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Participatory Irrigation Management in the Philippines:National Irrigation Systems

Namika Raby

EDI PARTICIPATORY IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES SERIES

Dr Namika Raby teaches anthropology at California State University at Long Beach and works asa consultant

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Participatory Irrigation Management in the Philippines i

Contents

Contents.......................................................................................................................................i

Foreword....................................................................................................................................iii

A Note on INPIM......................................................................................................................iv

A Note on the Series....................................................................................................................v

Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................................vi

Glossary.....................................................................................................................................vii

Summary.....................................................................................................................................1

1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................2

2 Background...........................................................................................................................4Geography and Culture........................................................................................................4The Farming Community....................................................................................................5Mandate of the National Irrigation Administration.............................................................5Water Rights and Cost Recovery............................................................ .............................6

3 The Process of Enhancing Participation...............................................................................9The Role of NIA.................................................................................................................9The IA ...............................................................................................................................9The Catalyst Approach To IA Organization.....................................................................11Contracts and Incentives...................................................................................................13

Maintenance Contracts.............................................................................................13IA Obligations (13)NIA Obligations (13)

Collection Contracts.................................................................................................14IA Obligations (14)NIA obligations (14)

System Turnover Contract.......................................................................................14IA Obligations (14)NIA obligations (15)

Assistance and Training.....................................................................................................15

4 Results of the NIS PIM Program.........................................................................................16Irrigated Area Under Shared Management..........................................................................16Reduction in NIA Personnel.................................................................. ............................18Cost Recovery Through ISF Collection...................................................... .......................23

5 Problems Identified in PIM Strategy ...................................................................................26

6 Conclusions.........................................................................................................................28Voluntary Membership........................................................................................ ..............28Accelerated Organization Schedules...................................................................................28Catalyst Dependence.........................................................................................................29Multi-Functional Associations...........................................................................................29Impact of Land Tenure.....................................................................................................30

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Participatory Irrigation Management in the Philippines iii

Foreword

Hatsuya AzumiDivision Chief, ....................

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Participatory Irrigation Management in the Philippines iv

A Note on INPIM

David GroenfeldtINPIM Coordinator

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Participatory Irrigation Management in the Philippines v

A Note on the Series

This series of case studies began with a month-long study of the Turkish experience withirrigation management transfer prepared for a workshop held in Antalya, Turkey in June 1996.Additional studies were prepared for a second international workshop held in Cali, Colombia in

February 1997. Both workshops were jointly sponsored by the Economic Development Institute(EDI) of the World Bank and the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI).

The purpose of the series is to make available a coherent set of case studies which describeand analyze successful, or otherwise significant, examples of transferring irrigation managementresponsibility to a locally-controlled entity. The intended audience for the studies comprisesparticipants in EDI training programs on Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM), policymakers thinking about introducing such changes, and other interested professionals who may nothave had first-hand experience with these noteworthy cases.

In editing the studies for publication, I have attempted to maintain the integrity of theauthors insights and meanings while restructuring and adapting the text to address a common setof questions and to present each study in a common format. Individual authors were given the

opportunity to review the edited paper and to make corrections. I hope, therefore, that thestudies remain true to the original meanings while conveying those meanings in a comparable andaccessible form.

Mark SvendsenSeries Editor

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Participatory Irrigation Management in the Philippines vi

Acknowledgments

Many individuals from NIA and outside generously took time off their schedules to sharetheir experience with the writer regarding the history and implementation of ParticipatoryIrrigation Management (PIM) in the Philippines. In particular, she is grateful to the following

individuals. However, the author is alone responsible for the interpretations and conclusionsdrawn therein, as well as any omissions and errors.

Rodolfo C. Undan, Ph.D., Administrator; Benjamin U. Bagadion, Former AssistantAdministrator, NIA; Avelino Billy Mejia, Manager, Institutional Development Department(IDD); Renato Gamboa, Division Manager, Irrigator Assistance, IDD; Dominador Macatumbas,Division Manager, Operations,IDD; Mario Gullinao, O&M Division Manager/ Assistant ProjectCo-ordinator, IOSP II, SMD; Erdolfo Domingo, Project Co-ordinator, WRDP; Danny Tolentino,Deputy Project Co-ordinator, WRDP; Dominador D. Pascua, Manager, Corporate Planning;Anabellen Lanoicho, Senior Corplan Specialist; Leonor P. Fernandez, Senior Corplan Specialist;Felimon C.Montano, Section Chief, IDD; Ariel P. Castro, Division Manager, Revenue, TreasuryDepartment; Jesus G. de Leon, Chief Water Rights Division, National Water Resources Board;Manuel L. Collado, Regional Irrigation Manager, Region III; Oscar M. Mercado, Provincial

Irrigation Manager, Region III; Marcelino S. Santos, Division Manager, IDD; Lorna Bitangcol,IDO; Efren Valondo, IDO; Leader and members of Pankasinta IA; Leaders and members ofBUSPA IA; Honorio Bautista, Farmer Management Expert; Honorato Angeles, Professor andVice President, CLSU, Munoz; Leonardo C. Lucero, Ph.D., Chief, District III, UPRIIS; AlbertoDela Cruz, Chief, Operations and Maintenance Division. Region IV; Virgilio Yorro, Assistant IS,Region IV; Bayani P. Ofrecio, Supervising Irrigation Development Officer, IDD; Leo Gallegeo,Trainer, IDD; Damiana Sanchez Cambe, IDO Chief, Region IV; Farmers and IA leaders of BRISIAIA in Balanuc System, Region IV; Marietta de La Cruz, IDO, Region IV; Orlando C. Hondrade,Regional Manager, Region X; Carlos Salazar,IS, Andanan System; All IA leaders and members andBarangay Captains and Councils, Andanan System; Robert Y. Siy, Jr., Senior Strategy and PolicyOfficer, ADB; and Buvan Batnagar, ADB.

This paper was presented in draft at the EDI/IIMI Workshop, Cali, Colombia. Thecomments of the participants at this workshop, in particular, David Groenfeldt, EDI, WorldBank, and Rodolfo Undan and Billy Mejia, NIA, are recognized with appreciation.

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Participatory Irrigation Management in the Philippines vii

Glossary

barangay A barrio or village and the lowest unit of governmentbarrio A villagebayanihan A system of exchange labor and mutual help

CDA Cooperative Development AuthorityCE Collection efficiencyCIS Communal Irrigation SystemCO Community OrganizerDSBA Dry Season Benefitted AreaFIO Farmer Irrigation OrganizerIA Irrigators AssociationIDD Institutional Development Division of NIAIDO Institutional Development OfficerIDP Institutional Development ProgramIAIMS Irrigators Association Information Management SystemIS Irrigation SuperintendentISF Irrigation Service Fee

NFA National Food AuthorityNIA National Irrigation AdministrationNIS National Irrigation Systempakikisama Smooth interpersonal relationsP Philippine Peso (US$ 1 = P27 in this paper)PC Personnel costsPIM Participatory Irrigation ManagementRM Repair and maintenance costsTSA Tertiary Service Areas , command areas of about 40 hectares

within an irrigation systemUPRIIS Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation System

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Participatory Irrigation Management in the Philippines 1

Summary

The Philippines was a pioneer in involving farmers in irrigation planning and management.Building on a centuries-old tradition of local communities developing and managing small

irrigation systems, the Philippines, in the mid-1970s, began to systematically adapt and apply

community management principles, first to government-assisted communal irrigation systemsand then, beginning in 1984, to larger national schemes. This gradual incremental process wastermed the learning process approach.

The approach involved using community organizers who entered and lived in ruralcommunities and helped farmers organized themselves into small irrigation associations (IAs).These associations then entered into contracts with the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)to perform various management functions, such as system maintenance and fee collection, withintheir portion of the larger system. A driving incentive for the program was the need to increasecost recovery by the government, and, in particular, NIAs need to fulfill its mandate to befinancially self-reliant. It tackled this task by attempting to both increase revenues throughimproved fee collections and trim costs, particularly staff costs. Organizing farmers was key toboth efforts.

NIA has a special department dealing with irrigator associations, the InstitutionalDevelopment Department (IDD), whose budget runs about 8 to 10 percent of the agencyconstruction budget. The IDD is responsible for carrying out organizing work and for supportingthe associations with ongoing training programs. The program has gradually expanded over thepast 12 years until about 90 percent of the area under large irrigation schemes in the country iscovered by some form of contract between NIA and local associations. The costs of forming anddeveloping an irrigator association are estimated to be about $28/hectare.

The results of the program are difficult to assess. Some studies show increases in areaserved, cropping intensity, and fee collection efficiency. However, assessment is complicated bythe fact that transfer of functional responsibilities was usually accompanied by rehabilitation,making it difficult to attribute the observed effects. Collection efficiencies are still low comparedwith other countries. Agency O&M staff levels have declined somewhat in the last 10 years.Interestingly, one study shows that collection efficiencies improve most in areas where the mostresponsibility is transferred.

A number of problems have emerged over the course of this program which now seem torequire a fresh look at the entire participatory program. One is that membership in an IA isvoluntary, and the tools available to the IA to compel compliance with rules and paymentobligations are very limited. A second is the dependency relationships which have arisen betweensome associations and the NIA organizers, and, more generally between IAs and NIA. Financescomprise another important problem area. Specific problems include continued non-payment offee obligations, poor financial management by associations, especially where subsidiaryenterprises are involved, and inadequate auditing and accountability.

The management model which has emerged in the Philippines is one where cleardistinctions between NIAs role and that of the IAs are often lacking. The two rolesinterpenetrate at low system levels forming a complicated pattern of joint managementarrangements. As a consequence, NIA is unable to make a clean break from lower levelmanagement functions, and the IAs fail to face a situation of true autonomy. A new model nowemerging involves a 3-way relationship between local village administration, IAs and NIA. Theassigning of a central role to local government agencies is an important innovation which shouldcharacterize future management models.

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1 IntroductionParticipatory irrigation management (PIM) in the Philippines is today synonymous with

what is known as the "learning process approach." This approach results from a history ofcommunity participation in the management of irrigation activities1 and the systematicimplementation of participatory processes in small (less than 100 hectares) communal irrigationsystems (CIS) and is characterized as gradual, progressive, small scale, and intensive.

The Philippines has a total of 3.1million hectares of irrigable area, of which49% is managed under two broad types ofPIM arrangements. In recent times,irrigator associations (IAs) formallyconstituted from the outside began insmaller government-constructed communalirrigation systems (Box 1). Under anational policy beginning with the passage

of the Irrigation Act of 1912, first underthe Bureau of Public Works andsubsequently the National IrrigationAdministration (NIA), the governmentfunded the construction of communalsystems covering an average of about 100hectares. It established the irrigatorassociation as a legal body to receivegovernment assistance for construction ofan irrigation system and subsequently manage it and collect from its members the costs ofmanaging this system in proportion to benefits received.

In 1975 the NIA Charter was amended to authorize recovery from beneficiaries of all

irrigation systems the full cost of construction or a portion thereof within a reasonable time, aswell as operation and maintenance costs, through irrigation service fees. Furthermore, itstipulated that the IA could make a contribution to construction, in cash, labor, or kind and, uponthe completion of the project, operate, maintain, and manage the completed irrigation system.Presently 245,829 hectares of a total of 268,971 hectares under NIA-assisted communalirrigation systems are covered by this arrangement.

By 1984, this policy of PIM was extended to National Irrigation Systems (NIS). IAs wereformed as a organized medium for communication with NIA, the agency that constructed andoperated the systems from the turnout and up.

IAs in NIS were organized following the same approach used in the communal systems. InNIS, this process is characterized by the formation of IAs to jointly manage irrigation related

activities with NIA, and in the long term, the secondary levels of the systems. Known as thelearning process approach, it was anchored in the position of the institutional developmentofficer (IDO) who had a dual role , as a catalyst helping mobilize farmers and organize the IAs,and as liaison between the IA and NIA in carrying out joint management. The IDOs role was toend upon the formation of viable IAs.

1The historical legacy of PIM in the Philippines dates back to the rice terraces of Northern Luzon, some 2000 years ago and

subsequently, the traditional community constructed and managed irrigation systems known as thezanjeras. State construction ofirrigation systems began during colonial period of Spanish rule and this was continued under the American period. The concept of PIMthrough formally organized irrigator associations dates back to 1912, under the American regime.

. IAs organized to assist and fund part of costs ofconstruction of an irrigation system

. IAs identified their needs before construction andparticipated in the construction

. Ten percent of cost was government subsidized, 20% had to be repaid by IA at 6% interest, theremaining 70% was amortized over 25 years

. If IA could come up with 30% of cost during

construction, the system was turned over to themwith no further payment due

. NIA remained responsible for giving technicalsupport and undertaking rehabilitation

. Fifteen percent of amortization payments were setaside by NIA in a trust fund to undertakeemergency work

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At present there are 165 national systems serving 652,264 hectares. NIA, established in1964 as a government-owned corporation, is responsible for irrigation development byconstructing, operating, and maintaining NIS. Three NIS, Angat-Maasim, Magat, and UpperPampanga River Integrated Irrigation System (UPRIIS) are reservoir-backed multi-purposesystems serving about 230,000 hectares The remaining 162 irrigation systems are of the run-of-the-river diversion type and pump irrigation systems. On the average, each serves 2,000hectares and is generally characterized by highly variable and generally low dry-season watersupplies; poor system design for flood control and drainage; deteriorating canal structure andsilted and defective diversion works; and inadequate drainage and on-farm facilities. The damageand deterioration of these systems is further compounded by such natural disasters as periodictyphoons, floods, and volcanic explosions. Resulting from this is the need for periodicrehabilitation and the frequent need for major and minor physical improvement of irrigationsystems.

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2 BackgroundGeography and Culture

The Republic of the Philippines is an island nation composed of an archipelago of islandslocated in the western Pacific off the coast of mainland Southeast Asia. A total land area of300,000 square kilometers is divided among three island groups , Luzon in the north, the Visayasin the center, and Mindanao in the south.

The climate of the islands consists of a dry summer, from November to May, and a rainyseason from June to October. The economy is agriculture based. In addition to irrigated smallfarms, there are coconut plantations. Mining, fishing and manufacturing are other majorindustries.

Comprising a population of 70 million, ninety percent of Filipinos speak the Englishlanguage. Filipino, or tagalog, is the national language. In addition there are 87 other languagesand 111 dialects in the archipelago.

Separated by geography, distinct ethnic groupings have emerged with a common set ofvalues, as well as distinctions. These characteristics define the Filipino social system andinfluence the nature of participation in any community activity, including those related toirrigation. Ethnic communities are identified with provinces and popular beliefs attached toethnic groups. For example, the thrifty, hard working Ilocanos from the north are said to makebetter irrigation managers.

A common set of Filipino values is a blend of different cultures that have come withimmigrants and rulers over the centuries. The value placed on family ties , helping each otherand respecting elders , is said to be inherited from the Chinese. Family values are reflected in tiesto land ownership and residence in the barangay , village or barrio. This is also the smallest unit

of political representation in the Philippines.

Maintaining smooth interpersonal relations,pakikisama, is a cultural value relevant incommunity interactions. It connotes consideration, fairness and camaraderie and a person maygo to considerable lengths to prove that he haspakikisama and is therefore a worthy member ofthe group.

Considered as a Malay legacy is the spirit of helping one another, bayanihan. In agrariancommunities this spirit is reflected during planting and harvesting when family members andneighbors give their help freely.

Piety is the legacy of three centuries of Spanish rule. In response to the question as to whois a good IDO, a well-known authority on the subject of farmer participation responded that such

a person must have missionary zeal in their approach to work and to a further question as to whya majority of IDOs are women, stated that they were better at the job because they were religious.

Historically, these and other values have mobilized the community into action groups forirrigated agriculture. Such values become social capital, institutionalized for the achievement ofinstrumental goals in the interests of self and the community.

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The Farming CommunityOver two-thirds of all poor households live in rural areas where persistent and widespread

poverty is the norm. More than half of all rural households fall below the 1995 official ruralpoverty line of P 8,000 (US$ 310) per capita. A continuing high population growth rate (2.3%p.a.), increasing landlessness and scarcity of land, and inadequate growth of the agricultural sector,

call for a improved strategy for managing this economic sector of society.

Some 75% of households cultivate 1 hectare or less, which, at full development, would onlyprovide incomes ranging from US$ 393 to US$ 785. Some 40% of farms are cultivated byleaseholders. The size of landholding and issue of landlessness is determined by institutionalfactors such as rules of inheritance, where family property is equally divided among all siblings,and the Philippine Civil Code, whereby property is jointly owned by the conjugal unit.

Women are active in household level decision making with reference to farming andfinance. Formal membership in IrrigationAssociations (IA) is limited to the tiller ofthe soil. However, it was perceived in fieldvisits that both married partners share de

facto membership in an IA. In addition toparticipating in transplanting, weeding, andharvesting activities, a married woman willuse her proxy membership to activelyparticipate as a fee collector. The IA leadership transmits O&M information through women, asthey are more readily available. Women are disproportionately represented in IA managementroles as secretaries and treasurers. Women also participate more actively in IA training sessions.

Mandate of the National Irrigation AdministrationThe Philippine National Irrigation Administration (NIA) was established in 1964 as a part

of the nations goal of achieving national self sufficiency in rice production. In 1974 NIAembarked on an ambitious program to reach the minimum and normal rice requirement of thenation through irrigation alone (NIA,1990, 63). NIAs charter was amended in 1974 throughPresidential Decree 552, which made the following changes.

. NIA was granted broader powers to undertake comprehensive water resource projects toinclude flood control, drainage, land reclamation, domestic water supply, hydropowerdevelopment, construction of roads and highways, and reforestation.

. The capitalization of NIA was increased from P 300 million to P 2 billion. Thegovernment provided an explicit subsidy to NIA for general administration, operation andmaintenance of National Irrigation Systems (NIS), and studies of new irrigation projects.NIA did not have to repay the government's advance funding and could keep its irrigationfee collection, funds from equipment rental, and administrative charges from administering

construction loans. Although not stated in the charter, an unwritten agreement called forthe subsidy for system O&M to be gradually phased out over a five year period at whichtime NIA would be directly dependent on collections from farmers for its O&M expenses.

. NIA was authorized to delegate the partial or full management of NIS to duly organizedcooperatives or associations.

. To cover the increasing costs of operation, the flat rate irrigation service fee (ISF) wasdifferentiated into reservoir, pump and diversion irrigation system categories.

NIA was to undertake the organization of viable and responsible Irrigator Associationswhich would assist in the construction of irrigation projects and undertake the management,

. Joint membership through proxy

. Collect service fees

.

Roles as IA secretary and treasurer. IA leaders

. Participants in training sessions

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operation and maintenance, of the completed irrigation projects. In selecting irrigation systemsto be constructed, the following criteria were to be evaluated: crop to be grown (projects with riceover other crops), benefit to cost ratios, average size of landholding; incidence of tenancy,farmers' commitment to do part of the project, and environmental impact. Before a project wasconstructed, the following had to be accomplished:

. Feasibility study showing cost-benefit ratio, internal rate of return and returns on farmer'sinvestment (done by NIA)

. Organization and registration of beneficiary association with NIA initiative and assistance

. Water Rights application

. Plans and estimates of construction

. Agreement between NIA and IA regarding the sharing of costs and managementresponsibilities in the national systems and the amortization of communal systems

. Program of work

Funding requirements were determined by the IAs ability to pick up costs, the rest to be suppliedby NIA.

As spelled out in its amended charter, NIA was authorized to recover from thebeneficiaries of all irrigation systems, the full cost of construction (at appraisal) or portionthereof within a reasonable time and to the extent consistent with government policy, inaddition to the collection of irrigation fees covering insurance and expenses for the operationand maintenance of the system by NIA or irrigation charges for management andadministration." IAs were to contribute to construction in cash, labor, materials or right of way,and upon the completion of the project it would be turned over to duly organized IAs to operate,maintain, and manage. NIA was to make all efforts to strengthen and develop the capability ofIAs, monitor and evaluate their performance to meet standards, assist them technically, and turnover the irrigation system to them only after they have been fully trained to manage it.

Water Rights and Cost RecoveryThe Irrigation Service Fee (ISF) is a charge levied on the farmer for water delivered and the

cost of delivery. The basic principles and framework for the appropriation, control andconservation of water resources are embodied in the Water Code of the Philippines, 1976.

Under Article 3 of this code, all waters2 belong to the state. The state may allow the use ordevelopment of waters by administrative concession. The control and regulatory functions ofthe government with reference to the objectives of the Water Code are exercised through theNational Water Resources Council and the National Water Resources Board. Under Article 10,the purposes of water appropriation are as follows: domestic, municipal, irrigation, powergeneration, fisheries, livestock raising, industrial, recreational, and other.

Water cannot be appropriated without a water right acquired through a water permit. This

water right is a privilege granted by the government. While an individual, a group such as an IAor a corporation (NIA) can secure a permit, in NIS NIA is the permit holder. For agriculturalpurposes, a permit must be supported by documents of ownership or possession of land to bedeveloped, such as a certificate of title; a tax declaration; and a certificate of land transfer orcontract of lease (if applicant is a lessee). Documents must also show the location plan of thearea, including point of diversion, nature of diversion works and hectarage for which water will beused.

2This definition of water refers to water under the ground, above the ground, water in the atmosphere and waters of the sea.

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in order "not to discourage participation of farmer beneficiaries in the development andoperation of irrigation facilities," the government (NIA) will bear the capital cost of NIS and wasauthorized to recover from the beneficiaries the cost of operating and maintaining them.

It was anticipated that improved communication between NIA and the cultivators throughthe formally organized IA would result in (1) a planned cropping calendar and better sharing ofwater among farmers, (2) increased benefitted (wetted) area (reduce gap between this and servicearea); and (3) increased cropping intensity, all of which would then increase the willingness ofirrigators to pay ISF. Increased contact and communication between NIA and IA would lead tobetter system maintenance at the tertiary level, and subsequently, IA performance ofmaintenance at the secondary level under contract, and, finally, the federating of IAs whichwould lead, in turn, to system turnover at the secondary system.

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3 The Process of EnhancingParticipation

The Role of NIAAt the national level, overall responsibility for managing the Institutional Development

Program (IDP) is vested in the NIA Administrator, supported by the NIA Board of Directors.The program is carried out through the office of the Assistant Administrator for SystemsOperation and Equipment Management. Under this Assistant Administrator, the institutionaldevelopment activities associated with the formation and development of IAs in the NIS comeunder the Institutional Development Department (IDD) (Figure 1).

At the regional level, the IDP is the responsibility of the Regional Irrigation Managerthrough the Institutional Development Division. Program management at the irrigation systemlevel is vested in the Irrigation Superintendent (IS) in the NIS and the Provincial IrrigationOfficer for communal irrigation systems (CIS). At the field level, the program is carried out bythe watermasters/water resources facilities technician and the Institutional Development Office(IDO).

The IDD at NIA headquarters operates under two divisions , Irrigators Organization, andIrrigators Assistance, each under an assistant manager. The organization division is responsiblefor IA formation and training while Irrigator Assistance provides skills development training forIAs to become economically viable.

The total staff of the IDD at the NIA headquarters is 25. At the regional level, the IDDstaff are almost exclusively the regional IDD manager and the IDOs who are appointed two perregion. TheNIA Annual Report(1994) gives the IDO number at 68 for NIS and 94 for CIS, atotal of 162. It is estimated that the IDD budget is 8-10% of the NIA construction budget.

The IAA formally organized IA is a non-profit, non-stock association registered under the

Securities and Exchange Commission. IA membership is voluntary. The membership fee is P 5.In addition, members make an annual contribution of P 105. According to the by-laws of the IA,membership is for the "tiller of the soil," and traditionally the position is filled by the male headof household. An organized and registered IA becomes the forum for mobilizing irrigation servicefee collection and transmitting information from the agency.

5The amount, and whether annual dues were charged, varied from IA to IA.

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Figure 1. NIA Structural Diagram for IDP Management (from NIA files)

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The Catalyst Approach To IA OrganizationIA formation is based on the catalytic role of the Institutional Development Officer

(IDO)6. College graduates in the social sciences,7 experienced in working with the rural and urbanpoor, were oriented in the policies and procedures of NIA, exposed to an operating irrigationsystems, and hired on a temporary basis, as community organizers (COs). They went and lived in

the farming communities and participated in community activities to gain rapport andacceptance. Over time, they acted facilitators among the farmers; helping them vocalize theirneeds, problems, and ideas regarding the irrigation system expansion, maintenance, andoperation; while informing them the kind of assistance they could obtain from NIA. In thisprocess the needs identified, as well as types of assistance to be provided, were tailored to theneeds of local farmers and the irrigation system. The need for sufficient lead time to do thisprior to construction has been pointed out as critical (Bagadion 1988). In one case such pre-construction activities in a project of 600 hectares was 10 months.

More intensive organization in a single IA is provided by a Farmer Irrigator Organizer(FIO), an irrigator resident in the community who is recruited by NIA for a period of twelvemonths for a stipend of P 500 per month. Beyond this point it was up to the IA to retain theFIO on its payroll as a member of its board of advisors.

Farmers would form into groups to prepare a map of the proposed irrigation service areaand the location of canals. They would discuss these matters with NIA engineers and accompanythem during the surveys for the planning and design of the system. They then negotiated theright of way with relevant landowners and prepared the documents needed for the registration oftheir association with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Prior to construction, the association met with NIA to discuss the type of diversionstructure, the construction schedule, extent of farmer involvement in construction work (throughcontract as well as association counterpart contribution), and estimated the costs that thefarmer's would repay. In older national irrigation systems which were constructed prior to theformation of IAs, this process was implemented at rehabilitation. The IA contributes 25% ofcosts in labor and materials. During construction or rehabilitation, farmer committees were

encouraged to monitor the use of equipment, fuel consumption and costs. Upon completion, theIA and NIA undertook the shared management of the system. This process of enhancingparticipation and recovering costs, tried out on a pilot basis in the 1980s and implementednationally by 1987, is known as the learning process approach.

6At various times, this catalyst role has been identified by other designations, e.g., Community Organizer (CO), Institutional

Community Organizer (ICO), and Irrigator Development Officer (IDO). However, the basic role has remained the same.

7Today, not all are from the social sciences, in fact a good many are agriculture graduates and some civil engineers.

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Figure 2. Typical IA Organizational Structure

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Contracts and IncentivesPIM under the shared management strategy is implemented through a sequence of contracts

between IAs and NIA and incentives given to IAs.

Maintenance ContractsAn organized and registered IA signs a maintenance contract with NIA, which specified

mutual obligations of both parties.

IA Obligations

. Undertake grass-cutting and clearing in the inside and outside slopes of the supply canals

. Fill up potholes along canal embankments and drain accumulated water from depressedportions of canal embankment

. Remove debris from canals and conveyance structures

. Undertake minor repairs of facilities that will not require equipment or constructionmaterials

. Undertake greasing of steel gates including turnouts gates at least once a month

. Undertake, with NIA, the painting of regulatory and control structures

. Protect and safeguard all irrigation structures

. Prevent persons form constructing illegal turnouts

. Maintain all farm level facilities within the IA area, including desilting, removal of debris,and grass cutting

. Prepare monthly maintenance reports to be submitted to NIA

. Participate in regular meetings, trainings and seminars

. Coordinate with other institutions (barangays etc.) and promote programs for the welfareof the association

. Participate in the identification of structures needing repair /restoration and undertake suchactivities with NIA

.

Allocate and deliver in timely fashion adequate amounts of water from the lateral headgateto individual farms programmed for irrigation during a cropping season

NIA Obligations

. Undertake rehabilitation of facilities jointly with IA

. Provide the IA with supplies for maintenance activities

. Provide IA with water delivery and planting schedules one month prior to start ofcultivation and notify of any unavoidable delays or changes

. Deliver in a timely manner, adequate water to the headgate of the lateral of the IA

. Develop and implement training programs to develop IA capacity to undertake itsactivities

. Regularly inspect and monitor IA activities regarding implementation of contract

. Assist IA in conflict resolution beyond its capacity to resolve

The IA is currently remunerated at the rate of P 1400 per 3.5 kilometers of canal, permonth for satisfactorily performing its obligations. The IA has replaced the agency ditchtenderwho had previously undertaken activities now performed by IA.

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Collection ContractsSimultaneous to the above, or independently, an IA could sign a ISF collection contract

which also specified mutual obligations of NIA and IA.

IA Obligations

. Monitor irrigated planted area weekly and report to NIA

. Distribute water within IA area

. Gather water discharge data and submit to NIA

. Deliver irrigation fee bills to farmers

. Collect payments and remit same to NIA every Friday or when collection reaches P 5,000

. Assist NIA in verifying farmlots to be exempted from the irrigation service fee

. Gather yield data from randomly selected farmer beneficiaries

. Monitor changes in landownership and tenure

NIA obligations

.

Inform IA of water delivery and planting schedules. Train IA to gather and report water discharge data

. Prepare and furnish to IAs, their irrigation bills

. Issue official receipts on remitted fee payments

. Assess farmlots requesting exemption of payments

. Train IA members in gathering yield data

. Ensure timely payment of IA share from fee collection

The IA receives a portion of the fee collected as incentive and compensation for their effort.Rebates are given on a sliding scale, ranging from 2% of fees collected above the first 60%, up toa maximum of 15% for collection of 100% of the fees due.

System Turnover ContractTurnover can be either full or partial. Under full turnover, the irrigation system is turned

over to the IA under the following agreement.

. The irrigation system is amortized as in the case of CIS

. Operation and maintenance tasks over the entire irrigation system are the responsibility ofthe IA

. NIA continues to be responsible for major repair and rehabilitation of the irrigation system

. NIA will provide technical and managerial training for the IA

. NIA will assist the IA in developing a system operation plan

Under partial turnover, obligations are defined as follows.

IA Obligations

. Maintenance of the entire length of the main canal

. Undertake all technical repair works considered to be minor

. Implement a jointly agreed water delivery plan for the entire system

. Collect irrigation service fees from farmers per collection contract

NIA obligations

. Undertake rehabilitation and major repairs to the irrigation system

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. Provide the IA with managerial and technical training to enhance its capacity for selfmanagement

. Funds permitting, provide IA with necessary tools and equipment

. Give preference to IA in carrying out rehabilitation of the system

. Operate the main canal and, where relevant, the reservoir

Assistance and TrainingAssistance given to registered IAs is categorized as internal and external. Internally, the

assistance division of the IDD has prepared a monitoring system, called the Irrigator AssociationManagement Information System (IAMIS), based on lessons learned under the CIS program.Instruments developed for this purpose are used by IAs to record information on farmingactivities, water delivery and distribution, harvesting, and ISF collections. IAs will be trained touse this cumulative information for planning future cultivation agenda.

Externally, the NIA IDD mediates and facilitates linkages between IAs and other agencies,as listed below.

.

Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). IAs typically receive production loansfrom the Land Bank during the first year of their existence. Beyond this period, the IAmust covert into a cooperative in order to continue to receive lending from the LandBank. The CDA relies on NIA to provide IAs with skills and training which allow them toconvert into cooperatives.

. Department of Agriculture. The IDD facilitates the implementation of the LivestockProject, the Enhancement of Agriculture Project, and the Rice Production Cluster Project,among others, aimed at improving farm output.

. National Food Authority (NFA). The IDD acts as liaison between IAs and NFA inmarketing and technology transfer.

. Technology and Livelihood Resource Center. The IDD mediates with non-government organizations such as this and assists IAs to procure loans.

A contracted IA, over a period of two or three years, is targeted to receive at least oneround of the following types of training

. The Basic Leadership Development Course encouraging leadership skills

. Systems Management Training including water distribution, implementation of croppingcalendar, in-season maintenance, ISF collection, and conflict management

. Financial Management Training including bookkeeping and money management

A second round of training is given at the request of the IA, with the latter bearing 50% of thecost of the training.

Finally, the PIM program in the Philippines supports the integration of IAs with thecommunity through IA participation in activities such as fiestas, parades, and harvest festivals.NIA also has a annual competition for Outstanding IA8 in the irrigation system and the region.These IAs in turn, compete for the position of Outstanding IA in the nation. The first placed IAreceives a cash award of P 20,000 with certificates given to the second and third placed IAs.

8NIA also recognizes the outstanding irrigation superintendent and outstanding regional irrigation manager.

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4 Results of the NIS PIM ProgramThe impact of PIM in the National Irrigation Systems of the Philippines is viewed under

the following categories: (1) the irrigated area under contract for shared management andrealization of goals of the program for irrigated agriculture (2) reduction of government coststhrough the reduction of NIA O&M staff as IAs took over such activities, and, (3) the trend incost recovery through the collection of irrigation service fees.

Irrigated Area Under Shared ManagementTables 2 shows the status of IA organization, contracting, and transfer as of December

1995. Table 3 presents several indicators of program coverage and impact for two points intime. The two years shown in the table can be associated with periods before and after theprogram was introduced. However, because the organizing program is a progressive and ongoingone it is difficult to associate a particular year with a before situation and another with theafter. Moreover it is risky to use agricultural data from a single year to represent typicalconditions because of the many possible variations associated with weather and other factors.

The data suggest increases in all five of the target variables, but more information is needed toevaluate these suggested changes.

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Table 2. IA organization, registration, and contracting for national irrigation systemsas of December 1995

PARTICULARS STATUS

I. IA Organizationa. Number of IAs Organized 1,861

Area Covered, hectares 586,990

Number of Farmers 388,606

b. Number of IAs Registered with SEC 1,826



II. IA Contracts

Total: (As of September 1995)

Number of IAs 1,552



Maintenance: Number of IAs 419



Collection: Number of IAs 398



Maintenance & Collection: Number of IAs 680



Turnover: Number of IAs Number of



Source: NIA/IDD

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Table 3. Status of irrigation before and after the introduction of PIM in NIS

Program Goals Outcomes

1987 1990

Service Area 600.5 621.0

Area Wet Season 436.4 478.5

Area Dry Season 370.1 382.8

Cropping Intensity 134.0 139.0

ISF Collection 51% 54%

Reduction in NIA PersonnelSince more than three-quarters of NIA's operating budget in the late 1970s was devoted to

operational costs, of which personnel expenses were the largest share, reduction in staff was amajor concern. Voluntary reductions in staff were carried out in the 1970s and 1980s. It isestimated that this reduced the personnel share of the budget from 80% in 1976 to 74% in 1986.From 1992 to 1996, staffing levels remained constant in the central, regional, and provincial

offices of NIA while the NIS staffing totals for the same period dropped from 5,660 to thepresent 4,785, a15% reduction. In NIS the NIA payroll includes the irrigation superintendent,watermasters, and ditchtenders. The reduction in staff has resulted primarily from thereplacement of ditchtenders upon retirement with contract labor arranged through IAs. Staffattrition is also a result of an increase in the command area serviced by an individual watermaster,from 500 hectares to 1000 hectares.

A 10-year trend in NIA staffing is given in Table 4. NIA permanent staffing has declined

over this period, which covers the period of nationwide implementation of the participatoryprogram in NIS, from 10,255 in 1986 to 7,077 in 1996, a decline of 31%. Temporary staffhired under foreign-funded project declined also from a high of 9,098 in 1986 to a low of 3,291in 1996. The institutional development program has relied primarily on project funds to hireIDOs.

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Table 4. NIA personnel trends, 1986-1996

YearMonthly

Daily TotalNIA/Project

TotalOverall

Perm. Temp.

1986 NIA 6,696 419 3,140 10,255 19,353

Proj 0 2,857 6,241 9,098

1987 NIA 7,795 611 2,917 11,323 18,821

Proj. 0 2,867 4,631 7,498

1988 NIA 7,529 583 3,734 11,846 20,771

Proj. 0 2,955 5,970 8,925

1989 NIA 7,656 416 3,576 11,648 20,026

Proj. 0 2,912 5,466 8,378

1990 NIA 7,721 0 1,591 9,312 18,199

Proj. 0 0 8,887 8,887

1991 NIA 7,555 34 5,301 12,890 16,781

Proj. 0 0 3,891 3,891

1992 NIA 7,281 25 878 8,184 12,896

Proj. 0 0 4,712 4,712

1993 NIA 6,931 25 1,202 8,158 12,177

Proj. 0 0 4,019 4,019

1994 NIA 6,633 11 1,855 8,499 13,203Proj. 0 0 4,704 4,704

1995 NIA 6,310 1,205 0 7,515 12,231

Proj. 0 0 4,716 4,716

1996 NIA 6,183 0 894 7,077 10,368

Proj. 0 0 3,291 3,291

In 1995, the government introduced a five-year O&M subsidy in NIS of P 220 per hectare.This was to be supported by system rehabilitation and an intensified effort at collecting ISF. To

motivate NIA system level staff to pursue ISF collections, NIS were carved into groups of

responsibility centers. Financial incentives totaling 10% of the ISF revenue collected above theactual operating costs (an amount sufficient to recover narrowly-defined O&M costs) were givenas bonuses to NIA staff at the regional and system levels.

NIA's operating expenses during the period covered by the nationwide implementation ofPIM in NIS are given, in nominal terms, in Table 5. At 1996 levels, operating expenses perhectare in NIS were P 1,360. Of this, salaries accounted for 56%, civil works for 30%, and otheroperational expenses for 14%.

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The cost of organizing an IA in 1991, as given by NIA, is P 47,816 (US$ 1,771) as shownin Table 6. Taken in conjunction with the cost per hectare for developing IA managementcapacity for turnover at the secondary system (Table 7) at P 572.4 per hectare, gives anapproximate cost of forming and developing an IA for a 250 hectare area as P 190,906 (US$7,070), or about US$ 28/hectare.

Table 6. Annualized costs per IA formed (1991)

Types of Costs Amounts

FIO Salary P 6,000

FIOS (Supervision) P 6,000

IDO P 8,096

IDO Allowance P 720

BLDC Training P 9,000

SMT P 9,000

FMT P 9,000

TOTAL COST P 47,816 ($1,771)

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ParticipatoryIrrigationManagementinthePhilippines

22

Table2.Summary

ofcostsofIAdevelopmentandmanag

ementforturnoverprogram,nationwide

Particulars

Number

ofNIS

s

ServiceArea

[hectares]

AreawithIAs

[hectares]

Areaw/out

IAs[hectares]

Dev.Cost/ha.

withIAs(Pesos)

Dev.Cost/ha.

w/outIAs

(Pesos)

Tot.Dev.

C

ostwithIAs

(Pesos)

Tot.Dev.Cost

w/outIAs

(Pesos)

IOSPII

18

94,689

75,555

1

9,134

572.41

569.41

43,248,437.55

10,895,090.94

WRDP

19

214,566

186,966

2

7,600

572.41

569.41

107,021,208,.06

15,715,716.00

ISIP

5

26,674

19,678

6,996

572.41

569.41

11,263,883.98

3,983,592.36

OtherNIS

291,561

235,561

5

6,121

572.41

569.41

1

34,837,472.01

31,955,858.61

TOTAL

627,611

517,760

10

9,851

572.41

569.41

2

96,371,001.60

62,550,257.91

Source:NIAFiles

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A comparative study of NIS with and without IAs done by NIACONSULT in 1993 using thecriteria of: collection efficiency (CE), repair and maintenance costs (RM), personnel costs (PC),and change in dry season benefitted area (DSBA) (Table 8) found that on all accounts the formerfared better than the latter.

Table 8. Performance of NIS with and without irrigator associations

CE RM PC DSBA

With IA 60% P 380/ha P 340/ha 40% >

Without IA 43% P 540/ha P 450/ha 20% >

Source: NIACONSULT, 1993

The sample IAs in this study were drawn from irrigation systems having undergone on-farmimprovements under project funds for system rehabilitation as well as IA organizing through thecommunity organizer approach. Thus results can not be attributed entirely to the communityorganizing approach.

By the year 2001 an additional 19 national systems covering a total of 25,426 hectares willbe added to the turnover program.

Cost Recovery Through ISF CollectionAccording to a study by NIACONSULT (1993,18), the role of IAs in ISF collection is more

as a stabilizer of collections once such collections had reached a certain level. This is alsosupported by the trend in collections in the late 1980s at the peak of IA contracting activities(Table 9).

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ParticipatoryIrrigationManagementinthePhilippines

24

Table3.Irrigation

servicefeecollectionefficiency,1980

-1995,millionPesos

Year

Receivabl

e

Beginning

Balance

Billing

(CA)

CURRENTACCOUNT

BACKACCO

UNT(New)

BACKACCOUNT(Old)

Total

Collectio

n

CollectionEfficiency

InKind

InCash

Total

InKind

InCash

Total

InKind

InCash

Total

CA/CA

BA/BA

Total/CA

1980

395.45

100.58

6.27

46.63

52.90

0.00

19.62

19.62

0.00

2.23

2.23

74.7

4

52.59

5.52

74.31

1981

318.54

132.76

3.15

43.04

46.20

0.00

13.21

13.21

0.00

0.21

0.21

59.6

2

34.80

4.21

44.91

1982

389.42

134.73

3.36

57.25

60.61

0.01

13.89

13.90

0.00

1.64

1.64

76.1

5

44.99

3.99

56.52

1983

432.92

136.77

4.32

52.44

56.76

0.00

14.77

14.77

0.00

1.01

1.01

72.5

5

41.50

3.65

53.04

1984

496.77

210.78

1.81

75.84

77.65

0.00

21.89

21.89

0.00

1.27

1.27

100.8

0

36.84

4.66

47.82

1985

534.23

306.84

6.56

115.70

122.26

0.00

27.58

27.58

0.00

1.08

1.08

150.9

2

39.85

5.36

49.19

1986

807.95

341.31

47.00

90.48

137.48

0.00

34.14

34.14

0.00

1.74

1.74

173.3

5

40.28

4.44

50.79

1987

1,092.35

337.93

81.85

55.04

136.89

13.13

20.46

33.58

0.18

2.58

2.77

173.2

4

40.51

3.33

51.26

1988

1,316.42

343.14

50.33

83.99

134.31

9.56

23.04

32.61

0.15

1.67

1.82

168.7

4

39.14

2.62

49.17

1989

1,537.62

379.34

10.18

147.03

157.20

2.39

39.47

41.86

0.00

2.97

2.97

202.0

3

41.44

2.92

53.26

1990

1,769.44

483.49

46.67

162.57

209.24

10.84

40.35

51.19

0.17

2.41

2.58

263.0

0

43.28

3.04

54.40

1991

2,118.46

568.40

200.38

89.35

289.73

23.73

27.52

51.24

1.58

2.15

3.72

344.7

0

50.97

2.59

60.64

1992

2,394.33

552.41

175.00

84.90

259.90

25.40

28.63

54.03

0.58

1.95

2.52

316.4

6

47.05

2.36

57.29

1993

2,664.53

609.40

106.92

164.44

271.37

15.40

41.02

56.42

0.14

3.73

3.87

331.6

6

44.53

2.26

54.42

1994

3,191.13

652.60

49.40

234.91

284.31

7.98

53.10

61.08

0.02

5.90

5.92

351.3

1

43.57

2.10

53.83

1995

3,254.15

604.79

9.67

256.42

266.10

3.04

68.92

71.96

0.01

9.80

9.81

347.8

7

44.00

2.51

57.52

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The study argues that the greater participation of IAs in negotiating the level of ISFcollection sharing between 1987 and 1991 resulted in the collection efficiency increasing from52% to 65%. The study also concludes that IAs which have taken more O&M responsibilitiesare more efficient in collecting irrigation fees (Table 10).

Table 10. IA irrigation fee collection efficiency, by contract type

Contractual ArrangementCollection Efficiency %

On-Contract

Effectivity

Two YearsAfter

Contract

1991

1. Canal maintenance and waterdistribution contract

41 58 60

2. Irrigation fee collection and waterdistribution contract

65 58 83

3. Canal maintenance, water distributionand irrigation fee collection contracts

a. Sharing of collections betweenNIA and IAs fixed by NIA

52 93

b. Sharing of collections negotiatedbetween IAs and NIA

65 58 110

4. Full turn-over contract to IA 77 103 143

Source: NIACONSULT, 1993

Some conclusions emerge from the above discussion of ISF collections. First, ISF collectionshave leveled off. Second, about70% of this income goes to supportactivities other than physicalworks. Third, a reduction inpersonnel costs can be achievedthrough IA contracting foractivities previously performed byNIA ditchtenders and watermasters.However, these personnel are

currently replaced only upon theirretirement. Fourth, there is agreater willingness to pay ISFamong IAs involved in systemoperation and maintenance.

A somewhat more critical view ispresented in the Water Resources Development Project Appraisal Report (1996, Annex 7). Thisreport states that income from NIS declined from 84% of costs in 1989 to 63% in 1993. This isattributed to increases in salaries of civil service personnel while ISF collections have remained atthe level of about 60% of collectibles. It states further that NIA system level staff spend 10-40% of their time collecting ISF from farmers and that the ratio of staff salaries to amountcollected was almost 100%.

. Area turned over completely: 11,202 ha

. Area under maintenance contracts: 144,926 ha

. Area under collection contracts: 81,141 ha

. Area under combined contracts: 236,088 ha

. Area under organized IAs: 108,103 ha

. NIA staff declined between 1986 and 1996 by 31%

. NIA O&M salary costs declined from 80% of 56% ofoperating expenses

. Dry season benefitted area increased by 20%

. ISF collection increased by 17%

. Repair and maintenance costs declined by P 160/ha

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5 Problems Identified in PIM StrategyThe IDD undertook an evaluation of IAs in the national irrigation systems in 1996, through a

functionality survey. The objectives of this survey were to (a) assess the current status of IAs,(b) identify functional and non-functional aspects of IA, (c) provide a basis for establishingdevelopment programs for IAs, and (d) serve as one basis for the selection of the OutstandingIrrigators ' Association (NIA/IDD, 1996). The findings of the survey reflect the organizationalcapacity of IAs to carry out activities mandated by their contracts and to progressively undertakegreater responsibilities. This in turn is a reflection of (a) the PIM strategy adopted by NIA forits national irrigation systems and (b) the adequacy of its training programs.

IAs were evaluated under the criteria and weightings shown in Table 11, and assigned scores.

Table 11. Evaluation criteria for 1996 IDD study

Criteria Scores

Operation and Maintenance 68%

O&M Planning 8%

O&M Implementation 48%

O&M Performance Outputs 12%

Organization 20%

Membership 4%

Board of Directors Meetings 4%

General Assembly Meetings 4%

Record Files 8%

Financial Performance 6%

Net Worth 3%

Income vs. Expenses 3%

Organizational Discipline 6%

Holding of Regular Meetings 2%

Imposition of Discipline and Sanctions 2%

Attendance at Meetings 2%

Total 100%

The evaluations were based on the functionality index shown in Table 12.

Table 12. IA Functionality criteria used by NIA/IDD

Very Functional 100 - 80%

Moderately Functional 79 - 60%

Not Functional 59% and below

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This survey evaluated 54% of all IAs in NIS and found that 14% were very functional, 52%moderately functional and 34% not functional.

Problems are summarized below.

. Voluntary membership made it hard to get compliance on contract obligations

.

NIA cannot enforce compliance of contracts by IAs except through long and cumbersomelitigation

. Unilateral changeover into uniform collection contracts by NIA was perceived as unfair bythe IA, and as result, the momentum of the program was lost

. Financial difficulties of the agency and failure to pay incentives on time

. NIA's inability to make repairs to systems on time

. Inadequate and untimely release of funds for IA development leading to a lack of syncronicitybetween construction/rehabilitation activities and IA development

. Inability of NIA to withdraw field staff even when IAs are interested in maintenance contracts

. Annual election of IA leaders results in rapid IA management turnover and heavy but unmetdemand for leadership training programs

. Inadequate training in financial management and lack of transparency of financial

management processes has resulted in many promising IAs becomiong insolvent. Lack of sufficient emphasis on the organization stage of IA and provision of some training

during the organization process rather than after contracts are let

. Conversion of IAs into multi-purpose cooperatives has not succeeded in generating additionalincome for the IA

. IDOs hired as temporary catalysts have fostered dependence of the IA on them

. Agency goal of cost recovery is in conflict with its long-term goal of strengthening IAs; NIAfield personnel are given bonuses based on success in collecting ISF, while very little emphasisis placed on strengthening IAs

. Poor internal agency management , unclear position descriptions, absence of managementcontrols, little training of systems level technical staff in managerial skills in support ofinstitution building

. Continuing NIA presence in areas where IAs are performing O&M activityes under contractleads to confusion and retardation of IA capacity development

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. 6 ConclusionsThe following conclusions are related to problems in implementing the current organizational,

training, and monitoring and evaluation strategy of PIM in the Philippines.

Voluntary MembershipIA membership is voluntary and full membership is seldom achieved. In the 19 systems

scheduled for turnover in coming years, full membership has been achieved in only 5. Theconsequences of this are two fold: first, the IA is unable to get cooperation to implement itscontract obligations and seasonal cultivation program from non-members. Secondly, thevoluntary nature of the IA limits its ability to enforce its policies even on its members, forexample in the non-payment of irrigation service fees. The IA bylaws rely on consensus andsocial pressure and not on legal sanctions.

For non-payment of fees, it is NIA who must take non-paying farmers to court. One suchcase was reported from Region V, where the land was seized by the regional office. Beyond this,

NIA has authorized the irrigation superintendent or district manager to send out letters ofdemand to non-paying farmers. In UPRIIS-District III, it was reported that usually upon thereceipt of one or two such letters, a farmer will come to the district office and pay up becausethey know the consequence of non-payment beyond this point, i.e., after the third letter ofdemand, the fiscal officer will repossess the land (this is stated in the third letter of demand).The social embarrassment of such action is said to be sufficient deterrent for a farmer to pay upany outstanding ISF.9 As of July 1996, however, the ISF collection efficiency in District III isonly 59%, about average for NIS.

The inability of NIA, and the associations, to collect ISF through current methods has animpact not only on current levels of ISF collection but, on what are known as new backaccounts,amounts owed by individual IA members since the date of IA contracting for ISFcollection, and old back accounts incurred prior to the signing of such a contract. (While theincentive for collecting old back accounts is as high as 25%, for accounting purposes all backaccounts are under one category.) The magnitude of these back accounts is seen in Table 8, andthe importance of their collection for the financial solvency of NIA as well as the sustainabilityof irrigation systems cannot be over emphasized.

Accelerated Organization SchedulesUnder project funding, the focus of monitoring efforts has been on IA creation within the

project area and not the sustainability of the IAs created. Thus little is known about longer-termeffectiveness. On the one hand, the success of the learning process approach, as documented byBagadion (1994), has been attributed to intensive organizing efforts focusing on a limited numberof systems and extending over at least a one year period. In contrast, IAs organized in the latter

half of the 1980s were organized in a hurry with limited staff and budget. Thus, from 1980-87, atotal of 1,233 IAs were organized, while over a one year period in 1989-90, a total 876 IAs wereorganized. It would be important to assess the impact that these different approaches to IAorganization has had on IA performance and sustainability.

9UPRIIS reports there are farmers who have not paid ISF in twenty years. The District Irrigation Office has a target of

apprehending at least 1,000 defaulters per year, with the staff of five billing clerks doing this job. Cases involving less than P 50,000 willbe arraigned in the Municipal Court while amounts up to P 200,000 will be brought to the Trial Court.

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Catalyst DependenceThe use of a catalyst to organize IAs is the centerpiece of the learning process approach in the

Philippines. Over time, this catalyst has been known as the Institutional Community Organizer,the Institutional Development Officer and recently, the Irrigator Development Officer. The

educational background of catalysts have varied over time from the social sciences to agricultureand engineering. Following "the farmer's way," a different type of catalyst was added on with theintroduction of the FIO. By all accounts, the primary responsibility for organizing sustainableIAs is now the domain of the watermaster, with support of the IDO and FIO. Thus, the catalysthas evolved from a single person to a triumvirate of individuals with different backgrounds andcapacities. In this case, accountability and responsibility need to be spelled out clearly.

The IDOs were originally hired as casual or contractual employees whose employment wasterminated at the end of foreign-funded programs. The first IDOs were hired and trained forwork in communal irrigation systems under Ford Foundation funding and were moved to the NISunder other foreign-funded projects. Over time, expectations have developed on the part ofIDOs that they should become permanent employees of NIA. But NIA currently has a limitednumber of permanent positions for IDOs, whose functions should end with the formation of IAs.

At least some IDOs appear to have cultivated a dependence relationship with IAs.

The situation as described above is also true of the FIOs, who were hired for twelve months tohelp establish an IA and whose services were terminated by NIA at the end of this period. Inmany cases IAs have demanded that NIA keep the FIO on its payroll beyond this period eventhough the IA itself is unable or unwilling to pay for the services of the FIO. Watermasters, onthe other hand, are part of the NIA's cadre of civil service positions and can only be moved tonewly irrigated areas or allowed to retire.

Multi-Functional AssociationsA number of IAs, particularly in reservoir and pump systems, have accumulated capital

through their O&M contracts, obtained loans from the Philippines Land Bank, bought tractors,established rice mills, and undertaken the trading of rice. The conversion of the IA into a vehiclefor channeling private and government-based enterprise for the development of the rural sectorwas envisaged by NIA as the next phase in IA development.

However, this has posed a dilemma in that IAs, as presently constituted, are registered as non-profit, non-stock, non-sectarian organizations. To perform these new functions , they must beconverted into for-profit organizations. However, in order to qualify for loans from the LandBank, the IA must be constituted as a cooperative. There is apprehension on the part of NIAthat in their enthusiasm for business related activities, IAs might forget their original functions ofperforming O&M activities. The recent history of IAs converting in cooperatives has not beenpositive.

The BUSPA IA, a pump irrigation system covering 831 hectares in Region III, is a case inpoint. Organized as an IA in 1984 with 700 members, it was turned over in 1986. The IA boardof directors had converted the IA into a cooperative without approval from the membership atlarge (fifteen members are required to form a coop and this number was met by the members ofthe board). In 1991, using IA funds as collateral they then borrowed P 6 million from the LandBank and diversified into other activities including a rice mill, a warehouse for rice storage and afisheries project. Two year later, after repaying part of this loan they obtained a further loan upto this amount. In the following year two new members were elected to the IA board of directorswho demanded the opening up of the association's financial records. This was the result offinancial problems faced by the IA, which was unable to make its loan payments to the LandBank. The Land Bank appropriated the IA funds of P600,000 and foreclosed on the propertieswhich, according to IA members, were worth at least P 3 million. The membership voted the

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board of directors out of office (and ostracized them in the community), separated the IA fromthe coop, and reorganized the IA under a new leadership. The IA is currently getting back on itsfeet, and refers to its experience as "the sad history of the coop." As mentioned by somemembers, "we should have enforced the yearly election of the board as mandated by the IA bye-laws. We trusted them (the board) and did not demand to see accounts. The IA should not beconverted into a coop unless all members are willing and able to become shareholders in thecoop."10

Given the above, NIA policy regarding the diversification of IAs into other activities is one ofgradually building up capital internally, and undertaking lending and income generating venturesusing this capital. According to the Manager, IDD, "no IA should convert into cooperativeunless all its members are willing and capable of buying a share."

Impact of Land TenureDuring the course of this study, it was uniformly reported that the difficulty in collecting at

least 50% of back accounts from farmers is because such payment are disputed by the farmer.This is directly linked to patterns of land tenure:11

In the irrigation systems in the Philippines there can be three types of cultivators,owners,lessees, and farmers of amortized lands. In District III of UPRIIS, from a total of 14,656 farms,the land tenure pattern is shown in Table 13.

Table 13. Land tenure pattern in District III of UPRIIS

Landowners 28%

Leasehold 29%

Amortized 43%

The average size of landholding was given at 1.7 hectare

12

Most non-payments of ISF are attributed to disagreements over who should be responsible forISF in the amortized lands when such payments are interrupted or stopped because the cultivatoris unable to make payments. The high level of leasing (50-70%) where landowner and lessee mayeach disclaim responsibility for paying ISF for certain years, compounds this problem. Landownership itself may also change without NIA's awareness and the new owner may disclaim anyoutstanding dues after the previous owner (notwithstanding the lien on the land) had sold theland. Finally, land fragmentation and intra-familial conflicts may also result in the non-paymentof ISF.

10Another case of financial mismanagement in a pump system (Stage III) in this region resulted in an IA (covering 1350 ha with

1200 members) owing NIA the operations cost of pump. Such costs are advanced by NIA up to the maximum allowed at P 800,000.00and then repaid by the IA. At this point, NIA sent a letter of demand to the IA and the members of the IA became aware that eventhough they had paid their share of the costs for operation (as well as amortization), the leaders had not remitted payments to NIA andhad misappropriated its funds. This IA board too has been replaced. As reported by the Regional Irrigation Manager, this IA has nowpaid the entire dry season bill of P 278,964.30 on 7/25/96, and paid an advance of P 400,00.00 for the upcoming season, on 8/27/96.However, a P 6 million back account is still to be negotiated.

11The Agricultural Land Reform Code, 1963, abolished share tenancy and established a system of leasehold until such time that

lessees could become full owners. It stipulated that repayment for the lease should not amount to more than 25% of the average normalharvest in the three years immediately preceding the date of leasehold after deducting the costs of seed, harvesting, processing and otherrelated activities . Over time, lessees would become owner cultivators. (Estrella 1969:17).

12The size of landholding was given as 2.8 ha in 1975 and this current size indicates the extent of fragmentation. Other figures

reported from different regions have varied from 1.5 ha to 0.5 hectare Though abolished under the Land Reform Act, there are somecases of share tenancy as well.

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IA ContractsPIM as implemented in the Philippines pioneered the strategy of contracts and incentives for

IAs. It was based on the premise that a gradual transfer of responsibilities to IAs, backed up by atraining program for them, would build their capacity to undertake complete responsibility forsystem operation and maintenance. However, in order for the contract mechanism to work

smoothly, there must be a third party arbiter and a set arbitration process to which both partiescan appeal. This, in the current case, is absent. When terms of contracts are changed, as in1987 when negotiated collection contracts were replaced by standardized ones, NIA was the partythat unilaterally enforced these terms through its memorandum circular of 1990. Granted thatNIA acted on behalf of the government of the Philippines which was implementing the IrrigationOperations Support Project I. However, the understandable perception of the farmers was that itwas a unfair change. Collection of ISF dropped with the implementation of standardized lowercollection incentives introduced in 1987, and uniformly adopted by 1990.

The explanation for the above debacle is linked to confusion in defining terms of thecontracts. Thus the "collection" (or Stage II) contracts written prior to 1987, were incorrectlynamed, because it was not a contract given to the IA to collect ISF. It was really a contractrecognizing the fact that IAs were progressively undertaking greater O&M responsibilities and

therefore were being compensated for it in the form of a greater share of ISF. This incentivewas generally ploughed back into system O&M, hitherto done by NIA and now by the IA.Identifying these contracts as collection and therefore making policy changes as if they werecollection contracts has proved to be a setback for the PIM program on its path towards systemturnover.13

Training

AssociationsIn the past IA training was focused on the leadership. As the IA by-laws stipulated annual

election of leaders, the impact of this training was limited due to rapid turnover of leadership.The training given to IAs is of the classroom variety. Training fatigue also set in when in order

to cut costs, two or three training sessions are held in a single day. Perhaps due to limitedresources and shortage of qualified personnel, not all IAs receive all types of training in the NIArepertory. This is particularly true of financial management training.

As described earlier, IAs that have gone beyond the initial water management activities andhave formed cooperatives have often succumbed to misappropriated funds. Lack ofaccountability and transparency of activities is a primary culprit here. However, lack of know-how in bookkeeping and money management may be other reasons for this outcome. Some IAswith contracts have reported spending income derived from contract work "on fiestas." Ifcapital build- up is the path to IA viability, then, providing relevant financial managementtraining becomes critical. Simplified financial management training was given to IA leaders insome schemes in preparation for joint management. This training included single entry bookkeeping, strategies and procedures for collecting ISF, preparation of annual budgets, internal

auditing methods, and preparation of simple financial reports (Bagadion, 1994,10). The lack ofadequate funding to carry out such training on a nation wide basis rather than lack of expertise isthe reason for the sporadic training given to IAs in this respect.

Irrigation Superintendents

13The reason for replacing the existing contracts was that the individually negotiated contracts were "too complicated." It was

also based on a policy emphasizing cost recovery through collection which due to the mis-labeled contract, overlooked the benefits ofcost recovery through IAs undertaking O&M. Furthermore, a closer examination of the terms of the collection and maintenancecontracts reveals other problems, for example, tasks that are really in the realm of system operations are under both types of contracts.IAs contracting under the post-1987 collection contracts were reluctant to takeover these responsibilities which they perceived should beunder the maintenance contract (O&M) while IAs contracting under the latter type of contract felt that they were not being compensatedfor operations activities.

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The Irrigation Superintendent as a civil engineer is called on to be a manager capable ofmotivating his staff and the IA to jointly bring the irrigation system to maximum productivity.Also, the implementation of the agricultural program for the system requires that he secure thecooperation of related agencies. Training programs to reorient the technical staff, currentlyimplemented on a pilot basis will need to be expanded and implemented systematically on anationwide basis.

Monitoring and Evaluation of NIA O&M StaffCurrent performance evaluation systems of NIA field staff do not sufficiently emphasize IA

development as a component for promotions or salary increases. Following a point system, awatermaster for example is given a maximum of 42 points for operations, 25 for maintenance,25 for ISF collection, and the remaining 8 for farmer organization and administration.

Building the capacity of IAs depends on the interest of individuals. This is particularly criticalsince PIM through contracts is implemented jointly by IA and NIA system staff in overlappingroles and responsibilities. Then, there must be sufficient incentive for NIA staff to train IAs totake over these shared roles, which would make the NIA role redundant.

Status of NIA as a Public CorporationThe status of NIA as a public corporation clearly gives it a number of mandates difficult to

fulfill simultaneously. First, it is one government agency, albeit a major one14 managing thediversified control of water, in this case by undertaking integrated irrigation development onbehalf of the state. Secondly, for this purpose, substantial government funds were invested, thegoals of which were to increase agricultural production, and in particular, to achieve self-sufficiency in rice. Thirdly, it was anticipated that this, in turn, would lead to rural developmentand the financial uplift of the farming population which would then enable the latter to complywith their obligations and responsibilities, such as in paying ISF and undertaking O&M ofsystems. The irrigators may be perceived as clients in some contexts, but, concern for theirwelfare overrides their status as dues paying customers , hence the change from the original

intention to recover all costs, to a policy of recovering from farmers only O&M costs.

Since ISF collections are insufficient to meet O&M expenses, NIA must rely on its otherincomes sources, such as management fees and equipment rental to cover part of its O&Mbudget. The shortage of government funds and the inability of NIA to access its resources in atimely manner tends to delay programs that encourage farmer participation, e.g., IA organizationprior to rehabilitation or construction (which is often carried out under government counterpartfunding). These problems also delay the payment of incentives and bonuses to IAs, underminingthe irrigators faith in the program.

Finally, the lack of funds to give a "golden handshake" to ditchtenders and watermasters meansthat NIA must keep such personnel on the payroll even when an IA is willing to take over moreresponsibilities in managing the irrigation system.

14

A plan to inaugurate a national water summit bringing together some 32 water agencies under the auspices of President Ramosand the appointment of a water czar to coordinate the activities of these agencies was reported (Mejia, personal communication) inOctober 1996.

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7 RecommendationsPIM in the Philippines in government-constructed national irrigation systems, is implemented

through IAs. The strategy for its implementation was transferred from the original design forcommunal irrigation systems which was based on multi-stranded pre-existing social patterns andsubsequently transposed into a model of formal organization for IAs. This strategy works best insituations where the social and hydrological units are coterminous; and where the social unit ishomogeneous, small in size (50 hectare systems work best and systems should perhaps be nomore than 200 hectares). Strong leadership and the ability to mobilize social groups toundertake construction, operation and maintenance, and conflict management are factors leadingto its success in communal systems.

In transferring this social design to the larger national systems, it was assumed that it wouldwork best in smaller units over a long period of nurturing. Thus, the IA selected by NIA as theOutstanding IA, 1996,15 has a total of 500 hectares of service area and 171 members. It iscomprised of one village and one ethnic group. This is not a typical profile of the IA in thenational systems. In many cases, the number of members and the command area would be in

reverse order and the social variables complicating manageability more numerous.

The strategy of PIM adopted in the Philippines for its national irrigation systems is at animpasse today because of this direct transfer of the communal PIM model without taking intoaccount the social, technical and managerial requirements of national systems. A new strategyfor organizing and developing IAs is needed. Such a strategy should take into account what isalready taking shape on the ground as response to the weaknesses in the current program.

From a Social Strategy to a Socially Based StrategyThis strategy is known locally within the irrigation systems as the "NIA-IA-LGU Tie-up." It

describes the informal liaison between the NIA and IA at the system level with the localgovernment unit, in this case the barangay, to resolve the problems arising from the voluntary

nature of IAs.

The barangay, also known as the barrio, is the traditional Filipino village. Typically settledby ethnically homogenous populations as well as groups of related kin, it is today the smallestlocal government unit in the Philippines. Under the Local Government Code, 1991, thefinancial as well as the power base have been strengthened. Twenty percent of taxes collected bythe Philippines Internal Revenue Department is returned to the barangay. The barangay hasalso benefitted from the Countrywide Development Fund allocated to congressmen and senatorsas well as the program known as "clean and green" inaugurated by Madame Ramos, the wife ofthe Philippine President.

An irrig