The CivilSocietyAssembly: shaping agreement

Enrique Alvarez

T he Oslo consultations in 1990 created momentumfor direct peace negotiations between thegovernment and Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional

Guatemalteca (URNG). The process was put on hold,however, during the run-up to the presidential electionsat the end of the year. Jorge Serrano – a centre-right, pro-negotiation candidate and a member of the Commissionof National Reconciliation (CNR) – won the elections. Heremoved key hard-line figures in the military highcommand and soon organized direct negotiations.Bishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruño continued as mediator,accompanied by a UN observer.

In April 1991, President Serrano issued his ‘Initiative forTotal Peace’ in advance of the first new round of talks inMexico, which gained the support of the conservativesectors of civil society. After three days of talks, the URNGand government agreed to the Mexico Accord thatspecified an 11-point negotiating agenda incorporatingmany of the recommendations of the Oslo consultations,including the idea of addressing both substantive andoperative themes. Although influenced by these earliercivil society inputs, these negotiations did not involve civilsociety representatives – a pattern that continuedthroughout the Serrano period. In July, a second round oftalks was held in Queretaro, Mexico where they agreedon the principle of democratization as the means to reachpeace through political means. Later that year, however,negotiations on human rights stalled as the governmentand URNG hardened their positions and no agreementwas reached during the next three rounds of talks. By late1991, popular organizations were protesting theirexclusion from the talks but their demands were largelyignored. Human rights violations increased and protestsmet with an increasingly authoritarian response.Nevertheless, new organized sectors – includingwomen’s, indigenous and community based groups –began to articulate perspectives that were oftenideologically independent of the left.

In mid-1992, the URNG issued a new peace programmemodifying its positions but the government mostlyrejected it. By the end of the year, however, someprogress has been made on freezing the development ofCivilian Defence Patrols and on the terms of return forrefugees from Mexico. In early 1993, both the URNG andPresident Serrano announced new peace plans that weremutually rejected and Bishop Quezada declared thenegotiations at an impasse.

‘Serranazo’: civil society takes a standIn early May 1993, the leader of the governmentnegotiating team broke off peace talks. Several weekslater Serrano suspended the constitution and attemptedto dismiss the legislature and judiciary – an attemptedcoup known as the Serranazo. Although supported bythe military high command, his moves met with stiff

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opposition in Guatemala and internationally. Congressand the Constitutional Court declared his moves illegal;international donors suspended aid and applieddiplomatic pressure. Civil society organizations fromacross the political spectrum quickly mobilized a broadmulti-sectoral forum, the Instancia Nacional de Consenso(INC) – or National Consensus Forum – to oppose thecoup. In early June, the popular organizations called ageneral strike and the INC presented a list of prospectivepresidential candidates. Serrano fled after senior militarycommanders withdrew their support. In June, theCongress elected the popular organizations’ nominee,Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio, asinterim president.

Over the next six months, President de León initiated aprocess of constitutional reform. Yet when pressured bypolitical and private sector elites and the military, hegradually excluded popular organizations from talks onconstitutional issues and toned down his initially radicalproposals. He made few efforts to renew peacenegotiations – claiming that they were not a priority forhis government, despite his previous involvement. In July,he issued a new peace programme that dismantled theCNR, suspended Bishop Quezada as conciliator (who hadlong been seen by the military as too ‘pro-URNG’), andinstalled a new governmental peace commission(COPAZ). He planned to separate the substantive from theoperative themes in the negotiations. Civil society wouldbe responsible for addressing the substantive issues in anew Permanent Peace Forum, whereas the URNG and thegovernment would negotiate a settlement on theoperative issues related to the conduct of the war. Thiswould mean that the URNG would effectively becomeone amongst multiple political forces and would notnegotiate issues related to social or state reform with thegovernment. These proposals were rejected by the URNGand the impasse continued.

Throughout this period, popular organizations becameincreasingly vocal in demanding participation in thepeace process. Grassroots popular and indigenousorganizations viewed the peace process as an arena fordiscussing issues unaddressed in the formal politicalarena. During the Serranazo, these popular forcesmobilized to play a role in mainstream national politics forthe first time in decades. Through the INC, they hadparticipated alongside established groupings such as theCACIF in demanding democracy and they were nowunwilling to be sidelined in future peace talks.

Framework AccordBy late 1993, with considerable pressure from theinternational community and UN involvement, thegovernment and URNG were preparing to resume formalnegotiations. Communication had been eased throughseveral unofficial ‘ecumenical encounters’ sponsored by

an alliance of international church bodies including theLutheran World Federation. They convened civil societyrepresentatives, the government and the military inforeign cities to engage in informal dialogue and help tore-establish communication.

In early January 1994, the government and URNG met inMexico City for UN-moderated talks and concluded theFramework Accord for the Resumption of Negotiations. Theyreaffirmed the 11-point negotiating agenda in the 1991Mexico Accord and agreed to a structure and procedurefor UN-mediated negotiations. It established a formal rolefor the ‘Group of Friends’ – comprising the governmentsof Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States,and Venezuela – to assist the UN and witness theagreements. They agreed the talks would be private andonly the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (in the person of Jean Arnault), who would issuepublic information. They envisioned a process lasting ayear, marking the expectation of an acceleratednegotiating process.

The Accord noted the specific contribution of the sectorsparticipating in the Oslo consultations and the generalrole of society in achieving peace and reconciliation. Itcalled for an assembly “open to the participation of non-governmental sectors of Guatemala society, providedthat their legitimacy, representative character andlawfulness have been recognised.” This Civil SocietyAssembly (ASC) was mandated to discuss the substantiveissues addressed in the bilateral negotiations and toformulate consensus positions on the six of the sevenmain topics from the Mexico Accord: (1) strengtheningcivil society and the function of the army in a democraticsociety; (2) the identity and rights of indigenous people;(3) constitutional reform and the electoral regime; (4) theresettlement of those displaced by the conflict; (5) socio-economic conditions; and (6) the agrarian situation. Thelast two topics were eventually merged into one. Theagreement specified that any ASC recommendations orguidelines on these issues would be considered by thenegotiators but were non-binding on them. The ASCwould, in turn, review the final agreements signed by theparties on substantive issues and could endorse them “soas to give them the force of national commitments,thereby facilitating their implementation”, but the ASCdid not have the power to veto those it did not endorse.

The Framework Accord proposed Bishop Quezada as theASC president, who would be assisted by an ‘OrganizingCommittee’ consisting of representatives of each of thesectors that participated in the Oslo consultations and“representatives of the Maya people.” The ASC’s workwould be synchronized to discuss the substantive issueswith the timetable for the bilateral negotiations so that itwould not delay the negotiating process. Although theofficial negotiations were to be held in secret, it wasunderstood that Jean Arnault would work with Bishop

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Quezada to exchange information necessary tocoordinate the work of the ASC with the negotiations.

The ASC’s mandate seemed to indicate that the CSC andCOCIPAZ – the coordinating councils that had beenformed by the sectors in the Oslo consultations inMetepec and Atlixco respectively – had been successfulin convincing the government to create a mechanism forcivil society involvement in the process. The governmenthad been reluctant previously to formalize any role forthe public in negotiations, presumably perceiving it as aURNG manoeuvre to strengthen its position by includingsectors with similar points of view. There is little reason tobelieve that the UN or any other external actor advocateda formal role for civil society. Many ASC participantsbelieved that the government accepted the ASC becauseit assumed that the diverse sectors would not be able toreach agreement on common positions and thus wouldbe ineffective. Furthermore, if it ignored theseorganizations altogether, the legitimacy of thenegotiations might have been weakened. However theASC’s mandate meant that civil society would not have aformal place at the negotiating table; they would have avoice, but not a decision-making vote. As Quezada laterobserved, the ASC could have been seen as a ‘consolationprize’ for being excluded from direct participation in thenegotiations. The challenge was therefore to make itsinfluence as effective as possible.

The Civil Society Assembly (ASC) in actionThe ASC’s minimal budget was funded primarily bymembers of the Group of Friends, particularly Norway.Earlier, they funded the newly created ‘Fundación CasaReconciliación’, which financed the CNR and built ameeting house. The ASC used this infrastructure and hada budget for a small administrative staff, for refreshments,and for publishing ASC proposals. Each of theparticipating sectors sought their own funding toparticipate, some of them receiving both financial andtechnical support from international donors and partners.

The Framework Accord provided only vague outlines forthe structure of the ASC. In the following months,Quezada and the Organizing Committee began to shapeit and devise a methodology to involve the large numberof organizations wishing to participate. They decided tostructure the ASC through sectoral groupings. TheAccord specified the inclusion of at least six sectors: thefive from the Oslo consultations (political parties, religiousgroups, trade unions and popular organizations, theCACIF and the Atlixco grouping) as well as Mayanorganizations. After some debate, however, they alsodecided to invite five more sectors: women’sorganizations, other non-governmental developmentorganizations, research centres, human rights groups,and media organizations.

At this point, the economically and politically powerfulbusiness elite’s CACIF withdrew from the ASC, claimingthat it comprised illegal and unrepresentative façadeorganizations. CACIF later sought to influence thegovernment team directly and may have weakened theeffectiveness of the ASC on socio-economic and agrarianreform issues. Nevertheless the ASC also includedparticipants from far-right political groupings – includingthe Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), the politicalparty led by former president General Ríos Montt. Yet itwas the involvement of indigenous’ and women’s sectorsthat was particularly monumental in the dynamics ofGuatemalan society and politics.

Each sector had its own organizational structure forinternal discussion to define priorities and formulateproposals, as well as enable members to discuss andapprove the outcomes of ASC plenary sessions. Eachsector chose ten delegates to represent them in the ASC.Each sector elected their delegates according to thesector’s own statutes and financial resources. Mostworked behind closed doors, with the exception of theindigenous organizations that convoked ‘GreatAssemblies’ convening representatives from throughoutthe country. The popular and trade union sector hadprobably the greatest challenge in reaching internalconsensus – with the URNG’s political influence on somemember organizations affecting the internal dynamic.

Mayan leaders initially demanded direct representation atthe negotiation table on the topic of indigenous rights.They objected to a process whereby approximately 60per cent of the population would be characterized as a‘sector’ of civil society. The indigenous sector formed theCoordination of Organizations of Mayan People ofGuatemala (COPMAGUA) comprising over 200 differentgroups, including the four most representativecoordinating groups – although there were no delegatesfrom the Garífuna or Xinca peoples. It created a spacewhere they could develop a common platform, despitetheir political and ideological differences and thevariations in the ways they had suffered during theconflict. Throughout the process, COPMAGUAmaintained a unified voice in the debates, despite anylingering internal disputes. They encountered difficultiesdue to the historical prejudices of a deeply racist societyimplicit in the ASC debates. Differences in underlyingcultural assumptions – particularly regarding values andperceptions of time – challenged discussions intended todevelop solutions to problems. A significant politicalprejudice stemmed from the belief that the indigenouspeople would take ‘revenge’ once they gained power andspace. Yet it was the first time in the country’s history thatracism, marginality and exclusion were discussed in sucha heterogeneous forum. As a consequence, drafting thedocument on ‘Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples’was the most complex topic on the ASC’s agenda.

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Women had played important roles in the re -development of civic movements in previous years buttheir participation was concentrated in human rightsorganizations. The invitation to the women’s sectormeant that women’s organizations with different politicaland ideological views were able to explicitly discussgender issues for the first time in Guatemala’s socio-political history. The sector was initially isolated within theASC, with many of the largely male-dominatedorganizations from other sectors treating them withdisdain. Yet within the year their policy documentsbecame key discussion points and they were seen as aforce for tolerance. The priority of the women’s sector waspromoting equality and improving the status of womenin the framework of political solutions to the conflict.Although gender issues were not on the negotiatingagenda as such, they were able to introduce provisions inthe accords that addressed or were sensitive to genderissues. In addition, women participated as delegates inmost of the other sectors. Although most had noexperience in formal activism on gender issues, theirinvolvement generated spaces for discussion and helpedto ensure that proposals articulated by the women’ssector were given serious consideration.

Another factor that contributed to the work of the ASCwas that the security situation had improved after theComprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in March1994 created the United Nations Mission for theVerification of Human Rights (MINUGUA). Their presencegave important support to social organizations, whosemembers felt less vulnerable than they did during theGrand National Dialogue. It also enabled a leftist partyclearly related to insurgent groups to contest theNovember 1995 general elections.

Reaching agreementsThe ASC was formed in April 1994 and formallyinaugurated the next month. Throughout April thesectors prepared themselves and the operatingprocedures were finalized. In addition to the challenge offorming a cohesive structure and securing participation,the ASC had to develop working methods to reachconsensus documents on some of the most challengingissues in Guatemala’s history under pressure from a tightdeadline of December 1994. This timetable involvedpreparing an average of one document every month. Toachieve these ambitious targets, every sector developedits own proposals for each of the five substantive topics.

Sectoral Groupings: eachsector develops positionpapers and chooses tendelegates for the ASC

Political Parties

Religious groups

Metepec (TUs and popular organisations)

Atlixco (academic, smallbusinesses, cooperatives)

COPMAGUA: Mayanorganisations

Women's organisations

Development NGOs

Research Centres

Human Rights groups

Media organisations

CACIF drops out of process

ASC Commissions: two delegatesfrom each sector are assigned totopical Commissions; eachCommission produces a preliminarysynthesis paper on the topic.

Role of civil societyand the army in ademocratic society

Resettling refugeesand IDPs

Constitutionalreform and electoral system

Identity and therights of indigenous people

Socio-economic andagrarian reform

ASC Plenary Session.All delegates debate the synthesis papers until members agree a finalConsensus Document for eachof five agenda items

Bilateral Negotiationsand the Official Accords

ASC ConsensusDocuments aretransmitted to theGovernment-URNG Bilateral Negotiations for consideration.

The Negotiators, with assistance from the UNmediator and the Group of Friends countries, draft Accords on each ofthe substantive andoperative negotiationagenda items.

The five substantive Accordsare transmitted back to theASC for deliberation andpossible endorsement.

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They could work on several topics simultaneouslybecause each had twenty members and could organizeseparate working groups for the different topics.

Separate topical commissions, with two delegates persector, were formed to work on each of the fivesubstantive topics. They were charged with compiling adraft document incorporating the various positionsarticulated by every sector. Each commission had toreach consensus on the positions while preparing thedraft or note any continued disagreements. These draftswere then debated in ASC plenary sessions until finalconsensus was reached. In practice, during plenarysessions new areas of disagreement often emerged andwere further debated. Sometimes internal disagreementsbetween members of the same sector surfaced andinformal alliances formed across sectors betweendelegates with similar perspectives. These disputes wereunderstandable given the magnitude of the issuesdiscussed and the deep divisions within Guatemalansociety reflected in the ASC. Nevertheless, the ASC wasable to formulate a consensus position on each of the fivetopics of their mandate before their deadline. In practice,the need for consensus tended to result in the ASCadopting a ‘lowest common denominator’ proposal, thuspossibly encouraging weak positions on the issues.

In general, the ASC process forced Guatemalan socialorganizations to cooperate with each other, reducing theintense fragmentation and mistrust that had oftencharacterized relations in the past. It providedopportunities to strengthen integration within sectorsand communication between sectors. Bishop Quezada’sleadership transmitted confidence, respect and credibilityand was a key element enabling the ASC to operateeffectively. Although Quezada had more authority thanordinary members, it resulted more from his naturalinfluence than a formal rule. He was able to mediate the

ideological differences that later proved disruptive to theASC’s work after his resignation in late 1994. TheOrganizing Committee members were elected by eachsector and their diverse and representative characteristicswere another factor that generated confidence in theprocess. The Committee also made decisions byconsensus, with all very important matters passed to theASC plenary.

Delegates worked very long hours and devotedthemselves to making the process work and to ensuringtheir sector’s effectiveness in promoting its aspirations.There were no arrangements to train ASC delegates innegotiation or consensus-building as a part ofpreparation for the process – although some individualshad experience from their previous work. Some of theless experienced sectors, such as the popularorganizations, had advisors who had worked with themfor years. Many had gained experience in formulatingproposals and negotiating through their earlierparticipation in the Grand National Dialogue and the Osloconsultations. They were subsequently more effective inthe ASC process. Nevertheless, political inexperienceinitially led the ASC to present unrealistic demands. Yetthey soon began to produce more credible proposals.The ASC also organized meetings with the URNG andgovernment negotiators to lobby for its positions andinitiated regular information meetings with the UN teamand representatives of the Group of Friends countries.

Perhaps one of the clearest indicators of the success ofthe ASC was the inclusion of many of its proposals in theofficial peace accords – in fact most were adopteddirectly by the negotiators. Some of the most significantareas where the ASC’s positions were ignored had to dowith socio-economic and agrarian reform and particularlythe issue of land redistribution. This was partially becauseof the influence of the CACIF in directly lobbying the

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government and refusing to accept the ASC’srecommendations. This failure left a lasting sense ofdisappointment amongst many, particularly as mostviewed these as the most important structural problemsthat needed to be addressed to transform the underlyingconflict and promote justice. Nevertheless, amidst someinternal controversy, the ASC eventually endorsed it andthe other accords from the bilateral negotiations.

One of the major weaknesses of the process, however,was ensuring that the wider public were aware ofdevelopments in the ASC and in the official negotiations.It was difficult for those not linked to organized socialsectors to have any interface with the process. Although amedia sector was included in the ASC, they were not veryactive or influential and it was difficult to disseminateaccurate information through the media – a factorperhaps compounded by the tendency of the army andthe conservative owners of media organizations toportrayal of the ASC as a mouthpiece of the URNG.

Re-defining the mandateThe Framework Accord did not envision an ongoing rolefor the ASC. After their proposals were delivered in late1994 and the negotiations stalled, some memberssuggested new roles. Some sectors, particularly membersof the Atlixco grouping, believed that the ASC shouldremain strictly within the bounds of the FrameworkAccord; others felt that the ASC could play an importantrole in consolidating the peace process. This debatecoincided with the resignation of Bishop Quezada in late1994 – due principally to internal political divisions withinthe Guatemalan Episcopal Conference over their role inthe peace process.

The ASC was strongly affected by these developments.There were tensions over the revised mandate andfunctions of the mechanism. A majority decided toinfluence the Guatemalan transition by situating the ASCas ‘a political reference point of consensus in civil society’by taking positions on national issues based either on theASC’s existing documents or through a new consensus-building process. With these decisions, however, mostmembers of the Atlixco sector withdrew from the ASC,arguing that it was dominated by leftist groups and wasinsufficiently representative of the public. Furthermore,although the sector representing political parties was notespecially influential in the ASC, after Bishop Quezadaresigned, only the small political parties remained.

Although there was a general effort to maintain the ASCas a mechanism of permanent discussion, two furtherfactors contributed to its decline. Firstly, some membersfrom the trade unions and popular organization sectorsdecided to create the New Guatemalan Democratic Frontas a political party to contest the November 1995 generalelections. The identification of key ASC figures with this

leftist party meant that the ASC lost some of its perceivedpolitical autonomy. Furthermore, when several becamecongressional candidates, they resigned from the ASCand their organizations failed to propose substitutedelegates – thus depriving the ASC of importantdelegates. Second, many members felt deeply dissatisfiedwith the process when the ASC endorsed the Socio-Economic Accord.

Throughout 1995 and 1996, one of the most hotlydebated issues was whether the ASC should be involvedin the verification and implementation of the peaceaccords. Yet from mid-1996, it was clear that neither thegovernment nor the URNG wanted to give the ASC aformal role in implementation. The issue eventuallybecame irrelevant, as the ASC lost its influence to thepoint where it was so marginalized that it dissolved.Therefore the ASC as an institution had no role inimplementing the accords – although some of the formerdelegates participated in commissions as representativesof their own groupings. Thus the experience of inter-sectoral discussion and negotiation was not deployed inthe implementation phase of the process.

ConclusionIn general, the Grand National Dialogue, the Osloconsultations and the subsequent Civil Society Assemblywere significant in defining the official negotiationprocess. They were crucial in identifying the underlyingcauses of the armed conflict, as well as the substantiveissues that would need to be addressed to end it andbuild peace. The armed forces tolerated these threeprocesses in order to change their negative image andend the isolation that resulted from it – a calculation thatpartially backfired on them. Nevertheless, each of theseprocesses both relied on and expanded the limited butimportant political openness begun by the military in1985 with the National Constituent Assembly.

Despite the fragmentation, atomization andconfrontation inherent in Guatemalan society, the ASCbecame a historical milestone because of the capacity fordialogue, negotiation and agreement between thedifferent sectors that participated in it. Unfortunately, inthe process of implementing the agreements, thesignatory parties to the peace accords did not define orassign any role to the ASC. This contributed to a processof decline that had started with the slow pace at thenegotiation table, the participation in politics of some ofits members, the withdrawal of the president of the ASCby the Episcopal Conference, and lasting disappointmentabout the Accord on Socio-economic Aspects and theAgrarian Situation. These developments contributed to amixed legacy for these innovative experiences in civilsociety involvement yet it is likely that the peace processwould have been very different – and probably much lesscomprehensive – without them.

Jean Arnault (second from left), representative of the UN Secretary-General, with the CNR. Bishop Quezada sits on his left.Source: Rene P