CRISIS AND REBELLION AS

PRECURSORS OF MASS TRADE UNIONS

AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAMAICA

W. Marvin WillThe University of Tulsa

Tulsa, Oklahoma

Paper Presented to theXIX Annual Conference of the

Caribbean Studies AssociationMerida, Yucatan, Mexico

23-28 May 1994

Draft copy of work in progress. Material not tobe cited or quoted without written permission of author.

CRISIS AND REBELLION AS PRECURSORS OF

MASS TRADE UNIONS AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN JAMAICA

INTRODUCTION

Institutional Survival and the Shocks of Indepe • once

Per ,capita economic growth in Jamaica was truly phenomenal in the both the decade preceding

and the decade following independence (1962) as Jamaica registered perhaps the highest per capita

increase in productivity in the world (Kuper 1976, 5). Multinational and other foreign investment rushed in,

tourism boomed, and although the have-have not gap was widening, a good deal of hope was generated

that this prosperity would eventually reach the masses, that genuine people-level economic development

would occur. But a substantial level of real development for Jamaica's numerous poor failed to occur

either at this time or In the decades that followed.

The largest of the newly independent insular Caribbean states (and the third largest island behind

Cuba and Hispanola), Jamaica, ironically, has significant resources: bauxite; coffee; bananas; sugar;

cattle; wonderful tourist sites, both for the sun-sea enthusiast and the culture-history buff; and two and one-

half million energetic people. Despite these assets, Jamaica has spent an inordinate amount of time since

the 1970s running only to stand still-or even to decline-on the down-escalator of underdevelopment. To

add to this frustration, this stagnation was occurring despite the fact that Jamaica had become the point-

country in the Caribbean for U.S. loans and positive investment attention in connection with the Caribbean

Basin Initiative (CBI) under a policy of generally favorable treatment by the Reagan administration. )

Had a similar magnitude of underdevelopment, economic downturns, and related disruptive events

occurred in several other countries in the Caribbean Basin, one could justifiably have anticipated either

open rebellion or military coups, especially in a country where one finds something of a culture of violence.

1 Prime Minister Edward Seaga was the first Head of Government invited to visit Washington after President Reaganassumed office. Since Seaga had impressed Reagan with his recent defeat of the largely democratic socialist government ofMichael Manley, this visit blossomed into a special relationship that endured throughout the Reagan years and extended, to somedegree, into the Bush Administration. Massive loans that were almost unpayabie were extended to Jamaica, making it the insularCaribbean complement to Costa Rica, Nicaragua's neighbor, in Central America (see WIN 1983, 90-100). Despite-or perhaps inspits of-this special relationship with the United States, Seaga would twice be defeated by Manley and only recently has therebeen a substantial scaling back of the island's run-away inflation plus a surfacing of hope for improved economic development.

2

Not only has the level of societal violence and crime in Jamaica Increased steadily since independence

until it is now one of the highest in the region but Jamaica also has a past record of several riots and

rebellions during and in the years following slavery (Hintzen and WM 1988; Headley 1982, 198-210; Eaton

1962, 43-45). Yet, in the late 1970s, and especially in the months preceding the November 1980 election,

when Jamaica experienced its most serious post-independence crises In the form of mushrooming socio-

economic and political divisions and an elevated level of crime and anomic violence, there was neither an

institution-threatening rebellion nor a coup. During this period the government of Michael Manley was

forced to accept ruinous "condltionalities" on domestic-social policy imposed by the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) as Jamaica suffered falling commodity prices; loss of foreign exchange and vital imports, plus

declines in many services and commodities; and unemployment levels that leaped to 27-50 percent. There

was also an expected acceleration in gang- and political-related violence that led to 745 deaths during the

ten months prior to the 1980 baiioting.2 The gravity of these crises led many specialists in both

Washington and Jamaica, including the soon-to-be-elected Prime Minister Edward Seaga, to fear a

breakdown of the island's political institutions, including those associated with security enforcement

(Seaga 1982; U. S. Department of State 1981).3 Remarkably, Prime Minister Seaga stated, the Jamaican

political institutions survived: parties, executive, legislative, judical, and administrative institutions, all. And,

In a sense, 1980 with all its dislocations . . . made us stronger," Seaga proudly told the nation in his 1981

New Year's message following his and his party's election, for we now know that we can face [an]

awesome confrontation of forces and deliberately and maturely make a strong decision without suffering

the collapse of [our] instftutions."4

2 Former Prime Minister Michael Manley must also shoulder some of the responsibility since he responded to protestingupper- and middle-class Jamaicans by angrily telling them to leave on any of the out-bound flights if they did not like his policies.Many did leave, taking capital with them and leaving behind dosed homes, closed businesses, and an eroding tax base. Manyisland businessmen made arrangements for double Invoicing with sizable amounts paid or siphoned off for deposit in the UnitedStates and other metropolitan countries. This practice not only helped circumvent the Jamaican restrictions on currency flows but,as one Miami-based trader told this writer In an off-the-record statement, Is a time-honored sign of a failing political economy."

3 In May 1982, Prime Minister Seaga told this author that he had feared Cuban involvement in a possible rebellion thatwould threaten Jamaican institutions. Surprisingly, Seaga added that he personally hoped to bring down one Jamaican institution:the opposition PNP, then led by Manley, "so it will never again pose a threat"!

4 Quoted inas Ascag;slic,1f Aunt% 1981, italics added. Economic conditions worsened under Seaga in the early1980s, and this decline continued into the early 1990s following Manley's re-election. National integration and the legitimacy of

3

Other crises would follow during both the 19808 and the 19908. Would the party and electoral

institutions developed some fifty years earlier in Jamaica be able to survive the onslaught? The short

projection Is yes–although such a reality for the long term definitely requires informed institutional

adaptation and major support building if this island is to avoid the coup or rebellion attempts that since the

late 1970s have besieged Commonwealth Caribbean states such as Grenada, Dominica, and Trinidad and

Tobago, as well as regional intermediate powers such as Venezuela, a four-decade democracy, and

Mexico, which until the Chiapas rebellion of 1994 had appeared to be stable for an even longer period.5

Jamaica was, after all, the leader in the development of party and related linkages and governmental

institutions in the Commonwealth Caribbean.

This positive legacy of Institutional development, it is hypothesized, Is a direct result of the

combination of people-powered rebellions and other labor actions during the late 19308 and early 1940s;

y policy responses by the colonial metr , — charismatic leadership that is often generated by

and associated with crisis6–although it appears the benefits from this phenomenon in Jamaica were

mix: The result was a legacy of mass-based party and related institutions that form one of the best

countervailing forces against the military coup and present an important antidote against insurrection and

the praetorian governments which, according to Gary Wynia, are concomitant to these alternate political

'games' (Wynia 1990, 24-44, 81-87; also Huntington 1968, and 1991)7 A closer examination of the

governance in Jamaica again seemed questioned. At one point Jamaica's inflation level was so severe that CARICOM members

refused to accept Jamaican dollars. The run on national reserves reached epidemic levels. Troubled times were indeed at hand.In early February 1902 Jamaica continued to lead the insular Commonwealth Caribbean countries in incidences of gang violence

as eight to twelve persons were struck down in gun battles. During Summer 1992, on-duty police were also gunned down. (See

Caribbean Insioht 1992, 1-2).

5 The Grenadian coup in 1979, of course, quickly became a social revolution. In Spring and Summer 1992 (while thisauthor was conducting research in Jamaica), Jamaica experienced a major run on its national exchange that threatened to topplethe nation's fiscal and monetary order. But a genuine people-powered adaptation occurred, led ironically by a local hotel owner

(Butch Stewart), that resulted in a massive return of currency to Jamaican banks and other financial institutions.

ff March, to quote Dsnkwart Ruslow (1987, 153), political charisma is one part gift of personality and "three parts

setting,' or being there at the right time. Charismatic leadership is extremely important where structures are new or not widelyaccepted for, to qua* PAontesqleu, "at the birth of societies, it is the leaders ... who create the institutions; afterwards it is theinstitutions that shape the leaders".

7 I use Wynia's "game" metaphor although he treats the military, corporatist democracy, etc. as players in the alternatepolitical games of Latin America. Still, it is worth noting that the negative and positive impacts of the colonial legacy of Jamaica

and many of Jamaica's close neighbors (she is but 90 miles south of Cuba and not much further north of Central America) account

4

process by which Jamaican linkgage institutions emergened Is now in order. But first, some words on the

debilitating legacy of class division and violence which very much impacts the development process both

in the pre World War period and also in the contemporary period.

A Costly Legacy: Color/Class Divisionand Rebellion in Jamaica

continuous linkage with England that exceeds 300 years, dating from 1655-1658 when it was militarily

wrested from the Spanish. Despite nearly a century and a half of Spanish colonization, which began fifteen

years after discovery of the island by Columbus in 1494, the visible Spanish imprint in Jamaica is small

since the island was only sparsely settled by the Iberian conquerors. 10 Two unsavory legacies of the

Spanish period in Jamaica, however, were the decimation of the indigenous Arawaks and the introduction

of African slaves to the island, some of whom, the ''Maroons," escaped to the island's mountainous Interior

where they resided in isolated settlements called "Maroon towns" (Wrong 1923, 30-31; Edwards 1979, 230-

45; Patterson 1979, 246-92). The black and mixed descendants of these and other former slaves comprise

96 percent of the current population of Jamaica, with the small remainder of the populace divided among

East Indians, Chinese, and whites. More than half of the island's 2.5 million population Is still engaged in

peasant farming or resides in rural areas. Another ruinous colonial legacy that relates to slavery in Jamaica

is the existing social divisions based on color and class.

According to Jamaican social scientists Aggrey Brown (1980) and Rex Nettleford (1972), it has

for many of the enduring aspects of both the players and their games.

8 It should be noted that the majority of states in the Caribbean have authority systems based primarily on institutionsand are relatively open political democracies. Somewhat ironically, the very openness of Jamaica and most of its neighbors

tremendously Increases the need for legitimacy or popular support. Even governments that are authoritarian or semi-authoritarian

need support from 'those who manor' for, as Chalmers Johnson (1966) argues, governments cannot survive by force alone. Also,

populist-type mobilization may prevail in both authoritarian and semi-authoritarian systems. One person, such as Gairy in

Grenada, Burnham in Guyana, or Manuel Ortega in Nicaragua, can play both charismatic populist and semi-authoritarian roles(see Will 1991, 29-57).

9 It should also be noted that the combined mass of the Bahamas archipelago exceeds the square mileage of Jamaica.

18 Unliks Trinidad where some Spanish tradition exists in Christmas music and carnival, evidence of the Spanish legacyIn contemporary Jamaica consists primarily of geographic place names.

5

been and remains indescribably destructive not only of the Jamaican sense of national unity but also of the

sense of self worth. Thus, a decade after independence, in a country whose population is almost totally of

African descent, blacks and blackness were "still not regarded as the desirable symbol for national

identity!"

A maid insists that she would never work 'for black people';...a young black womandestroys a photographic print of herself because it is printed too black; and an older blackwoman insists that she is giving her vote to a white candidate 'for no black man can helpme in this yah country these days' (Nettleford 1972, 36, 34).

Such attitudes not only negatively affect the development of self appreciation and esteem but also can

negatively affect the acceptance of or support for the political authority. Such a class/color system

induces citizens to relate differently to the political structures; those which some accept,others reject, and vice versa, thereby making it impossible to evolve a congruousrelationship between any single duster of structures and the majority of individuals (Scott1963, 77).

Problems of this nature are not unique to Jamaica, of course, but are inherent in the colonial

system generally and in the former slave-based plantation systems in particular. Slavery had a 'brutalising

[and] coarsening effect" in all of the Caribbean sugar islands but, as John Heame (1967) further concludes,

'the simple code of grab and 'cent per cent' which was to so large an extent the legacy left to Jamaica by

an 'overseer' class' had a more negative impact on Jamaica and Jamaicans than on many other West

Indian territories. There were also fewer freedmen or "unappropriated" black people in the Jamaican

population pattern (Handler 1974) and another contributing factor, saysliMtbliner Jamaican Minister of

Culture, was the smaller percentage of white women. This, lye . asserts, led to a higher percentage of

brown mulattos in Jamaican society than in most islands and, given the tensions and color-linked rewards

of the day, produced sharper than average conflicts—and deep-felt resentments—between brown and black

groups. Unfortunately, these color/class resentments are a continuing reality.

Jamaican anthropologist M. G. Smith (1973, 193) regards the legacy of these color-class

differences as "dearly, the greatest cultural gulf within this society." Overlapping economic, social, and

political customs and institutions reinforce and further accentuate the divisions, contributing to lighter

skinned upper- and middle-class groups being juxtaposed against a peripheral or marginal subculture."

11 The generalizations about oleos divisions an supported by survey findings of Carl Stone (1980, 8-68) in the late

6

Instead of courts, for example, many working class Jamaicans show greater willingness to trust the

revivalist "priest" or an Obeah woman, the informal family or village arbitrators. An even stronger

generalization Is made by M. G. Smith (1973, 186-87, emphasis added): "Under and since slavery, this

massive subordinate section has only been able to impress itself politically by riots, rebellions and

the like; t tia'v.ir FA, a greater willingness by many Jamaicans to go 'outside the system' and employ

greater violence than most of the remaining countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Lacey 1977;

Headley 1982).

Colonial Institutional Transplants: A Mixed Legacy. As in the case of the older settled Islands

such as Barbados, the Bahamas, and Bermuda, colonial Jamaica initially Inherited the "Old Representative"

system of parliamentary government, England's seventeenth century version of judicial, bureaucratic and

parliamentary (combined executive and legislative) patterns of governance. In early 1660, the very year of

the Spanish cession of Jamaica to England by treaty from Spain, a twelve-member Council was elected in

Jamaica, thereafter to be appointed by the governor who "deriv[ed] his authority from his commission and

instructions, and from vaguely defined delegation of the royal prerogative to him as agent of the king'

(Wrong 1923, quote on 37; also Brathwaite 1971, 7-8).

Four years later a Jamaican Legislative Assembly was convened which from the outset asserted its

right to speak for Jamaica. The degree of independence developed by seventeenth and early eighteenth

century legislatures in Jamaica In control of taxation policy and the supervision of public expenditures

actually surpassed that practiced by the "mother" House of Commons in England. Jamaican domination of

insular administration and parliamentary purse strings succeeded in making the Governor dependent on

the Assembly, thus enabling that body to encroach on powers or functions of the Crown (Spurdle [1962],

25-26; Augier 1962; Brathwaite 1971, 7-8, 12). Such elite success in checkmating English control

contributed to a parochial sense of White elite pride, which led more than a few white creole Jamaicans to

1970s. His selected findings indicated that 70% of what he calls the working class, plus 100% of the lower working ohms and small

farmers earned, less than 970 a week; in fact, 84% of small farmers and 67% of the lower working class earned less than $30. Thisgap appears to have widened during the 1900s1 Further, 84% and 80%, respectively, of lower and working class individuals shared

toilets, 88% and 80% did not own their residences, 65% and 42% lived in a one-room dwelling; only one percent owned an auto;and less than half (33.6% and 47.3%, respectively) were functionally literate as compared to at least 71% literacy among the topthree social classes.

7

resist the tide 'Englishman" and attempts by the House of Assembly, with increasing success, to exclude

European-born parliamentarians. It was during this period, suggests Roy Augier, that black Jamaicans

began to see that British colonialists, hardly great supporters of African-West Indian interests, were still

better than the local creole elites (Augier 1993).

Members of the earliest Jamaican legislatures were exclusively white slave owners and merchants,

a condition perpetuated through the late eighteenth century by a severely restrictive franchise which limited

voting privilege to "pure" white adults-defined as those removed at least four times from Negro ancestry-

who held personal estates valued at at least £3,000 or who received annual freehold income of at least

£300. These restrictive and racist policies not only stringently limited electoral participation, to the extent

that elections between 1810 and 1816 averaged only 36 votes per elected member of assembly, but also

contributed to the previously noted race-class divisions and resentments. Worse, fifty years later when the

population of Jamaica had increased to one-half million, still only 20,000 persons qualified for suffrage!

The result was almost no governmental support for blacks and their causes, even after 1838 when slavery

was finally terminated.

Nonetheless, pressures from London and "patterns of local consent" in Jamaica, as well as in other

British territories in the region, made it possible for limited numbers of blacks and persons of mixed race to

purchase their freedom during the decades preceding abolition, to petition for increased civil

rights/liberties and, increasingly, to gain suffrage. Most important for the future of long-term legitimization

of the transplanted Westminster model of governance, the changing times also made it possible for limited

numbers of "privileged persons of color" to seek and hold government office, thus developing potential role

models for the black masses. And, as will be further noted, so pervasive was the denial of rights for Afro-

Jamaicans by local whites, that in later years the more positive policies promoted by Britian earned the

support of local men of color.

Morant Bay: A Harbinger of Heroes and Violence, Two Afro-Jamaicans who managed to hold

office in early to mid-nineteenth century Jamaica were Edward Jordan and George William Gordon.

Jordan, who sat on the Kingston Common Council and served as Mayor of Kingston for twelve years,

beginning in 1854, was elected to the Jamaican Assembly in 1835 and advanced to the office of speaker of

8

the House during 1861-1864. Somewhat ironically, Jordan's phenomenal elevation to high office occurred

only after he had started to support the establishment," a major reversal for a man once jailed (1831) for

allegedly fomenting slave rebellion. During his tenure in public office, according to Gordon Lewis (1968,

168), Jordan had come to see black Jamaicans as unsuited for truly representative government. 12

Born a slave of mixed parentage, William Gordon also served on the Kingston Common Council,

was mayor of Kingston on several occasions, and in 1850 was elected to the Jamaican House of Assembly.

Although a successful businessman, Gordon retained and projected sensitivity for his roots, which induced

him to assume a leadership role in the disturbances of the post abolition period.

Racial and economic tensions in Jamaica mounted during the three decades following

emancipation. By the 1860s the sugar-based economy was in near collapse as inflation soared and wages

fell—from 2s 6d per day in 1840 to less than a shilling in 1860. Food was scarce, especially the flour and

saitfish "slave food" traditionally imported from North America, now curtailed due to the U.S. CM War.

Then came drought and three years without "croptknes." Unrest ensued, but the government's response

was merely a curt, widely distributed Queen's Message that asserted improvements were possible, but only

through hard and continuous labor 'when ... and as long as It is wantedr It was a stinning slap that was

deeply felt.

William Gordon, together with Paul Bogle, peasant leader and Baptist deacon, stepped forward to

help articulate grievances of the oppressed. Bogle's congregation had become so alienated from the non-

responsiveness of the Jamaican institutions, particularly the governmental courts in Morant Bay, that they

abandoned these institutions and set up their own (Brathwaite and Phillips 1972, 145-46). Dozens were

killed by the militia, including a chief magistrate, in a court-linked confrontation that spread over four violent

days in October 1865. Martial law was declared. In the aftermath, 439 "rebels" were executed, and 600

more were flogged, and to send "messages" to the masses, more than 1,000 village homes were

destroyed. Fianally, both Bogle and Gordon were hanged.

12This so-called "Uncle Tom" complex is not unique to Jamaica, of oourse, nor to blacks. Contemporary standards of"correctness" are often invalid when applied to this period. Simply to survive took courage and not a little Brier Rabbit cleverness.Further, any black hoe In a position of power had the potential for being a needed role model (See Edward Brathwalts andAnthony Phillips, 1972).

9

'Paul Bogle died but his spirit talks,

Anywhere in Jamaica that freedom walks...*,

commerates the "Ballad of Sixty Five," a popular rendition of the period. Besides the violence and great

personal and political cost, this uprising and the "justice" meted out was a significant radicalizing

experience for the island that forged black heroes for the masses but, most significant for the subject at

tit kthand, it paper . as was becoming traditional in Jamaica, options increasingly were outside the largely

closed legal process.

Following an official inquiry, Britain presented the Jamaican legislature with a simple choice:

enlarge the Jamaican franchise to further mass participation in its institutions or forfeit local control of

government, in the tradition of the past 200 years, in favor of Crown Government with its single non-elected

house controlled by a Crown-appointed governor. Several in the Jamaican elite also supported this option

and Jamaica became a Crown colony (Brathwalte and Phillips 1974, 145-49).

Between the Wars: Prelude to Blowup and Change

By the opening of the twentieth century, the focus of British colonial activity had dearly switched

from the small, most ancient colonies of the Caribbean to the larger fish in India and Africa. With this

switch in priorities, European colonialism in the Americas no longer represented the very high strategic

value for military/transportation needs it once held. 13 Still, there remained two factors for maintaining the

colonial empire in the Caribbean: national prestige, which Winston Churchill would later emphasized when

he remarked that he had not assumed the Prime Ministership to dismantle the Empirel; 14 and, most

significantly, the issue of looming defense needs, which consisted of three parts: a) raw materials, chiefly

oil from Trinidad, the most important British-controlled supply for the Royal Navy, b) personnel from the

colonies to provide fighting forces and support for the war effort, and c) the avoidance of propoganda

reversals In the battle for minds.

13 To assess just how much the value of the Caribbean colonies had declined, see Williams 1944; and 1971, 47-74.

14 Although this reference was primarily in response to emerging nationalism in India, the British colonial crown jewel,there was a residue of pride in the legacy that was empire, the largest overseas empire of any European state and one on which itwas widely asserted the sun never set.

10

German social scientist and Jamaica specialist, Carsten Schmieder (1993), somewhat over-asserts

that the primary factor that "caused the British to maintain their rule in the Caribbean was . . . the[ir]

commitment towards the small insular white communities [who were rightfully] suspicious of the black

majority of the population? Some MPs obviously supported the West Indian elites but a growing official

awareness that social, economic, and political conditions were spiraling into crises belatedly emerged

following publication of W. M. Macmillan's Warning From Ale West Alio (1935) that described the

deplorable conditions and the potential for violence. The coming unrest had potential to Impact each of

the policy issues noted above.

The Economic. Labor. and Political Crisis of the 19300

Socio-Economic Problem*

The Great Depression hit the underdeveloped political-economies of the Caribbean even more

drastically than it did the metropolitan countries. Its impact was devastating given the high dependence on

agricultural exports and the low level of diversification experienced among the Caribbean colonies—and

several previously independent regional Hispanic states as wel1. 1 5 This was especially the case in

Jamaica. In addition to plummeting export earnings throughout the region, the population growth rate

problem was exacerbated by the diminishing opportunities for workers to migrate to the traditional haunts

of Panama, Cuba, and the United States for employment.

The number of unemployed in the urban areas of the Caribbean skyrocketed not only because of

the considerable and often forced return of (Wigan, but also because the sharp drop in agricultural prices

(sugar was a mere five cents per pound) and steep* contractions in local employment led to accelerated

migration to the towns and emerging cities throughout the West Indies, much as did the Okies in the United

States in their quest for a better life, symbolized ftitie *Grapes of Wrath", the title of John Steinbeck's well

chronicled novel (1939). In the West Indies rumors also would spread that a praticular mill, oil field, or

wharf was hiring and thousands would spend their last shilling getting to the estate or city only to find

15Al5ost all countries provide examples of not only extreme poverty In the Great Depression, but labor unrest as well.

For oases of the latter, see Panama, B Slavador, and !Akio), among others. Even in the U.S. there was massive poverty and there

were violent strikes, bonus marches, and bands of the dispossed who organized to prevent foreclosures, especially in rural areas.

11

sot/tic-0,4-unsatisfactory numbers of jobs and, especially seldom wages that permitted support of a family. Still, the

numbers came and Kingston's population doubled In the two decades following 1921 (Government of

Jamaica, 1945, 2).

Most revealing statistics on the actual living conditions of the urban and rural masses in Jamaica

during the 1930s were gathered by two members of Jamaica Welfare Ltd.: a study of differing Jamaican

rural areas by H. P. Jacobs; and a study conducted by E. P. Carter in West Kingston (see F.-Stolberg,

1990).

Housing—

To the casual observer passing along Spanish Road . . . it would be a shock of surpriseto learn that human beings dwelt behind those derelict Iron fences. . . . These hutmentssurround a central patch of uneven sunbaked earth, which is a sea of mud in wetweather. An occasional tree—never more than x two in a yard—affords the only coolshelter from the sun. The rooms, being roofed with unsealed iron though they giveshade afford no shelter, and the occupants find it more confortable to sit in the directrays of the sun (42-43). . . . The House contains one rusty iron bedstead, a disreputablemattress on the floor.. a small table with a dirty tablecloth and a few iron cookingutensils (58).

Employment, Food, and Health—

The two women take in washing, and earn between them a maximum of 2/- per week.Rent is 1/6 per week, leaving 6d to buy food for themselves and two children (49). . . .The man earns a maximum of 3/ at the banana wharf. His wife has very bad ulceratedsores on her legs and cannot work. Her sister brings home about 2/- per week from thebanana wharf (50). . . . He has to beg or gamble for the rent, while the woman makes afew pence by higgling (50).

Some attempt is made to feed children appropriately. Milk Is sometimes speciallybought for small children; but some of them get nothing better than a sweet 'tea" of fevergrass and mint (10). They stated that on the day visited they had only had bush-tea forbreakfast (59). Another man had two bananas for breakfast while two children spilt abanana.

There Is a general lack of amusements. This is partly the result of poverty, partly the lackof organised effort (14).

In cases of complete disablement by illness the patient is compelled to resort to thehumiliating and insanitary procedure of lying out on the sidewalk until a policemannotices (61).

There is general dissatisfaction with conditions of life and work. Scarcely anyoneseemed contented. The wish for land . . . Is almost universal. . . . There is [also] ageneral wish for higher wages. On the Chariottenburgh property there was a strikealmost every week. . . . It was impossible they said to make a living wage (14).

Most people lived on next to nothing," concluded Norman Manley, a young barrister only recently

12

returned to Jamaica from studies at Oxford which followed his World War I military service. As might be

expected, tensions Increased dramatically (see U. K Colonial Office 1939, hereafter called Orde Brown

Report; Eaton 1975, 91-93; and U. K Colonial Office 1945, hereafter called Moyne Report).

Crisis. Rebellion. and Charismatic Leadership

The first signs of coming crises appeared at the end of World War I when West Indian soldiers,

mostly black, return to their islands with an enhanced sence of outrage and the inequality. When this

sensed social-political deprivation is combined with sharp economic downturn, the potential for change,

violent or othewise, is great. All that awaits is a charismatic leader. In the West Indies, generally, and in

Jamaica in particular, these three factors merged in the late 19308. The winds of change were blowing.

The first serious labor unrest in the region erupted In British Honduras (now Belize) in February and

March 1943, followed by strikes in Trinidad later the same year. Then came an uprisings in St. Kitts in

January 1935, followed by hunger marches in Trinidad, strikes in British Guiana, St. Lucia, and in Falmouth,

Jamaica. There was also significant rioting in St. Vincent (See Tables ). 16 By 1937 the labor uprisings

had moved beyond mere strikes and riots to become costly rebellions in both Trinidad and Barbados with

14 killed in each island.

As it is so well documented in the Moyne Report, living conditions as well as possibilities of political

participation in the West Indies remained far below metropolitan standards and even local expectations

until after the War. Consequently, one could expect to see similar reactions to a similar situation

throughout the whole British Caribbean. And indeed, this was what happened. It Is worth noting, however,

that there were only infrequent efforts to coordinate actions or even to exchange information about the

state of affairs among the islands in the region during the violent thirties. 17

16 Both Sir Grantley Adams (personal interview 1971) and Sir Arthur Lewis, in his perceptive tract for the Fabian Society

(1938), assert that 1936 was the beginning of the major labor rebellions In the West Indies. A recent dissertation-based book

(Browne 1992, 13) indicates the labor unrest in the region began in a series of hunger strikes in Trinidad in 1934. While importantharbingers, these initial elements of labor protest in Trinidad were for the most part more non-violent than the confrontations led by

Antonio Soberanis in British Honduras or oven the Buckley Estate and related violence in Si Kitts, which resulted in the interventionof formai British military power in both instances.

17 One example of cooperation and most likely oonspirational promotion is documented in my recent article,

"Insurrection and the Development of Political institutions in Barbados," 1992, esp. 9-18).

"Unemployed Brigac1C4V2Nrimitripiyhrio SoberanisGomez confronts treAgov , Mobe nis is jailed byOctober 1934

Disturbances on sugar estates in Trinidad

Sugar strike and demonstration begins at Buckley Plantationin St. Kitts: 3 dead

Strikes and hunger march in Trinidad

Strike of wharf laborers at Falmouth, Jamaica, followed bydisturbances

February-March 1934

May-July 1934

January 1935

February 1935

May 1935

Table 1

Disturbances and Insurrections in theBritish West Indies, 1934-1948

September-October 1935 Disturbances at various estates in British Guiana

October 1935 Rioting in Kingstown and Camden Park, St. Vincent: 3 dead

June-July 1937 General strikes and insurrections in Trinidad led by T. U."Buzz" Butler: 14 dead

July 1937

Disturbances and rebellion in Barbados, initially led byClement Payne: 14 dead

Strikes and major rioting from Serge Island and FromeEstate to the Kingston docks in Jamaica: 12 dead

February 1939

Disturbances at Leonora Plantation and neighboring areas inBritish Guiana

1942 Labor strikes and disturbances in the Bahamas

1946

Riots in Jamaica: 15 dead

1948 Riots in British Guiana

Source: Moyne Commission Report (Cmd. 6607), 1945, p. 196; John Mordecal,lhe Federationthe West Indies (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 26-27.

13

On the other hand, occurrences throughout the region during the decade following 1934, including

those in Jamaica, probably built on or were in some way influenced by the chain of events that had

previously occurred in the region. Uniting in a common movement to defuse the growing tendency to

rebel in the Caribbean, was, no doubt, one of the important reasons why the process and pace of political

change initiated and pushed.18

As 1937 came to a close with lingering crys and smoke still hovering over the distant territories, it

was somewhat of a surprise that only minor strikes and major violence had visited Jamaica. Given the

island's divisions, penchant for violent protest, and its desperate sorb-economic conditions, it could have

been predicted that violence would soon beset the island. But poor, hungry men do not generally rebels

make—at least generally not without a leader who perceptively proves himself or herself. These seeming

preconditions would soon merge in Jamaica at an estate called Serge Island where labor unrest seemed to

surface with the coming of the new year, 1938. The Serge confrontation soon surged in the form of an

increasingly violent strike and counter attacks (Eaton 1975, 38). The self-appointed potential labor leader

was William Alexander Clarke, the talliffikamoNgetusin of the previously mentioned Norman Manley, and a

frequent writer of pro-working class letters to the Kingston newspapers. Newly returned from work in New

York, this man who had more recently been a money-lender was no ordinary writer of Indignant letters. He

was a natural charismatic leader who assumed the pseudonym of Alexander Bustamante, which later was

made his legal name. With Busts, the workers cause took on new momentum.

At Serge, one thousand cane cutters remained adamant against returning to work for the existing

rate of 10.5d per ton, demanding instead a settlement that increased the rate to 2/ per ton. They already

had been dispersed by police armed with flailing batons but the unemployed workers reassembled with

machetes and sticks and their number swelled to 1,400. And on 5 January 1938, as several workers

attempted to stop carts from entering or leaving the estate, police attacked, injuring 34 workers. One

policeman was also hurt (Eaton 1975, 38). Bustamante spoke to the strikers and attempted to negotiate for

18 It should be remarked here that deprivation and even starvation do not necessarily lead to the development ofpolitical movements or to rebellion. To actually engage in such acts usually requires a catalytic action that shocks the masses, oneor more oharismatic leaders to lead the protest, and usually a strong middle-class component within the leadership as well as

among the secondary leaders and even the 10110WKS.

1 4

them, gaining a small increase in wages.

Events then moved swiftly. On 20 April the "Serge infection" spread to the Frome estate in

Westmoreland, on the island's western tip, where Tate and Lyle, a British sugar corporation, had

announced plans to erect a huge sugar factory. As thousands poured Into the area, the usual claims

emerged regarding unkept promises regarding conditions and wages. A violent protest ensued with four

killed and 13 Injured as a result of police firing rifles into the amassed demonstrators. Busta arrived

after the violence but again assumed a leadership position.

The wharf workers in Kingston were the next to strike. Again there was violence, again Busta's

charismatic leadership intervened. In all, at least 12 individuals were killed in labor-management strife in

Jamaica during the 19305 and an even larger number would die in riots during the 1940s. In the 1930s

nearly 200 were wounded (171 by one count) and more than 700 were arrested in separate but related

labor actions.

Meanwhile, Bustamante engaged In speaking and, in a manner typical of most charismatic leaders,

he frequently allowed his love of a good story and what he considered to be the larger "truth"—that the

lessons from the confrontations at Serge and Frome should not die, for example—to overreach a true

rendition of events. Serge and Frome certainly did not die and he, Bustamante, continued to gain in

perceived stature with the workers. We will follow Busta till we die . . . is the way one refrain goes.

During this time Bustamante was either Joining or building—but never would he take a second seat.

MitFor example,4

A he associated himself with probably the Island's oldest union, the Jamaica Workers and

Tradesmen Union (JWTU). Failing to gain the leadership of JWTU, Bustamante broke with its leader, A. G.

S "Father" Coombs, after telling 7,000 workers that Coombs should be replaced. His heroic status

increased significantly in May 1938 when he was arrested and imprisoned for the first of several

incarcerations. (His incarceration in the 19405 simply added to the luster of his name.) His release in 1938

was secured by his barrister cousin, Norman Manley, who himself was in the process of forming the

island's first mass-based political party, the Peoples National Party (PNP), which was initiated in 1938.

And, it might be added, for a brief period Bustamante also was a PNP member—until he withdrew

to form his own party, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). 114Lese were certainly heady times for

15

instution building!

Norman Manley, it should also be mentioned, lent his services to the emerging workers' movement

while his cousin was imprisoned-and was accused by Bustamante of attempting to raid workers from the

movement for his PNP-linked union. This led to a major falling out with his cousin, a spilt that was

reinforced by what the PNP faithful perceived as an alleged "dear worked out between Bustamante and

Governor Sir Edward Denham to permit Busta's early release from prison. These emotionally charged

percptions were partial factors in inducing two cousins to eventually form and lead competing political

parties and competing trade associations. Bustamante's union, incidentally, was and remains the

Bustamante International Trade Union.

Within hours of Bustamante's release in the summer of 1938, he announced to the assembled

throng of an estimated 15,000 that he, Busta, had won for them all their goals. In actuality, the contract for

the striking workers had been negotiated by Manley and the Conciliation Board, although Bustamante did

win an overtime concession (Lady Gladys Bustamante, 1993).

This and other Busta anomolies perplexed his more learned cousin. It has also apparently

perplexed Bustamante's chief biographer, George Eaton (1975, 38-48, quote on 48), who writes:

How was it that William Alexander Clarke, who returned to Jamaica in 1934 with a foreign-sounding name (Bustamante), foreign mannerisms and a foreign accent and who, before1937, was hardly known to the masses . . . could, by 1938, command such devotion andloyalty from the masses? The answer lies in the fact that social forces and Influences whichwere at work In Jamaican society converged and came to a head in 1938 and AlexanderBustamante, by force of personality and character-as well as understanding the role which hewas called upon to play. [Other factors were] the bankruptcy of the Colonial administration;return of emigres; Garveyism; race consciousness and increasing politicization of the masses[and] . . . the example of other West Indian colonies.

The Impact of the Emigres

The rimignis referred to by Eaton included Jamaican soldiers who prompted the first signs of

coming crises at the end of World War I when they returned to their black or working classes, from which

they had been recruited, with a much enhanced sense of outrage at the old (and continuing) inequalities.

Their contribution was joined and fanned by another much famed Afro-Jamaican emignit, Marcus Garvey,

who by December 1927 had returned "permanently" to his Jamaican birthplace following his expulsion from

the United States.

16

Upon his return to Jamaica, Garvey established branches of his Universal Negro Improvement

Association (UNIA) throughout the island and using the UNIA as a base in 1928 founded one of the island's

first genuine, though short-lived, political parties: the People's Political Party (PPP). His unsuccessful bid

to win a seat in the island's Legislative Council elections of 1930 revealed to him the limitations of progress

by Afro-Jamaicans within the still largely dosed political system. This led Garvey to seek a later-to-be-

much-emulated path to political power that contributed to the founding of the earlier noted JWTU. In 1935,

however, one year after the return of Bustamante, Garvey left Jamaica for England for the last five years of

his life.19 The institution building contributions of this equally genuine charismatic leader (like the similar

attributes of the two fabulous cousins, Manley and Bustamante) earned each the title "national hero."

Garvey's role with development of his party and trade union at a time when the laws hardly permitted either

to property function, provided an important positive force for subsequent changes in Jamaican politics

Ask. 09which occurred beginning in 1938. ePeP raote (1 Cm*,

The Metropole Responds

As early as the nineteenth century, official colonial office personnel had also begun to change

toward increased support of the region's black masses to the point that, as earlier noted, black Jamaicans

gradually came to prefer the official British to the elected but typically conservative whites and a few

elected brown or mixed blood MPs. The goal became limited self-rule or perhaps, as one governor noted,

the British perspective was to institute small changes to prevent potentially greater change later—to forestall

the potential river of change from destroying British structures and values and, most crucial as Britain and

the world anticipated the coming war, for maintaining colonial and worldwide support in the face of the

Fascist propaganda machine.

Prior to the 1930s, the chief alarm ringers in England and the ones who now led the official

rethinking of policy were the Fabian trade unionists, who made up the left-wing (and the social conscience)

la Gaivey's personal popularity and that of the PPP probably peaked in 1929 on the occasion of the UNIA's SixthInternational Convention that witnessed a mass meeting of some 10,000 people at Edelweiss Park in Kingston. It should be notedthat it was not Just the U. S government that turned on this important Ako-Jamaican/American/Caribbean leader. The British

government also lifted Garvey's passport (which can be found today in a data collection file at the Public Records Office, KewGardens, United Kingdom.)

17

of the Socialist Party. This critical awareness did not immediately produce far-reaching change In trade

union laws in Jamaica. Although trade union activity became legalized In Jamaica much earlier than in

many other Caribbean colonies, It was typically 'without the right of peaceful picketing on a strike.

Moreover, unions continued to be liable for economic losses during strike actions' (Phillips 1972, 420).

Thus, despite the presence of a truly charismatic leader In the form of Garvey and his newly formed union,

the disappropriated black majority in Jamaica remained muted from the beginning of the economic

depression in the 1920s by their inability to strike and strongly protest. Not only charismatic leadership and

fledgling Institutions were needed, but also corrective legislation regarding the participation of workers.

Their day was heralded with the shots at Serge and Frome in 1938.

One important external change was developed as early as 1929 In the British

parliament, Colonial and Welfare legislation. The initial act, however, was merely a

manifestation of good intgetions to come and very nominally impacted trade union ,

participation in Jamaica and the other Anglophone Caribbean colonies (Wicker 1958)."

And, the legislation of funds which might have encouraged an active and less violent

development did not occur until the labor strife In 1938 generated external pressure and6oueutA.4a ',do-N.4e 1%. vs-a-fig cot ve- 39 aaii C-e)kta•e-'5AX-at, eice.Q

local mobilization via the(Moyne Report, which due to the fear of war-time propaganda

attacks, was not published until 1945. Yet on 20 February 1940 the British government

issued a white paper which accepted in principle the Moyne Report. This action was

reinforced by an immediate grant of L350,000 to the West Indies colonies for the

20 E. R. Water (1968) oonoludes that a) the small sum of £1 million a year provided by London for all colonies wasinsufficient, and b) the most Impotent 'fact to emerge (was] ... under spending; that is, actual development expenditures in thecolonies (were) teeing short of Parliamentary appropriations' (189). In addition, the fiscal philosophy was based on an *arty formof "Vickie down' economics which, like Its later models practiced by the Reagan Administration and pushed on LDCs by USAID,the World Dank, and the IMF during the 1980s, contributed to some degree of growth but devoMd little attention to realdevelopment for the poor In the knpacted countries.

21 According to the scorching words of Porter and Stockwell (1987, esp. 9), this &emphasis by the Colonial Office onstructural development was amplified by a selective lack of competence on the part of key personnel. 1St& there were a fewSecretaries of State like Cranbome, lyttellon and Macleod, whose skill and clout were respected by thek Prime Ministers, the postwas often occupied by political lightweights (such OS Malcolm Macdonald) or by elder (If not superannuated) statesmen such asGeorge Hall and James Griffith.. Even Creech Jones who has been called 'the most influential Colonial Secretary since JosephChamberlain', was unimpressive In the House of Commons, . . . and was later regarded by Mika as 'one of my mistakes." It

18

purposes of colonial development schemes (See Jetta, 18811, irt).

This acceptance of Moyne and the initial allocation of development funds was

almost remarkable considering the fact that Britain was at war, under major financial

stress, and that her policy making processes were hampered by the institutional

inadequacies then in place both in the Colonial office, and the separate colonial

administrations. In the face of both war and economic stress, the status of the Colonial

Office had been reduced in favor of the Treasury, the Foreign Office, and the Home Office,

all of which placed security and financial considerations formOst."

A compounding structural or policy handicap for the translation of Whitehall's

intentions into a viable and visable policy output in Jamaica and the other

Commonwealth Caribbean colonies was the relative independence and broad

discretationary powers on the part of the colonial officers in the colonies. Here, Jamaica

had it better than such colonies as British Honduras (Belize), but as Gordon Lewis (1968)

has shown, having sympothetic, flexible, and able colonial officers on the spot was

purely the luck of the draw that only slightly favored the larger colonlecn

Still, between 1936 and 1938 a new style of colonial administration gradually was

introduced in the Colonial Office, pushed ifiteretery 01 Stele Maleolm

should be noted, however, that the problem of compsienoe and smelt ► WW1 the ofilasidom In the colonies has a muchlonger history as specifically applied to the West Indies, espeellify to lidf *kg* ettiltorke. Sikh, according to the late GordonLewis (1969), had long been assigned the left avers' in terms of goo Maori arid h1oY ifIIN olvil tin/ants.

22 The assumption of functionsl separateness went so far as le view WNW with the Home CM Service or with theColonial Servioe, respectively, as different OIMPOrs. Exchange of personnel bebveion London and the ocionies did not improve untilthe 19301. (See Porter agd Stockwell 1997, 10; and G. Lewis 199$).

MacDonald served as Undersecretwy of State for Dominion Make, 1031-35; Secretary of SW for the Colonies, 1935and 1938-40; and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 19115-34.

24 The rapid policy response following the Jamaican blowup In 1938 will emeoled on elfOO counts: a) this, as noted,was nearing the end of a continual series of labor-related thipletiOne *roughest the insular region; b) Jamaica was the largest ofthe Commonwealth Caribbean entities In population and It was also the IMO* elti Ntadv WY In sit and o) as I noted in myfirst college paper on this subject, the British had Named • valuable MOM Seth tlwi *eh Arestleen ear of Independence-one, kmight be noted, that the French never seemed to lam from their *AWN expidshoeil that noted from Algeria to Vietnam to NewCalodonia. For the British, a better response than allowing violence to Wig* into a war Wee to make selected policy moves,especially those that we largely symbolic, including the 'fiery British pattern' of appointing an inves5gatory commission.

MacDonald." Concrete policy changes included appointment of a labor adviser and the

establishment of a Social Service Department within • the Colonial Office. Thus, there

wasat least the potential for greater sensitivity of the labor issue, and perhaps some

greater open mindedness in place when rebellion occured In the larger Caribbean

territories, Trinidad, Barbados, and, most of all, Jamaica."

Of course, the pressures of World War II also played an important positive role in

promoting change in the West Indies. This is the point made by Ken Post (1981),

although in this author's view, Post massively over does this argument, essentially

saying that the war was the "end all" phenomenon for explaining the policy change. As

20previeusly noted, however, Britain's need for Were Indies Weenier!, resources,

Trinidadian oil especially, and the fear of propaganda preittires not only from the Nazis

but also from the Roosevelt administration, all combined to play an important stimulatory

role in moving Whitehall to act.

Suermev AND CONCLUerOtel

Jamaica's political legacy from the metropolitan colonizer Is very mixed with both negatives

and positives-the latter chiefly the admittedly tardy but always welcomed parleys role In maintaining the

momentum for political change in Jamaica and the Anglophone Caribbean once the violent 1930s provided

the initial push. This development in the period initiated In the 1900s benefited from at least two to three

genuine charismatic leaders: one of the Island's first labor union founders, Marcus Garvey, although the

bulk of his adult life was not spent in Jamaica; Alexander Bustamante, founder of the Jamaica Labour

Party (JLP) and the Bustamante International Trade Union (BITU), and also served as the Island's first

Prime Minister. Although not mentioned In this paper, contemporary Jamaicans who recall the 1930s also

include Kenneth He, a young socialist leader and Journalist who helped kindle early support for the

Peoples' National Party (PNP), the Island's first mats political party whose primary founder was Norman

Manley, the father of Michael Manley. A second, or sub-hypothesla itlette;ear Is that whie all three

leaders contributed to institutional development in Jamaica, their charismatic leadership often contributed

as many problems as solutions to the long-term legitimation of the Wand's national structures. In shod, as

countless nations have experienced, reliance on polidCal Oedema tires the masses and buys time but

beyond that it is not a sure thing, as it certainly was not in the case of Jatnalca's charismatic leaders.

Of the three sources of political authority discussed, kretitutkwelized governance In Jamaica and

elsewhere appears to be the most Important contributor to lore-term politiCal stablity. This Is so for two

reasons: (1) institutionalized governance provides greater potential for flexibility or adaptability than

traditional systems, and (2) although charismatic rule can indeed be flexible, institutionalized patterns

22 Later, British Guiana, the largest bind-mass in the Commonwealth Caribbean, would also We labor vidence—whNethe Moyne Commission was visiting the country. Finally, major labor unrest broke out In the %homes during the World War II era,appropriately in this Mlaml-approxknate archipelago in response to U.S. rodent Inettmorated In labor relations and indiscriminatory wage scales practiced during the construction of a World War II air bale M Neseau—whith ones as the currentIntermitted airport ,of the Bahamas.

2 1

support reasonable flexibility with greater longevity. Unless charisma can lend itself to the

institutionalization process, it is no more enduring than the mortal leader. Hence, when a Juan Peron--or a

Castro-departs the scene, be it via coronary or bullets, there is an ensuing political vacuum that invites a

golpe or some other form of political force and, frequently, an indefinite future for the country. 3°

But, as has been argued here, substantial change requires a push, and shock therapy was

required In Jamaica and the Commonwealth Caribbean. Just one year after the riots in Barbados and

Trinidad, similar confrontations with the establishment and ensuing violence surfaced in Jamaica. And, as

in most of the other "trouble spots," there was potential charismatic leadership available in Jamaica,

especially In the person of Alexander Bustamante, who was called the uncrowned king of Jamaica.

30 in the case of Argentina, this South American intermediate power found itself tottering on the brink of a legitimacyabyss in the Peronista aftermath (MAII and Soudriett• 1980).

31 Before 1938 most of the pre-mass movement associations in Jamaica were basically middle class in membership andin aims. The most notable were the Federation of Citizens Associations, constituted in April 1936; the National Reform Association,launched on the initiative of Ken Hill and established in March 1937; the Jamaican's Labour Party, launched in April 1937 by CecilBeckford and Percival James; the Jamaica Progressive League founded in September 1938, first in New York, then in December19371n Kingston; and, last but not least, Marcus Ganny's universal Negro Improvement Association, which spread to Jamaica andthe Caribbean from the United States and remained active in Jamaica after Garvey left the Island in 1935.

32 As will be noted later, within two years Bustamante would again be arrested and Incarcerated for threatening theWorld War II endeavor. Circumstances for his release from this imprisonment were to prove controversial.

33 Carsten Schmieder, a Ph.D. student, speculates that if Jamaica had been granted general adult suffrage only tenyears earlier, it is probable that Garvey could have played the longer-term "hero and the crowd" role later played by Bustamante.This is highly possible. Schmieder also raises the question (but does not project an answer) regarding how the very light-skinnedBustamants could win black mass support in racially divided Jamaica. First, in Jamaica as in most societies, actions andperceptions usually count for more than pigmentation. It appears that Busts was first introduced to the masses of Kingston withthe line that "there are different kinds of blaok men," that Busts was a special type of light complexioned black man and that hoshould be accepted as one of their own. It must be added that Busts's actions and mannerisms attracted strong mass support,from his initial letters to the editor in support of workers to his imprisonment for popular causes and his highly flamboyant yet non-pretentious style.

34 Adoption of the name "Bustamants" by Alexander William Clarke, his birth name, and the accompanying much-amplified story about his careers in Cuba, Panami, and the United States, as well as the highly suspect stories about his status asa military officer in Spain or Mor0000, helped to establish Bustarnante as a larger than life personality in the eyes of his potentialfollowers. (For a short version of this "story," sae Eaton 1975, 32ff.)

35 This business activity gave him the financial independence he needed to throw himself into the task of mobilizing andorganizing. He combated attempts to portray him as a businessman living on the backs of the poor by presenting his business asa quasi-charitable Institution.

36 Most of these points were emphasized by Lady [Gladys] Bustamante (Interview 1993).

2 2

the 1930s was very productive in the creation of polltial parties and trade unions: the PNP,

BITU, and a second labor organization at7. . 3( the Trade Union Council (TUC).

MI were formed as a direct result of this period. For a time Busta led the BITU into a cooperative

arrangement with TUC, and even joined the PNP, but the personalist messianic leader, whom Gordon

Lewis (1968, 180) feels neither understood the full meaning of democracy nor felt comfortable with shared

or collective power, soon withdrew himself and his union from PNP affiliation and formed his own political

party, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) on 8 July 1943. There were now two Jamaican parties to contest the

first general election under full suffrage scheduled for 1944: the JLP, a personalist working-class

movement with 'rightist* leadership inclinations; and the PNP, a middle-class movement which felt forced

to appeal to labor—and even democratic socialism—in order to compete for the expanding electorate. The

PNP adaptation could not be effected in time, however, even with the new labor legitimacy extended by its

affiliate organization, the rtic, and in 1944 the hero "won his crowd" by a two-to-one margin, 41.4 percent

/044-Luiti 14)a 01/--"a446L ‘04for Busta's Jlf, 23Aper14thiti;N4 ndIalre401-0/1*-1,242" 1 "Pr tib%h 114 74 A- -Veti rt74) 0 tepah.

tA4 Aim 6) 11 ell to •

Despite broad-based support for political institutions in Jamaica, today there are still serious

problems In this society that is divided by class and race and, increasingly, by economic and ideological

factors. Jamaican parties crosscut such cleavages far better than most Basin movements, Guatemala and

El Salvador for example, but there is an increasing tendency, according to Stone (1976), for the upper

classes to identify more closely with and accord legitimacy to non-party structures such as the courts and

administrative bodies while the working and lower class Jamaicans, from Paul Bogle's day to the present,

have had limited access to such institutions and, hence, accord highest support to mass parties.

Frustration grows rapidly, however, when parties in the Jamaican clienteletky-stem cannot deliver—as

insured by capital flight and IMF econditionalitiesu (Stone 1980, esp. 91-110; Foner 1973, esp. 62-64). The

uncertain 80s furtherlihis dilemma, even though the Reagan Administration selected Jamaica and the

Seaga Government for special U.S. attention.

37 For the divisions that remain, see Rex Nettleford (1972, esp. 19-37). The term "working oleos" is used here to

characterize the social stratum that depends on its own capacity for work to *am its living, self-employed or externally employed,

but normally not primarily manual labor. As Ken Post (1978, 213) establishes in his detailed albeit ideologically laden analysis of

the 1938 unrest in Jamaica, middle-oleos consumption patterns *were strongly oriented towards imported goods . . . taxed by the

colonial government as a major source of revenue, which led to middle oleos criticism and resentment" Further, specific interests

-rt•Jo zvoi

23

Finally, in the West Indies as a whole, the disorders of the 1930s led to at least 475 casualties,

including 46 dead, plus thousands jailed or imprisoned. While these numbers may seem small when a%

contrasted to the daily carnage in Cambodia during Poi Pot's reign, former Yugoslavia, or RwandaAbut

when the diminutive size of the Commonwealth Caribbean is considered, and, comparatively speaking, the

violence and cost of the riots and rebellions during the 11308 are significant. But, when, the institutional

accomplishments and impetus given to the region's independence movements, and to eventual

democratization are all considered, the violent 1305 may have been an acceptable trade off. This certainly

appears to have been the case ki Jamaica.

of the Jamaican middle class at this time were expanded opportunities for secondary and higher education and for employment in

the Civil Service. Moreover, out of a widespread feeling of social obligation, people from this social sector were frequently sociallyactive on the community level.

38 One example of cooperation and most likely conspiratorial promotion is documented in my recent articleInsurrection and the Development of Political institutions In Barbados," 1992, esp. 9-18).

39 It should be mentioned that deprivation and even starvation do not necessarily lead to the development of politicalmovements or to rebellion. To actually engage in such acts generally requires a catalytic action that shocks the masses; one ormore charismatic leaders to lead the protest; and, usually, a strong middle-class component within the leadership as well asamong the secondary leaders and even the followers.

24

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