ebola crisis has drawn off attention and funding and there are other major

emergencies to be addressed. However, there are still donor groups trying to keep Syria on

the agenda and as one informant put it, ‘there is still money out there for Syria for

organisations that know how to get it’37.

From now on, the IFRC may need to split its fundraising strategies for Syria and the

neighbouring countries. Syria itself continues as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and

as such should continue to be funded from humanitarian budgets. For the neighbouring

countries, however, the IFRC should look more widely to both humanitarian and development

funding. The donor focus in these countries will be on resilience, and perhaps on conflict

reduction. Humanitarian funding for these countries may decline. The HNS need help to

access new funding sources, which could be reflected in a IFRC resource mobilisation

strategy for the region.

35 This seems a long way off but given that country plans are not due to be completed before March 2015 under

the MAP process, it is not realistic to expect a high quality regional presentation before May/June. 36 If the Zone determines the level of the disaster, as the SOPs propose, it is likely that the Zone will find reasons

to classify the emergency in a way that Geneva should not lead. The current proposal includes convening a Senior

Management Adjudication Body (p8) if the USG Programme Services disagrees with the Zone decision. This

overcomplicates the matter. 37 For example, on October 28 2014, 40 countries and international bodies adopted a declaration saying donors

would “mobilize for years to come” increased development support (ie from development budgets) to help

Lebanon and Jordan shoulder the impact of millions of Syrian refugees, with Germany announcing 500 million

euros for 2015-2017.


19

The IFRC’s resource mobilisation networks should research the potential for accessing

development funds. Typically, development funders (that is the development departments of

the normal back-donors) require higher standards in terms of assessments, plans, funding

proposals and reports. The advantage is that funds can be secured for 2-3 years at a time,

instead of short-term humanitarian financing.

In theory, there should be considerable potential for more funding via the Gulf National

Societies to the Syria crisis response, if not for Syria itself, then for the neighbouring

countries. However, at the moment, most financial resources from the Gulf States go from

government-government, or to the UN. The IFRC Secretary General has recently signed a

Memorandum of Understanding with the Saudi Red Crescent, which may pave the way for

specific investments. The Secretariat at MENA Zone and Geneva levels should continue to

work, in support of the IFRC Regional Representative, to create more meaningful

partnerships with Gulf NS. (see also 4.6.3)

The HNS would appreciate and benefit from Secretariat support to develop their fundraising

strategies for continuing humanitarian services for this crisis, going well beyond the IFRC

appeals. The resource mobilisation ‘map’ is complicated with many different donors, with

varying interests and conditions, a world that the HNS in the region have limited exposure to.

There is potential for the IFRC to play a high value added bridging/liaison role between HNS

and donors (not just PNS). As one example, the TRC would welcome assistance with how to

engage with the World Bank. Given the scale of the funding that will be needed, this

investment is certainly justified.

5.9 Capacity Development

The Secretariat has been providing various forms of training for the HNS of the region, in

particular Regional and National Disaster Response Training. The HNS appreciate these

events, although there does not seem to be an assessment of the effectiveness of these

resource intensive training events.

In Syria reporting, information management and communications have all been a prominent

part of NS capacity building, Monthly country-wide reports for all SARC partners beyond

IFRC (including INGOs and UN) as well as in information management and communications

products (available on SARC website/Facebook). PNS capacity building efforts have

targeted other areas.

The documents for the three Federation appeals did not distinguish between capacity building

and adding extra capacity. For example, provision of fuel for vehicles, or paying salaries for

staff is listed as ‘capacity building’. While such actions add temporary capacity, they do not

strengthen the organisation. In interviews, all parts of the Movement stated that they were

engaged in capacity building. Capacity building38 equips the organisation to improve its

financial or technical capacity and to strengthen the structures, decision-making or

governance.

For the Syria crisis, the Secretariat could usefully strengthen the links between disaster

management capacity building for HNS and the regular NS development processes. In

particular, Step 1 self-assessment stage of the Organisational Capacity Assessment and

Certification (OCAC) has been undertaken by JRC and LRC in recent years, with, reportedly,

good facilitation from the MENA Zone office and Geneva Secretariat. It is remarkable that

the OCAC process does not include an assessment of the disaster management capacity of the

38 Some other organisations find ‘capacity development’ a less patronising term


20

National Society, even though this is a fundamental role of every NS. The OCAC should

cover disaster management39.

As part of achieving Movement wide country planning for the region, it would be helpful for

the IFRC to have a common understanding of what capacity building means (ideally also with

ICRC). The RTE team was not able to locate a concise IFRC definition of capacity building.

5.10 United Nations response and planning

There has been some heart-searching during the Syria crisis that, especially in Lebanon and

Jordan, the IFRC has been ‘upstaged’ by the UN and has lost ground and room to operate as a

result. Certainly, the UN response is larger in all countries than the RCRC response, and in

some the UN and RCRC response are closely connected, especially in food assistance.

By the end of 2014, the UN will release two 2015 plans for the Syria crisis:

An ‘All-of-Syria’ plan including assistance provided from within in Syria and cross-

border operations40

A Regional Refugee Response and Resilience Plan (‘3RP’41), covering Lebanon,

Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt. This plan will be close to final by the time this RTE

is complete and should prove a reference document for the MAP planning process.

The TOR raises the question of why, if the UN is following a whole-of-region approach, why

is the IFRC pursuing a country approach. The 3RP will have separate country chapters, but

also a regional overview, so, the difference between the UN and the IFRC planning

approaches may not be as great as might first appear, if the MAP planning process includes

both country plans and a regional overview.

Following the UN Security Council Resolution 2165 in July 2014, the UN is gearing up for

cross border operations at four crossing points from neighbouring countries into Syria. There

seemed little enthusiasm from informants for the RCRC to participate in these operations and

the Federation does not seem to have taken a position on the issue.

5.11 External Coordination


Beyond the Movement, the most important partners for the IFRC to coordinate with are the

UN agencies and INGOs. The IFRC has observer status in the Inter-Agency Standing

Committee (IASC) 42 , and hence also in the Humanitarian Country Team. The

HNS/Secretariat attendance at the HCT and the sector working groups or clusters under the

HCT was not consistent in any of the four countries reviewed. The IFRC could play a much

fuller role in such groups:

Explaining RCRC activities and advocating for its role

Influencing the approach and focus of the HCT, especially from a community

perspective

Contributing to needs assessment, analysis and strategy of the HCT, plus spotting

openings for new activities or partnerships.

39 Another Federation standard tool, the Cooperation Agreement Strategy, captures NS development needs and

partner inputs to capacity development39. There was no mention of CAS in any interviews for the RTE. If such

strategies exist, any elements relating to increasing the NS disaster and crisis management capacity should inform

the coming the MAP-led Country Plans. 40 as authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 2165 July 2014 41 for the 3RP, UNHCR and UNDP have signed an MOU concerning ‘complementary humanitarian and resilience

based development interventions’. A preview of the 3RP document was released on November 2 2014. See http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=1&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Type%5B%5D

=13 42 As does the ICRC

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=1&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Type%5B%5D=13

http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/documents.php?page=1&view=grid&Language%5B%5D=1&Type%5B%5D=13


21

In the offices visited, IFRC participants were not being briefed on how to prepare for and

exploit the humanitarian diplomacy opportunities these meetings provide. There did not seem

to be a vision for doing so. The Secretariat needs to clarify for its staff and the PNS what the

observer role means and how to be more effective in inter-agency forums, which some see as

low priority when faced with other pressures of work. This is an important missed

opportunity for influence, and for learning.

The evaluation found specific examples of IFRC contributions to sector working groups43. In

Jordan, the health delegate contributes actively to the health sector working group, and chairs

the Community Based Health Task Group. In Lebanon, various PNS take part in working

groups, in particular those designated by the LRC as lead for a particular sector. (Even so, a

number of PNS may attend the same working group without having first coordinated their

inputs.)

6 Conclusions

6.1 Strategic decisions for the IFRC

Regarding the Syria crisis, the IFRC faces a number of strategic decisions for the immediate

future. These are

1. How to scale up the IFRC crisis response in affected countries

2. How to maintain the profile of the Syria crisis as the world’s worst (and deteriorating)

crisis today, including highlighting the plight of the more than the 13 million affected.

3. How to bring the important MAP planning process to a successful, practical

conclusion by March 2015.

6.2 The crisis response has been strong but variable in scale

The SARC operation inside Syria, supported by the IFRC and the ICRC, has given itself and

the Movement strong credibility for the regional response as a whole. SARC has risen to the

challenge of expanding its services, reaching perhaps 3 million people each month, its

increased strength based in part on pre-crisis investments in capacity development by IFRC

Secretariat and a few PNS. In Turkey, the TRC has responded strongly and at scale to the

needs of refugees in camps, although a very small proportion of its resources have come

through the RCRC network.

In Lebanon, the LRC emergency medical services are highly respected and have provided the

bulk of the ambulance services during the crisis. In both Lebanon and Jordan other service

areas, especially cash and non-cash relief, appear to be at a scale well below that of the needs,

although the IFRC has limited documentation of existing gaps.

There has been discussion during the RTE about how different the IFRC response would have

been if the crisis had been disaster related rather than conflict related. Challenges related to

security, access and obtaining visas have all been worse than would be typical for a disaster

situation but the capacity and ambition of the HNS has been much more influential over the

shape of the IFRC response than whether the crisis is conflict or disaster-related.

6.3 Conflicting assumptions have weakened the IFRC approach

Various parts of the IFRC have found themselves conflicted over the Syria crisis response.

The Zone offices and delegations have taken as their starting point the tailoring of the scale of

the response to the capacity of the HNS, while supporting, and sometimes urging the HNS,

towards a greater response capacity. The option of maximising the response by adding

parallel but coordinated IFRC capacity alongside the HNS has yet to be fully explored. The

43 Sector working groups are more informal than the HCT. The ‘observer’ role is not as relevant and to intents and

purpose the HNS, PNS and Federation participants can consider themselves on a par with other participants.


22

Secretariat has not succeeded in providing a middle way that respects the role of the HNS,

while delivering significant additional response capacity in parallel to the HNS, using the

Secretariat and the PNS. This is where the Secretariat could and should be exercising

leadership.

6.4 The MAP process is important and should be supported strongly

The MAP has provided political momentum for the Movement partners to improve movement

wide cooperation and coordination for the Syria crisis response, even if some of the past MAP

meetings have been ineffective. With the establishment of the MAP Steering Group and the

first ‘mini-MAP’ meeting, some progress is being made towards Movement-wide country

planning, communication and reporting and there is a new determination of the IFRC

Secretariat and the ICRC to improve cooperation between the two organisations. The MAP

process needs wider communication of the intended process and outcomes.

The MAP has considerable potential to improve RCRC strategy, planning, coordination,

communication, external presentation of the response, and resource mobilisation, and should

therefore be well supported. The next six months is crucial. If the process fails, it may be

hard to revive. At first sight, the new IFRC appeal totals for Lebanon and Jordan reflect the

MAP Steering group decision for a 50% increase in activity, with, taking an average monthly

budget compared between new and previous appeals, a 152% increase for Lebanon and 147%

for Jordan.

To be somewhat comparable, and able to add up to a regional presentation of the Movement

response, country plans need a basic, agreed common structure with a common core, even if

plans differ in detail in other respects. The MAP process will need to both support the

development of the movement wide country plans and continue to support and track their

implementation.

6.5 IFRC planning needs improvement

(See also Annex 13)

IFRC planning tools need updating given that they have evolved relatively little since 2000.

In terms of the understanding of what makes for quality humanitarian response, the IFRC

may have lost ground relative to other actors. RCRC assessments and plans need to reflect a

more thorough analysis below the headline numbers. Appeals and EPOAs need better

analysis of needs by age, gender, disability, rural versus urban needs etc, and better developed

strategies for addressing these needs, especially now that the crisis has moved beyond

emergency response, at least in the neighbouring countries. Investing in quality

improvements in these areas could pay significant dividends in terms of donor support.

The MAP movement wide country planning process has the potential to provide improved

strategy for the Syria crisis over a 3-year term, increased financial resources, better alignment

of Movement actors, consensus on the way forward between HQ, region and country levels

and greater trust and cooperation between the Secretariat and ICRC. Given this potential,

every effort should be taken to ensure the MAP process succeeds.

6.6 The IFRC needs a way to predict response capacity

The IFRC should have known the likely scale of the response to the Syria crisis by the

relevant HNS but, it appears, did not. For the IFRC to have a predictable response in any

country, it needs a system to match likely National Society response with the likely crisis

impact, and then plan how other Movement partners, including the ICRC for conflict-related

crises, can provide additional response capacity. Without such a process, the IFRC will find

itself mounting responses of unknown speed, scale and sector focus. It cannot afford to start a

debate over how Movement partners should respond when the crisis has already begun.


23

6.7 Partner National Society bilateral assistance is set to increase

PNS pressure and persuasion has been a factor in the HNS gradually opening up to more

bilateral assistance. The PNS themselves acknowledge that they have mixed motives, in part

to see more assistance to going to affected people, but also wishing to increase their presence,

influence and visibility in ‘responding’ to the Syria crisis (even if it is the HNS that are

responding, not the PNS). The PNS preferences for bilateral and consortium style PNS

activities are likely to continue or increase, relative to multilateral funding.

6.8 Resource Mobilisation has had some success but needs to adjust

The three current appeals for the Syria crisis have been somewhat underfunded but have

similar percentage coverage levels to the UN appeals, in some cases better. Many informants

stated that resources will be tighter from here on, and all actors will need to be creative in

maintaining support and creating new openings. The IFRC may need to split its fundraising

strategies for Syria and the neighbouring countries. Syria itself continues as the world’s

largest humanitarian crisis and as such should continue to be funded from humanitarian

budgets. Emergency relief, health and other forms of support will be required in the medium

term.

For the neighbouring countries, however, the IFRC should look more widely to development

funding, for which IFRC emergency appeal documents will not be suited. The IFRC will

need to shift towards a resilience approach, to ensure that the most vulnerable avoid

destitution and host communities are not unfairly disadvantaged by the refugee influx. This

may mean the adoption of livelihoods and income generation approaches. Cash based

programmes have already shown their potential.

The HNS would appreciate and benefit from Secretariat support to develop their fundraising

strategies for the crisis going well beyond the IFRC appeals. Monitoring and reporting

systems, which have shown some recent improvements in HNS and the Secretariat, will need

to go on improving to maintain donor support in a competitive environment.

6.9 Innovations

The Syria crisis response has thrown up a number of new innovations. While these are

mentioned elsewhere in the report, a selection is assembled here:

The Movement wide initiatives on communications, reporting, and country planning

are all important, ambitious but common sense initiatives to present a more joined-up

view of RCRC action. These all have teething troubles and will require special effort

and leadership to become standard practice for major crisis.

The Emergency Plans of Action underpinning the new country appeals for Lebanon

and Jordan show a much more coordinated approach between Movement partners

than previous appeal documents, and themselves will contribute to the development

of movement wide country plans.

Europe and MENA zone offices have made efforts to include information on bilateral

activities into the Federation appeals, using different approaches: For Turkey,

bilateral budgets are included into the budget page of the appeal; for Lebanon, the

PNS plans are included into the narrative of the new appeal and are an integrated part

of the overall plan; for the regional appeal and for Syria, PNS contributions are

shown in the respective donors response pages. A combination of all these

approaches points the way forward for providing a more integrated HNS plan and

overview of IFRC-wide contributions.

Both SARC and TRC are operating successfully as major partners of WFP in food

assistance, a new departure for NS in the region. It would be worth at some stage

organizing a joint reflection with WFP on how well this arrangement has worked and

what lessons can be drawn from these partnerships.


24

MENA zone office has invested in its capacity to produce graphical presentations of

information regarding the Syria crisis response, including Turkey, which was

generally welcomed. This approach could be used to good effect by other zones,

bearing in mind that these infographics are not a substitute for management

information reports.

For Turkey, the Secretariat has taken the initiative before any other organization to

commission a translation of the Sphere Handbook into Turkish.

In Jordan, the IFRC health delegate chairs the inter-agency community health task

force, with the French RC acting as co-chair, a good example of the RCRC offering

inter-agency leadership.

Also in Jordan, the JRC has recruited equal numbers of male and female volunteers

for its CBHFA programme, one of few explicit attempts to ensure gender balance in

the regional crisis response.

Various European NS have shown themselves adept at forming consortia, sometimes

with Secretariat involvement, to obtain funds from ECHO, one of the most important

funding sources for this crisis. In most cases, this has improved collaboration

between these NS, drawing on the strengths of the consortium partners, and has been

undertaken in coordination with the HNS concerned. (This is not an endorsement of

consortia, rather a recognition of the initiative and cooperation shown).

In Lebanon, the LRC has initiated a system of lead PNS for specific sectors, helping

to coordinate the activities of other PNS. While certainly innovative, this is only a

‘half-way house’ towards a rationalization of PNS activity and presence in Lebanon

with regard to the Syria crisis.

6.10 Comparisons with other RTEs

The RTE reports for Pakistan, Haiti and the MENA Civil Unrest Operation have been

reviewed with a view to identifying common themes from those evaluations that also resonate

with this RTE. It appears that the issues are persistent and still need attention:

Haiti

The need for more flexible design for ERU deployments

Strategic planning should come before delegate (i.e. HR) planning

PNS should harmonise salaries for the same country/location

The need to strengthen induction for delegates

HQ and Zone should agree strategic directions

Increasing interaction with non RC actors

PNS to work in a concerted approach, not individually

Increase expertise on livelihoods and cash grants

Systematic inclusion of GBV in response plans

Pakistan

Resolve communications issues between Zone and Geneva offices

Assess (and, by implication, improve) the needs assessment capacity of HNS and the

Secretariat

Collect and analyse information in a timely way

MENA population movement

Ensuring adequate MENA Zone office capacity

Ensure assessments lead to common situation analysis

Agree a strategic framework that underpins the response actions of the Movement

Zones/Geneva HQ/PNS to develop a resource mobilisation strategy for the operation


25

7 Recommendations

7.1 Country specific recommendations

The IFRC Secretariat in Syria should:

11. Work with Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and other partners to improve

programme monitoring, in particular to resolve the SARC-WFP arrangements over

third party monitoring of food parcel distributions.

12. Support the SARC in its management of coordination meetings with INGOs active in

Syria to make sure that the constraints on the SARC are well understood and that

INGOs perspectives are taken into account, to help make these important

relationships work as well as possible.

13. Work with the SARC and the ICRC to agree a robust security protocol for foreign

delegates to replace the current unstructured security arrangements, including seeking

advice from the Zone security adviser and Geneva security section.

14. Support SARC in defining its capacity development needs for improved response, for

example strengthening through strategic planning, resource mobilisation or

international relations and, working with ICRC, identify high quality technical

support, which may mean looking beyond the RCRC network.

15. The MENA Zone office, in consultation with the Europe Zone office, should issue an

internal written communication to clarify the responsibilities of the respective Syria

crisis team and the Syria team, and how the two coordinate, to avoid any confusion or

overlap between Secretariat teams in the countries of the region.

16. The IFRC Secretariat Secretary-General should visit Damascus in the near future to

show support to the SARC and help cement Movement cooperation, as there has been

no S-G visit there since the start of the crisis44. (The RTE team understands that a

visit is planned.)

The IFRC Secretariat in Lebanon should:

17. Support the Lebanon RC in developing a strategy for a significant expansion of the

Syria crisis response, harnessing additional PNS operational capacity alongside LRC

implementation, with full LRC endorsement. The underlying principle is to continue

the progressive, long-term development of the LRC response capabilities, while other

National Societies mount short and medium term responses to acute needs not

covered by the LRC. The Secretariat should provide additional specialist

coordination and technical support over a period of months to make the scale-up

possible, according to the priorities for growth identified in the Lebanon Country

Plan being developed under the MAP process. Once agreed, this will require an

upward revision of the Lebanon Population Movement Emergency Appeal. (Shared

recommendation for Jordan and Lebanon).

18. Take a stronger lead in PNS coordination in Lebanon, as several of the PNS have

been requesting, and negotiate, in discussion with PNS and the LRC, a reduction in

the number of PNS present in Lebanon, to improve efficiency in the use of resources,

and reduce the coordination and hosting burden on the LRC. As a guide, the end

44 both the President and Director General of ICRC have visited Damascus.


26

result should be the operational presence in Lebanon45 of not more than 6 PNS

working on the Syria crisis response.

19. Clarify responsibilities and procedures for security (for example for evacuation). If

the LRC is established as having responsibility security for PNS and Secretariat

delegates, the Secretariat should make use of its international experience and standard

procedures to assist the LRC in adapting its systems to include expatriate

requirements.

The IFRC Secretariat in Jordan should:

20. Support the Jordan RC in developing a strategy for a significant expansion of the

Syria crisis response, harnessing additional PNS operational capacity alongside JRC

implementation, with full JRC endorsement. The underlying principle is to continue

the progressive, long-term development of the JRC response capabilities, while other

National Societies mount short and medium term responses to acute needs not

covered by the JRC. The Secretariat should provide additional specialist coordination

and technical support over a period of months to make the scale-up possible,

according to the priorities for growth identified in the Jordan Country Plan being

developed under the MAP process. Once agreed, this will require an upward revision

of the Jordan Population Movement Emergency Appeal. (Shared recommendation for

Jordan and Lebanon).

21. Work with the JRC to devise measures that will improve the confidence of partners in

the JRC as a partner. A programme of measures is required to improve financial

systems, and clearer and more formalised management structures and systems.

Donors will likely also require stronger monitoring processes as part of any

confidence building measures.

22. Develop a handover strategy for the Azraq camp hospital to be ready at latest 12

months before the PNS Hospital Consortium funding comes to an end.

23. Assist in the Movement’s country-level coordination meetings’ decision-making and

definition of specific action points through improved preparation and management of

meetings. JRC decision makers should be encouraged to attend. Attempts to bring in

to these meetings those Movement partners who attend on a less regular basis have

already born some fruit and should be continued.

The IFRC Secretariat in Turkey should:

24. The TRC receives very considerable funds from the Government of Turkey but these

do not allow the TRC to address the substantial unmet humanitarian needs of Syrians

across Turkey. The TRC aspires to raise funds from external donors and the World

Bank, just as other well-established NS do. Therefore, the Europe Zone Office, with

Geneva HQ support, should consider how it can provide high quality support to the

Turkish RC in the development of its resource mobilisation strategies (not just for the

Emergency Appeal), to increase its understanding of funding sources and donors, as it

seeks to diversify funding sources and partnerships.

25. Consider how to revive its ‘dormant’ status agreement with the Government of

Turkey to provide the IFRC with the tax and other benefits the agreement confers46.

45 Some PNS will continue to have a presence in Beirut to fulfill a regional function rather than a country function. 46 The TRC has decided to turn its tent manufacturing into a private business. In future all purchases will be

subject to tax.


27

26. Explore whether the TRC might welcome a small increase in IFRC presence in

Turkey, and perhaps the opening of a small delegation, if support services the TRC

considers high priority are made available.

7.2 Syria crisis regional recommendations

27. Movement Advisory Platform

a. IFRC Secretariat (with the ICRC) should provide high-level technical support

to HNS to develop 3-year movement-wide country plans, in accordance with

the decisions of the ‘mini-MAP’ meeting of October 2014. These plans

should be focused on responding the Syria crisis, not comprehensive NS

development strategies. Given the many potential options for a ‘country

plan’, the minimum expected content and basic structure should be agreed in

advance with the HNS, so that a regional narrative and presentation can be

added to attract donor interest.

b. The plans for, and progress of, the MAP process (including the Steering

Group and mini-MAP) should be circulated more widely to ensure that

interested stakeholder are more fully engaged.

c. The MAP process should conclude movement wide country plans by March

2015 and a regional chapeau by June 2015 that brings all the plans together

into a cogent whole, with resources specified for regional coordination and

communications activities required.

28. The Secretariat should institute a series of measures to improve internal coordination,

communication and support across the Syria crisis response, as follows:

a. The Secretariat should improve its internal communication and coordination

for the Syria crisis by, for example, convening on an biweekly working level

operational progress teleconference/meeting at regional level for the Syria

crisis, including Europe and MENA zones, HQ, and country delegations,

possibly chaired by the Head of Syria Crisis Operation based in Beirut.

b. To improve regular information flow with the PNS and Geneva Secretariat,

the Secretariat should convene a teleconference, perhaps every 6 weeks, for

each country, again at senior working level, with the individual HNS.

(Demand will probably be highest for Syria itself).

c. The MENA Zone office, with the Europe Zone office, should issue a written

communication on the respective roles and responsibilities of the Syria team

and Syria crisis team, to clarify how they relate to each other.

d. The Secretariat in Geneva should appoint one designated focal point for the

Syria crisis, dedicated to the task of linking the operations coordination to the

regional coordination level, with a widely advertised email and phone

number.

e. The Directors of Zone concerned should call for additional technical support

from Geneva HQ, especially, but not limited to, those areas where the zone

office has no technical specialist. Geneva HQ should, in turn, propose to

zone and country offices, through the designated HQ focal point, where

technical support could usefully be provided.


28

f. By end April 2015, the two Directors of Zone should send a short progress

report on the implementation of recommendations 18a-18e to the Secretary-

General for his review.

29. As far as possible, the current MENA Zone strategic planning exercise should

encompass:

a. The development of a 3-5 year DM development strategy for the countries of

the Zone.

b. Developing greater clarity on the nature of the leadership the HNS and PNS

expect from the Secretariat zone and country offices.

c. How to maintain sufficient human resources to support the Syria crisis

operation, while at the same time providing the rest of the Zone with the

support it requires.

d. Engagement of Geneva HQ on how to address the general under-resourcing

of the Zone Office compared with the current and possible future scale of

crises in the zone.

30. The IFRC, led by the Secretariat, should develop a regional resource mobilisation

strategy for the medium term. To gain longer-term financial support to maintain

RCRC activities for Syrians and affected local communities in neighbouring

countries, the IFRC will need to adopt a resilience approach and seek out

development funding sources, not just traditional humanitarian donors. To be

successful in this approach, it will require high quality, detailed proposals covering a

2-3 year time frame.

31. Alongside the regional resource mobilisation strategy, each country in the region

should develop, with technical support, a mobilisation plan to raise resources in-

country, via embassies, local donor representation, UN agencies and the private

sector.

32. The Secretariat should ensure that IFRC participation in inter-agency fora is more

regular and is equipped to exert greater influence, strengthen the perception of the

RCRC role and relevance, and learn from the situation analysis and strategies of other

actors. To do so, representatives need to be well prepared with information and

shared messages. It is legitimate for the IFRC or designated PNS to represent an

IFRC position, in addition to the HNS, as long as all parties coordinate in advance.

33. The Secretariat should build on current good practices regarding the presentation

IFRC-wide planning and reporting, as observed from Lebanon, Turkey and the

MENA Zone office, by working with PNS to; 1) reflect bilateral plans and

contributions in the EPOA and the Emergency Appeal, in both the narrative and

budget columns designed for the purpose, and 2) listing bilateral contributions in the

Donor Response document. The combination of 1) and 2) will provide a better

overview of the IFRC-wide contribution to the Syria Crisis response. (This

recommendation could also have global application).

34. To help ensure that all Secretariat and ICRC staff in the region understand the

intention to increase cooperation between the organisations, it is proposed that the

ICRC Director-General and the IFRC Secretary-General send internal

communications to their staff in the region, spelling out their intent for closer

cooperation between the organisations, and highlighting particular areas where

cooperation is to be strengthened.


29

35. Working with Secretariat HQ, the zone offices should invite PNS (traditional and

non-traditional) to provide or fund senior technical support for the following:

a. Movement wide country plans, in line with the on-going MAP process

b. A Syria region resource mobilisation strategy, and country strategies

c. An Humanitarian Diplomacy Strategy, building on the work already done in

devising the Movement Communications Strategy.

36. The Secretariat should convene the HNS at operational level, to share practical

lessons (as proposed by SARC). The Secretariat should first test the interest level of

the NS concerned.

7.3 General recommendations prompted by the RTE

37. The Secretariat should complete and publish the Global Disaster Response Standard

Operating Procedures (SOPs), with a modification for how the decision is made on

the location and organisation of the Secretariat leadership of the response to a major

crisis. It is proposed that the standard procedure should be for the Secretary-General

to make the decision based on the advice of senior management from the zone(s)

concerned and HQ, with a written instruction, valid for a set duration.

38. The Secretariat should consider how to revise its incentive systems for its managers

of offices and delegations to measure and reward performance against clearly defined

tasks and products, in line with the SOPs, rather than using resources raised for the

Secretariat as a key performance indicator.

39. The IFRC should ensure a more predictable response to major emergencies by 1)

analysing disaster and crisis risks in the countries most at risk of crisis or disaster (say

the top 2047), 2) map the likely response capacity of the National Societies in those

countries, based on the NS own self assessment, 3) create a dialogue and plan for

how an emergency response would be scaled up, building on any OCAC and CAS

results available, in consultation with the HNS and Movement partners active in the

country.

40. The Organisational Capacity and Certification (OCAC) process should be amended to

include NS capacity for disaster management within its scope.

41. The IFRC Secretariat should work to improve the quality of its own, and NS,

response planning and preparedness, in particular, needs assessment, vulnerability

analysis, and gap analysis, including assessment of non-RCRC actors, and

beneficiary consultation, as part of a general standards improvement initiative, which

is amongst the new Secretary-General’s priorities.

47 using the Federation’s existing risk assessment methodology or, for example, the Index Risk Management

Initiative, see http://inform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/About-us

http://inform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/About-us


30

Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

1. Summary

1.1. Purpose: This real time evaluation (RTE) will assess aspects of the IFRC’s

response to the Syria Crisis. It will inform the on-going support to the Syrian Arab

Red Crescent (SARC) operations in Syria and the support to operations in the

surrounding countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. As with other RTEs,

the evaluation will also inform future global emergency response operations and

approaches. Particular emphasis will be placed on looking at the opportunities and

challenges in such a complex Movement response over an extended time period, and

how Movement coordination / cooperation can be best applied to provide flexible

and optimal support to the National Societies involved. The RTE will also be asked

to scope out future directions and opportunities for the on-going response and

contingency planning.

1.2. Commissioner: This RTE has been commissioned by the USG of the Programme

Services Division at the IFRC secretariat in Geneva.

1.3. Audience: This RTE will be used by the IFRC Secretariat in Syria, in the

neighbouring countries, in the MENA Zone, Europe Zone and in Geneva to improve

delivery in the various Syria crisis-related operations and to help plan future

strategies and interventions. It will also inform all RC/RC actors contributing to the

operations, to help improve RCRC Movement coordination and integration around

this crisis. And finally, it will inform future global emergency response operations

and the improvement of IFRC approaches and coordination mechanisms in the

changing operating environment.

1.4. Duration of consultancy: Approximately 30 days (with approx. 15 days in the field)

1.5. Estimated dates of consultancy: August to September 2014.

1.6. Location of consultancy: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Budapest / Turkey and Geneva

2. Background

The conflict in Syria persists with no end in sight. The impact on the humanitarian crisis in

the region is worsening and becoming increasingly complex, with increasing number of

refugees in need of assistance, increased burden sharing by host communities, and the spread

of political tensions and violence in the region.

Humanitarian actors and donor governments are looking at ways to find alternative solutions

and to maintain humanitarian assistance to the affected communities. This includes scaling-

up and sustaining response activities. The revised UN appeal - Syria Humanitarian Assistance

Response Plan (SHARP) 2014 for USD 2.28bn (26% covered) and the Syria Regional

Response Plan (RRP) for USD 3.74bn (36% covered)48 according to UNOCHA. Attempts are

being made to raise further funds and find negotiated solutions through the Geneva peace

talks process.

The IFRC has been involved in this crisis since the beginning, starting with the MENA Civil

Unrest operation from July 2011 and then specifically in support to SARC and the

neighbouring countries since 2012. Although not directly operational in Syria, has provided

funding, technical and material assistance to SARC since the outset of the crisis, to enable

them to respond to the growing and challenging needs in an increasingly tense and

fragmented situation. The IFRC has also provided targeted support as required to those

countries neighbouring Syria, who are hosting an increasing number of refugees either in

48 http://www.unocha.org/crisis/syria


31

camps or in host families and through DREF to more distant countries hosting Syrian

refugees, such as Bulgaria. At this point, the refugee numbers for “people of concern” show

nearly three million people have crossed into neighbouring countries (49over 1,122,221 in

Lebanon, 605,719 in Jordan, 799,291 in Turkey, 220,210 in Iraq, 138,290 in Egypt and

several thousands in Bulgaria, plus in Greece, Italy and other countries). Unofficially, the

estimated figures are higher and are likely to rise above the current 2.2 million.

Given the current context, the IFRC will continue to assist SARC within the framework

followed up until now, and will increase that support as requested by the National Society.

The IFRC continues to provide its humanitarian support working integrally with the National

Societies in different ways according to the specific context.

It will provide all support to SARC and will have a particular focus on providing capacity-

building support to the National Society, in accordance with the IFRC’s mandate and the

National Society’s needs. The IFRC will also provide targeted assistance to the National

Societies of the neighbouring countries as required, and will also focus on ensuring that there

is capacity to maintain current or scaled-up response levels. The IFRC will continue to

coordinate and communicate with Movement partners to enhance the complementarities of

Movement’s work, and improve coordinated Movement action in support of the response and

the capacity building of the National Societies.

To date, the IFRC has launched three Emergency Appeals (two managed by the MENA Zone

and one by the Europe Zone), plus a DREF for Bulgaria for CHF 172,746 given in October

2013 to assist their response in support of refugees from the crisis:

1. Syria - The MENA Zone launched the Emergency Appeal for Syria on 6 July 2012, and

revised it in December 2012, July 2013, and again on 18 November 2013 to scale-up

support for the SARC. The current Appeal aims to assist up to 5.4 million beneficiaries

until December 2014. The total budget of the Appeal now stands at CHF 106,323,513 and

focuses on:

a. Food and Non-Food distributions: IFRC supports SARC’s relief efforts in areas not

covered by other partners. The objective is to provide assistance to 2.3 million people,

through supplementary food (food parcels) and non-food items (hygiene parcels,

women’s kits, and winterization items etc.). The Appeal will also provide

contingency stocks for 5,000 families (50,000 people).

b. Health: The IFRC Appeal will continue to assist SARC emergency and basic health

facilities in areas where it has been providing this support over an established period.

It will also support psychosocial assistance to the affected population through this

established network of clinics, health points, mobile health units and ambulance

services

c. Capacity building: The IFRC is placing a strong emphasis on building and

maintaining the capacity of SARC, in both technical and management areas, as well

as supporting SARC’s branches and volunteers to be able to continue the response in

support of affected populations.

2. Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq – On 9 August 2012, the IFRC launched a Preliminary

Emergency Appeal for Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq to address population movement

resulting from the Syria Crisis. The Appeal sought CHF 3.7 Million for six months to

strengthen the capacities of the Jordanian Red Crescent, Lebanese Red Cross and Iraqi

Red Crescent to respond to the needs of some 11,000 families in relief, cash transfer,

hygiene promotion and disaster preparedness, and on the capacity building of the three

National Societies. This Appeal was revised in January 2013, in May 2013, in November

49 All refugee are taken from UNHCR snapshot for 7 July 2014


32

2013 and again on 4 July 2014, to cope with the needs of the growing numbers of Syrian

refugees and to support the National Societies of the region who are trying to assist them.

The revised appeal is now at CHF 49.2 million to assist 479,350 people. The revised

Appeal will provide support for:

a. Relief distributions and cash transfer: The Appeal will support the distribution of

non-food items in all three countries as well as food kits and supplementary food in

Lebanon and Iraq, while at the same time supporting the scale-up of cash transfer

programming to 5,000 families in Jordan and the start up of a similar programme in

Lebanon

b. Health: The IFRC will continue its support to the Emergency Medical Services,

clinics and other services of the Lebanese Red Cross, will support the health and PSP

activities of the Jordanian and Iraqi Red Crescent and is coordinating the support of a

consortia-led ERU Hospital in Azraq camp in Jordan. The Appeal also supports the

Palestine Red Crescent Branch in Lebanon to provide health care for the increasing

numbers of Palestinian refugees fleeing Syria.

c. Water supply and hygiene promotion: The appeal will support Lebanese Red Cross

to provide water and hygiene supplies / promotion to 24,000 Syrian refugees and the

Iraqi Red Crescent to provide safe water to 20,000 refugees.

d. Capacity building: In all three countries there is strong element of support for

headquarters and branch capacity, through the provision of material, technical and

financial support, as well as support for staff and volunteers.

3. Turkey – On 9 November 2012, the Europe Zone launched an Emergency Appeal for

Population Movement seeking CHF 32 million in cash to support Turkish Red Crescent

Society (TRCS) to assist up to 170,000 people displaced by the Crisis. This Appeal was

revised in May 2013, on 18 November 2013 and again on 30 June 2014, and now seeks

CHF 42 million to assist 250,000 people in camps and in urban areas in Southern Turkey.

The Appeal is focused on:

a. Relief distributions and winterization support: This Appeal will cover the

distribution of vital non-food to 250,000 temporary protected people living in camps,

This includes the provision of shelter support to 40,000 families with shelter materials

and contingency stocks for a further 5,000 families. The Appeal will also support the

provision of contingency stocks for an additional 5,000 families (50,000 people).

b. Sanitation and hygiene promotion: The Appeal will provide sanitation and hygiene

promotion/ hygiene kits to 45,000 people living in the camps, and will set up

temporary shower and toilet facilities for 2,400 people.

c. Health and Psycho-social support: The Appeal will provide First Aid training and

support to up to 80,000 people in the camps and Psycho-social support to 20,000

adults and children in the neighbouring urban communities. The National Society

will also set up information and call centres to improve communications with

beneficiaries.

d. Capacity building: IFRC will support TRCS in areas where it requires or requests

capacity building support, such as in reporting, beneficiary communications, finance

and logistics and will support the translation of key DM tools and trainings into

Turkish.


33

The IFRC has also provided DREF and technical support to other countries receiving an

influx of Syrian refugees. For example, on 3 October 2013, the IFRC allocated a DREF of

CHF 172,726 to assist Bulgarian RC to respond to the needs of 1,500 asylum seekers mostly

coming from Syria. While these countries will not be the focus of this RTE, the reviewers will

consider any implications of that wider support.

The situation faced by the affected populations, both inside Syria and in the surrounding

countries, continues to worsen and the needs will increase and continue for the foreseeable

future. The future needs of the affected populations will be significant, and National Societies

must be prepared for a protracted situation and long-term humanitarian consequences. It is

therefore necessary for the RCRC Movement to work with the National Societies to look at

how to scale-up and also sustain a high level of response in this difficult context, for some

time to come. It is also necessary for the Movement to consider the subsequent recovery

needs over the coming years. The IFRC will be required to maintain the continuity of its

support in key areas over this longer-term period and to help the National Societies to have

the capacity to deliver services and maintain credibility for the longer-term and to work with

them to build community resilience.

3. Evaluation Purpose & Scope

The IFRC secretariat is committed to ensuring quality assurance, standards and a strong

culture of lesson learning in its disaster response. It is committed to carrying out RTEs during

all major disasters requiring an international response and meeting certain criteria of scale,

scope, complexity or risk. These RTEs aim to improve service delivery and accountability to

beneficiaries, donors and other stakeholders; and to capture lessons for the improvement of

IFRC’s disaster response system. The response to the Syria Crisis, both within Syria and in

the neighbouring countries, falls within these criteria.

Normally RTEs are carried out in the early stages of a response, which was not possible

for this particular operation, for operational and security restrictions (the RTE was

originally scheduled to take place in May 2013, but had to be postponed).

This RTE is therefore quite different in timescale from those normally conducted by

IFRC and others50, which has had consequences on its purpose and scope.

The purpose of an early-stage RTE is to influence key decisions early in the

development of an operation and demands a quick turn-around time for the evaluation

report and management response. However, the timing of this RTE means that this

exercise will focus more on lesson learning from operational decisions already made,

but it will still aim to inform operational decisions for the remainder of the operation,

as well as for future operations.

The humanitarian context in relation to the Syria Crisis is particularly complex for the

humanitarian system and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. The operating

environment for both the National Societies and the IFRC secretariat is changing

rapidly and creating new challenges.

This RTE will also extend its focus beyond the specifics of operational management

and delivery systems and will take this opportunity to examine the challenges of this

on-going, multi-country crisis. It will look at how the Red Cross Red Crescent

Movement can best sustain a prolonged response through its multiple stakeholders

and the coordinate of such efforts between these Movement actors.

50 See http://www.alnap.org/resource/5595.aspx

http://www.alnap.org/resource/5595.aspx


34

Geographically, the evaluation will include the affected countries, with a focus on the

response in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The team will refer to the operation in Iraq,

but as there has been limited support for this operation to date, this will not be a main focus

for the RTE. The evaluation should consider the challenges in the Iraq operation related to the

lack of funding and any general findings or recommendations that are considered relevant to

the operation. The reviewers should also be aware of the wider IFRC support (through DREF)

to countries such as Bulgaria and Armenia to respond to the needs of Syrian refugees,

although, likewise, these countries are not the focus of the RTE.

The timeframe of the RTE will focus on the period of the current emergency appeals (from

July 2012 to the present day), but should also be aware of the assistance provided to Syria and

the region under the MENA Civil Unrest operation from May 2011. The evaluation team

should be aware of the RTE carried out for that operation and any key findings and follow-up

actions agreed.

The evaluation will look at the following areas:-

i) How well did the IFRC secretariat coordinate its response internally and with other

Red Cross Red Crescent Movement actors.

ii) What were the challenges and opportunities of a multi-country (multi-zone)

response?

iii) How has the IFRC dealt with and learnt from a long-term, chronic crisis of this

nature?

In relation to all of these areas above, the RTE should help the IFRC secretariat and relevant

National Societies refine their strategy to sustain the longer-term response and plan for

recovery operations in each country and regionally. The data collection, conclusions and

recommendations should include a focus on National Society capacity building as well as

support to operational delivery.

4. Evaluation Objectives and Key Questions

The specific objectives and possible key questions to be addressed in this RTE are listed

below, under the three areas outlined above. In addressing these issues, particular emphasis

should be placed on considering the performance and delivery of the IFRC Secretariat support

to the National Societies in the four countries, in relation to the specific environment and

context and in relation to the wider RCRC Movement engagement and considering possible

future scenarios, options and directions.

Please note that these are guiding questions and the RTE team are not limited to those below.

1. How did the IFRC secretariat coordinate its response internally and with Red

Cross Red Crescent Movement and non-Movement actors

a. Has there been clarity around the division of roles and responsibilities

between the National Societies, the IFRC and the ICRC in each context and

across the Syria Crisis response in its entirety?

b. Did the secretariat optimize available Movement-wide resources? What has

been done to coordinate Movement messaging around Syria and the region,

and how could challenges in this area be addressed in future?


35

c. How effectively did the IFRC secretariat coordinate the international

operation and has the secretariat been able to adhere to and support agreed

joint working modalities?

i. within the secretariat (country/regional/zonal/HQ (Geneva) levels),

ii. within the wider IFRC membership and

iii. with ICRC51?

What recommendations would the evaluators give to help the secretariat

adapt its coordination approaches and tools in future?

d. What coordination has there been with non-Movement actors at national and

at regional levels? How has this been balanced with engagement with

Movement actors? And how has this worked in relation to the National

Societies’ auxiliary role with their governments?

e. What systems for communications and information management/reporting

have been set up and used in the different countries and what has been done

to adapt these systems to improve IFRC and Movement coordination? How

has this worked where the IFRC secretariat has had no or limited presence in

country?

f. What challenges have been faced by the secretariat regarding the

mobilization of resources (funds, HR and logistics) in this politically

sensitive environment? Has this been optimized across the RCRC

Movement? What opportunities and challenges have there been in engaging

with the Gulf States National Societies and how could the secretariat enhance

that cooperation?

g. Make recommendations for future coordination and working together, both in

the response and recovery operations.

2. What are the challenges and opportunities of a multi-country (multi-zone)

response

a. How effectively have the secretariat and partner National Societies tailored

and delivered support to the National Society response in each country -

including capacity building?

b. To what extent has the secretariat established coherence between the different

operations? The evaluators should also examine opportunities for resource

sharing and joint lesson-learning related to the overall response to the Crisis,

including the development of future DM approaches and tools.

c. Given the increasing regional approach of the UN and the humanitarian

system, what recommendations would the RTE make to improve NS to NS

and IFRC coordination around a regional strategy for this Crisis?

i. What options have already been considered to establish a regional

approach? What factors have influenced this and what possibilities

could be considered to address this in future?

51 It should be noted the RTE will look at links to ICRC’s activities but will not include them within the scope of

the actual evaluation. The ICRC will be fully briefed on this RTE and will be encouraged to input into its findings.


36

ii. What opportunities are there for engagement with other humanitarian

actors or other partners to strengthen our future approach at a

regional level?

d. What role has humanitarian diplomacy taken in presenting the Syria Crisis as

a coherent regional response and what key messages have been identified /

advocated? How could this role be strengthened in future?

3. How has the IFRC dealt with a long-term, chronic crisis of this nature?

a. How effectively did the secretariat and partner National Societies reinforce

and adapt their operational support and capacity building as the crisis

continued?

b. How have the secretariat and member National Societies adapted their tools

and systems to better plan for, resource and respond to a multi-year response

and longer-term recovery operation – including sustaining capacity building

of National Societies?

c. What contingency planning has taken place to date at country and regional

level? How could this be strengthened? Has contingency and scenario

planning taken place with other Movement and non-Movement actors? What

recommendations would the RTE make regarding this, given the complexity

and rapidly changing dynamic of the context?

d. What recovery actions have or are being considered? How can the secretariat

best support member National Societies in their planning for recovery?

e. Given an assessment of the evolving situation on the ground, the rapidly

changing and increasing needs and the engagement of other actors, what key

directions would the RTE recommend that the IFRC secretariat and the

National Societies consider for future strategies? How would this inform

extension or revision of existing plans and emergency appeals? 52

f. What challenges has the IFRC secretariat faced in resourcing its support to

National Societies over the longer-term? How would the RTE recommend

addressing these issues and what options would it suggest the IFRC

secretariat and wider IFRC to consider in future to access and sustain funding

for a longer-term response to a chronic crisis?

5. Evaluation Methodology & Process

The methodology will adhere to the IFRC Framework for Evaluations 53 , with particular

attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned,

managed, conducted, and utilized.

An IFRC evaluation management team will oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluators,

ensure that it upholds the IFRC Framework for Evaluations. The evaluation management

team will consist of three people not directly involved with the MENA operation; one of

which is from the IFRC secretariat Planning and Evaluation Department, the other two who

have direct experience in emergency operations and assessments – one from either the MENA

52 This question would have to be discussed with the other members of the RCRC Movement to be viable in this

context 53 http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf

http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf


37

or Europe Zone and one from the Programme Services Division. The evaluation management

team will provide the interface with the Secretariat offices in each country, and will help to

support the functioning of the team prior to and during the evaluation.

The evaluation team will consist of three to four people: an external evaluator who will be

the team leader, and 3 representatives from PNS, including one from a Society in the region

or from a non-traditional partner National Society). Ideally the team leader or one of the PNS

representatives should have regional knowledge / experience. Ideally all candidates should

have some experience of the IFRC disaster response systems and operations.

The external evaluator / team leader will provide an independent, objective

perspective as well as technical experience on evaluations, and will be the primary

author of the evaluation report. S/he should not have been involved or have a vested

interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired through a

transparent recruitment process, based on professional experience, competence, ethics

and integrity.

The PNS evaluators will assist the external evaluator in the evaluation process, and

will be able to provide perspectives on the RCRC actors and interactions in the

operation. It is expected that this team will be able to conduct a reliable and informed

evaluation of the operation that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

The specific evaluation methodology will be detailed in close consultation between the RTE

team and IFRC, but will draw upon the following primary methods:

1. Desktop review of operational background documents, relevant organizational

background and history, including prior IFRC RTE evaluation reports, and any

relevant sources of secondary data, such as existing surveys from IFRC participants

in the operation.

2. Field visits/observations to selected sites and to the Country/Zonal offices.

3. Key informant interviews (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate).

4. Focus group discussions, (institutional and beneficiaries as appropriate) as time and

capacity allow.

The RTE team will mainly look at the response in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey and

will visit each the National Society and IFRC office in each location if feasible. If access is

not possible, the team will carry out the review by phone/Skype and other means. It is

possible that the team will split to allow coverage of all locations. The team will not visit Iraq,

but will aim to speak with the Iraq office by phone/Skype or to meet the IFRC Representative

as feasible, to reflect input from that National Society and response. They will also not visit

Bulgaria or Armenia, but will seek information from the Europe Zone to complement their

research. The team will be briefed by the teams in Geneva and Beirut and in Budapest (by

phone) and will receive a full security briefing for the countries to be visited (this will include

completing the IFRC online security course if not already done).

The draft IFRC Real-time Evaluation Management Guide will guide this RTE,

including the report review process and the management response.

6. Evaluation Deliverables

Inception Report – The inception report will be a scoping exercise for the RTE and will

include the proposed methodologies, data collection and reporting plans with draft data

collection tools such as interview guides, the allocation of roles and responsibilities within the


38

team, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements

for the team.

Debriefings / feedback to management at all levels – The team will report its preliminary

findings to the IFRC MENA Zone in Beirut, Europe Zone in Budapest, and the team or team

leader will debrief in Geneva, in a timely manner and will adhere to the above mentioned

review process.

Draft report – A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and

lessons for the current and future operation, will be submitted by the team leader within two

weeks of the evaluation team’s return from the field.

Final report – The final report will contain a short executive summary (no more than 1,000

words) and a main body of the report (no more than 10,000 words) covering the background

of the intervention evaluated, a description of the evaluation methods and limitations, findings,

conclusions, lessons learned, clear recommendations. Recommendations should be specific

and feasible. The report should also contain appropriate appendices, including a copy of the

ToR, cited resources or bibliography, a list of those interviewed and any other relevant

materials. The final RTE report will be submitted one week after receipt of the consolidated

feedback from IFRC. Budget and time should be made available to translate the final report

and management response into Arabic and Turkish, so that it is accessible for use by the

National Societies.

All products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IFRC. The evaluators will not

be allowed, without prior authorization in writing, to present any of the analytical results as

his / her own work or to make use of the evaluation results for private publication purposes.

7. Consultancy Timeframe

Consultants’ Activities Due dates Deliverables Develop inception report August Inception plan

Review background documents and data collection Aug-Sept

Debriefing/feedback of preliminary findings to management at all levels September Preliminary findings

Submit draft report with annexes, September Draft report

IFRC submits any requests for clarifications, corrections, changes September

Submit final report with annexes September Final report

8. Evaluation Quality & Ethical Standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and

conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of the people and communities

involved and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable, is conducted in

a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and

accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and

applicable practices outlined in the IFRC Framework for Evaluations.

The IFRC evaluation standards are:

1. Utility: Evaluations must be useful and used.

2. Feasibility: Evaluations must be realistic, diplomatic, and managed in a sensible, cost

effective manner.

3. Ethics & Legality: Evaluations must be conducted in an ethical and legal manner,

with particular regard for the welfare of those involved in and affected by the

evaluation.


39

4. Impartiality & Independence; Evaluations should be impartial, providing a

comprehensive and unbiased assessment that takes into account the views of all

stakeholders.

5. Transparency: Evaluation activities should reflect an attitude of openness and

transparency.

6. Accuracy: Evaluations should be technical accurate, providing sufficient information

about the data collection, analysis, and interpretation methods so that its worth or

merit can be determined.

7. Participation: Stakeholders should be consulted and meaningfully involved in the

evaluation process when feasible and appropriate.

8. Collaboration: Collaboration between key operating partners in the evaluation

process improves the legitimacy and utility of the evaluation.

It is also expected that the evaluation will respect the seven Fundamental Principles of the

Red Cross and Red Crescent: 1) humanity, 2) impartiality, 3) neutrality, 4) independence, 5)

voluntary service, 6) unity, and 7) universality. Further information can be obtained about

these Principles at:

www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp

http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/index.asp


40

Annex 2 – Documents Consulted

IFRC Appeals and Appeal related documents

1. MDR81003 - Revised Emergency appeal Lebanon, Jordan & Iraq: Population Movement (4 Jul

2014)

2. MDR81003 - Donor response, Emergency Appeal Lebanon, Jordan & Iraq - Population

Movement. Donor response (as per 6 Nov 2014)

3. MDR81003 - Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) -Lebanon, Jordan & Iraq: Population

Movement

4. MDRJO001 - Emergency Appeal Jordan: Population Movement (29 Oct 2014)

5. MDRJO001 - Donor response, Emergency Appeal Jordan - Population Movement (as per 6 Nov

2014)

6. MDRJO001 - Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) Jordan: Population Movement (29 Oct 2014)

7. MDRLB004 - Emergency appeal - Lebanon: Population Movement (30 Oct 2014)

8. MDRLB004 - Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) - Lebanon: Population Movement (30 Oct

2014)

9. MDRSY003 - Revised Emergency Appeal Syria - Syria Complex Emergency, (18 Nov 2013)

10. MDRSY003 - Emergency Appeal Syria - Syria Complex Emergency, Operation Update #7 (11

Oct 2014)

11. MDRSY003 - Donor Response, Emergency Appeal Syria - Syria Complex Emergency (as per 6

Nov 2014)

12. MDRTR003 - Revised Emergency Appeal Turkey: Population Movement (30 Jun 2014)

13. MDRTR003 - Donor Response REA Turkey - Population Movement (as per 6 Nov 2014)

14. MDRTR003 - Revised Emergency Appeal Turkey - ops update 6 (1 Oct 2014)

15. MDRBG001 - Bulgaria: Population Movement; DREF final report

16. MDRAM002 – Armenia: Extreme Winter; DREF Operation Final Report

Information Products

17. IFRC Syria crisis IFRC wide support 29042014

18. IFRC Syria crisis map: areas reached through IFRC support 30042014

19. IFRC Syria Facts&Figures May-July2014

20. IFRC Regional Jordan REA Summary of Needs nov 2013

21. IFRC Regional Lebanon REA Summary of Needs nov 2013

22. IFRC Turkey REA Summary Of Needs

23. IFRC Who does what, where and when; MENA Zone and Turkey map Jan 2014

24. RCRC Syria Crisis Common Narrative, March 2014

25. IFRC Project Proposal Food assistance to families affected by ongoing conflict inside Syria

26. Press releases SARC, IFRC, combined Movement 2013-2014

27. IFRC Plan and Budget 2014

IFRC Secretariat documents, Syria Crisis

28. IFRC MENA Strategic framework 2012-2015

29. IFRC MENA Logistics Supply Chain strategy

30. Organigram MENA - Sept 2014.

31. Organigram Syria Operation Sept 2014

32. Draft Concept - Syria Crisis, Scaling Up Humanitarian and Development Response, Dec 2013

33. Masterplan for Syria Crisis, Draft Sep 2013

34. The DM Brief #53, Jun 2013

35. List of PNS delegates – Lebanon, Jun2014

36. IFRC 4Ws v3 0 May 2013 - April 2014

37. ERU Jordan &JRCS Partnership A discussion paper

38. Movement-wide reporting for the operation responding to the Syria crisis – concept paper May

2014

39. MENA RTE Civil Unrest 2011


41

40. MENA RTE Civil Unrest 2011, Management Feedback 2011

41. Pakistan RTE Report Final

42. Haiti RTE Management Response 10

43. IFRC Federation-wide Master Plan for Syria crisis covering Syria and neighbouring countries,

draft September 2013

44. Syria Crisis Scenarios, August 2012

45. HEOps Jordan EoM Report

46. HEOps Syria Crisis EoM Report, Sept 2012

47. HEOps MENA EoM, Apr-Oct 2013

48. End of Mission report (EoM) IFRC Gender Advisor MENA Zone, May 2014

49. EoM Financial Controller, MENA Zone, March 2014

50. EoM Regional Psychosocial Coordinator, MENA Zone, Dec 2013

51. EoM DR delegate, MENA Zone, Apr 2014

52. EoM Quality Assurance & Resource Mobilisation Delegate for Syria, Dec 2013

53. EoM Disaster Response Delegate, MENA Zone Mission, Dec 2012

54. EoM Human Resource Coordinator, MENA Zone, June 2012

55. EoM Reporting Delegate, Syria Crisis Operation, Aug 2012

IFRC Documents

56. IFRC Constitution

57. IFRC Principles and Rules of Humanitarian Assistance

58. Recovery programming guidance, 2012

59. Emergency Plan of Action guidance for NS

60. Handbook for coordination: Working together in international disaster response (draft)

61. OCAC introduction to pilots

62. Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy

63. Gender Policy

64. Handbook for Coordination: Working together in international disaster response, 2010

65. Country Assistance Strategy Planning tool, 2012

66. The Way We Finance, 2014

67. Roles and Responsibilities in Disaster Response, draft 2011

68. Global Disaster Response Standard Operating Procedures, draft Sept 2013

69. The Road to Resilience – discussion paper June 2012

70. Review of Movement Coordination and Cooperation: Syria crisis: 2011-2013, Wolfgroup

consultants

71. Review of the Decentralisation of the IFRC Secretariat, Accenture, 2013

72. The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, Jean Pictet,1979

73. Real Time Evaluations – Haiti, Pakistan, MENA Civil Unrest

Movement documents

74. Movement Communication Strategy on the Syria crisis, Nov 2013

75. Movement Common Narrative

76. Movement Advisory Panel, conference papers and MAP Steering Group minutes

77. Syria Crisis Special Notes to National Societies 1 to 12

78. Summary report of the Movement Advisory Platform Conference on the Syria conflict and its

regional consequences 17-18 May 2014

79. Minutes of Meeting - MAP Steering Group, 18 June 2014

80. DMWG Stockholm meeting, June 2014 - Draft minutes

81. Presentation to ICG Paris, June 2014: Scaling Up the Movement Response to the Syria Crisis in

the neighboring countries - Lessons Learned and thoughts about the ECHO Consortium

82. IFRC PNS Lebanon Assessment report Dec 2014

Non RCRC documents

83. Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis, May 2014, IASC Humanitarian Evaluations Steering

Group


42

84. SHARP: 2014 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan, Dec 2013

85. Key Emerging Issues: Overarching principles, from Syria UNCT, 2014

86. Regional Response Plan 2014 and mid year update

87. HPG ODI Syria Crisis - notes of a roundtable, June 2012

88. ALNAP Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis, June2014

89. UNHCR ‘From slow boil to breaking point: A real-time evaluation of UNHCR’s response to the

Syrian refugee emergency’

90. Lebanon Interagency assessment 13 June 2014

91. RRP6 Mid Term Review, Lebanon Overview

92. WFP Syria Monitoring Report May 2013

93. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2014

94. Syrian Refugees Inter-Agency Regional Update, September 2014

Methodological Guidance

95. IFRC Framework for Evaluation

96. IFRC RTE guide DRAFT


43

Annex 3 – Schedule of Interviews

IFRC Geneva

Elise Baudot Legal Counsel, Legal Department

Roger Bracke Head, Organisational Development Department

William Carter Senior Officer, WatSan, Water, Sanitation and Emergency Health Unit, Health Department

Walter Cotte Under Secretary General, Programme Services Division

Pieter De Rijke Senior Officer, ERU, Disaster and Crisis Management

Department

Simon Eccleshall Head, Disaster and Crisis Management Department

Cristina Estrada Senior Officer, Operations Quality Assurance, Disaster and Crisis Management Department

Hakan Karay Senior Disaster Response Officer, Disaster Crisis Management Department

Pierre Kremer Benoit Carpentier

Head, Communications Department Team Leader, Public communication and Outreach

Josse Gillijns Head, Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting

Pankaj Mishra Senior Officer, Preparedness, Disaster and Crisis Department

Ivana Mrdja Senior Officer, Relationship, Management, Strategic

Partnerships Unit

Panu Saaristo Senior Officer, Emergency Health Coordinator, Water, Sanitation and Emergency Health Unit, Health Department

Valpuri Saarlerma Programming Senior Policy Advisor, Resilience, Programme Services Division

Matthias Schmale Under Secretary General, National Society and Knowledge

Development

Isabelle Séchaud Unit Manager, Field Logistics, Global Logistics Service

Ela Serdaroglu Senior Officer, Shelter and Settlements Department

Pedro Simoes Senior Auditor, Risk Management & Audit Department

Christine South Senior Officer, Operations Quality Assurance

Lars Tangen, Karl Julisson

Head, Security Unit, Senior Officer, Security Unit

Joelle Tanguy Under Secretary General, Humanitarian Values and Diplomacy

Division

Miki Tsukamoto Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer

IFRC MENA Zone,

Beirut

Tamreez Amirzada DM Information Delegate

Marina Bassil HR Manager

Melkar El Khoury Gender & Diversity Officer

Hossam Faysal DM coordinator

Elias Ghanem Director of Zone

Nadine Haddad Senior PMER officer


44

Tenna Mengistu Head of NSKD and support services, Policy, Strategy& Planning

Senior Advisor

Zamira Muca Financial Controller

Jean Salloum Security Advisor

Shail Shrestha Lebanon Operations Manager

Azmat Ulla Head of Operations

Syria Crisis Cell and Syria Office Staff in MENA Zone office,

Beirut

Tommaso Della Longa Communications Coordinator Syria Crisis

Mohamed El Amin Ibrahim Logistics Syria Crisis

Khaled Erksousi HD coordinator Syria Crisis

Mike Higginson Head of Syria Crisis Operations

Ezster Matyeka Reporting Delegate Syria

Sophie Sutrich Quality Assurance & RM Delegate Syria

IFRC Syria, Damascus

Asa Erika Jannsson Federation Representative Syria - outgoing

Gyula Kadar Operations Manager

Jeyathesan Kulasingam Health Delegate

Jyri Rantanen Federation Representative Syria - incoming

IFRC Iraq

Farid Aiwyar Federation Representative Iraq

IFRC Jordan, Amman

Khaled Abu Assaf Finance Manager

Mohamed Babiker Regional Representative, Gulf & HoD

Karsten Dahl CTP & Livelihood Delegate

Jacinta Hurst Health Coordinator

Francisco Maldonado Head of Operation

Rose Munene Regional Reporting Delegate Syrian Crisis

Doa’a Okour Senior Admin Officer

IFRC Europe Zone office, Budapest

Andrea Anca Senior Communication Officer

Sophia Keri Grant Administration and Programme Reporting Officer

Timea Kramcsak Zone Finance Controller

Alberto Monguzzi Zone DM coordinator

Imre Nagy PMER Manager

Evgeni Parfenov Head of Operations

Anitta Underlin Director of Zone

IFRC Turkey, Ankara

Javier Ormeno Reporting Delegate


45

National Societies Marwan Alawar Lebanese Red Cross, DM Coordinator

Georges Kattaneh Lebanese Rec Cross, Secretary General

Samer Husein Chehade Palestine Red Crescent Society, Lebanon – Director of Projects

Unit

Mash'al AL Hadid &

Ra’ed Al Hadid

Jordan Red Crescent Society, Admin Advisor, Projects

Coordinator

Jordan Red Crescent Society, DM Manager

Marwan Abdullah Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Director General

Abdul Raman Attar Syrian Arab Red Crescent, President

Hazem Bakleh Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Head of Medical Services

Sami Fakhoury Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Deputy Director General

Hussam Saeid Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Information Management Coordinator

Raya Ramadant Samir Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Deputy Director General

Rami Sattouf Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Project Finance Manager

Tarek Tannira Syrian Arab Red Crescent, Health Coordinator

Yasemin Aktaş Turkish Red Crescent, Head, International Programs Systems

Management Department

Kamil Erden Guler Turkish Red Crescent, Executive, Middle East Desk

Mehmet Güllüoğlu Turkish Red Crescent, Director General

Mintez Şimşek Turkish Red Crescent, Deputy Director General

Deniz Solen Turkish Red Crescent, Coordinator International Relations,

Programmes and Operations

Katy Attfield British Red Cross, Head of Disaster Management

Julia Brothwell British Red Cross, Syria Crisis Programme Manager

David Peppiat British Red Cross, Head of International

Hosam Elsharkawi Canadian Red Cross, Director, Emergencies and Recovery

Breanne England Canadian Red Cross, Manager, Emergency Relief and funds

Tina Agerbak Danish Red Cross, Organisational Development Delegate, MENA

Region

Mads Brinch Danish Red Cross, Head of Region, MENA

Charlotte Kjoerrup Danish Red Cross, Country Coordinator, Lebanon

Alfredo Melgarejo Danish Red Cross, Country Coordinator, Syria

Florent del Pinto French Red Cross, Regional Representative, Middle East

Kirsi Pohjola Logistics Delegate, Finnish RC

David Kenealy German Red Cross, Programme Coordinator Syria Crisis

(Lebanon/Turkey)

Franziska Kellerhaus German Red Cross, Desk officer Syria Crisis

Annette Kohlmeier German Red Cross, Syria Country Delegate

Frido Hendrickx Netherlands Red Cross, Head of Disaster Response Unit

Gerard Jonkman Netherlands Red Cross, Lebanon Country Representative

Cristhian Cortez Cardoza Norwegian Red Cross, MENA Regional Representative

Ola Ulmo Norwegian Red Cross, Syria Consortium Delegate

Torgeir Vasaasen Norwegian Red Cross, Lebanon Country Manager

Ana Roldan Spanish RC, Regional Representative MENA

Malena Rembe Swedish Red Cross, Regional Representative MENA

Thomas Söderman Swedish Red Cross, Senior Advisor, Disaster Management


46

Atef Dalgamouni Qatar Red Crescent, Jordan, Chief of Mission

Pepe Salmela

Juhanni Mietola

Hamsa Assi

Azraq Hospital Consortium Manager, Finnish RC

Hospital Manager, Finnish RC

HR Manager, Canadian RC

ICRC

Robert Mardini

Jane Clarke

Dorothea Krimitsas

Celine Leonet

ICRC Geneva, Head of Region, Near and Middle East

ICRC Geneva, Head of Sector, Cooperation and Coordination in

the Movement

ICRC Geneva, Head of Public Relations a.i.

ICRC Geneva, Head of Movement Operations Unit

Boris Michel ICRC Damascus, Head of Delegation

Brigitta Kunz ICRC Amman, Cooperation Delegate

Fabrizio Carboni ICRC Beirut, Head of Delegation

Rocio Fischer ICRC Beirut, Cooperation Delegate

Finn Ruda ICRC Beirut, Cooperation Delegate (Regional)

Non-Movement Partners

Carlos Afonso Gallegos ECHO Amman Regional Support Office, Technical Assistant

Max Hadom OCHA Geneva, Senior Humanitarian Advisor

Carlos Geha OCHA Jordan Office, Head of Office

Maria Rosaria Bruno OCHA Syria, Humanitarian Affairs Officer

Severine Jacomy-Vité UNICEF Turkey, Chief of Child Protection

Ann Burton UNHCR Jordan, Health Working Group

Volker Schimmel UNHCR Jordan, Cash Working Group

Paul Stromberg UNHCR Jordan Deputy Representative

Lynne Miller UNHCR Lebanon, Deputy Representative (Operations)

Karim Atassi

Alev Orsel-Karaca

UNHCR Turkey, Deputy Representative

UNHCR Turkey, Liaison Officer

Norimasa Yoshida Japanese Embassy, Amman, First Secretary and Head of the

Economic Division

Adeyinka Badejo WFP Syria, Deputy Country Director

Helene Greiche WFP Turkey, Programme Officer


47

Annex 4 – Country Observations - Syria

The achievements of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent are generally acknowledged to be

remarkable. The SARC itself recognises that, at the outset of the crisis, it did not have

sufficient capacity to respond, and acknowledges the help of Movement partners in helping

the organisation to develop. Through its own efforts, and with the support of the IFRC and

the ICRC, and as a partner of UN agencies, SARC has increased its institutional and

operational capacity to the point where it is meeting perhaps 50% of the total relief needs of

the affected population. The commitment and bravery of the 3,000 active SARC volunteers is

frequently cited in Movement communications. Sadly, 40 SARC volunteers have so far lost

their lives while responding to those in need.

However, humanitarian needs in Syria are huge and increasing, and humanitarian agencies

struggle with response gaps in all sectors. For example, there are an estimated three million

people in need who would qualify for food assistance but who are not receiving it.

SARC has worked hard to establish its credibility as a neutral actor, working in both

Government and opposition controlled areas to alleviate the suffering of civilians. With its

network across the country and its capacity to negotiate access it is able to reach most areas

affected, apart from the north of the country.

From early in the conflict, humanitarian work inside Syria has faced severe constraints,

especially from the high risk working environment, restricted access, and bureaucratic

obstacles. SARC was put in the delicate and difficult role of ‘official Government interface

and operational partner for all humanitarian agencies’. SARC has risen to the challenge

presented by this role, despite initial concerns from outside the Movement that it would not be

effective or impartial. SARC has proven the doubters wrong on both counts.

SARC is a key partner for the United Nations, in particular WFP, but also UNICEF and

UNFPA, and other humanitarian organizations in Syria. In practice, the SARC does not

coordinate the UN agencies, which work directly with government, but retains the task of

coordinating international NGOs.

In the Letter of Understanding, signed in June 2012, SARC, IFRC and ICRC agreed on

SARC as the Lead Agency for the RCRC movement in Syria.

The IFRC has no separate office in Syria. IFRC representation and PNS delegates are

accommodated in the SARC offices in Damascus. Until late 2013, the IFRC had only a

Representative and one logistics delegate present. The last Representative served for more

than 5 years in Syria up to September 2014, and was very much appreciated by the SARC

leadership.

The Secretariat made proposals for increasing its support to the SARC, as far back as June

2012, in the following areas: IT/Telecommunication, Financial management and reporting,

logistics, disaster management capacity, and emergency health. Several of these offers were

taken up by SARC. The Secretariat produced a report on ‘propositions for a Strategic Plan

for SARC’, but SARC decided not to undertake a new strategic plan at the height of the crisis.

The IFRC human resources dedicated to Syria in Damascus and in Beirut have been

strengthened only recently. The reasons for this delay include: SARC not welcoming extra

foreigners in the beginning, difficulty in getting visas, slow IFRC recruitment procedures, and

security limitations. Currently, the IFRC Syria team is split into 5 staff permanently based in

Damascus and 2 based within the MENA Zone office in Beirut, travelling back and forth (as

per Figure 1 above).


48

A small number of PNS is present with bilateral support to SARC and with delegates. Some

were already working with SARC before the current crisis: Danish RC Long term focus on PSP; with the Syria crisis, it added support to relief activities

and EMS, branch and sub-branch structures. The programme is linked up with

British RC who add livelihood support (micro projects for economic restart - in

kind;

2 delegates: PSP technical staff and Representative

German RC/

Norwegian

RC

The 2 PNS combine different qualities (timeline, earmarking) of their funding into

one joint programme with SARC; focus lies on logistics support (GerRC) and

WatSan (Norwegian RC); 2 Del: Logistics (German RC) and WatSan/OD (NorRC)

Iraqi RC 4.5 million medical supply units. 2 medical centres for Iraqi residents. Distribution

of blankets and food parcels.

The Qatari RC operates independently of the SARC in the north of the country. Several other

PNS have given bilateral support without deploying staff to Syria.

Figure 2 below shows the cumulative donor response to the Syria Appeal

Figure 2 – Donor response to the Syria Appeal 2012-2014

What works well: The IFRC Secretariat presence and role in supporting the NS is broadly appreciated

because of its long-term supportive approach to the SARC. It is working in the same

offices as SARC and is seen as a real partner. Where well-qualified technical IFRC

staff provide support, it is highly appreciated.

Via the Emergency Appeal, the IFRC has added a substantially to the SARC crisis

response operation in food and health.

The food parcels supplied by the IFRC are seen to be very high quality, according to

beneficiary feedback, and the sourcing and logistics for the food component of the

Syria Appeal is seen to be effectively managed. (The British and German RCs also

provide logistics support to SARC).

The Secretariat has supported SARC to increase its capacity in communications and

reporting, improving SARC’s external image and its information flow to partners and

donors. The relatively small group of IFRC and PNS delegates in Damascus have worked

well together, and with the SARC, and with the ICRC.

The PNS present are following mid/long-term agendas in partnership with SARC.

Some of their funding support is already secured for 2015 and 2016. Their physical

integration in SARC offices supports a frequent dialogue and coordination. With the SARC working in full response mode and with no spare time for non-urgent

activities, the successful IFRC and PNS approach is one of tightly knitting capacity

building onto operational support.


49

Movement Cooperation: The 2012 agreement between SARC, ICRC and IFRC

created greater clarity on their respective roles and responsibilities. The movement

wide publication of this agreement also made this transparent to the other RCRC

partners.

Challenges: The overall response is not keeping up with the increasing humanitarian needs in the

country and the funding environment is becoming tighter. The highly sensitive working environment restricts public communication and

humanitarian diplomacy. Stakeholders in and outside the Movement consider that the Secretariat is putting too

much emphasis on its own visibility and on the funding of its operational support,

compared with its coordination and capacity building roles. SARC, as an implementing partner of most of the humanitarian UN agencies

operating in Syria is also affected by funding shortfalls that are likely to affect the

UN. WFP is facing funding shortages, with funds varying from month to month. To

manage this, WFP reduces the volume of the food parcel but not the number of food

parcels. This can make the WFP food parcel still less attractive than the IFRC

supplied parcels.

The substantial food component54 of the Syria Emergency Appeal55 has proven

contentious with ICRC because, in its view, with the IFRC having agreed to lead on

capacity development, a large food component is not appropriate for the IFRC. From

the SARC viewpoint, if having more sources of food means there is a greater volume

overall, this helps to meet the unmet needs for beneficiaries. The disagreement is

affecting the tone of ICRC/IFRC cooperation in Syria. The IFRC food parcels offer

the greatest flexibility because, as they come directly to the SARC warehouses, they

can be used for immediate deployments when short-term access is granted to

contested areas.

IFRC and PNS delegates are frequently absent from Damascus because of official

travel, R&R, and holidays, reducing their perceived effectiveness to SARC.

SARC now organises regular coordination meetings with the nine INGOs authorised

to work in Syria. Relationships with these INGOs can be complicated by having to

impose restrictions on their movement or activities that originate with government

but the INGOs may not be aware that this is the case. The Secretariat could usefully

support SARC in building strong partnerships with these organisations, including by

playing a liaison role.

The security situation makes the independent monitoring of relief distributions

difficult. SARC is not yet working with the WFP third party monitors, and the

Secretariat should work with SARC to find a solution for independent monitoring to

avoid a risk of reputational damage. The Tripartite SARC/ICRC/IFRC agreement was an early achievement but formal

meetings that include the Federation Representative are not being held, and should be

revived. At working level SARC/ICRC/IFRC meetings continue well.

Opportunities

SARC can certainly absorb more funding if it can be obtained, for its proposed future

focus on disaster management, health, relief (food and non-food) and life-saving

services, and for SARC capacity building.

54 The Federation Appeal has provided about 5% of the total food provision so far, with ICRC a further 15% and

the remainder coming from WFP. 55 According to the expenditure table accompanying the Operations Update No 7 of 11 Oct 2014 (‘Two years on

update’) the food component was CHF 15.2m out of a total raised against the Syria appeal of CHF 51.2m, ie 30%.


50

SARC has been through a steep and long learning curve to arrive at its current

increased capacity. Given that expatriate delegates are relatively costly, the SARC is

open to receiving technical assistance, as long as it high calibre. If the ICRC can match both the quality and flexibility of the IFRC food parcels, and

if it can provide the extra food to cover that coming through IFRC channels, this

should be a feasible option. This would make the logistics chain more cost effective

and bring the IFRC more in line with its commitments in the tripartite agreement of

2012. Given that the RTE has not made an in-depth assessment of this matter, the

RTE cannot make a firm recommendation on this point. As other funding resources are at risk of declining, the IFRC’s multilateral and

bilateral contributions, while small compared with UN resources, become

increasingly important. ICRC is also increasing its budget for 2015 for Syria

significantly to help close the resource gap. From CH139m to CHF 163m

(provisional). SARC is open to receiving high quality facilitation and technical support with

strategic planning in general, and the Country Plan to be developed under the MAP

process, in particular.

SARC is becoming more open to further PNS involvement and, in a limited way,

additional PNS presence. The entry barrier will, and should be, high to ensure that

the PNS contribution is of material significance either financially or in terms of

technical support, or both. PNS may consider the provision of short/medium terms

specialist technical inputs over longer term posting of delegates with only generalist

operations management skills that the SARC already has. The visa situation for

foreigners has improved to an extent. There is room for more advocacy/raising public awareness for the plight of people

affected by the conflict (past communications have emphasised the Movement and

the SARC volunteers). As part of the MAP process, the new Syria country plan should be mapped against all

financial sources of support, including UN, INGO, and all RCRC sources. As a first,

simpler step, both multilateral and bilateral support could be shown in the IFRC

Emergency Appeal to provide a more complete picture of IFRC support and activity

to Syria.


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Annex 5 – Country Observations - Lebanon

Since 2012, Lebanon has received a steady influx of Syrian refugees, with a major surge in

early 2013. By end of September 2014, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon

was estimated at 1.2 million, although the actual number of Syrians in Lebanon could easily

exceed 1.5 million, against a Lebanese population of only 4.5 million. The rate of entry of

new refugees has reduced significantly. The presence of so many refugees will place a heavy

burden on Lebanon's infrastructure and social stability for some years to come. With the

crisis protracting, the needs for short-term assistance and for long-term support for refugees in

Lebanon and host communities are both increasing and changing in nature (for example, there

is an increased demand for schooling).

In Lebanon, refugees are staying with relatives, or renting in urban areas. It has been

government policy not to provide shelter, although it is now considering opening two camps

for the first time, in part because informal settlements have grown significantly and over 1000

such settlements hold an estimated 15% of all registered Syrian refugees.

The LRC enjoys a good reputation in the country for its Emergency Medical Services (EMS),

and for its impartiality and neutrality, to which it is highly committed to safeguarding. Its

reputation allows it to access areas that no other national or international organization can

reach. The Lebanon Branch of the Palestinian RC Society is active in Palestine refugee camps

in Lebanon, supporting Syrian as well as resident Palestinians in need of health care.

In recent years, the LRC has undergone considerable change in its governance and

management structures, with the first appointment of a Secretary-General only in 2013. LRC

management adheres to a strategy of sustainable growth in services. The LRC has taken a

responsible and carefully chosen path to gradually expand its services, while maintaining

service quality and the respect of its service users. The LRC’s main concern is that it should

not start something it cannot sustain. At the same time, beyond the EMS, the LRC response

is growing but modest and the bulk of the humanitarian response for Syrian refugees and

local communities has been left to other actors.

Other humanitarian actors (UN, Danish Refugee Council, etc.) have responded strongly and

at scale, and the RTE team heard a number of times from RCRC actors that there are no

serious gaps in provision left in Lebanon, although they could not give a proper analysis of

the needs and no RCRC analysis could be found. External reports tell of growing

impoverishment, poor shelter conditions, inadequate access to the health system, foreseeable

long-term effects of a lack of schooling and preventive health measures, and the negative

impact on the social and socio-economic stability of the country. Some of these themes now

appear in the new EPOA for Lebanon.

The IFRC Secretariat moved its MENA Zone office from Jordan to Lebanon in 2012. There

has been no Lebanon Delegation or Country Representation for several years, nor has there

been a dedicated staff to support Lebanese RC in the Syria Crisis Response. In June 2014, an

IFRC Country Operations Manager was appointed for Lebanon.

There are 16 PNS with either a country or regional presence in Lebanon, supporting the LRC

and the PRCS in their long-term development, standard operations and response to the effects

of the Syria crisis. Most of the PNS with a presence are providing bilateral assistance. The

LRC is concerned that if Syria opens up to more PNS, some will discontinue their support to

LRC and move to Syria. In 2014, the ICRC increased its operations in Lebanon, especially

for water and sanitation sector, so enlarging the total RCRC Movement’s response in the

country.


52

Figure 3. Sector participation of the PNS in the RCRC Syria crisis operation in Lebanon56.

What works well:

Given the relatively low levels of target beneficiaries compared with the needs in past

IFRC appeals, the recently released Lebanon Emergency Appeal increase in targeted

population from 200,000 to 415,000 is a positive step. (Part of this increase may

relate to the inclusion of PNS-funded activities related to the Syria crisis. LRC

considers that the new appeal is based more clearly on LRC plans than previous

versions.

The improvement in the EPOA and Emergency Appeal appears to have been helped

by the appointment of an IFRC Lebanon Operations Coordinator57. ICRC has also

been giving active support to a coordinated Movement response in Lebanon.

The LRC has expanded cautiously but effectively into new areas. Just over a year

ago, there was no disaster management function in LRC but this has now been

established and oversees the provision of relief goods to 4,000 families per month. A

cash transfer programme is being tested. Logistics and other capacity have been

strengthened with PNS support during the current crisis.

There is a high interest of PNS to work with LRC for the Syria Crisis response and

some are committed to long-term partnership. Most PNS present have their offices in

the LRC HQ, which has a positive impact on cooperation and communication, and

provides rental income for LRC.

Good practice examples of NS effort to improve efficiency include: 1) The French

RC has fully embedded a delegate into the LRC management and reporting structures,

2) Netherlands RC is implementing funding of Austrian RC, 3) The joint ECHO

application of several PNS and the Secretariat, under the lead of French RC,

projected a more coordinated RC approach to ECHO.

The ICRC has increased its presence and response in Lebanon and appears to be

committed to a further increase from 2014 to 2015 from CHF 38 million to CHF 45

million (provisional).

The LRC has set up a system of sector coordination whereby ‘close partner’ PNS

provide a measure of coordination of other PNS working in that sector. The protocols

for this coordination are still to be completed. A Disaster Management strategy for

the LRC has been drafted with the relevant partners.

56 Taken from the draft Federation Emergency Appeal for Lebanon, October 2014 57 The position currently depends on the funding of a PNS, and has just been extended from 6 months initially to

April 2015.


53

Challenges: Needs versus RCRC response:

To date, the RCRC response to the needs of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has been

modest compared with both the scale of the needs and with the response of some

other organizations.

There is room for improvement of the IFRC’s analysis of current and future

humanitarian needs in country. The latest Emergency Appeal (30 Oct 2014) refers to

'identified humanitarian needs, gaps and constraints' without any closer analysis. Coordination:

There appears not to have been a clarifying discussion on roles and responsibilities of

the Movement components based on the Seville Agreement (or if there has, the result

has not been shared).

Lebanon RC is in the lead by right and by default, but there is no clarity on the extent

to which the Secretariat should support Movement coordination. All Movement

actors would like the Secretariat to play a stronger coordination role. The Lebanon

operations coordinator has already made some progress in this direction but the

Secretariat has work to do to avoid being seen as another PNS.

Participation of the IFRC in external coordination is patchy. The LRC does not

participate systematically. Some PNS attend sector coordination forums based on

their own decision, while the Secretariat accompanies the LRC. The result is

uncoordinated representation of the IFRC and a lack of common messages to be

delivered to these forums.

The Secretariat is yet to provide the LRC with a proposal for how RCRC activity can

be significantly scaled up to provide a response that is provided alongside the LRC

and is both short-term (2-3 years) and explicitly non-sustainable.

Fragmentation and Inefficiency:

As almost all RCRC actors in Lebanon acknowledge, the relatively small number and

small scale of programmes being supported by a large number of PNS and the

Secretariat has led to an inefficient use of resources. The numbers of delegates and

their considerable associated costs cannot be justified58. The ‘crowding’ of PNS is

not ideal for the RCRC image.

Some combination of the following steps is required to improve the situation:

o The Secretariat takes a stronger hand in PNS coordination in Lebanon, as

several of the PNS have been requesting

o Assuming that role is fulfilled successfully, some bilateral funding could

revert to the multilateral support the Appeal

o PNS consortia are expanded to allow some PNS to invest through others,

creating joint programmes with one PNS lead

o Each PNS consortium lead manages a programme that supports the LRC in

each major sector, building on the current system of sectoral support.

Whichever combination of measures is adopted, the end result should be a more

streamlined IFRC programme of activities with the LRC, with lower overheads, and a

significantly reduced number of PNS for the LRC to relate to.

58 The RTE team did not receive exact numbers but based on the MENA Zone office contact list and its own

investigations, the team counted 32 PNS delegates based in Beirut during the time of the RTE visits, out of which

15 were performing in a regional function (MENA or Syria Crisis).


54

Annex 6 – Country Observations – Jordan

At the end of October 2014, more than 618,000 Syrian refugees were registered in Jordan, of

which 20% are residing in refugee camps, where government and aid organizations provide

humanitarian support. The total number of Syrians in Jordan almost certainly exceeds 1

million. For the majority of refugees outside the camps, not all needs can be adequately

addressed. The greatest challenge for Syrian refugees is to find jobs and income, especially

for food and rent. The dependency of the refugees on assistance is said to be increasing. An

estimated 1 million Jordanians are themselves considered to be affected by the crisis.

The Jordanian Red Crescent (JRC), supported by RCRC movement partners has responded to

the needs of a reported 30,000 households (approximately 150,000 individuals) since the

beginning of the crisis, with immediate relief distribution, shelter, cash transfer programming,

medical services, restoring household links among others. The delegation in Amman comprises the IFRC Representative59, plus a Head of Operations

and a Health Coordinator and Cash Delegate dedicated to the Syria crisis response. The

Delegation also houses the Hospital consortium team. The delegation, as it was formerly the

regional delegation, still includes the finance manager for the Syria operation, although

consideration is being given as to whether to move this function to Beirut. The delegation

also houses the regional reporting delegate.

A country based IFRC Jordan Population Movement Emergency Appeal has been developed

during the period of the RTE, and was published on 29 Oct 2014 with an implementation

period to 31 Dec 2015. For Jordan, this appeal has replaced the Regional Population

Movement EA covering Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq. It asks for 12 Million CHF to provide

support to 126,400 Syrian Refugees and Jordanians.

According to the Appeal, 13 Movement partners are active in Jordan (but not all are present).

They include, Canadian RC, Danish RC, Finish RC, German RC, French RC, Iraqi RC,

Norwegian RC, as well as IFRC and ICRC. The Qatari UAE, Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian RCs

operate on a loosely bilateral or unilateral basis.

In Jordan, the ICRC and the Secretariat actively coordinate their capacity building support to

the JRC. The ICRC, IFRC and the bilateral PNS are all funding staff within the JRC. Some

PNS have integration agreements with the Secretariat, while the four PNS within the hospital

consortium have a modified service agreement.

What works well:

The Cash Transfer Project (CTP) (JRC/IFRC, ICRC and Swiss RC) had reached

6,649 households with unconditional cash assistance by 31 August 2014. The RTE

has not evaluated the project technically but the project is said by all parties to be

highly relevant. It is well integrated as part of a UNHCR coordinated effort with

other agencies. In Jordan, UNHCR reports very good technical engagement with the

IFRC on the Cash Transfer Programme. (This was the only example reported to the

RTE team where the IFRC was implementing directly with UNHCR.)

In 2014, the IFRC Amman office has taken a more active role in controlling the

implementation of the JRC/IFRC part of the programme. A temporary IFRC Cash

Transfer Delegate has been focusing on the set up and improvement of the system

over four months.

59 The current acting head of delegation is also the Regional IFRC Representative for the Gulf States


55

The Emergency Appeal foresees an increase of the IFRC/JRC part of the programme

to target 4,000 instead of 2,500 households per month, which shows progress even if

beneficiary numbers are still modest compared to the needs in the country. The Secretariat is supporting the JRC in organizing Movement coordination in

Jordan. Meetings take place every fortnight, chaired by JRC and supported by IFRC

delegates. Coordination is said to work well with those who participate. Trilateral

meetings are also taking place between IFRC, ICRC and JRC, as well as bilateral

coordination. Programme discussions were described as pragmatic.

The Secretariat organised for a Japanese Government grant to be transferred partly to

the Danish RC/JRC bilateral psychosocial programme to reinforce the existing

programme rather than using the funds to start a new one.

The Head of Delegation regularly attends the HCT, while the Health delegate chairs

an interagency Community Health task group, with the French RC as co-chair.

In Jordan, a process has started to develop one plan for the JRC, with every

Movement partner identifying areas to support. This will in turn feed into the Country

Plan anticipated by early 2015 under the MAP process.

Challenges The RCRC has been increasing and adapting its response according to the needs

identified but the limited organizational and response capacity of the JRC remains a

limitation on the scale of the response.

PNS do not have confidence in JRC accountability systems. The JRC does recognise

the need for improvements but, as yet, there is no roadmap (at least, none written) for

strengthening JRC management structures and accountability systems.

In common with other offices, short-term contracts for some IFRC delegates are a

weakness, and are accompanied by gaps in staffing and insufficient handovers.

The ERU Field (now District) Hospital

The RCRC hospital in Azraq is now open after a one-year delay. In 2013, a consortium

formed of the Canadian RC, Finnish RC, German RC and Norwegian RC accepted a

prefabricated ERU hospital from the Italian Government via the IFRC, valued at €1.1 million.

Approval and authorisation for the hospital to open finally came from the Jordanian Cabinet,

through Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation on 25th

Sept 2014 and the

hospital was officially opened on October 12th. Since then the Consortium has been scaling up

the medical services comprising the OTP, internal medicine, paediatrics, X-Ray and

Laboratory Services, maternity and surgery services. (The laboratory services and dispensary

had been active for some time before the official opening).

The long delay in opening the hospital has been problematic for the Consortium and all other

partners, including the main funder, ECHO. For UNHCR, the lack of secondary care in the

camp increased costs and, in its view, slowed down the growth of the population in Azraq

camp. UNHCR assumes that the camp population will rise to 30,000, while the IFRC

planning figure for 2015 is 60,00060. On 9 October 2014, Azraq held 14,493 refugees. The

border with Syria was closed on October 31, adding to further uncertainty over the final Azraq camp

population.

The RTE Team heard a wide variety of views with regards to the project, which dominated

discussion of the crisis response in Jordan. A combination of factors led to the delayed

opening:

The authorities’ delayed the opening of the Azraq camp, and it has since been filling

up slowly.

60 judging by the draft revised Federation appeal for Jordan


56

Lack of awareness of, and changing, administrational procedures to achieve

permission to run the hospital. The Secretariat was seen not to move hard or fast

enough to gain the permission required. At the same time, the fact that the JRC was

not involved in the negotiations, plus new requirements introduced by sections of

government apart from the Ministry of Health, all led to the decision on approving

the opening of the hospital ending up before the Jordanian Cabinet.

The benchmark for opening of the hospital was set for a minimum camp population

of 30,000 (based on the average needs of a population for secondary treatment) may

have reduced the pressure to open (the population has still not reached that figure).

The JRC was not involved in the set up or management of the hospital, a decision the

JRC has disputed, and it maintains that the decision to open would have been far

smoother if it had been involved. The JRC is still looking to participate on a small

scale in the hospital.

A high need for secondary treatment amongst refugees leaving Syria only when

treatment was already urgently needed, or, labour was already underway, has made

the need for hospital care even more evident. (UNHCR had to refer people to a

hospital 70km away)

The management of the hospital consortium does not seem to have run smoothly and

it was sometimes slow to make decisions. It took the Secretariat and the consortium

more than 7 months to agree a relatively simple modified service agreement. The

Canadian and Norwegian RCs will continue to support the hospital but have

withdrawn from the consortium arrangement.

The concept of the consortium and the hospital was reasonable, although there were concerns

for some months about whether the Azraq camp, let alone the hospital, would open. The

delayed start has been negative for the reputation of the RCRC in Jordan but hopefully this

can be recovered once the fully-functional hospital proves its value.

Excluding the funds for the hospital structure itself, ECHO and Canadian funding together

came to €8.7 million. Some €2 million has been spent on the tents for the original ERU

hospital, on medical equipment and on additional buildings to complement the main structure.

Some of the medication purchased for the hospital expired before it could be used and was

disposed of (value not known). By mid-September 2014, some €2 million of the original

budget remained. The ECHO funding ends at the end of 2014, with a possible extension to

March 2015. Future resourcing will need to be negotiated soon.

How long the consortium intends to run the hospital is not clear. However, a handover

strategy will need to be developed before long, unless international support is to continue into

the medium term. A handover strategy should be in place at least 12 months before the RC

funding ends.


57

Annex 7 – Country Observations - Turkey By 2 October 2014, UNHCR had registered some 896,702 Syrian refugees61 in Turkey, plus

about 170,000 awaiting registration. The Turkish Government estimates the total number of

Syrian refugees in Turkey to be around 1.6 million. 75% of registered refugees live outside

camps. The Turkish Government, with its national Disaster Management Agency AFAD, is

leading a huge effort to support Syrian refugees.

The Turkish RC (also known as Kizilay) is part of a very large-scale government effort and

works closely with AFAD. The TRC has been given specific responsibilities by government

for nutrition, shelter, and non-food items. Turkish RC has distributed kitchen utensils,

cooking stoves, mini-fridges, fans and other essential household items. In 23 camps, the TRC

is providing e-cards food aid programme reaching some 250,000 people each month, with

supported from WFP since the beginning of the 2013.

The resources devoted by government outweigh many times any international assistance

provided. Government spending so far exceeds US$3 billion, while TRC spend since the start

of the crisis in 2011 is estimated by TRC at US$1 billion, making the total funding via the

IFRC Appeal some 2% of TRC expenditure, or 3% if bilateral contributions are included.

The TRC is aware of the need to also provide assistance outside camps, where the bulk of the

Syrian refugees are living. The authorities have recognised that there is a risk of social

instability if refugees become destitute or local community resentment against refugees grows.

Syrian refugees will soon have the right to work in Turkey.

In 2015, the TRC will open a Community Centre in the same border region as the camps for

Syrians living outside camps, as a pilot project funded from the IFRC Emergency Appeal, to

provide information and psychological support to Syrian citizens living in an town. The

possibility of including Child Friendly Spaces in partnership with UNICEF is under

discussion. Should the pilot prove successful, more community centres will be opened.

In addition to camp operations, since 2013, the so-called ‘zero-point’ operations 62 from

Turkey have been providing substantial relief into northern Syria, though with little or no

chance of monitoring the results by SARC or other Movement actors. The TRC provides all

the customs clearance and transport for zero-point operations on behalf of INGOs.

The engagement of RCRC and non-RCRC with the TRC element of the Turkish government

Syria Crisis operation is summarised as follows:

Place Activity Group Non-Turkish Government Partners

Camps

Shelter UNHCR, IFRC, IOM

Food WFP

NFI IFRC, UNHCR, IOM, GermanRC,

BritRC, NethRC, etc.

Sanitation (Showers and WC) and Hygiene

Promotion (Hygiene Kits) IFRC, UNHCR, IOM, GermanRC,

Psychosocial Support and Remedial

Education (Children Friendly Spaces and

Youth activities)

UNICEF

Off

Camp

Community Centre pilot IFRC, UNICEF

Mobile Kitchen in Suruch IFRC, WFP

61 Use of the term ‘refugee’ is technically incorrect in this context. Turkey has accorded temporary protection

to Syrians on their territory, which precludes forced repatriation, however legally they are not refugees in Turkey

but ‘guests’. 62 ‘zero-point operation’ refers to delivery of relief goods across Turkey up to the border with Syria and collection

by other parties taking the relief goods into Syria. This is in contrast to the UN’s more recent cross border

operations, in which the RCRC does not take part.


58

Zero Point Operation (Transfer of food and

non food items at border)

UNICEF, Save the Children, Mercy Corps

and many other organizations

Other relief activities by branches Local NGOs

The TRC is the sole partner for WFP in the distribution and follow up of ‘e-cards’ for food

assistance. According to WFP it is facing a serious financial shortfall in 2015 (across the

region, not just for Turkey), for which no solution is yet evident. As of late October, WFP

only had funds for the e-card programme to end November 2014.

While the financial contribution of the RCRC partners is tiny compared with the resources

flowing to TRC from government agencies and the UN, as funding becomes tighter, the TRC

is keen to explore new avenues for funding partnerships within the Movement and beyond.

The IFRC Appeal is currently used primarily to fund hygiene kits for use in the camps, for

food support to the refugee influx to Kobane, and for off camp activities. The appeal funds

have also been used to fund 4 three-monthly ‘Impact’ trainings in disaster management and

induction, including elements of the Sphere Standards, for TRC staff joining the operation.

The appeal is also funding the translation of the Sphere handbook into Turkish.

The IFRC Turkey Population Movement Emergency Appeal was first published in its 3rd

revision on 30 June 2014, with a timeframe until 31 December 2015. It is seeking for 41

million CHF in total, of which 15 million are already covered by bilateral contributions and

22 million by multilateral means.

The PNS have supported the TRC with contributions in kind and cash. There is no possibility

of individual PNS opening representations in Turkey, which the TRC does not need and

would not welcome. This is one reason why the IFRC Appeal is relatively well supported,

because PNS have no presence. Bilateral contributions to the TRC operations have come from

the Norwegian, British, Finnish, Swedish, German, and Netherlands RCs.

What works well:

The TRC is responding at scale, handling a significant portion of national and

international assistance to Syrian refugees.

The TRC enjoys strong partnerships with UN partners, especially UNHCR, and

UNICEF and WFP. These working relationships began because initially the UN had

no choice but to partner with TRC. However these partnerships are now close and

TRC is valued for its ‘can-do’ problem-solving attitude.

The IFRC Europe Zone Office has provided specific technical support to the TRC in

disaster management and finance, which has been appreciated. One reporting

delegate, reporting to the zone office, sits in the TRC team office.

The Turkey operation is seen as successful thanks to the high capacity of Kizilay and

its close working relations with the government disaster response agency.

The Reporting Delegate (in reality performing also a liaison role with TRC and RC

partners) has built a good rapport with the TRC and his role seems to be valued. This

is especially important given the good will lost by the IFRC when it closed its

delegation in Turkey some years ago.

The Secretariat has been successful in negotiating two ECHO contributions to the

Turkey appeal

The TRC has followed a clear programmatic approach and plan in its Syria crisis

response. The IFRC Appeal for Turkey is the only one that lists the bilateral

contributions to the response operation in the standard column foreseen for exactly

this purpose in the Revised Appeal Budget Overview63. The Appeal document allows

63 Out of the CHF41m planned to the end of 2015, CHF15m are to be covered by bilateral contributions and

CHF26m by multilateral means


59

an overview on the IFRCs contribution instead of an IFRC Secretariats contribution

only, and, thanks to the cooperation of the PNS involved adds a level of transparency

that the RTE team did not find elsewhere.

Challenges:

With no end in sight of the Syria crisis, the need to support the Syrian refugees will

continue in the medium term in Turkey, as per other neighbouring countries. The

resources available to the TRC are well below those needed to address outstanding

needs of Syrian visitors to Turkey.

The PNS providing funds via the multilateral appeal or bilaterally have had a long

wait to be able to visit camps where their financial support has been utilised. In

October, PNS representatives were able to visit one camp and there were positive

reports of the visit, even though only 7 out of 20 NS took up the opportunity.

The TRC, like other organisations in Turkey, depends on the government for the

analysis of the conditions of refugees. Organisations cannot make their own

assessments. The government assessments can be slow in coming but in the

meantime, the TRC needs to understand the situation and vulnerabilities of refugees

out of camps.


60

Annex 8 – Resource Mobilisation History (See also relevant ‘country observation’ annexes 4-7 above)

Syria Complex Emergency Appeal

The MENA Zone launched the Emergency Appeal for Syria on 6 July 2012, and revised it in

December 2012, July 2013, and again on 18 November 2013 to scale-up support for the

SARC. The current Appeal aims to assist up to 5.4 million beneficiaries until December 2014.

The total budget of the Appeal stood at CHF 106 million, primarily to fund interventions in 1)

Food and Non-Food distributions, 2) Health and 3) Capacity building, but in its recent

revision, has been reduced to CHF97 million64.

Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq Population Movement Appeal

On 9 August 2012, the IFRC launched a Preliminary Emergency Appeal for Lebanon, Jordan

and Iraq to address population movement resulting from the Syria Crisis. The Appeal sought

CHF 3.7 Million for six months to strengthen the capacities of the Jordanian Red Crescent

(JRC), Iraqi Red Crescent, Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) and the Palestinian Red Crescent

(Lebanon branch) to respond to the needs of some 11,000 families in relief, cash transfer,

hygiene promotion and disaster preparedness, and on the capacity building of these National

Societies. This Appeal was revised in January 2013, in May 2013, in November 2013 and

again on 4 July 2014, to cope with the needs of the growing numbers of Syrian refugees and

to support the National Societies of the region who are trying to assist them. The revised

appeal was for CHF 49.2 million to assist 479,350 people with 1) Relief distributions and

cash transfer, 2) Health, 3) Water supply and hygiene promotion, and 4) Capacity building.

The 3-country sub-regional appeal has been discontinued and replaced by separate country

appeals for the three countries, which have been in preparation during the course of the RTE.

Turkey Population Movement Appeal

On 9 November 2012, the Europe Zone launched an Emergency Appeal for Population

Movement seeking CHF 32 million in cash to support Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS)

to assist up to 170,000 people displaced by the Crisis. This Appeal was revised in May 2013,

on 18 November 2013 and again on 30 June 2014, seeking CHF 42 million to assist 250,000

people in camps and in urban areas in Southern Turkey. The Appeal is focused on 1) Relief

distributions and winterization support, 2) Sanitation and hygiene promotion, 3) Health and

Psycho-social support, and 4) Capacity building. In future, the Appeal will also support one

pilot community centre. The Appeal budget now stands at CHF 41 million.

Figure 4 shows the IFRC Emergency Appeal coverage for the region, including how the

budgets for the new country level appeals have evolved from the regional appeal.

64 This is a technical correction due to a change in commodity prices, there is no intended change in activity levels


61

Figure 4

The major PNS multilateral contributors to the appeals were:

Swedish Red Cross, British Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross Society, Netherlands Red Cross,

Norwegian Red Cross, British Red Cross, Danish Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, American

Red Cross, Australian Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, German Red Cross, Austrian Red

Cross, Kuwait Red Crescent Society, Spanish Red Cross.

The major PNS bilateral contributors were (only those reported to the Secretariat)

German Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross Society,

Danish Red Cross, Red Crescent Society of Islamic Republic of Iran, Netherlands Red Cross,

Austrian Red Cross, The Republic of Korea National Red Cross, Swiss Red Cross, Italian

Red Cross.

Other contributions are not recorded and may be substantial, eg those from the Iraqi RC,

Qatar RC, Kuwait RC and UAE RC. These national societies should be asked again for their

contribution data.

ICRC Appeals

For reference, data provided by ICRC shows ICRC Appeals for 2014 as follows:


62

ICRC provisional appeal totals for 2015, not yet approved by the ICRC Assembly, are: Syria,

CHF163.4m, Lebanon CHF45.1m, Jordan, CHF31.8m. (The ICRC has no operations in

Turkey).

Comparison with UN coverage

As of October 30, the UN’s Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP), with a

budget of $2.28 billion, was 39% funded and the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan

(RRP), with a budget of US$3.74 billion, was 53% funded. The funding ratios are therefore

slightly worse than for the IFRC’s Emergency Appeals.


63

Annex 9 – Competing Models of Federation Response

A dominating feature of the Syria crisis response, and the part played in it by the Secretariat,

is competition between sets of assumptions about how the IFRC as whole should engage in

the response to the crisis. There are strong differences of opinion within and between HNS,

PNS, and Secretariat, about the approach to be taken. The two competing models are shown

below:

Model A

Humanitarian Imperative

Model B

National Society

Sovereignty

Humanitarian Needs

determine IFRC Response

National Society capacity,

intentions, and needs

determine IFRC response

In Model A, all parts of the Federation are mobilised to mount a response that comes as close

as possible to meeting the humanitarian needs of the populations affected, in those sectors in

which the IFRC is competent. This model is driven by the humanitarian imperative65. The

end goal is the maximum assistance to the maximum number of people affected, in

coordination with other actors, leading to an exit when/if needs decline.

Model B recognises the humanitarian needs but places the emphasis on the capacity and

intentions of the National Society to determine the scale of the response. Parallel responses

mounted by other actors of the IFRC are not considered and are not seen as appropriate. In

Model B, the IFRC response is scaled to fit within the capacity of the HNS, while, as far as

possible, working to expand the capacity of HNS, according to the wishes of HNS leadership.

The end goal is gradual, sustainable growth in HNS capacity, including for emergency

response (or disaster management in IFRC parlance). Anything going against the wishes of

the NS is seen as ‘anti’ the Unity principle.

The difference between these two models is far from academic; the adoption of Model B for

the Syria crisis has profoundly affected the IFRC’s response, influencing every aspect of how

the HNS, IFRC Secretariat and PNS have responded to this crisis, and may continue to affect

the IFRC response into the future.

In reality, there is a spectrum between Models A and B and no part of the IFRC engaged in

the Syria crisis is working purely to one model or the other. Some HNS have come under

some pressure from the Secretariat and the PNS to expand their services, and all have taken

on some new services, on a large or small scale, that 18 months ago they might not have seen

themselves undertaking. So, the IFRC approach has not been 100% Model B, but heavily

weighted towards it.

Inside Syria and Turkey, the difference between the two models is not great in practice, given

that, while Model B is dominant, in line with government policy, the NS are responding with

services at the same order of magnitude as the needs, even if many needs remain unmet. In

Lebanon and Jordan, Model B is also dominant but the difference between the magnitude of

the response and the humanitarian needs is much greater.

65 The RCRC principle of Humanity includes the right to receive and to give humanitarian assistance. It states the

obligation of the international community “to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed”. The only

explicit reference found to ‘humanitarian imperative’ is in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross

and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief


64

Once the commitment to Model B is understood, the reasons for other features of the IFRC

response become clear, including why some of processes now regarded as standard by other

humanitarian organisations are not, or only partially, in place for the IFRC response to the

Syria crisis as illustrated in Table 2 below:

Function

Required for an ‘at

scale’ response?

Ie Model A

Required for

response based on

HNS capacity?

Ie Model B

Rapid response Yes Yes within the

capacity of the NS

Country-wide, multi sector needs assessment Yes No

Analysis of driving forces behind the conflict Yes No

Overarching strategic RCRC approach Yes No

Mapping of other organisation activities and resources Yes No

Analysis of service gaps Yes At local level

Analysis of vulnerabilities by eg gender, disability, age Yes Yes

Determination of RCRC competence to close gaps Yes Limited

Operational coordination with other organisations in

RCRC sectors

Yes Limited to avoiding

overlap in specific

communities

Monitoring of RCRC activities Yes Yes

Reporting of RCRC activities Yes Yes

Reporting of gaps Yes No

Determination of RCRC impact Yes Yes

Regional strategy for RCRC response Yes No – strategy is led

by individual NS

Advocacy with government Yes No

Advocacy with HCT Yes No

Local/community strategy for RCRC response Yes Yes

Regional humanitarian diplomacy/ communications

plan

Yes Yes

HNS development plan/activities to increase response

capacity

Yes Yes

Table 2 – Functions required under Models A and B

The Secretariat has not succeeded in providing an alternative middle way between Models A

and B that respects the role of the HNS, while providing significant additional response

capacity in parallel to that of the HNS using the Secretariat and the PNS. This is where the

Secretariat could and should be exercising leadership. The HNS themselves are more open to

greater engagement of Movement partners than in the earlier stages of the crisis.

The tensions between Models A and B reflect contradictions within some of the fundamental

documents of the Movement. Model B is in line with:

The RCRC Principles and Rules For Humanitarian Assistance, Para. 3.2 “The

International Federation shall promote and support the strengthening of National

Societies’ capacities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster response”

and


65

Article 5.4 of the Constitution ‘In each country the International Federation shall act

through or in agreement with the National Society and in conformity with the laws of

that country.’

Model A, on the other hand, conforms to other elements of the Constitution and the PRHA:

Article 5.1.B.a) under Humanitarian activities: ‘bring relief by all available means to

all disaster-affected persons’; and ‘organise, co-ordinate and direct international relief

actions in accordance with the Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent

Humanitarian Assistance’.

PRDR 1.8 “National Societies through the International Federation shall call for Red

Cross Red Crescent assistance where the humanitarian consequences of a disaster

cannot be met by its resources or those of domestic partners, in a timely manner,

appropriate scale or in accordance with applicable standards.”

PRDR 3.8 ‘Where the International Federation considers that a National Society has

not requested international assistance adequate to the scale and impact of the disaster,

the International Federation shall make its concerns known to the National Society

and propose appropriate action to be taken in order to respond to the humanitarian

needs of the affected people.’


66

Annex 10 – Secretariat Leadership

In response to the draft version of the RTE report, requests made for further explanation of

how the Secretariat can exert leadership in situations where HNS do not request support even

when crises exceed their capacity to respond. This Annex was added to the report in response.

The IFRC cannot claim to be the effective as the world’s largest humanitarian network if the

Secretariat is not in a position to harness and coordinate the resources from that network. In

order for this to happen there needs to be an effective way of bringing those resources into

play. This should be the job of the Secretariat in crisis response. Whether the Secretariat is

leading this process, or it is accompanying the HNS in doing so, the role needs to be

performed. The Secretariat has knowledge, skills and experience in international

coordination and should therefore always have an important role to play. The HNS electing

not to make use of the network’s resources is not a valid reason for not doing so, unless

government decision, very poor security, or other external factors prevent it.

The issue of leadership comes back to the role of the Secretariat and to the question posed in

the main report ‘‘What job exactly, is the IFRC Secretariat in the zone and country there to

perform during a major crisis?’ (section 5.4). While anyone in the role of zone or country

director needs a high level of influencing, facilitation and negotiation skill, it is the question

of role that needs to be addressed first.

As the individual national society has gained more power within the Federation compared

with the Secretariat and the governance bodies, the tendency is increasingly for RCRC actions

in any country to be determined solely by the HNS66. This situation arises in part because of

how the Secretariat has projected its role. Over the past decade, the Secretariat appears less

the voice of the whole international federation and more a channel for services to national

societies, according to their requests.

While this may be appropriate for national society development, during a major crisis that

exceeds the response capacity of the national society, it is not. The first task of the Secretariat

should be to help harness and coordinate the resources available from across the international

federation to meet the needs of people affected by the crisis, while giving full respect to the

local national society. However, ‘full respect’ cannot mean just following the preferences of

the HNS. Humanitarian needs come first.

The national society may be limited in the scope of its activities by its legal mandate. In

cases of major emergencies, it may be that the government will allow or request the NS to go

beyond its original mandate, or the NS may be able to negotiate to do so, with Secretariat

assistance if needed. National societies operating internationally may have capacity and

expertise outside the mandate of the HNS that can be harnessed. It may be that the

government of the crisis-affected country does not even know that there is an international

RCRC federation with resources to draw on, or how to access it. Here there is scope for the

Secretariat to play its role in Humanitarian Diplomacy with, or on behalf of the HNS.

It is at the governance level that the role of the Secretariat needs to be re-discussed, as should

take place through the SMCC process. Without waiting for the outcomes of the SMCC

process, however, more immediate progress could be made through a fuller application of the

current Director/HOD job descriptions. (The responsibilities listed below are extracted from

the MENA Zone Director job description).

66 The ICRC provides an alternative channel for humanitarian assistance and, by mandate, is able to take whatever

measures are deemed necessary, though in practice, this is done in consultation and cooperation with the HNS.


67

Responsibility Comment

Coordinate and, where appropriate, lead

efforts to effectively respond to humanitarian

disasters

Ensure that the zone response to major

disasters is in line and coordination with

global and regional systems and policies.

Monitor adherence of the membership to

Federation-wide agreed performance and

accountability standards aimed at ensuring

relevant and effective delivery of RC/RC

disaster response and development

programmes

Ensure overall compliance with Movement

and Federation strategies, plans, regulations,

procedures and standards

The Secretariat has a coordination and where

needed leadership role in disaster response

and makes sure that the IFRC membership

follows systems and policies, including the

Principles and Rules for Humanitarian

Response.

Facilitate partnerships and alliances and

represent the Federation secretariat in the

zone to Movement partners, relevant inter-

governmental bodies, international

organisations, as well as international media.

…representing the Federation secretariat to

all relevant governmental and

intergovernmental authorities, international

organisations as well as international media. Provide guidance and advice to National

Societies in their relationships with

governments, the UN and other

intergovernmental agencies.

The Secretariat is in touch with and

establishing partnerships with international

bodies and organisations to further the

perception and performance of the RCRC in

the zone (or country). In principle, the

Secretariat relates directly to governments,

not just through the HNS. The Secretariat is

active in bringing the NS into contact with

(which should include a measure of

coordination with) UN and intergovernmental

bodies

Following up on these points would go a long way to strengthening Secretariat leadership at

zone and country level with regard to the IFRC Syria crisis response. This would almost

certainly encourage greater PNS financial support.


68

Annex 11 - The Movement Advisory Platform (MAP)

The RCRC Movement conference of December 2012 requested regular and structured

coordination within and beyond Syria. The Movement Advisory Platform was set up in

response, with the purpose of ensuring that Movement components were up to date on

challenges and needs in connection with the response in Syria.

Movement conferences on Syria and neighbouring countries were organised in Geneva in

December 2012 and May 2013, with the participation of 24 National Societies. Partners

agreed to aim to hold these conferences every quarter, though in practice this has not

happened. A National Societies Consultative Meeting to discuss the impact of the crisis on

neighbouring countries took place in Amman, Jordan in March 2013. Further MAP meetings

took place in Geneva in December 2013 and in Beirut in May 2014.

The MAP process is judged by almost all informants to have been ineffective and inefficient

and the large conferences/meetings were widely criticised as wasteful ‘talk shops’. However,

largely thanks to the ICRC, the May 2014 meeting did manage to agree to a commitment to

expand Movement activities for the Syria crisis by 2015 by 50%, and the appointment of a

small Steering Group, comprising 3 PNS representatives, the regional/zone heads of ICRC

and Secretariat, and one NS Secretary-General from the region. The larger MAP meetings,

while ineffective in practical terms, did create some political momentum for a Movement

wide approach to the Syria crisis that the Steering Group, with the HNS concerned, is trying

to take forward.

The MAP meetings appear to have been convened without the preparation necessary to make

them productive. One of the challenges was simply the size of the meetings. After the last

MAP meeting, the Steering Group May 2014 meeting decided that discussions should

continue in a smaller group, the ‘mini-MAP’, which met in Geneva October 27-28 2014. Its

decisions included:

Country plans should be developed for Syria and each of the neighbouring countries67

by early 2015, with a further mini-MAP meeting to be held in Q1 2015. The format

of the plans will be tailored to country context as needed.

MENA Zone Office and ICRC Beirut are to develop Terms of Reference for resource

person(s) who will be made available by IFRC/ICRC to support HNS in the

development of country plans68.

A further attempt will be made to advance Movement-wide reporting, taking Lebanon

as a model

The Movement Communications strategy was revived, including through the website

www.redforsyria.org.

The practical cooperation between ICRC and the Secretariat in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and

Iraq at working level in support of the HNS is positive for the chances of reaching Movement

wide plans for these countries.

In advance of the mini-MAP meeting, the Movement response and plans at the country level

for the Syria crisis were conceived as follows69:

67 National Societies of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt, plus the Palestinian Red Crescent 68 based on verbal feedback from the meeting. The minutes of the meeting are unlikely to be published before this

report is finalised 69 as shared with the HNS concerned in advance of the mini-MAP meeting.


69

Both the Secretariat and the ICRC are clear that the idea of joint appeals for the Syria crisis is

a step too far at this stage but the IFRC and ICRC have a joint task team looking into these

issues. In the meantime, it will be necessary to ensure that different funding sources can be

mapped against the jointly agreed objectives in the country plans, and hence, very important

that PNS are included in the discussions of the country plans, as they emerge.

The MAP process, including the development of country plans and a regional chapeau to

those plans, represents a major opportunity that must not be lost. Well managed, the MAP

process will provide:

improved planning and strategy for the Syria crisis,

planning for a 3-year term, rather than just for the short term, in recognition of the

long term nature of the crisis

potential for increased financial resources by presenting donors with a cogent range

of plans for response across the crisis and across the Movement

better alignment of Movement actors, and therefore more efficient implementation

with fewer service gaps than before

further joined up and Movement wide communications

consensus on the way forward between HQ, region and country levels

development of greater trust and cooperation between the Secretariat and ICRC.

Given this potential, every effort should be taken to make the MAP process succeed.

It was sensible to reduce the size of the MAP meetings but this should not make the process a

closed shop. The communications before the min-MAP were kept to a tight circle. It was

notable that during interviews for the RTE, not one informant could explain what the

proposed country plans were supposed to contain. Others were not aware of the MAP

Steering Group decisions.

From here on, the process and intended outcomes of the MAP process need much wider

communication across and within the HNS, PNS, and between different levels of the ICRC

and Secretariat, to make sure they are understood, even while some of the details (for

example planning formats) are still emerging. If Movement partners are to get behind the

country plans they cannot be presented with a fait accompli produced only by a small group.

Here again the use of external facilitation may be helpful. The process of communicating the

outcomes of the MAP meetings also needs speeding up.

It would be advisable to have a straightforward skeleton format for the country plans before

the process of agreeing them begins. While each country has different needs, there should be

components common to all plans, so that a coherent regional projection of the plans can be

made.


70

Annex 12 – PNS Consortia

The concept of the PNS consortium, whereby NS group together to undertake a programme

or raise funds together, usually with one NS designated as manager, is well established. The

Syria crisis response has given rise to a number of PNS consortia, in various forms. They are

a manifestation of a general trend amongst PNS to, in their view, make bilateral work more

efficient or effective and/or to increase the chances of obtaining funds. The trend towards

consortia is an important development, worth trying to understand.

The Norwegian and German RCs have formed a close partnership for their work with SARC,

with a joint representative in-country and a limited number of delegates, the two NS have

combined their considerable bilateral funding into one programme with SARC. The two NS

make a virtue of combining German government significant but short term funding with a 6-

month lifespan and Norwegian funding, which is lower volume but can be used over 15

months. In addition, the Danish RC leads a consortium in Syria with the German RC, the

Norwegian RC and the Secretariat.

The Hospital Consortium of 4 NS (Finnish, German, Norwegian and Canadian RC) was

formed for the field hospital ERU for the Azraq Refugee Camp in Jordan. The Finnish RC

signed the ECHO contract and is the sole partner responsible to ECHO. (See also Annex 6).

Other consortia have developed around ECHO funding applications in context of the Syria

Response. In 2013 and 2014, groups of National Societies 70 and the Secretariat worked

together to apply for funding of RCRC Syria response activities in the neighbouring countries.

The Secretariat was asked to take the lead in coordinating the application and to act as

contracting partner for ECHO. This did not work as the Secretariat was not able to reduce its

6.5% PSSR share (which would have left 0.5% for the PNS, from the 7% overhead allowed

by ECHO), and so the French RC took on the leadership of the consortium. The 2013

application was not successful, while a 2014 application received 1 million Euros out of 5.3

million applied for. In the 2014 contract, the Secretariat applied to be an implementing

partner for the Jordan CTP, but that part was not approved by ECHO.

In other less visible PNS consortia, ‘silent partners’ have added funds into other bilateral NS

projects, such as Austrian RC contribution to the Swiss RC CTP investment in Jordan, and to

the Netherlands RC programming in Lebanon, and British RC passing funding for livelihoods

to the Danish RC in Syria.

Potentially, there are advantages to the HNS from PNS Consortia:

As with all bilateral assistance, once funding is assured there is a set budget, with

which both the PNS and HNS can plan. The IFRC Appeal, while setting a target, is

frequently under funded and less predictable as a funding source.

The HNS may gain the benefit of increased bilateral funding from multiple PNS

without having to manage relationships with all the PNS funding (though still more

than with multilateral funding).

The consortium approach can be seen as the PNS inventing an alternative IFRC multilateral

programming to the IFRC Appeal. At the same time, some PNS would still prefer to fund a

more effective and less costly Secretariat. They don't feel this is available to them, and as a

result they try to increase efficiency, effectiveness, and funding levels for their bilateral work

via temporary NS partnerships.

70 In 2013, the consortium comprised 6PNS, LRC, JRC, Iraqi RC. In 2014, the consortium was made up from 8

PNS, JRC, LRC and the Secretariat


71

In the Syria crisis response, the European NS asked the IFRC Secretariat to take the lead in

ECHO applications but not to keep the whole 6.5 % PSSR for itself. However, the Secretariat

in the region (reportedly on instruction from HQ) declined to lower the percentage and were

left out as a result, leaving a PNS as the lead applicant for the consortium. This leaves the

Secretariat – in the best case – as a partner in a group application, acting more or less as

another PNS.

The Secretariat in the region considers that the PNS should support the IFRC Appeals and

offer to fund delegates required in the zone and country offices. For the PNS to do this to a

greater extent than now, the MENA Zone office will need to take an approach to planning and

coordination that the PNS themselves consider more relevant and effective. As PNS gain

more experience and make more use of consortia, the Secretariat runs the risk of becoming

less relevant as a funding channel.


72

Annex 13 – Raising standards in IFRC Planning

IFRC planning tools need updating given that they have evolved relatively little since 2000.

In terms of the understanding of what makes for quality humanitarian response, the IFRC

may have lost ground relative to other actors. IFRC staff do not seem to understand the UN

humanitarian reforms and transformative agenda and the several parallel quality initiatives led

by INGOs (some of which have been hosted by the Secretariat), or their implications for how

humanitarian ‘industry standards’ have changed. If the Syria crisis response is representative,

the Secretariat has not responded with sufficiently extensive improvements to Federation

systems, with the exception of the Emergency Plan of Action, which is certainly an advance.

With regard to the Syria crisis response:

The Federation has struggled to present a cogent picture of the totality of its plans and

achievements, nor are there yet common goals. The latest country level Emergency

Plans of Action do show progress in presenting a fuller Federation wide approach and

the MAP-led country planning process should go further.

Overt commitment to standards, in particular the Sphere Standards, and to

accountability to beneficiaries is generally absent from Federation Appeals and

EPOA (there are mentions of beneficiary feedback from Syria and Turkey).

The PNS have been demanding more by way of strategy from the Secretariat but do

not feel that a strategic approach has been adopted. (There is no agreement of what

‘strategic means here’)

Outside implementing partner arrangements, the Federation plans and appeals seldom

show how they complement government, UN, and INGO action

If the RCRC volunteer network provides a unique community presence and

perspective, this is not well justified in Federation documents.

RCRC assessments and plans need more ‘granularity’ below the headline numbers. Appeals

and EPOAs need better analysis of needs by age, gender, disability, rural versus urban needs

etc, and better developed strategies for addressing these needs, especially now that the crisis

has moved beyond emergency response, at least in the neighbouring countries. Investing in

quality improvements in these areas would pay dividends in terms of donor support.

The best example identified during the RTE of needs assessment comes from Jordan, 2013,

where the JRC and multiple PNS took part in a joint needs assessment, using a British RC

sponsored consultant.

In addition to improving the current tools, the Federation needs an additional tool; a ‘risk

register’ of countries most at risk of crisis or disaster, where risks are assessed (or

assessments are borrowed from elsewhere, see for example the Index Risk Management

Initiative71), and matched with the response than can be expected from particular National

Societies in the high risk countries. This would then form the basis of a discussion with these

NS about how an emergency response would be scaled up.

If the Federation had had such a register at the start of the Syria crisis, it would not have been

surprised by the very different scales of humanitarian response by the HNS in the region, and

would have had plans in place on how to provide additional capacity to particular HNS.

71 http://inform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/About-us

http://inform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/About-us


73

Annex 14 - The Observer Role of the Federation

The IFRC has an observer role in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)72. As a

consequence, the Federation Secretariat, in the form of the Head of Delegation, is normally

asked to represent the Federation at the country-level Humanitarian Country Team (HCT),

which is chaired by the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator73.

The HNS/Secretariat attendance at the HCT and the sector working groups or clusters under

the HCT, was not consistent in any of the four countries reviewed. There seemed to be a

mixture of reasons for this: some staff say they are too busy to attend, others did not see the

purpose, while others stated that it was not their role, as the HNS was in the lead.

It appears that the Federation is not making the best use of its potential influence in these

forums, in part because participants are not sure what role they are supposed to be playing

beyond information sharing. The impression gained from RC and partner interviews is that

the RCRC participants tend to be passive.

The only limit on the ‘observer’ role of the Federation is that it cannot take part in HCT

decision-making, but otherwise it can play a full part in

explaining RCRC activities and advocating for its role,

influencing the approach and focus of the HCT,

contributing to needs assessment, analysis and strategy of the HCT, plus spotting

openings for new activities or partnerships.

In the offices visited, Federation participants were not being briefed on how to prepare for

and exploit the humanitarian diplomacy opportunities these meetings provide. There did not

seem to be a vision for doing so.

The Federation is not part of the UN planning and appeal systems but could use its observer

role to influence and to learn from the UN planning processes. As part of playing a more

relevant and influential role in inter-agency forums, the Secretariat needs to clarify for its

staff and the PNS what the ‘observer’ role means.

The evaluation found specific examples of active Federation contributions to sector working

groups74. In Jordan, the health delegate contributes actively to the health sector working

group, and chairs the Community Based Health Task Group. In Lebanon, various PNS take

part in working groups, in particular those designated lead by the LRC for a particular sector.

(However, a number of PNS may attend the same working group without having first

coordinated their inputs, running the risk of the Federation appearing fragmented). The PNS

have asked the Zone Office in Lebanon to provide position statements for the sector working

groups but without progress so far.

72 As does the ICRC 73 In principle, the Federation could be represented by the HNS with or instead of the Secretariat, or by a PNS on a

case-by-case basis, with the agreement of other national societies (ICRC representation being separate). 74 Sector working groups are more informal than the HCT. The ‘observer’ role is not as relevant and to in intents

and purpose the HNS, PNS and Federation participants can consider themselves on a par with other participants.