Pulling out of landed property: the Oxford colleges and the Church Commissioners

Area (2000) 32.3, 297-306

Pulling out of colleges and

landed property: the Oxford the Church Commissioners

David Spencer Department of Geography, University of Reading, Whiteknights, Reading, RG6 6AB

Email: [email protected]

Revised manuscript received 28 April 1999.

Summary This paper assesses the extent to which the Oxford coileges-like the Church Commissioners-have transferred capital out of landed property as part of a broader project of asset re-structuring. It argues that explanation lies in changes to the rules of accumulation, which were the outcome of a series of political and ideological conflicts between the colleges and the central state.

In trod uction

Over the last 20 years, the ’traditional’ landowning institutions’ in Britain have become more like the ’newer’ financial institutions in so far as their landownership is part of a broader strategy of maximizing the return from their investments. Indeed, some have withdrawn their capital from land if yields have been considered too low (see, for example, Munton 1985; Massey and Catalan0 1978; the Northfield Com- mittee 1979; Norton-Taylor 1982; Shoard 1987; Hamnett 1987). Hamnett’s analysis of the changing investment strategies of the Church Commissioners’ is, arguably, the prime exemplar of geographical research in this idiom, and forms the basis for the analysis and discussion presented in this paper.

Hamnett points out that before the late 194Os/ early 195Os, decisions to pull out of land were not taken solely on economic grounds but were tempered by social, ideological, and moral considerations. However, in the post-war era ‘. . . the Commission’s obligations to maximize the income from their assets for their beneficiaries-the clergy- quickly led to the adoption of a more explicitly commercial approach to the management of their assets’ (Hamnett 1987, 480). This new strategy took the form of disinvestment in low yielding agricultural, residential, and commercial property (and some fixed interest securities) and the re-investment of the proceeds in higher yielding sectors, especially urban real estate. Even though the Commissioners

continued to retain some low-cost housing investments to help those in need, Hamnett maintains that their social obligations became marginal to their major objective of income growth.

The Annual Reports and Accounts of the Church Commissioners for the period 1985-97 show that they have continued to operate in this manner, relying heavily upon urban commercial and residential sectors. However, the Commissioners were adversely affected by the recession in this sector in 1 990/91, primarily because they had borrowed heavily in order to finance a substantial development programme. Since then, they have followed profes- sional advice by re-investing in the stock market, retaining agricultural holdings that were of good quality, and building up a substantial development land bank.3 However, the Commissioners have con- sistently maintained that their attitude towards their remaining holdings reflects the manner in which their business considerations are tempered by strict ethical and environmental guidelines. When selling land for development, for example, they have under- taken to consider its likely impact on local com- munities and to ensure that proper weight is given to environmental issues.

The objectives of this paper

This paper has two objectives. The first is to critically assess suggestions of a convergence between the ’traditional’ institutional proprietors and the ‘newer’

ISSN 0004-0894 0 Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2000

298 Spencer

category of financial landownership in relation to their strategic conduct and ideologies of ownership. At present, only Hamnett’s (1987) analysis of the Church Commissioners has convincingly indicated that important similarities may be emerging. Conse- quently, in order to make valid generalizations, other traditional institutional proprietors must be subjected to closer scrutiny than has been the case to date: while the financial strategies of those which have received little or no attention must be examined. This paper will ascertain whether one relatively neglected group of ‘traditional’ institutional landowners-the Oxford Colleges5-have also come to regard their landed property assets as an investment like any other.

In order to pursue this objective, Hamnett’s approach is followed closely. Analysis and discussion will focus upon the extent to which the colleges have withdrawn from land, coupled with an assessment of how far this has been part of a broader strategy of shifting capital within and out of landed property, urban real estate, and stock market securities from the 186Os/7Os up to the late 1990s. At times, the focus will be upon the ‘historic’ colleges6 as a whole. Clearly, however, aggregate trends are the outcome of strategic conduct by colleges who vary considerably as regards the value of their endowments, the nature and structure of their investments, their attachment to their landed assets, their conceptions of what is a relatively safe (or risky) business strategy, and their experiences of investing in each sector. In order to highlight similarities and differences, three colleges have been singled out for closer examination, namely Magdalen (one of the richest), Merton (a relatively rich college) and Oriel (middle-ranking) (for an explanation for the selection of these case study colleges see Spencer 1999a).

Hamnett interprets the changing strategic conduct of the Church as a response to economic impera- tives. The second objective of this paper is to broaden Hamnett’s line of explanation by focusing upon how and why changes were made to the rules of accumulation within which traditional landowning institutions have been obliged to operate. As far as the colleges are concerned, changes to these rules must be examined in the context of political and ideological struggles between the colleges and the state as successive governments sought to re-shape them in a manner consistent with their vision of a changing society, polity, and economy.

Asset re-structuring

The disposal of landed property prior to World War I When the Cleveland Commission reported in 1873, the Oxford colleges owned nearly 185,000 acres from which they generated 85 per cent of their gross external income. However, as Figure 1 shows, the next 40-50 years saw a steady decline in the importance of income derived from agriculture, with a marked drop in the 1880s and 1890s. Although this may be explained partly by a fall in receipts during a time of agricultural depression (Jones 1997), records compiled around the turn of the century’ nevertheless show that both the Oxford and Cambridge colleges had taken steps to re-structure their assets, albeit under difficult market circumstances. More- over, the report of the Asquith Committee (1922) noted that total collegiate landholdings had fallen to around 169,000 acres by 1919.

Magdalen was one of a number of Oxford colleges which made efforts to dispose of its less valuable holdings during this period. Between 1871 and 1885, Magdalen sold 1,308 acres in 1 7 parishes across 11 counties as the college began to focus its agricultural investments upon lowland England? At this time, Magdalen, Merton, and Oriel had all developed a strategy of re-investing some of the proceeds of their land sales into urban real property, which is consistent with the increasing contribution of urban house rents to total endowment income for all colleges as shown in Figure 1 (although, once again, this increase came about partly because agricultural revenues were relatively depressed). Merton in particular benefitted from switching capital into this sector. The 191 4 Bursar’s Report shows that its urban rentals tripled in the period 1897-1913, their contribution to endowment income increasing from 23 to 36 per cent. Clearly, however, most colleges were avoiding government securities before World War 1. Figure 1 shows that the contribution made by dividends to gross endowment income was extremely modest, increasing by only two percentage points over four decades.

Despite some success in diversifying their sources of income in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries, however, the colleges lagged behind the progress made by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. According to Dunbabin (1975) and Massey and Catalan0 (1978), only one third of all the Church’s income was derived from their landed assets in the early 1870s, falling to as little as 13 per cent by 191 3.

Pulling out of landed property 299

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7 0 - .- c

i! 6 0 - s 3 5 0 - 0 8 40 -

30 -

= 20- n 8 lo-,

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Landed property lands at rack rents, beneficial leases,

copyholds, fines and tithes)

All house property (rack rents, beneficial leases and long leases)

/ - - /

I I I

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- - - # Dividends and interest _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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1871 1883 1893 1903 1913 Source: calculations from J.P.D. Dunbabin, 1975. table 4

Figure 1 income, 1871-1913

The historic Oxford Colleges: the declining significance of their landed

Over the same period, the contribution of urban rentals to the Church‘s income rose from 19.1 per cent to 32 per cent. Dividends and interest payments followed a similar pattern.

The diminishing significance of agricultural property rentals during the inter-war years It was not until after the Great War that the behaviour of the colleges began to parallel that of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. It began with their participation in a process whereby around a quarter of all agricultural land in England changed hands shortly after the ending of hostilities. While most colleges capitalized upon the fact that their tenant farmers were in a good position to purchase,their holdings at this time, some were more eager to pull out of land than others. Much depended upon the extent to which they had disposed of their less remunerative land in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Oriel, for example, still possessed a considerable amount of low-yielding property (Bagnell- Wild 1964; Vallis 1991), but took full advantage of the changed economic climate in order to sell virtu- ally all of i ts holdings between 1919 and 1921.9 By re-invekting the whole of the proceeds in government securities, Oriel almost doubled its endowment income. Having already disposed of considerable tracts of land subjected to beneficial leases,”

Magdalen calculated that it was in a position to meet its liabilities without radically changing its accumulation strategies. The net outcome of such diverse patterns of behaviour is depicted in Figure 3. By 1926 land rents (plus tithes) had fallen to 44 per cent of the gross external receipts of the ‘historic’ colleges. By way of comparison, however, it should be noted that this figure had been recorded by the Church some 50 years earlier.

With the onset of the agricultural depression in the inter-war era it became more difticult for colleges to dispose of their agricultural assets to their tenant farmers. Consequently, the sustained decline in the relative importance of the agricultural components of collegiate income (Figure 2) may be attributed to falling revenues as much as to land sales. Indeed, facing the prospect of taking land in hand, some richer colleges (such as Magdalen) had little option other than to retain their property and agree to rent remissions on some of their estates. In contrast, however, there is evidence that another group of colleges-both rich and less well endowed-were successfully re-organizing their holdings at this time. Merton was a case in point; it was actively buying and selling as part of a strategy of spreading its investments in roughly equal proportions between high-yielding agricultural land, urban real estate, and approved securities in order to minimize the effects

300 Spencer

i - a

0

60

40

20

- - - - I I I I I I

Dividends and interest

Houses at rack rent, beneficial < leases and other leaseholds

Landed property (including tithes, 1913-26)

1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970

Source: calculations from J.P.D. Dunbabin, 1994, table 24.2

Figure 2 The historic Oxford Colleges: the changing relative importance of agricultural and non-agricultural income, 191 0-70

of a sudden recession in any one sector. Moreover, Merton made windfall profits from selling land for development,’ ’ a considerable proportion of which was poured into productive farmland in eastern England when land prices were depressed. In the case of less well endowed colleges, such as Oriel, the purchase price of some non-agricultural investments (especially high yielding government securities) was considered unacceptably high (Vallis 1991 ). Consequently, Oriel’s Bursar reluctantly agreed to re-enter the land market.

Despite the willingness of some colleges to purchase land, however, the overall trend was towards a greater dependence upon receipts from non- agricultural investments (Figure 2). Returns from urban house property rose steeply from the late 1920s to the mid/late 1930s, and contributed around 45 per cent of all endowment income by the end of World War II. According to Dunbabin ( 1 980), some of the proceeds of the f1.5 million derived from the sale of low-yielding property went into the stock market, reflected in the growing significance of returns from this source before the outbreak of the War (Figure 2).

The post war era: the growing significance of non-agricultural investment sectors Although agricultural rentals re-gained their relative importance during the war years, their significance began to wane once more throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Similarly, as Figure 2 shows, the relative importance of urban sources of income slipped back

to inter-war levels. These trends reflect the determi- nation of some of the richer colleges to exploit the high-yielding investment opportunities which were beginning to emerge on the stock market.”

Despite the fall in the importance of receipts from the colleges’ agricultural investments at this time, however, they remained considerably more dependent upon a landed income than did the Church. According to Hamnett ( 1 987), only 4 per cent of the Church’s income was derived from agriculture in 1958, rising slightly to 6.2 per cent in 1976. As far as stocks and shares are concerned, their importance to the Church and colleges also varies. Hamnett’s figures show that the Church was becoming less reliant upon this sector, the contribution of dividends and interest payments falling from 60 per cent of total income in 1948 to 46 per cent in 1976. In contrast, the significance of this source of revenue to the colleges was increasing steadily in the post-war era, rising to 43 per cent by the early 1970s. Hamnett stresses that the Church came to depend heavily upon urban property rentals-both residential and commercial-after the early 1950s. These rose steadily throughout that decade, reaching 3 1 per cent of all income in 1958 and 41 per cent by 1976. Over this same period, however, the contribution made by urban rentals to total college revenues fell by 7 percentage points.

Dunbabin’s ( 1 994) survey of collegiate landownership revealed that their holdings had fallen to 127,690 acres by 1989. The annual summaries of the accounts of the Oxford colleges show that this


Yo a) All "Histork" Colleges

6o 1

0 - - - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - . - - - _ _ _ _ 198W81 1985/86 1990/91 19w97

Years

% c) Merton College

6o 1

- - - - - - _ _ _ - - .--- 0 _ - *

1980/81 1985/86 1990/91 19w97 I I I I

Years

Interest & dividends - Urban land - -

% b) Magdalen College

- - - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . 0 _ _ - - - - - - 198W81 1985/86 1990/91 1996/97

Years

d) Oriel College %

40

. _ - - - - . . . . . . . . ............... I I I I

1980/81 1985/86 1990/91 199W97 Years

Agricultural land - - - Other .....

Source: University of Oxford: Accounts of the Colleges for years shown

Figure 3 The historic Oxford Colleges: changing sources of endowment income, 1980/81 to 1996/97. (a) All colleges; (b) Magdalen College; (c) Merton College; (d) Oriel College

was paralleled by a decline in the relative importance of their landed incomes, a trend that has continued up to the mid/late 1990s. Aggregate figures for the period 1980/81 to 1996/97 are presented in Figure 3a. After 1985/86, the relative importance of receipts from agricultural rents fell sharply (although like all receipts they increased in absolute terms). By 1990/91, they comprised around 12 per cent of gross endowment income, remaining at this level throughout the decade. The contribution made by urban rentals rose slightly throughout the 1980s (although in money terms they rose almost four fold). Similarly, absolute returns from dividends and interest payments increased dramatically after 1980/81 to reach f22.2 million in 1990/91, by which time they accounted for more than half of all gross collegiate endowment income (Figure 3a). During the next 6-7 years, however, both the money value and relative importance of stock market investments declined slightly. Currently, the colleges are looking towards their non-agricultural assets for almost four-fifths of their endowment income. By way of

comparison, however, the Church Commissioners have moved even further away from agriculture. Their Annual Report and Accounts for 1997 shows that their combined receipts from urban property and the stock market amounted to f 1 15 million, comprising around 93 per cent of all investment income.

Figures 3b, c, and d highlight the sheer variety of investment strategies pursued by the three case study colleges since the early 1980s. Merton college has, historically, looked to retain capital in agriculture as part of a long-standing policy of spreading its investments, and with 20-30 per cent of its income generated from this source has remained considerably more dependent on it than the others (and indeed the 'historic' colleges as a whole). At the other extreme, Oriel has lost faith in agricultural property rentals, having experienced poorer than anticipated yields from purchases made during the inter-war and early post-war years (Vallis, 1991) and has become heavily dependent upon the urban property market-considerably more so than

302 Spencer

Merton or Magdalen. The stock market has clearly side of England-from Northumberland through been a major attraction to Magdalen since 1980, its Lincolnshire and Cambridgeshire into Kent-with returns from agriculture declining steadily since this other large and valuable assets in Lancashire time in line with the aggregate trends for all colleges. and Cumbria (Hamnett 1987 figure 1 ). The Com- Magdalen’s behaviour (Figure 3b) reflects its post missioners’ Annual Report and Accounts for 1 99013 war policy of disposing of a large proportion of i ts shows that this pattern has changed little. agricultural assets.

The spatial re-distribution of landed Explaining collegiate strategic conduct

property Despite the overall tendency of the colleges to pull out of landed property after the 187Os, it has been regarded as a relatively secure long-term investment in sub-regions renowned for productive farmland. According to Dunbabin (1 994 table 24.3), between 1871 and 1920 substantial investments were therefore made in Buckinghamshire (3,000 acres) and Hertfordshire (around 4,000 acres), while more modest acquisitions occurred in Leicestershire, Cambridgeshire, Kent, Gloucestershire, and Wiltshire. However, a more striking spatial re-organization of collegiate landed property has come about since the 1920s. Most collegiate holdings became concentrated in a group of counties forming a broad south west-north east corridor extending from Berkshire through Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire into Northamptonshire and Uncolnshire. Good quality arable farmland in Lincolnshire has proved particularly attractive to the colleges. Merton in particular purchased a number of large and capital-intensive farms, spending f285,OOO between the early 1930s and the late 1940s. The aggregate landholdings of the ‘historic’ colleges in this county increased five fold between the 1920s and late 1980s (from 3,600 to 18,000 acres) and by 1988/89 14 per cent of all their landed property was located in this one county.

Hamnett’s (1 987) analysis of the re-structuring of the landed property assets of the Church in the post-war era shows some similarities. Through shrewd sales, purchases, and the retention of their better holdings the Commissioners came to own large, productive, and generally well-managed estates as opposed to the smaller, more scattered, and less productive holdings which they had once relied upon. Like the colleges, a number of these were located in central southern England. In contrast, however, several of their principal land holdings (estates covering over 5,000 acres and valued at between f 5 and f10 million) were spread quite widely along a north-south axis along the eastern

Hamnett (1 987) regards the changing strategic conduct of the Church Commissioners as a response to financial crises brought about by the failure of the Church‘s income to grow sufficiently in order to meet its existing (and growing) liabilities. A similar explanation could be advanced for the colleges. By focusing upon the economic environment per se, however, there is a danger of subscribing to an involuntarist model of structure and agency whereby proprietors simply respond to the changing oppor- tunity costs of retaining capital in the three principal investment sectors. This limitation can be circum- vented by developing a more holistic explanatory framework which incorporates a political/ideological dimension; specifically, by focusing upon the rules of accumulation within which landowning institutions have been obliged to 0 ~ e r a t e . l ~ Hamnett notes that such rules shaped the Church’s financial objectives and hence its strategic conduct. In 1987, when Hamnett’s paper was published, the Commissioners were forbidden to borrow money against their assets and were therefore principally concerned with income ma~imization.’~ However, Hamnett says little about the origin of these rules, what they were intended to achieve, and the political processes through which they were formulated and re-formulated.

Research has shown that, over the long term, the state has been anxious to regulate the circumstances under which the traditional landowning institutions were empowered to participate in capitalist economic relations. As far as the colleges are concerned, the switch to more business-like behaviour discussed above must be interpreted in relation to the re-making of the rules of accumulation. These were not, however, re-written simply to draw the colleges more fully into capitalist economic relations, neither does their relaxation reflect sympathy on the part of the state for the plight of the colleges when the scale of their agricultural revenues were threatened. Change can only be understood in a much broader sense, namely in relation to attempts by the state to


re-define what kinds of institutions the Oxford colleges should become.

For over a century, the state became embroiled in an ideological dispute over which of two competing models of higher education-liberal or utilitarian-should underpin the role played by Oxbridge in a changing society (for full details see Halsey 1992; Salter and Tapper 1994; Tapper and Salter 1992). The state’s objective was to promote the utilitarian view, to give ‘ - a rationale to the entry of the university into the modern world in the search for new and more effective solutions to age-old human needs’ (Halsey 1992, 49) which it believed would come from the development of the sciences. While a number of University reformists were sym- pathetic with the state’s aims, conservative interests within the colleges were deeply sceptical. They insisted that, as independent and privately-endowed institutions, any contribution the colleges made to the University (and indeed society) should be on their own terms, that is in accordance with the liberal ideology of education to which they subscribed. From the state’s perspective, the colleges were relatively rich, the University poor. Making Oxford func- tion in a manner increasingly conducive to the advancement of national social and economic objectives therefore necessitated the implementation of procedures whereby some college resources would be transfered to the University and allocated to the development of teaching and research in the sciences under the control of the University authorities.

Clearly, it was in the interests of both the state and the colleges to ensure that college finances would become (and remain) robust. The success of the state’s reformist project depended upon the financial strength of the colleges. Although the colleges regarded any notion of compulsory re-distribution of their resources to the University as unwarranted interference in their financial affairs, they appreciated that they could use their negotiating power to re-shape the rules of accumulation. This would ensure that their private financial resources would grow, ideally to a level that would more than offset any compulsory payments into University coffers.

A series of negotiations between these two powerful institutional actors (often culminating in official commissions of inquiry into Oxbridge) brought about the gradual loosening of the regulatory framework within which the colleges were obliged to operate. The outcome was a succession of regulatory regimes (for a full discussion see

Spencer 1999b). Each was defined by a combination of specific rules of accumulation and income re- distribution through legally binding statutes (and, in the case of income re-distribution, some informal procedures). Two sets of rules of accumulation can be identified. The first was concerned with private property rights which, as Munton (1995) has stressed, are maintained and modified by the state, and which has clearly been the case as far as the colleges are concerned. The second set of rules defined the economic sectors in which the colleges were permitted to invest.

Following legislation in 1858 and 1860, the property rights of the colleges were re-defined in a manner which put them in a position to exploit their land fully as both a production and capital asset. For the first time, colleges were empowered to buy and sell land, charge rack rents, borrow money, and switch capital into approved government securities. This relaxation of the rules of accumulation marked the beginning of the first regime. It lasted until the late 1870s, when changes were made to the existing legislation and a more formal mechanism, the ‘endowment tax‘, was introduced in order to transfer money from the colleges to the University. The statutes and regulations which defined this second regime must be regarded as the context within which colleges re-structured their assets in the latter part of the nineteenth century, as outlined earlier in this paper. During the inter war period, the rules of accumulation were altered once again. Legislation in 1 925 was designed to facilitate asset re-structuring, the Ministry of Agriculture being required to work on behalf of those colleges wishing to re-organize their landed property. The onset of this third regime may therefore explain why some colleges adopted an increasingly business-like approach towards landownership in the inter-war era. However, the most significant de-regulatory actions heralded the onset of the fourth and fifth regimes. In 1954, the colleges were permitted to invest in equities, and a decade later the 1925 Universities and Colleges Estates Act was repealed, all remaining restrictions on investment (and intervention by the Ministry of Agricul- ture) being brought to an end. The removal of these remaining rules of accumulation must go some way towards explaining why an unprecedented rational- ization of collegiate assets has taken place over the last three decades, with increased emphasis placed upon returns from the stock market.

Asset re-structuring therefore reflects the collec- tive ’reading’ of the possibilities for action by the

304 Spencer

colleges in the face of a changing structure, notably the five regulatory regimes through which the state pursued its political and ideological objectives. How- ever, the empirical evidence presented in this paper illustrates that the colleges did not respond instan- taneously to the emergence of new investment opportunities following each relaxation of the rules of accumulation, neither did they pursue the same strategy during each regime. Aggregate strategic conduct has been the product of quite marked variations in the manner in which strategic objectives have been formulated, revised, and translated into action.

Conclusions

This paper has highlighted some close parallels between the strategic conduct of the Oxford colleges and the Church. In doing so, it has sub- stantiated notions of a convergence between the ‘traditional’ institutional landowners and ’newer’ financial institutions in terms of prevailing ideologies of landownership and strategic conduct. Over the long term, both have disposed of a large proportion of their landed property in order to capitalize upon the emergence of new and highly profitable investment opportunities. As a result, their importance as landowners has gradually declined as the twentieth century has progressed. Withdrawing from land has brought about the spatial re-organization of their landed assets, the bulk of their property now being located in productive agricultural regions. Moreover, in both cases the post-war era in particular has witnessed a sharp break with long-established accumulation strategies; indeed, by the 1950s/60s both were treating their land as a commodity and have continued to do so. In the words of Bagnell-Wild (1 964, 17), former treasurer of Oriel College:

It is true that the treasurer enjoys visiting farms and is sometimes soft hearted to the tenants, but the close connection between the Provost and Fellows of Oriel and the tenants and cottagers has gone. . . . No longer do we regard ourselves as Lords of the Manor with a personal interest in tenants and their affairs; farms are something to buy like stocks and shares or urban property.

Nevertheless, until recently, the colleges have dif- fered from the Church as regards their motivation for adopting a more business-like approach. When Hamnett’s (1 987) paper was published, the Church’s main concern was to maximize its income (and

income growth), while the colleges aimed to achieve both income and capital growth. Since the early 1990s, however, these differences have been eroded as both the colleges and the Church have sought to generate income and ensure that the capital value of their assets rises. This has also brought about a convergence as regards the dependence of both institutions upon the stock market.

Following Massey and Catalan0 (1 978), Hamnett (1 987) concluded that the Church adapted to capi- talism and became transformed into financial landownership. The same point can be made in relation to the behaviour of the colleges. Nevertheless, this study has shown that to restrict explanation to the economic domain is to overlook the political and ideological processes which also brought about change. While the changing fortunes of agriculture, urban real estate, and the stock market are of explanatory significance in so far as they influenced the timing of the emergence of intra- and inter- sectoral re-investment, the protracted struggles through which the opportunities for re-investment were gradually created is also of great significance. It was the outcome of these struggles, notably the changing rules of accumulation, which empowered the colleges to behave in a more capitalistic manner than hitherto.

This explanatory framework need not be restricted to the study of the Oxford colleges. It may be developed in order to explain why other ’traditional’ institutional landowners, including the Church Com- missioners and the Crown Estates Commissioners, have also treated their landed property as a commodity. The re-organization of their capital assets in the context of the state’s role as a regulator of institutions occupying a central place in the social formation (and the tensions and struggles which have emerged) require detailed investigation. Given that the Church Commissioners are answerable to Parliament for their actions, the nature of their relationship with the state and the political and ideological context within which rules of accumulation were changed needs to be unravelled. The reasons why the Commissioners were empowered to borrow money (and indeed, under certain circumstances, spend capital) need to be identified because it was the relaxation of pre-existing rules that subse- quently brought about their financial difficulties and ultimately a change of strategic conduct. The activi- ties of the Crown Estates Commissioners also need to be investigated along these lines. Like the Church


and the colleges, their sphere of action was re- defined following legislation between 1952 and 1961. But in marked contrast their dealings have remained largely in land, and they have not been given permission to invest in equities and borrow money.

Notes

1 This group comprises the Crown, the Church, and various semi-public bodies (such as the Universities and colleges, government departments, local authorities, the nationalized industries, and some charities).

2 The Ecclesiastical Commissioners administered the Church’s finances before the the Church Com- missioners took on this responsibility shortly after the end of World War I I .

3 In 1997, their holdings totalled 135,000 acres. 4 See, for example, the work of Norton-Taylor ( 1 982) and

Shoard ( 1 987). 5 Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to

undertake a comparative analysis of the similarities and differences in the strategic conduct of the Oxford and Cambridge colleges.

6 The ’historic’ colleges are the 19 founded before 1800, that is Christ Church, Magdalen, New, All Souls, Corpus Christi, Merton, St John’s, Brasenose, Queen’s, Exeter, Oriel, Trinity, Lincoln, University, Balliol, Jesus, Wadham, Pembroke, and Worcester.

7 Universities and Colleges €states Acts Committee, 1896, tables B and C. File MAF 48/213 at Public Records Office.

8 For full details see file MAF 48/213 held at the Public Records Office.

9 For details of all transactions see Spencer 1999a tables 1, 2, and 3.

10 This was a system involving a small annual reserved rent together with a periodic fine (lump sum payment) for renewal of the lease.

1 1 For details of Merton College’s transactions at this time see the Bursar’s Reports for 1934 and 1949 (held at Merton College); also files MAF 48/512 and MAF 48/686 held at the Public Records Office.

12 Dunbabin (1980 table 2) shows that some of the f16 million received by the nine richest colleges from the sale of low-yielding urban and rural investments shortly after the end of the war found its way into securities and (increasingly) equities. This group of colleges also received f 1,718,000 under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1954 as compensation for not being allowed to develop some of their land, much of which also went into this same sector (Dunbabin ibid).

13 At the time of writing, this is the most recent annual report which portrays the spatial distribution of their land holdings.

14 For a full discussion of the theoretical principles which underpin this perspective see Spencer, 1999b.

15 However, this regulation was withdrawn in the late 1980s and led to financial difficulties a few years later when urban property rentals and prices collapsed.

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Documents

Pulling out of landed property: the Oxford colleges and the Church Commissioners