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Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing. 2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop Alexandria, VA (USA) October 29, 2007. Mariusz H. Jakubowski Ramarathnam Venkatesan Microsoft Research. Introduction. Biometrics: “What you are” - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via
Fingerprint Hashing
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management WorkshopAlexandria, VA (USA)
October 29, 2007
Mariusz H. JakubowskiRamarathnam Venkatesan
Microsoft Research
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 2
Introduction• Biometrics: “What you are”
– Measurements over bodily features (e.g., fingerprints)– Applications for security and convenience
• Biometric hashing– One-way extraction of information from biometric data– Human identifiers for DRM authentication
• Goals of our work:– New method for fingerprint hashing– Applications to strengthen and streamline DRM security
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 3
Overview
• Introduction• Fingerprint hashing• Experimental results• Conclusion
Fingerprint hashing via Radon transform
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 4
Fingerprint HashingConversion of fingerprints to one-way hashes
for authentication applications
• Fingerprint hash: An irreversible compressed representation of fingerprint data, extracted according to a secret key.
• Basic procedure:– Compute various metrics over a fingerprint image and combine
these into a hash vector.– Apply error correction and other methods to increase hash
robustness.
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 5
Radon Transform• Standard: (x,y) (θ, ρ), where θ and ρ denote angles and distances of lines.• Line at angle θ and distance ρ from origin will result in high value of transform
coefficient (θ, ρ).
Hash transform: This line-based metric is replaced by a custom metric.
R(θ, ρ)Original image
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 6
Randomizing the Transform• Standard:
– Exhaustively enumerate all lines.– Typical metric: Compute projections of lines onto image.
• Randomized:– Generate a pseudorandom sequence of lines, using a
secret hashing key.– Simpler metric: Compute crossing counts of lines with
image (i.e., number of times each line crosses or grazes fingerprint curves).
• Randomized transform leads to hashing scheme.
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 7
Fingerprint Hashing: Example
Scanned fingerprint
Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 8
Fingerprint Hashing: Example
Scanned fingerprint
Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves
Cleaned fingerprinto Generic clean-up: Filters, thresholds, etc.o Specialized methods: VeriFinger
(Neurotechnologija, Inc.)
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 9
Fingerprint Hashing: Example
Scanned fingerprint
5 random lines
Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves
Cleaned fingerprint
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 10
Fingerprint Hashing: Example
Scanned fingerprint
25 21 24 25 25
5 random lines
Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves
Cleaned fingerprint
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 11
Fingerprint Hashing: Example
Scanned fingerprint
25 21 24 25 25
22 17 21 23 2322 22 27 24 2514 23 25 27 25
5 random lines
15 random lines
Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves
Cleaned fingerprint
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 12
Fingerprint Hashing: Example
Scanned fingerprint
25 21 24 25 25
22 17 21 23 2322 22 27 24 2514 23 25 27 25
5 random lines
15 random lines
Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves 10 random curves
Cleaned fingerprint
3 24 44 27 328 16 24 37 31
Hashes (crossing counts)
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 13
Some Metrics for Hashing• Counts of crossings with lines and curves• Curvatures of fingerprint lines within random regions• Numbers and types of minutiae contained in random regions (e.g.,
rectangles)
7 6 0 1 2 2
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 14
Hash Properties
• Secret key or password used to determine metric types and parameters
• Controllable length and security (e.g., 64, 128, or 256 bits)
• Resistance against minor scanner distortions and noise
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 15
Fingerprint Authentication• Standard authentication: Compare fingerprint scans
against stored “correct” fingerprints.• Hash-based authentication: Compare hashes of
scanned fingerprints with stored “correct” hashes.
• Benefits of hashes:– Actual fingerprints need not be stored for comparison.– Stolen hashes do not reveal or compromise entire
fingerprints.– Key-derived hashes bind passwords and fingerprints tightly.– Short hash length allows usage in network protocols, Web
services, etc.
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 16
Experiments
Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 17
Experiments
Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22
Distorted fingerprintHash: 29 19 20 23 22Difference: 1 0 -1 0 0
o StirMark distortions usedo Approximation of real-life scanner distortions
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 18
Experiments
Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22
Distorted fingerprintHash: 29 19 20 23 22Difference: 1 0 -1 0 0
Different hash keyHash : 20 26 28 21 17Difference: -8 7 7 -2 -5
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 19
Experiments
Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22
Different fingerprint #1Hash: 38 17 24 34 28Difference: 10 -2 3 11 6
Distorted fingerprintHash: 29 19 20 23 22Difference: 1 0 -1 0 0
Different hash keyHash : 20 26 28 21 17Difference: -8 7 7 -2 -5
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 20
Experiments
Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22
Different fingerprint #1Hash: 38 17 24 34 28Difference: 10 -2 3 11 6
Different fingerprint #2Hash: 19 26 18 24 23Difference: -9 7 -3 1 1
Distorted fingerprintHash: 29 19 20 23 22Difference: 1 0 -1 0 0
Different hash keyHash : 20 26 28 21 17Difference: -8 7 7 -2 -5
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 21
Experimental Results
0 5 10 15 20 250
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Fingerprint Number
Dis
tanc
e
Distances between each fingerprint and its distorted version
Distances between each fingerprint and other distinct fingerprints
5 random lines
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 22
Experimental Results
0 5 10 15 20 250
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Fingerprint Number
Dis
tanc
e
0 5 10 15 20 250
100
200
300
400
500
600
Fingerprint NumberD
ista
nce
Distances between each fingerprint and its distorted version
Distances between each fingerprint and other distinct fingerprints
5 random lines 50 random lines
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 23
Experimental Results
0 5 10 15 20 250
100
200
300
400
500
600
Fingerprint Number
Dis
tanc
e
Distances between each fingerprint and its distorted version
Distances between each fingerprint and other distinct fingerprints
50 random lines 200 random lines(diminishing returns)
0 5 10 15 20 250
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Fingerprint NumberD
ista
nce
2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 24
Conclusion• Contributions
– Methodology to extract fingerprint entropy– Applications in biometric authentication
• Address “too many passwords” problem• Augment password-based schemes
• Future work– Handling scanner distortions
• Naturally robust metrics• Better error correction• Explicit fingerprint synchronization
– Applications to other biometric data• Retinal blood vessels• Vein patterns on hands