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Eleazar Quinto and Gerino Tolentino vs Comelec(Puno, 2010)

Facts:

The assailed Decision declared asunconstitutional Section 4(a) of Resolution

8678, the second proviso in the third paragraphof Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) 9369, andSection 66 of the Omnibus Election Code,mainly on the ground that they violate the equalprotection clause of the Constitution and sufferfrom overbreadth.

COMELEC and movants-intervenors filed anMR.

SC now reverses this decision.

Issue/ Held:W/N the laws stated above areunconstitutional. | NO.

Ratio: Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a

faithful reflection of the present state of the lawand jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:

o Under Section 13 of RA 9369, anyperson holding a public appointiveoffice or position, including activemembers of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines, and officers andemployees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall beconsidered ipso facto resigned from hisoffice upon the filing of his certificate of

candidacy. On the other hand, anelected official may run for anotherposition without forfeiting his seat.These laws and regulations implementSection 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987Constitution, which prohibits civilservice officers and employees fromengaging in any electioneering orpartisan political campaign.

The constitutional ban does not cover electedofficials, notwithstanding the fact that the civilservice embraces all branches, subdivisions,instrumentalities, and agencies of theGovernment, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charters.This is because elected public officials engagein partisan political activities almost all yearround, even outside of the campaign period.

The prohibition notwithstanding, civil serviceofficers and employees are allowed to vote, aswell as express their views on political issues,or mention the names of certain candidates forpublic office whom they support

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 ofRA 9369, and Section 66 of the OmnibusElection Code Do Not Violate the EqualProtection Clause

Substantial distinctions clearly exist betweenelective officials and appointive officials. Theformer occupy their office by virtue of themandate of the electorate. They are elected toan office for a definite term and may beremoved therefrom only upon stringentconditions. On the other hand, appointiveofficials hold their office by virtue of theirdesignation thereto by an appointing authority.Some appointive officials hold their office in apermanent capacity and are entitled to securityof tenure while others serve at the pleasure ofthe appointing authority.

Appointive officials, as officers and employeesin the civil service, are strictly prohibited from

engaging in any partisan political activity ortake part in any election except to vote. Electiveofficials, or officers or employees holdingpolitical offices, are expressly allowed to takepart in political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section66 of the Omnibus Election Code, thelegislators deemed it proper to treat these twoclasses of officials differently with respect to theeffect on their tenure in the office of the filing ofthe certificates of candidacy for any positionother than those occupied by them.

There is a rational justification for excluding

elected officials from the operation of thedeemed resigned provisions. An election is theembodiment of the popular will, perhaps thepurest expression of the sovereign power of thepeople. It involves the choice or selection ofcandidates to public office by popular vote.Complete deference is accorded to the will ofthe electorate that they be served by suchofficials until the end of the term for which theywere elected. In contrast, there is no suchexpectation insofar as appointed officials areconcerned.

The provisions challenged in the case at bar,

are not violative of the equal protection clause.The deemed-resigned provisions substantiallyserve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficientcivil service faithful to the government and thepeople rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of theappearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii)avoidance of the danger of a powerful politicalmachine; and (iv) ensuring that employeesachieve advancement on their merits and thatthey be free from both coercion and the


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prospect of favor from political activity). Theseare interests that are important enough tooutweigh the non-fundamental right ofappointive officials and employees to seekelective office.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 ofRA 9369, and Section 66 of the OmnibusElection Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth

According to the assailed Decision, thechallenged provisions of law are overly broadbecause they apply indiscriminately to all civilservants holding appointive posts, without dueregard for the type of position being held by theemployee running for elective office and thedegree of influence that may be attendantthereto.

Its underlying assumption appears to be thatthe evils sought to be prevented are extant onlywhen the incumbent appointive official running

for elective office holds an influential post. Sucha view fails to consider a different, yet equallyplausible, threat to the government posed bythe partisan potential of a large and growingbureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuseperpetuated by a "powerful political machine"that has amassed "the scattered powers ofgovernment workers" so as to give itself and itsincumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp onthe reins of power."

The alleged overbreadth is more apparent thanreal. The rules and guidelines set forth inResolution 8678 refer to the filing of certificates

of candidacy and nomination of officialcandidates of registered political parties, inconnection with the May 10, 2010 National andLocal Elections. These rules and guidelines,including the restriction in Section 4(a) ofResolution 8678, were issued specifically forpurposes of the May 10, 2010 National andLocal Elections, which are decidedly partisan incharacter. Thus, it is clear that the restriction inSection 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to thecandidacies of appointive officials vying forpartisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010National and Local Elections. On this score, the

overbreadth challenge leveled against Section4(a) is clearly unsustainable. Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the

Omnibus Election Code are likewise notintended to apply to elections for nonpartisanpublic offices. Elections for barangay officesare the only elections in this country whichinvolve nonpartisan public offices.

As far back as the enactment of the OmnibusElection Code in 1985, Congress has intended

that these nonpartisan barangay elections begoverned by special rules, including a separaterule on deemed resignations which is found inSection 39 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Since barangay elections are governed by aseparate deemed resignation rule, under thepresent state of law, there would be nooccasion to apply the restriction on candidacyfound in Section 66 of the Omnibus ElectionCode, and later reiterated in the proviso ofSection 13 of RA 9369, to any election otherthan a partisan one. For this reason, theoverbreadth challenge raised against Section66 of the Omnibus Election Code and thepertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369must also fail.

Moreover, in order to have a statute declaredas unconstitutional or void on its face for beingoverly broad, particularly where, as in this case,"conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved,

the overbreadth must not only be real, butsubstantial as well, judged in relation to thestatutes plainly legitimate sweep.

SWS v. COMELEC (2001, Mendoza)Facts:

Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS)is a private non-stock, non-profit socialresearch institution conducting surveys invarious fields. On the other hand, petitioner

Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishesthe Manila Standard, a newspaper of generalcirculation.

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition toenjoin the Commission on Elections fromenforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (FairElection Act), which provides that: Surveysaffecting national candidates shall not bepublished fifteen (15) days before an electionand surveys affecting local candidates shall notbe published seven (7) days before anelection.

Petitioners argue that the restriction on the

publication of election survey results constitutesa prior restraint on the exercise of freedom ofspeech without any clear and present danger tojustify such restraint. They claim that SWS andother pollsters conducted and published theresults of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and1998 elections up to as close as two daysbefore the election day without causingconfusion among the voters and that there isneither empirical nor historical evidence to


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support the conclusion that there is animmediate and inevitable danger to tile votingprocess posed by election surveys.

No similar restriction is imposed on politiciansfrom explaining their opinion or on newspapersor broadcast media from writing and publishingarticles concerning political issues up to the dayof the election. They contend that there is noreason for ordinary voters to be denied accessto the results of election surveys, which arerelatively objective.

Respondent Commission on Elections justifiesthe restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 asnecessary to prevent the manipulation andcorruption of the electoral process byunscrupulous and erroneous surveys justbefore the election. It contends that:(1) the prohibition on the publication of electionsurvey results during the period proscribed bylaw bears a rational connection to the objective

of the law, i.e., the prevention of thedebasement of the electoral process resultingfrom manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect,and absence of reply;(2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils"sought to be prevented; and3) the impairment of freedom of expression isminimal, the restriction being limited both induration, i.e., the last 15 days before thenational election and the last 7 days before alocal election, and in scope as it does notprohibit election survey results but only requiretimeliness.

Issue:Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes anunconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,expression and the press?Held: yes, it constitutes an unconstitutionalabridgement of freedom of expression, speech and thepress.Ratio:5.4 is invalid because:(1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom ofexpression,(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category ofexpression even though such suppression is only for alimited period, and

(3) the governmental interest sought to be promotedcan be achieved by means other than suppression offreedom of expression.

The O 'Brien test was employed to determinethe constitutional validity of 5.4. The UnitedStates Supreme Court, through Chief JusticeWarren, held in United States v. O 'Brien:Government regulation is sufficiently justified:

[1] if it is within the constitutional power of theGovernment;

[2] if it furthers an important or substantialgovernmental interest;[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to thesuppression of free expression; and[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged FirstAmendment freedoms [of speech, expressionand press] is no greater than is essential to thefurtherance of that interest.

Under this test, even if a law furthers animportant or substantial governmental interest,it should be invalidated if such governmentalinterest is "not unrelated to the Expression offree expression." Moreover, even if the purposeis unrelated to the suppression of free speech,the law should nevertheless be invalidated ifthe restriction on freedom of expression isgreater than is necessary to achieve thegovernmental purpose in question.

First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O'Brien test because the causal connection of

expression to the asserted governmentalinterest makes such interest "not related to thesuppression of free expression."

By prohibiting the publication of election surveyresults because of the possibility that suchpublication might undermine the integrity of theelection, 5.4 actually suppresses a wholeclass of expression, while allowing theexpression of opinion concerning the samesubject matter by newspaper columnists, radioand TV commentators, armchair theorists, andother opinion takers.

In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular

subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referringpersonal opinion to statistical results.

The prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot bejustified on the ground that it is only for a limitedperiod and is only incidental. The prohibitionmay be for a limited time, but the curtailment ofthe right of expression is direct, absolute, andsubstantial. It constitutes a total suppression ofa category of speech and is not made less sobecause it is only for a period of fifteen (15)days immediately before a national election andseven (7) days immediately before a localelection.

Second. Even if the governmental interestsought to be promoted is unrelated to thesuppression of speech and the resultingrestriction of free expression is only incidental,5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] ofthe O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction benot greater than is necessary to further thegovernmental interest.

As already stated, 5.4 aims at the preventionof last-minute pressure on voters, the creation


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of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or"losing" candidates, and resort to the form ofelection cheating called "dagdag-bawas."Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulationmight be, they cannot be attained at thesacrifice of the fundamental right of expression,when such aim can be more narrowly pursuedby punishing unlawful acts, rather than speechbecause of apprehension that such speechcreates the danger of such evils.

MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects asinappropriate the test of clear and present danger fordetermining the validity of 5.4. Hence, while it may beuseful for determining the validity of laws dealing withinciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it may not beadequate for such regulations as the one in question.For such a test is concerned with questions of thegravity and imminence of the danger as basis forcurtailing free speech, which is not the case of 5.4 andsimilar regulations. Instead, MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN

purports to engage in a form of balancing by "weighingand balancing the circumstances todetermine whetherpublic interest is served by the regulation of the freeenjoyment of the rights". The dissenting opinion simplyconcludes that the objectives of Section 5.4 are valid. Itmay be seen that its limitingimpact on the rights of freespeech and of the press is not unduly repressive orunreasonable.

ABSCBN v Comelec (2000, Panganiban)

FACTS:This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing Comelec en

banc Resolution No. 98-1419 1 dated April 21, 1998which issued a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN orany other groups, its agents or representatives fromconducting exit survey for the 1998 elections.

Comelec insists that the issuance of the resolution was"pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers topromote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11,1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintainthe secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that"the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse andinfluence the voters," and that the surveys weredesigned "to condition the minds of people and cause

confusion as to who are the winners and the [losers] inthe election," which in turn may result in "violence and

anarchy."

Comelec further argues that "exit surveys indirectlyviolate the constitutional principle to preserve thesanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to revealthe contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, ArticleV of the Constitution; and relevant provisions of the

Omnibus Election Code. It submits that theconstitutionally protected freedoms invoked bypetitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State inthe legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in

the present case.

The solicitor general, in support of Comelec, adds thatthe exit polls pose a "clear and present danger ofdestroying the credibility and integrity of the electoralprocess," considering that they are not supervised byany government agency and can in general bemanipulated easily. He insists that these polls wouldsow confusion among the voters and would underminethe official tabulation of votes conducted by theCommission, as well as the quick count undertaken bythe Namfrel.

ISSUE: WON there is a valid justification for thecomelec resolution?

HELD: NO

Freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of a

democratic government. It is a 'preferred' right and,

therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive

economic or other liberties. Our Constitution clearly

mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the

freedom of speech or of the press.

The realities of life in a complex society, however,preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms ofspeech and of the press. They are not immune toregulation by the State in the exercise of its police

power.

There are two theoretical tests indetermining thevalidity of restrictions to such freedoms, these are the'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangeroustendency' rule. Unquestionably, this Court adheres tothe "clear and present danger" test. A limitation on thefreedom of expression may be justified only by adanger of suchsubstantivecharacter that thestate hasa right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous tendency"doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but alsopresent. "Present" refers to the time element; thedanger must not only be probable but very likely to be

inevitable.

The power to exercise prior restraint is not to bepresumed; rather the presumption is against itsvalidity. And it is respondent's burden to overthrow suchpresumption. To justify a restriction, the promotion of asubstantial government interest must be clearly shown.

Thus:


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"A government regulation is sufficientlyjustified if it is within the constitutionalpower of the government, if it furthersan important or substantial governmentinterest; if the governmental interest isunrelated to the suppression of freeexpression; and if the incidentalrestriction on alleged First Amendmentfreedoms is no greater than is essentialto the furtherance of that interest."

The freedoms of speech and of the press should all themore be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed isthe dissemination of information meant to add meaningto the equally vital right of suffrage. There can be nofree and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintainthem, the freedom to speak and the right to know are

unduly curtailed.

These freedoms have additional importance, becauseexit polls generate important research datawhich maybe used tostudy influencing factors and trends in votingbehavior. An absolute prohibition would thus beunreasonably restrictive, because it effectively preventsthe use of exit poll data not only for election-day

projections, but also for long-term research.

The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot,therefore, be justified. the assailed Comelec Resolutionis too broad. It does not leave open any alternativechannel of communication to gather the type ofinformation obtained through exit polling. On the other

hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways andmeans to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding orminimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought

about by exit surveys.

The interest of the state in reducing disruption isoutweighed by the drastic abridgment of theconstitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and theelectorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disruptingelections, exit polls -- properly conducted andpublicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest,orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for theelimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoralills.

The contention of public respondent that exit pollsindirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of theballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does notseek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballotsystem of voting is not at issue here.

The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is toavoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus,

voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents oftheir official ballots to other persons, from makingcopies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marksthereon so as to be identified. Clearly, what is forbiddenis the association of voters with their respective votes,for the purpose of assuring that the votes have beencast in accordance with the instructions of a third party.This result cannot, however, be achieved merelythrough the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure toa pollster of whom they have voted for.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are notactually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whoman elector has voted for is not compulsory, butvoluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal theiridentities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasuresmay be prescribed by the Comelec, so asto minimizeor suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exitpolls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of

our people.

Phil. Press v. Comelec (1995, Feliciano)

Facts:

! Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") isassailing the constitutional validity of ResolutionNo. 2772 issued by Comelec

! PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization ofnewspaper and magazine publishers.

! Resolution No. 2772! Comelec through Commissioner Maambong

sent identical letters to various publishers ofnewspapers like the Business World,the Philippine Star, the Malaya andthe Philippine Times Journal, all members ofPPI. These letters read as follows:

! you are directed to provide free print space ofnot less than one half (1/2) page for use as"Comelec Space"or similar to the print supportwhich you have extended during the May 11,1992 synchronized elections which was 2 fullpages for each political party fielding senatorialcandidates, from March 6, 1995 to May 6,1995, to make known their qualifications, theirstand on public issues and their platforms and

programs of government.! PPI: declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772

unconstitutional and void on the ground that itviolates the prohibition imposed by theConstitution upon the government, and any ofits agencies, against the taking of privateproperty for public use without justcompensation.


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! It also contends that the 22 March 1995 letterdirectives of Comelec requiring publishers togive free "Comelec Space" and at the sametime process raw data to make it camera-ready,constitute impositions of involuntary servitude,contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2),Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

! PPI argues that Section 8 of ComelecResolution No. 2772 is violative of theconstitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech,of the press and of expression.

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! OSG: Comelec Resolution No. 2772does not impose upon the publishers anyobligation to provide free print space in thenewspapers as it does not provide any criminalor administrative sanction for non-compliancewith that Resolution.

o Resolution merely establishedguidelines to be followed in connectionwith the procurement of "Comelec

space," the procedure for and mode ofallocation of such space to candidatesand the conditions or requirements forthe candidate's utilization of the"Comelec space" procured.

! Comelec: Resolution No. 2772, particularlySection 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 lettersdispatched to various members of petitionerPPI, were not intended to compel thosemembers to supply Comelec with free printspace.

o Resolution and the related letter-directives were merely designed to

solicit from the publishers the samefree print space which many publishershad voluntarily given to Comelec duringthe election period relating to the 11May 1992 elections.

SC:! That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express

terms, threaten publishers who would disregardit or its implementing letters with some criminalor other sanction, does not by itselfdemonstrate that the Comelec's originalintention was simply to solicit or requestvoluntary donations of print space from

publishers.! A written communication officially directinga

print media company to supply free print space,dispatched by a government (here aconstitutional) agency and signed by a memberof the Commission presumably legallyauthorized to do so, is bound to produce acoercive effect upon the company soaddressed.

! That the agency may not be legally authorizedto impose, or cause the imposition of, criminalor other sanctions for disregard of suchdirections, only aggravates the constitutionaldifficulties in hearing in the present situation.

! To compel print media companies todonate "Comelec-space" of the dimensionsspecified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772(not less than one-half page), amounts to"taking" of private personal property for publicuse or purposes.

! Section 2 failed to specify theintendedfrequency of such compulsory"donation:" only once during the period from 6March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12 May1995? or everyday or once a week? or as oftenas Comelec may direct during the sameperiod?

! The extent of the taking or deprivation is notinsubstantial; this is not a case of a de

minimistemporary limitation or restraint uponthe use of private property. The monetary valueof the compulsory "donation," measured by theadvertising rates ordinarily charged bynewspaper publishers whether in cities or innon-urban areas, may be very substantialindeed.

! The taking of print space may first be appraisedunder the rubric of expropriation of privatepersonal property for public use.

! The threshold requisites for a lawful taking ofprivate property for public use

o the necessity for the taking;

o legal authority to effect the taking.! The element of necessity for the taking has not

been shown by Comelec. It has not beensuggested that the members of PPI areunwilling to sellprint space at their normal ratesto Comelec for election purposes.

! the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec tobuy print space lies at the heart of the problem.

! it has not been suggested that Comelec hasbeen granted the power of eminent domaineither by the Constitution or by the legislativeauthority.

! A reasonable relationship between that power

and the enforcement and administration ofelection laws by Comelec must be shown; it isnot casually to be assumed.

! under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, thefree "Comelec space" would be used not onlyfor informing the public about the identities,qualifications and programs of government ofcandidates for elective office but also for"dissemination of vital election information"


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(including, presumably, circulars, regulations,notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec).

! government offices and agencies (including theSupreme Court) simply purchase print space, inthe ordinary course of events, when their rulesand regulations, circulars, notices and so forthneed officially to be brought to the attention ofthe general public.

! The taking of private property for public use is,of course, authorized by the Constitution, butnot without payment of "just compensation"(Article III, Section 9).

! the necessity of paying compensation for"Comelec space" is precisely what is sought tobe avoided by COMELEC,

! Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does notprovide a constitutional basis for compellingpublishers, against their will to provide free printspace for Comelec purposes. Section 2 doesnot constitute a valid exercise of the power of

eminent domain.! On police power:! there was no effort to show that the police

power has been constitutionally delegated torespondent Commission.

! while private property may indeed be validlytaken in the legitimate exercise of the policepower of the state, there was no attempt toshow compliance in the instant case with therequisites of a lawful taking under the policepower.

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! Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt andheavy instrument that purports, without a

showing of existence of a national emergencyor other imperious public necessity,indiscriminately and without regard to theindividual business condition of particularnewspapers or magazines located in differingparts of the country, to take private property ofnewspaper or magazine publishers.

! No attempt was made to demonstrate that areal and palpable or urgent necessity for thetaking of print space confronted the Comelecand that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 wasitself the only reasonable and calibratedresponse to such necessity available to the

Comelec.! Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of

the police power of the State.! On Sec. 8: Undue Reference to

Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. No newspaper or publication shall allow to beprinted or published in the news, opinion,features, or other sections of the newspaper orpublication accounts or comments whichmanifestly favor or oppose any candidate or

political party by unduly or repeatedly referringto or including therein said candidate or politicalparty. However, unless the facts andcircumstances clearly indicate otherwise, theCommission will respect the determination bythe publisher and/or editors of the newspapersor publications that the accounts or viewspublished are significant, newsworthy and ofpublic interest.

! Section 8 should be viewed in the context ofour decision in National Press Club v.Commission on Elections.

o There the Court sustained theconstitutionality of Section 11 (b) ofR.A. No. 6646 which prohibits the saleor donation of print space and airtimefor campaign or other politicalpurposes, except to the Comelec.

o the Court carefully distinguished(a)paid political advertisements which

are reached by the prohibition ofSection 11 (b), from (b) the reportingof news, commentaries andexpressions of belief or opinion byreporters, broadcasters, editors,commentators or columnists whichfalloutsidethe scope of Section 11 (b) andwhich are protected by theconstitutional guarantees of freedom ofspeech and of the press

! Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears torepresent the effort of the Comelec to establisha guideline for implementation doctrine

in National Press Club an effort not blessedwith evident success.

! The distinction between paid politicaladvertisements on the one hand and newsreports, commentaries and expressions ofbelief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters,editors, etc. on the other hand, can realisticallybe given operative meaning only in actualcases or controversies, on a case-to-casebasis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.

! At all events, PPI has failed to allege anyspecific affirmative action on the part ofComelec designed to enforce or implement

Section 8.! PPI has not claimed that it or any of its

members has sustained actual or imminentinjury by reason of Comelec action underSection 8.

! the precise constitutional issue here sought tobe raised whether or not Section 8 ofResolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissibleexercise of the Comelec's power under ArticleIX, Section 4 of the Constitution to


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o supervise or regulate the enjoyment orutilization of all franchise or permits forthe operation of media ofcommunication or information [forthe purpose of ensuring] equalopportunity, time and space, and theright of reply, including reasonable,equal rates therefore, for publicinformation campaigns and forumsamong candidates in connection withthe objective of holding free, orderlyhonest, peaceful and credible elections

! not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actualcase or controversy involving, as the very lismota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.

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