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Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing 2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop Alexandria, VA (USA) October 29, 2007 Mariusz H. Jakubowski Ramarathnam Venkatesan Microsoft Research

Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

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Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing. 2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop Alexandria, VA (USA) October 29, 2007. Mariusz H. Jakubowski Ramarathnam Venkatesan Microsoft Research. Introduction. Biometrics: “What you are” - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via

Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management WorkshopAlexandria, VA (USA)

October 29, 2007

Mariusz H. JakubowskiRamarathnam Venkatesan

Microsoft Research

Page 2: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 2

Introduction• Biometrics: “What you are”

– Measurements over bodily features (e.g., fingerprints)– Applications for security and convenience

• Biometric hashing– One-way extraction of information from biometric data– Human identifiers for DRM authentication

• Goals of our work:– New method for fingerprint hashing– Applications to strengthen and streamline DRM security

Page 3: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 3

Overview

• Introduction• Fingerprint hashing• Experimental results• Conclusion

Fingerprint hashing via Radon transform

Page 4: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 4

Fingerprint HashingConversion of fingerprints to one-way hashes

for authentication applications

• Fingerprint hash: An irreversible compressed representation of fingerprint data, extracted according to a secret key.

• Basic procedure:– Compute various metrics over a fingerprint image and combine

these into a hash vector.– Apply error correction and other methods to increase hash

robustness.

Page 5: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 5

Radon Transform• Standard: (x,y) (θ, ρ), where θ and ρ denote angles and distances of lines.• Line at angle θ and distance ρ from origin will result in high value of transform

coefficient (θ, ρ).

Hash transform: This line-based metric is replaced by a custom metric.

R(θ, ρ)Original image

Page 6: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 6

Randomizing the Transform• Standard:

– Exhaustively enumerate all lines.– Typical metric: Compute projections of lines onto image.

• Randomized:– Generate a pseudorandom sequence of lines, using a

secret hashing key.– Simpler metric: Compute crossing counts of lines with

image (i.e., number of times each line crosses or grazes fingerprint curves).

• Randomized transform leads to hashing scheme.

Page 7: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 7

Fingerprint Hashing: Example

Scanned fingerprint

Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves

Page 8: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 8

Fingerprint Hashing: Example

Scanned fingerprint

Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves

Cleaned fingerprinto Generic clean-up: Filters, thresholds, etc.o Specialized methods: VeriFinger

(Neurotechnologija, Inc.)

Page 9: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 9

Fingerprint Hashing: Example

Scanned fingerprint

5 random lines

Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves

Cleaned fingerprint

Page 10: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 10

Fingerprint Hashing: Example

Scanned fingerprint

25 21 24 25 25

5 random lines

Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves

Cleaned fingerprint

Page 11: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 11

Fingerprint Hashing: Example

Scanned fingerprint

25 21 24 25 25

22 17 21 23 2322 22 27 24 2514 23 25 27 25

5 random lines

15 random lines

Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves

Cleaned fingerprint

Page 12: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 12

Fingerprint Hashing: Example

Scanned fingerprint

25 21 24 25 25

22 17 21 23 2322 22 27 24 2514 23 25 27 25

5 random lines

15 random lines

Metric: Crossing count with random lines and curves 10 random curves

Cleaned fingerprint

3 24 44 27 328 16 24 37 31

Hashes (crossing counts)

Page 13: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 13

Some Metrics for Hashing• Counts of crossings with lines and curves• Curvatures of fingerprint lines within random regions• Numbers and types of minutiae contained in random regions (e.g.,

rectangles)

7 6 0 1 2 2

Page 14: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 14

Hash Properties

• Secret key or password used to determine metric types and parameters

• Controllable length and security (e.g., 64, 128, or 256 bits)

• Resistance against minor scanner distortions and noise

Page 15: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 15

Fingerprint Authentication• Standard authentication: Compare fingerprint scans

against stored “correct” fingerprints.• Hash-based authentication: Compare hashes of

scanned fingerprints with stored “correct” hashes.

• Benefits of hashes:– Actual fingerprints need not be stored for comparison.– Stolen hashes do not reveal or compromise entire

fingerprints.– Key-derived hashes bind passwords and fingerprints tightly.– Short hash length allows usage in network protocols, Web

services, etc.

Page 16: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 16

Experiments

Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22

Page 17: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 17

Experiments

Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22

Distorted fingerprintHash: 29 19 20 23 22Difference: 1 0 -1 0 0

o StirMark distortions usedo Approximation of real-life scanner distortions

Page 18: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 18

Experiments

Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22

Distorted fingerprintHash: 29 19 20 23 22Difference: 1 0 -1 0 0

Different hash keyHash : 20 26 28 21 17Difference: -8 7 7 -2 -5

Page 19: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 19

Experiments

Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22

Different fingerprint #1Hash: 38 17 24 34 28Difference: 10 -2 3 11 6

Distorted fingerprintHash: 29 19 20 23 22Difference: 1 0 -1 0 0

Different hash keyHash : 20 26 28 21 17Difference: -8 7 7 -2 -5

Page 20: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 20

Experiments

Original fingerprintHash: 28 19 21 23 22

Different fingerprint #1Hash: 38 17 24 34 28Difference: 10 -2 3 11 6

Different fingerprint #2Hash: 19 26 18 24 23Difference: -9 7 -3 1 1

Distorted fingerprintHash: 29 19 20 23 22Difference: 1 0 -1 0 0

Different hash keyHash : 20 26 28 21 17Difference: -8 7 7 -2 -5

Page 21: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 21

Experimental Results

0 5 10 15 20 250

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Fingerprint Number

Dis

tanc

e

Distances between each fingerprint and its distorted version

Distances between each fingerprint and other distinct fingerprints

5 random lines

Page 22: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 22

Experimental Results

0 5 10 15 20 250

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Fingerprint Number

Dis

tanc

e

0 5 10 15 20 250

100

200

300

400

500

600

Fingerprint NumberD

ista

nce

Distances between each fingerprint and its distorted version

Distances between each fingerprint and other distinct fingerprints

5 random lines 50 random lines

Page 23: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 23

Experimental Results

0 5 10 15 20 250

100

200

300

400

500

600

Fingerprint Number

Dis

tanc

e

Distances between each fingerprint and its distorted version

Distances between each fingerprint and other distinct fingerprints

50 random lines 200 random lines(diminishing returns)

0 5 10 15 20 250

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Fingerprint NumberD

ista

nce

Page 24: Randomized Radon Transforms for Biometric Authentication via Fingerprint Hashing

2007 ACM Digital Rights Management Workshop October 29, 2007 24

Conclusion• Contributions

– Methodology to extract fingerprint entropy– Applications in biometric authentication

• Address “too many passwords” problem• Augment password-based schemes

• Future work– Handling scanner distortions

• Naturally robust metrics• Better error correction• Explicit fingerprint synchronization

– Applications to other biometric data• Retinal blood vessels• Vein patterns on hands