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 Criminal Law Web R. v. Tolson [1886-1890] All ER Rep 26; [1886-90] All ER Rep 26 11 May 1889  HEADNOTE: It is a principle of the criminal law that, ordinarily speaking, a crime is not committed if the mind of the person doing the allegedly criminal act is innocent. Generally, proof of mens rea is a necessary ingredient of an offence. The guilty intent is not necessarily that of intending the very act or thing done and prohibited by common or statute law, but it must at least be the intention to do something wrong. A statute may, however, be so framed as to make an act criminal whether there has been an intention to break the law or otherwise do wrong or not. Whether an Act is to be construed in this sense or with the qualification ordinarily imported into the construction of criminal statutes, namely, that there must be a guilty mind, must depend on the subject-matter of the Act and the circumstances of the case which may make the one construction or the other reasonable or unreasonable. It is within the competence of the legislature to enact that a man shall be branded as a felon and punished for doing an act which he honestly and reasonably believes to be lawful and right, but such a result seems so revolting to the moral sense that the clearest evidence is required that such is the meaning of the Act. At common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances which, if true, would make an act for which a person is indicted an innocent act, or proof that such a person had made an honest and reasonable mistake, has always been held to be a good defence to a charge involving the existence of mane rea, and the principle applies equally in the case of statutory offences unless it is excluded expressly or by necessary implication.  A bona fide belief, held on reasonable grounds, in the death of one party to a marriage is a defense to a charge of bigamy against the other party who has married again, whether or not the second marriage has taken place within the seven years prescribed by the proviso to s 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861. That proviso is intended absolutely to exempt f rom the operation of the section (which provides that "whosoever, being married, shall marry any other person during the life of the former husband or wife ...shall be guilty of felony") any person who does not have any actual knowledge of his or her former wife or husband being alive within seven years before the second marriage, and not to deprive a person who is indicted for bigamy of any defense which would have been open to him or her if the proviso had never been introduced at all. Case Stated by STEPHEN J,upon the trial of an indictment for bigamy, under s 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861.

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    CriminalLawWeb

    R.v.Tolson[18861890]AllERRep26[188690]AllERRep26

    11May1889

    HEADNOTE:

    Itisaprincipleofthecriminallawthat,ordinarilyspeaking,acrimeisnotcommittedifthemindofthepersondoingtheallegedlycriminalactisinnocent.Generally,proofofmensreaisanecessaryingredientofanoffence.Theguiltyintentisnotnecessarilythatofintendingtheveryactorthingdoneandprohibitedbycommonorstatutelaw,butitmustatleastbetheintentiontodosomethingwrong.Astatutemay,however,besoframedastomakeanactcriminalwhethertherehasbeenanintentiontobreakthelaworotherwisedowrongornot.WhetheranActistobeconstruedinthissenseorwiththequalificationordinarilyimportedintotheconstructionofcriminalstatutes,namely,thattheremustbeaguiltymind,mustdependonthesubjectmatteroftheActandthecircumstancesofthecasewhichmaymaketheoneconstructionortheotherreasonableorunreasonable.Itiswithinthecompetenceofthelegislaturetoenactthatamanshallbebrandedasafelonandpunishedfordoinganactwhichhehonestlyandreasonablybelievestobelawfulandright,butsucharesultseemssorevoltingtothemoralsensethattheclearestevidenceisrequiredthatsuchisthemeaningoftheAct.Atcommonlawanhonestandreasonablebeliefintheexistenceofcircumstanceswhich,iftrue,wouldmakeanactforwhichapersonisindictedaninnocentact,orproofthatsuchapersonhadmadeanhonestandreasonablemistake,hasalwaysbeenheldtobeagooddefencetoachargeinvolvingtheexistenceofmanerea,andtheprincipleappliesequallyinthecaseofstatutoryoffencesunlessitisexcludedexpresslyorbynecessaryimplication.

    Abonafidebelief,heldonreasonablegrounds,inthedeathofonepartytoamarriageisadefensetoachargeofbigamyagainsttheotherpartywhohasmarriedagain,whetherornotthesecondmarriagehastakenplacewithinthesevenyearsprescribedbytheprovisotos57oftheOffencesAgainstthePersonAct,1861.Thatprovisoisintendedabsolutelytoexemptfromtheoperationofthesection(whichprovidesthat"whosoever,beingmarried,shallmarryanyotherpersonduringthelifeoftheformerhusbandorwife...shallbeguiltyoffelony")anypersonwhodoesnothaveanyactualknowledgeofhisorherformerwifeorhusbandbeingalivewithinsevenyearsbeforethesecondmarriage,andnottodepriveapersonwhoisindictedforbigamyofanydefensewhichwouldhavebeenopentohimorheriftheprovisohadneverbeenintroducedatall.

    CaseStatedbySTEPHENJ,uponthetrialofanindictmentforbigamy,unders57oftheOffencesAgainstthePersonAct,1861.

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    On6July1888,attheassizesatCarlisle,MarthaAnnTolsonwasconvictedbeforethelearnedjudgeofbigamy.On11September1880,theaccusedwasmarriedtooneTolson.On13Dec1881,hedesertedher.Sheandherfathermadeinquiriesabouthim,andlearnedfromhiselderbrother,andfromgeneralreport,thathehadbeenlostonavesselboundforAmerica,whichwentdownwithallhandsonboard.On10Jan1887,theaccused,supposingherselftobeawidow,wentthroughtheceremonyofmarriagewithanotherman.Thecircumstanceswerewellknowntothesecondhusband,andtheceremonywasinnowayconcealed.InDecember1887,TolsonreturnedfromAmerica.STEPHENJdirectedthejurythatabeliefingoodfaithandonreasonablegroundsthatbarhusbandwasdeadwouldnotbeadefencetoachargeofbigamy.Hestatedthat,insoholding,hisobjectwas,ifpossible,toobtainthedecisionoftheCourtforCrownCasesReservedonthepoint,astherewereconflictingnisipriusdecisions.Thejuryconvictedtheprisoner,stating,however,inanswertoquestionsbythejudge,thattheythoughtthatsheingoodfaith,andonreasonablegrounds,believedherhusbandtobedeadatthetimeofhersecondmarriage.Thejudgesentencedhertooneday'simprisonment.Thequestionforthecourtwaswhetherthedirectionofthelearnedjudgewasright.

    Bys57oftheOffencesAgainstthePersonAct,1861:

    "Whosoever,beingmarried,shallmarryanyotherpersonduringthelifeoftheformerhusbandorwife...shallbeguiltyoffelony....Providedthatnothinginthissectioncontainedshallextendtoany...personmarryingasecondtimewhosehusbandorwifeshallhavebeencontinuallyabsentfromsuchpersonfortheapaceofsevenyearsthenlastpast,andshallnothavebeenknownbysuchpersontobelivingwithinthattime...

    STEPHENJ:

    Forthepurposeofsettlingaquestionwhichhadbeendebatedforaconsiderabletime,andonwhichIthoughtthedecisionswereconflicting,andnotastheexpressionofmyownopinion,Idirectedthejuryatthetrialoftheaccusedwomanthatabeliefingoodfaithandonreasonablegroundsinthedeathofonepartytoamarriagewasnotadefencetothechargeofbigamyagainsttheotherwhomarriedagainwithinthesevenyears.Ipassedanominalsentenceontheaccused,andIstated,forthedecisionofthiscourt,acasewhichreservedthequestionwhethermydecisionwasrightorwrong.Iamofopinionthattheconvictionshouldbequashed,asthedirectionIgavewaswrong,andthatIoughttohavetoldthejurythatthedefenceraisedfortheprisonerwasvalid.

    Myviewofthesubjectisbaseduponaparticularapplicationofthedoctrineusually,thoughIthinknothappily,describedbythephrasenonestreus,nisimanesitrea.Thoughthisphraseisincommonuse,Ithinkitmostunfortunate,andnotonlylikelytomislead,butactuallymisleading,onthefollowinggrounds.Itnaturallysuggeststhat,apartfromallparticulardefinitionsofcrimes,suchathingexistsasamane

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    rea,or"guiltymind,"whichisalwaysexpresslyorbyimplicationinvolvedineverydefinition.Thisisobviouslynotthecase,forthementalelementsofdifferentcrimesdifferwidely.Mensranmeansinthecaseofmurder,maliceaforethoughtinthecaseoftheft,anintentiontosteelinthecaseofrape,anintentiontohaveforcibleconnectionwithawoman,withoutherconsentandinthecaseofreceivingstolengoods,knowledgethatthegoodswerestolen.Insomecasesitdenotesmereinattention.Forinstance,inthecaseofmanslaughterbynegligenceitmaymeanforgettingtonoticeasignal.Itappearsconfusingtocallsomanydissimilarstatesofmindbyonename.Itseemscontradictoryindeedtodescribeamereabsenceofmindasamensreaorguiltymind.Theexpressionagainislikelytoandoftendoesmislead.ToanunlegalminditsuggeststhatbythelawofEnglandnoactisacrimewhichisdonefromlaudablemotives,inotherwords,thatimmoralityisessentialtocrime.Itwill,Ithink,befoundthatmuchofthediscussionofthelawoflibelinRvShipley(19)proceedsuponamoreorlessdistinctbelieftothiseffect.Itisatopicfrequentlyinsisteduponinreferencetopoliticaloffences,anditwasurgedinarecentnotoriouscaseofabduction,inwhichitwascontendedthatmotivessaidtobelaudablewereanexcusefortheabductionofachildfromitsparents.

    LikemostlegalLatinmaxims,themaximonmensreaappearstometobetooshortandantitheticaltobeofmuchpracticalvalue.Itis,indeed,morelikethetitleofatreatisethanapracticalrule.Ihavetriedtoascertainitsorigin,buthavenotsucceededindoingso.ItisnotoneoftheregulaejurisintheDIGEST.TheearliestcaseofitsusewhichIhavefoundisintheLEGESHENRICIPRIMI,Vs28,inwhichitissaid:

    "Siquispercoaccionemabjurarecogaturquodpermultosannosquietetenueritnoninjurantesetcogenteperjuriumerit.Reumnonfacitnisimensrea."

    InBROOM'SMAXIMStheearliestauthoritycitedforitsuseistheTHIRDINSTITUTE,chi,fo10.Inthisplaceitiscontainedinthemarginalnote,whichsaysthatwhenitwasfoundthatsomeofSirJohnOlcastle'sadherentstookpartinaninsurrection"protimoremortisetquodrecesseruntquamcitopotuerunt"thejudgesheldthatthiswastobeadjudgednotreasonbecauseitwasforfearofdeath.COKEadds:"Etactusnonfacitreum,nisimenssitrea."ThisisonlyCOKE'Sownremark,andnotpartofthejudgment.COKE'SscrapsofLatininthis,andthefollowingchaptersaresometimescontradictory.Notwithstandingthepassagejustquoted,hesaysinthemarginofhisremarksonopinionsdeliveredinparliamentbyTHYRING,andothersinthe21stR2:"Meliusestomniamalapatriquammaloconsentire"(223)whichwouldshowthatSirJohnOldcastle'sassociateshadamensrea,orguiltymind,thoughtheywerethreatenedwithdeath,andthuscontradictsthepassagefirstquoted.Itissingularthatineachoftheseinstancesthemaximshouldbeusedinconnectionwiththelawrelatingtocoercion.

    Theprincipleinvolvedappearstome,whenfullyconsidered,toamounttonomorethanthis.Thefulldefinitionofeverycrimecontainsexpresslyorbyimplicationapropositionastoastateofmind.Therefore,ifthementalelementofanyconductallegedtobeacrimeisprovedtohave

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    beenabsentinanygivencase,thecrimesodefinedisnotcommittedor,again,ifacrimeisfullydefined,nothingamountstothatcrimewhichdoesnotsatisfythatdefinition.Crimesareinthepresentdaymuchmoreaccuratelydefinedbystatuteorotherwisethantheyformerlywere.Thementalelementofmostcrimesismarkedbyoneofthewords"maliciously","fraudulently","negligently",or"knowingly"butitisthegeneralImight,Ithink,saytheinvariablepracticeofthelegislaturetoleaveunexpressedsomeofthementalelementsofcrime.Inallcaseswhatever,competentage,sanity,andsomedegreeoffreedomfromsomekindsofcoercionareassumedtobeessentialtocriminality,butIdonotbelievetheyareeverintroducedintoanystatutebywhichanyparticularcrimeisdefined.Themeaningofthewords"malice","negligence",and"fraud"inrelationtoparticularcrimeshasbeenascertainedbynumerouscases.MalicemeansonethinginrelationtomurderanotherinrelationtotheMaliciousMischiefAct[?MaliciousDamageAct1861],andathirdinrelationtolibel,andsooffraudandnegligence.

    Withregardtoknowledgeoffact,thelaw,perhaps,isnotquitesoclear,butitmay,Ithink,bemaintainedthatineverycaseknowledgeoffactsistosomeextentanelementofcriminalityasmuchascompetentageandsanity.Tomakeanextremeillustration,cananyonedoubtthatamanwho,thoughhemightbeperfectlysane,committedwhatwouldotherwisebeacrimeinastateofsomnambulism,wouldbeentitledtobeacquitted?Andwhyisthis?Simplybecausehewouldnotknowwhathewasdoing.Amultitudeofillustrationsofthesamesortmightbegiven.Iwillmentiononeortwoglaringones.Levett'sCase(20)decidesthatamanwhomakingathrustwithaswordataplacewhere,uponreasonablegrounds,hesupposesaburglartobe,killedapersonwhowasnotaburglarwasheldnottobeafelonthoughhemightbe(itwasnotdecidedthathewas)guiltyofkillingperinfortunium,orpossibly,sedefendendo,whichtheninvolvedcertainforfeiture.Inotherwords,hewasinthesamesituationasfarasregardedthehomicideasifhehadkilledaburglar.InthedecisionofthejudgesinM'Naghten'sCase(21)itisstatedthatifunderaninsanedelusiononemankillsanotherandifthedelusionwassuchthatitwould,iftrue,justifyorexcusethekilling,thehomicidewouldbejustifiedorexcused.Thiscouldhardlybeifthesamewerenotlawastoasamemistake.Abonafideclaimofrightexcuseslarceny,andmanyoftheoffencesagainsttheMaliciousMischiefAct[?MaliciousDamageAct,1861].Apart,indeedfromthepresentcase,Ithinkitmaybelaiddownasageneralrulethatanallegedoffenderisdeemedtohaveactedunderthatstateoffactswhichheingoodfaithandonreasonablegroundsbelievedtoexistwhenhedidtheactallegedtobeanoffence.Iamunabletosuggestanyrealexceptiontothisrule,norhasoneeverbeensuggestedtome.

    Averylearnedpersonsuggestedtomethefollowingcase.Aconstable,reasonablybelievingamantohavecommittedmurder,isjustifiedinkillinghimtopreventhisescape,butifhehadnotbeenaconstablehewouldnothavebeensojustified,butwouldhavebeenguiltyofmanslaughter[see10HALSBURY'SLAWS(3rdEdn)709].Thisisquitetrue,butthemistakeinthesecondcasewouldbenotonlyamistakeoffact,butamistakeoflawonthepartofthehomicideinsupposingthathe,aprivateperson,wasjustifiedinusingasmuchviolenceasapublic

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    officer,whosedutyistoarrest,ifpossible,apersonreasonablysuspectedofmurder.Thesupposedhomicidewouldbeinthesamepositionasifhismistakeoffacthadbeentruethatis,hewouldbeguilty,notofmurder,butofmanslaughter.Ithink,therefore,thatthepresentcasefallsunderthegeneralruleastomistakesoffact,andthattheconvictionoughttobequashed.

    Iwillnowproceedtodealwiththeargumentswhicharesupposedtoleadtotheoppositeresult.Itissaid,first,thatthewordsoftheOffencesAgainstthePersonAct,1861,s57,areabsolute,andthattheexceptionswhichthatsectioncontainsaretheonlyoneswhichareintendedtobeadmitted,andthisitissaidisconfirmedbytheexpressprovisointhesectionanindicationwhichisthoughttonegativeanytacitexception.ItisalsosupposedthatRvPrince(15)decidedons55,confirmsthisview.IwillbeginbysayinghowfarIagreewiththeseviews.First,Iagreethatthecaseturnsexclusivelyupontheconstructionofs57oftheActof1861.Muchwassaidtousinargumentontheoldstatute,theBigamyAct1603.Icannotseewhatthishastodowiththematter.Ofcourse,itwouldbecompetenttothelegislaturetodefineacrimeinsuchawayastomaketheexistenceofmystateofmindimmaterial.Thequestionissolelywhetherithasactuallydonesointhiscase.InthefirstplaceIwillobserveupontheabsolutecharacterofthesection.ItappearstometoresemblemostoftheenactmentscontainedintheconsolidationActsof1861,inpassingoverthegeneralmentalelementsofcrimewhicharepresupposedineverycase.Age,sanity,andmoreorlessfreedomfromcompulsion,arealwayspresumed,andIthinkitwouldbeimpossibletoquotemystatutewhichinanycasespecifiestheseelementsofcriminalityinthedefinitionofanycrime.Itwillbefoundthateitherbyusingthewordswilfullyandmaliciously,orbyspecifyingsomespecialintentasanelementofparticularcrimes,knowledgeoffactisimplicitlymadepartofthestatutorydefinitionofmostmoderndefinitionsofcrimes,buttherearesomecasesinwhichthiscannotbesaid.Suchares55,onwhichRvPrince(15)wasdecided,s56,whichpunishesthestealingof"anychildundertheageoffourteenyears",s49,astoprocuringthedefilementofany"womanorgirlundertheageoftwentyone",ineachofwhichthesamequestionmightariseasinRvPrince(15).TotheseImayaddsomeoftheprovisionsoftheCriminalLawAmendmentAct1885[repealedbySexualOffencesAct1956].Reasonablebeliefthatagirlissixteenorupwardsisadefencetothechargeofanoffenceunderss5,6,and7,butthisisnotprovidedforastoanoffenceagainsts4,whichismeanttoprotectgirlsunderthirteen.

    ItseemstomethatastotheconstructionofallthesesectionsRvPrince(15)isadirectauthority.Itwasthecaseofamanwhoabductedagirlundersixteen,believing,ongoodgrounds,thatshewasabovethatage.BRETTJwasagainsttheconviction.Hisjudgmentestablishesatmuchlength,and,asitappearstome,unanswerably,theprincipleaboveexplained,whichhestatesasfollows(LR2CCRatp170):

    "Thatamistakeoffootsonreasonablegrounds,totheextentthat,ifthefactswereasbelieved,theactsoftheprisonerwouldmakehimguiltyofnooffenceatall,isanexcuse,andthatsuchanexcuseisimpliedineverycriminalchargeand

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    everycriminalenactmentinEngland."

    LORDBLACKBURN,withwhomnineotherjudgesagreed,andLORDBRAMWELL,withwhomsevenothersagreed,donotappeartometohavedissentedfromthisprinciple,speakinggenerallybuttheyheldthatitdidnotapplyfullytoeachpartofeverysectiontowhichIhavereferred.Someoftheprohibitedactstheythoughtthelegislatureintendedtobedoneattheperilofthepersonwhodidthem,butnotAll.ThejudgmentdeliveredbyLORDBLACKBURNproceedsupontheprinciplethattheintentionofthelegislatureins55was"topunishtheabductionunlessthegirlwasofsuchanageastomakeherconsentanexcuse".LORDBRAMWELL'Sjudgmentproceedsuponthisprinciple(ibidatp175):

    "Thelegislaturehasenactedthatifanyonedoesthiswrongact,bedoesitattheriskofherturningouttobeundersixteen.Thisopiniongivesfullscopetothedoctrineofmensrea.Ifthetakerbelievedhehadherfather'sconsent,thoughwrongly,hewouldhavenomensreasoifhedidnotknowshewasinanyone'spossessionnorinthecareorchargeofanyone.Inthosecaseshewouldnotknowhewasdoingtheactforbiddenbythestatute."

    Allthejudges,therefore,inRvPrince(15)agreedonthegeneralprinciple,thoughtheyall,exceptBRETTJ,consideredthat,theobjectofthelegislaturebeingtopreventascandalousandwickedinvasionofparentalrights(whetheritwastoberegardedasillegalapartfromthestatuteornot)itwastobesupposedthattheyintendedthatthewrongdoershouldactathisperil.

    Asanotherillustrationofthesameprinciple,ImayrefertoRvBishop(6).Thedefendantinthatcasewastriedbeforemeforreceivingmorethantwolunaticsintoahousenotdulylicensed,uponanindictmentonthe[repealedLunacyAct1845,s44.Itwasprovedthatthedefendantdidreceivemorethantwopersons,whomthejuryfoundtobelunatics,intoherhouse,believinghonestly,andonreasonablegrounds,thattheywerenotlunatics.Iheldthatthiswasimmaterial,havingregardtothescopeoftheAct,andtheobjectforwhichitwasapparentlypassed,andthiscourtupheldthatruling.Theapplicationofthistothepresentcaseappearstometobeasfollows.Thegeneralprincipleisclearlyinfavouroftheprisoner,buthowdoestheintentionofthelegislatureappeartohavebeenagainsther?ItcouldnotbetheobjectofParliamenttotreatthemarriageofwidowsasanacttobe,ifpossible,preventedaspresumablyimmoral.Theconductofthewomanconvictedwasnotinthesmallestdegreeimmoral,itwasperfectlynaturalandlegitimate.Assumingthefacttobeasshesupposed,theinflictionofmorethananominalpunishmentonherwouldhavebeenascandal.Why,then,shouldthelegislaturebeheldtohavewishedtosubjecthertopunishmentatall?Ifsuchapunishmentislegal,thefollowingamongmanyothercasesmightoccur:Anumberofmeninaminearekilled,andtheirbodiesaredisfiguredandmutilated,byanexplosiononeofthesurvivorssecretlyabsconds,anditissupposedthatoneofthedisfiguredbodiesishis.Hiswifeseeshissupposedremainsburiedshemarriesagain.Icannotbelievethatitcanhavebeentheintentionofthe

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    legislaturetomakesuchawomanacriminalthecontractingofaninvalidmarriageisquitemisfortuneenough.Itappearstomethateveryargumentwhichshowed,intheopinionofthejudgesinRvPrince(15)thatthelegislaturemeantseducersandabductorstoactattheirperil,showsthatthelegislaturedidnotmeantohamperwhatisnotonlyintended,butnaturallyandreasonablysupposedbytheparties,tobeavalidandhonourablemarriage,withaliabilitytosevenyears'penalservitude.

    Itisarguedthattheproviso,thataremarriageaftersevenyears'separationshallnotbepunishable,operatesasatacitexclusionofallotherexceptionstothepenalpartofthesection.Itappearstomethatitonlysuppliesaruleofevidencewhichisusefulinmanycases,intheabsenceofexplicitproofofdeath.Butitseemstometoshow,notthatbeliefinthedeathofonemarriedpersonexcusesthemarriageoftheotheronlyaftersevenyears'separation,butthatmereseparationforthatperiodhastheeffectwhichreasonablebeliefofdeath,causedbyotherevidence,wouldhaveatanytime.Itwould,tomymind,bemonstroustosaythatsevenyears'separationshouldhaveagreatereffectinexcusingabigamousmarriagethanpositiveevidenceofdeath,sufficientforthepurposeofrecoveringonapolicyofassuranceorobtainingprobateofawill,wouldhave,asinthecaseIhaveput,orinotherswhichmightbeevenstronger.Itremainsonlytoconsidercasesuponthispointdecidedbysinglejudges.AsfarasIknowtherearereportedthefollowingcases:RvTurner(12)(1862).InthiscaseMARTINBisreportedtohavesaid(9CoxCCatp145):

    "Inthiscasesevenyearshadnotelapsed,andbeyondtheprisoner'sownstatementtherewasthemerebeliefofonewitness.Stillthejuryaretosayifuponsuchtestimonyshehadanhonestbeliefthatherfirsthusbandwasdead."

    InRvHorton(13)(1871)CLEASBYBdirectedthejurythatiftheprisonerreasonablybelievedhiswifetobedeadhewasentitledtobeacquitted.Hewasconvicted.InRvGibbons(14)(1872)BRETTJafterconsultingWILLESJsaid(12CoxCCatp238):"Bonafidebeliefastothehusband'sdeathwasnodefenceunlessthesevenyearshadelapsed",andherefusedtostateacase,adecisionwhichIcannotreconcilewithhisjudgmentthreeyearsafterwardsinRvPrince(15).InRvMoore(17)(1877)DENMANLJafterconsultingAMPHLETTLJheldthatabonafideandreasonablebeliefinahusband'sdeathexcusedawomanchargedwithbigamy.InRvBennett(16)(1877)LORDBRAMWELL,agreedwiththedecisioninRvGibbons(14).TheresultisthatthedecisionsinRvGibbons(14)andRvBennett(16)conflictwiththoseofRvTurner(12)RvHorton(13)andRvMoore(17).Ithink,therefore,thatthesefivedecisionsthrowlittlelightonthesubject.TheconflictbetweenthemwasinfactthereasonwhyIreservedthecase.GRANTHAM,J,authorisesmetosaythatheconcursinthisjudgment....

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