Quesnel v. Prudential Insurance, 1st Cir. (1995)

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    USCA1 Opinion

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________

    No. 95-1178

    THOMAS QUESNEL,

    Plaintiff - Appellant,

    v.

    PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

    Defendant - Appellee.

    ____________________

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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Michael Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]

    ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge,

    ___________

    Lynch, Circuit Judge,

    _____________

    and Casellas,* District Judge.

    ______________

    _____________________

    John F. Moriarty, Jr., with whom Moriarty & Neves was

    ______________________ _________________

    brief for appellant.

    Burton J. Fishman, with whom Tucker, Flyer & Lewis and

    _________________ _____________________

    Patrick Reilly were on brief for appellee.

    ______________

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    ____________________

    September 25, 1995

    ____________________

    ____________________

    * Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.

    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Plaintiff-appellant T

    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge

    _____________

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    Quesnel challenges the district court's dismissal of his wron

    termination action, originally brought in state court, aga

    his former employer, Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudentia

    The district court found that Quesnel's claim necessit

    analysis of the collective bargaining agreement binding

    parties, and accordingly held the claim to be preempte

    federal labor law. For the following reasons, we affirm.

    BACKGROUND

    BACKGROUND

    Quesnel began his employment at Prudential a

    district agent, and became a sales manager in 1991. He l

    returned to the level of district agent in September of

    year.

    Throughout Quesnel's period of employment, Pruden

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    agents were employed and compensated. The CBA also set fo

    inter alia, grievance procedures, which provided for

    _____ ____

    arbitration of grievances for wrongful termination. Quesnel

    Prudential were also parties to a standard Agent's Agree

    which set forth the scope of the agency relationship.

    Quesnel was terminated in March 1992. He filed

    action in Massachusetts state court in May 1994, claiming

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    Prudential had terminated him for the purpose of denying hi

    earned commissions, which, under Massachusetts law, is consi

    a wrongful termination. See Fortune National Cash Register

    ___ _______________________________

    373 Mass. 96, 104-05 (1977). Prudential removed the case to

    United States District Court for the District of Massachuse

    and moved to dismiss Quesnel's claim on the grounds that it

    preempted by federal labor law and that Quesnel had faile

    exhaust his administrative remedies available to him under

    terms of the CBA. Quesnel responded that he was not a membe

    the Union and therefore not a party to the CBA. Instead,

    argued, his employment relationship with Prudential

    controlled by the Agent's Agreement, which, he asserted,

    independent of the CBA, and thus his claims were not preemp

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    Accordingly, Quesnel moved for remand to state court.

    On February 1, 1995, the district court gra

    Prudential's motion to dismiss and denied Quesnel's request

    remand. The district court ruled that because "no court c

    begin to address [Quesnel's] claims here without immersing it

    in the CBA," Quesnel's state law claims were preempted u

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    principles of federal labor law. The court then dismi

    Quesnel's claim because it was governed by the NLRA and bec

    Quesnel was time barred from any recovery.2

    DISCUSSION

    DISCUSSION

    A. Standard of Review A. Standard of Review

    __________________

    Appellate review of a district court's dismissal u

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is plenary. We therefore apply the

    standard as did the district court, that "'a complaint shoul

    be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it app

    beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of fact

    support of his claim which would entitle him to relie

    Miranda v. Ponce Fed'l Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1

    _______ _________________

    (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

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    ______ ______

    B. Preemption of Quesnel's Claim

    B. Preemption of Quesnel's Claim

    _____________________________

    The sole issue before us is whether Quesnel's state

    claims are preempted as a matter of law under 301(a) of

    Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a).3 It

    ____________________

    2 The CBA sets forth grievance and arbitration procedures

    wrongful termination. Quesnel did not pursue these remedies,

    the time limit for seeking relief under the CBA has lap

    Finding that Quesnel was subject to the CBA, the district c

    accordingly dismissed his claims for failure to exhaust t

    administrative remedies.

    3 Section 301(a) provides:

    Suits for violation of contracts between

    an employer and a labor organization

    representing employees in an industry

    affecting commerce as defined in this

    chapter, or between any such labor

    organizations, may be brought in any

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    district court of the United States

    having jurisdiction of the parties,

    -4-

    well-established that 301 completely preempts a state law c

    if the resolution of the claim necessitates analysis of,

    substantially depends on the meaning of, a collective bargai

    agreement. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,

    ______ ____________________________________

    U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471

    ____________________ _____

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    202, 220 (1985); Magerer v. John Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525,

    _______ __________________

    (1st Cir. 1990).

    1. Does Quesnel's claim require interpretation of

    1. Does Quesnel's claim require interpretation of

    _____________________________________________

    CBA?

    CBA?

    ____

    Assuming Quesnel is subject to the CBA, we

    determine whether resolution of his claims in the instant

    necessitates analysis of, or substantially depends upon

    meaning of, the CBA. If so, then his claims must be dismisse

    preempted in light of the foregoing principles. Having caref

    examined the CBA, we think that the district court corre

    found that the CBA is directly implicated in any resolutio

    Quesnel's claims. The CBA sets forth the terms and scope of

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    employment relationship of all district agents, encompas

    rates of pay, wages, and conditions of employ

    Significantly, the CBA sets forth grievance procedures

    alleged wrongful termination. Determination of whether Que

    was indeed wrongfully terminated, and whether his failure

    follow grievance procedures set forth in the CBA nonethe

    precludes his claim would require a court, as the district c

    ____________________

    without respect to the amount in

    controversy or without respect to the

    citizenship of the parties.

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    found, to immerse itself in the CBA's terms. Interpretatio

    the CBA is therefore crucial to any resolution of Quesn

    claim.

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    2. Is Quesnel subject to the CBA?

    2. Is Quesnel subject to the CBA?

    ______________________________

    Because we find that resolution of Quesnel's cl

    require interpretation of the CBA, his claims are preempte

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    Quesnel is indeed subject to the CBA's terms. Quesnel wi

    does not dispute this; rather, he claims that his employ

    relationship with Prudential was governed not by the CBA,

    solely by the Agent's Agreement, and therefore his claims s

    be adjudicated in state court. At the very least, Que

    argues, there exists a genuine issue of material fact a

    whether he is subject to the CBA.4

    Whether Quesnel is subject to the CBA is in this c

    however, a question of law, not of fact. See Coll v.

    ___ ____

    Diagnostics Systems, Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1122 (1st Cir. 1

    __________________________

    (interpretation of contract is a question of law); Whitney B

    ________

    v. Sprafkin, 3 F.3d 530, 534 (1st Cir. 1993) (same).

    ________

    examining the CBA and the Agent's Agreement, we conclude tha

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    is clear that Quesnel is indeed subject to the CBA's te

    First, the CBA was effective on the date Quesnel beca

    district agent, and by its terms encompasses "all District A

    employed or hereafter to be employed" by Prudential, inclu

    those agents employed in the company's Massachusetts offices.

    ____________________

    4 Quesnel contends that because the district court went be

    the pleadings by considering the CBA, the Agent's Agreement,

    an affidavit of Quesnel, it was actually treating Prudenti

    motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, and that we

    therefore apply the standard of review applicable to su

    judgment decisions. As we explain, however, because we conc

    as a matter of law that Quesnel's claim is preempted,

    arguments regarding the appropriate standard of review

    irrelevant.

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    Second, regardless of the fact that Quesnel was n

    Union member, he is a member of the bargaining unit for

    benefit the CBA was created. The Union was and is obli

    under 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C

    159(a), to represent the interests of all employees in collec

    ___

    bargaining, including nonmembers. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386

    ___ ____ _____

    171 (1967) (unions must fairly represent all employees in a

    for which it is exclusive bargaining representative). Theref

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    the fact that Quesnel is not a Union member does not remove

    from the bargaining unit for whose benefit the CBA was crea

    See Saunders v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 927 F.2d 1154, 1156 ( ___ ________ ___________________

    Cir. 1991) (individual employee is bound by terms of collec

    bargaining agreement even if not a union member). Indeed, in

    brief Quesnel essentially concedes that he was a member of

    bargaining unit of the CBA, and maintains that he could

    _____

    invoked the CBA's grievance and arbitration procedures,

    properly chose not to. Quesnel cannot pick and choose amon

    avenues of remedy, however; having been a member of

    bargaining unit and received the benefits of the CBA

    employed, Quesnel cannot now disclaim it. The grie

    procedures set forth in the CBA is exclusive of other dis

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    resolution mechanisms.

    Finally, we do not think that the Agent's Agree

    displaces or in any way substitutes for the CBA. The Age

    Agreement does not deal with terms and conditions of employ

    or with grievance procedures, as does the CBA. Rather,

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    Agent's Agreement merely delineates Prudential's busi

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    policies applicable to district agents. Moreover, Articles

    and XXVII of the CBA specifically reference and amend the Age

    Agreement, a strong indication that the Agent's Agreement is

    intended to supplant, but merely to supplement, the CBA.

    therefore find that Quesnel is subject to the terms of the

    and that his claims are, accordingly, preempted.

    CONCLUSION

    CONCLUSION

    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

    ______

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