A Story of Canadian Military Communications 1903 – 2013

BGen William J. Patterson OMM, CD (Ret’d)

Published by The Military Communications and Electronics Museum Foundation

SATElLITETOSEMAPHORE

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cha pte r nin e

The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals serves during the Second World War, in Canada, the Aleutians, Hong Kong, and Australia, and

“Behind Enemy Lines”

lthough canada did not declare war on Germany until 10 September 1939,

elements of the Permanent Active Militia (PAM) and Non-Permanent Active Mili- tia

(NPAM) were placed on active service on 26 August, followed by the whole of the PAM

on 1 September. The 1936 Mobilization Plan was put into effect on the 16th and those units and sub-units required for the “Mobile

Force,” a corps of two divisions, were authorized to be part of the Canadian Active

Service Force (CASF). On 1 September, all DND expenditures were considered War

Expenditures, which al- lowed the NPAM units necessary to fill the “Mo- bile Force” to be placed on Active Service. In the First

World War, Militia appropriations for 1914 - 15 were not renewed the following year, and

no more funds were allocated until 1919 - 1920. During the Second World War,

funding for the NPAM continued, which allowed units to recruit to war establishment

and to maintaintheir strength until the end of the war.

Beginning in September 1939 and continu- ing into 1943, the first priority of the RCCS was to enlist, train, and despatch overseas the Sig- nal units and signallers required by the Cana- dian Army. Chapter Six lists the vital statistics of the 13 major and 6 minor Signals units despatched overseas or formed there from of- ficers and men sent as reinforcements. Over 1,000 RCCS officers and 12,000 men served overseas in the European Theatre of Opera-

tions. Of the 57 Permanent Force (PF)officers, only 13 did not serve overseas and 10 of them

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were veterans of the First World War. While no statistics on how many of the 356 NPAM officers in 1939 served overseas are available, it is known that 90 of the 356 were veterans. In 1939 and 1940, most of the officer vacancies were filled by NPAM officers, supplemented by PF officers and PF men, who then received their commission. During the War, at least 150 of the 389 signallers in the PAM on 1 September 1939 were commissioned.* It was estimated, that by the end of 1941, 35 per cent of all signallers in the CA (A) had been members of the NPAM.

In the fall of 1939, there were NPAM Signals units in every Military District (MD) from Hal- ifax to Vancouver.# In addition, there were three Fortress Signal units on the East Coast and three on the West Coast. Initially, the ma- jority of the units carried on with their regular duties of recruiting and training officers and men, both for the CA (A) and for home serv- ice, while maintaining the 26 stations of the Canadian Army Signal System, which con- nected the MDs throughout Canada. On 15 August 1940, the National Resources Mobi- lization Act (NRMA) established a universal re- cruiting system. In order to make full use of Canada’s manpower resources, both for mili- tary service and for war industries, there was a national registration of all single men and childless widowers between the ages of 19 and45. For fear of an uprising in Quebec over conscription, that had been perceived as a* See Appendix 20# See Appendix 24

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Barriefield Camp, 1943.The troops on the road are only a small portion of the 10,000 that were stationed there.

serious threat to Canadian solidarity in 1917, the Government made service overseas an in- dividual voluntary decision at the time of en- listment in the Canadian Forces. Men who volunteered to serve overseas were entitled “A” men and wore a special badge on their right forearm sleeve; those who declined to serve overseas were titled “R” men. On 27 April 1942, a plebiscite was held across Canada that asked voters if they would agree to compulsory overseas service should it be necessary. The vote was 64 per cent in favour overall but only 47 per cent in Quebec. Faced with this opposition, the Government made the decision, “Conscription if necessary but not necessarily conscription.” For the time being, there would be compulsory military training but limited to home service. In No- vember 1944, in view of a manpower shortage, especially of infantry soldiers overseas, Gov- ernment was forced to reverse its decision and “R” men were sent overseas.

Initially, all eligible males were called up by

newly-organized District Depots (DD) in groups of 30,000 and allocated to various CA (R) units

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for 30 days training. It was soon recognized that such a short period of training was insuffi- cient to make soldiers out of the so-called “R” men or to entice them to be “A” men. On 21 February 1941, the period of compulsory train- ing was increased to four months, and in April 1941 the Government decided that all men had to stay for the duration of the war. The end result was better trained soldiers and increased numbers switching from being a “R” soldier, also known as a “Zombie,” a derogatory term used to encourage enlistment in the CA (A), to being an “A” soldier. All members of a Reserve Unit, whether they were “A” or “R” men, had to fulfill the obligations of the NRMA until the end of the war.

A man with no previous military training, who volunteered to serve overseas after the in- troduction of the NRMA, went by a different route. Posted to a DD, he was inducted into the Army, clothed, paid $1.30 a day, and sent to a Basic Training Centre for eight weeks training. Then, he went to an Advanced Train- ing Centre, which in the case of signallers was A - 7, the Canadian Signal Training Centre

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(CSTC) at Vimy Barracks. There, recruits were sent to various training companies depending on their natural aptitudes, and after four months service were paid $1.40 per day. Op- erators has to achieve the standard of 18 words a minute in Morse Code in 16 weeks. Drivers underwent eight weeks training to be a DR, and, if selected, more training at the Canadian Army Trades School at Hamilton to be a driver-mechanic (dvr-mech) or a fitter (Signals). A large percentage of the men were trained to be linemen, which took nine weeks. The most lengthy course was that of 20 weeks for electricians and instrument mechanics. By now, most signallers would have had six months service and make $1.50 per day, or$45.00 a month; trades pay was additional. In 1943, all potential signallers went straight to Vimy Barracks from the DD, which necessi- tated an enlarged staff to handle both the basic and advanced training of signallers.

By July 1943, A - 7, commanded by Col F.G. Malloch, MC, VD, had a staff of 72 officers and over 800 NCOs and men to supervise and train up to 4,000 officers and men. One of the re- sults of a great increase in strength was the doubling of the size of the Parade Square in

A Morse Code class at Vimy Barracks during the Second World War.

1942. Another was the formation of Band No. 20 of the Home War Establishment (HWE), a 27 piece band that became the first Signals Band. It was organized under the direction of Sgt S.T. Cruickshank, formerly of the RCHA Band, on 9 August 1940. Cruickshank, who was appointed Bandmaster in the rank of WO 1 on 1 October 1940, had the Band playing before the end of the month in spite of the fact they had to provide their own instru- ments. After being issued instruments on 4 December 1940, the Band made itself popu- lar, playing for concerts, parades, and having

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The RCCS Band was formed in 1940 under the direction of WO 1 S.T. Cruickshank, formerly of the RCHA Band. In the centre of the front row is the Commandant of the CSTC, Col F.G. Malloch;WO 1 Cruickshank is to his left.

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a dance band for the troops’ entertainment. The Band was disbanded on 31 May 1946.

With an organization as large as the CSTC became during the war, it was inevitable that fatalities occurred from time to time: on 29 November 1940, Sigmn W.A. McDonnell, ac- cident; 28 May 1941, LCpl W.D. Prentice, electrocuted; 3 May 1942, LCpl N.L. Steward, accident; 18 May 1942, Sigmn C.V. Cole, ill- ness; 5 August 1942, Sigmn J. Stevenson, ill- ness; 10 November 1942, Sigmn J.E. Colwell, accident; 27 December 1942, Sigmn R.W. Gunn illness; 21 March 1943, Capt H.O. Lough, RCAMC, Senior Medical Officer, ill- ness; 4 July 1943, Sigmn R.R. Cork, drowned; 18 July 1943, Sigmn P. Masson, drowned;

During 1939 and 1940, officers with basic military experience received refresher and qualifying courses at Vimy. It was not long, however, before most officer candidates had no military background, and it was necessary to teach both all-arms subjects as well as sig- nalling. This additional strain on the Vimy staff was rectified with the opening, in the spring of 1941, of the Officers Training Cen- tre (OTC) in Brockville, where all prospective officers were given an all-arms basic course, after which those wishing to be signal officers came to Vimy for signals training. The re- quirement to attend the Brockville OTC also applied to serving soldiers selected to be com- missioned. After March 1941, only recom- mended soldiers, who had served for at least four months in the ranks, were eligible. A Sig- nal Officers’ Course of 20 weeks was offered: 4 weeks on fundamentals – motor transport, electricity and magnetism, and signal proce- dures; 5 weeks on line instruments, field cable, and line transmission; 7 weeks on wire- less theory, operation and maintenance, labo- ratory, and wireless exercises; 4 weeks on tactics, organization and administration.

In September 1939, the Canadian eastern and western coastal defences were manned, al- though most of the equipment was obsolete, many of the gun positions

temporary, and the units under strength and incompletely trained. Anti-aircraft defences were virtually non-existant, since there were only four anti-

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Capt T. J.Wallis, age 59 in 1942, still very much a soldier.

aircraft guns in the country. By 1943, with the acquisition of coastal and anti-aircraft guns from the UK, the east coast defences were built up into 13 defensive areas with 45 indi- vidual sites. On the west coast, where there were more modern coast guns initially, four defensive areas were set up with 23 individual sites. Similarly, anti-aircraft defences were slowly developed on both coasts but it was the end of 1943 before an adequate defensive sys- tem was in place. To co-ordinate these de- fences with other Army units, Atlantic Command was established on 1 August 1940 with a headquarters in Halifax. It covered all of MD Nos. 6 and 7: the Provinces of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and New Brunswick, and part of MD No. 5, most of the Province of Quebec east of Quebec City. Sim- ilarly, Pacific Command was

organized on 1

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October 1940, comprising all of MD Nos. 11 and 13: the Provinces of British Columbia and Alberta, the Yukon Territory, and the District of Mackenzie. To provide infantry protection, the 6th Division, formed for Home Defence in 1941, had its three brigades allocated one each to Nanaimo, BC, Niagara, ON, and Val- cartier, QC. Although Newfoundland was a colony of Great Britain, in August 1940 Canada agreed to be responsible for its secu- rity and it became a sub-command of Atlantic Command. The first commander of the Cana- dian Forces in Newfoundland was Brig P.E. Earnshaw, DSO, MC, who was relieved of the post of D Sigs, in Ottawa on 15 October 1940 and moved to St John’s, where he remained in command until 24 December 1941. On that date, Newfoundland became part of the responsibility of the Commander of Atlantic Command. The northern portion of Canada continued to be served by RCCS Signallers of the NWT&Y Radio System, although as noted in Chapter Five, the number of stations was much reduced and manned by only 38 sig- nallers. Later on, more stations were manned by large numbers of US signallers.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor

on 7 December 1941, civilian anxiety in British Columbia grew steadily, mostly as the result of rumours. They led to the creation of another infantry division, the 7th, and a infantry brigade for an 8th Division. By June 1942, the whole of the 6th Division and two brigades of the 8th were sent to the West Coast, while the 7th Divi- sion went to the East Coast. When the Japanese invaded the Aleutian Islands on 6 June 1942, DND authorized the completion of the Order of Battle for the 8th Division. Further alarm was spread by a Japanese submarine shelling the wireless station and lighthouse on Estevan Point on Vancouver Island on 20 June 1942, although it did little damage and there were no casualties. It was during this period that the resident Japanese-Canadian population was re- moved from the West Coast to internment camps in central Canada.

Shortly after Japanese forces occupied the Aleutian Islands of Kiska and Attu in June 1942, US air and naval forces periodically at- tacked the islands during the year. In the spring of 1943, the Americans decided to rid the islands of the Japanese and a strong US force attacked Attu on 11 May 1943 and read- ily captured it, killing most of its garrison of

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2,500. On 31 May, the Canadian Government agreed that a Canadian contingent would join an American force to attack Kiska, which was garrisoned by 6,000 troops. OP COTTAGE was planned as a sea-borne landing on 15 August 1943 by a US and a Canadian brigade group, under US command. The 13th Canadian In- fantry Brigade with supporting arms and serv- ices of the 6th Division was chosen, although many of the men were “R” men. The Canadian force of 4,831 all ranks sailed on 12 July to Adak where it underwent amphibious training. The assault began on schedule on 15 August, only to find, with extreme embarrassment, that the Japanese had withdrawn from the island on 28 July. The 13th Brigade Group stayed on Kiska for three months before returning to British Columbia in late 1943.

The Atlantic and Pacific Commands reached their peak strengths in the summer of 1943. Because of the apparent greater threat on the West Coast, Pacific Command, with its HQ in Vancouver had a total of 34,316 all ranks. The 6th Division was mostly located on Vancouver Island, while the 8th Division was lo- cated on the mainland; altogether there were21 infantry battalions. Atlantic Command, with its HQ in Halifax, had a total of 24,784 all ranks. The 7th Division with its HQ in Debert, NS, had 18 infantry battalions scattered about the Maritimes, Newfoundland and Labrador. In addition, in Canada, there were 31,989 men in units doing Garrison Duty. Sixty per cent of the men on active duty in Canada were “R” men. In February 1942, the Canadian Army Reserve was organized into 12 brigade groups, one for each MD with an extra one for MD No. 6 (Nova Scotia). All brigades had full- time commanders and staffs. By the summer of 1943, the strength of the CA (R) was 105,000. With the Japanese expelled from the Aleutian Islands and the German U-Boat men- ace decreasing, the Canadian Government wisely felt that there was little need for such large forces to exist in Canada. In September 1943, it was

decided to disband the 7th and 8th Divisions and part of the 6th. The HQ of the 6th Division was moved to Prince George and while it still consisted of three brigades, the

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13th Brigade, when it returned from Kiska in January 1944, was sent overseas, where it be- came a training brigade. A new brigade, the 16th, was formed in August 1944 just about the same time that the “reinforcement crisis” in Northwest Europe was reaching the boiling point. It caused the Government to send “R” men overseas and as a consequence the 6th Di- vision was disbanded on 2 December 1944. Al- together, two brigade HQs, and 13 battalions were sent overseas where they were broken up for reinforcements. Only 8 battalions re- mained in Canada, Newfoundland, and the West Indies. Most of the coastal artillery and anti-aircraft units were also disbanded. Atlantic Command was stood down on 15 December 1944. Pacific Command, however, continued until 23 January 1946.

From late 1940 until late 1943, both the CA

(A) and the CA (R) in Canada grew steadily to about 175,000 and 100,000 all ranks respec- tively. With five major headquarters and a mul- titude of minor establishments and units, there was an obvious need for signallers. The first of RC Sigs to be affected was the CSTC at Vimy Barracks, mentioned previously. The Di- rectorate of Signals was not expanded but was abolished on 8 December 1940. For reasons unknown, DND felt the Director of Staff Du- ties could do both his work and that of the Di- rector of Signals (D Sigs), and Col P.E. Earnshaw was sent to be the Commander in Newfoundland. The Corps, however, felt the loss of the Directorate and set up a temporary office in April 1942 in Vimy Barracks under LCol R.D. Heustis. During that summer, BrigJ.E. Genet, CSO, 1st Cdn Army, realizing there was a real need for a central authority for sig- nal training and administration, prevailed upon DND to restore the directorate. Col W.L. Laurie, a PF officer, was installed as D Sigs in AHQ on 9 February 1943. On 31 August 1944, his staff included LCols G.A. McClellan, ED and J.H. Eaman and 25 other officers. In addition to D Sigs at AHQ, there was a

Signal Company that had been built up from a de- tachment at the first of the war. By 31 August 1944, it was commanded by a major with 16 other officers.

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A typical Second World War parade on the Vimy Parade Square. Note all the temporary buildings in behind the trees.

The further opening of Canada’s North during the war, mainly by US forces, resulted in re-opening of signal stations closed in 1939. By the end of 1944, 19 stations were function- ing and the NWT&Y Radio System had five of- ficers and many more men than the 38 other ranks in 1940. In Atlantic Command HQ, LCol B.S. Lake, ED was appointed CSO on 1 May 1942 and served until he was relieved by LCol R.D. Heustis, ED, who served until his re- tirement six weeks before the Atlantic Com- mand was disbanded on15 December 1945. The Atlantic Command Signals, developed out of the 6th, 7th, and 8th Fortress Signal Com- panies mobilized on 26 August 1939, and be- came a lieutenant-colonel’s command by 28 August 1941. By August 1944, it had grown to 7 companies with 40 officers but its remaining life was short-lived as it was disbanded on 15 December 1944. Pacific Command Signals began in the same way with the mobilization of the 9th, 10th, and 11th Fortress Signal Com- panies on 26 August 1939, however, it

devel- oped in a different way. Under the leadership

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of Col A.R. St Louis, who was appointed CSO on 1 August 1942 and stayed until the end, the three Fortress Companies grew into three independent area companies with over 300 men each. In August 1944, there were 29 sig- nal officers in Pacific Command that lasted until 23 January 1946.

In addition to signallers in the Atlantic and Pacific Commands, there were signallers in the 6th, 7th, and 8th Infantry Divisions. The 6th Division, which was always intended for home defence, was organized in July 1941. 6 Div Sigs was stood up, in part, by October 1941 and was at full strength by 1 April 1942. It was commanded by LCol G.W. Smart, a PF officer, who was still commanding in August 1944 with a complement of 23 officers plus 5 at- tached. Although originally formed to be sta- tioned on the East Coast, it was moved to the West Coast in 1942 because of the perceived Japanese threat. 6 Div Sigs was disbanded on 30 April 1945. The 7th Division Signals was formed in June 1942 at Vimy under the com- mand of LCol H.D. Rice and was stationed at

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Debert, NS, until it was disbanded in October 1943. The 8th Divisional Signals was formed when the Division was fully organized in June 1942 but it was a short-lived unit, being dis- banded in the fall of 1943. Although the 7th and 8th Divisional Signals were disbanded in 1943, there were still infantry battalions on both the East and West Coasts; in August 1944 there were 14 RCCS Signal Officers with in- fantry battalions on the West Coast and 9 with battalions on the East Coast. There were, as well, numerous Signal Officers scattered about Canada as recorded in August 1944: 12 as District Signal Officers, 3 with Training Bat- talions, 4 at Camps Borden and Petawawa, 4 with Special Wireless Sections, and 68 in vari- ous staff positions. In July 1945, there was one very short-lived signal company formed to serve with the 6th

Division, Canadian Army Pa- cific Force (CAPF). The 6 Div Sigs (CAPF) was composed of officers and men who volun- teered while serving in Europe and were sent back to Canada in June 1945. It was located in Brockville with LCol A.E. Wrinch as CO. With the surrender of Japan on 14 August 1945, the unit was disbanded on the 28th.

Special Wireless Groups

There was one more field unit raised in Canada destined to serve overseas, not in Eu- rope but in Australia. On 19 July 1944, No. 1 Special Wireless Group was formed to serve in India with the aim to intercept and decipher Japanese wireless messages. The unit, com- manded by LCol H. W.D. Wethey, a PF Officer, consisted of 13 RCCS officers, 6 Intelligence officers, and 317 men. It began training in Ot- tawa, then moved to Vancouver Island. By early 1945, it was ready to go overseas. Instead of India, it was sent to Australia. It landed in Brisbane on 16 February 1945, where it spent two months working with Australian and American “Y” units. In early April, it was sent to Darwin in the most northern part of Aus- tralia, and by mid-May was operational with operators

manning 13 intercept positions 24 hours a day. Within a month, the unit was pro- viding 22 per cent of the intelligence gathered

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by the 12 “Y” sites working in Australia. Be- cause of a above average ability to interpret Japanese, six members of the unit were sent to Manila, Philippines, one to San Miguel in the southern part of the Island of Lauzon, and four to Japan. Based in a camp outside Dar- win, very much constructed by themselves, the members of the Group provided intelligence about Japanese forces until the end of the war on 14 August 1945. Leaving Darwin on 24 Oc- tober 1945, the Group retraced its steps the 3,000 miles to Sydney by truck and train. It boarded ship on 6 February 1946 to Vancou- ver 7,000 miles distant, where it was dis- banded on 28 February. Its achievements were recognized by MGen C.H. Simpson, Chief Sig- nals Officer of the Australian Army, who wrote to LCol Wethey, “ I feel that the results of the work performed by your unit in no small measure contributed towards achieving final victory.” The Group had two fatal casualties: Capt J.D. Miller, who died of illness and SigmnD.J. Green who drowned. Because of bureau- cratic nonsense, no member of 1 Special Wire- less ever received Pacific Campaign Pay, and it was 1995 before members were declared el- igible for the Pacific Star.*

Signals Equipment, Design, and Development

In addition to recruiting, training, and despatching overseas signal units and individ- ual reinforcements, and the signal units re- quired for the defence of Canada, the RCCS provided a most valuable resource in the de- sign, development, and manufacture of new signal equipment. During the War it con- tributed a most imposing list of achievements: seven major wireless (radio) sets, five commu- nications receivers, frequency shift apparatus, headgear, electronic signalling devices for line telegraphy, installation kits for mounting wire- less sets in vehicles, wavemeters, crystals and crystal

calibrators, remote control gear and

* To recognize the services of No. 1 Special Wireless Group in Australia, the C&E Branch erected a com- memorative plaque in Darwin in 2011.

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switching devices, aerials, sound ranging am- plifiers, charging plants, power supplies, syn- thetic insulated wire and cable, switchboards, carrier equipment, cable-laying equipment, field inter-communication sets, public address systems, dry cells, secondary batteries, mine detectors, and many minor communication devices.

At the beginning of the War, the RCCS, es- pecially the NPAM, had mostly First World War signal equipment, with the exception of 100 WS No. 1 that had been made by Northern Electric in 1935. Only the NWT&Y Radio Sys- tem had up-to-date radio equipment, much of it made by the Signal Inspection and Test De- partment (SI&TD) in Ottawa, because the funding for it came from sources other than the RCCS budget. The staff of the SI&TD, six officers and 20 men in 1939, was much too small to begin to provide the many types and hundreds of communication devices required. The pre-war policy had been to rely on British designed equipment but after the losses at Dunkirk and the desperate need by the British Army to replenish its own equipment, Canada was forced to rely on its own resources. In May 1940, a technical group of SI&TD was trans- ferred to the Branch of the Master General of the Ordnance (MGO) and made responsible for the design, development, procurement, and inspection of signal equipment. In the years that followed, a number of technical es- tablishments achieved this aim.

In May 1941, the remainder of the SI&TD staff was incorporated into the Directorate of Technical Research, which had obtained draw- ings and specifications of British equipment. Signals personnel co-ordinated the production of this equipment in Canada through the De- partment of Munitions and Supply. At the same time, the Canadian Signals Experimental Establishment (CSEE) was formed to function in a similar way as did the old SI&TD. Early in 1942, the Signals portion of the Directorate of Technical Research was reconstituted as the Directorate of Signal Design and placed

under the Army Engineering Design Branch with a strength of 27 officers, 90 men, and 43 civil- ians. In May 1942, as the production of signal

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equipment grew, a Signal Production Branch consisting of 10 RCCS officers was created within the Department of Munitions and Sup- ply. On 16 July 1943, a Directorate of Electrical and Communication Design (DE&CD) was cre- ated within the MGO and the CSEE was placed under the control of DE&CD. Brig H.E. Taber, the only RCCS officer with a Doctorate in Elec- trical Engineering, was appointed Director over 30 officers, 47 men, and 44 civilians. The CSEE, which later in 1943 grew into the Cana- dian Signals Research and Development Estab- lishment (CSRDE) was located in pristine quarters in the National Research Council Annex just outside Ottawa. It was commanded by LCol J.E. Cumming, a PF officer, who had a staff of 16 officers and a number of civilians. There was an Inspection Board, headed by ColR.A.H. Galbraith, a PF officer, who also had a staff of 10 officers. A good example of the work undertaken by the more than 70 officers in these various agencies was the development of the Canadian Wireless Set (WSC) No. 29, which came into service at the end of the War. It was designed to improve on the popular WS No. 19 and did have some innovative and ad- vanced features. Unfortunately, it came too late for the War and only small numbers were manufactured..

Hong Kong

While, on the whole, the Canadian Army in Canada was involved in the recruitment and training of men for overseas service in the Eu- ropean Theatre, and the provision of all the equipment necessary for a modern mobile army, it did have an operational role in the de- fence of Canada. There was one exception, that in retrospect should have never hap- pened, the sending of a Canadian force to bol- ster the defences of Hong Kong. The grievous loss of Canadian soldiers, both in combat and as a result of unspeakable treatment as prison- ers of war (POW) by the Japanese

was stagger- ing. The Canadian losses at Hong Kong amounted to 290 killed or died of wounds, while 267 perished as POW, 557 out of the 1,975 all ranks sent there. The rate of fatalities,

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28.8 per cent, was much greater than that of Dieppe’s 18.8 per cent, yet the story of Dieppe has always overshadowed that of Hong Kong.

Japan, though allied to Germany and Italy since September 1940, remained neutral to- wards the European War. In 1941, relations

between Japan and the United States deterio- rated, and Britain, standing alone

and at bay in Europe, viewed the weakness of her posi- tion in the Far East with

concern. Since the disaster at Dunkirk, every man and every gun was needed to

repel the expected invasion at home. British Intelligence believed that Japan would not

attack Britain or the United States but would join Germany in the war against Russia,

which had begun in June 1941. War with Japan was a recognized possibility, though

not a probability in the opinion of the British military authorities. Prime Minister

Winston Churchill believed Hong Kong could not be held or relieved in a war with

Japan and should not be reinforced but was swayed from his position before the request for aid was made to Canada. The decision

to seek rein- forcements for Hong Kong was primarily a po- litical one: to bolster Chinese morale, to encourage the United

States, and to deter Japan. It was, as well, based on the British mil- itary appreciation

of the combat capability of the Japanese Army as poor. Unfortunately, that analysis

turned out to be totally incorrect. On 19 September 1941, the British War Of- fice

requested of Canada one or two battalions to reinforce the Hong Kong garrison. After

se- rious consideration, the Canadian govern- ment agreed to the proposal ten days later on the strength of the British

Intelligence’s eval- uation of the Far Eastern situation. Two bat- talions would be sent

from Canada, not from the Canadian forces in England. On 11 Octo- ber, the War Office

asked also for a brigade headquarters and certain specialist units, in- cluding a Signals

section. The two battalions chosen, The Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, for the Canadian Con- tingent,

named “C” Force, were among the nine battalions in Canada considered to be “not

recommended for operational consider- ation at present.” The Royals had just re-

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turned from garrison duty in Newfoundland and the Grenadiers from similar duties in Ja- maica; neither had participated in field exer- cises, nor had any training with live ammunition with the 2 or 3-inch mortar. Since both battalions were being sent to per- form garrison duties, it was felt that further training in Hong Kong would bring them up to an acceptable standard. Unfortunately, for the Canadians, from the time they landed in Hong Kong until the Japanese attacked was only a period of three weeks, barely time to be familiar with the local topography that was far more mountainous than appreciated.

The Signals’ contribution to “C” Force, commanded by Brig J.K. Lawson, RCR, con- sisted of a reduced brigade signal section of one officer and 32 signallers. There were 22 radio operators, 6 DRs, and 4 linemen, from the original 4th Infantry Divisional Signals at Barriefield. Individually, they were well trained in their respective trades but had little opportunity to work together as a Signals sec- tion. Capt G.M. Billings, a PF officer, on de- tached duty from 1st Cdn Corps Sigs in England, was named to command the Signals section but before he could even appraise his men the whole force was embarked on 27 Oc- tober 1941 from Vancouver aboard the Aus- tralian liner SS Awatea and the escort vessel, HMCS Prince Robert. The first time Billings saw his men was on board ship on 28 October. Be- cause of hasty planning, “C” Force sailed with- out its transport, and none of its 221 vehicles had arrived when the Japanese attacked 40 days after the departure from Canada.

The Force reached Honolulu on 2 Novem- ber, and Manila 12 days later, where the British cruiser HMS Danae joined the Prince Robert as escort. On board ship, every effort was made to maintain a training program. Some of the officers realized that if war did come there was slight chance that the colony could be held for long against the superior numbers which Japan could throw into the battle. Training in small arms was therefore

emphasized. Visual signaling practice was carried on by the Signals section but no wireless practice was possible because of the necessity for radio silence.

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When the Canadian force arrived on 16 November, the Hong Kong Garrison was or- ganized into two brigades. The first or Main- land Brigade, commanded by British Brig C. Wallis, was to be deployed in the defence of the Kowloon Peninsula, and the second for the protection of Hong Kong Island. Brig J.K. Lawson’s Canadian Infantry along with the British 1st Middlesex Regt, formed the “Island Brigade.” The Canadian Signal Section was mostly attached to Brig. Wallis and his British Mainland Brigade HQ, which needed wireless to supplement fortress line communications. Others were attached to Brig Lawson’s HQ, and three signallers were attached each to the Royals and the Grenadiers. So small was the Crown Colony area that all the Canadians, whether serving on the mainland or on the is- land, could be billeted together. “C” Force Sig- nals, intended to fill gaps in the Royal Signals Hong Kong Establishment, was solely a group of tradesmen, among which no

orderly room or administrative personnel were included. In

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the actual fighting, however, they had to act as a skeleton Brigade Signal Section and the lack of administrative personnel soon became ap- parent, as the Chinese civilians employed as cooks and batmen disappeared at the sound of the first shot.

“C” Force Signals was equipped with WS No. 11 for battalion to brigade communications, and No. 18 sets for communications within the two battalions. The sets were held for some time by the Hong Kong Ordnance, which had unloaded them from the Awatea. They were finally released but no vehicles or motorcycles were made available to the sec- tion. Until the start of the fighting the section was limited for transport to the services of a station wagon loaned by Royal Army Service Corps, when it was free of other duties. Nev- ertheless, ingenious schemes were devised to familiarize men of the Signals section, partic- ularly the DRs, with the terrain on the main- land and to give them some practice in carrying messages, even without the benefit of

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motorcycles. The linemen were detailed to various Royal Signals Line sections and em- ployed on fortress communications with which they had little experience.

In addition to limited training and the com- mitment to provide wireless

communications for the mainland brigade, the section was re- sponsible for instructing wireless to selected in- fantry signallers of

the British Mainland Brigade: the 2nd Royal Scots, the 2/14 Pun- jabis, and the 5/7

Rajputs. Despite the delay in getting release of WS No. 18 sets from Ord- nance, these

infantry signallers were trained to an elementary level in the field use of wireless. No training on maintenance was possible so

that when sets broke down later in action they were discarded. However, the loss of

these sets during the fighting on the Island was not of se- rious consequence since the Island was ade- quately served by fortress underground lines. On 7 December 1941,

the Japanese launched their infamous attack on Pearl Har- bour. That same fateful day, 8 December (Hong Kong time), the Mainland

Brigade had prepared, co-incidentally, a “manning exer- cise” as a test of operational efficiency. Thus, by accident, the Canadian

Signalmen were at their posts, loading supplies into their only ve- hicle when

Japanese planes raided the Kai Tak aerodrome, and shortly afterwards bombed a prominent building in Sham Shu Po. Two

sig- nalmen, Cpl R. Routledge and Sigmn J.L. Fair- ley, were wounded.

Captain Billings immediately commandeered a number of

civilian vehicles, and the DRs obtained some motorcycles from the Ordnance

Depot on Hong Kong Island. Now the Signal Section had the transport that had

been withheld. A DR service was established and operated suc- cessfully until the evacuation of the mainland. Early on the

morning of 8 December, Japan- ese troops crossed the border into the New Ter- ritories

and encountered British troops carrying out a series of demolitions prior to falling back

to their main defensive position, the Gin Drinkers Line. It was a prepared posi- tion of

some strength and was held by the three British battalions of the Mainland Brigade. The most important strong point was the

Shing

25

Mun Redoubt on the left flank held by a com- pany HQ and a platoon of the Royal Scots. The Japanese made a surprising night attack on it on the 9th and overran its defenders. This loss was disastrous but the British made no attempt to counter-attack. D Company of the Grenadiers was moved from the Island to Kowloon to act as a reserve. The Japanese re- sumed the attack on the 11th and easily rolled up the rest of the Drinkers Line, forcing the British to retreat to the Island, except for the 5/7 Rajput Regt which was to hold the Devil’s Peak. By the 13th, the Rajputs had to be with- drawn as well, because there was no way to get supplies to them. After only five days of very lit- tle fighting the British had been driven from the Mainland and withdrawn to the Island. This precipitous retreat had a serious effect on the general morale of the Garrison.

During the withdrawal phase on the 13th, RCCS Cpl C.J. Sharp had been ordered to evacuate a group of non-essential men and ve- hicles from the Kowloon Headquarters. This entailed a drive to the ferry terminal through surprisingly heavy guerilla opposition. With his charges safely aboard the ferry, Sharp at- tempted to return to report to Captain Billings. He was turned back by stiffening enemy opposition, and failed to get through even on foot. The remainder of the day he spent helping to engage enemy patrols. Even- tually, he crossed to the Island on a sampan whose crew he intimidated with his sub-ma- chine gun. Some RCCS operators attached to the Royal Scots drove commandeered buses to assist in the evacuation.

The remaining Canadian Signals and Head- quarters personnel moved to the Kai Tak air- port shoreline, where small boats had been waiting to evacuate them to Devil’s Peak. When it was agreed by the British Com- mander that there was no point in the Cana- dians to go to Devil’s Peak, permission was granted for volunteers to make a run to the vehicular ferry in order to take all the Signal equipment over to the Island. Captain

Billings gathered up all the vehicles he could and with motorcycle outriders, and half dozen cars and trucks loaded with Signals stores he and his

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men raced to the dock through enemy-held territory in total blackout with only minor damage from enemy fire. Signals lost only a WS No. 11 that was with the 5/7 Rajput Regi- ment, whose operators had to destroy every- thing in their withdrawal from Devil’s Peak.

The section reformed at its billets in the villa Casa Bianca that served as the Island Sig- nal Pool. A hot meal was waiting, the first in five days, and the men enjoyed the

luxury of several hours’ uninterrupted sleep. Both brigades deployed for the

defence of the is- land. The East Brigade, commanded by Brig Wallis, consisted of the

Royal Rifles, 40 offi- cers and 921 men commanded by LCol W.J. Home, a PF officer, and the 5/7 Rajputs.The West

Brigade, commanded by Brig Lawson consisted of the Grenadiers, 40 officers and

873 men commanded by LCol J.L.R. Sutcliffe, MC and the 2/14 Punjabs. The

Middlesex Bat- talion manned pill boxes around the perime- ter of the island, which

was generally divided between the East and West Brigades. The Royal Scots were put in reserve. Capt Billings and 14 Signallers

were attached to Brigadier Lawson’s “West Brigade,” the HQ of which was located at

Wong Nei Chong in the centre of the Island. The separation of the Canadian Battalions

was not a good idea because they had no experience working with British units. Five days elapsed before the enemy crossed the

strait and during that time an operational communications system functioned under

constant aerial observation and heavy shelling. Every attempt to use wireless

brought down an immediate enemy artillery barrage. DR runs along the exposed roads on the north side of the Island to Victoria

Headquar- ters were extremely dangerous in the days pre- ceding and immediately after

the Japanese crossing. Cpl L.C. Speller and Sigmn R. Damant and E.R. Thomas made many of these trips as volunteers; Thomas lost his life in the course of this duty when

machine gunners caught him on an open stretch of shore road. During the night of 18

- 19 December, three Japanese regiments

landed about 2100 hours at three places on the northeast end of the Is- land. “C”

Company of the Royals made a

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counter attack in the area of Sun Mun Bar- racks but were unable to stem the tide, mostly because a Japanese force had ascended the high ground at Mount Parker and were able to bring down fire from its commanding posi- tion. The Japanese, is spite of losses, made rapid progress and by the morning of the 19th were in possession of Jardine’s Lookout and close to Wong Nei Chong Gap. Further ad- vances went on during the day and by the 20th the Japanese had reached Repulse Bay and had cut the Island defences in two. By the af- ternoon of the 19th, Brig Wallis, having lost most of the 5/7 Rajputs and with the Japanese holding the high ground, withdrew his forces, the Royals and some remnants of the Middle- sex to the area of Stone Hill and Stanley Vil- lage. A defensive line was established from Stanley Mound through Sugar Loaf Hill to Palm Villa by companies of the Royals. Wallis began on the morning of the 20th an advance toward Repulse Bay with the object of making contact with the West Brigade at Wong Nei Chong Gap. By just a few hours, Japanese troops had reached Repulse Bay first and when “A” Company of the Royals approached the Repulse Bay Hotel, a fire fight com- menced. The Hotel was captured but the ad- vance could go no further. “D” Company moved to the right around the Japanese on Middle Spur but after failing to drive the Japanese off Violet Hill, it withdrew to Stanley View. Another attempt was made to advance by the remaining Royals toward the area of the Ty Tam Tuk Resevoir on the following day but once again the Japanese holding the high ground were too strong. Several more at- tempts were made to advance beyond Repulse Bay on the 21st and 22nd by British troops and “A” Company but they could not get past the Ridge on the road to Wong Nei Chong. Fi- nally, on the 23rd, all the troops were with- drawn to the Royals position at Stanley. The Japanese made constant attacks forcing the Royals, who were worn out by constant com- bat, no hot food, and little sleep for five days, to

withdraw to the Stanley Peninsula on the night of the 23rd. By the 24th, LCol Home in- sisted that his battalion had to be taken out of

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the line to recuperate. Only part of his battal- ion could do so since “B” Company was hold- ing out at Chung Hum Kok and “C” Company was ordered to hold the high ground north of the Fort. A rested “D” Company made another counter-attack on the morning of 25 Decem- ber, without artillery support, and was beaten back with a loss of 26 killed and 75 wounded. Later in the morning, “A” Company tried to return to Stanley Village but lost 6 killed and 12 wounded in a Japanese artillery barrage. About noon, all fighting stopped as word was received that the Governor of Hong Kong had surrendered the Colony. The formal surren- der of Stanley forces took place on the morn- ing of the 26th.

Meanwhile, the West Brigade had organ- ized several flying columns of platoon size that attempted to blunt the Japanese advances on the night of the 18 - 19th but were defeated by the rapid seizure of the high ground by Japanese infantry. On the 19th, a more serious attempt was made by the Grenadier’s “A” Company to clear Jardine’s Lookout and to press on to Mount Butler. Initially, it was suc- cessful but after serious fighting during which all the officers were killed or wounded the Company was surrounded and forced to sur- render. It was during this action that CSM J.R. Osborn earned Canada’s first Victoria Cross in the Second World War by throwing himself on a Japanese grenade to save the lives of his men. When it became clear on the 19 th, that Brig Lawson’s HQ was in danger of being over- run, he decided to stage a withdrawal. An ad- vance party was sent to an alternative position at Mount Nicholson but so rapid was the enemy advance that there was no time for an orderly withdrawal of the skeleton staff at Brigade Headquarters. Small arms fire was raking the position and the staff was pinned down. Brigadier Lawson finally gave the every- man-for-himself order. Each man crawled and fought his way up the exposed slope towards the intended new headquarters to the south- west. During one period Corporal Sharp and his men held a vital road position on their own initiative, stalling the Japanese advance in that sector until relieved by a larger force.

Brigadier Lawson had delayed his departure to destroy documents and was killed soon after leaving the command shelter. When Cap- tain Billings attempted to leave by the same route he was wounded but later he and the Staff Captain of the Brigade made their way in an abandoned vehicle travelling northwest to the Winnipeg Grenadiers’ headquarters at Wan Chai Gap. “D” Company of the Grenadiers holding vital ground in the area of the Wong Nei Chong Gap managed to hold off the Japanese until the 22nd, before surren- dering. Attempts to relieve “D” Company by both “A” Company and the Royal Scots on the 19th

failed, mainly because of a lack of effec- tive command after the death of Brig Lawson. About noon on the 20th, Col H.B. Rose, a British Regular Officer, assumed command of the West Brigade. On the evening of the 20th, “B” Company, which had been at Pok Fu Lam, came up to Mount Nicholson to prepare for a counter-attack on the 21st. Once again, the Japanese had beaten the Canadians to the hill- top and repulsed all attacks that night and on the 21st. The Grenadiers gathered up all avail- able men and reinforced by a platoon of Royal Engineers occupied Mount Cameron and re- sisted Japanese attempts on the 22nd

to take it. Due to some confusion over orders, the Grenadiers left Mount Cameron and with- drew to Wan Chai Gap but the hill continued to be held by the Royal Scots.

By midnight on the 23rd, there were Grenadiers near Mount Cameron and on Bennet’s Hill with Battalion HQ at Wan Chai Gap, a company of the Middlesex at Little Hong Kong and another on Leighton Hill and the Royal Scots with the remnants of the two Indian Battalions on the northern and western slopes of Mount Cameron. All troops were extremely tired and were being con- stantly shelled and bombed. On the 24th, the Japanese drove the Royal Scots down into the lower slopes of Mount Cameron and cap- tured Leighton Hill. In the morning of the 25th, the Japanese renewed their offensive tak- ing Mount Parish and advanced into Wan Chai Gap.

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At 1515 hours, the British Com- mander surrendered realizing that further re-

30

sistance was futile and would only cause use- less slaughter.

The Signals detachments, many of them walking wounded, had gathered at Wan Chai Gap. Shelling became heavy, and the men had scarcely settled into a villa when three of them were killed by a direct hit: Sgt C.J. Sharp, Sigmn R. Damant and H. Greenberg, and four were wounded, two of whom died of their wounds, Sigmn J.L. Fairley and J.E. Horvath. The last scene of this tragic piece was played out at Victoria Barracks. Remnants of Brigade Headquarters Staff and others, under com- mand of Captain Billings, took up positions round about the barracks for a last-ditch de- fence of the area. Instructions were to stand or fall. For several days, they patrolled an ever diminishing perimeter, fighting off Japanese attacks at close range. Shortly before noon on Christmas Day, they were ordered to lay down arms. This they did after destroying all equip- ment, including the last link with Canada, a high-powered wireless station working through England. The capture of Hong Kong had taken 18 days.

The surviving troops were fated to endure almost three and a half years in prison camps of indescribable squalor and horror. Insuffi- cient food and unclean conditions led to bouts of dysentery, which often proved fatal. After a few months, the POW were put to work, in spite of their weakened condition. Initially, all 1,685 Canadian POW were kept at Hong Kong, where 128 died including LCol Sut- cliffe and three Signallers: Sigmn J.S. Little, 5

tinguished themselves far beyond the call of duty. Sgt. R. Routledge, one of the four RCCS members who remained imprisoned at Hong Kong, assumed the perilous role of go-be- tween for senior officer prisoners and Chi- nese Chungking agents. Messages concerning plans for mass escapes were passed by the Ser- geant on work parties. A Japanese agent in- tercepted one of these, and Sgt Routledge was taken into custody. In the full knowledge that his predecessors in this venture had been executed, the NCO refused to divulge the names of his colleagues, despite the torture, starvation, and beating to which he was sub- jected. Sgt A.R. Squires, although he had no medical training, volunteered to be a medical orderly and became so proficient he was made the head medical orderly in the Hong Kong Hospital. He managed to survive in spite of the close proximity to many diseases, particularly diphtheria.

This distressing episode at Hong Kong re- mains a sad chapter in the history of Canadian arms. The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals can be justly proud of the caliber of its repre- sentatives there. All ranks,in the words of the British Chief Signal Officer, “did all he could have hoped.” The following signalmen were awarded decorations: Sgt R. Routledge, DCM; Cpl L.C. Speller, MM; Sgt A.R. Squires, BEM; Sgt C.J. Sharp and Sigmn R. Damant,

June 1942; LSgt W.J. White, 25 September MiDs (posthumously). DCM

1942; and Sigmn T. Redhead, 30 September 1942. Beginning in January 1943 followed by

a second contingent in July and a third group in De- cember, Canadian POW, in- cluding 19 signallers, were sent to Japan to work in var- ious industries, mainly min- ing. There, 136 more died with the

Signals contingent sharing in all the misery, hunger and degradation.

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On 22 October 2010, a new dining facility at Vimy Barracks, Kingston, the home station of the Communications and Electronics Branch, was dedicated and named Routledge Hall. The Routledge name has come to repre- sent the quiet courage required of every sol- dier

regardless of the time or conflict in which Canadians may be asked to serve. Sgt. Rout- ledge’s DCM, second only to the VC as a mark of courage, was the only one awarded to a member of the RCCS in the Second World War, and only one awarded to a Canadian

Pacific Star Several Signals POW dis- while in captivity. After returning to Canada,

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Sgt R. Routledge being presented with the Distinguished Conduct Medal by the Governor General HE, FM,The Viscount Alexander of Tunis, KG, GCB, CSI, DSO, MC, in 1947.

Sgt Rutledge continued to serve in the RCCS, into which he was later commissioned.

Special Operations Executive (SOE)

There was one little known special activity in which the RCCS played a part, because of its expertise in wireless communication. After the fall of France in 1940, the British Govern- ment established an organization to assist the conquered peoples in Europe to regain their freedom by providing leadership, weapons, and other resources to enable the growth of resistance activities. The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was formed and began to send agents into France as early as May 1941. Initially, agents were entrusted with sabotage activities but more and more became involved with resistance movements, and through the office of a branch of Military Intelligence (MI9) to assist with the recovery of downed air- men through two escape routes, by sea or through Spain. Two of the prerequisites of

possible agents were the ability to speak the

33

language, and to be able to send and receive wireless messages, usually in encoded Morse Code. It was not long before the British saw potential agents among RCCS members who could speak French. Inevitably, French-Cana- dians were approached and asked to volun- teer for what was a dangerous occupation.

Although agents did go into many coun- tries, the majority parachuted into France. Al- together 441 men and 39 women agents went to France; of the 480, 79 were executed and 93 died in prison. The Canadian contribution was quite small, 28 men, of which 12 were members of the RCCS, which supplied the largest contingent. All, but one, were NCOs or signalmen, who, on being accepted, were commissioned in the SOE on the understand- ing that when their period of service was over, they would return to the ranks. Twelve served in Europe with four of them also serving in Asia. Two of the twelve were executed after capture and one died as a result of a brutal captivity.*

The one exception was Capt R.K. Cheng, who was the first Chinese-Canadian to be com- missioned into the RCCS at Vimy Barracks. After a period of service in Ottawa, he was sent to British Columbia to train a small group of Chi- nese-Canadians with the idea of sending them into Nationalist China. As a result of diplomatic problems with the Chinese government, Capt Cheng and his group were sent instead to the Island of Sarawak in the Dutch East Indies, where they served until the end of the war.

Signals Welfare

On 15 April 1940, a RCCS Women’s Auxiliary was founded in Kingston to assist soldiers’ fam- ilies in finding housing or to help in cases of sickness or other needs. Soon, other auxiliaries were founded in Montreal, Ottawa, and Toronto, and later on in other large centres, es- pecially where NPAM Signal units had con- tributed men for overseas service. Most auxiliaries wanted to supply the

men overseas with comforts as well as assist families at home.

*For details see Appendix 37.

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The portrait of Colonel Elroy Forde, DSO, OBE,VD was placed in the Vimy Officer’s Mess in 1943.

Since the Auxiliaries only existed in large cen- tres, it was not long before there was a feeling that signalmen coming from small villages or rural areas were being neglected. As a result, a National Committee was formed in August 1940 at Vimy Barracks with Col E. Forde as president. By the War’s end thirteen Auxiliaries had been formed: Victoria, Vancouver, Saska- toon, Calgary, Winnipeg, Windsor, Hamilton, London, Toronto, Kingston, Ottawa, Montreal, and Halifax. The work increased as the years passed especially when casualties became nu- merous and there was a need for welfare. Wel- fare representatives had to be located in every area of Canada, and it soon became necessary for welfare funds to be available. Fund-raising among the Signal units based in Canada brought in more than $125,000 of which about$50,000 was spent on welfare.

In order to account for the money being raised and to protect the funds for the future, the Signals Welfare Incorporated was consti- tuted by a Dominion Charter on 10 May 1945. It was led by its hard-working

president, LColD.C. Greeys. As noted in Chapter Six and Ap-

35

pendix 33, quite independently, Brig Genet had formed overseas the “Royal Canadian Corps of Signals Welfare Society” for much the same purpose. After the War, it was de- cided rightfully to amalgamate the two funds and Brig Genet’s fund, which totaled$47,267.86, was added to the funds of Signals Welfare Incorporated. The Fund, which had as its aim, “rendering the most efficient help possible to signalmen and their families, who find themselves in difficulties,” continued until 6 December 2004.

Summary

By mid-summer 1946, the last members of the Canadian Army overseas had returned to Canada. The process of winding down the wartime Army was well underway, and decisions were being taken as to the composition of the peace-time Army, due to be inaugurated on 1 October 1946. During the Second World War, the Canadian Army enlisted a total of 604,947 men and women and reached its peak strength of 495,804 all ranks on 22 May 1945. About 80 per cent served in the CA (A), while the re- maining 20 per cent served in the CA (R). Overall, there were 22, 917 fatal and 58,094 non-fatal casualties. The strength of the RCCS is not known exactly, but there were at least 1,000 officers and over 12,000 men who served in the European theatre, while there were about 500 officers and 6,000 men who served in Canada. There were 413 RCCS fatalities.

It is of some interest to compare the rate of casualties in the First World War to those of the Second. During 1914-1919, a very small Canadian Corps Signal Service of about 3,000 all ranks suffered 141 fatalities, a rate of 4.7 per cent, compared to the 13,000 RCCS over- seas from 1939 to 1946, which had 433 fatal- ities, a rate of 3.32 per cent. This difference is not surprising when it is realized that in the First World War, all communications

above the corps level were carried out by the British Army, whereas in the Second, the RCCS han- dled communications up to the army level in-

* See Appendix 54 for details.

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Senior officers attending a 25th anniversary dinner at the Vimy Officers’ Mess in October 1945 (taking 1920 as the founding date of the RCCS, when LCol Forde recruited 5 officers and 14 NCOs to begin the Corps). Front row, l-r LCol C. S. Bate, RCDS; Brig J. E. Genet, CBE, MC; former CSO, 1 Cdn Army; MGen A. E. Potts, CBE, ED, DOC MD 2; Col W.L. Laurie, D Sigs; Col F.G. Malloch, MC,VD, former Comdt CSTC. Rear row, l-r LCol G.A. McClellan, ED, G 1, D Sigs; LCol James,A Corps Sigs; LCol H. B. Dean, ED, former G 1, 1 Army Sigs, Col E. Forde, DSO, OBE,VD; LCol C. Shergold, MC, DCM; LCol G.W. Smart, RCCS; LCol W. P. Shirreff, OBE, Comdt CSTC. LCol Shergold, a Canadian Engineer Signals NCO, serving with the British Army in 1914, was the first Canadian to be decorated in the First World War.

cluding lines of communication. Signallers in the First World War worked much closer to the front lines and within the reach of Ger- man artillery. For that reason, it is also of in- terest to note that the number of decorations won by signallers in the two wars was nearly

the same. In the First World War there were 686 decorations awarded to signallers, while in the Second 707 were awarded. In both Wars, Canadian Signallers performed beyond the call of duty and set a standard for all fu- ture signallers.