Ray Jackendoff,Paul Bloom,Karen Wynn - Language, Logic, And Concepts

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Language, Logic, and Concepts.Ray S. Jackendoff, Paul Bloom and Karen Wynn, editors.© 2002 The MIT Press.

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Meaning and Misconceptions Anil Gupta

2.1 An Example

Let us begin with an example of a discourse that embodies a fundamentalmisconception: discourse about "up" in a community that believes there

This chapter is dedicated to the memory of my friend John Macnamara and hislove of philosophy.

I have been thinking about the problems discussed in this chapter for a longtime, and over the years I have accumulated a large debt. My most significant debtis to my friend and former colleague Professor Mark Wilson. Mark and I havehad numerous discussions on the problems of meaning and truth, and these con-versations have been of great value to me. Also of value to me were some earlydiscussions I had with Eric Dalton, Adam Kovach, and especially Jerry Kapus. Ipresented some of the ideas in this chapter in a graduate course on the philosophyof language given at Indiana University in spring 1997. I also presented these ideasin talks at MIT , National Chung Cheng University (Taiwan), and Notre DameUniversity. I wish to thank my auditors for the feedback they gave me. I also wishto thank the following people for their comments and suggestions: Andre Chapuis,William Demopoulos, Michael Friedman, James Hardy, Allen Hazen, Christo-pher Hill , Peter van Inwagen, Ray Jackendoff, Hans Kim, Robert Kraut, ByeongDeok Lee, Vann McGee, George N akhnikian, Alvin Plantinga, Jerry Seligman,Robert Stalnaker, and Bosuk Yoon. Finally, I wish to thank the National En-dowment for the Humanities for support. An NEH Fellowship for UniversityTeachers enabled me to devote a part of the academic year 1995- 1996 to thischapter.

Chapter 2-

How should we think about the meaning of sentences in discourses thatcontain fundamental misconceptions? Reflection on this question reveals,I shall argue, some flaws in our current ideas about meaning (sections 2.2and 2.3). And it motivates some modifications of these ideas that, I be-lieve, are intuitively plausible and theoretically fruitful (sections 2.4- 2.6).

16 Gupta

Figure 2.1

(2) c is up above d

and

(3) The direction of the ray dc is the same as that of the ray b71.

(See figure 2.1.) Furthermore, they recognize the denial of (1) to be war-ranted when based on (2) and the denial of (3). These two criteria, let usassume, are of equal importance in the uses of 'up'. Both criteria come

ours.)

is an absolute distinguished direction in space called 'up'. It will simplifyour discussion if we make the following assumptions about the commu-nity 's use of 'up'. (In other respects, let the use of the term be much like

(i) Let us assume that two criteria govern the use of 'up' in the com-munity 's language. One criterion is perceptual: members of the commu-nity recognize the assertion of

�

(1) a is up above b

to be warranted in certain perceptually distinguishable situations. Theother criterion is conceptual: members of the community recognize anassertion of (1) to be warranted when it is based on the premises

17Meaning and Misconceptions

Figure 2.2

into play to an equal degree, and neither can be given priority over theother.

(ii) Let us also assume that the community uses certain objects to de-fine the " Standard Up" direction. The community, let us assume, definesthe Standard Up to be the direction of the ray jiSdetermined by a moun-tain peak p and a natural satellite s located in a geostationary orbit abovep. (See figure 2.2.) So, the community's conceptual criterion can also bereformulated as follows:

-+a is up above b iff the direction of the ray ba is the Standard Up .

This criterion, let us imagine, is so strongly embedded in the communitythat the two sides of the biconditional are regarded as equivalent ways ofsaying the same thing.

(iii ) Let us assume that the community engages only in Plain Speech.There is in its discourse no subtle exploitation of conversational maximsto communicate one thing while saying another.1 The content of, for ex-ample, an assertion made by using ' a is up above b' is precisely what theconventional meaning of the sentence would dictate it to be. The as-sumption of Plain Speech will enable us to focus on the main issues beforeus, freeing us from irrelevant distractions.

Standard Up

= the direction of

Satellite s the ray pi

Mountain

peak p

(iv) Finally , let us assume that the main conventions and facts about"up" and other related subjects are common knowledge. All members ofthe community are (and are recognized to be) authorities of equal stand-ing on these subjects.2 This assumption, like the previous one, removesmerely extraneous factors from our deliberations. We lose nothing essen-tial by making it .

The question before us is how to think about the meaning of sentencessuch as 'a is up above b' in the community's language. It will be necessaryto address also the parallel question about the contents of speech acts(e.g., assertions) and of attitudes (e.g., beliefs) that the speech acts express.The meaning of a sentence will be assumed to be fixed; it will not varyfrom context to context. But the content that a sentence is used to expresscannot be assumed to be fixed, and I shall explore both possibilities withrespect to it . In one group of theories I shall consider- namely, the abso-lute theories- content will remain fixed through all contexts. These theo-ries will identify meaning with content. In the other group of theories Ishall consider- namely, the relativistic theories- content will vary withcontext. These theories will draw a categorial distinction between mean-ing and content.

The concept of meaning is called upon in current philosophy of lan-guage and mind to serve many functions. These functions are so diversethat one may be excused for thinking that no concept can serve them all,that different notions of meaning are needed for different kinds of ends.The notion- or aspect- of meaning of interest here, I should stress, isone that yields a true/false distinction (or something similar such as thewarranted/unwarranted distinction). The account of meaning (and con-tent) should yield a satisfactory assessment of speech acts and of practicesfound in the community. The account should provide a way of separatingthose assertions that are true (or warranted) from those that are false (orunwarranted). And it should provide a way of separating those inferentialpractices that are sound (or adequate) from those that are unsound (orinadeq ua te ).

2.2 Conceptual- Role Semantics

18 Gupta

Philosophy of language offers two broad approaches to gaining an under-standing of meaning: the representational approach and the conceptual-role approach. The representational approach attempts to explain meaningby invoking language-world relations. On this approach, the meaning of

a linguistic element is- or is constructed out of- what the item repre-sents or would represent in various contexts and possible situations. Thus,on this approach, the meaning of a proper name (e.g., 'Socrates') might beidentified with the referent of the name (the man Socrates)3 and themeaning of a predicate F might be identified with the property F repre-sents. The vocabulary this approach favors for the assessment of speechacts is that of the true and the false. An assertion of 'Socrates is F ', for

example, is evaluated as true if Socrates has the property represented byF; otherwise, the assertion is evaluated as false.

The second, conceptual-role, approach attempts to explain meaning viathe rules governing the proper use of language. On this approach, themeaning of a linguistic element is given by the rules that specify the ele-ment's conceptual role in the linguistic system. Thus, on this approach,the meaning of a predicate F might be given by rules that state the con-ditions under which predications of F are warranted (" F-introduction"rules) and by rules that state the conclusions, both discursive and practi-cal, that may be based on these predications (" F-elimination" rules).4 Thevocabulary this approach favors for the assessment of speech acts is thatof the warranted and the unwarranted. An assertion of 'Socrates is F ',

for example, is evaluated as warranted, if the conditions under which theassertion is made are of the kind laid out in the F-introduction rules;otherwise, the assertion is evaluated as unwarranted.s

The two approaches to meaning rest on vastly different pictures of lan-guage. Still, the assessment of speech acts they yield are similar: the true/false distinction coincides with the warranted/unwarranted distinctionover a large domain. This is not surprising, for both the language-world relations of the representational approach and the introduction-elimination rules of the conceptual-role approach have their foundationsin the actual use of language. Over " decidable" assertions (i .e., assertionswhose truth or falsity can be settled by the users of the language), the twoapproaches aim to yield the same verdicts. The debate between the twoapproaches centers on the "undecidable" assertions. Here the language-world relations of the representational approach may yield an assessmentwhereas the introduction-elimination rules of the conceptual-role approach

may fail to do 80.6Although they illuminate much about language, the two approaches do

not yield a solution to the problem of meaning before us. This is easiest toshow for the conceptual-role approach. This approach takes the meaningof 'up' to be given by the rules governing its use- rules such as the per-


Figure 2.3

20 Gupta

ceptual and conceptual criteria introduced above. The difficulty is that

these rules do not yield a satisfactory assessment of assertions. For manypairs of objects a and b, the rules dictate that the assertion of 'a is upabove b' is warranted and also that its denial is warranted . Suppose a and

~

b are objects such that the direction of the ray ba is epistemically accessi-ble to the community . The near spherical shape of the earth ensures that

~

objects c and d can be found (or placed) so that the direction of the ray dc~

is the same as that of the ray ba and, furthermore , the perceptual criterionfor 'c is up above d ' is satisfied. The conceptual criterion now yields that

the assertion of 'a is up above b' is warranted . Similarly , the conceptualcriterion can be made to yield that the denial of 'a is up above b' is war -

~

ranted : objects e andfcan be found so that the direction of the rayfe is~

not the same as that of the ray ba and , furthennore , the assertion of ' e is

up above f ' is deemed warranted by the perceptual criterion (see figure2.3).

This argument , it should be observed , reads the criteria for ' up ' in a

strong way : as laying down what assertions, actual and possible, would bewarranted in various situations irrespective of the presence of a warrant -

supplying intelligence . Thus , it reads the perceptual criterion as stating


that in certain perceptually distinguishable situations ' a is up above b' iswarranted; whether someone actually experiences the situation and makesthe assertion is irrelevant for the application of the criterion. This readingof the criterion is essential if the conceptual-role approach is to yield, evenin unproblematic cases, a satisfactory demarcation of speech acts. On aweaker reading of the perceptual criterion (e.g., one that requires the sit-uation to be actually experienced for ' a is up above b' to be warranted),the warranted/unwarranted distinction diverges from the true/false dis-tinction in completely unacceptable ways.

The argument assumes, I should note, that the community has theability to determine the identity and distinctness of the directions of cer-tain rays. This, it seems to me, is a harmless assumption and changesnothing essential in the example. In particular, it does not erase the pos-sibility of the misconception about 'up' : the community may harbor itsmisconception, for it may simply not have undertaken the expeditions andthe experiments necessary to expose the misconception.

The conceptual-role approach, then, assesses far too many assertions ofthe form " x is up above y" in the same way. It attributes to them an in-coherent content, a content determined by empirically incoherent con-ceptual rules. But, as the following examples illustrate, there can be asignificant true/false distinction (or warranted/unwarranted distinction)among speech acts even in the presence of a fundamental misconception.The conceptual-role approach provides no resources for making the dis-tinction, however.

The lamp example Suppose that two roommates A and B in our imaginedcommunity are debating which of the two lamps in their kitchen needsrepair. A says that it is the one up above the stove, and B denies this.Suppose that as a matter of fact the broken lamp is the one used to illu -minate the stove. Now we should assess A 's assertion to be warranted (or

true) and B's to be unwarranted (or false).7The Vishnu example Suppose that the community has a primitive obser-vatory that studies astronomical phenomena. The astronomers at theobservatory record and predict- as far as they can- positions of astro-nomical objects. Their predictions are circulated in the local communityand are used by the more curious members in their own study of the nightsky. The astronomers, let us suppose, use their earlier observations topredict the relative positions of a bright astronomical object that thecommunity calls 'Chandra' and another faint one the community calls'Vishnu' . Their prediction "Vishnu will be directly up above Chandra at

22 Gupta

9 :00 p .m . today " is distributed , and is used by some astronomically in -

clined individuals to locate Vishnu in the night sky . Now , if the direction

of the ray from Chandra to Vishnu is in fact the same as that of the local

up direction - that is , if the astronomers ' prediction is a good guide for

the community members - we should assess the astronomers ' claim to be

warranted ( or true ) .

Incoherence in conceptual rules , then , does not erase the true / false

( or the warranted / unwarranted ) distinction between speech acts . The

problem before us is to find an account of meaning and content that will

enable us to draw this distinction even when the discourse contains radical

misconceptions and the resulting incoherence .

2 .3 Representational Semantics

Let us now turn to the representational approach . The key question here

- one to which it is difficult to find a good answer - is what relation ' up '

represents in the community ' s language . Let us consider some possibleanswers .

( i ) Suppose it is said that ' up ' represents the relation R , where

x bears R to y iff the direction of the ray jiX is the Standard Up . 8

This suggestion respects the conceptual criterion , but it neglects the per -

ceptual criterion . As a result , it yields wrong assessments of many asser -

tions ; for instance , it yields that A ' s assertion in the lamp example is false

and B ' s assertion true . 9

( ii ) Suppose it is said instead that ' up ' represents S , where

x bears S to y iff the straight line joining x and y passes through the

center of the earth 0 and the ray Y ; points away from 0 ( equivalently ,

iff the directions of the rays Y ; and 0 ; are the same ) .

This suggestion encounters problems similar to those facing the previous

proposal . It respects some of the applications of the perceptual criterion ,

but it neglects the conceptual criterion . It also yields wrong assessments of

many assertions ( e .g . , the astronomers ' prediction in the Vishnu example ) .

One response to these difficulties is to insist that ' up ' represents Sand

that the troublesome phenomena can be explained away . But the explan -

atory burdens that the insistence entails are , in my view , unsustainable :

( 1) An explanation has to be provided why it is S - as opposed to Rand

various other relations - that constitutes the proper semantics for ' up ' .


There must be something about the use of 'up ' that makes S the proper

interpretation , but our example provides nothing to distinguish it asproper . (2) An explanation has to be provided how certain sentencesevaluated as false by the proposed semantics (e.g., the astronomers ' pre-

diction ) are nonetheless good guides for action - whereas their true neg-ations are poor guides. (3) This explanation will have to be quite differentfrom the explanation given for those more straightforward cases in whichsentences deemed true by the semantics are good guides for action . An

account has to be given of this difference in the two explanations . Whyare certain instances of successful linguistic behavior explained in one wayand others in a completely cliffe' ent way?

(iii ) Suppose it is said that '1 I..p ' represents the conjunctive relation R &S , where

x bears R & S to y iff x bears R to y and x bears S to y .

This suggestion lands us in an " error theory " for 'up' : nearly all assertionsof the form " x is up above y " are evaluated as false; only if a and barecollinear with the mountain peak p and the geostationary satellite s (see

figure 2.2) can the assertion " a is up above b" be true . Thus , the theoryfails in the same way that the conceptual -role approach failed : it does not

yield a significant true / false distinction . (This kind of difficulty attaches, itseems to me , to all error theories . Hartry Field and J . L . Mackie are well

known for their advocacy of error theories for , respectively , mathematics

and ethics (see Field 1980; Mackie 1977) . Field regards mathematicalstatements to be untrue and Mackie takes the same view of ethical claims .

However , even if all the premises on which Field and Mackie base their

views are granted - principally , that mathematical statements are bur -dened with an unacceptable Platonism and ethical statements with an

unacceptable claim to objectivity - their error theories will remain un-

acceptable until these theories are shown to yield a significant true / falsedistinction . )

(iv ) Suppose it is said that 'up ' is ambiguous between Rand S. This isalso unsatisfactory . First , the postulated ambiguity is not discoverable by

the community members through reflection on their language . Second, Rand S are plausible candidates for the semantics of 'up ' in only a few of itsuses; other uses demand other relations . Hence, a manyfold ambiguity in

'up ' will have to be postulated - something that is plainly unattractive .(v) Suppose the idea of indeterminacy is tried in place of ambiguity .

The suggestion now is that the semantics of 'up ' is indeterminate , that 'up '

24 Gupta

is to be assigned a class of interpretations including R , S , and others . But

this is not an improvement over earlier ideas . It implies that virtually all

assertions of the form " x is up above y " are neither true nor false . We are

landed again in an error theory .

Let us note , finally , that this and the previous difficulties are not over -

come by the idea that we assign truth - conditions to ' a is up above b '

directly , bypassing the specification of a relation for ' up ' .

So far we have considered only absolute theories . These theories take

all uses of ' a is up above b ' to have the same content irrespective of the

context of use . Let us now consider whether the difficulties we have en -

countered can be overcome if we allow content to vary with context .

Perhaps the most natural way of relativizing content here is to view ' up '

as being implicitly indexical - an indexical like ' I ' whose interpretation

varies systematically with context . We can spell out this variation as

follows . Suppose we view the context as supplying the location of dis -

course , much as it supplies such elements as speaker and time for the

interpretations of ' I ' and ' now ' . We can use the location to define " the

standard up direction relative to the context c " : this is the direction of- +

the ray ol determined by the center of the earth 0 and the location l supplied

by the context c . And we can say that , in a context c , ' up ' represents the

relation T c , where

x bears T c to y iff the direction of the ray yX is the standard up relative

to c .

On this view , the relation represented by ' up ' is determined by both the

perceptual and the conceptual criteria governing ' up ' , but the application

of the perceptual criterion is limited to the location of the discourse . Each

location yields its own standard up direction and its own distinctive

ordering of objects as constituting the relation " up above . "

In contrast to the absolute theories , the relativistic theories make a

categorial distinction between the contents expressed using ' a is up above

b ' and the meaning of ' a is up above b ' . The content expressed by ' a is up

above b ' varies from context to context , but the meaning of ' a is up above

b ' does not vary . Further , the content can - but the meaning cannot - be

evaluated as true or false . One can think of the content expressed by ' a is

up above b ' in a context c as a structured item built out of the denotations

of ' a ' and ' b ' and the relation represented by ' up ' in the context c . And ,

following David Kaplan , one can think of the meaning of ' a is up above

b ' as a rule ( or function ) that , given a context c , yields the content ex -

pressed by ' a is up above b ' in c .


The indexical view has the virtue that it yields a nonvacuous true/falsedistinction for assertions. But the view faces several related- and, in my

opinion, overwhelming- difficulties. First, the view does not draw thetrue/false distinction in the right way. In the lamp example, if the debatebetween A and B is conducted in the vicinity of the kitchen, then the viewdoes yield the right truth-values for A 's and B's assertions- namely, thevalue " true" for A 's assertion that the broken lamp is up above the stove,and the value " false" for B's opposite claim. However, if the debate isconducted away from the kitchen, then the view yields assessments ex-actly opposite to the proper one: A 's assertion is evaluated as false andB's assertion as true. For, now, the standard up relative to the debate'slocation differs from the standard up relative to the kitchen. And relativeto the debate's location, the broken lamp does not lie in the standard updirection above the stove.

These considerations point to a second, related difficulty . The indexicalview makes assessment of A 's and B's assertions dependent on the loca-tion of their debate. As a consequence, the view yields a negative assess-ment of some practices- for example, reassertion and appeal to authority- that are fruitful and proper. It is easy to imagine that the practice ofreasserting sentences such as 'The broken lamp is up above the stove', andof passing them from one mouth to another (regardless of location), cando useful work in the community. It may help, for example, in guiding athird party to repair the right lamp. According to the indexical view,however, reassertion of 'a is up above b' in a different location is alwaysas fallacious as the reassertion of 'I am hungry' on the basis of another'sassertion of the sentence. The indexical view explains the success of the

practice of reassertion as due to a lucky accident: a series of fallaciousmoves combine to yield a happy result. Such an explanation is plainlyunattractive. No fallacy is committed by A (or by B), if he reiterates hisclaim (possibly in a different location), or if others do so on the basis ofhis authority . 1 0 An adequate account of meaning should respect andexplain this phenomenon. The success of the practice of reassertion is tooubiquitous and commonplace to warrant an imputation of error.

There is a third difficulty that highlights yet another aspect of the pre-vious problem. Sentences of the form ' X believes that a is up above b',, X desires that a be up above b', and the like are complete as they stand(neglecting tense as before). In this respect, they differ markedly fromsentences containing genuine indexicals, such as 'X believes that she is nottrustworthy' and ' X desires that Fred sit over there' . The latter sentences

26 Gupta

are incomplete : unless semantic values are specified for indexical terms in

them , these sentences cannot be interpreted as making a definite claim or

as expressing a proposition . The indexical view predicts that sentences

such as ' A believes that the broken lamp is up above the stove ' are simi -

larly incomplete . But this plainly does not fit the facts . It is a plausible

principle governing belief that the content of a belief is the content of any

sincere expression ( actual or potential ) of it . A ' s belief receives sincere

expression in his assertions of ' The broken lamp is up above the stove ' .

So the indexical view implies that the content of A ' s belief changes as

A moves from location to location . This yields the undesirable result that

the persistence of A ' s belief through his meanderings is as erroneous as the

persistence of A ' s belief " Here is Mooresville " when he has long left the

town behind on Route 67 . 11

The essential problem with the indexical view , then , is the same as that

with the absolute views considered earlier . The indexical view finds only

error where there is in fact much truth , and only fallacy where there is in

fact essentially sound practice .

2 . 4 Conceptual Disengagement

Let us gather together what we should accept from the theories consid -

ered above . First , we should accept the absolutist idea that ' a is up above

b ' expresses a proposition . F or , as just observed , ascriptions of proposi -

tional attitudes such as ' X believes that a is up above b ' and ' X desires that

a be up above b ' are complete as they stand . Their complement clauses

express definite contents without needing values for any parameters . It

follows that we should accept also that ' up above ' expresses a binary

concept ( neglecting time as before ) . This concept takes as arguments two

individual concepts - or individuals , if one prefers a Russellian semantics

for names over the Fregean - and yields a proposition . 12 Second , we

should concede to the absolutist that , in one sense , the proposition " a is

up above b " is not true or even perhaps truth - apt . 13 That is , in one sense ,

all assertions of the form " x is up above y " are infected with error . Third ,

notwithstanding this concession , we have to recognize that there are im -

portant differences among these assertions , and we need to find a way of

making sense of the differences . To do so , we shall have to accommodate

relativistic ideas .

The difficulties we have had in making sense of the " up / down " dis -

course have their source , it seems to me , in the idea that the elements of

our language have fixed interlocking conceptual connections with eachother - connections that are all invoked in the uses of the elements . It is

this idea, irrespective of whether we follow the lead of the absolute or ofthe relativistic theories , that blocks our way to making sense of the " upjdown " discourse . If we follow the absolute theories , the idea makes it

impossible to see how an assertion such as " The broken lamp is up abovethe stove" could be true . For the assertion conceptually implies numerous

claims that are plainly false- for example , " The direction of the ray that

begins at the stove and goes through the broken lamp is the Standard

Up .,,14 The same holds of assertions of the form " x is up above y " gen-erally . So the absolute approach lands us in an error theory for the dis-course. We can avoid the error theory by shifting to the relativistic

approach . But matters do not improve if we stick with the idea of rigidconceptual connections . For we are now forced to deny that sentencescontaining 'up ' have problematic conceptual connections and, thus , thatthere is conceptual incoherence in " up ." The indexical theory consideredabove goes so far in this direction as to say that the sense of ' up ' , like that

of 'he' , is not rich enough to yield assertible contents ; some contextualinformation must be supplied before sentences containing 'up ' express

complete propositions . But to say this is to recoil from the phenomenonconfronting us to the opposite extreme . The fact is that the sense of 'up ' isnot at all poor like that of the indexicals . The sense is actually far toorich - so rich that it constitutes a problem . If we stick with the idea of

rigid conceptual connections , we are confined to unpalatable choices:error theory and the denial of the phenomena at hand .

Not all conceptual connections are relevant - not all are invoked , not

all come into play - in every use of language . This is the lesson we shoulddraw from the lamp example . Given the way the assertion " The broken

lamp is up above the stove" is used, and is expected to be used, the rele-vant conceptual component is that provided by the perceptual criterion

for 'up ' . The noffi1al use of the sentence might be something like this : thesentence is passed from person to person till it reaches a repairman , whothen uses it to perceptually locate the lamp he will repair . Given that thisis how the sentence is used, assertions of 'The broken lamp is up above

the stove' are good and fruitful guides to action - they are true . Asser-tions of the negation are poor and misleading guides to action - they arefalse. This assessment of truth -value is one at which the community

members themselves will arrive once they know the relevant facts . And

the assessment would survive any unmasking of their misconception .


28 Gupta

Even a god with a sweeping and eternal view of the world would concur

with their assessment. In short , the assessment is neither parochial , norfleeting , nor unstable . It is one that an account of meaning needs torespect and accommodate .

Every assertion of the form " x is up above y " contains error . The as-

sertion of the sentence 'The broken lamp is up above the stove' can be

used, it has to be conceded, in ways that conform to conceptual rules but

lead to error . One , less serious , kind of error occurs in idle uses - when ,

for example , one derives from the lamp sentence the false claim that

the direction of the ray that goes from the stove to the broken lamp is theStandard Up . If this derivation does not materially affect the use of the

lamp sentence, then it is idle .15 A more serious kind of error is also pos-sible, however . Suppose, for example , that the repairman were to use the

assertion in the following way : The repairman goes on an expedition tofind the direction called ' the Standard Up ' . Then through elaborateengineering he somehow constructs a pointer at the stove that points in this

direction . Finally , he uses the pointer to locate the lamp he will repair . Ifhe were to do all this , he might uncover a deep misconception in hiscommunity but he would not find his way to the right lamp . He would

have been misled by the sign. This hypothetical way of using the sign isutterly eccentric , however .16 And its existence should not call into ques-tion the idea that the assertion " The broken lamp is up above the stove"is , in one sense , true .

An analogy will help make this point clear . Suppose we have a flawed

map of a city . The map , let us say, accurately depicts the streets in thecenter of the city , but is inaccurate regarding some streets that lie on the

periphery . Plainly , despite the errors , the map remains a good and true

instrument for navigating through the city center . This is so even thoughthe map could mislead one if it is used to plan an eccentric roundabout

route from one city -center street to another . Similarly , many conceptualpaths issue from 'The broken lamp is up above the stove' ; one can use this

sign in many ways to guide one's actions . But some ways of using it are(in certain situations ) salient and ordinary , whereas some other ways of-using it are extraordinary and eccentric . The eccentric uses are valid and,

indeed, important : they can expose fundamental flaws in our conceptions .Nonetheless , their possibility leaves intact the need for a distinction be-

tween truth and falsehood that respects actual practice .! 7

As noted above, not all conceptual connections come into play in alluses of language . This conceptual disengagement or isolation may occur

even when we are not explicit- or even clear- about its extent or exis-tence. Sometimes, however, conceptual disengagement results because ofan explicit stipulation on our part. Consider, for example, our use of thenotion of the celestial sphere- a notion that is a product of an ingenioussynthesis of ages of ancient astronomical observations. We find this notionuseful- even indispensable in some contexts- though we recognize it torest on a deep error. Our use of the notion is in some ways very similar tothat of the ancients: we follow them in speaking of certain parts of the

sphere as constituting the constellations of the zodiac; we speak of the sunas being in Capricorn one month and Aquarius another; we infer the on-set of spring when we see that the sun has a certain position in the zodiac;and so on. But we disengage all this talk from various other parts of ourdiscourse: we no longer infer motion from variation of position; we nolonger derive the true distance between stars from their (apparent) loca-tion on the sphere; we no longer think of the sphere as having a definitevolume; and so on. A farmer in ancient times might have looked at thestars in the western night sky some chilly night and have said, " The sun isin Pisces; spring will be here soon." A modern child might do the same.The farmer's assertion is in one sense erroneous- the sense in which it is

seen as fully engaged with the ancients' conception of the zodiac. But inanother sense- one in which we are concerned with how the assertion isused in the farming community- the assertion might be as true as thechild's. The child is explicit about the disengagement; the farmer is not.Nonetheless, the farmer's assertion, like the child's, can be assessed astrue and can report a hard fact about the world .

Our language is not a rigid system. Its terms do not stand in fixedinterlocking conceptual connections with each other. Engagement of ourconcepts is important for both theoretical and practical purposes. But soalso, I want to stress, is disengagement. Only if we keep these dual possi-bilities- the possibility of engagement and of disengagement- firmly inmind can we make sense of how our language can function even when it isinfected with deep misconceptions.

Frames

A familiar and good way of thinking about meaning is this. A declarativesentence, understood as a linguistic type, has meaning. When the sentence


2.5

is used (e.g., to make an assertion), the speech act has a particular con-tent- a content that is fixed by the meaning of the sentence and by certain

30 Gupta

features of context. The content, in turn, fixes, in light of the facts, thetruth-value of the assertion. Thus, for example, the sentence 'She is inIndianapolis' has a certain meaning. Suppose I use the sentence to makean assertion and that the context of use supplies a person- say, MJ- asthe denotation of 'she' and 24 January 1997 as the time reference for thepresent tense. This contextual information together with the meaning of'She is in Indianapolis' fixes the content of my assertion to be that MJ isin Indianapolis on 24 January 1997. In view of the fact that MJ is actuallyin Bloomington on 24 January 1997, the content fixes the truth-value of

my assertion to be the False. We can schematize this familiar way ofthinking about meaning thus:

(Meaning + Context) Fixes =;.. Content;(Content + The World) Fixes =}- Assessment of truth-value.

Theories of meaning often use these schemata in reverse to " solve" formeaning. Thus, the second schema is used to derive the idea that contentis a function that maps worlds to truth-values. And the first schema is

used to derive the idea that meaning is a function that maps (relevant)contextual information to content.

This familiar way of thinking about meaning needs a little fine-tuning ifit is to fit the phenomena highlighted above. We need to distinguish firstof all two types of assessment, which we shall call 'assessment of absolutetruth-value' and 'assessment of effective truth -value' . We encounteredinstances of these types in the previous section. The assessment of A 'sassertion, "The broken lamp is up above the stove," as erroneous is anassessment of its absolute truth-value. The other assessment, namely, thatA 's assertion is true, is an assessment of its effective truth -value. We needto distinguish also two types of content that are correlated with theseassessments: absolute content and effective content. Absolute content issimply the old and familiar content under a new name. This content takes

into account all the conceptual connections of an assertion and providesthe basis for the assessment of absolute truth-value. Effective content, onthe other hand, takes into account the conceptual engagements and dis-engagements that are in effect and provides the basis for an assessment ofeffective truth-value. 18 Absolute content captures what an act of assertionis committed to; effective content captures the content that is in play.

The two types of assessment have their own distinctive meaning-truthschemata. The version for absolute assessment parallels the original ver-sion closely:


( Meaning + Context ) Fixes = } Absolute content ;

( Absolute content + The World ) Fixes = } Assessment of absolute truth -

value .

The version of the schemata for effective assessment has to be a little more

complicated because content that determines effective truth - value ( i . e . ,

effective content ) is not fixed by meaning and context - at least , not if

context is understood in the traditional way . Something else is needed ;

and this something else I shall call ' frame ' . Under this terminology , the

schemata for effective assessment are as follows :

( Meaning + Context + Frame ) Fixes * Effective content ;

( Effective content + The World ) Fixes * Assessment of effective truth -

value .

Let us clarify the notion of frame by reflecting on how contexts and

frames differ .

First , let us note that contexts are local but frames are not . Contexts

carry information such as denotations of personal pronouns and demon -

stratives , senses in which ambiguous words are to be understood , and

degrees of vagueness to be tolerated in certain predicates - information

that is provided by the local speech situation . 19 But this local sort of

information will not suffice to fix effective content . For this we need ,

in addition , information about normal or standard uses of sentences -

information that is not localized to any particular speech situation but is

spread across uses of language . Frames , then , are not local in that they

carry this nonlocal sort of information . There is another respect in which

frames fail to be local : frames stay constant through a substantial range of

speech situations . Contexts , on the other hand , tend to be highly variable ,

for the denotations , say , of the personal pronouns are liable to shift

from speech situation to speech situation . Frames thus occupy a place

intermediate between context and language . Language can remain fixed

through variation in frame , and frame through variation in context .

Context is highly local , language is global , and frame lies in between the

two .

Second , contexts and frames have different functions in the fixing of

content . Context often serves , as remarked earlier , to fill holes in content .

Without contextual information , an assertion of , say , ' He is hungry ' is

incomplete . The function of frame is altogether different . Frame helps

determine the content that is in play . So , although context often adds

to content, frame often subtracts from it . This difference in function is

reflected in a difference in relationship to the rules of language. Rules oflanguage make reference to, and partly determine, what constitutes con-

text. The rules governing 'I ', for example, determine that the identity ofthe speaker is relevant contextual infonnation , and the rules refer to this

information in specifying the proper use of sentences containing '1' .Frames, on the other hand, do not figure in the statement of the rules oflanguage. Nor do these rules fix the character of frames. Frames concern

how the rules of language are applied or implemented. Perhaps this con-trast can usefully be put as follows: contexts are in part internal to therules of language, but frames are wholly external.

Third , context and frame have different connections with understand-

ing. Information carried by the context is necessary for understandingwhat a speaker has said; not so for information carried by the frame.If one does not know the intended denotations of indexicals used in anassertion, then one does not understand what has been said. But lack of

information carried by the frame does not imply lack of understanding. 20Frames contain information that accounts for effective uses of language,and this information is not always necessary for using language. The pointhere is general: knowledge needed for using an instrument effectively isnot necessarily the knowledge needed for understanding the effectivenessof the instrument.21

Fourth, frames do not always exist. Successful communication impliesthe existence of a sufficiently rich context, but it does not imply the exis-tence of a frame. Existence of a frame requires not only successful com-munication but also successful practice. Let a speaker in the communityimagined earlier say, 'Up above every star there is another star' . The

speaker expresses a definite thought that can be grasped, and debated, byher neighbors. But there may well not be systematic and successful prac-tice connected with her assertion (and related assertions) to allow a sepa-ration of absolute content from effective content; there may be no frameassociated with her assertion. Existence of requisite frames is a featurethat separates the ordinary and the practical from the theoretical and thespeculative in the use of language.

Let these observations suffice for now as an explanation of frame.Much more can be said- and needs to be said- on the subject. But letus postpone this to another occasion and turn to some philosophicalconsequences and applications.

32 Gupta

Metaphysical debates about the reality of objects and properties (e.g.,numbers, theoretical posits, everyday objects, and goodness) typicallytransfoffil into debates about the nature of the discourses about the re-

spective objects and properties (arithmetic, science, ordinary discourse,and normative discourse). 22 Two contrasting pictures dominate the latterdebates. One picture, favored by those who espouse realism, presents thediscourse as representational: the elements of the discourse " hook up withthe world" ; the names and predicates in the discourse refer to objects andproperties (including relations) in the world.23 On this picture, the dis-course engages with the world: our use of the discourse is seen as guidedand constrained by, and as being responsible to, how things are. Theother picture, favored by those who espouse antirealism, presents the dis-course as nonrepresentational, as not hooking up with the world. Thispicture builds on the idea that not all our discourses serve one and thesame function: reporting how things are. Different discourses- for ex-ample, mathematics, physics, and everyday discourse- serve, it is sug-gested, different functions: the point of mathematical discourse is not toreport on how things are in some otherworldly mathematical reality, but amore practical one of enabling shorter deductions; the point of physicaldiscourse is not to report on some mysterious invisible universe, but toenable us to cope with everyday needs and problems in an efficient way;and even everyday discourse, it has been suggested, does not aim to reporton an inaccessible external world, but to bring order and manageabilityinto our chaotic sense impressions. On the antirealist picture, discoursedoes not engage with the world ; it is not constrained by how things are.But this does not mean that the discourse is completely unconstrained andfreewheeling. According to the antirealist, the distinctive function of thediscourse provides a strong constraint on it .

This is, I should stress, a bare sketch of the dominant pictures under-lying the current debate. The debate itself provides a wealth of alternativeways of developing, modifying, and defending the pictures. I will notenter into the details here, for my aim is to point out a problem in thedominant pictures. This problem in turn suggests a synthesis that may beuseful for understanding some (not all!) of our conceptual activity .24

The realist picture, we have seen, subscribes to the ideas of repre-sentationalism (R) and engagement-with-the-world (E); the antirealistpicture subscribes to the ideas of antirepresentationalism (not-R) and


2.6 Realism and Antirealism

34 Gupta

disengagement-from-the-world (not-E). The typical realist argument (e.g.,for physics) is based on success: if the objects physics speaks about(gravitational action at a distance, curved space-time, and such) do notexist, then- in the words of Hilary Putnam-

it is a miracle that a theory \\7hich speaks of gravitational action at a distancesuccessfully predicts phenomena; it is a miracle that a theory which speaks ofcurved space-time successfully predicts phenomena. (1978, 19)

The strength of this argument lies in the transition from success to

engagement-with-the-world (E)- it would indeed be a miracle if physicsyielded helpful predictions and were at the same time disengaged fromthe world . The rest of the realist argument consists of a move fromengagement-with-the-world (E) to representationalism (R). The typicalantirealist argument, on the other hand, rests on the " queerness" (to usean expression of J. L . Mackie's) of the objects, and of the " referring" or"picturing" relation, required by representationalism. The antirealist thus

rejects representationalism and moves from there to embrace disengage-ment (not-E).

The realist argument moves from engagement (E) to representational-ism (R); the antirealist argument from antirepresentationalism (not-R) todisengagement (not-E). The two arguments share an important assump-tion (namely, if E then R)- and one that is problematic. The fact that adiscourse genuinely engages with the world does not imply that it " pic-tures" the world . Contrapositively, the fact that a discourse fails to picturethe world does not imply that it is disengaged from the world . The prob-lem with the realist and antirealist pictures is that they contain an illegit-imate link between engagement and representationalism.

A useful synthesis of the realist and antirealist pictures is possible. :Thissynthesis views the discourse as engaging with the world and as servingthe function of informing us how things are- in this respect it followsrealism- but it adopts the antirealist idea that the discourse is not repre-sentational. This possibility is illustrated by our imagined community andits talk about "up." A representational semantics for 'up', we have seen, isnot acceptable. But the community's discourse is fully engaged with theworld . The primary point of the " up" talk is to help community membersnavigate their way around the world by making them sensitive to howthings are (or are desired to be).

The gap between representationalism and engagement can be madeintelligible through the notion of " frame" (section 2.5). Consider again the


example of the repairman and how he locates the broken lamp. Room-mate A determines the position of the broken lamp perceptually andarrives at the judgment that the broken lamp is up above the stove. Heutters the words 'The broken lamp is up above the stove' to inform othersof the location of the lamp. These words (or their variants) are passedfrom mouth to mouth till they reach the repairman, who uses them toperceptually locate the lamp to be repaired. The sentence 'The brokenlamp is up above the stove', we have seen, cannot be assigned determinatetruth-conditions. However, relative to the pattern of use exemplified, rela-tive to the frame of use, we may be able to assign 'up above' a definiterelation- perhaps the relation S defined in section 2.3- and the sentencedeterminate truth-conditions. Once we keep the frame fixed, we can rea-

sonably view A 's perceptual interaction with the world as providing Awith information about the relative positions of the lamp and the stove,information that he passes to the repairman via the various inter-mediaries. Absolutely speaking, 'up' does not represent any relation, butrelative to a frame, when the use of 'up' is disengaged from some of theconceptual elements, it may well represent a definite relation. Disengage-ment within the conceptual system can help bring about engagement withthe world .

The success of our linguistic and conceptual practices proves at mostthat our assertions have true effective contents. That is, it proves at mostthat within their respective frames our assertions hook on to the world .But from this we cannot conclude that our assertions have true absolutecontents and that our discourse pictures the world . Such a conclusionwould follow only if our linguistic and conceptual practices constituted amonolithic whole, unfragmented into multiple frames. Mere success ofour practices does not establish the requisite unity in our thought.

The proposal, then, is to combine nonrepresentationalism and engage-ment in the following way. We allow a discourse to be nonrepre-sentational in that the absolute contents expressed by its statements are

problematic- perhaps they all contain error; perhaps they are ill defined.But we allow the discourse to engage with the world in that much (per-haps most) of the discourse is viewed as separable under several frames.Relative to these frames, the statements of the discourse have (effective)contents that can be assessed for truth and falsehood.

This combination of nonrepresentationalism and engagement avoidssome of the weaknesses of both realism and antirealism. Antirealism is

prone to view our theory construction as being so much storytelling;

realism , on the other hand , is prone to view it as so much revealed truth .

Neither tendency is acceptable- except insofar as it provides a counter tothe other . Realists are correct to insist that there is a vast difference

between fictional discourse and theoretical discourse . Fictional discourse

does not - but theoretical discourse does - engage with the world .25

Unlike fictional discourse, a discarded scientific theory - even one that

proves to be deeply erroneous , and one for which we are unable to pro -vide a representational semantics- generates useful frames and true effec-

tive contents . (Example : " Don 't touch that . It has high caloric content ." )26Indeed , sometimes a discarded theory proves such a convenience within

certain frames that we allow its continued use, with the proviso that

the use shall not extend beyond those frames (as in the celestial sphereexample given above). I suspect that this kind of fragmented use is moreprevalent in our language than we realize .

Antirealists , on the other hand , are correct to insist that our presenttheoretical terms do not have a special status over those of the earlierscientists, prophets , and myth -makers : there is little reason to count as

representational our present-day theoretical terms while denying thisstatus to the terms of the earlier , discarded theories . Our evidence and our

situation in the world are not essentially different from those of our an-

cestors. Our evidence is not so comprehensive , nor our understanding sodeep and clear , that we can rule out the possibility that we ourselves suffer

from deep misconceptions . The perennial problems of philosophy and the

irresistible force of the skeptical arguments stand witness to the fragmen -tation in our understanding and the narrowness of our evidence. 2 7

Conceptual disengagement and fragmentation of thought are essentialfor creatures such as we are. Had God (or evolution ) equipped us with theright set of concepts once and for all , had the overall structure of the

world been somehow revealed to us (as Plato and Descartes thought ), had

our inquiries only the simple goal of filling in the mere details in a given , apriori , picture of the world - had our epistemic position been so fortu -

nate, disengagement and fragmentation might have had no place in theworkings of our language and thought . But , unfortunately , our epistemicposition is a precarious one. We do not approach the task of under -standing the world with perfect ready-made tools in our hands. We

approach the task bare-handed; we need to make the tools, including thetools needed to make the tools themselves. We need to make (or discover )the system of concepts needed to conceptualize the detailed facts about

the world , facts that are essential to our well -being . However , we cannot

36 Gupta

arrive at the right system of concepts without an adequate fund of facts,and we cannot arrive at an adequate fund of facts without the right sys-tem of concepts. If we had the right system of concepts, we could securelygo about collecting and cataloging facts. If we had a fund of solid facts,we could securely go about improving our system of concepts. However,we begin our inquiry into the world having neither- neither the rightsystem of concepts nor a fund of solid facts. We need somehow, throughour inquiry , to work our way to both. It is inevitable that in the processwe need to work with imperfect systems of concepts- systems that em-body deep misconceptions- and with the resultant distortions of fact. It isthis epistemic environment that makes conceptual disengagement andfragmentation of thought inevitable and important .


for the study of language was first

Notes

1. The importance of conversational maximsobserved by Paul Grice (see Grice 1989).

2. So I wish to set aside what Hilary Putnam calls 'the division of linguistic labor '(see Putnam 1975 ) .

3. And it is so identified by a currently popular theory .

4. The version of conceptual -role semantics I shall be working with is due toWilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom (see Sellars 1953, 1974; Brandom 1994). Twodistinctive features of the Sellars- Brandom semantics are worth noting . First , it

explains meaning and content in terms of inferential role , as opposed to , say,functional role in the user's psychology (cf . Harman 1982) . Second, it understandsinferential role to include role in substantive , material inferences, not merely for -mal inferences .

5. Note that the conceptual -role approach uses an absolute notion of " warrant ."This notion is connected to , but it is not identical with , the notion " warranted

given that the language user is in such-and-such epistemic situation ." The con-nection between the two notions is roughly as follows : P is warranted in theabsolute sense if and only if P would be warranted by the rules of language underidealized epistemic conditions .

6. I follow Michael Dummett jn seeing the primary disagreement between the

representational approach and its rivals to be over undecidable sentences (seeDummett 1978, 1993) .

7 . Let me stress that the sense in which ' ~ Tarrant ' is used here is not that of per -

sonal warrant . It does not mean " being warranted given one's epistemic situa-tion . " In this latter sense , it could well be that both the assertions of A and Bare

warranted - or that neither of them is .

8. Here and below , I make several simplifying assumptions - for example , that

objects can be treated as if they were points and that 'up ' is not vague . Further , I

38 Gupta

suppress the relativity of 'up ' to time . (Some of the complexities of our actual usesof 'up ' are detailed in Jackendoff 1996.)

9. Assuming , as I shall , that A 's and B's kitchen is not on the mountain peak p(figure 2.2) .

10. I am assuming , of course, that there are no other reasons to call into questionA 's authority on this matter .

11. Another way of putting the difficulty is this : the wish of a person , X , that a beup above b can be fulfilled only by adjusting the positions of a and b, not bymoving X to a place where the standard up is the direction of ~ !

12. The idea that 'a is up above b' expresses a proposition and 'up above ' a binaryconcept will meet resistance from the Platonist and from the Nominalist . These

new entities will seem to the Platonist to be unworthy of a place in the realm ofPlatonic Heaven ; to the Nominalist they will seem unworthy of a place even in therealm of ordinary existence. In response, it may be observed to the Platonist that

the new entities exemplify an important virtue : they do real work in our concep-tual scheme . Furthermore , whatever flaws may be found in these entities , the same

flaws (and many more ) are found reflected in Truth , whose place in PlatonicHeaven is unquestioned . To the Nominalist it may be observed that the new enti -

ties are not going to make their programs any more difficult to execute. Anyscheme they devise that succeeds in eliminating the familiar abstract entities willsucceed in eliminating the new, unfamiliar ones as well .

13. Propositions are defined in the literature in two nonequivalent ways . Some-times they are defined as the objects of attitudes such as belief and desire;sometimes they are defined as objects that are truth -apt . The first definition putspropositions closer to the representings ; the second puts them closer to the repre-senteds. I have chosen above to follow the first definition , but the choice is purelyterminological . The important point is that the two definitions define distinct

notions . Which notion ends up winning the label 'proposition ' is not at allimportant .

14. Recall we are assuming that the kitchen is not located on the mountain peak p(see figure 2.2).

15. Another sort of idle use is worth noting . Suppose roommate A informs therepairman of the location of the lamp by saying ,

(i) The direction of the ray that goes from the stove to the broken lamp is theStandard Up .

The repairman naturally uses (i) to infer that

(ii ) The broken lamp is up above the stove,

and proceeds in his usual way to locate the lamp to be repaired . The use of (i) isnot now idle , for it informs the repairman of the lamp 's location . But the detourvia directions contained in (i) is idle . For A arrives at (i) through (ii ), and he relieson the repairman to return to (ii ) from the assertion of (i) . (This sort of idle detourvia the theoretical is also witnessed in a college cafeteria when a student employeemarks the water container 'H2O '.)


16. More eccentric than if at a dinner party a guest should pullout a microscope

to examine the contents of her plate before declaring that the host had served peas.

Deep errors in our botanical theories might be revealed by this chance examina -tion, but a dinner party is not the time and place to explore the possibility.

17. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that we, who are aware of the mis-

conception , are willing to ascribe knowledge that the broken lamp is up above thestove. We would explain some of the successes of the community members interms of their possession, and some of their failures in terms of their lack , of thisknowledge . Since knowledge implies truth , it follows that we recognize that thereis a sense in which the assertion that the broken lamp is up above the stove is true .

18 . I use the word ' effective ' here to indicate that the notions of truth -value and

content under discussion serve to explain the practical effectiveness of language .

This is not the place to develop a precise account of effective contents . For the

purposes of this chapter , effective contents can be thought of as being of the samegeneral type as absolute contents. Whether one favors the idea that absolute con-tents are conceptual roles, or the idea that they are sets of possible worlds, or thatthey are Russellian structured entities , one can take a parallel view of effectivecontents . Note that absolute and effective contents , though they can formally be

similar , are, in general , materially different . For example , if content is understoodas conceptual role , effective content will be restricted conceptual role . For anotherexample , if content is understood as a set of possible worlds , the effective andabsolute contents of an assertion will often be given by different sets of possibleworlds .

19. For a good account of information that might be supplied by context , andhow it might evolve in the course of conversation , see Lewis 1979.

20. Hence , the meaning -truth schemata for effective truth should not be used to" solve" for meaning , if we wish to preserve a connection between meaning andunderstanding .

21. The importance of separating factors that help explain understanding fromthose that help explain the workings of language has been stressed by Mark Wilson(see Wilson 1994, forthcoming a, b) .

22. The literature generated by these debates is vast (see Field 1980; Mackie1977; Leplin 1984; Sayre-McCord 1988; Devitt 1991 and the works cited there) .Jackendoff 1991 is a valuable contribution to the realism debate for intentional

discourse. Maddy 1990 and Wright 1992 contain illuminating discussions of sev-eral aspects of the debates .

23. This claim needs qualification . First , it should be understood to be restrictedto names and predicates that are essential to the discourse . A realism with respectto physics may be willing to allow that some of the names and predicates found inphysical discourse (e.g., arithmetical ones) fail to refer . Second, the names andpredicates that are essential may not be discernible simply from the surfacegrammar of the discourse ; it may be necessary to reveal the deeper logical form ofthe discourse . Third , on some varieties of realism , language -world relations count

as representational if statements are correlated with states of affairs, bypassing

40 Gupta

worldly assignments for names and predicates. For example, if a statement such as" The United States government has reduced all tariffs on imports" is correlatedwith a complicated worldly state of affairs (including the actions of the presidentand the various members of Congress), the correlation will count as representa-tional, even though the terms and predicates in the sentence (and in its logicalanalysis) are not correlated with worldly items.

I will continue to use the simpler formulations of " representationalism" given inthe text, leaving the qualifications implicit .

24. In contemporary philosophy, one finds the dialectic of thesis and antithesisfollowed often, not by a useful synthesis, but by a sterile super-antithesis, onewhich asserts that the earlier dialectic is meaningless. This super-antithesis invites,of course, a super-thesis that the dialectic is indeed meaningful. And the focusshifts to a new debate at a higher level- "higher" not in the sense of nobler orbetter but in the sense of being more detached from down-to-earth concerns thatreally matter. The entire foundation for the super-antithesis (with respect to therealism/ antirealism debate) rests, in my opinion, on misconceptions about theconcepts of truth and meaning. In essential respects, the super-antithesis mirrors,in content and in the ways it goes wrong, the logical positivist rejection of meta-physics on the basis of the verification theory of meaning. (The proponents of thesuper-antithesis are some of the most vehement critics of logical positivism. Butthey seem to me to exemplify many of the intellectual vices of the positivists, andfew of their virtues. In philosophy wrong attitudes are often more pernicious thanwrong doctrines.)

25. I am setting aside figurative uses of fictional terms.

26. A distinction is worth noting here: a complete rejection of the vocabulary ofthe theory and a complete rejection of the statements of the theory. The formerdoes not imply the latter. We reject the use of 'caloric' and 'witches' in our de-scriptions of the world, but this does not require us to reject completely all earlierstatements containing these terms. We can, and should, attribute true effectivecontents to many of these statements.

27. I do not mean to suggest that nonrepresentationalism is plausible for all the-oretical terms. I do think that it is attractive to treat all of our theories, both theearlier rejected ones and the currently accepted ones, as semantically pretty muchon a par. All engage with the world, though some more fruitfully than others. Allfail to be representational, though again some more than others.

References

Brandom, R. (1994). Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursivecommitment. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.

Devitt , M . (1991). Realism and truth (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell.

Dummett, M . (1978). Truth and other enigmas. London: Duckworth .

Dummett, M . (1993). The seas of language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Field, H . H . (1980). Science without numbers: A defense of nominalism. Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press.


Grice, P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress.

Harman, G. (1982). Conceptual role semantics. Notre Dame Journal of FormalLogic, 23, 242- 256.Jackendoff, R. (1991). The problem of reality. Noils, 25, 411- 433.Jackendoff, R. (1996). The architecture of the linguistic-spatial interface. InP. Bloom, M. Peterson, L. Nadel, and M. Garrett (Eds.), Language and space(pp. 1- 30). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Leplin, J. (Ed.). (1984). Scientific realism. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press.

Lewis, D. (1979). Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of PhilosophicalLogic, 8, 339- 359.Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. London: Penguin.

Maddy, P. (1990). Realism in mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language, and reality: Philosophical papers, vol. 2.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Putnam, H. (1978). Meaning and the moral sciences. London: Routledge & KeganPaul.

Sayre-McCord, G. (Ed.). (1988). Essays on moral realism. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press.Sellars, W. (1953). Inference and meaning. Mind, 62, 313- 338.Sellars, W. (1974). Meaning and functional classification. Synthese, 27, 417- 437.Wilson, M. (1994). Can we trust logical form? Journal of Philosophy, 91, 519- 544.Wilson, M. (Forthcoming a). Inference and correlational truth.Wilson, M. (Forthcoming b). Physica stint, non leguntur.Wright, C. (1992). Truth and objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress.

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