R.a.H. Robinson - Political Conservatism the Spanish Case 1875-1977

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Political Conservatism: The Spanish Case, 1875-1977Author(s): R. A. H. RobinsonSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 14, No. 4, A Century of Conservatism, Part 2(Oct., 1979), pp. 561-580Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

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R.A. H.Robinson

PoliticalConservatism:The SpanishCase, 1875-1977

'Conservatism is a word whose usefulness is matched only by its

capacity to confuse, distort, and irritate.' Denoting, Clinton

Rossiter supposes, patterns of thought and action that are endur-

ing, the same authority expresses the opinion that the word is 'a

handy, if dangerous, tool of social science.' When someone has ac-

cepted the invitation of the editor of an academic journal to write

an article on 'Spanish conservatism', it is perhaps a little churlish of

him to begin by casting considerable doubt on the validity or utility

of the concept as an aid to clarification in contemporary historicalstudies. Nevertheless, the present writer feels it incumbent uponhim to make clear from the first his distaste for the use of the con-

cept, while he also feels it necessary to make a brief excursion into

some of the literatureon 'conservatism' as a trans-national political

phenomenon before surveying the last century of Spanish political

history with a view to locating which political organizations can

fairly be saddled with the term.

To many inhabitants of the United Kingdom the very idea of ex-tending the political usage of the terms 'conservative' and 'conser-

vatism' in any precise sense beyond their shores is alien. 'Conser-

vatism' should, in this view, be exclusively reserved for a uniquehistorical phenomenon, the British Conservative (formerly Tory)movement, the product of specific historical traditions and cir-

cumstances which, by definition, are not to be found elsewhere. Asone spokesman puts it: 'any concept of English or British Conser-vatism as a national branch of a European or international system

is preposterous and nonsensical. The Tory or Conservative Par-ty... is strictly local, as also practical and pragmatic... Toryism isnot for export', since it is a British 'national philosophy'. Yet evenwhen examining the specific British context, the same author has to

Journal of Contemporary History (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills),Vol. 14 (1979), 561-580







Journal of ContemporaryHistory

concede that, after allowances have been made for differing na-tional traditions -

'the English do well to cherish their ancientMonarchy, the Swiss their ancient Republic', there remains an in-ternational dimension. 'The conservative instinct is a natural in-stinct. .., a healthy mistrust of innovation':

In political society, therefore, we find a conservative force and conservative

classes, and, where political parties have appeared, they will ordinarily include

reactionaries, conservatives and revolutionaries. The reactionary is one who

seeks the restoration of an earlier order or class structure; the revolutionarydemands the sudden or violent

impositionof

reforms,and

those, independentlyof his aims and intentions, either provoke reaction or terminate in tyranny; the

conservative wisely accepts necessary or unavoidable change and directs it in the

path of peaceful reform. He thus forestalls the infructuous misery of revolution

and ensures his society that continuity of growth from which it derives

sustenance and strength...

Conscious of the reality of original sin, knowing that we have no power of

ourselves to help ourselves, the Conservative is sceptical of innovation and

deferential to those members of his community who are dead or yet unborn.2

This statement of conviction by a British Tory/Conservative

conveniently opens up the whole question of definition, a questionwhich, in the last resort, can only be resolved arbitrarilyand sub-

jectively by each individual. Since the search for definition, itself

for some an 'unconservative' activity, has been largely carried on in

the context of debates over the nature of the American so-called

'new conservatism' which appeared after 1945, it is only natural

that reference be made to trans-Atlantic writings on the subject, to

the opinions of such as Rossiter, Kirk, Viereck, Wilson and Hun-

tington.3The first task, when writing about 'political conservatism', is to

make clear that this is not necessarily identifiable with 'conser-

vative' 'psychology', 'instincts', 'temperament', 'disposition',

'mentalities', 'attitudes' or 'spirit'. The 'political conservative' maywell possess many or all of these traits, but the same traits are to be

found among opponents of 'political conservatism': a 'radical' in

politics is not necessarily 'radical' in other respects. Secondly, inthe strictest and most meaningful use of the term, which Roberto

Michels labelled the 'technically political' usage,4 'con-

servatism'/'conservative' denotes simply defence of or support for

the status quo, whatever that may be at a particularmoment. Thus,as Michels pointed out, the Bolsheviks of 1930 were as 'conser-

562







Robinson: Spanish Conservatism 1875-1977

vative' as the Tsars before 1917, the Fascists as 'conservative' as

Italian liberals in 1921. This perfectly accurate usage is not one,however, with which 'political conservatives' always feel at ease,

fearing guilt by association: in 1968 some British Conservativestook exception to the term's application by pressmen to the anti-Dubcek forces in Czechoslovakia, while in Spain in the 1960s anti-

leftists expressed shock at Burnett Bolloten's use of it to describethe personnel and policies of the Popular Front government of1936 when faced with a revolutionary challenge from their left.5

Obviously Michels's 'technically political' usage, equivalent to

the 'situational' definitions of Huntington and Rossiter, is anessential descriptive aid; but can - or should - a secondary

political meaning be identified with a particular space on the

political spectrum, with a distinct (international) political

philosophy or ideology, in such a way as to constitute a distinctive

category useful for political and historical analysis? The presentwriter thinks not and notes the vagueness and discomfiture of theacademic authorities when they endeavour to move beyond the

'technically political' or 'situational' definitions. If 'conservatism'is something more than a word to be applied in one specifichistorical situation, viz. 'the ideology...of the reaction of the

feudal-aristocratic-agrarian classes to the French Revolution,liberalism, and the rise of the bourgeoisie at the end of the eight-eenth century and during the first half of the nineteenth', then it isnot clear what it is.

Rossiter suggests that 'political conservatism' is 'roughly

synonymous'with 'the worn but still convenient label the

Right ,' but goes on to show that it really is not. 'Conservative

parties in the most meaningful sense' are deemed by this authorityto be the British Tories, American Republicans, French Gaullistsand European Christian Democrats. However, 'the right' also in-cludes 'reactionaries', who may be called 'restorationists', in-asmuch as they wish to bring back 'the best' of the past andtherefore cannot be simply conserving the social or political orderas it exists. Also on 'the right' are 'violent reactionaries' who are

tantamount to 'violent revolutionaries'. A survey of Spanish 'con-servatism' along these lines will clearly not be the same as a surveyof 'the right' in Spain.6The focus, it would seem, should be on 'themoderate right', on the 'centre-right', on persons and groups intenton maintaining political and social stability, on defending thestatus quo against both 'reactionaries' on 'the right' and

563








against forces representing the antithesis of 'conservatism',

variously defined as 'liberalism' (in the popular trans-Atlanticsense), 'radicalism' or 'revolutionaries' of the left.

While for Huntington 'conservatism' cannot exist (at least con-

sciously) if there is no challenge to the framework of existing in-

stitutions - 'consensus precludes conservatism', Rossiter arguesthat 'conservatism' is only really possible when the opposition is

'liberal' and not 'radical' in its attitude to the established order.

'The historic mission of political conservatism in the West', he

writes, 'has been not to defeat but to forestall revolutions, not to

crush but to anticipate them.' For him the advent of 'a truly revolu-

tionary situation' (as perceived by whom?) shows that 'conser-

vatism' has failed in its mission. Furthermore, in this 'truly revolu-

tionary situation', 'conservatism' cannot exist except as 'a politicsof delusion': as men of order 'conservatives' have to become

'restorationists' or 'reactionaries', or else indulge in 'crypto-radicalism' by 'riding the tiger' of revolution. In other words,

'moderates' are swamped at moments of social and political

polarization, a rule to which Spain is no exception. Yet, as Rossiteradds, 'the conservative as revolutionary , the traditionalist who

acts radically to preserve the crumbling values and institutions

of his community, is no conservative at all.' Or, as Michels observ-

ed earlier, 'when the social order they desire to conserve is merely

threatened..., conservatives generally stop behaving as conser-

vatives and, sometimes accompanying action with ideological shifts

to justify it, violate their own code to avoid the danger of disap-

pearingwith it.'

The need to prevent revolutionary change and the hostility to in-

novation are both recognized by students of 'conservatism' as

characteristics of the phenomenon, or at least of its 'intelligent'

adherents. 'Conservatives' apparently accept that life is change and

history process, but wish to progress as slowly as possible: like Fa-

bian Socialists, they adhere to 'the inevitability of gradualness.'The rationale for changes by those who want as little as possible to

change is always couched in terms of the same paradox. The Whig

Edmund Burke, who has won almost unanimous support for the ti-tle 'the father of conservatism', contended that 'a state without the

means of some change is without the means of its conservation',

while Metternich told the Tsar that 'stability is not immobility.' In

this paradox lies the apple of discord for 'conservatives'. 'In order

to preserve the fundamental elements of society', notes Hun-

564








tington, 'it may be necessary to acquiesce in change on secondary

issues.' As Francis Wilson explained, 'conservatism... must adaptitself to the necessities of the time...; it learns to forget the lost

cause and the irrelevant tension.' Yet even among 'conservatives'

imbued with pragmatism and empiricism, disagreement is likely as

to which are 'fundamental elements' and which 'secondary issues',as to what 'the necessities of the time' are, which causes are really'lost' and which tensions are 'irrelevant' to whom. With or without

a 'substantive ideal', varieties of 'conservatism' are inevitable.

Before seeking to locate 'political conservatism' and 'conser-

vatives' in the political history of Spain in the 'contemporary'

period, one last observation derived from the general literature on

the phenomenon should be made. Although, as Rossiter says, 'the

mere intention to spin out a theory of conservatism is somehow an

unconservative impulse', the model for 'modern conservatism' is,for both 'conservatives' and 'non-conservatives', assumed to derive

from the Irish Whig, 'liberal' and free-trader Burke. Even thoughthe first conscious uses of the term for political identification are

thought to date from Chateaubriand's Conservateur of 18187andfrom the appropriation of the word to describe their political

organizations in the 1830s by British Tory and Prussian Junker in-

terests, the writings and speeches of Edmund Burke, and his

Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) in particular, are

deemed to provide the ideological archetype. What can be ex-

trapolated from his unsystematic defence of existing institutions

forms, by general agreement among the authorities, the 'core of

principles'or 'the basic elements' or 'the

doctrinal source' of'modern conservatism' as an international phenomenon.'Modern conservatism' is therefore, allowing for adaptations to

'national traditions', held to be 'Burkean' constitutional conser-

vatism, or simply 'the Burkean ideology'. There is also generalagreement among the authorities as to the basic tenets of this

'ideology' (summarized by Rossiter in nine points and by Hun-

tington in six). The empirical and pragmatic 'doctrine' of the'moderate right' holds that man is a religious animal and that

religion (or religiously derived secular humanitarianism) is thefoundation of civil society (it is not institutions, but the men thatcreate them, that are defective); that national societies are organicproducts of slow historical evolution; that man is a creature asmuch of instinct as of reason, and therefore 'experience', habit andcustom are superior guides to abstract reason and logic, and that a

565







Journal of Contemporary History

'presumption' therefore exists 'in favour of any settled scheme of

government against anyuntried

project';that human

beings are,except in an ultimate moral sense, unequal - hence the necessity of

hierarchy, classes or orders in society; that order, moderation, self-

restraint and balance are necessary prerequisites for the exercise of

'freedom' within the sanctity of laws hallowed by custom. Thus

there is said to be a 'constant rebirth of conservatism', in all placesand ages, which emphasizes the crucial role of the 'middle classes'

or 'intermediate social groups' in a 'healthy' society. In an 'age of

liberalism' such as that inaugurated symbolically by the so-called

'Glorious Revolution' of 1688 in England, or the AmericanRevolution of 1776, or the French Revolution of 1789, there is,

moreover, 'no necessary dichotomy' between the basically 'institu-

tional' (as opposed to 'ideational ') 'ideology' of 'conservatism'

and 'liberalism'. Shorn of its abstract rationalism, 'liberalism' in-

deed would seem to be the major component of 'conservatism'.

Vague though this description of 'conservatism' is - and most

'conservatives' would maintain that it would not be 'conservative'

if it were not vague - it nevertheless provides a useful introductionto the quest for the phenomenon in the Spanish 'contemporary'

context.

The obvious and convenient starting-point for a survey of 'conser-

vatism' in Spain in the 'contemporary' period, usually considered

by Anglo-Saxon historians as opening in the last quarter of the

nineteenth century, is the creation of the constitutional phase

known as the 'Restoration Monarchy'.8 The great architect of the

Constitution of 1876, whose defenders claim gave Spain fifty years

of peace - no mean achievement - was Antonio Canovas del

Castillo. Although he himself had not wanted the Monarchy, in the

person of Alfonso XII, to return as a result of a military pronuncia-

miento, as happened in December 1874, he nevertheless accepted

this technically violent change. Canovas, considered the great 'con-

servative' statesman of modern Spain, was however basically a

liberal as the title of the political organization he created in 1875showed: partido liberal conservador (Conservative Liberal Party).

From 1845 until the revolution of 1868 he had operated in

moderate liberal political formations, generally showing that he

believed in constitutional parliamentary monarchy and was oppos-

ed to the radicals of the left as well as to the Carlists, who

566








represented increasingly as the years passed 'reaction' inasmuch as

they wished to move away from the political status quo in a radicalmanner. He was also an opponent of military dictatorship and

authoritarian solutions, such as those that came to be defended byDonoso Cortes from the late 1840s.9 Cainovas's position before

1868 was, then, broadly pragmatic within the framework of liberal

constitutionalism, a position defined more by opposition to threats

to 'the middle way' than by adherence to clear-cut principles. In

1868 he found himself 'neither with the Court nor with the Revolu-

tion'.

After the period of upheaval and frequent changes in 'establish-ed' institutions which made a consistent 'political conservatism'

impossible between 1868 and 1875, Canovas emerged as, in one

sense, a 'liberal restorationist' - a man out to bring back 'the best'

of the status quo ante 1868, and, in another, as a 'conservative' in-

asmuch as he was a defender of the established but threatened

social order, and of the constitutional-monarchical 'middle way'.10The constitutional system which he established was both 'tradi-

tional' and 'liberal' so that it could comprehend all sectors of opi-nion who were prepared to 'compromise' and accept the rules of

the game within a rather vaguely 'eclectic' system of 'principles'.Indeed for Canovas the absence of clear-cut principles was seen as

advantageous. Influenced by French conservative-liberal and

British Burkean-conservativenotions, the Constitution of 1876 was

essentially an improved version of the Royal Statute of 1845.

Canovas argued that a viable constitution had to reflect tradition,

Spain'straditional 'internal

constitution',which was a 'mixed

regime' of monarchy and representativeinstitutions. Canovas's ap-peal to 'tradition' was as subjective as anyone else's, since there areas many national 'traditions' as there are historical interpretationsof a national past. Nevertheless it served its purpose as a legitimiz-

ing prop for the 'new institutions' in so far as Canovas's traditionwas incompatible both with radical liberal conceptions of a con-stitution resting, allegedly, only on abstract principles and withwhat emerged as the 'tradition' of the Carlists which, in its 'ideal-

typical' form, came to see any evolution from the socio-politicalregime of the 'Golden Century' as false, erroneous and 'anti-national'.

For Canovas, constitutional monarchy had to be a comprehen-sive national regime: 'the nation' was the central feature of his

'system' of belief. The nation was not, as for liberals or democrats,

567








simply the product of a daily plebiscite or a desire to go on living

togetheron the

partof

the citizenry: 'The tie of nationality whichsubjects and conserves nations is by its very nature in-

dissoluble... Nations... are the work of Providence.' Though na-tions were in origin violent or arbitrary amalgams, their in-

dividuality and nature were forged by centuries of history.

Sovereignty, for Canovas, resided in the national will, but the latter

was a mystical concept transcending the sum of individual wills. In

Spain the Crown and the Cortes were said together to exercise the

sovereignty which emanated from 'the nation': 'King and Cortes

are co-partners in sovereignty, such is the keystone of the Spanishinternal constitution.' The constituent monarchy of 1875-76 was

therefore not dependent on the votes of the Cortes because the Cor-

tes were dependent on the monarch's right of convocation. For

Canovas, monarchy was more than a mere form of government,for history demonstrated that 'the hereditary Monarchy with the

Cortes is the essential constitutional form of the country.' The

monarchy provided for most Spaniardsthe only link between them,

and without it there could be no legality: the Cortes had the rightonly to decide on the form of constitutional monarchy appropriateto the realities of a particular age, and not on whether or not the

monarchy should exist. Thus was the Restoration Monarchy

justified.The outward constitutional form to be given to Spain's 'internal

constitution' in the late nineteenth century could only be, in

Canovas's view, liberal-parliamentary, albeit with the Crown con-

stituting'a

real, effective, decisive, moderatingand

guiding force,because none other exists in the country'. What was needed was a

system that worked, not one based on abstract principles, but

shaped only by a few guiding 'mother-truths'. One of the latter was

that politics was a governmental science and not a theme for

metaphysical speculation, another that optimists were the most

dangerous of persons because they falsified reality and paved the

way to disillusion and sadness: those inclined to pessimism, like

himself, were altogether preferable.

If Canovas's regime was a 'mixture of opposed elements' unac-ceptable to progressive idealists or anti-liberal Carlists, then this

was no cause for concern: contradictions were at the heart of all

life. What was needed in Spain was political compromise elevated

into a principle. 'English-style government', since he deemed the

English political regime superior to any other, was his 'definable

568








ideal' for Spain. Political parties were indispensable since they

reflected the diversity of opinions, but they had to accept the rulesof the game within his institutional framework. Like Whigs and

Tories, Liberals and Conservatives should alternate in power in

Spain, while 'His Majesty's opposition' was essential if the

monarch was to remain above day-to-day government. 'Intelligentminorities' would rule, and they would recognize that 'governmentbecomes impossible without just, honest and intelligent com-

promises.' Ideals and beliefs had to be moderated by reality:'Politics is a science of the changeable, the relative, the contingent;a science subject in its practical conclusions to the century, the peo-

ple, the moment to which its dependent art must be applied.'Politics was the art of the possible: 'all that is not possible is false in

politics.' Politicians could only hope to influence reality with for-

mulas; they could not hope to apply ideas wholesale.

To the eternal pragmatist and practical politician Canovas,

philosophizing did not come easily. Maxims were the product of ex-

perience. Apart from his commitment to liberal monarchy, he had,

however, set views on the socio-political roles of property andreligion. Property had to be defended: 'property, representation of

the principle of social continuity; property... true source and true

basis of human society.' The Restoration Monarchy, indeed, was in

one sense an arrangement designed to safeguard the rights of the

property-owning oligarchy by providing a framework within which

they could disagree without grave consequences for the established

social order. A strong State was necessary to protect the rights and

freedoms of theindividual,

and suchauthority,

inturn,

had to be

based on property. Naturally ownership of property was not

something from which the propertyless should be barred, but the

idea of universal suffrage would upset the whole evolutionary pro-cess. Universal suffrage, he declared in 1871, would be either afarce in which the multitudes would be deceived by the elite or itwould signify 'in a free state, and working quite independently and

consciously, irresistible and fatal communism.' However, in 1890he accepted the change from restricted to universal male suffrage

introduced by his Democratic Liberal loyal opponents. If theKing's powers were left unchanged, then the network of politicalmanagement known as caciquismo on which the Canovite systemof peaceful rotation of Liberals and Conservatives in office was

based, would, he confidently felt, frustrate the dire consequencesfor the propertied feared in 1871.

569








To the 'Burkean' virtues of belief in a national tradition, in the

defence of property, in political liberty within a mixed parliamen-tary constitutional/monarchical framework, in order, moderation

and compromise, Canovas added the equally 'Burkean' belief in

the need for religion as the basis for civil society. He did not think

much of the 'God-State' as the omnipotent representation of pure

humanity, but nor did he believe in theocracy or the completealliance of the spiritual and temporal advocated in his later years byDonoso Cortes. Once again Canovas sought the juste milieu. A

practising Catholic, he placed the problem of faith in the context,

not of political theology, but of sociology. The social order, he

once said, was like a coin: one had to choose between the Christian

and socialist sides. Respect for religion was the basis of social life

and 'social man' was unthinkable without religion. Secularization

was the great threat of the age: if doubt and unbelief spread from

the private to the public realms, then disaster was bound to over-

take society. The rights of the Church and religion must therefore

be preserved and the best way to do this was to avoid tying Chris-

tianity to particular political institutions which were, by their verynature, transient and mutable. In the Constitution of 1876

Catholicism was restored to its place as the sole national religion,

but the State allowed non-Catholics to worship in private. Such

'liberalism' displeased the more intransigent Catholics but was ac-

cepted by Leo XIII and, therefore, by the Spanish Hierarchy and

Pidal's 'possibilist' Uni6n Catolica, which joined Canovas's Con-

servatives in 1883.

Just asin the realm of

religion,so in other social matters

Canovas believed that the State should not invade the sphere of the

individual. The State was an instrument of government which was

not entitled to usurp human rights and existed to uphold the rule of

law. This view meant the inhibition of the State in economic and

social affairs, though the line between the 'collective' and 'in-

dividual' spheres was never clearly drawn. Canovas was essentially

an economic individualist, but circumstances should determine

when and to what extent the State should step in to make up for the

lack of charity, piety and fraternity in societies removed fromChristian stimulus. In his later years (he was assassinated in 1897),

he edged away from economic liberalism a little as the age of

(nominal) universal male suffrage and industrialism dawned.

Canovas was probably the closest Spain ever got to producing a

'Burkean conservative', even though he associated the Conser-

570








vatives with tariff protection. In the words he got Alfonso XII to

say in the Sandhurst Manifesto of 1874, only constitutional Monar-chy could bring order, peace and harmony: the age demanded that

Canovas, like the King, be 'a good Spaniard, ... a good Catholic,... [and] as a man of the century, truly liberal.' 'If you want to

conserve liberty', he had told the Cortes of 1869, 'as I want it to be

conserved, you must also of necessity save religion and monarchy.'Revolution had come nevertheless. Revolutions were doubtless no

more than tiny ripples on a lake in the eyes of the Almighty, but, as

Canovas put it in 1872:

What is an insignificant detail in space and time, weighs most painfully uponeach age of man. Let new dikes be prepared, then, since you can already see that

the old ones are inadequate, so that, in so far as is possible, doleful floods and

destruction be avoided, however strongly the full and proud river of civilization

goes on flowing, ceaselessly flowing, running towards its unknown and distant

ocean.

The great aim of the constitutional monarchical system of 1876,

which Canovas boasted he had made with Republicans, was to de-fend what were vaguely called 'the conservative classes' against thetide of revolution. It was a device which held for over forty yearsbut was difficult to improve. If in theory Canovas gave the system a

flexibility allowing it to change the better to preserveitself, in prac-tice the electoral corruption and manipulation on which its workingdepended imprisoned its operators. Whether under the Liberal or

Conservative label too many vested interests against internal

reform existed as essential cogs in the machine.The 'liberal-restorationist' Canovas was obviously succeeded inthe leadership of his party by 'conservatives'. However, Francisco

Silvela, Antonio Maura and Eduardo Dato, the three main leadersfrom 1897 to 1921, all found it necessary, amid the widespreadcriticism of the Restoration system and calls for 'national regenera-tion', to be reformist Conservatives. All three held to what maynow be called the basic trinity of Spanish Conservative belief: liber-

ty, constitutional monarchy and religion. For Silvela,11whose 'con-servative regenerationist' efforts were abandoned through loss of'faith and hope' in 1903, the necessary reforms were a mixture ofmodest social reform based on Catholic conceptions of social

justice and the substitution of a mass party, based on 'the conser-vative classes' or 'the Catholic masses' or 'the neutral masses', for

571








Canovas's cadres of professional politicians. The road to increased

stability lay through'sincere' elections and

therefore municipalreform. Such was the Conservative conception of 'the revolutionfrom the top downwards' of which it was usual to speak after thedefeat of Spain in war in 1898.

Antonio Maura, whether as Conservative leader after Silvela orleader of dissident Conservatives from 1913, advocated a similar

programme in rather more dynamic style, thus perhaps putting himinto Russell Kirk's 'Disraelian' category of 'conservatism with im-

agination', a 'new conservatism'.12Dato, leader of the Party from

1913 until his assassination in 1921, was less 'stylish' than Mauraand placed the emphasis on social reforms, like Silvela. His aim

was 'to avoid the class struggle by establishing industrial life on thesolid base of harmony between capital and labour', and he believed

the Conservative Party the best suited to carry out reforms because'it cannot inspire uncertainties or misgivings on the part of anyone,but especially the capitalist classes. 3 If Dato were the more prac-tical politician who got things done within the system while firmly

holding off threats to the established order,14 t was Maura whobecame the symbol of the 'new conservatism'.

Like Canovas, Antonio Maura was a product of the Liberal

camp and he announced the need for that 'revolution from above'

with which he is associated from the Liberal benches in 1899: 'All

Spaniards are convinced that Spain must pass through a revolution.

If we do not make the revolution here [in the Cortes], it will be in

the streets. It is absolutely inevitable.'5 After the symbolic date of

1898 the age ofdemocracy

had arrived and both Liberals and Con-

servatives sought to make the Restoration's oligarchic-caciquista

political system evolve to come into line with the 'new age'. Both

groups in fact failed. There was no difference of substance between

Liberal and Conservative factions, but both sides engaged in

'image-making' to try and create differences at particular junc-tures. Among these probably the most noticeable was the attemptto seem to have differing attitudes towards religion. Liberals in the

first decade of the century tended to be more sympathetic to laicists

although not attempting to change basic institutional ar-rangements. Since the adherence of Pidal's Union Catolica to

Canovas's party in the 1880s, the Conservatives had given the im-

pression that they were the constitutional party of religion, an im-

pression they tried to reinforce after the turn of the century.

Although such pronouncements scandalized the 'integrist'

572








Catholics in or proceeding from the Carlist-traditionalist camp,

Maura was typical of Conservatives in seeing no contradiction bet-ween his 'fervent Catholic faith' and his profession and practice of

'liberal ideas'. Though called a 'clerical' and 'reactionary' by anti-

clerical opponents, he stood firm on the maintenance of the

religious status quo. Like Canovas, he saw religion as the necessaryfoundation of civil society and opined that in Spain, 'what did not

correspond to the religious feeling of the country could not be con-

servative policy.' For Conservatives as opposed to Liberals,Catholicism was thought to be a necessary rallying cry for the at-

tempt to build a mass party. The representation of the interests of

religion would help in the necessary task of incorporating the

politically indifferent into the regime. 'The conservative classes

need to enter vigorously into public life and use and exercise

scrupulously, pertinaciously, all their rights, in order to confront

the left-wing groups, who are a mass of contradictions, but, in the

last analysis, a threatening and subversive alliance.'

Maura's rhetoric was reminiscent of what in later times and other

countries were to be called appeals to the 'silent majority'. 'Conser-vative interests', 'the right wing of society' should unite (behind

Maura) to participate in the system as the alternative to 'suicide',even though this meant political activity of a type formerlyassociated with parties of the left. 'Conservative policy', he said in

1913, 'is democratic or it is not conservative.' Maura's assumption,like that of Lord Randolph Churchill or Baron Sonnino, was that'the democracy' was 'conservative'. What was needed was the 'in-

terpenetration'of leaders and

led,for the

peoplewould of

coursestill give their mandate to a political elite. The framework for this

'interpenetration' was the organized political party. In Maura'sview political parties were inevitable and indispensable componentsof political life and were the great link between government and

governed - hence they had to be healthy and have programmes,principles and ideas. Parties were not only necessary instruments of

government but 'trade unions of public opinion... The party is an

organism which gathers in opinion, serves the desires of society,

coordinating them when they are close together, taming them, im-proving them, making them compatible, reducing them to theboundaries of possibility.' This was the theory, but 'the conser-vative classes' and 'the neutral masses' failed to respond; attemptsto reform the political system from within, based on the idea of the

municipality as a 'school for citizenship', came to nothing; and in

573








1913 the haughty and impetuous Maura split the Conservative Par-

ty by leavingit. Neither female

suffrage, nor compulsory voting,both advocated by Maura, were implemented.Like Canovas, Silvela and Dato, Maura was a practical politi-

cian, not a theorist. His 'principles' and 'ideas' were not alwaysclear-cut, but his actions and speeches showed that, even after 1913when he was at the head of a rowdy and youthful 'Maurist' move-

ment, he continued to believe in both monarchy - with the Kingwho 'abandoned' him in 1909 as 'the living incarnation of the

Patria' - and in parliamentary institutions and a pluri-party

system. Whether by his actions he did or did not weaken both willremain a subject for controversy. What disappointed the youthful'conservatives' who idolised him was what disappointed others out-

side the orbit of constitutional politics such as the Traditionalist

Vazquez de Mella: 'he could have been Mussolini before

Mussolini.'

Having given brief resumes of the political attitudes and beliefs ofCanovas and Maura to shed a little light on 'conservatism' in Spainin the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and to illustrate

the essential continuity between them despite the differences of ap-

proach, one must return to more abstract problems of politicalclassification. First, even if one assumes the Liberal-Con-

servative/Conservative Party from Canovas to Sanchez Guerra

(Dato's successor as leader from 1921) to be the embodiment of

'Spanishconservatism' in the

period1875-1923-

seeminglya safe

assumption - were there not other 'political conservative' groupsaround in the Restoration period? As has already been suggested,there were no very great differences between the

Liberal/Democratic Liberal and Conservative parties. Both soughtto work within and uphold the system established by Canovas while

endeavouring to broaden its basis of support and reform it to bringit into line with the demands of a democratic age. It could therefore

presumably be plausibly argued - by authors with a clearer notion

of what 'political conservatism' is than the present writer - thatthe Liberals were 'conservatives', just as one can accurately main-

tain that the Conservatives were but a portion of 'liberalism' in

Spain. From the point of view of an attempt to locate 'conser-

vatism', however, it would seem best to leave the Liberals alone in

the 'liberal' camp.

574








Other candidates for the title 'conservative' should presumably

be the Carlist movement and its Integrist and mellista offshoots,'6the Catalan Lliga and the PSP (Partido Social Popular) of

1922-23.'7 As has already been suggested, the term 'political con-

servative' does not fit the Carlists and other self-styled Tradi-

tionalists. While a change of dynasty need not entail major changesin the established constitutional order, in the Spanish case it would

have done. The Carlist and Traditionalist ideal is best described, as

it is in Spain, as 'traditionalist', but some may prefer 'reactionary'or 'restorationist'. It was one thing for Canovas to 'restore' in 'im-

proved' form a political system functioning only a few years

earlier, but it would seem to be qualitatively and quantitatively dif-

ferent to seek to revert to a mythified status quo ante in the six-

teenth or seventeenth centuries, albeit 'adapted to modern needs'.

The distance from the status quo would seem to this writer to be so

great as to preclude use of the term 'conservative'.

The Lliga and the PSP are in some ways more promising can-

didates. The Lliga became a constitutional party accepting the

monarchy and parliamentary institutions, and it respected bothreligion and local tradition. However as a Catalan regional party it

naturally never had any reality outside Catalonia and this mightmake its inclusion in a 'Spanish conservative' category dubious

during the years before 1923 when it was trying to reform the

political system to an extent that was arguably greater than the ex-

tent to which it was trying to conserve it. The PSP, on the other

hand, set out to be a national, Catholic, reformist party conscious-

lymodelled on the Italian Partito

Popolare,and its leaders includ-

ed former Conservative party members such as Ossorio Gallardo,who in 1919 had declared: 'As for a great conservative party, I

think there is an undeniable need to organize it on the basis of the

principles of Christian social democracy.' 8Though the PSP had

hardly got organized before it split and disappeared, it does raisethe question as to whether 'Christian democrat' parties between the

two Vatican councils should be called 'conservative'. Clearly thePSP accepted the established political order as the starting-point

for reform, but its socio-political ideal could be called 'corporative-restorationist' inasmuch as it adhered to the neo-Thomism of thesocial Encyclicals. At what point does reformism inspired by tradi-tional and preliberal ideals cease to qualify for the 'conservative'

category? The question is unanswerable, but it would seem wise to

preserve some classificatory distinction between 'political

575








Catholicism' and 'political conservatism', even if there is a prac-

tical overlap on occasion.All of which seems to bring the utility of such a category as 'con-

servatism' into question. It may be, of course, that, 'politicalCatholicism' and 'traditionalism' should be considered variants of

'political conservatism', but the latter would then cover so manydifferent things that it would lose what little utility it seems to have

as a trans-national label.

In their endeavours to explain 'conservatism', Rossiter noted

that in revolutionary times 'political conservatism' ceases to exist in

any real sense: 'conservatives' either become 'restorationists' or in-

dulge in 'cryptoradicalism'; while Michels noted that when the

social order is threatened, 'conservatives' generally stop behavingas such and often shift their ideological stance accordingly.19These

features are noticeable in Spain from 1923, the year in which the

Canovite system was overthrown by General Primo de Rivera's

pronunciamiento. In the period 1923-31, while some members of

the Conservative Party, the PSP and the Maurist movement col-

laborated with the Dictatorship,20others opposed it. The Conser-vative leader Sanchez Guerra engaged in military revolution to tryand overthrow the Dictator and after Primo de Rivera's fall in 1930

called upon the King to abdicate. In 1930-31 the politicians, Con-

servative and non-Conservative, failed to make the return to con-

stitutional monarchical rule, while some joined the Republican

camp.The ideals and 'solutions' put before 'the conservative classes',

'the Catholic masses' and 'the neutralmasses',

the termsgiven

to

those sections of the electorate presumed to be the potential sup-

port for what might in more settled times have been recognizable as

'political conservatism', were many and varied during the

Republic. In general the word 'conservative' was eschewed as

politically counter-productive. An exception was the Conservative

Republican Party founded in 1931 by Miguel Maura (a son of An-

tonio),21but its lack of success reflected the impossibility in the cir-

cumstances of trying to continue the liberal-conservative Canovite

'tradition' in Republican garb. The main right-wing group, theCEDA, though it appealed to and incorporated many of 'the con-

servative classes', is perhaps best classified under the 'politicalCatholic' or 'corporativist-restorationist' label, while supporters of

the exiled Alfonso XIII moved into a 'neo-traditionalist' monar-

chist position close to the Carlist-Traditionalist 'reactionary revolu-

576








tionaries'. One way or another, the return to (an albeit updated)

sixteenth century was a long way from the status quo ante 1923.22The civilians who supported and encouraged the military rising

in July 193623 ould be loosely described as the conservative half of

the country, and fought to negate a negation, what their propagan-da called 'anti-Spain'. Thoughts of settled constitutional life and a

pluri-party system were inappropriate to the situation of civil war,in which the first priority was to win in order to survive. The

political initiative lay with the Generals, who put Franco in powerin September 1936, and he united the political currents of the Na-

tional zone into the official FET y de las JONS in April 1937. The

winning side emerged in ideological confusion. In reality Franco

was the dictator, but the 'new State' over which he ruled was Janus-

faced. On one side were the 'progressive' and 'innovatory' radical

features of the fascist Falange, and on the other a neo-

traditionalism without a King. Those who might have been

'political conservatives' in more stable times, such as the Marquesde la Eliseda, an Andalusian aristocrat on the National Council of

the FET, gave vent to curious syntheses such as the following in1939:

Our National Movement is, indubitably, the translation of the fascist fact which,because it has been born in Spain, will be the most positive and progressivefascism of all; that is to say, a fascism so perfect in its search for truth that it will

implant the Spanish Catholic State, which will be none other than the modern

translation of the old Spanish State of the Catholic Kings, the least imperfect

political organization on earth.24

At the time of political unification in April 1937 Franco had

hinted at the eventual return of monarchy. Ten years later, after

Allied victory in the world war and considerable 'defalangisation'of the regime, Spain was proclaimed a Kingdom without a King.The Francoist regime's device for 'succeeding itself' was to adoptthe 'neo-traditionalist' solution of 'a traditional, Catholic-social

and representativeMonarchy... within the immutable principles ofthe National Movement.' Thus in 1969 Alfonso XIII's grandsonJuan Carlos was proclaimed Franco's successor in a 'future Monar-

chy' which was to be at once 'the Monarchy of the Catholic Kings'and the 'Monarchy of the National Movement', born on 18 July1936 and 'owing nothing to the past.'25Events after Franco's deathin 1975 showed that the 'installation' of a brand new but very old

577








monarchy commanded exiguous support. Instead King Juan Carlos

presidedover the conversion of the 'Francoist

institutions' into amonarchy more in line with that of the Canovite Restoration a cen-

tury earlier.

In so far as this 'restoration' of parliamentary monarchy can beseen as evidence of a 'new conservatism', its roots should perhapsbe sought not only in the exigencies of the situation in 1975-77 butalso in a gradual evolution away from the 'neo-traditionalism'fashionable in the 1930son the part of Spanish monarchists. Just assome parliamentaryConservatives of the pre-1923 period 'evolved'

into 'neo-traditionalists', so people of this type began to 'evolve'back again in the 1940s, a key document being Don Juan'sLausanne Manifesto of March 1945 which called for political liber-ties and a monarchy with a popularly approved constitution and

elected legislative assembly.26 The heirs of the old liberal-monarchist establishment who had once espoused a mixture of

fascism and traditionalism recovered their Canovite respect for

'English-style government': as one of them said in the 1960s, 'I am

a liberal man and in some sense a conservative, in the fashion of theEnglish Conservatives.'27

In 1977, the word 'conservative' was creeping back into Spanish

political usage as a respectable term for 'right-wing', now no longera fashionable term - the reverse of the situation of the 1930s. Peo-

ple willing in 1977 to refer to themselves or their nascent political

groups as 'conservative' were to be found in the two coalitions

competing for 'the conservative vote': the Union de Centro

Democratico ledby

Adolfo Suarez and the AlianzaPopular

of

Fraga Iribarne. For the former CEDA leader Gil Robles Alianza

Popular was 'historical neofranquismo',28 but in the view of one of

its own luminaries, Fernandez de la Mora, ideologue successivelyof neo-traditionalism and the end of ideology, it was 'what in the

world of today is called a conservative party, which aspires to pro-

gress and reform without maximalisms, without destroying

anything positive and without unnecessary risks'; 'conservatism' he

equated with 'empirical rationalism'.29 Nevertheless, no political

party has emerged with 'conservative' in its title.

After focussing on the Spanish case through a 'conservative' lens,this writer remains convinced that the terms 'conservatism' and

'conservative' should be sparingly used. In the socio-political

578








sphere, the 'situational' or 'technically political' usage will remain

indispensable as a descriptive label for particular people or groupsat particularhistorical moments. This writeralso recognizes that all

functioning societies or political systems must contain conservativeelements. As Huntington expresses it, conservatism 'is the intellec-

tual rationale of the permanent institutional prerequisitesof human

existence.' It has therefore 'a high and necessary function. It is the

rational defense of being against mind, of order against chaos.

When the foundations of society are threatened, the conservative

ideology reminds men of the necessity of some institutions and the

desirability of existing ones.'30Yet between the specific and the verygeneral usages, the term would seem to be best avoided in politicalor historical analyses. It causes more confusion than the (admitted-

ly imprecise) category of 'centre-right'. Indeed attempts to use it to

describe a trans-national political or ideological phenomenonwould seem to make relatively simple things unnecessarily com-

plicated.

NOTES

1. C. Rossiter, 'Conservatism' in D. L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia ofthe Social Sciences (New York 1968), iii, 290-94.

2. J. Biggs-Davison, ToryLives: From Falkland to Disraeli (London 1952), 3-5.

3. Rossiter, loc. cit.; R. Kirk, The Conservative Mind (London 1954); P.

Viereck,Conservatism: From John Adams to Churchill

(Princeton, NJ 1956); idem,Conservatism Revisited (New York 1965); F. G. Wilson, The Casefor Conservatism

(Seattle 1951); S. P. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology' in The American

Political Science Review, li (1957), 454-73.

4. R. Michels, 'Conservatism' in R. A. Seligman, ed., Encyclopedia of theSocial Sciences (London 1931), iv, 230-32.

5. Cf. B. Bolloten, The Grand Camouflage (London 1961).6. For such a survey see S. Payne, 'Spain', in H. Rogger and E. Weber, eds.,

The European Right (London 1965), 168-207.

7. For the context see R. Remond, La droite en France (Paris 1963), 50-51.8. General histories include R.

Carr, Spain1808-1939

(Oxford 1966);R.

Herr,Spain (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1971); S. G. Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal(Madison, Wis. 1973), ii; F. G. Bruguera, Histoire contemporaine d'Espagne1789-1950 (Gap 1953); and D. Sevilla Andres, Historia politica de Espaha 1800-1973

(Madrid 1974).9. Cf. J. Donoso Cortes, Textos politicos (Madrid 1954); F. Suarez, Introduc-

ci6n a Donoso Cortes (Madrid 1964).10. For Canovas see L. Diez del Corral, El liberalismo doctrinario (Madrid 1945),

esp. chaps. 25-26, and J. L. Comellas, Cdnovas (Madrid 1965), from which sources

579







580 Journal of ContemporaryHistory

the quotations that follow are taken. Cf. J. M. Garcia Escudero, De Cdnovas a la

Republica (Madrid 1953).11. Cf. Carr, op. cit., 364 and 477-81.

12. Cf. Kirk, op. cit., 230.

13. Quoted in O. Alzaga Villaamil, La primera democracia cristiana en Espana(Barcelona 1973), 57-58.

14. For a 'rehabilitation' of Dato see C. Seco Serrano, Alfonso XIIIy la crisis de

la Restauraci6n (Barcelona 1969), 103ff; cf. M. Garcia Venero, Eduardo Dato: vida

y sacrificio de un gobernante conservador (Vitoria 1969).15. For Maura see D. Sevilla Andres, Antonio Maura: la revoluci6n desde arriba

(Barcelona 1954), and J. B. Catala y Gavila, ed., Don Antonio Maura: ideario

politico (Madrid 1953), from which sources the quotations are taken.

16. Cf. M. Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931-1939(Cambridge 1975),

chap. 1.

17. See Alzaga Villaamil, op. cit.

18. Quoted ibid., 115.

19. See above, notes 1 and 4.

20. For a recent short assessment see S. Ben-Ami, 'The Dictatorship of Primo de

Rivera' in Journal of Contemporary History, 12:1, 1977, 65-84.

21. Cf. M. Maura, Asi cay6 Alfonso XIII (Mexico City 1962).22. For these groups see R. A. H. Robinson, The Origins of Franco's Spain

1931-1936 (Newton Abbot 1970); Blinkhorn, op. cit.; P. Preston, 'Alfonsist Monar-

chism and the Coming of the Spanish Civil War' in Journal of Contemporary

History, vii (1972), 89-114; J. Tusell G6mez, Historia de la democracia cristiana en

Espana (Madrid 1974).23. For the Civil War see H. Thomas, TheSpanish Civil War(London 1977) and

R. Carr, The Spanish Tragedy (London 1977).24. Quoted in J. Ynfante, Laprodigiosa aventura del OpusDei (Paris 1970), 312.

25. Cf. R. A. H. Robinson, 'Genealogy and Function of the Monarchist Myth of

the Franco Regime' in Iberian Studies, ii (1973), 18-26. For general studies of the

regime see M. Gallo, Histoire de l'Espagnefranquiste (Paris 1969): J. Georgel, Le

franquisme: histoire et bilan 1939-1969 (Paris 1970); E. de Blaye, Franco, ou la

monarchie sans roi (Paris 1974); and J. Amodia, Franco's Political Legacy (London

1977).26. S. Vilar, Protagonistas de la Espana democrdtica: la oposici6n a la dictadura

1939-1969 (Paris 1968 [sic]), 582.

27. Quoted ibid., 580.

28. Quoted in El Pais (Madrid), 15 June 1977.

29. Quoted in ABC (ed. aerea semanal, Madrid), 5 May 1977. Cf. M. Fraga

Iribarne, Alianza Popular (Bilbao 1977).30. Huntington, loc. cit., 460-61.

R. A. H. RobinsonSenior Lecturer in Modern History at the Univer-

sity of Birmingham, is the author of The Originsof Franco's Spain (Newton Abbot/Pittsburgh1970) and Contemporary Portugal (London1979).

Documents

R.a.H. Robinson - Political Conservatism the Spanish Case 1875-1977