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LIBYAN OPERATION AS A RHETORICAL OPPORTUNITY: OPERATION EL DORADO

CANYON, TERRORISM AND MU’AMMAR AL-QADHAFI

Sidney Fussell

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Executive Summary

Operation El Dorado Canyon was launched on April 15th, 1986 by President Ronald

Reagan. The Operation’s objective was the death of Libyan dictator Colonel Muammar al-

Qadhafi, his cabinet members and his family. The operation was unsuccessful; Qadhafi and his

family fled and later resurfaced and resumed his dictatorship. President Ronald Reagan’s tactics

against the dictator, however, accounted for more than simply dropping bombs – Reagan’s

comments on terrorism and Qadhafi himself created a narrative on the nature of terrorism that

exists to this day and is especially relevant following Qadhafi’s October 2011 death. Reagan

used heavily moralized language that evoked images of villainy when discussing Libya,

implying to his audience that the nature of the relationship between the United States and Libya

follows the simple good/evil dichotomy of popular fiction. This myopic perspective worked not

only to simplify the complexities of international affairs between the two nations, but illustrated

Reagan’s attempt to force a paradigmatic shift away from intellectualism in understanding

current affairs.

Chiefly, when discussing Operational El Dorado itself, Reagan emphasizes the amoral

savagery of Libyan terror and the righteous, “last-resort” retaliatory nature of the Libyan

airstrikes. The contrast here is purposeful, meant to highlight American morality and villianize

Libyan tactics, with no discussion of the nature of causes of terrorist tactics – especially

American complicity or a historical context. This same dichotomy is present as Reagan discusses

terror itself, erasing possibility of a nuanced, contextualized understanding and instead making

non-violent approaches to resolution seem impossible (especially considering the inherent

amorality of terrorist nations). These rhetorical tactics work in tandem to create what the paper

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describes as “Reagan’s Qadhafi,” a monolith of mercurial cruelty that requires every resource

the United States can muster to defeat. The paper will argue that the creation of Reagan’s

Qadhafi, contrasted with Reagan’s exaltation of American force, works to advance

conservative objectives of American hegemony though military strength and moral

superiority. Additionally, it is argued, rhetorical tactics of de-historicization, justification

of American actions and false binaries shift the discourse away from critical debate and

toward a pathos-driven understanding of the complexities surrounding Operation El-

Dorado Canyon.

The Rhetoric and the Reality of Terror

Following the death of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi in October 2011, President

Barack Obama announced to the American public that Qadhafi’s death “marks the end of a long

and painful chapter for the people of Libya” remarking that “the dark shadow of tyranny has

been lifted. With this enormous promise,” the president continues, “the Libyan people now have

a great responsibility to build an inclusive and tolerant and democratic Libya that stands as the

ultimate rebuke to Qaddafi’s dictatorship.”1 It would be difficult to find comments from any

politician remarking on Qadhafi’s death that isn’t colored with similar diction of morality or

commentary of the evils of totalitarian leadership. Expressive language may appear warranted

given the Libyan colonel’s notoriety as a tyrant, terrorist and “mad dog,” as called by President

Reagan. However, these words are not simple summary of Qadhafi’s actions or even subjective

commentary on the fallen “king of kings of Africa.” These words are strategies repeated to the

1 Muammar Qadhafi death: world reaction. (2011, October 20). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15390864

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American public for decades, with specific rhetorical objectives meant to form our

conceptualization of both our enemy and ourselves.

What is tyranny? What is terror? For Americans, the narrative provided by President

Obama provides definitions by example. The Libyans are oppressed by the “shadow” (read:

darkness, subterfuge, conspiracy) of “tyranny” (read: imprisonment, overbearing rule, slavery) of

a “mad dog” (read: insanity, violence, inhumanity). The Qadhafi of the American imagination is

a paragon of both power and madness. He is the antithesis to our values of liberty and heroism.

Any American with any degree of familiarity with the name “Qadhafi” will likely describe him

as a “terrorist.” But what specific crimes has he committed? And against whom? The rhetoric of

“terrorist” has replaced knowledge of his actual acts of terror. But this ignorance isn’t incidental.

The immediate alignment of Qadhafi with terrorist, terrorist with evil, and evil with them (as

opposed to us) is the result of dual rhetorical and military campaigns dating back to Qadhafi’s

rise to power in Libya during the 1960s. Qadhafi was unwaveringly opposed to Western

imperialism and endeavored (often to the suspicion of neighboring countries and the United

States) for pan-Arab unity in North Africa. His means for doing so, as will be discussed later,

include warfare and military action – even against his own people.

Libya and the United States

Although the airstrikes of Operation El Dorado canyon were key in the cessation of

amicable interactions between the United States and Libya, and chiefly created the rhetorical

opportunity of villianizing Libya through conservative rhetoric, several important events

preceded the bombings and characterized the deteriorating relationship between the two nations,

beginning with the Carter administration. As explained in the exquisitely detailed El Dorado

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Canyon: Reagan’s Undeclared Way on Gadaffi by Joseph Stanik, Qadhafi’s rapid ascension to

power and his populist pan-Arab appeals made him a very conspicuous figure in international

affairs.

Qadhafi began his career as a military officer, joining Libya’s Revolutionary Command

Council (RCC), a body dedicated to overthrowing the previous conservative monarchy led by

Muhammad Idris. Although little more than a figure head while Libya was under Italian colonial

rule, Idris came to formal power following allegiance with the Allied Forces during World War

II. In exchange for support in a bid for Libyan independence, Idris pledged the Libyan Arab

Force to the Allied Forces, resulting in massive Libyan casualties in the desert battles between

British and Italian forces. Upon the withdrawal of Italian troops, Libya petitioned the United

Nations for recognition of formal sovereignty and, in 1952; Idris became the first head of state of

the independent United Kingdom of Libya. 2

The RCC modeled the newly republic Libya after the teachings of revolutionary Egyptian

president Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser was an Arab nationalism and believed in pan-Arab unity

under the commonalities of Islam. Additionally, he was stridently opposed to imperial

intervention in the Arab world, nationalizing British and French owned assets in Egypt and using

military force to contain Communist influence in North Africa. Qadhafi employed similar

populist messages as he rose in popularity among the Libyan people, vowing to end the

corruption of the current West-leaning monarchy.

2 Stanik, J. (2003). El dorado canyon : Reagan's undeclared war with qaddafi. . (pp. 6-20). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institue Press.

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Qadhafi’s rise to power coincided with unprecedented wealth for Libya, as revenues from

commercial oil development greatly increase the resources and power of Qadhafi and the RCC.

Qadhafi used this power to hasten Libya’s independence from Western bodies, ending World

War II era agreements with Great Britain and the United States and gaining control of the

Wheelus Air Base, originally under American control. Eager to amass military strength as well,

Qadhafi approached the Soviet Union for arms, reaching the first agreement in 1974. By 1983

Libya had purchased nearly $13 Billion in arms from the Soviet Union.

Ties to the Soviet Union, particularly in the context of warfare, were especially alarming

to the Reagan Administration, whose policies reflect a decidedly more interventionist approach

to international relations than the previous Carter administration. Reagan himself made the

dismantling of the Soviet Union a top priority for both his terms, calling them “a society which

wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand

and dominate other nations."3

But while Qadhafi’s North African excursions and Moscow dealings certainly soured his

relationship with the American government, the La Belle bombing is cited as Reagan himself as

necessitating American intervention. On April 5th 1986, La Belle, a German nightclub frequented

by American soldiers, was destroyed by explosives – killing two American soliders, a Turkish

woman, and wounding upwards of 200 people, roughly 50 of whom were part of American

Armed Forces. Reagan would go on to condemn these actions as “cowardly and murderous,”

faulting not only Libya as a whole but Qadhafi himself. The statement issued to the press on

3 Stanik, J. (2003). El dorado canyon : Reagan's undeclared war with qaddafi. . (pp. 33-51). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institue Press.

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April 14 repeats this, saying “Libya bears direct responsibility for the bombing in West Berlin

[and] in light of this reprehensible act of violence … the United States has chosen to exercise its

right of self-defense.” Relations between the two nations had become increasingly tense, with

the La Belle bombing seen as the specific inciting incident (reportedly) leading to American

intervention.

RHETORICAL OVERVIEW

Ronald Reagan’s framing of Operation El Dorado Canyon went beyond the simple tactics

of sanitization and selective disclosure. Reagan used El Dorado Canyon as illustrations that

exemplify the nature of the United States, of Libya, of himself and of Qadhafi through moral

lenses that worked to create a narrative for the public that would give fidelity to his career-long

goals of American military hegemony and reduced government. This same strategy would also

give narrative consistency to the rhetorical strategies of American exceptionalism and inherent

moral superiority, which Reagan has used in his speeches throughout his career. The first tactic

under analysis is Ronald Reagan’s ‘justification rhetoric,’ present in nearly all of his discourse

on Libya and El Dorado Canyon. Reagan’s rhetoric of justification has multiple effects: First, it

assures Americans of their own peaceful nature, transforming the perspective Americans have

of the functions of military and it contrasts us from Libya in a way that reinforces our own self-

image as savior.

Justification Rhetoric

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Analysis of Reagan’s Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against

Libya4 is foundational in understanding his rhetorical justifications for El Dorado Canyon.

As the greatest military strength in the world, it would be easy to perceive aggressive military

actions against a much smaller nation as excessive. Thusly, to garner support, Reagan assures

the audience of the merciful nature of the United States, justifying our actions as a “last resort,”

an act of “self-defense” and in the best interest for all nations. This functions not only to justify

not only El Dorado Canyon itself, but works as self-assurance to the nation as it reframes our

military actions as moral goods, regardless of the collateral damage.

Reagan sought to display for his audiences an American moral compass that guided

the nation’s military to good deeds and made them reluctant to use military force as a means

of domination. Reagan begins the address recounting the familiar narrative of the “monstrous

brutality” of Qadhafi’s “reign of terror” and his “record of subversion and aggression.“ Reagan

is consciously making a connection between the military actions of a state and the morality

of its actors. Reagan called the German bombing a “massacre” that “put [Qadhafi] outside

the company of civilized men.” Reagan then juxtaposes the amorality of Qadhafi and the

German bombing with a description of the American response, saying Americans conducted a

“concentrated and carefully targeted [operation that] minimized casualties among the Libyan

people,” saying that although Americans are “slow to anger,” but to “ignore the slaughter of

American civilians…is simply not in the American tradition.” Here he is creating contrasting

definitions for his audience: Americans act out of “self-defense,” while Qadhafi and Libyans

simply act out – using violence and terrorism to threaten peace.

4 “Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya.” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

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Reagan maintains consistency in rhetorically transforming the offensive strike into

an act of defense. When addressing members of the American business conference the day

after the bombing, Reagan said “America’s policy has been and remains to use only force as a

last…resort., we would prefer not to repeat the events of last night.”5 In addition to repackaging

offense as defense, Reagan notes a “policy,” without citing any specific documents of course,

of military strength as a last resort. This implies a historical propensity for temperance and

patience, not hot-headed reaction. The purpose here is to speak not just to America’s history, but

its identity. We are a nation of the temperate. We are not a tempestuous hegemonic force in the

world, we are loathe to use our own force. This is evinced by our (completely uncited) “policy”

and untold history of “force as a last resort.” As the audiences for this speech are American

citizens, talk of our merciful forbearance is tantamount, specifically when justifying the bombing

of a poor Arab nation 6,000 miles away by the greatest military power in the world.

The American moral compass guides us to react only when backed into a corner with

no other options. Reagan describes America’s cornered position by detailing the “atrocities”

Qadhafi has committed without impediment: “We tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation,

economic sanctions and demonstrations of military force. None succeeded. Despite our

repeated warnings, Qadhafi continued his reckless policy of intimidation.”6 By emphasizing the

unprovoked and repeated actions taken by Qadhafi and his military forces, Reagan implies the

need for proportionality between the US and Libya: our actions must match the strength of his

5 Remarks at a White House Meeting With Members of the American Business Conference.” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

6 “Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya.” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

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if we are to defeat Qadhafi’s forces. La Belle was not an isolated event, but one of a series of

crimes for which Qadhafi must answer and that we cannot ignore.

Reagan is explicit in discussing the necessity of our intervention, saying: “When our

citizens are abused or attacked anywhere in the world, we will respond…self-defense is not

only our right, it is our duty.”7 Our actions are justified because justice is not only our burden, it

is our identity. This connects with his “slow to anger” comments, working together to reframe

El Dorado Canyon as justified reaction, not vengeful action. These characterizations assure

audiences that we are a peaceful nation and flows consistently with Reagan’s paradoxical

“peace through strength” platform wherein conspicuous displays of strength deter enemies from

attacking America and its allies.

The first half of the ‘rhetoric of justification’ ultimately works to inflate the American

ego as a benevolent guardian battling the forces of terror. Unsurprisingly, the best of America

is seen in its military. A long-time champion of defense spending and traditional patriotism,

Reagan lauds the military as the reluctant peacekeepers working to protect American values.

But every hero needs a villain, and ours is embodied in Qadhafi. Alongside the hagiographic

re-characterization of the American military is commentary on Qadhafi’s terrorist action that

hyperbolizes the threat against American citizens, lending both legitimacy and urgency to the

crusade against him. Thusly, Reagan’s rhetorical work is to position America and Qadhafi as

opposing forces, almost cosmic in scope. American aggression is then valorized as a work of

justice, while Libya and Qadhafi’s actions are cowardly and abhorrent.

7 …

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Ronald Reagan presents the American military as paragons of defense and forbearance,

serving his purpose of justifying America’s position as global peacekeeper. In his radio

address on National Armed Forces Day, which occurred a month to the day after his Address

to the Nation concerning Libya, Reagan says American military history “has been largely

one not just of great battlefield victories but victories in the name of something beyond

conquest or self-interest.” 8 This address is especially noteworthy for Reagan’s mention of

“appropriations necessary to rebuild America’s defenses,” and his laudation of “the American

people…committed to national defense and that we stand behind those who wear our country’s

uniforms.” This is a deliberate conflation of patriotism and support for American dominance via

the military, and uncovers politics strategizing to increase military spending. Linking patriotism

to the military and briefly mentioning two soldiers who lost their lives “in a raid on Libyan

terrorists” exactly one month after the Libyan airstrike showcase Operation El Dorado Canyon as

Reagan saw it: an opportunity to both exercise and gain support for American military action.

Reagan’s praise of military strength continues as he presents a false dichotomy that

overlooks his dismissal of creative conversations on how to fight terrorism, implying that not

only can military force end terrorism, it is the only viable way to do so. In his address, Reagan

says “It is said that by imposing sanctions against Colonel Qadhafi or by striking at his terrorist

installations we only magnify the man’s importance, that the proper way to deal with him is to

ignore him. I disagree.”9 Reagan presents so few options for handling terrorism that, given the

8 Radio Address to the Nation on Armed Forces Day.” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

9 Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya.” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

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enormity of Qadhafi’s propensity for terror and violence, non-violent actions seem like woefully

inadequate solutions. This line of thinking is visited again in his business address, in which

Reagan says that during the strike, “the United States spoke to the outlaw Libyan regime in the

only language they seem to understand,”10 referring of course to bloodshed. Violence is not the

only option for dealing with terrorism, but it is the option most congruent with an agenda to

increase American militaristic hegemony and interventionist policies.

The relegation of compromise to cowardice is emblematic of a gendered concept known

as “hegemonic masculinity.” Based on the Gramscian concept of “hegemony,” which concerns

itself with the systematized domination of subordinate social classes, hegemonic masculinity is

the notion that masculinity itself is constructed and reinforced through a pattern analogous to

social class domination, typically enacted through violence. Men actualize their gender through

reenacting hegemony and exerting force on subordinates – not solely women, but the feminine

itself. Consider the simple phrase: “man up.” Colloquially, it means to harden one’s resolve and

endure. This creates a binary wherein “man” is associated with strength, endurance and resolve

while the unannounced “woman” is granted an oppositional association with weakness and

frailty.

Reagan’s actions are a re-presentation of this binary, positioning conflict as one

option and compromise as the other. This implicitly recreates the masculine/feminine binary

that associates conflict with strength and masculinity and compromise with weakness and

10 Remarks at a White House Meeting With Members of the American Business Conference.” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

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femininity. As Mike Donaldson states in “What is Hegemonic Masculinity?”11 hegemony and its

maintenance extends beyond individual gender performance: “There is nothing outside gender.

To be involved in social relations is to be inextricably ‘inside’ gender. If everything, in this

sense, is within gender, why should we be worried about the exteriority of the forces for social

change? Politics, economics, technology are gendered.” Reagan’s characterization of violence

as benevolent and the best option is, then, a gendered action, and a form of enacting hegemonic

masculinity.

Accepting this myopic understanding of violence as strength while eliding conversations

about its consequences or alternatives serves the ‘rhetoric of justification’ by not only equating

military action with strength, but American identity itself with military strength. This is done in

two ways. First, Reagan phrases military decisions as the actions of “we” “us” and “the United

States” linking himself, his audience, the United States and the military into a collective identity.

Reagan’s individual gender performance of hegemonic masculinity then becomes not his own,

but a collective, American identity. Once this false monolith of American thought has been

established, it is then placed within the gendered weak/strong binary. Hence, to compromise is

not simply weak, not simply feminine, but un-American.

Characterization of Qadhafi, Libya

In order to not only justify American reaction, but showcase the military as defenders,

Qadhafi must become a monolith of terror or our response will seem disproportionate. As such,

11 Donaldson, M, What Is Hegemonic Masculinity?, Theory and Society, Special Issue: Masculinities, October 1993, 22(5), 643-657

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Reagan’s description of Qadhafi ‘s villainy must match his description of American virtue in

scope. Early in the initial address Reagan asserts that Americans have “no quarrel” with the

people of Libya, who “are a decent people caught in the grip of a tyrant.”12 This assigns all the

blame of La Belle to a single man, greatly magnifying his perceived power. Later in the address

when Reagan thanks America’s Europeans allies and reminds his audience of the need for

constant vigilance as “Europeans who remember history understand better than most that there

is no security, no safety in the appeasement of evil.”13 A clear parallel is drawn here between

Mu’ammar Qadhafi and Adolf Hitler, a historical figure whose role in terror is near impossible

to overstate. This sets the tone for all future discussions of Qadhafi in Reagan’s speeches and

letters; Qadhafi is a menace to humanity, whose “relentless pursuit of terror” must be halted at

all costs.

It’s important to make a distinction here in the arguments concerning Reagan’s portrayal

of Qadhafi. Frankly speaking, Ronald Reagan isn’t lying. Qadhafi has been linked to numerous

coups attempts, illegal expansionist activities and acts of violence around the world. The

argument is not being made that Reagan is inventing Qadhafi’s crimes because he needs a

bad guy. The argument is that Reagan is decontextualizing Qadhafi’s actions and offering his

audiences selective bits of information that fit neatly together to create a moral narrative that will

make it easier to gain public support, unethically overlooking the role of Western imperialism

in these acts. Qadhafi is a tyrant, yes, but Reagan’s Gaddaffi is a purposeful tyrant, constructed

to legitimize the conservative notions of “strength” and “justice” that supports American

12 Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya.” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

13 …

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hegemony.

With a clearer understanding of how Reagan uses justified benevolence as the underlying

ideology behind American actions, an analysis is necessary for understanding how he defines

terrorism and characterizes it as the underlying ideology behind Qadhafi’s actions. In keeping

with the simplified moral narratives, Reagan offers no explanations of terrorism, but instead

perpetuates several myths and half-truths that work to advance his administration’s goals.

Chief among them, Reagan implies that terrorism can be defeated through military

strength. On April 15th, Larry Speakes, Principal Deputy Press Secretary says that the ‘goal’ of

Operation El Dorado Canyon was to “disrupt Libya’s ability to carry out terrorist acts and deter

future terrorist acts by Libya”14 and twice, in the original Address to the Nation and the later

business conference remarks, Reagan says the operation was successful (he did not mention

that Qadhafi survived the attacks). In his Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,

Reagan himself calls the airstrike the “necessary and appropriate action” targeted as “the Libyan

terrorist infrastructure…designed to deter acts of terrorism by Libya.”15 The fallacious line of

reasoning here, that more violence will somehow lessen violence, is blithely overlooked and

is evidence of Reagan’s misunderstanding of terrorism, overreliance on force and dismissal of

compromise as a viable course of action.

Were Reagan to provide a more comprehensive and scholastic definition of terrorism,

focusing on its emergence as a result of structural inequalities, globalization, etc., it would not

14 Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the United States Air Strike Against Libya.” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

15 Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

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serve to aid the conservative agenda, as ideologies cannot be fought with bombs. This constraint

illustrates the necessity of having Qadhafi as the face of American anti-terror strikes. Qadhafi

operates as a tangible enemy, an easily identifiable figure against whom Americans can mobilize

as the physical embodiment of the perverse ideology of terror.

Jeff Goodwin’s “A Theory of Categorical Terrorism” is a seminal work that both

problematizes decontextualized and vague definitions of terrorism and suggests multiple

iterations depending on the actors and their reasoning, while smartly avoiding any arguments of

causality. Goodwin creates the concept of “categorical terrorism,” defined as “the strategic use

of violence and threats of violence…intended to influence several audiences”16 against whom

he identifies “complicitous civilians,” a group of people within the targeted population who

have the capacity either to influence, benefit from or support the actions of the state which the

“terrorist” (Goodwin refers to them as’ revolutionaries’) group is targeting. While Goodwin’s

article goes on to expound on these definitions and analyze the process of constructing

complicity, what is clear is that “terrorism” and “terrorist acts” occur in reaction to complex,

intersecting occurrences between multiple actors with contrasting motives, methods and degrees

of agency.

The concepts of agency and complexity are especially overlooked in Reagan’s discussion

of Qadhafi and Libya, because the words “terror” and “terrorist” reduce both to a state of

savagery and immorality worth of contempt and reprisal but not close examination. Goodwin’s

definition of categorical terrorism is effectual (though by no means all-encompassing) because it

is a networked framing that connects opposing states, their audiences, the targets and redefines

16 A Theory of Categorical Terrorism," Jeff Goodwin (2006), Social Forces, Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 2027–46.

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violence as goal-oriented, rather than the goal itself. This is very different from Reagan’s

definition, which necessitates a rigid linearity to facilitate its imbedding into discussions

of morality and his characterization of Libyan actions. Granted, Goodwin’s piece is not

contemporary to that time period, and draws from 20 years of scholarship Reagan would not

have had access to, but the definition is helpful in examining how the definition elides nuance for

a wholesale admonishment of these actions.

Reagan’s characterization of Qadhafi falls almost perfectly within the parameters of a

rhetorical notion Robert Ivie termed “savagery.” Built on morally positioning a contrast between

terrorism as “the reigning symbol of savagery opposed to a civilising empire of democratic

peace,” savagery exists to “[empty] democracy of its meaning as a political practice and [reduce]

it to a rationalisation for world domination.” Reagan’s incessant laudation of the American

military as a global guardian is camouflage. While the red herrings of peace and security are

enticing, the material, tangible actions Reagan endorses are a buffed military with a greater

capacity to police and intimidate other nations through violence. This becomes justified only

through gross, completely ahistorical valorization of the military (transforming it from a

highly problematic state apparatus into the citadel of security and forbearance) and ahistorical

villianization of Libya, which ignores sociocultural and economic complexity.

Ultimately, this is the goal of Reagan use of terrorism as a rhetorical strategy and

Reagan’s Qadhafi: he is a specter meant to agitate a paradigm shift within the public sphere.

Specifically, placing all discussion of Libya and Qadhafi within a moral framework calls for

a conceptualization that prioritizes morality as the guide for understanding both America and

Qadhafi. This is why Reagan’s work has such a moral bent – moralizing these issues promotes

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an internal logic within the narratives he’s given that delimts the conversation such as to only

allow for patriotic support of Reagan’s push for increased militarism and villianization of

Qadhafi. As Ivie wrote, “A people reduced by the dichotomous language of good versus evil

to a form of patriotism that is reflexive rather than reflective could not debate the character of

terror without sounding supportive of terrorists.” Reagan’s work is strategically reductive, using

Qadhafi and Libya as opportunities to de-intellectualize public discourse and easy mobilization.

RHETORICAL DISCUSSION

Justification rhetoric, hyperbolizing Qadhafi and caricaturizing Libya work together to

create a rhetorical landscape in which Operation El Dorado Canyon transforms from an act of

violent retaliation to one of heroism. By emphasizing the morality of its actors, Reagan creates a

good/evil binary that obscures the complexity of terrorism and, most importantly, dehumanizes

its actors, turning ‘terrorists’ into monsters and barbarians, reducing any need for understanding

either them or the structural constraints that makes terrorism a viable option for them. Once it is

established that America serves the globe as the ultimate good and terrorists are an ultimate evil,

the contrasts between them are presented as irreconcilable in order to justify military force as the

only viable option, the “only language they speak.” This language and the landscape it creates

prioritizes the very violence it is seemingly opposed to, as both Libya and the United States are

defined solely by the moral reasoning behind their violent actions (either bombing in the name

of peace or bombing in the name of “terror”) and not by the collateral damage or consequences,

shifting the focus away from discussions of the victims or long-term goals for peace.

The use of this structure is what separates Muammar al-Qadhafi from Reagan’s Qadhafi

and illustrates the rhetorical dexterity that made Ronald Reagan “the great communicator.”

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Reagan’s extremely adept skill as a communicator is exemplified in his rhetorical position of

America and Libya’s role in Operation El Dorado Canyon. In order to gain popular support, the

airstrike needed to be seen as a just act. Justification is gained in activating axioms on American

identity that are taken for granted and, within the rhetorical landscape Reagan constructed,

made logical sense. Military action is a sign of strength in the hands of a just nation. By forming

a collective identity predicated exclusively on self-assured benevolence, Reagan convinces

the nation of its moral fortitude. Hence, morality guides the nation’s understanding of its own

actions. There is no complexity, no global awareness, only the “knowledge” that America is

good. Reagan himself is not inventing this self-perception, but activating a “truth” that is part

of the nation’s identity. The endeavor of Reagan’s speeches is to weave together the notions of

military force as fortitude, America as benevolent and violence as vigilance. Rhetorical success

lies in activating these notions in a simple, consistent and un-problematized manner.

This is equally true of the caricaturization of Libya and Qadhafi. In the absence of

empirical data or global discourse, verisimilitude suffices in understanding “terror,” Libya

and Qadhafi. The rhetorical counterpart to justification is condemnation. Libya functions as

an immoral counter to America and Qadhafi functions as an embodiment of the purposefully

skewed definition of terror. Purposefully mystifying “terrorism” in conjunction with repeatedly

emphasizing morality places the entire conversation onto axes of good and evil, precluding

American audiences from engaging in intellectual conversation and developing either nuanced

understandings of themselves in relation to other global forces or self-awareness.

Placing the La Belle bombing, Operation El Dorado Canyon, the American military,

Libya and Qadhafi on such a highly skewed, highly prejudiced spectrum of morality is key.

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Morality is an abstraction, seemingly drawn from “gut,” untutored beliefs. Removed from

empiricism, it is highly responsive to narratives of justice, peace and goodwill. Reagan

understands this. What elevates Reagan from a “speaker” to a “great communicator” is his ability

to consistently present information in a way that prioritizes moral frameworks of understanding

which then in turn disincentivize complexity and nuance, instead offering his audiences a set of

identity tropes for the actors (America, Libya, and Qadhafi) coded in heavily obfuscated binaries.

Force is good when we do it, because we’re good. Force is bad when they do it, because they’re

bad. They use terror because they’re bad. We couldn’t have played a role in terror, because

we’re good. It is a tactical removal of a need for deep understanding. Concerns of engagement,

long-term planning, ethics and American aggression are each met with a corresponding

redirection onto an axis of “morality” that camouflages a need for intellectual dissent because it

is an epistemological framework highly responsive to these narratives of justice and “good.”

CONCLUSION

Operation El Dorado Canyon was not an operation – it was an opportunity. It allowed for

the showcasing of American military strength, morality and provided assurance of the necessity

of violence, reifying it as the sole conceptualization of strength. Ultimately, Reagan’s goal

was epistemological. To garner support for action, a certain degree of proof and congruence

with one’s own personal values is necessary. Reagan’s discussion of terrorism was an act of

subterfuge that implicitly prompted comprehension of these concepts in terms of good and

evil. Life is not this simple. A detailed look at America in terms of this conflict complicates

clearly drawn distinctions of “good” and “bad’ and renders categories of hero and villain wholly

immaterial. Good and bad have no place here, they are distractions. This is not to argue that

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military action should preclude moral reasoning, it is to argue that morality in and of itself does

not suffice as a cognitive tool set. Ronald Reagan is essentially priming his audience to use

the wrong tool set – one on justice, indignation and retribution instead of one of complexity,

comprehension through conversation and criticism. This is a paradigm shift that makes audiences

much more reactionary and homogenizes them into a singular “American citizen” that wants to

fight the bad guys in the oversimplified narratives Reagan offers.

The relevance of this issue should be immediately apparent. Political figures that harp

on notions of peace, justice and democracy or paint ostensibly simple pictures of international

actions should be cause for concern. Simplified narratives or overemphasis on morality are

strategies that prompt a specific type of logic that is not congruent to holistic, comprehensive

understanding of complex issues. With this awareness, it may become possible to perceive gaps

in information or purposeful mystification of issues when consuming the rhetoric of our leaders

and our sources of information.