Reading List

Topics and Papers

Learning

• H.P. Young, “The Evolution of Conventions,” Econometrica, vol. 61, pp. 57­84,1993.

• M. Kandori, G.J. Mailath, and R. Rob, “Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games,” Econometrica, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 29–56, January 1993.

• E. Kalai and E. Lehrer, “Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica, vol. 61, no. 5, 1993, pp. 1019-1045, 1993.

• J. Hofbauer and W. Sandholm, “On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play,” Econometrica, vol. 70, pp. 2265–2294, 2002.

• J.S. Shamma and G. Arslan, “Dynamic fictitious play, dynamic gradient play, and distributed convergence to Nash equilibria,” IEEE Transactions on Au­tomatic Control, March 2005, pp. 312–327.

• J.R. Marden, H.P. Young, G. Arslan, and J.S. Shamma, “Payoff based dy­namics for multi-player weakly acyclic games,” to appear in SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, special issue on Control and Optimization in Cooperative Networks, 2008.

• D. Fudenberg and D. Levine, “Conditional Universal Consistency,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 29, pp. 104–130, 1999.

• D.P. Foster and R.V. Vohra, “Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilib­rium,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 21(1-2), pp. 40-55, October 1997.

• D.P. Foster and R.V. Vohra, “Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 29(1-2), pp. 7-35, October 1999.

• S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, “A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Cor­related Equilibrium,” Econometrica, vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 1127-1150, 2000.

Repeated Games

• D. Abreu, D. Pearce, and E. Stachetti, “Towards a theory for discounted repeated games,” Econometrica, vol. 58, no. 5, pages 1041-63, September 1990.

Games with special structure (Supermodular and potential games)

• J.R. Marden, G. Arslan, and J.S. Shamma, “Joint strategy fictitious play with inertia for potential games,” preprint, 2006.

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• Rosenthal, “A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria,” 1973.

• D. Monderer and L. Shapley, “Potential Games,” Games and Economic Be­havior, vol. 14, pp. 124–143, 1996.

• D. Monderer and L. Shapley, “Fictitious Play Property for Games with Iden­tical Interests,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 1, pp. 258–265, 1996.

• D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz, “Distributed Games,” Games and Eco­nomic Behavior, vol. 28 , pp. 55–72, 1999.

• Topkis, “Equilibrium points in nonzero sum n-person submodular games,” 1979.

• P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, “Rationalizability, learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities,” Econometrica, vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 1255–1277, November 1990.

• P. Milgrom and C. Shannon, “Monotone Comparative Statics,” Economet­rica, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 157–180, January 1994.

• X. Vives, “Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 19, issue 3, pp. 305-321, 1990.

Wireless Network Games

• S. Adlakha, R. Johari, and A. Goldsmith, “Competition in wireless systems via Bayesian interference games,” preprint, 2007.

• J. Huang, R. Berry and M.L. Honig, “Auction-based Spectrum Sharing,” ACM Mobile Networks and Applications Journal, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 405-418, June 2006.

• J. Huang, R. Berry and M.L. Honig, “Distributed Interference Compensation for Wireless Networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 1074-1084, May 2006.

• J.-W. Lee, A. Tang, J. Huang, M. Chiang and A.R. Calderbank, “Reverse En­gineering MAC: A Non-Cooperative Game Model,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 6, August 2007.

• A.H. Mohsenian-Rad, J. Huang, M. Chiang and V.W.S. Wong, “Utility-Optimal Random Access: Reduced Complexity, Fast Convergence, and Ro­bust Performance,” submitted to IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communi­cations, 2007.

• A.H. Mohsenian-Rad, J. Huang, M. Chiang and V.W.S. Wong, “Utility-Optimal Random Access: Optimal Performance Without Frequent Explicit Message Passing,” submitted to IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communi­cations, 2007.

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• U.O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, and P.A. Parrilo, “Competitive Scheduling in Wireless Collision Channels with Correlated Channel State,” Proc. of GameNets, 2009.

• U.O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, and P.A. Parrilo, “Near-Optimal Power Control in Wireless Networks: A Potential Game Approach,” Proc. of INFOCOM 2010.

Existence and Computation of Nash Eq., Correlated Eq., and Wardrop Eq.

• S. Hart and D. Schmeidler, “Existence of correlated equilibria,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 18–25, February 1989.

• C. Papadimitriou, “Computing correlated equilibria in Multi-Player Games,” Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2005.

• McKelvey and McLennan, “Computation of Equilibria in Finite Games,” 1996.

• B. Von Stengel, “Computing Equilibria for Two-Person Games,” 1999.

• R.J. Lipton, E. Markakis, and A. Mehta, “Playing large games using simple strategies,” Proc. 4th ACM conf. Electronic Commerce, 2003.

• A. Fabrikant, C. Papadimitriou, K. Talwar, “The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria,” In Proc. of STOC 2004, pages 604–612.

• P.A. Parrilo, “Polynomial Games and Sum of Squares Optimization,” Pro­ceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, December 2006.

• N.D. Stein, A. Ozdaglar, and P.A. Parrilo, “Separable and Low-Rank Con­tinuous Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 475-504, 2008.

• N.D. Stein, P.A. Parrilo, and A. Ozdaglar, “Characterization and Compu­tation of Correlated Equilibria in Infinite Games,” Proceedings of the 46th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, December 2007.

• N.D. Stein, A. Ozdaglar, and P.A. Parrilo, “Structure of Extreme Correlated Equilibria,” submitted for publication, 2010.

• M. Kearns, M. Littman, S. Singh, “Graphical Models for Game Theory,” Proceedings of UAI, 2001.

• M. Kearns and L. Ortiz,“Nash Propagation for Loopy Graphical Games,” Proceedings of NIPS, 2002.

• S. Kakade, M. Kearns, and L. Ortiz“Graphical Economics,” Proceedings of COLT, 2004.

Equilibrium Selection

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• H. Carlsson and E. van Damme, “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,” Econometrica, vol. 61(5), pp. 989-1018, 1993.

• M. Yildiz and J. Weinstein, “A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements,” Econometrica, 75(2), pp. 365-400, 2007.

Network Pricing and Cost Sharing

• K. Jain and P. Varaiya, “Combinatorial exchange mechanisms for efficient bandwidth allocation,” 2004.

• J. Feigenbaum, C. Papadimitriou, and S. Shenker, “Sharing the Cost of Mul­ticast Transmissions,” Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 63, pp. 21-41, 2001.

• L. He and J. Walrand, “Pricing and Revenue Sharing Strategies for Internet Service Providers,” IEEE JSAC, May 2006.

• J. Musacchio, G. Schwartz, and J. Walrand, “Network Neutrality and Provider Investment Incentives,” preprint, 2007.

Network Design and Formation

• M. Jackson, “Network Formation,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Eco­nomics and the Law , MacMillan Press, forthcoming.

• E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler, and T. Roughgarden“The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allo­cation,” 2004.

• E. Arcaute, R. Johari, and S. Mannor, “Network formation: bilateral con­tracting and myopic dynamics,” preprint, 2007.

• R. Johari, S. Mannor, and J.N. Tsitsiklis, “A contract-based model for di­rected network formation,” Games and Economic Behavior, 56(2):201224, 2006.

• E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, E. Tardos, and T. Wexler, “Near-Optimal Net­work Design with Selfish Agents,” 2003.

• A. Fabrikant, A. Luthra, E. Maneva, C.H. Papadimitriou, and S. Shenker, “On a Network Creation Game,” 2003.

Price of Anarchy

• E. Koutsoupias, C.H. Papadimitriou “Worst-case equilibria,” STACS, 1999.

• T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, “How Bad is Selfish Routing?” JACM, 2002.

• T. Roughgarden, “The Price of Anarchy is Independent of the Network Topol­ogy,” JCSS, 2003.

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• T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, “Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Nonatomic Congestion Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 389–403, May 2004.

• J.R. Correa, A.S. Schulz and N.E. Stier Moses, “Selfish Routing in Capac­itated Networks,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 961–976, 2004.

• J.R. Correa, A.S. Schulz and N.E. Stier Moses, “A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games, ” to appear in Games and Economic Behavior, 2008.

• R. Cominetti, J.R. Correa and N.E. Stier Moses, “The Impact of Oligopolistic Competition in Networks,” to appear in Operations Research

• P. Maille and N.E. Stier Moses, “Eliciting Coordination With Rebates,” preprint, 2008.

• D. Acemoglu and A. Ozdaglar, “Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 1–31, February 2007.

• D. Acemoglu, R. Johari, and A. Ozdaglar, Partially Optimal Routing,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on Non-cooperative Behavior in Networking, vol. 25, no. 6, 1148–1160, August 2007.

• D. Acemoglu and A. Ozdaglar, “Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on Non­cooperative Behavior in Networking, vol. 25, no. 6, 1180–1192, August 2007.

• D. Acemoglu, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Price and Capacity Competi­tion,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 1-26, May 2009.

• A. Ozdaglar, “Price Competition with Elastic Traffic,” to appear in Networks, 2008.

• R. Johari and J.N. Tsitsiklis, “Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 29(3):407435, 2004.

• G. Perakis, “The price of anarchy when costs are non-separable and asym­metric,” 2004.

• A. Vetta, “Nash equilibria in competitive societies with applications to facility location, traffic routing, and auctions,” Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 416–425, 2002.

• E. Friedman, “A Generic Analysis of Selfish Routing,” 2004.

• A. Hayrapetyan, E. Tardos and T. Wexler, “The Effect of Collusion in Con­gestion Games,” ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2006.

Social Networks

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• A. Banerjee, “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Eco­nomics, vol. 107, pp. 797-817, 1992.

• A. Banerjee and D. Fudenberg, “Word-of-mouth Learning,” Games and Eco­nomic Behavior, vol. 46, pp. 1-22, 2004.

• S. Bikchandani, D. Hirshleifer, I. and Welch, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Information Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 100, pp. 992-1026, 1992.

• G. Ellison and D. Fudenberg, “Rules of Thumb for Social Learning,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 101, no. 4, pp. 612-643, 1993.

• G. Ellison and D. Fudenberg, “Word-of-mouth communication and social learning,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110, pp. 93-126, 1995.

• M.O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky, “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 71, pp. 44-74, 1996.

• M.O. Jackson and A. Watts, “The Evolution of Social and Economic Net­works,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 106, pp. 265-295, 2002.

• L. Smith and P. Sorensen, “Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learn­ing,” Econometrica, vol. 68, no. 2, pp. 371-398, 2000.

• B. Golub and M.O. Jackson, “Naive Learning in Social Networks: Conver­gence, Influence, and the Wisdom of Crowds,” preprint, 2007.

• V. Bala and S. Goyal, “Learning from Neighbours”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 595–621, 1998.

• D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, “Maximizing the Spread of Influence in a Social Network,” Proceedings of KDD, 2003.

• D. Acemoglu, M. Dahleh, I. Lobel, and A. Ozdaglar, “Bayesian Learning in Social Networks,”, preprint, 2008.

• D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, and A. ParandehGheibi, “Spread of (Mis)information in Social Networks,” to appear in Games and Economic Behavior, 2009.

• D. Acemoglu, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Communication Information Dynamics in (Endogeneous) Networks,” LIDS report 2813, 2009.

Game Theory for Cooperative Control

• G. Arslan, J.R. Marden and J.S. Shamma, “Autonomous vehicle-target as­signment: A game theoretical formulation”, ASME Journal of Dynamic Sys­tems, Measurement, and Control, special issue on Analysis and Control of Multi-Agent Dynamic Systems, September 2007, pp. 584–596.

• J.R. Marden, G. Arslan, and J.S. Shamma, “Connections between cooperative control and potential games ilustrated on the consensus problem”, Proceedings of European Control Conference, July 2007.

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Mechanism Design and Auctions

• J. Gallien, “Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce,” 2004.

• E. Friedman and D. Parkes, “Pricing WiFi at Starbucks – Issues in Online Mechanism Design,” 2003.

• N. Nisan and A. Ronen, “Algorithmic Mechanism Design,” Proceedings of 31st ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 1999.

• B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz, “Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Key­words,” American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 242-259, March 2007.

• A. Mehta, T. Roughgarden, and M. Sundararajan, “Beyond Moulin Mecha­nisms,” EC, 2007.

• T. Roughgarden and M. Sundararajan, “Is Efficiency Expensive?”, 3rd Work­shop on Sponsored Search, 2007.

• J. Feigenbaum, C. Papadimitriou, R. Sami, and S. Shenker, “A BGP-based Mechanism for Lowest-Cost Routing,” Distributed Computing, vol. 18, pp. 61–72, 2005.

• D.C. Parkes, “Online Mechanisms,” in Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University press, 2007.

• I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, R. Srikant, and D. Acemoglu, “Dynamic Online-Advertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling,” Proc. of NetEcon, 2009.

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6.254 Game Theory with Engineering Applications Spring 2010

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