RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE - Ny i Danmark · RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE ... A second type of Islamist group is the interactionists ... the meetings when he began asking critical questions

RADICALIZATIONIN EUROPEA POST 9/11 PERSPECTIVE

ANN-SOPHIE HEMMINGSENSTÉPHANIE JEANNERET ANDREASEN

DIIS · CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

CONFERENCE CS 24/11/07 15:24 Side 1


CONTENTS

Introduction · 3

Radicalization – what do we know? · 4

An Insider Perspective · 7

Home Grown Warriors - Radicalization in the Netherlands · 9

De-radicalization in the Netherlands · 11

Which remaining puzzles – and how do we study them? · 15

Conclusions · 18

Policy Recommendations · 19

Appendix – participants · 21

About DIIS and TTSRL · 22


INTRODUCTION

Ever since the events of 11 September 2001, the threat of terrorism has increasingly been on the agenda not only in USA but also in Europe.The samehas been the case with violent radicalization.

Attacks on European soil, such as Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005,have brought attention to a disturbing tendency; namely that some of the individualscarrying out terrorist attacks have spend the majority, and sometimes all, of theirlives in Europe and have thus presumably been moulded in a European, democraticcontext.Their processes of radicalization must be assumed primarily to have takenplace in Europe.

But what is radicalization? Why do some apparently well-integrated Europeanyouth become attracted to Islamist militancy? Why and when do people cross fromviolent talk to violent action? What makes others, who share the same beliefs andthe same social and cultural backgrounds, refrain from violence? And where do wego from here?

On 20 August 2007, the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) hosted aone-day seminar on violent radicalization and gathered scholars and experts fromEurope as well as USA to share insights into radicalization, the research of thephenomenon, and attempts at preventing or countering radicalization.

The seminar was closed to the public to allow the researchers to engage in freeand open discussion.With these proceedings, the knowledge, findings and recom-mendations are disseminated to a wider audience.

The views expressed in the proceedings are those of the respective speakers anddo not necessarily reflect the views of DIIS.The proceedings are true to thespeakers and the terms referred to are used by them. Different terms may there-fore be used by the speakers to explain certain concepts.


RADICALIZATION – WHAT DO WE KNOW?

Magnus Ranstorp from The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish Defence Academy gave an overview of different studies on radicalization phases, factors and processes.The briefing also gave an insight insome of the problems concerning counterterrorism measures.The discussionsgave some ideas and recommendations for further studies on the subjects.

EXPERT BRIEFING

Radicalization phases and factorsIt is difficult to extract any general trends from known cases since every case sofar has been unique. It would appear that there are multiple processes of radical-ization. Conducted studies, however, point to certain reoccurring phases in the radicalization of individuals.

Marc Sageman has identified four reoccurring phases:

1. Moral outrage2. Interpretation – a specific interpretation of the World3. Resonance with personal experience – the notion of the West against Islam4. Mobilization through networks

Different factors play different roles in each case of radicalization.The decisive factor in one case may be only a contributing factor in another.

The known factors can be divided into internal and external:

Internal factors

• A sense of identity crisis• A perception of marginalization, stigmatization, criminalization and exclusion• An encounter with a charismatic radical leader• Glorification of martyrdom• Sociological and socioeconomic factors

External factors

• The perceived double standards of Western foreign policy• Muslim communities suffering in regional conflicts• Western military intervention in Muslim countries• Mass media and Cyberspace


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Cyberspace appears to be an important external factor in many radicalizationprocesses.The Internet is a virtual sanctuary where different radicalizing actors can operate.

Thomas Hegghammer has identified four types of radicalizing actors:

1. The “old” Al Qaeda leaders or ideologues such as Osama Bin laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri

2. Religious scholars3. Strategic thinkers4. Active militant organizations

Each of the above mentioned actors express their radical views in different ways:in speeches, fatwa, or anonymous discussions on the Internet. But the Internet isnot only an ideological platform. It is also a functional tool where new recruits canbe trained. A “collective brainstorming” is taking place online, shaping, changing andreconstructing the ideology and the methods of the radical militants.

Counterterrorism (CT) measuresCT measures are not always effective and may, in some cases, even be counter-productive.

One example is that when the Swedish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned,it gained more popularity than ever before.

It can be problematic that moderate mainstream Muslim communities andmosques exclude radical individuals or groups because mainstream Muslim communities, and thus society, might lose track of them.This might isolate themfrom the world in which they live and further radicalize them. Another problemmight be the discrepancy between arrests and convictions in relation to suspicionsof terrorism and the possible radicalizing effect of this.

A key point is that if CT measures are to be successful, they have to be implemented on a global scale with international cooperation.

DISCUSSIONS – RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

Studies on radicalization should be cross disciplinary. Future studies could lookinto:

• Explaining explicitly where the lines are in terms of CT legislation.What is legal and what is illegal in practical examples;

• Analysing the way in which Muslim communities perceive radicalization countermeasures and CT;

• Looking into how to gain access to militant and non-militant radical Muslim communities;5


• Creating exit-strategies out of militant as well as non-militant radical groups.In this it might be relevant to look into the experience of rehabilitationstrategies from North African countries and Saudi Arabia;

• Examining court-records from terrorism cases in Europe to shed light onknown cases of radicalization;

• Group dynamics and leadership in the militant and non-militant radicalgroups;

• Comparing Islamist militancy today with left-wing militancy in the 1960’s and 70’s;

• Examining how we create trust between authorities and communities inorder to create effective measures.

FURTHER READINGS

• Sageman, Marc; “Radicalization of Global Islamist Terrorists “, United StatesSenate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs June27, 2007 http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/062707Sageman.pdf

• Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West:TheHomegrown Threat”, NYPD, 2007,http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf

• Hegghammer,Thomas; “Global Jihadism after the Iraq War”, Published in The Middle East Journal, vol. 60 no. 1 (2006), pp. 11-32,http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00076/Global_Jihadism_Afte_76427a.pdf

• PET Conference 26.-27. April 2007, www.petkonference.dk


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AN INSIDER PERSPECTIVE

Kamran Bokhari from Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) in Washington gave a briefingon his personal past experiences and observations as a former member of Hizbut-Tahrir.The briefing focused on the nature of Islamist movements, the differenceand rivalries among them and the recruitment of young people to radical groupswith focus on al-Muhajiroun, an off-shoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir.The discussions gave aninsight into potential future problems concerning radical groups that should belooked into.

EXPERT BRIEFING

Islamist MovementsThe definition of an Islamist is: A Muslim political actor (individual/group) whoseeks to establish an ‘Islamic state’ – a state which implements the shariah.What an ‘Islamic state’ is and how it is to be achieved is the root of intra-Islamist contention. Significant ideological rivalries exist within and between Islamisms and the disagreement over how to achieve the political aim is essential.

Moderates, Radicals & Militants:Integrationists: The majority of Islamist groups are integrationists.They accept the structural functionalism of the nation-state(s) in which they operate. In otherwords, they embrace both the state and society seeking to establish an Islamicstate through participation in the democratic process.

Interactionists: A second type of Islamist group is the interactionists.Those whoreject the state but interact with society.These radical (but non-violent) Islamistsreject both the concept of the nation-state and democracy. Instead they workamong the masses trying to shape public opinion against the status quo and seekingsupport from select elements within the state, hoping to pave the way for a revolution, which will replace the current polity with a new forming the nucleus of a transnational caliphate.

Isolationists: The third main type of Islamist groups is the isolationists.These militantIslamists reject both the state and society, operating at a clandestine level. Insteadthey call for jihad (armed insurrection) as the appropriate modus operandi toestablish their envisioned Islamic state.

Why do People Join?The members of a radical group such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT), which has experi-enced a revival in the West even though it does not enjoy strong support in theArab countries, are mostly found among the Western diaspora.The membersoften join for political or religious reasons combined with a search for empower-ment.The youngsters can, in some cases, also find a sense of identity that their

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parents have not been able to provide them with and a possibility to achievesocial upward mobility.The radical groups, however, are often characterized by a“revolving door” phenomenon.Very few of the individuals who join the groupsstay there in the long run.

This was the case for Kamran Bokhari himself, who was introduced to HUT by a fellow student and friend at the age of 18 as a college student in the early1990’s.The HUT –community was perceived as a “cool” community because thestudents could be modern and good Muslims at the same time.The motivationfor attending HUT-meetings was the possibility to meet friends and sometimes alsoa shared sense of indignation about the situation of Muslim communities aroundthe world. Kamran Bokhari never became a full member. He was excluded fromthe meetings when he began asking critical questions of the HUT interpretationof the history of the Muslim people and thus he went through the revolvingdoors.

DISCUSSIONS – PROBLEMS TO BE LOOKED AT IN THE FUTURE:

• The discursive struggle between moderate, radical and militant Islamists over how to achieve political and religious aims and goals;

• Define mainstream Islam and not focus on radicals versus moderates;

• The need to develop a “Western Islam” and give legitimacy and support tomoderate Muslim leaders and communities which are trying to give youngMuslims a sense of a Muslim Western identity without alienating them fromthe surrounding society or from their parents;

• Encouraging and supporting local moderate communities but at the sametime maintaining a safe distance to not de-legitimize them;

• The problem of access to militant and non-militant radical individuals andcommunities.


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HOME GROWN WARRIORS – RADICALIZATION IN THENETHERLANDS

Atef Hamdy from the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands gave a briefing onthe characteristics of Islamist extremism and patterns of radicalization in theNetherlands based on his own fieldwork and research on Islamist extremists anddemocratic Muslims.

EXPERT BRIEFING

The Dutch contextThree historical events have had an important impact on the Dutch perception of radicalism.The first one was the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the globalization ofterrorism.The second was the murder of the populist right-wing politician PimFortuyn on 6 May 2002.This event changed the way the Dutch society perceivedthe radical threat.The third was the assassination of the film-maker Theo vanGogh in November 2004 which created the notion of an “enemy inside” and a“fifth column” approach to migrants, and particularly Muslims, in Dutch society.

The political scene in the Netherlands reacted by either ignoring the problem or by linking the assassinations to other issues such as the role of religion in publicspace, the threat to the freedom of expression and to failed integration.

ExtremismsExtremism has come in many different forms: Left wing, Right wing, Religious and Single issue extremism among others.They differ greatly but do share somecharacteristics.

Common characteristics of extremisms and extremists:

• They thrive on fear, threats and perceived marginalization;• The dominant order of the state is often associated with evil, injustice,

deprivation, de-humanization and marginalization;• Most radicalisms and extremisms offer an alternative future in the form

of a “Utopia”;• A small core has the economic means, charisma, organizational capacity and

also the ability to translate and express dissatisfaction;• Extremists legitimize un-democratic instruments and violence in their struggle

against the state or society, by holding it responsible for their marginalization.

Islamist extremisms:

• Religion is viewed as marginalized in political and social life;• Government and public figures are held responsible for this marginalization;

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• Religious and political elites are viewed as collaborating with the system,which makes them “betrayers”;

• It is argued that fundamentals, values and norms of religion should be strictlyfollowed and reinstalled in political and social life;

• Own religion is perceived as superior ;• A sense of urgency is perceived, “it is now or never”;• Utopia is formulated using metaphors such as Ummah, Jihad, Khilafah, holy

war, peace, prosperity and justice;• Own uniqueness is emphasized and “the others” are demonized;• The World is viewed in absolutes. Just versus unjust, good versus evil,

the followers of God versus the followers of Satan;• Legitimization of own struggle and the use of any means necessary, including

violence.

The research project, of which Atef Hamdy has been part, has identified three dif-ferent paths of radicalization:

1. The first one is a political-ideological path; its core issues are injustice andsocio-economic deprivation;

2. The second path is religious; it focuses on religious identity and spirituality;3. The third path is social-cultural; it is concerned with binding and preserving

the Muslim cultural uniqueness.

The project revealed that there are crucial differences between Islamist radicalsin the Middle East and Islamist radicals in a Dutch/European context.

DISCUSSION – POLICY-RECOMMENDATIONS

• Find inspiration in the confetti-approach/the New Dutch model, which supports many different micro-projects;

• Muslim clerics should be strengthened in their ability to:• Form moderate Islamic religious elites in the West and fill the apparent

theological void by fighting religious illiteracy among Muslims and providingspiritual guidance and teaching

• Make an ideological besiegement of extremists. Muslim clerics will be able toplay this role because they use a familiar language, they have the theologicalresources and the religious authority;

• Look into the role of non-militant groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir – are theybulwarks or conveyor-belts to militant groups?

FURTHER READINGS

• Buijs, Frank and Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy: “Home Grown Warriors:Radical and democratic Muslims in the Netherlands”, Amsterdam UniversityPress, 2006


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DE-RADICALIZATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

Marco Zannoni from the Dutch Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management(COT) gave a briefing on the Dutch response to Radicalization.The discussionsgave some policy recommendations to preventing radicalization and to de-radical-ization in a European context.

“The problem is not that there is a supply of radical ideologies. It is that there is ademand for them” (Zannoni)

EXPERT BRIEFING

Definition of radicalismThe Dutch General Information and Security Agency’s (AIVD) definition of radicalism is “The growing willingness to pursue and/or support far-reaching changesin society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) thedemocratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods(means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect).This definition therefore implicates much more than just terrorism and violencebut also a democratic dimension.”

Policy initiativesIn the period 2005-2007, different initiatives have been taken in the Netherlandsconcerning increased awareness, intervention and de-radicalization as well as conducting research.The next step is to look at the current risks, which are thatradicalization is still increasing and that polarization is a long-term risk to socialcohesion.

Countering radicalizationCountering radicalization calls for various actions on various levels; it requiresmore than just the de-radicalization of radicalized individuals.

Depending on which groups to handle there are several combinations of strategiesto choose from:

• Countermeasures at a national and local level such as micro-projects;• Countermeasures against violent and anti-integrative developments;• Strategies focusing on the prevention, repression and de-legitimization

of militancy;• Countermeasures on the societal level, the group level and the individual level• Strategies focusing on the cooperation and communication between

Government, civil society, Islamic organizations and organizations of Muslims;• Strategies focusing on creating opportunities and explaining boundaries for

Muslim communities;11


• Strategies focusing on increasing social and religious resilience and counteringnegative societal developments (breeding ground theory);

• Strategies focusing on legal actions and administrative actions.

Opportunities for interventions and de-radicalizationMultiple tasks are to be handled in a de-radicalization process. A key point is to acknowledge that different authorities should undertake different tasks in any de-radicalization process at different points in the process. Any intervention involvesmultiple sets of tasks such as preparing, preventing, spotting, gathering information,monitoring, interpreting and responding to radicalized individuals. For example the roles of a teacher or a social worker are quite different from the roles of the Police and those roles are crucial at different points in time.

Any intervention should be targeted at an individual who might be radicalizing,but additional interventions are needed.Those have to be targeted towards theindividual’s context/situation. Possible leads for radicalization, but also for intervention,can be found in the radicalizing/radicalized individual’s immediate surroundings:at school, at work or when they perform acts such as writing messages on the internet. (See model above)


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Underlying factors• Home situation• Personal

environment• Organisation• ‘Leader figure’• Radical material

Possible leads for interventions

• Ideology• Ideas

• Groupmembership

• Followers

Drivers• View on society• Emotional state• Psychological state• Character

• Physical act (violence,intimidation)

• Speech• Writings• Internet/virtual

Location• Private• In public• In school• At work

• Direct victims• Indiretct victims

(fear)• Eyewitnesses• Material damages

PERSON INCIDENT EFFECT


As a consequence representatives from those different contexts must be involvedin the processes.

Some of the basic conditions for de-radicalization are: access to the radical environments; expertise; jurisdiction and insights into both the personal situationsof, and the drivers of, the radicals as well as their views of the world.

De-radicalization, intervention and countermeasures involve challenging politicalissues such as freedom of speech, personal freedom, protection of the privatesphere, freedom of religion and also whether radicals who cooperate should berewarded.

Exit-strategy: learning from anti right-wing strategies?De-radicalization takes place on a daily basis without being defined as such.Dutch research by Grunenberg and Van Donselaar has been looking into a numberof de-radicalization programmes in Germany targeted at right-wing radicals inorder to see what can be learned from these programmes and if a similar policycan be applied in the Netherlands.The key lesson learned from this is that theones that got out, wanted to get out.The radicals voluntarily contacted de-radical-izing organizations looking for help. In general they wanted to exit the radicalgroups because their partners put pressure on them or because they experienceddifficulties in their daily life such as impending court cases or drinking/drug problemsor difficulties in their working lives due to their radicalism.

DISCUSSIONS – POLICY-RECOMMENDATIONS

• There is a need for a scientific focus on which interventions are available;• De-radicalization must be part of an overall action plan including prevention;• De-radicalization must be aimed at various phases in radicalization processes;• De-radicalization involves insights into personal drivers, ideology and personal

experiences;• De-radicalization may involve help from a Muslim community, such as co-

operation from radical leaders;• There is a need to look into why American Muslims are not radicalized to the

same degree as European Muslims;• The European community must look into whether it has created a subsidizing

system providing people with the opportunity to radicalize;• The radicalization problem differs greatly between European countries.

The countries’ different policies and de-radicalization initiatives are importantfactors in this;

• A comparative study of Islamist radicalism in different European countriesshould be made to clarify whether Islamist radicalism takes different forms as a consequence of interactions with different contexts;

• There is a need to educate teachers and social workers to understand Islam,Islamism and Islamist radicalism because teachers and social workers are central actors in any de-radicalization process.13


FURTHER READINGS

• Grunenberg, Sara and Jaap van Donselaar : “Deradicalisation: Lessons fromGermany, options for the Netherlands?” chapter 8 in Racism & extremismmonitor : seventh report, ed. by Jaap van Donselaar and Peter R. Rodrigues,Department of Public Administration, Leiden University, 2006.

• General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD): “From dawa to jihad.The various threats from radical Islam to the democratic legal order”, 2004http://english.nctb.nl/Images/From%20Dawa%20to%20Jihad_tcm127-85238.pdf

• General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD): “The radical dawa in transition.The rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands”, 2007http://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/90126/20071542bzk-bw.dawaengels.pdf


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WHICH REMAINING PUZZLES – AND HOW DO WE STUDY THEM?

DIIS gave a brief introduction to the research conducted by the research unitPolitical Violence,Terrorism and Radicalization headed by Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen.The introduction gave an overview of the existing methods and theories appliedto studies of radicalization and the remaining puzzles.The discussion gave somerecommendations and ideas for further studies.

EXPERT BRIEFING

Background for the researchThe research unit Political Violence,Terrorism and Radicalization at DIIS is a groupof researchers working with the general research question, “When, why and howdo people living in a democracy become radicalized to the point of being willing touse or directly support the use of terrorist violence against civilians and what canbe done about it?” and zooming in on Islamist Militancy in Europe.

The research unit focuses on the apparently recent developments in which theprocesses of violent radicalization seem to be happening over a short period oftime and mainly in European countries.These developments question the traditionalsociological assumptions on violent radicalization about deprivation, repressionand prolonged periods of indoctrination within camps or violent subcultures.

What we already knowThus far, research and knowledge on violent radicalization in Europe into IslamistMilitancy can be divided into four categories:

• Sociological explanations (examples are Gilles Kepel, Farhad Khosrokhavar andOlivier Roy) focusing on the role of globalization, marginalization, socioeconomicexclusion and perceived humiliation.This approach leaves the unansweredquestion “Why does only a small minority of the individuals exposed to thesame factors turn to violence?”

• Social Movement Theory and Network Theory (examples are QuintanWiktorowicz and Marc Sageman) focusing on the role of alienated individualsseeking a place to belong, social networks, movement outreach, group bonding and indoctrination.This approach leaves the unanswered question“Can group-processes turn anyone into a terrorist?”

• Empiricism (an example is Petter Nesser) is based on case studies and focuses on the role of grievances with regard to own position in society andthe situation of fellow Muslims internationally, on lateral rather than top-downrecruitment and on different roles in violently radical groups, particularly therole of the “entrepreneur”.This approach leaves the unanswered question“What drives the entrepreneur?”

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• Integrative approaches (examples are Frank Buijs, Froukje Demant and AtefHamdy) drawing on all of the above mentioned.This approach leaves theunanswered question “Are non-violent radical groups bulwarks or conveyorbelts?”

Which remaining puzzles:The research unit will explore some remaining puzzles in several research projects.Those puzzles will include:

• What sets the minority of violent radicals apart from the majority ofnon-violent radicals?

• Are group-processes in themselves sufficient to radicalize?• What drives the recruiters/leaders/entrepreneurs and what sets them apart

from those who get engaged in constitutional politics?• Are non-violent radical groups bulwarks or conveyor belts?• Are there feedback loops to radicalization from authorities’ responses and

media coverage?

The researchers are approaching these questions from different theoretical points of departure and are thus focusing on different elements of the issue “violent radicalization”.

The research unit has it as a declared goal to generate a broader empirical basis.Existing studies on the phenomenon tend to recycle a very small pool of empiricaldata.

DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

• Looking into non-violent radical groups in order to understand why andwhen a radical Islamist becomes violent and if the non-violent groups are bulwarks or steppingstones. It is important to keep in mind that very fewradicals actually become violent;

• Looking into the individual motivations for becoming radical and into theindividual motivations for wanting to leave radical groups;

• The difference between the individuals planning a violent act and the onesactually performing one;

• The use of speech-act theory and constructivism in the study of Islamist militancy;

• Defining radicalization from both a Western and a non-Western perspective• The challenges of access to the radical environments:

– Speaking the same language can in some cases be a gate-opener andmake it possible to understand the radicals’ own understanding of con-cepts such as jihad


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– Interviews in prisons can be very relevant but it is necessary to rememberthat the ones who talk often do not know much and the ones who doknow, often do not talk

– Focus on the surroundings, family and friends of radicals– Distribute questionnaires through a gatekeeper. In some cases this has

resulted in a great response frequency.

FURTHER READINGS

In Danish• Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja and Jon A. Olsen: ”Voldelig Radikalisering i Europa:

Hvad vi ved og ikke ved” DIIS Brief, September 2007• Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja and Line Selmer Friborg: ”Mindst holdbar til…

Udløbsklausuler som garant for løbende demokratisk debat om retssikkerhedog terrorbekæmpelse”, DIIS Brief, June 2007

• Staun, Jørgen: ”Mellem terror og folkelig protest – Europas islamistiske udfordring”, DIIS Book, December 2007

Forthcoming,Winter 2007/2008:• Irani, Nadeem: “Islamisk lov – om sharia og andre begreber”, DIIS Brief• Irani, Nadeem: “En kort introduktion til Islam og til den islamistiske ideologi”,

DIIS Brief• Schrøder, Sofie: “Kvinder i militante islamistiske grupper i Europa – trussel

eller integrationsfaktor?”, DIIS Report

In English• Taarnby Jensen, Michael: “Jihad in Denmark - An Overview and Analysis

of Jihadi Activity in Denmark 1990-2006”, DIIS Working Paper

Forthcoming,Winter 2007/2008:• Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja: “The Elusive Root Causes: Sociopsychological and

Psychological Approaches”, DIIS Working Paper• Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja: “The elusive Root Causes: Social Movement Theory”,

DIIS Working Paper• Staun, Jørgen: “The Linguistic Turn of Terrorism Studies”, DIIS Working Paper

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CONCLUSIONS

The seminar made it very clear that radicalization processes, de-radicalizationprocesses and counterterrorism measures are very complex issues that followdifferent paths and take on different shapes in each individual, group or country.

Even though radicalization processes are multiple, it is possible to extract somegeneral trends and identify both internal and external factors that play roles inthe radicalization of an individual.

The perception of personal marginalization combined with the perception ofWestern double standards in foreign policy appears to play a crucial role.

Additionally, individuals often join radical groups for political or religious reasonsand in a search for empowerment but also in search for friendship and a sense of social belonging.

There is a need to cooperate internationally in research as well as in de-radical-ization or radicalization-management and in counterterrorism. But there are challenges when cooperating across borders.There are differences between the countries’ definitions of concepts such as terrorism and radicalization.The differences in definitions are not only between Western and non-Westerncountries but also between the Western, and even European, countries.These differences must be overcome.

Many different counterterrorism measures have been launched - on national orlocal levels, focusing on the individual, the group or on society and legislation.Counterterrorism measures can however be counterproductive because theymay strengthen or give further legitimacy to radical groups, as was the case withthe banning of the Swedish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir.

As a consequence, there is a need to do research on the effects of counter-terrorism measures.

There is a need to learn from the experiences of other countries and from past experiences with other types of radicalization, always bearing in mind thatdifferences between contexts, countries, communities or groups may cause aneed for alterations or make experiences less useful.

Dutch experiences and research show that de-radicalization strategies need toinvolve the cooperation of different authorities such as teachers, social workersand the police. Authorities at every level need to acquire basic knowledge ofIslam, Islamism, Islamist militancy and radicalization to know the differences and tobe equipped to handle different tasks in the different phases of de-radicalization orprevention of radicalization. It is equally crucial to involve the Muslim communities,radical and moderate alike, in order to reach radical youngsters before theybecome militant or violent.


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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

PREVENTING RADICALIZATION

• There is a need to explain explicitly where the lines are in terms of counter-terrorism legislation. It must be clarified by giving examples of what is legal andwhat is illegal so that individuals do not unknowingly get involved in illegalacts;

• There is a need to look into how counterterrorism measures and counter-radicalization measures are perceived by relevant communities to evaluatewhether these measures are effective or if they are, in fact, supporting or giving legitimacy to violently radical views;

• There is a need to look into how trust can be created between authoritiesand relevant communities in order to make effective counter-measures;

• There is a need to support the development of a European Islam by encouraging and supporting local moderate communities but at the sametime maintaining a safe distance to avoid de-legitimizing them in the eyes ofindividuals who are sceptical of authorities;

• It is recommended to find inspiration in the confetti-approach/the NewDutch model, which consists of supporting many micro-projects.

DE-RADICALIZATION

• De-radicalization must be part of an overall action plan including preventionand aimed at various phases in radicalization processes;

• There is a need to provide teachers, social workers etc. with basic knowledgeof Islam, Islamism, Islamist militancy and radicalization so they know the differences and are equipped to handle different tasks in the different phasesof the de-radicalization of individuals or in preventing radicalization.They arecentral actors in these processes;

• There is a need to involve the Muslim communities - radical and moderatealike in order to reach radical youngsters before they become militant or violent;

• There is a need to focus on individual programmes of actual de-radicalization.This may be demanding and costly but very few individuals can potentially dogreat damage if nothing is done. On the other hand such individuals can latercontribute to de-radicalization or to the prevention of radicalization if thistask is successfully carried out.

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STUDYING RADICALIZATION – WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

There is a need to produce theoretically and methodologically well-foundedresearch based on new empirical data.

The challenge in gaining access to violent and non-violent radical individuals andcommunities:

• There is a need to gather experiences and learn from other studies on howto gain access to violent and non-violent radical communities in order to doproper research on radicalization;

• Since access is a major obstacle in this type of research, it would be recommendable that authorities assist researchers in gaining access wheneverthey can.This would involve facilitating access to imprisoned individuals andto court records from trials in Europe.

Theoretical approaches:

• There is a need to define radicalization;• Studies on radicalization should be cross-disciplinary and involve different

theoretical approaches;• There is a need to focus on the role of group dynamics and leadership in

violent radical and non-violent radical groups.

Comparative studies:

• There is a need to do comparative studies of radical Islamism in differentEuropean countries to clarify whether it takes on different forms when interacting with different contexts;

• There is a need to look into why American Muslims are not radicalized tothe same degree as European Muslims;

• There is a need to do comparative studies of today’s Islamist militancy andleft-wing militancy of the 1960’s and 1970’s.

Focus on the radicalization process:

• There is a need for more focus on different individual paths and differentmotivations for radicalization;

• There is a need to look into non-violent radical groups in order to understand why and when an individual or group becomes violent and if the non-violent groups are bulwarks or steppingstones;

• There is a need to look into the personal motivations of individuals forentering radical groups and for wanting to get out again;

• There is a need to look into the differences between individuals planningviolent acts and individuals actually performing them.


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APPENDIX – PARTICIPANTS

Erik Andre AndersenAnalyst, Research DepartmentDanish Institute for Human Rights

Stéphanie Jeanneret AndreasenMA political scienceFreelancer

Edwin BakkerHead of Clingendael Security and Conflict ProgrammeClingendael

Kamran BokhariDirector of middle East AnalysisStrategic Forecasting, Inc.

Atef HamdyFellowClingendael

Martin HarrowPhD-studentDanish Institute for International Studies

Ann-Sophie HemmingsenPhD-studentDanish Institute for International Studies

Ulla HolmSenior ResearcherDanish Institute for International Studies

Anja Dalgaard-NielsenSenior Researcher, Head of the research unit on PoliticalViolence,Terrorism and RadicalizationDanish Institute for International Studies

Dennis de HoogSenior Advisor and ResearcherCOT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management

Annette Haaber IhlePostdocUniversity of Copenhagen

Nadeem IraniHead of SectionDanish Institute for International Studies

Martin Fernando JakobsenStudent AssistantDanish Institute for International Studies

Michael Taarnby JensenProject ResearcherDanish Institute for International Studies

Jon Alix OlsenResearch AssistantDanish Institute for International Studies

Birgitte Kofod OlsenHead of National DepartmentDanish Institute for Human Rights

Magnus RanstorpResearch Director of Center for Asymmetric Threat StudiesSwedish National Defence College

Sofie SchrøderStudent AssistantDanish Institute for International Studies

Jørgen Bæk SimonsenProfessorUniversity of Copenhagen

Jørgen StaunResearcherDanish Institute for International Studies

Tinka VeldhuisInternClingendael

Marco ZannoniSenior Advisor and ResearcherCOT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management


ABOUT DIIS AND TTSRL

DIIS’S STUDIES IN TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

This publication is part of DIIS’s Studies in Terrorism and Counterterrorism,a project funded by a research grant in the Danish government’s “plan of actionfor countering terrorism, 2005.”The project runs from 2006 through 2009.

The research focuses on processes of radicalization, particularly in Europe, and on the effectiveness and possible side effects of different national and internationalmeasures to counter terrorism.

Research subjects are formulated in consultation with the Danish Council forStrategic Research as well as with representatives from the Ministries of ForeignAffairs, Defence, and Justice.The actual research and the conclusions of theresearch are entirely independent, and do not necessarily correspond to the viewsof the ministries involved or any other government agency, nor do they constituteany official DIIS position.

We aim to conduct high quality research and to communicate our findings broadly.Therefore we publish in a variety of forms, from DIIS research briefs toarticles in international journals.

The main publications published by DIIS are subject to peer review by one ormore members of the review panel. Studies published elsewhere are reviewedaccording to the rules of the journal or publishing house in question.

Review Panel• Andersen, Lars Erslev. Senior Lecturer, Centre for Contemporary Middle

East Studies, University of Southern Denmark.• Crenshaw, Martha. PhD, Professor of Government,Wesleyan University.• Hansen, Birthe. PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,

University of Copenhagen.• Jenkins, Brian Michael. Senior Advisor to the President of the RAND

Corporation.• Neumann, Peter. PhD, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies,

Kings College London.• Oudraat, Chantal de Jonge. PhD, Senior Fellow, Adjunct Professor,

School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.• Ranstorp, Magnus. PhD, Research Director, Centre for Asymmetric Threat

Studies, Swedish National Defence College.• Scheffler,Thomas. Dr.phil., Assistant Lecturer, Department of Cross-Cultural

and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen.• Simonsen, Jørgen Bæk. Dr.phil., Professor, Department of Cross-Cultural

and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen.• Vestergaard, Jørn. Lic.jur., Deputy Dean, Lecturer, Faculty of Law,

University of Copenhagen.


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TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM, SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (TTSRL)

The Trans-European research project Transnational Terrorism, Security and theRule of Law is aimed at framing the current nature of the threat of terrorism as it exists within the EU, and at generating insight into the various response optionsto terrorism that are available to European governments.

The research bridges the gap between the general scientific approach to terror-ism and insight into the effectiveness of the various available response options.It focuses on a broad range of topics, including the development of the Europeansecurity-discourse as a consequence of contemporary terrorism, terrorism’sbroader societal consequences such as radicalisation, its effects on civil order,as well as the way in which these issues are framed and affected by the media.The outcome of the efforts will thus be a better understanding of the issues athand, as well as recommendations as to solutions to some of the most pressingpolicy issues arising from the threat of terrorism in the EU.

The research is conducted by a consortium made up of six research institutionsfrom four member states of the European Union.This allows the institutions notonly to combine their broad range of knowledge and expertise but also to approachthe issues at hand from varying European perspectives.The consortium consistsof:

1. COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (the Netherlands)2. Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNO (the

Netherlands)3. Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (Spain)4. Danish Institute for International Studies (Denmark)5. Danish Institute for Human Rights (Denmark)6. Institute of International Relations Prague (Czech Republic)7. Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations (the Netherlands)

The European Commission (co-)finances the research efforts of the individualparticipating institutions under the 6th framework program.

For further information visit www.transnationalterrorism.eu

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This publication is part of DIIS’s Studies in Terrorism and Counterterrorism,a project funded by a research grant in the Danish government’s “Plan of action for countering terrorism, 2005.”


Documents

RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE - Ny i Danmark · RADICALIZATION IN EUROPE ... A second type of Islamist group is the interactionists ... the meetings when he began asking critical questions