Public Policy Management and Transparency Networktions in policy-making. Ideas about changing government gained momentum during the 1980s and 1990s, flagged by new administrations,

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK REGIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE

Public Policy Management and Transparency Network

Report on the Situation of the Civil Service

in the Caribbean

Mercedes Mateo Díaz Koldo Echebarría

Editors

Washington, DC2008

Servic_Civil_CaribENG 6-19-08.in1 1 6/19/08 6:57:01 PM

Further, the views and interpretations in this document are ours, and should not be attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf.

Cover: Shell-shaped pendant belonging to the Quimbaya prehispanic Society.Gold Museum Collection – Bank of the Republic, Colombia

Additional copies of this publication can be obtained from:Secretariat of the Regional Policy DialogueInter-American Development Bank1300 New York Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20577E-mail: [email protected]: 202-623-2271Web Site: http://www.iadb.org/int/drp


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INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK REGIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE

The Regional Policy Dialogue was established in December 1999 by the initiative of the Board of Ex-ecutive Directors. The objective was to create a forum of communication within the Bank to expand and enhance dialogue among the countries in the region by sharing experiences, preparing them to face the great challenges of globalization, and generating processes for regional cooperation. The Bank identified eight areas to be included on the Dialogue and created seven specialized networks in which government officials at the Vice-Minister level from Latin America and the Caribbean, who are respon-sible for decision making and public policy design, participate.

1) Trade and Integration; 2) Poverty and Social Protection Networks; 3) Education and Human Resources Training; 4) Macroeconomic and Financial Policy; 5) Public Policy and Transparency; 6) Natural Disasters Management; 7) Environment; and 8) Science, Technology and Innovation Network.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixMercedes Mateo Díaz

PART I: METhODOLOGICAL APPROACh

CHAPTER 1: Analytical Framework for the Institutional Assessment . . . . . . . . 3 of Civil Service Systems

Francisco Longo

PART II: INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS BY COUNTRY

CHAPTER 2: Barbados . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 Hedy Isaacs

CHAPTER 3: Belize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 Mercedes Iacoviello

CHAPTER 4: Jamaica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123 Hedy Isaacs

CHAPTER 5: Trinidad and Tobago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 Hedy Isaacs

PART III: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 6: Comparing the Civil Service in Four English-Speaking . . . . . . .169 Countries: a Quantitative and Qualitative Approach

Ana Laura Rodríguez Gustá and Mercedes Iacoviello

Table of Contents


TABLE OF CONTENTS

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APPENDICES Appendix A. Critical Points Valuation – Comparative Table . . . . . . . . . . . .205 Appendix B . Summary of the Institutional Assessments – . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211

Comparative Table Appendix C. Quantitative Indicators – Comparative Table . . . . . . . . . . . . .217 Appendix D. Civil Service Indices for Latin America and the Caribbean – . . .219

Summary Table Appendix E. Civil Service Development by Subsystems: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221

Latin America and the Caribbean


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Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the participation of several colleagues who contributed to this book. Projects are not just indebted to ideas but also to the people who make them come true. This book would not have been possible either without the funding and continuous sup-port of the Regional Policy Dialogue (RPD), and particularly without the endorsement re-ceived from María Carmenza McLean and Laura Bocalandro. Also from the RPD, Rodrigo Salas, Pabla Ayala and Yungju Carolina Oh have been essential and almost daily counterparts for the editing of this volume. This work is also indebted to Robert Daughters, Division Chief, a.i. of the former State, Governance and Civil Service Division, for his faith in this project and his special dedication at a critical moment of its completion. We would like to thank Mer-cedes Iacoviello for her enthusiasm and capacity to coordinate the country specialists in order to ensure a coherent application of the analytical framework for the cases subject to study. We are also grateful to Hedy Isaacs for her professionalism and excellent disposition to undertake the revision of the contents of the three assessments she wrote almost two years ago.



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The State is the primary instrument for organiz-ing and regulating public activity as well as in-teractions between groups and individuals. The search for wealth and prosperity permanently modifies the structural conditions in which the State relates to its citizens and how individuals relate to each other and the world. As the na-ture of relationships changes, the State has to reinvent itself and accommodate its functions to these contextual changes. If there is one single, clear feature of the State, it is its dynamic nature, permanently adapting to the changing social, economic, political, and technological circum-stances in which it works, and forced to “con-stantly re-evaluate what it does and how it does it” (Stiglitz 1997; Tanzi 1997).

It is along these lines that Woodrow Wilson (1887) acknowledged that “it is the object of ad-ministrative study to discover, firstly, what gov-ernment can properly and successfully do, and secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least pos-sible cost either of money or of energy.” Never-theless, it is precisely in defining what to do and how to do it that controversies arise. Behind the notion of bureaucracy is the belief that the State can better perform its functions—and thus that society will be best served—through the creation of a permanent organization managed by civil servants who are hired and promoted on the ba-sis of merit and competence. How efficient these organizations are will, to a degree, determine the

quality of public policies and, hence, their sta-bility, adaptability, implementation, and enforce-ment, the degree of public regarded-ness, and its efficiency (Stein et al., 2006).

While recognizing that “governments can no longer manage social issues alone” (United Nations Foundation 2003:2), one of the central policy objectives of governments still remains the improvement of public services. It is along these lines that during the last decades, there has been a progressive redistribution of roles and responsibilities among governments, the private sector, and the civil society. This real-location of roles among different players is the result of two simultaneous movements towards “privatizing government,” while at the same time parts of the private sector and non-profit organizations have been “governmentalized” (Kettl 2002). In this context, the State is widely accepted to be primarily responsible for set-ting the framework in which this redistribution operates. Thereof, regulation becomes a fun-damental tool in increasingly “mixed manage-ment strategies,” where responsibilities between the public and the private are becoming more unclear and delivery more heavily depends on the respect and enforcement of contracts (Dent et al. 2007:3).

Together with a redefinition of the role played by government and the State, public ser-vice management has also moved from the tra-ditional hierarchical, rigid bureaucratic model

IntroductionMercedes Mateo Díaz


REpORT ON ThE SiTuATiON OF ThE CiviL SERviCE iN ThE CARiBBEAN

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towards less monopolistic, more decentralized, less permanent, and more flexible, client-focus government models that have a progressive sepa-ration between design and implementation func-tions in policy-making.

Ideas about changing government gained momentum during the 1980s and 1990s, flagged by new administrations, particularly in Great Britain, New Zealand, and the United States, and partly as a response to the growing gap between “doing business in the private sector” and “doing so in the public sector” that took place over the second half of the twentieth century (Kamarck 2007:1). These reform processes came to a large extent as a response to the following two paral-lel movements: constraining public budgets, and increasingly evident citizens’ concerns about the quality of public services. Both movements combined put a strong pressure on politicians for change. As a result, new governance models represent a progressive alignment of public sec-tor practices with private sector principles such as customer satisfaction, efficiency and perfor-mance, as guides for institutional operating and organizing.1

In this regard, the trends followed by Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries have been increasingly influenced by many of the new parameters triggering the wave of institutional reforms discussed above.

During the 1950s and 1960s, LAC expe-rienced a strong economic growth which had as principal agent an active State in terms of industrial policies and investments in infra-structure, health, and education. However, by the decade of the 1970s, it became increasingly evident that both the State and the economic models suffered from serious problems of com-petitiveness and efficiency. Excessively dirigiste, these development strategies assumed an overly ambitious role for the State, going far beyond its effective capacity, and in turn undermining its performance in the delivery of core func-tions (Snowdon 2001:47, citing World Bank 1997). In reaction to this, the 1970s and 1980s saw a growing skepticism develop towards the

expanding role of government, and the debate about market failure versus government failure started to intensify. As a result, over the last de-cade and a half, countries in the region moved towards the implementation of orthodox poli-cies of fiscal discipline and the resizing of the State.

In addition to proposing active economic and business development policies, States in the Re-gion also have to face important social demands, with 40 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Addressing these demands en-tails rendering first-quality, efficient and effective services that reach those who most need them, which, in turn, creates continuous pressure over public budgets. This situation has become even more apparent with the trade and financial liberalizations which have in turn reduced the maneuvering capacity of the State (Barreix et al. 2005). The liberalization of domestic prices has resulted in greater transparency, impeding lowering costs of some basic services without subsidizing, and having a related impact on the fiscal balance. A lack of flexibility in trade, and monetary and exchange policies, increases the pressure over the fiscal policy, which, as a re-sult, becomes the main instrument of economic policy.

The policies of fiscal discipline and resizing of the State, while very successful in bringing needed macroeconomic stability to the region, have in some cases resulted in a weakening of its institutional capacity, with a corollary negative impact on public investment and the delivery of basic services and social protection systems. This does not mean, however, that the services rendered by the public administration will be improved simply by increasing budgetary re-sources. It can be argued that both the failure of some development policies in which the State was the primary actor and the weakness of the executive power vis-à-vis other stakeholders are a consequence of the weaknesses of bureaucra-

1 For a review see Kamarck, 2007.


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cy (Echebarría 2006a). These State deficiencies are not exclusively due to budgetary restrictions but also to structural factors regarding organi-zational capacity and efficiency that are signifi-cantly affecting government performance. In turn, overall government performance reflects on citizens’ satisfaction with public services, con-fidence, and perceived sense of value of public institutions.

ThE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT MODELS

There have been different attempts to classify new strategies used by governments to operate and fulfill their functions and responsibilities towards their citizens more efficiently. In mod-ernizing governments, very often practice pre-cedes theory, or as Guy Peters puts it: “except for the market model2 these alternatives have not been articulated in a comprehensive form; they have appeared more clearly in government documents than in the academic literature” (2001:13). Given that they are more the result of practicing ‘the business of government’ than thinking about it from a theoretical perspective, the boundaries between different government management models can sometimes be unclear. Even if they are presented as management models, in practice governments use or discard them in an opportunistic manner, according to needs.

Table 1 tries to summarize the most relevant of these alternatives in a comprehensive manner according to important features of public sector governance, such as the managerial methods and financial arrangements, the production schemes and purchasing techniques, the way policy-mak-ing is structured, performance criteria, or ac-countability mechanisms. Always having the traditional or bureaucratic model as a reference, two lines have been added to the table that re-spectively present the main criticism that each of the new models has of the former, and, in turn, their potential shortcomings.

The traditional bureaucratic or hierarchi-cal model (Column 1) owes much of its con-ceptualization to the work of Max Weber, who identifies as some of its distinguishing factors a clear division of labor among different agencies and public servants, the existence of stable and linear career paths, continuity and institutional permanence, and a vertical and hierarchical dis-tribution of authority and centralized decision-making. In this model, there is no separation of functions between policy design and implemen-tation. The State and its bureaucratic apparatus make policy and deliver services. Accountabil-ity processes seem to be rather straightforward, provided that the existing mechanisms function accordingly: citizens elect their representa-tives who, in turn, make policy decisions and put them in operation; if citizens are satisfied with the way social problems have been dealt with and with the services provided, they will reward governments at the next election peri-od; otherwise, they will sanction the incumbent government by voting for any of the opposition parties.

After the bureaucratic model, the next col-umns refer to Guy Peters’ work, in which he orga-nizes the different reform trends into four groups that he denominates as the “market model,” the “participatory State,” the “flexible government,” and the “deregulated government” (Columns 2 to 5).

The first and most elaborate type is the mar-ket model (Column 2), which builds on the hypoth-esis that private sector managerial methods are superior to those of the traditional public sec-tor. With some variations, this model has been presented under different names: entrepreneur-ial government or entrepreneurial public man-agement, reinvented government (Osborne and Gaebler 1993, Gingrich 2005, Kamarck 2007),

2 According to Peter’s classification, the “market mod-el” is identified as the governance mechanisms in which private sector managerial methods replace traditional public sector managerial systems.



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TABLE 1. MAIN FEATURES OF DIFFERENT MODELS OF PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE

Models of Public Sector Governance

Flexible Deregulated Bureaucratic Market Participatory government government Governing Governing Features model model model model model by network by market

Reference Weber Peters,2001 Peters,2001 Peters,2001 Peters,2001 Goldsmith Kamarck, &Eggers,2004 2007

Managerial Hierarchical Private Lesshierarchical Uprooted Unleashingof Mutating Nomethod model sectormodel: processes; organizations. rules:public structure government competition creationof Mutating servantsasrisk respondingto apparatus participatory structures takers configurations required channels ofactors involvedina policyproblem

Personnel Rigidhierarchy Rewardto Flatter Flexible.Adapted Hierarchical Shiftin n/a rulesand meritand personnel toneeds. personnel managers’ payment performance schemes Fixed-term structures responsibility: schemes contracts from administering peopleand programsto organizing resources

Financial Traditional Budgeting Budgetasa Noincrementa- Budgetingfor Budgeting Nopublicmanagement budgeting forresults. resultof lism:Budgetasa results accordingto resources Creationof consultation resultofactual needs internal needs markets

Production Providers= Separation Increased Exchangeable Subjectedto Governmentis Governmentschemes purchasers between participation schemesadapted managers notalwaysa isnota providersand ofproducers toneeds decisions serviceprovider service purchasers butagenerator provider ofpublicvalue

Purchasing Internaland Competitive: Internal Competitive Subjectedto Identification n/atechniques centralized contracting bargaining managers ofactorswith out,market decisions greatervalue testing,etc addedforeach service

Policy-making Policydesign Policydesign Separationof Separationof Separationof Separationof Government andpolicy separated functions. functions.Experi- functions. functions.Most onlydesigns implementation frompolicy Bottom-up. mentation Strongerroleto ofthetime policy,does integrated implementa- Decentralized bureaucracyin governmentis notimple- tion.Decen- decision-making policymaking notaprovider mentit tralizationof functions

Performance Publicvalue Costand Participation Innovationand Adaptation Publicvalue Publiccriteria efficiency efficiency purpose

Accountability Government Government Government Government Government Government Government respondsto respondsto respondsto respondsto respondsfor respondsfor respondsfor citizens signals collectivesignals contextual policyoutputs: policyoutputs policydesign comingfrom fromcitizens stimuli moreactivists, market lessaccountable. Expostcontrols

(continuedonnextpage)


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TABLE 1. MAIN FEATURES OF DIFFERENT MODELS OF PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE (continued)

Models of Public Sector Governance

Flexible Deregulated Bureaucratic Market Participatory government government Governing Governing

Roleofthe Citizens Customers Citizens Customers Downgraded Citizen Customerspublic citizen

Maincriticism n/a Monopoly Top-down Permanence. Internal Partialreplace- Governmenttothe management Excessivecosts. regulations mentof shouldnotbureaucratic Policyrigidity bureaucracy: implementmodel government policy oftendelegates implementation

Potential n/a Coordination. Focuson Tendencyofany Risk Biasinprovider Lackofshortcomings Transitional processrather agency,evenif management. selection. control.ofnewmodels costs thanstructure. external,to Fairness Fairness Accountabil- Coordination. perpetuate. ity.Fairness Flexibility Fragmentation. Coordination. Fairness

Othernames/ Hierarchical Entrepre- n/a n/a n/a Kamarck2007 n/areferences model neurial government (Osborne& Gaebler,1993; Gingrich2005). Government bycontract (Schick1998). Reinvented government (Kamarck 2007)

Source:Author’selaboration.

or governing by contract3 (Schick 1998). The baseline for judging public services delivery is cost: “government should be judged on the basis of how cheaply it delivers public services. Even more fundamentally, the market model asks what things should be public in the first place” (Peters 2001:46). Traditional public administra-tions are considered to provide insufficient in-centives for good performance, because, among other reasons, their goods and services are un-priced and results are not rewarded; they have the monopoly on information; and their struc-tures are too complex, hierarchical, large and rigid to effectively respond to external stimuli. In

relative terms, markets are seen as a more effi-cient mechanism for allocating resources within

3 Government by contract functions through formal agreements, where the purchaser of goods and services is the government, and the suppliers are the agencies and entities in charge of delivery. The system promotes competition among suppliers. Policy-making functions and service delivery are decoupled. Just as with con-tracts, the dues are spelled out and specified: “when the budget is tabled in Parliament, each department publishes a departmental forecast report that, among other things, specifies the outputs it will produce in the next financial year” (Schick 1998:125).



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society. The market model proposes to replace the rigid payment schemes with merit principles through which people are rewarded according to performance; competition becomes the basis for allocating resources and budgeting, with a separation between the providers of services (ex. an enterprise), the purchasers of those services (government), and the customers (citizens). This marketization implies that techniques like con-tracting out or market testing are employed to identify “who will do the job better and cheap-er.” Leaving aside the “transitional costs for gov-ernment” that any transition to a new model implies (Peters 2001:49), the quoted author men-tions other potential downsides of the market model, among which there is an excessive de-centralization of functions to a number of “pri-vate sector-like” agencies making autonomous decisions, with subsequent problems in terms of coordination and control; there is also the fact that citizens lose some of their status by becom-ing “customers” if governing is “reduced to the level of mere economic action” (Peters 2001:45). Finally, identifying the channels for and direction of accountability is also difficult.

The second model discussed by Peters is the participatory State (Column 3), which portrays a government with more collective mechanisms to channel citizens’ preferences, and, therefore, an enhanced participation that goes beyond vot-ing. The main criticism of the public sector is its hierarchical style of management and central-ized decision-making. This second model pro-poses a system in which there is a greater deal of consultation procedures, and employees and consumers are more involved in the decisions taken by the organization. Breaking away from hierarchy implies making organizations more horizontal and creating new structures and participatory channels. Yet, the implications of this model affect the processes more than the structure. Some aspects and recommendations of reform are shared with the market approach, like the idea of protecting the rights of the con-sumers of public services, in this case, through participation and involvement in the decisions.

However, the underlying objectives are differ-ent. Rather than stressing competition, the ob-ject of decentralization is to change the holders and mechanisms of control. Problems in this model are likely to be related to coordination between agencies and policy programs, and consistency among the policies. Participation may also endanger the needed flexibility among leadership to negotiate by increasing the bar-gaining costs through collective decisions and consultations.

Flexible government (Column 4) is a third model in which the State’s capacity of response is the most important feature. Government has to be structured in a way that allows for rapid adapta-tion to changing external conditions and produc-es immediate responses to new challenges. This model can be considered to be the most at odds with traditional public sector management strat-egies. It criticizes the low efficiency of the public sector on basically two grounds: its permanence and institutionalization that tend to produce a certain degree of immobility, rigidities, and ex-cessive costs, and the tendency of traditional bu-reaucracies to perpetuate themselves, where the subject of concern becomes the survival strate-gies and self-perpetuating structures instead of the original purpose of the organization. To es-cape from this, the flexible government has to be capable of “uprooting organizations.” This has implications for the way employment is ap-proached. Against permanent employment, flex-ible government implies moving to part-time and fixed-term contracts. It also implies a process in which government is constantly terminating ob-solete organizations and creating new ones. In budgetary terms, it entails escaping from incre-mentalism. This model gives a premium to ex-perimentation, where decisions and policies are approached in a more modest way; the govern-ment is explicit about the risks involved. Howev-er, possible shortcomings are that the creation of external agencies very often falls into the same traps of traditional organizations, by tending, in turn, to perpetuate themselves. As already seen in other models, here there is also a potential


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problem of fragmentation in addition to a lack of coordination and control. Also the temporary nature of institutions can have an effect on the level of commitment of public employees, and make government organizations more fragile. There is also a further issue having to do with the level of fairness that this type of system will produce. Indeed, the most disadvantaged tend to have more difficulties to access certain institu-tions. Undoubtedly, for certain groups, it takes more than good intentions and good will to ben-efit from public services, among other things be-cause the costs of access to information are too high.

The fourth and last model discussed by Pe-ters is the deregulated government (Column 5). It posits that by reducing constraints and inter-nal red tape government will be more efficient. Both, the deregulation and the market approach are complementary. Clearly, new managerialism cannot be achieved if managers are constrained by the rigidity of the different sets of rules that regulate the personnel, the budget, or the pro-curement processes. The main flaw this model reveals in the traditional public sector is its inter-nal regulations that limit its performance. As it is the case with the flexible government model, one of the foreseen shortcomings of the deregulated government is risk, given that the likelihood for error increases as internal controls decrease, as well as a possible bias in the distribution of ben-efits. Central evaluation agencies focus more on policy and results than on accounts, and ex ante controls are replaced by ex post controls. This sys-tem, however, shares with the bureaucratic mod-el its emphasis on authority as the sole recourse to some degree of internal control. Managers become the source of institutional inspiration and are given more freedom for policy-making, following the principle that “the public inter-est can be served through a more activist, and perhaps a less accountable, government” (Peters 2001:111).

Other works have also revolved around new organizational forms and strategies increasingly used by governments to function and deliver

services more efficiently. Along these lines, Ste-phen Goldsmith and William D. Eggers (2004) dedicate a few hundred pages to what they re-fer to as governing by network (Column 6). They consider all third-party service delivery models, including contracts between government agen-cies, commercialization, public-private partner-ships, outsourcing, concession arrangements, and privatization, as different types and “a cen-tral component of the trend toward networked governing” (Goldsmith & Eggers 2004:10). This model clearly shares some common characteris-tics with some of the previous ones, particularly the market and flexible models. However, instead of respectively stressing competition or the need to permanently uproot organizations, governing by network focuses on the importance of select-ing the right configuration of actors for each pol-icy problem. This model points to the existing contradiction between the structures of authority and action. Whereas in traditional bureaucracies authority is vertically structured, public action takes place along horizontal lines. Government executives no longer have to focus on managing human resources. On the contrary, they have to manage the myriad of actors involved in policy-making and implementation to produce public value. Government is not so much a provider of public services as an organizer and facilitator of relationships.

Finally, the last column of Table 2 repre-sents what Elaine Kamarck has called government by market, which, despite the apparent similar-ity in terms, is significantly different from the market model presented in column 2. Govern-ment by market implies the complete absence of the State in the provision of the service and involves no public resources: “the government uses state power to create a market that fulfills a public purpose, and by definition that kind of market would not exist in the private sector. […] government by market is so well disguised that most people are not even aware that it is govern-ment in its operation” (Kamarck, 2007:17–18). As opposed to other models of government, Kamarck argues that government by market is



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the most efficient of all when it comes to chang-ing people’s behavior on a massive scale. This model is to some extent close to the governing by network model in that it uses other players to create public value. Yet, government by market is a much more opportunistic and less generaliz-able as a form of government than any of the others.

In short, new models of public sector man-agement have questioned traditional bureaucra-cies in four major accounts: their hierarchical, monopolistic, rigid, and overly regulated ways of doing business. Beneath these criticisms lies the issue of performance, with an assumed lack of governmental efficacy, efficiency, flexibility and capacity of innovation, to deal with—now more than ever—new and changing circumstances. In response to these perceived state failures, a num-ber of new strategies to deal with government business has emerged. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that, sometimes, instead of immediately discarding “the virtues of stability and perma-nence,” one must consider that “long-standing organizational structures can help to guide policy choices,” the challenge being to find the “mechanisms for identifying and discarding the overly mature policies while retaining the effec-tive ones” (Peters 2001:80).

New models of public sector management have in common an increasing presence of ex-ternal actors in governmental processes, under the form of markets, agencies, not-for-profit and civil society organizations, private sector enter-prises, or simply citizens included as individuals having a right to participate, if not in the deci-sions, at least in the implementation of policies. This innovation has important implications for public management, since government is in some cases less of a provider and more of an organizer of different suppliers and quality-controller of services. However, “government cannot through partnerships avoid its ultimate responsibility to the public for both the quality of a service and whether it is justly delivered” (Goldsmith & Egg-ers 2004:21–22).

ARE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT MODELS SUITED FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?

Both in developed and developing countries, States have been increasingly confronted with situations in which some of the old commit-ments to welfare state services and social pro-tection systems were not viable as they were performed due to restrictions on public budgets and the subsequent cost of opportunity for gov-ernments. Without necessarily having to give up basic citizens’ rights to access decent services, these constraints have progressively forced gov-ernments to innovate and experiment with new and cost-reducing forms of state organization and management.

One of the major public sector implications of new arrangements is a progressive alignment with private sector practices. However, as for any institutional reform, this might imply some trade-offs. Sometimes changes can have unfore-seen costs, both financial and institutional, if risk is not properly addressed and the correspond-ing mitigating mechanisms are not anticipated. Breaking away from traditional bureaucratic values such as institutional permanence may en-danger important public administration values such as impartiality and independence of public officials, with the risk of making them more sub-jected to political capture. At the same time, per-manence is also linked to institutional memory, which in turn helps prevent incurring the costs of repeating the same errors.

Extremely relevant for a book on the situ-ation of the civil service systems in the Carib-bean is the debate generated around the issue of whether or not developing countries should first have classical hierarchical bureaucracies before moving on to new public management models (Schick 1998; Bresser-Pereira 2007). To date there is no last word on this issue, as scholars and practitioners involved in this debate have been changing their positions over the years.

Discouraging developing countries from en-gaging in government reforms in line with those advanced in countries like New Zealand, Alan


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Schick pointed out that with the existing high levels of informality in the market economy and in the public sector overall (influencing, for in-stance, the budget process or the way civil ser-vants are hired), new public management reforms will inevitably lead to corruption and greater inefficiencies: “no country should move directly from an informal public sector to one in which managers are accorded enormous discretion to hire and spend as they see fit” (Schick 1998:129). He argues that some progression in the logic of changes is needed: where there have to be, first, effective external controls, before moving on to internal controls; and, second, politicians and of-ficials “must be able to control inputs before they are called upon to control outputs; they must be able to account for cash before they are asked to account for cost; they must abide by uniform rules before they are authorized to make their own rules; they must operate in integrated, cen-tralized departments before being authorized to go it alone in autonomous agencies” (Schick 1998:130).

Against the hypothesis that developing coun-tries need to complete a traditional civil service reform before moving on to new public manage-ment schemes, Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira ar-gues that there is no need for sequencing both types of reforms; they can be done simultane-ously particularly in middle-income developing countries (2007). The issue, he argues, is that de-veloping countries should not uncritically adopt public management models exported by devel-oped countries: it is fundamental to always de-velop some sense of ownership.

Increasingly, governments make a clear separation between decision-making and imple-mentation functions. A citizen entering an office asking for a traditional public service—both in developed and in developing countries—will be surprised to discover who the real provider is and, overall, how the system operates. The State has modestly come to accept that it no longer has the capacity and resources to implement certain services as it used to. Together with the myriad of alliances with different actors from the private

sector and not-for-profit and civil society organi-zations in general, other important innovations have also been introduced, such as information and technology. Governments have fewer incen-tives to operate “by the book.” On the contrary, the reality of governing is progressively demand-ing more tailor-made formulas specially designed for each policy problem.

However—and this is particularly true for countries in which institutions need to be con-solidated—the more pro-active a State is, the more openness, transparency, and accountability are needed to avoid State capture (Staab 2003). This dilemma is explained by Vito Tanzi as fol-lows: “the very countries that would seem to have the greatest need for an expanded public sector role may be the same ones where the pub-lic sector is least prepared to play that role ef-ficiently. Therefore, when policymakers of these countries attempt to play a large role, they end up damaging economic activity” (Tanzi 1997:3). The same applies when flexibility and deregula-tion are part of the managing rules: the higher the degree of discretion of public officials, the more control mechanisms are needed to avoid state failures. Only when there is a clear alloca-tion of responsibilities can the parties be held accountable. Blurred and diluted responsibilities among different actors and institutions will make it very hard for citizens to identify and demo-cratically sanction. When nobody can be clearly identified and blamed for public dissatisfaction, it is the general political trust that will pay the consequences (Kumlin, forthcoming).

Coming back to the debate on “simultaneity” versus “sequencing,” it seems that, in practice, what many developing countries are implement-ing today is some kind of a hybrid system, which cannot be identified with any particular model. Recent practice in the region has shown a ten-dency to move away from the logics of univer-sal panaceas and exportable models to focus on more pragmatic decisions (Santiso 2006). Better and over-reaching institutions have facilitated the implementation of gradual reforms well ad-justed to each reality.



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Resuming the initial discussion, it is not a question of identifying what the State must do but of determining what the State can do and how it can be done, i.e. what is in the realm of the possible given the circumstances. Thus, the problem does not lie in choosing the best model but in creating the institutional mechanisms re-quired so that the country concerned may reduce its risk when making decisions and in taking the necessary measures so that it is able to properly react with any unpredictable situation that may occur. It is precisely in these circumstances when public institutions and, therefore, the quality of their employees, have a role to play.

LAC is currently in a positive cycle with a rise in commodity prices, significant inflows in remittances, and economic growth clearly above recent trends with an increasing rate of almost 5% per year since mid-2003. LAC countries have progressively been integrated to the world economy, which has in turn been reflected in greater access to international capital markets, and decreased financial country risk and lower spreads. Enhanced economic management has translated in low inflation rates and decreasing levels of public debt. All of the above, in addi-tion to the relative success of certain institutional reforms, has resulted in more solid economies and significant advances in average social indica-tors.

For this very reason, the region has to take advantage of this period to enhance its risk man-agement, and prepare for anti-cyclic phases. This calls not only for pragmatic management, but also for improved planning and forecasting ca-pacities. To develop these skills, the State should strengthen its public institutions by staffing them with qualified personnel through management systems that ensure efficient hiring, promotion, and a retention processes.

OUTLINE OF ThE BOOK

As a sequel of the book published by Koldo Eche-barría for Latin American countries (2006b), this

report describes the access and career manage-ment systems applied to public employment in four Caribbean countries (Barbados, Belize, Ja-maica, and Trinidad and Tobago).

The assessments or diagnoses were conduct-ed in eighteen Latin American countries and four Caribbean countries between April 2002 and December 2004 on the basis of the analyti-cal framework elaborated by Francisco Longo. In December 2003, the Network agreed to devise a short form of the analytical framework, which helped accelerate the diagnoses by country car-ried out during 2004.

In May 2006, the first part of the results were published for the following Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Co-lombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecua-dor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This edition includes Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

As in the previous version, the document is organized in three parts: the methodological ap-proach, the institutional assessments by country, and the comparative analysis.

Part I. Methodological approach. The first part of this report presents the analytical framework de-signed to provide insight into the status of the civil service system in each country by using common criteria. This tool is flexible enough to allow for the variations that may reflect the di-versity found in all countries.

In order to assess different human resources management (HRM) systems, seven subsystems have been identified (Planning, Work Organiza-tion, Employment, Performance Management, Compensation, Development, and Human Re-lations), from which indices and indicators have been derived to quantify the data for compara-tive purposes. Even if there is some degree of consensus as to the need for empirical evidence, its gathering encounters important method-ological issues that limit the robustness and further acceptance of the results obtained. Un-doubtedly, generating data involves simplifying


xix

iNTRODuCTiON

complex realities through numerical valuations. Yet, these efforts are needed in order to feed in-formation back into reform processes already in place and guide new choices. One of the objec-tives of this work is precisely to contribute to that exercise.

Part II. Institutional assessments by country. Part II contains the institutional assessments of the civil service systems in the four countries selected: Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

The institutional assessments are structured as follows:

Executive summary, which provides a quick overview of the information produced in the assessment and is further developed in the subsequent sections.Analysis of subsystems, which describe the seven functions that a HRM system should perform according to the analytical framework. Indicators and indices, which are quan-tifications of the qualitative analyses per country in terms of merit, efficiency, struc-tural consistency, functional capacity, and in-tegrating capacity of the civil service. Conclusions, which elaborates on the identified strengths and weaknesses of each system, presenting the main findings of the assessments.Recommendations, which includes sug-gestions for the areas that should be pri-oritized in order to improve civil service performance in the country concerned.Summary Table, which briefly reproduces the main results of each country assessment.

Following the logic behind the analysis by HRM subsystems specified in the analytical framework, the assessments enable the analysts to identify the area in which the cause of a pos-sible dysfunction or inefficiency lies, to work on the interrelation between each set of factors, and to identify possible courses of action.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Part III. Comparative analysis. Part III compares the results obtained in the case studies described in Part II, This analysis serves as an input to assess the degree of relative development of each sub-system in each country, and enables to compare it not only with its Caribbean counterparts but with the results obtained in the previous report for Latin America (Echebarría 2006b). Through this comparative analysis, the specific trends of each national context can be observed in the light of the evolution of the civil service systems in other countries.

The report also contains five appendices at the end, which provide the raw data and basic information from which the assessments were made.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Barreix, Alberto; Roca, Jerónimo & Villela, Luiz (2005). “Tributación en el MERCOSUR y la necesidad de coordinación.” In Tanzi, Vito & Villela, Luiz (eds), Tributación para la Integración del MERCOSUR. Washington, DC: IADB.

Bresser-Pereira, Luiz Carlos (2007). “The Struc-tural Public Governance Model,” Internation-al Public Management Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 16–31.

Dent, Mike; Van Gestel, Nicolette & Teelken, Christine (2007). “Symposium on Chang-ing Modes of Governance in Public Sector Organizations: Action and Rhetoric,” Public Administration, Vol. 85, No. 1, pp. 1–8.

Echebarría, Koldo (2006a). “Caracterización empírica de las burocracias latinoamerica-nas: configuraciones y roles en el proceso de elaboración de políticas públicas,” Reforma y Democracia, No. 34, pp. 127–146.

Echebarría, Koldo, ed. (2006b). Informe sobre la situación del servicio civil en América Latina. Red de Gestión y Transparencia de la Política Pública. Washington DC: Regional Policy Dialogue, Inter-American Development Bank.



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Gingrich, Newt (2005). “21st Century Entrepre-neurial Public Management as a Replace-ment for Bureaucratic Public Administration: Getting Government to Move at the Speed and Effectiveness of the Information Age,” Center for Health Transformation, http://www.healthtransformation.net/.

Goldsmith, Stephen & Eggers, William D. (2004). Governing by Network. The New Shape of the Pub-lic Sector. Washington DC: JFK Harvard Uni-versity/Brookings Institution Press.

Kamarck, Elaine C. (2007). The End of Govern-ment as We Know It: Making Public Policy Work. Colorado/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Kettl, Donald F. (2002). The Transformation of Governance Public Administration for Twenty-First Century America. The John Hopkins Univer-sity Press.

Kumlin, Staffan (forthcoming). “Overloaded or Undermined? European Welfare States in the Face of Performance Dissatisfaction.” In Svallfors, Stefan (ed.), The Political Sociology of the Welfare State.

Norris, Pippa, ed. (1999). Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Ox-ford University Press.

Osborne, David & Gaebler, Ted (1993). Reinvent-ing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. New York: Pen-guin.

Peters, Guy (2001). The Future of Governing. Sec-ond Edition, Revised. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

Santiso, Javier (2006). La economía política de lo pos-sible. Washington DC: Inter-American De-velopment Bank.

Schick, Alan (1998). “Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand’s Reforms,” The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 123–131.

Snowdon, Brian (2001). “Redefining the Role of the State. Joseph Stiglitz on Building a Post-Washington Consensus,” World Economics, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 45–86.

Staab, Martin (2003). “Public-Private Sector Re-lationships in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic Development, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 22.

Stein, Ernesto; Mariano Tommasi, Koldo Eche-barría, Eduardo Lora & Mark Payne (2006). The Politics of Policies. IPES 2006 Report. Washington, DC: Inter-American Develop-ment Bank and David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies Harvard University.

Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1997). “The State and De-velopment: Some New Thinking,” http://go.worldbank.org/ZOARWHPNG0.

Tanzi, Vito (1997). “The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: A Historical Perspec-tive,” IMF Working Paper, p. 28.

United Nations Foundation (2003). Understand-ing Public-Private Partnerships. Washington, DC: United Nations Foundation.

Weber, Max [1919] (1994). “The Profession and Vocation of Politics.” In Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, Woodrow (1887). “The Study of Ad-ministration,” Political Science Quarterly, No. 2, pp. 197–222.

World Bank (1997). The State in a Changing World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


PART I

METhODOLOGICAL APPROACh



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I. OVERVIEW

Purpose

The purpose of this document, requested by the Inter-American Development Bank, is to pres-ent an analytical framework that may serve as a common frame of reference to assess national Civil Service (CS) systems in countries located within the Bank’s scope of action.

Goals and Characteristics of this Chapter

This document pursues three goals:

a) Facilitate the task of analysts of national CS systems by serving as a reference for compar-ison purposes as well as by providing meth-odological guidelines for their work.

b) Encourage the use of a common approach in their diagnoses, thus facilitating the com-parative analysis of their conclusions by their target readers.

c) Provide measuring tools, such as indices, that may enable analysts to make comparative as-sessments of some dimensions of the differ-ent countries under study.

Scope

The document is intended to serve as an analyti-cal frame rather than as an instruction manual. Therefore, it is not aimed at standardizing the behavior of analysts to conform to a predeter-mined methodological pattern of content, se-quence, and details. The powerful influence of contextual factors, inherent in the examination of different national situations, advises against this approach. Furthermore, our object of analysis is not a single organization but an entire political-administrative system made up of networks of organizations, which imposes the need to draw comparative conclusions with a high degree of generalization.

Consequently, our overall aim is to construct a common analytical language that should fa-cilitate a shared approach, without, however, replacing the auditors’ own judgment to adapt it to different situations and reach their own con-clusions.

Basic Characteristics of the Diagnostic Assessments

The diagnostic assessments are expected to in-clude the following:

ChAPTER 1

Analytical Framework for the Institutional Assessment

of Civil Service SystemsFrancisco Longo



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a) A common approach for comparison pur-poses based on the theoretical model of the CS system presented and developed in this chapter.

b) A rigorous analytical methodology based on the collection of data that should support the conclusions drawn.

Structure of the Chapter

This chapter is organized as follows:

Section II describes as clearly as possible the objective scope of the diagnoses conducted, specifying the meaning of “Civil Service” in its broad and restricted senses for the pur-poses of this work. Section III presents a global and systemic reference framework or model1 for public employment and human resources manage-ment to be used for comparing the analyses on different national situations.Section IV, the largest section, provides more accurate guidelines to conduct the diagnostic analyses. It specifies, as much as it is deemed suitable, the content and method of analysis of the different subsystems which make up the whole model described in the previous section.

The following are also included as annexes:

a) A glossary of the terms used;b) A section devoted to describing the peculiari-

ties of Employment and HR Management systems within the public sector in order to frame the proposed model within a political-administrative context;

c) A description of the proposed quantitative indicators used to account for certain aspects of the diagnoses;

d) The list of indices and sub-indices proposed for the final stage of the diagnoses, as well as the methodology used for their construction;

e) A full checklist of critical points, including the valuation scale and guidelines for weigh-

•

•

•

ing each one of them, as well as their relation with the indices and sub-indices provided;

f) An overall scheme for the content of the final report.

Bibliographical references are also included at the end.

II. SCOPE OF ThE DIAGNOSES CONDUCTED

This section is intended to accurately delimit the object of analysis, for which purpose the scope of the Civil Service concept is defined.

What We Mean by Civil Service

In its broadest sense, Civil Service (CS) is to be understood as the system of public employ-ment and human resources management in the public organizations of a given country.

In a more restricted sense, CS shall refer to a system that incorporates specific institu-tional arrangements—either similar to or different from those that characterize ordi-nary employment—in order to ensure the provision of professional public services.

Based on this two-fold definition, we can fo-cus on some elements that will help define the concept more accurately.

Elements and Goals of a CS System

The CS is made up of a set of institutional bod-ies through which public employment and the

1 The HRM theoretical model presented in section III is based on the approaches used by the Human Re-sources Management Department at ESADE, devel-oped and adapted to the public sector by its Instituto de Dirección y Gestión Pública. In particular, the author thanks prof. Ricard Serlavós for his contributions, from which he has adopted the basic approach described herein.


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ANALyTiCAL FRAmEwORk FOR ThE iNSTiTuTiONAL ASSESSmENT OF CiviL SERviCE SySTEmS

people who are part of it are coordinated and managed. These arrangements include written or informal rules, structures, cultural patterns, explicit or implicit policies, a wide range of pro-cesses, practices and activities aimed at ensuring the proper management of human resources within the framework of a professional and ef-fective public administration for the sake of the general interest.

In the public sphere, the purpose of the Em-ployment and Human Resources Management systems is to make effectiveness and efficiency goals compatible with the requirements of equal opportunities, merit, and neutrality that charac-terize professional administrations in democratic contexts.

A CS System is More Than a Regulatory Framework

CS systems are governed or influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by a specific legal frame-work, but they should not be confused with it. On the one hand, because in practice regulations are very likely to be breached repeatedly. On the other hand, because the margin left for interpret-ing rules is sometimes so ample that different, even opposed practices may be enclosed within the same legal framework.

What basically identifies a CS system and is therefore the object of this analysis is a set of practices involved in the actual operation of the national political-administrative system under analysis, regardless of the correlation between that operation and the regulatory framework in force. The analysis of the latter, i.e. the regulatory frame-work, is an important component of the overall analysis, but it is not to be taken as covering the full purpose pursued.

A CS System Can Include More than One Type of Employment Relation

Defining CS as a public employment manage-ment system entails adopting a comprehensive

view of CS, in which different types of employ-ment relations, either close to or different from the ordinary labor regime, may fit. The Civil Service thus defined may accommodate employ-ment relations based on appointments or con-tracts, regulated by public or private law, whose disputes are settled before special judicial bodies or in the trial courts.

Therefore, the uniformity or diversity of a country’s regulations, structures, and policies on public employment and human resources management does not determine or restrict the scope of the diagnostic assessment, but simply expresses the existence of various national CS models, a diversity that will be duly reflected in the papers.

One or More Administration Levels

The scope of each diagnostic assessment will evi-dently be the one laid down in its own terms of reference. The complexity and difficulty of the task will depend on the extent and diversity of the institutional scope analyzed. Without preju-dice to this, this analytical framework can be ef-fectively applied to the CS in a restricted sense, i.e. the central government, or in a broad sense, covering sub-national governments as well.

III. ThE REFERENCE FRAMEWORK OR MODEL

III.1. Introduction

One of the basic objectives of this paper is to define a ref-erence framework to guide the analysis. This section aims at defining the scope of this framework and identifying the proposed model.

On What Basis Should a Framework be Constructed?

As stated in the introduction, the method pro-posed involves using a common reference framework to carry out the diagnostic assess-ments. But what reference framework should be



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used by analysts concerned with employment and human resources management in public systems?

An apparently simple answer might be the generally accepted rules and principles de-veloped by experts in the fields involved. The problem is that the complexity of these subjects makes it impossible to have a standardized or generally accepted theoretical pattern, i.e. a set of clear, undisputed principles. Even in the pri-vate sector management, there are various ap-proaches, differing in relevant aspects, which compete with one another. This is even more complex in the field of public sector manage-ment where new variables appear on stage, adding further complexity and giving rise to multiple perspectives.

A Model Must Be Chosen

Yet, it is necessary to choose one out of all the existing reference frameworks—it has to be rele-vant, understandable, easy to use, and adaptable to the scope and scale of the diagnostic assess-ments to be performed. Analysts in this field cannot have a model as accurate as, for example, the accounting plan of a financial auditor, but they can rely on a human resources management model (see glossary), chosen out of the various ones available.

The HRM Model Proposed

The HRM model presented below offers, in our opinion, the following advantages:

a) Its broad approach can accommodate dif-ferent perspectives and multiple disciplines without necessarily excluding any point of view.

b) It is an updated model that incorporates the most modern views on HRM.

c) It adapts to the macro-scale of analysis that, as mentioned before, characterizes institu-tional diagnoses for which it serves as refer-ence.

d) Although originally designed for private sec-tor management, it has been widened and adapted to the public sector, as well as tested successfully in teaching and consultancy.

III.2. An Integrated Model of Employment and human Resources Management System

Below is the theoretical reference model in its broadest dimension, together with its founda-tions, strategic value, and the situational factors to be considered.

HRM Acts as a Link Between the Strategy and Human Resources

Figure 1 is a first and general, panoramic view of the basic elements of the theoretical model proposed. HRM is presented as an integrated management system, the basic purpose of which is to align the people to the strategy (see glossary) of an organization or of a multi-organizational system,2 in order to achieve the desired results, consistent with the goals pursued.

The desired results depend—to the extent appropriate for each case—on the human re-sources involved, in two different ways:

a) Results depend on the degree of adjustment of the quantitative and qualitative size (or dimension) of the human resources to the objectives pursued.

b) Results are a consequence of the behavior observed by the staff members in their work-place.

HRM will have an impact on both variables. Therefore, any assessment of a HRM system must be associated with such impacts, provided they are positive and give rise to actual results.

2 From now onwards and for simplicity purposes, the word “organization” shall also encompass, unless oth-erwise specified, a multi-organizational institutional system, whose Civil Service area is under analysis.


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HRM as a Strategic Value System

Strategic coherence is a key feature of the mod-el. This means that the quality of HRM—in terms of each one of its policies or practices and in terms of the management system as a whole—cannot be judged independently of the organization’s strategy (mission, priorities, and objectives). HRM adds value only if it is in line with the organization’s priorities and objec-tives.

The macro-scale in which the institutional diagnoses of CS systems take place will force us to address the issue of strategic coherence in a relatively different way from the one that would be applicable if it were a single organization. On the one hand, the strategic statements will be more general and ambiguous (save for some few exceptions, such as those related to the fis-

cal policy), thus demanding a greater effort of interpretation. On the other hand, the strategic statements will tend to be less explicit, forcing analysts to make implicit preferences and orien-tations more explicit.

Influential Contextual Factors to Be Considered

The set of personnel polices and practices (see glossary) known as HRM does not constitute the only source of impact on the two variables al-ready mentioned (size and behavior). The weight of other influential contextual factors—identifi-able either inside or outside the organization—should also be taken into account.

These contextual factors have a direct or in-direct impact on the people and their conduct by influencing the design and implementation of

INTEGRATED MODEL OF HR STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

STRATEGY

EXTERNALFACTORS

INTERNAL CONTEXT Human

ResourcesManagement

PEOPLE

RESULTS

Legal frameworkLabor market

Others

StructureCultureOthers

Source: Adapted from R. Serlavós

FIGURE 1



8

HRM policies and practices or even on the stra-tegic goals of the organization.

Factors Related to the Internal Context

As far as the internal context of the organization is concerned, there are many factors to be con-sidered, namely: its internal political situation, its economic context, the technology used, its work systems, the sociological profile of its staff, its leadership style, etc. One or the other factor will be deemed more or less relevant or influen-tial, depending on each case. At any rate, two factors are considered mandatory for analysis, given their direct or indirect relevance for hu-man behavior: the organizational structure and culture.

The organizational structure (see glossary) is an important source of influence. The degree of standardized behavior resulting from rules or job descriptions, the hierarchical pyramid, the planning systems and types of controls in place, and the degree of centralization/decentraliza-tion in the decision-making process are some of the structural data relevant for HR manage-ment.

The organizational culture (see glossary) is another factor of extraordinary importance. Fre-quently, the mental models and values prevailing in an organizational context may account for the human behavior as well as for HRM policies and practices.

Factors Related to the External Context

Influential factors outside the organization are also numerous. Among others are the socio-po-litical and economic situation, the technological advances, the expectations of public service us-ers, opinion leaders, the mass media, etc. Two other external factors are important for HRM and should therefore be included in the analy-sis—i.e. the regulations or legal framework in force and the labor market.

The legal framework in force is a pow-erful element of the external context, since its

influence, by typically imposing restrictions on the HR system, cannot be disputed. In the pub-lic sector, rules are even more important given their wider scope and greater intensity. Some of the specific features and restrictions inherent to HRM in the public sector derive precisely from the legal framework.

The labor market is of the greatest im-portance for the design and implementation of HRM policies and practices. As will be shown, the labor market has a powerful influential role to play in areas such as human resources recruit-ment or compensation policies.

The Utility of this Model for Diagnostic Purposes: Defining Problems Correctly Is Crucial

The general, panoramic picture presented so far provides some useful elements for the diag-nosis of HRM systems, especially to analyze the causes of problems, an issue that will be touched upon again in section IV.2. Specifically, it can be used as a map to locate the origin or root cause of identified dysfunctions.

Thus, a dysfunction in a HRM system (for example, a person who is poorly adjusted to his or her job position, an excessively rigid mobility or promotion scheme, or compensation inequi-ties) may simply result from an ill-designed per-sonnel policy or unsuitable HRM practices, but also from lack of strategic clarity in the organi-zation, inaccurate or incoherent HR strategies, structural design imbalances, legal restrictions, a reduced labor market, predominant mental atti-tudes or cultural patterns, or from any other fac-tor of the internal or external context.

Detecting the root cause of the problem (or its root causes, since there is often more than one) is essential in order to “hit the nail on the head,” i.e. to make the diagnosis point to the correct so-lutions. Otherwise, to cite just one example: if we proposed the introduction of a legal reform to solve a problem that is predominantly cultural in nature, the dysfunction would be likely to re-main unchanged.


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III.�. Basic Subsystems that Make Up the Model

This section enlarges on the proposed model, presenting the main HRM components or subsystems. This systemati-zation is important, as will be further seen in section IV, because these elements constitute the main areas of analy-sis, while giving shape to the diagnostic assessments.

HRM Involves Several Subsystems

Let us return to Figure 1 and imagine that a zoom lens focusing on the central circle of the diagram comes so close to it that we can see its content in detail. If this were done, we would find Figure 2 displayed.

Figure 2 presents HR management as an in-tegrated system that can be broken down in dif-

ferent components, all of which are subsystems of the former and are connected and interrelated as the arrows so indicate.

The Need for a HR Strategy

The upper part of Figure 2 shows again the stra-tegic component. While Figure 1 presents the organizational strategy, Figure 2 shows a byprod-uct or secondary component of such strategy, namely: the human resources strategy. We may define the latter as a set of basic priorities or goals guiding HRM policies and practices for the benefit of the organizational strategy.

Having a more or less explicit and formal-ized strategy of human resources is essential in order to:

HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEMS

STRATEGY

WorkOrganization

EmploymentManagement

PerformanceManagement

CompensationManagement

Job DescriptionProfiles Definition

RecruitmentMobility

Separation

PlanningEvaluation

Planning

DevelopmentManagement

Monetary and non-monetary

payment

Promotion and CareerIndividual and Collective

Learning

Human and Social Relations Management

Work Climate Labor Relations Social Policies

FIGURE 2

Source: Author’s model, adapted from R. Serlavós.



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a) Attain what was previously called “the stra-tegic coherence of a HRM system;” in other words, to make personnel policies and prac-tices consistent with the organization’s pri-orities.

b) Add meaning and value to HRM policies and practices, which would otherwise tend to restrict themselves to merely administer-ing human resources, i.e. a routine, almost automatic activity devoted to preserving the status quo and completely deprived of drive.

c) Facilitate the innovation of HRM policies and practices.

The Seven Basic Subsystems

Figure 2 shows the HRM system divided into seven interconnected subsystems, vertically or-ganized in three levels:

HR Planning is in the upper level, thus being the “front door” or first step into any in-tegrated HRM system and helping to design consistent policies for all the other subsystems connected to it.

In the mid-level there are five subsystems, organized in four blocks according to a logical sequence:

First is Work Organization, which an-ticipates and specifies the tasks to be performed as well as the profile of the people, qualified to carry them out.

Second, Employment or Staffing Man-agement, which includes the processes whereby people are recruited, move within, and leave the organization.

The third block is Performance Manage-ment, which is concerned with planning, stimu-lating and evaluating the staff ’s contribution to work.

The last component is made up of the Compensation Management, which refers to the compensation received by staff members for their contribution to work, and the Staff De-velopment Management, which involves in-dividual and group training and development.

Finally, at the bottom or lower level, we find the Human and Social Relations Manage-ment, which is connected to all the other sub-systems.

There are three essential require-ments for HRM policies and practices to be smoothly implemented in any organization as an integrated system capable of adding value and working towards the objectives of the organiza-tion concerned:

All the subsystems must be in place

1. All the previously listed subsystems need to be in place, i.e. there should be a minimum number of consistent personnel policies and practices that may lead us to rationally infer that they have been designed and are being implemented. For example, if there is no formalized performance evaluation in place, promotion and career processes cannot rely on such basic inputs to be properly imple-mented. The tendency, therefore, will be to promote staff members on an arbitrary ba-sis, on grounds of seniority or purely formal merit.

Subsystems must be interconnected, as shown

2. Furthermore, HRM subsystems must work together, interconnected as indicated by the arrows in Figure 2 and as will be explained later in more detail. Let us give an example: if job descriptions and profiles were not properly interconnected with recruitment processes (i.e. if each subsystem operated in an isolated manner), it would be very diffi-cult to match the best qualified people with their best suited tasks.

Strategic coherence is mandatory

3. Finally, all these subsystems must constitute the implementation of a HR strategy that should result from and be consistent with


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the organizational strategy. As already ex-plained, no personnel policies or practices can be assessed without considering this basic coherence. By way of example, if a variable compensation policy based on performance rewards staff for achieving goals that are not clear organizational priorities—although in a technically correct manner—personnel be-havior will deviate and the organization will be damaged.

V. METhODOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION

The work method proposed is based on the mod-el described in the previous section and consists in identifying and analyzing HRM policies and practices observed in the national CS concerned. This methodology follows the sequence of the subsystems as described above.

This section includes a series of content guide-lines and recommendations that will help direct the analysis of each subsystem, as well as some methodological guidelines to clarify the process.

IV.1. Content Guidelines: Analysis of hRM Subsystems

For each of the seven subsystems to be analyzed according to the model described, in the framework of a CS assess-ment, the following items are included:

a) The basic object or purpose of each subsystem.

b) The identification of other subsystems related to it and the meaning of that relation.

c) The processes and practices in-volved..

d) The critical points to be considered by auditors when analyzing each subsystem. The critical points will be presented under each subsystem as factual statements, which jointly tak-en define a correct HRM and there-fore serve as references to determine

the extent to which they are actually complied with in practice. Hence, these statements describe the opti-mum situation against which the reality will be as-sessed. Appendix 6 enumerates all the critical points in a checklist.

e) Specific considerations that are deemed useful for the analysis of the subsystem under analysis.

IV.1.1. Human Resource Planning

A) Objective

HR Planning (HRP) enables an organization to evaluate its qualitative and quantitative needs of human resources for the short, medium, and long term, in order to confront identified needs with its existing capacities and to identify any actions that need to be undertaken to bridge the gap.

HRP is the subsystem that contributes to en-suring strategic coherence in all HRM policies and practices by linking them with organiza-tional priorities. Therefore, it may be regarded as the “front door” in any integrated HRM sys-tem.

B) Relation with Other Subsystems

Given the explanation above, HRP has to be necessarily related to all the other HRM subsys-tems. This relationship is crucial to ensuring that


STRATEGY

WorkOrganization



CompensationMangement


RecruitmenMobility

Separation

PlanningEvaluation

Planning



payment


Learning

Human and Social RelationsManagement




12

personnel policies and practices respond to pre-viously set priorities and objectives and are not merely inertial or reactive behaviors.

These interconnections will be preferably verified by auditors in each of the different sub-systems, when trying to answer to the following question:

To what extent do HRM policies, decisions, and practices in this concrete area respond to consciously pre-established goals within a HRP process?

C) Processes

In the HRP subsystem, we can distinguish the following processes:

a) The analysis of gross HR necessities, consisting in evaluating quantitatively (how many people, how long) and qualitatively (what skills – see glossary) the human resources required to perform which tasks and when.

b) The analysis of the current and future availability of resources in order to pre-dict the future situation in the area under analysis if no corrections are introduced to the vegetative evolution of existing resources.

c) The analysis of net HR necessities by comparing the two previous items, which will result in either an excess or a deficit.

d) The planning of corrective measures in-volves identifying and anticipating actions that should be undertaken to deal with the net necessities detected and that may affect any of the HRM subsystems.

D) Critical Points

The following key issues cannot be disregarded by analysts when assessing a HRP system:

Existence and Integrity of the System

The processes comprising a HRP system are ad-equately developed.

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Strategic Coherence

HR planning decisions usually derive from the orga-nization’s strategic priorities and guidelines. There is a close match between them. HRP mechanisms in place make personnel practices adaptable to changes in the organization’s strategy.

Basic Information

Personnel information systems provide knowledge on the quantitative and qualitative availability of ex-isting and expected HR in different organizational situations and units.

Effectiveness

The HRP policies and instruments in place favor optimization and facilitate a suitable distribution of resources and workload among the units. The organization is neither overstaffed nor under-staffed. Labor costs in the public sector are within reasonable parameters, compatible with the country’s economy. Staff members are redistributed whenever necessary. The technical skills of the staff are in line with the knowledge society. The weight of qualified personnel is significant.

Administration

HRP plans are monitored and updated when neces-sary to adjust to changing strategies or situations. Line managers are acquainted with HRP plans and are involved in their design and follow-up.

E) Specific Considerations

Two levels can be conceptually distinguished in the analysis of HRP: a) the examination of HR planning tools, mechanisms, and decisions, and b) the evaluation of their op-erativity, by verifying their impact on the different HRM policies, practices, and deci-sions. This does not mean that a predeter-mined sequence is imposed, but rather that

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each analyst must organize his or her own sequence and take into account that the full HRP picture will not be completed until all the subsystems in the model are analyzed. In the administrative or func-tional areas of the public sector, one can very often find deci-sions of an inertial or reactive nature, along with others where considerable planning tools have been used as a result of the firm adoption of strategic priorities. The auditor should take this into account so as not to make the mistake of taking the part for the whole. Very often, the development of HRP is relat-ed (not causally) to the development of HR information systems. A good starting point in the analysis of this subsystem is to explore the quality of these information systems. In the absence of any elaborate or specific tool, it should be borne in mind that all bud-gets contain elements of personnel planning. An analysis of the budgeting process as well as of the mechanisms for and decisions on their implementation and control seems es-sential for a successful assessment of this sub-system. For the analysis of this subsystem, the use of some quantitative indicators, such as civil service staff numbers, the fiscal weight of public employment and levels of technical skills, is highly advisable.

IV.1.2. Work Organization

A) Objective

The Work Organization subsystem comprises the HRM policies and practices that define the characteristics of and conditions for performing the tasks concerned, and the requirements to be met by the people hired to carry them out.

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B) Relations with Other Subsystems

In an integrated HRM system, the Work Orga-nization is associated with Planning, which pro-vides the necessary input (at least in mid- and long-term planning; instead, when planning is made for the short term, the existing work orga-nization usually acts as an independent variable, hardly modifiable by the planning process).

Work Organization is mainly interconnected with the Employment Management subsystem. A good design of job and profile descriptions is like a prerequisite to ensuring the proper man-agement of staff recruitment and selection, favoring an optimum matching between the needs of the organization and the labor market (including both the external and internal labor markets).

C) Processes

In the Work Organization subsystem, there are two different processes that must be considered:

a) The design of jobs, which involves describ-ing the activities, functions, responsibilities, and goals assigned to each position by the or-ganization, all of which form the framework in which the job holder will have to contrib-ute to and achieve the expected results.


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Job design entails that important choices have to be made with regard to the following:

The degree of horizontal and vertical specialization (see glossary) of the posi-tion concerned. The degree of formalized behavior es-tablished for the position (i.e. the stan-dardized behavior expected from the job holder).

b) The definition of the profile (see glos-sary) of the job holder, which involves identifying the basic skills required for the position.

D) Critical Points

Existence and Integrity of the Subsystem

The processes that comprise this Work Organization system are adequately developed.

Technical Quality and Flexibility of Job Design

Job designs follow management criteria rather than legal considerations or collective agreements. The legal framework or labor agreements only provide a general frame within which the work is organized and managed according to the needs of the organization. Jobs are described accurately, so that the chain of responsibilities is clear. Employees know what they are accountable for and why their contribution is re-warded. Job descriptions are not as exhaustively detailed as to preclude proper adaptation to changing or unexpected circumstances. Job design tends to enrich or enlarge the jobs both horizontally and vertically in order to produce gains in job quality and encourage employee motivation without serious losses in productivity or coordination (see “specialization” in the glossary). The classification and hierarchy of positions respond to sound criteria and are adjusted to each organiza-tion.

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Quality of Profiles Definitions

Qualification or skills profiles of job holders go be-yond degrees, expertise, or formal merit and identify other competencies (see glossary). Skills profiles are defined prior to the technical studies conducted by experts. Profiles include the competencies deemed key for the successful performance of each job holder. Task requirements are generally consistent with the elements that make up the position profiles.

Administration

Job designs and profile definitions are reviewed on a regular basis to adapt them to the evolution of the tasks and their new requirements. Line managers have a crucial role in the job design and profile definitions that concern them.


Job descriptions may be found in a great number of public organizations. It is neces-sary to evaluate whether these job descrip-tions are part of a global system (however decentralized their administration might be) or are mere isolated practices. Moreover, the fact that jobs are described does not mean that such descriptions are ac-tually being used. Evidence of their actual use will have to be obtained. In order to evaluate whether skills profiles are effectively used, the Employment Man-agement subsystem will need to be analyzed. By focusing specifically on recruitment and selection practices, valuable information on their use and effectiveness will be obtained. In this field, no document or official state-ment from relevant central organizations—although required by the analyst—can ever replace the substantiated information and opinions that are given by line managers, who are the main actors in the use of these Work Organization tools.

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IV.1.3. Employment or Staffing Management

A) Objective

This HRM subsystem involves per-sonnel policies and practices con-cerned with managing the processes by which people enter, move within and leave the organization. It is a complex subsystem, within which some of the most important areas of HRM have to be analyzed.


The Employment Management subsystem in-volves linking the people to the tasks assigned to them throughout their career. Therefore, it is mainly connected with the Work Organization subsystem. The job and profile design constitutes the foundation for a correct operation of this HRM subsystem.

In addition, the Performance Management subsystem is an excellent source of informa-tion for all decisions that have an impact on the mobility in or termination from the orga-nization.

C) Processes

In this subsystem, three main management areas can be identified:

a) The hiring management, which includes the policies and practices related to the ac-cess of people to the vacant positions (this may involve new hires in the organization), within which three processes can be identi-fied:

Recruitment, which includes HRM policies and practices concerned with looking for and attracting candidates to fill vacant positions.

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Selection, which involves choosing and using accurate instruments to make a correct selection and a proper decision on the position to be assigned to the se-lected candidate. Induction, comprising policies and practices designed to welcome new em-ployees and accompany them in their first steps in their new position and work environment.

b) Mobility management, which relates to the movement of people between positions in the organization. A distinction can be made between:

Functional mobility, which only means a change of task, and Geographic mobility, which also in-cludes a change in the place of work, in-volving a change of place of residence.

c) Separation management, which in-cludes HRM policies and practices related to the termination of employment due to performance or disciplinary problems, or on account of economic, organizational or technological reasons. Disciplinary policies and practices, even when not involving seri-ous misconduct or amounting to dismissal, are included under this item.

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D) Critical Points

Access Based on Equal Opportunity and Merit

Recruitment to fill vacant positions is open, both in fact and in law, to all candidates who meet the requirements laid down. These requirements are established on the basis of the candidates’ quali-fications, which are technically and not arbitrarily evaluated. There are procedures and mechanisms throughout the hiring process to avoid arbitrariness, politicization, cronyism or patronage practices. Only a reasonably limited number of positions are filled with people appointed as a result of political mechanisms. There are mechanisms in place to guarantee the prin-ciples of equality and non-discrimination, intended to eliminate any disadvantage based on sex, race, cul-ture, or origin, to gain access to or be promoted in the public sector.

Recruitment Quality

The methods used for the search, communication, and attraction of candidates normally result in an ad-equate number of eligible applicants for the positions to be filled.

Selection Quality

Selection is based on the profiles of competencies (see glossary) prepared for the applicants to the vacant positions. The selection instruments used normally suit the pre-viously defined profiles, and their design is based on technically validated effectiveness criteria applicable to the identification of professional skills. Selection committees or bodies are formed on the basis of the professionalism and expertise of its members, who select the best candidates using their independent judgment. Hiring decisions are based on technically proven merit and professional skills.

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Induction Quality

There are adequate procedures in place to welcome employees, facilitate their entry into the organization and their first steps in the new position and work environment, and such procedures are correctly imple-mented. Furthermore, employees are provided with guidelines on the core principles and behavior they must be acquainted with at the time of entry. There are adequate procedures in place (such as trial periods) to ensure that the selection of candidates is correct and that corrective measures are adopted, if appropriate.

Mobility

The functional and geographic mobility mechanisms adopted enable the organization to be flexible enough to respond to staff redistribution needs.

Absenteeism

Absenteeism rates are, normally, acceptable.

Discipline

The disciplinary actions taken allow the organiza-tion to correct employees’ behavior in a fast, effective and exemplary manner.

Separation

There are no dismissals or terminations of profes-sional, non-political positions resulting from change of government. Employees can be dismissed due to gross negligence or low performance, founded on objective facts. Employment contracts may be terminated due to tech-nical, economic, or organizational reasons, grounded on objective facts that impose the need for lay-offs. There is no excessive staff turnover in any depart-ment or sector.


In the Employment or Staffing Management field more than in any other CS area, it is fundamen-

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tal to draw a distinction between the regulatory framework and actual practice. Some pictures drawn by regulations are very often denied by reality. As stated before, the analyst should basi-cally focus on the latter.

The scale of the analysis undertaken will force the analyst or auditor to diversify his or her sources of information. Documentary analysis will demand collecting large samples of evidence (databases, requests, selection instruments, etc.) as well as gathering a wide range of informants (central agencies, managers, employees, mem-bers of selection committees) from different sec-tors of the organization.

It is worth remembering that the use of quantitative indicators for measuring the rate of political designations, absenteeism, and staff turnover is valuable.

The analyst should explore and verify wheth-er consultancy or other alternative mechanisms are used for personnel hiring purposes.

IV.1.4. Performance Management

A) Objective

The Performance Management subsystem is aimed at influencing the workforce performance so that it is in line with the organization’s pri-orities and kept as high as possible, enhancing the employees’ contribution to the organization’s objectives and facilitating the gath-ering of information that will help improve the HRM decision-making process in different areas.

B) Relation with Other Subsystems

Performance Management plays a central role in any HRM integrated system, as can be inferred from the figure. Given its influence on the op-eration of the system as a whole, the analyst should particularly focus on its connections with the Compensa-

tion and Staff Development Management sub-systems.

It is connected with the former when the Compensation Management subsystem incor-porates variable compensations tied to perfor-mance, a trend strongly followed by many CS systems everywhere despite the criticisms about its actual operation.

Its link with the Staff Development Manage-ment subsystem is two-fold:

It provides essential input for promotion and career development processes, which would otherwise have to rely on seniority and for-mal merits, with the consequent loss in excel-lence; and It helps detect training needs in the work-force—a basic tool for the design of effective development policies.

C) Processes

Performance Management can be seen as a cycle made up of several stages:

a) Performance planning: this stage includes establishing performance standards consis-tent with the strategy and objectives of the organization, the efficient communication of such expectations to the employees, and the

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success in the adoption of these standards by the workers along with their commitment to adapting their own efforts to achieve the per-formance standards set forth.

b) Active follow-up: this involves observing and supporting employees’ performance throughout the entire management cycle.

c) Performance evaluation: in this stage, performance standards and goals are com-pared with the results. As mentioned before, this can be tied to other HRM policies or practices.

d) Feedback to employees: this involves in-forming employees and establishing perfor-mance improvement plans, which should be connected with the planning stage of the fol-lowing cycle.

D) Critical Points

Planning and Follow-up

Top management usually defines standards of ex-pected performance, consistent with the organization’s priorities and strategy. Consequently, employees are very well aware of what aspects of their contribution will be specifically valued in a given period. Performance objectives are set forth within the frame-work of improvement plans resulting from the previ-ous management cycle. Performance objectives are communicated to the em-ployees in a way that their involvement and commit-ment are encouraged. Throughout the management cycle top managers ac-tively follow, observe, and support performance im-provement efforts by providing resources or removing obstacles where necessary.

Evaluation

People’s performance is evaluated by the organization according to the expected standards. Evaluation criteria and practices enable the organi-zation to efficiently distinguish differences in perfor-mance among employees.

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Performance evaluation criteria are regarded as reli-able and objective by those responsible for their imple-mentation.

Administration:

Line managers who are responsible for work units at different hierarchical levels play a leading role in the performance management of the employees under their supervision.


Below are some considerations related to the Performance Management subsystem that the CS analyst should take into account:

In every organization there are elements of performance management, although they may be only informal practices based on in-tuitive assessments. For this subsystem to be deemed operational, a minimum degree of formalization is required. The existence of a formalized system (for example, a mandatory procedure for defin-ing objectives, holding interviews, and ad-ministering performance evaluations, plus questionnaires and other printed documents) does not mean per se that all the relevant ele-ments of this HRM field (probably the most difficult one) are being implemented. Very often the system becomes a mere bureau-cratic formality. Some of the weaknesses usually observed in Performance Management systems are the following:

the lack of commitment from the top managers who are expected to play a proactive role in the management of the system; shortage of time and insufficient training in the effective use of manage-ment instruments; the tendency to evaluate peers uniformly in order to avoid interpersonal conflict;

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the lack of technical reli-ability and objectivity of the instruments used for measurement.

IV.1.5. Compensation Management

A) Objective

This subsystem entails the manage-ment of all types of monetary (i.e. wage or non-wage) and non-mone-tary benefits offered by the organiza-tion to its employees to reward them for their contribution to achieving the organization’s objectives.


It is mostly connected with two already described subsystems:

The Work Organization, and more specifi-cally, job design, constitutes the basis for the design of wage structures.The Performance Management, particu-larly, the performance evaluation element, provides essential information to:

Apply, where appropriate, variable pay-ments based on performance; and Devise mechanisms related to non-mon-etary recognition.

C) Processes

a) Salary Structure Design:

In most organizations, the design of a fixed or basic compensation structure starts with the job design. To achieve internal and external wage equity (see glos-sary), the following processes should take place:

The assessment of positions, whereby each job is weighed against and in line with its relative

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contribution to the results of the organiza-tion and relevant salary benchmarks in the market. The classification of jobs in salary bands or lev-els consistent with the assessment mentioned above and facilitating a suitable wage progres-sion and sound compensation management.

The variable compensation structure design in-volves choosing what to reward (performance, profit sharing, overall results, etc.), the beneficia-ries (either the individual or the group), and the spread of the salary band.

b) Extra-salary Benefits

The use of non-monetary compensations (e.g. life or accident insurance, aids and loans, supplemen-tal pension plan contributions, etc.) imposes the need to define policies that enable the organiza-tion to tie them to an overall pay strategy.

c) Design of Progressive Mechanisms

This involves designing compensation policies in two areas:

Global progress, i.e. choosing whether to tie in-creases to actual or forecasted inflation, re-sults, etc., and

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The individual’s development, i.e. choosing whether to tie increases to seniority, length of service, performance, etc.

d) Salary Administration

This entails defining policies concerned with the degree of centralization or decentralization of the decisions on workers’ compensations and with the degree of transparency of the sala-ries.

e) Non-monetary Recognition

This includes any policy or instrument defined and adopted by the organization to recognize and reward achievements, without causing any impact on wages.

D) Critical Points

Existence of a Compensation Strategy

The wage structure and compensation policies derive from a set of priorities and objectives linked to the or-ganization’s strategy rather than to inertial practices or reactive responses to claims and labor conflicts.

Internal Equity

In general, the people in the organization have the perception that their compensations are consistent with their contribution. People feel that the compensation received by other employees is equitable vis-à-vis their own salaries. Job classifications translated to salary levels contrib-ute to a flexible progression based on performance and training. The wage scale is reasonable. Vertical differences in salary respond to the different nature of the posi-tions. There is some balance between the staff compensa-tion in the organization and the salaries earned by equivalent employees in different sections and areas of the public service.

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External Equity

The compensation structure is adequate to attract, motivate, and retain skilled employees in the different types of positions required by the organization. Salary costs at every level are not excessively high vis-à-vis those prevailing in the market.

Effectiveness of Compensation Policies

The compensation policies adopted promote effort, improved individual and group performance, as well as learning and skills development.

Administration

Decisions on salary administration are adopted in accordance with pre-established criteria and in line with the structural design parameters laid down by the organization. No arbitrary practice, rent-seeking, or political pa-tronage is detected in salary decisions. The HR information system has all the updated information on compensation that is required for the correct management of the salary system.

Other Benefits

Non-wage benefits given are cost-effective. The pension plan for public employees meets their so-cial security needs, is financially sound, does not cre-ate exclusive privileges vis-à-vis other social groups, and does not represent an excessive burden on the economy. Useful policies and instruments are in place for the non-monetary recognition of achievements.


As in the analysis of other subsystems, it is important to distinguish between formal or theoretical devises and real practice. Com-pensation is what the employee actually gets, regardless of any regulation in force. Any in-formal or irregular wage structure should be reported.

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Job assessments are decisive elements in the analysis of compensation systems. Without a properly updated assessment instrument, it is very difficult to verify whether compensation policies are suitable or not. In analyzing this subsystem it is advisable to use quantitative indicators related to CS in-centives. A problem frequently observed in the pub-lic sector is that wage scales are considerably tighter than in the private sector. Usually this brings about problems of internal and ex-ternal equity in the compensation structure. The opposite situation may also take place, revealing other dysfunctions. Furthermore, an excessive horizontal decompression of salaries may be detrimental to a merit-based system.

IV.1.6. Development Management

A) Objective

Development Management policies and prac-tices aim at stimulating the professional devel-opment of the staff members according to their potential, encouraging learning and defining ca-reer paths that should match the organization’s needs with the individual profile.

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The Development Management subsystem is re-lated primarily to three other ones, namely:

Employment Management: together they define and coordinate the movement of people in the organization.

Performance Management: from the Per-formance Management this subsystem receives essential input to define training needs and pro-motion opportunities.

Compensation Management: this subsystem must be coordinated with the compensation poli-cies in force, particularly with the wage progres-sive mechanisms that are linked to the career plans.

C) Processes

Development Management includes two basic areas of HRM policies:

a) Career and promotion policies, which articulate the processes whereby people make progress based on their contribution and on the rewards granted by the organization in recognition.

b) Training policies, aimed at ensuring the individual and collective learning required to attain organizational objectives, at develop-

ing competencies among employees, and at stimulating their professional progress.

D) Critical Points

Effectiveness of Promotion Policies

In general, people perceive that their reasonable expectations of promotion are satisfied in the organization. There are career and succession plans that harmonize individual expecta-tions with the foreseeable needs of the organization.

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Career Design Quality

Promotion criteria and mechanisms are based on per-formance, potential for growth, and skills develop-ment. The organization manages the progress made by its human resources with flexibility—i.e. without too many formal barriers or restrictions. There are formulas other than the strictly hierar-chical career—e.g. horizontal careers or change of positions—based on the recognition of professional excellence, without necessarily granting more author-ity to the individual.

Training Quality

Employees receive adequate training from the orga-nization to supplement their initial training, adapt them to changing tasks, solve poor performance, and support their professional growth. Training activities support collective learning, thus strengthening advances in the organization’s capacity to deal with problems and respond effectively. Training activities effectively support innovation and cultural change processes.

Training Management

Training is based on a reliable diagnosis of needs. Investments in training are made through plans re-sulting from the diagnosis of needs and are designed to support clear organizational priorities. Training is evaluated in terms of the satisfaction pro-duced on trainees together with the result-cost ratio and its impact on the employees’ performance.


Promotion and career policies coupled with recruitment and selection policies are highly sensitive to any violation of the principle of merit. Promotion based on performance and qualifications rather than on political or personal contact or on any arbitrary circum-stance is the basic requirement to be met by any CS system.

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Very often, particularly in the public sector, organizations identify career with promo-tion. When this is the case, the need to sat-isfy promotion expectations and promotion demands leads to an artificial “inflation” of structures, having damaging consequence from many angles. The design of horizontal, non-hierarchical careers is intended to ad-dress this problem. It is worth remembering that it is in the field of career development where CS reform-ers have endeavored to add flexibility, as ex-plained in Appendix 2. There is ample consensus among specialists on the crucial value of training in modern HRM. It should be kept in mind, however, that for a training system to meet expecta-tions it must be designed to serve the orga-nizational strategy rather than constituting a mere catalogue of training courses managed by the employees themselves on the basis of their own preferences and personal interests. Many times, as training activities do not usu-ally encounter resistance of any kind, they become a policy used to deal with any staff-related problem, even when this might not be the best suited instrument. It should be borne in mind that training alone cannot make up the deficits in “tougher” HRM ar-eas, such as performance or compensation management. To avoid these problems, it is advisable to develop suitable instruments to evaluate training investments, despite their inherent difficulties.

IV.1.7. Human and Social Relations Management

A) Objective

This HRM subsystem is concerned with the management of the relations between the orga-nization and its employees regarding personnel policies and practices when these acquire, in a given context, a collective dimension.

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This dimension is reached when the coun-terpart to the top management is not an in-dividual employee or a specific unit or work group, as in any ordinary labor relation, but the whole staff, or one or more groups of employ-ees joined by their work or professional iden-tity that goes beyond a specific work functional area.


As can be inferred from its location on the dia-gram, the Human and Social Relations Man-agement subsystem is connected with all HRM subsystems. In fact, collective relations may de-velop in any of the other areas of people man-agement.

The fact that the topics in the collective re-lations of a given CS system affect some issues more than others (compensation policies more than payroll policies) will help define the collec-tive relations model, which the analyst will have to confront and analyze in his or her diagnostic work.

C) Processes

Of all the classifications available used to system-atize this particularly broad field, we decided to divide it into three management areas:

a) The management of the organizational climate (see glossary), which comprises the communication policies and prac-tices, both upwards and down-wards, as well as a wide range of personnel policies oriented to maintaining and improving the employees’ perception of their own satisfaction.

b) The management of la-bor relations, which includes collective bargaining—wherever this is an established practice—in order to determine wages and working conditions as well as all


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the relation between the organization’s man-agement and any staff representative, for ex-ample trade unions, guilds, associations, etc. Labor relations will also extend to all rep-resentative bodies in institutional contexts, having delegates chosen by vote, wherever they exist.

c) The management of social policies, among which those related to occupational health and safety are the most important ones, comprises a set of policies and practices aimed at granting collective benefits and as-sistance to needy staff members or groups.

D) Critical Points

Work Climate

The organization is concerned with evaluating the work environment or climate on a regular basis by resorting to reliable instruments. Climate evaluations are taken into account at the time of reviewing and improving HRM policies and prac-tices in force.

Communication Effectiveness

The organization makes frequent use of different mechanisms to learn about the employees’ initiatives, requests, suggestions, information, and opinions.

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In general, all-level management decisions as well as all types of relevant information fed by top managers flow easily and fluently in the organization and reach every stakeholder in due time and manner. The organization has specific communication chan-nels to reinforce the staff ’s sense of belonging and involvement in the global project.

Labor Relations Balance and Quality

Each party plays his or her role, without stepping beyond it, and these roles are reciprocally recognized by the other party.

In general, power is reasonably balanced between management and staff. Negotiations between the par-ties usually reflect this balance. Labor relations usually and preferably choose the path of negotiation and consensus rather than confronta-tion or disrepute. Intermediated labor relations—i.e. those carried out by representatives—do not exclude direct or personal relations between management and employees where appropriate.

Labor Conflict Management

Labor conflict is not intense, in number, impact or in the radicality of the methods used. There are effective mechanisms in place to manage and settle labor conflicts.

Social Policies Management

Occupational health and safety practices are satisfac-tory. There are adequate social security policies and ben-efits for employees that do not exceed those that are characteristic in the environment in which the organi-zation operates. Furthermore, the benefits are appreci-ated by staff members.


When examining this HRM area, it is advisable to consider the following issues:

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The staff in most organizations perceives that internal communication is highly defi-cient. People usually describe very different situations by using almost the same words. Therefore, when analyzing this field it is crucial to confront people’s opinions with as many objective data sources as possible. In the public sector, labor relations are usu-ally extremely reactive, in other words, they are neglected until a conflict takes place or demands are made, leaving the initiative in the hands of labor representatives. This ab-sence of labor strategy makes public orga-nizations particularly vulnerable to conflict and prone to adopt short-term solutions, thus weakening their negotiating power. This lack of proactivity is even worse when the managers’ leadership in representation and decision-making issues is assumed by the organizations’ political management, which is characteristic of politicized labor relations models, in which political parties have a strong influence on unions. As we have seen, some countries actually tend to go in the op-posite direction, advocating the increase of professionalism in this area. As indicated before, when analyzing this sub-system, it is advisable to use a quantitative indicator to measure labor conflict. It is interesting to explore if there is any me-diation or arbitration arrangements in CS systems for the settlement of labor disputes. In some countries (such as Spain), substantial regulatory ambiguity is detected when trying to determine the civil servants’ working con-ditions. The increasing number and impor-tance of collective bargaining agreements does not eliminate but rather coexists with the unilaterally established rules on work-ing conditions issued by the public authority, thus leading to contradictory practices and considerable confusion. The degree of regu-latory clarity in each national context is an issue worth analyzing. Social security benefits and policies targeted at employees in the public sector must be de-

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signed so as to avoid inconsistencies or con-tradictions with fiscal policy considerations, i.e. privileges for public sector employees that are denied to other workers or public services users.

IV.1.8. The Organization of the Human Resources Function

The description of each subsystem forming part of the HRM is not complete unless we analyze the mechanisms used for the management of the system, particularly the distribution of personnel decisions among the different responsible parties.

Scope of the HR Function Analysis

The institutional diagnosis of the organization of the Human Resources function in the con-text of the CS system must analyze two funda-mental dimensions of the organizational design, namely: a) how unified or fragmented are HRM responsibilities, and b) how centrally or not are personnel decisions made.

Critical Points in the Organization of the HR Function

The following extremes may be deemed critical points:

Whether managers are in general empow-ered and autonomous enough to deal with the personnel assigned to the units under their supervision. If this were not so, in which cases are they? Whether managers are suitably trained to perform this task; Whether managers are aware of and assume their responsibilities as human resources managers; if so, to what extent; and Whether the central services responsible for the CS system are perceived, by the rest of the organization as adding value and con-tributing to the attainment of common goals; if so, to what extent.

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IV.2. GUIDELINES FOR ThE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

As stated in the introduction, this document does not purport to be an instruction manual. The scale of the analysis and its intrinsic complexity will oblige analysts to adapt this work method to the situation under analysis. Without prejudice to this, this section presents a set of gen-eral guidelines intended to shape a common methodological basis with the minimum requirements necessary to fulfill two purposes:

a) To make the best possible use of the proposed model, and

b) To ensure that the analyses of the different national contexts follow a common pattern, so that compara-tive studies are made easier.

To this end, the analysis of the national CS systems has been systematically divided into four areas. Although this arrangement follows a logical rather than a chrono-logical work order due to the fact that the time sequence should be decided by the analyst according to his or her own criterion and the circumstances inherent to each case, it seems reasonable to anticipate that all the areas men-tioned will have to be covered in the analysis if the desired goals are to be achieved. The report sample model in Ap-pendix 5 follows these methodological guidelines.

IV.2.1. Background and Institutional Context

Background

This first part aims at gathering evidence about the relevant characteristics of the institutional framework in which the CS system has operated and still operates. It will be necessary, then, to briefly summarize a core historical background of the national political-administrative system and CS evolution. For this review, analysts can resort to valuable material already published.

Legal Framework

At this initial stage, it is advisable to carry out a preliminary examination of the regulatory



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framework within which the CS operates. This will provide an overview of the regulatory model, as well as a first impression of its main features: What are the areas of public employment cov-ered by the regulatory framework? Which ones are not covered by any regulation? Are there dif-ferent regulations enforced for different admin-istrative sectors? Are top managers governed by or subject to another regulatory system? Are CS regulations comprehensive enough? Or are there HRM areas left without any regulation? Are reg-ulations applied to different areas enforced with different degrees of strictness?

This preliminary analysis of the legal frame-work in force will provide a first approach to the reality being analyzed. Later, this approach will have to be compared with the actual operation of the CS in order to verify whether in practice it holds true, or is violated or neglected.

Other Contextual Elements

Different elements of the CS institutional con-text can be relevant in this phase. The analysis may include, without being limited to, the fol-lowing:

a) The country’s socio-economic situation, fo-cusing on the present status of and future trends in the labor market.

b) Priorities in governmental policies.c) Budgetary policies and future trends.d) The reforms being introduced to the politi-

cal-administrative system, public manage-ment, or specifically the CS, or even any announcement of a reform to be made, though not yet underway.

e) Predominant social perceptions of the public system.

Analysts should take into account, however, that the IDB has basic data on the institutional context of the countries concerned. Hence, re-ports should describe civil service systems as briefly as necessary to gain better insight into the actual systems in force.

IV.2.2. A Functional Analysis of the Civil Service as a HRM System

This is the central part of the diagnostic assess-ment and consists in the detailed analysis of the CS system as an employment or staffing system and as a human resources management system.

Analysis by Subsystems

The content of section IV.1 of this document, in which the seven basic subsystems that make up the proposed HRM model are described, can be used as a reference framework.

Specifically, we suggest analyzing the nation-al CS system by assessing how it works in rela-tion to each of the subsystems mentioned and by gathering evidence on:

a) The existence and integrity of each of the HRM areas and processes, and the fulfill-ment of their basic purposes.

b) Their major connections with the other HRM subsystems.

c) The way each subsystem behaves in relation to the critical points, which enable the ana-lyst to prove its effectiveness and quality. Ap-pendix 6 includes a checklist of all the critical points described.

The analysis by subsystems should include a description of the organization of the HR func-tion, within the scope laid down in IV.1.8.

The Use of Quantitative Indicators

Appendix 3 describes seven quantitative indica-tors designed to support the empirical basis of the assessment. These indicators serve two pur-poses:

a) On one hand, the use of indicators suited for the subsystem and country under analysis will provide quantitative measures of intrin-sic value for comparison purposes. Further-more, the use of indicators devised by the


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World Bank and the OECD will facilitate comparative analysis with countries outside the region.

b) On the other hand, the information con-veyed by these indicators will contribute to further analyze some critical points in the vari-ous subsystems.

The indicators listed in Appendix 3 are not limiting, since analysts may incorporate other quantitative indicators deemed relevant and use-ful for the purposes of their work.

Comparison with other CS Systems Assessments

To complete the CS functional analysis, it is ad-visable to compare the conclusions drawn so far with the dysfunctions and common CS system reforms proposed under the OECD, as detailed in Appendix 2. This comparison may help com-plete, enlarge or clarify some of the evidence or data revealed by the research work, and remind of any other field requiring further examination.

Sources of Information

In this phase, the analyst should combine sources of various types:

a) Documentary sources, which include:

Rules of different types: laws, regulations, guidelines, collective bargaining agree-ments. Management instruments of a general nature, such as staffing plans, budgets, list of staff members, pay scales, job descriptions. Sample of instruments used, such as recruitment or promotion notices, performance evalua-tion reports, negotiation records, disciplinary actions. Databases, like age pyramids, mobility, train-ing, vegetative evolution, absenteeism and staff turnover tables.

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In-house and external studies on the issue in-volved: white papers, previous diagnoses, job satisfaction surveys, etc.

b) Informants’ Opinions, including those by:

Central government leaders, either political or ex-ecutive managers, responsible for the opera-tion of the CS system. Technical experts in the different HRM areas of government. Line managers from the public administration, managers of various hierarchical levels from different types of organizations, encompass-ing the widest possible diversity of public sector agencies, degrees of autonomy and sector-specific characteristics.

(The analyst should take special care in learning what consulted managers think about sensitive personnel-related areas, such as health and education, and about other more specific is-sues, such as justice, police, etc.)

External experts from the academic, profes-sional or other sectors, with profound knowl-edge and reliable opinions about the CS. Unions, associations or guilds of employees, es-pecially for the analysis of labor relations.

Data-Gathering Instruments

Gathering information from these sources re-quires the use of various instruments, adapted in each case to the source and nature of the ex-pected information. Among these instruments, the following can be mentioned:

Interviews: open or semi-guided, to an indi-vidual or a group, interviews are a frequently used vehicle to get to know the interviewees’ opinions and check the viability of other sources of information.

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Panels of experts, organized to share qualita-tive information and harmonize opinions on highly complex or controversial issues. Diagnostic techniques, like “brain storming,” the nominal group technique or others, focused on analyzing specific matters. Questionnaires and surveys on certain topics and distributed to a significant number of repre-sentative and relevant informants.

IV.2.3. Proposed Indices

What is Meant by the Indices?

Indices are measuring tools to quantify the as-sessment to be conducted. Their purpose is to focus on a set of core dimensions and assign them a score or value in order to facilitate com-parative studies. Indices will reflect the analysts’ expert judgment on the critical points subject to evaluation. Any additional research instrument employed should be deemed complementary and secondary to the analysts’ appraisal.

To this end, the indices for this assessment work are listed in Appendix 4. They specify and define five dimensions of the CS systems under analysis (efficiency, merit, structural consistency, function-al capacity and integrating capacity). Two of them will be built upon sub-indices, following the method specified in the appendix.

How to Calculate the Indices?

The indices will be worked out by analyzing the critical points pursuant to the scheme described below.

a) Scoring the Critical Points

Every critical point in each subsystem analyzed will be given a score from 0 to 5—5 repre-sents the score closest to the ideal situation as conveyed in the statements that serve as basis for the analysis, while 0 is the farthest from the ideal. The empty space in Appendix 6 checklist has been left to this effect.

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b) Weighing the Critical Points

In Appendix 6 checklist, each critical point is identified with a letter (A, B or C) that in-dicates the weight assigned to it in the index (or sub-index) to which it relates. For weigh-ing purposes, the scores given in the previ-ous step should be multiplied by 3 if the critical point concerned has been weighed with an A, by 2 in the case of a B, and by 1 if a C.

c) Grouping by indices or sub-indices

The values calculated following the two pre-vious steps should be grouped by indices (or sub-indices, where appropriate), as indicated in Appendix 4. This is also indicated in the Appendix 6 checklist.

d) Valuing indices Once the values have been grouped by indices (or sub-indices, where appropriate), they need to be given a valuation, following the instructions in Appendix 4.

Consultation Instruments: Expert Panels

To facilitate the task of scoring critical points, the analyst may seek third parties’ opinions. In this case, neither individual interviews nor sur-veys are recommended. When consultation is deemed necessary, a panel of experts should be summoned. In such circumstances, the following is highly recommended:

Consultation with the panel should be limited to the critical points about which the analyst has the most doubts or the panel of experts may add the greatest value. The description of critical points should be restricted and adapted to such criteria. Experts can be chosen from as wide a back-ground as those described in the “Informants’ Opinions” section. Ideally, panel members

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should be representative of all possible back-grounds. What makes an expert a qualified informant is his or her profound and vast knowledge of the civil service system. Panels of 3 to 7 experts are recommended. When necessary, more than one panel can be summoned. The meeting may last from 3 to 4 hours de-pending on the number of critical points subject to consultation. Below is a model agenda for this purpose:a) Presentation of the meeting, its partici-

pants, and the objective pursued.b) A brief presentation of the conceptual

framework from which the critical points result. To this end, the subsystems dia-gram presented in this document should be used.

c) Comments and explanations.d) A joint review of the critical points on

which experts are being consulted: each point will be discussed during the previ-ously established time period and scored by consensus. Voting should be used only where necessary.

e) Results, final remarks and conclusions.

IV.2.4. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions: Focus on the Most Relevant Aspects

In this final part of his or her work, the CS sys-tem analyst will be in a position to briefly assess the context analyzed and draw some conclu-sions. These conclusions should focus on the key elements for the diagnosis as well as on any area that might be deemed decisive for the potential improvement of the system under analysis.

What to Change

Even though the main objective of this work is not to make recommendations on any change or

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reform, it seems only natural to think that the time and effort devoted by analysts to their work will have qualified them to have some substanti-ated opinions on the changes that could be intro-duced in the CS system concerned.

For this reason, it will be deemed useful that their report should include their recommenda-tions to reform or streamline the system. Their analysis of the HR subsystems and of the mech-anisms for their organization will serve as the foundations to account for their recommenda-tions.

Analysis of Causal Areas

The analyst can use the reference model de-scribed in section III.2 to explore the causes of the problems detected, as suggested below:

Figure 1 above presents different areas with which we can relate, on an exclusive or inclusive basis, the evidence gathered, the conclusions drawn, and the recommendations made.

Organizational strategy (see glossary): This is the first area mentioned. Some of the di-mensions it involves are clarity, coherence, political support and continuity; the ac-curacy with which it is communicated to the organization as a whole; the leadership that supports it; the extent to which it is an explicit and endorsed Human Resources strategy. The HRM system: The origin of a problem is very likely to be in this system because: either it has been incorrectly devised or it is not working properly; the strategic value of HR management is underestimated; only per-sonnel administration schemes are in place; there are problems in policy design, innova-tion and modernization; the managerial or technical expertise within the organization is insufficient. Factors related to the internal context: The degree in which the organizational structure (see glossary) favors or hampers the work of the CS; the inertia or resistance to change re-

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sulting from the predominant organizational culture (see glossary); the degree of internal conflict; the budgetary or technological situ-ation, etc. Factors related to the external context: In particular, the legal framework and its degree of adjust-ment for effective HR management; the la-bor market and its trends; other factors, such as the social culture, people’s opinions on the public system, expectations from and prefer-ences about the public administration, etc.

How to Make the Recommendations?For recommendations to be of quality, they should meet some of the characteristics below:

Recommendations should be directly related with the diagnosis, at the level of both the subsystems and the causal areas. They should be relevant for correcting im-portant CS system dysfunctions. Their contents should be both concrete and clear. It is advisable to develop few but accu-rate and easily understandable recommenda-tions targeted at people not knowledgeable in this issue.

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Analysts should also suggest how to imple-ment their recommendations (management of change) and describe how these relate to the analysis of the institutional situation.

IV.2.5. Formalization of the Assessment

Final ReportIn Appendix 5 there is a sample report to show how to formalize the diagnostic assessment, fol-lowing the methodological guidelines specified in the analytical framework.

Additional DocumentationAny complementary evidence, statement, illus-tration or appraisal that may contribute to the understanding and rationale of the diagnosis should be included as documentary appendices, though not strictly forming part of the main doc-ument. This serves the purpose of standardizing the form of the different reports, thus facilitating their reading.

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APPENDIX 1

hRM Policies and Practices

When we speak of “a policy in a given man-agement area,” we mean the conscious and reasoned intention to act in a certain and consis-tent way, so long as such policy is not reviewed. Thus, HRM policies can be understood as the set of general criteria and ways of doing things that guide the decisions related to the manage-ment of people in a particular organizational context.

HRM practices involve the decisions adopt-ed and activities developed in this field that very often, though not always, entail the application of HRM policies.

HRM policies may be explicit and formal-ized in writing, making it easier for the analyst to recognize them, but inconsistencies between the adopted and proclaimed policy and the practices actually detected are likely to be found in the organization under analysis, and this should be taken into account.

Policies may not be formalized in writing nor made explicit in any way, but they do indeed exist. In such cases, analysts will recognize the existence of a HRM policy when the repetition of a specific practice in a given context, over an extended period of time, may reasonably lead them to infer a given criterion and a goal behind its implementation.

Model

A model is an instrument devised by a scholar to study a complex reality in order to describe and gain insight into it and its components. It is, then, a specific approach to a complex reality, among others.

A model is less than a hypothesis, because it does not purport to be a truth to be put to test. It is also less than a paradigm, which generally re-fers to an explanatory framework accepted and

GLOSSARY

Competencies

The concept of competencies or skills adopted is that of Boyatzis (1982), who defines it as an un-derlying characteristic of the person that leads to or causes effective or superior performance.

All research works on competencies and on their influence on people’s behavior at their workplace started with McLelland’s studies, which aimed at identifying real success factors at work through empirical research. Today, HRM experts have reached remarkably strong consensus about how restricted the mere con-cept of expertise or know-how is to predict suc-cess. The competency-based approach involves a broader and more comprehensive view, ac-cording to which other characteristics besides expertise are required to anticipate how com-petent an employee will be. These other char-acteristics are:

Interpersonal skillsLearning and behavioral capacitiesSelf-concept or perception of oneself trans-lated into attitudes and valuesMotives or drivers that select and determine behaviorCharacter or personality traits

Management by competencies involves a cer-tain approach to HRM. While competencies are a key variable to account for people’s behavior at work, HRM should take them into account and try to have an impact on them by introducing policies and practices that concern all relevant subsystems and become evident when planning staff qualitative needs, defining skills profiles, se-lecting people, evaluating performance, defining staff development policies, and even when re-warding employees.

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adopted by all or most members of the scientific community. This does not hold true for models.

Therefore, models are basically justified be-cause they serve for explanatory and analytical purposes. They are not meant to be the only possible explanation of a complex reality, but to contribute to its understanding.

Organizational Climate

In a classic work, Litwin and Stringer (1968:66) define “climate” as the sum of perceptions of indi-viduals working in an organization. This collective spirit or shared perception has repercussions in the employees’ behavior; hence its interest to the HRM.

Organizational climate is usually surveyed using questionnaires that evaluate employees’ views based on a series of dimensions. The mea-surement of the climate helps to improve HRM policies and practices in the areas where defi-ciencies are detected.

Weinert (1985:176) identifies five main com-ponents or dimensions in the organizational climate, all of which constitute the common denominator of the different measuring instru-ments proposed:

a) the individuals’ autonomy or freedom to make decisions about their work;

b) the degree of clarity with which methods and objectives have been organized and con-veyed by the person in charge;

c) the compensation and reward system, and the way it is tied to actual and perceived per-formance;

d) the attention, support, interest and “warmth” given by managers to their direct reports; and

e) cooperation and capacity to settle conflicts.

As can be easily observed, these elements are mostly related to the vertical relationship between managers and subordinates, and are therefore particularly relevant to be analyzed

and incorporated in HR policies and prac-tices.

Organizational Culture

We have adopted the approach by Schein (1999:29), whereby culture is defined as a pat-tern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned throughout its history. This author establishes three levels of approach to the organizational cul-ture:

1. Artifacts, or visual organizational structures and processes (relational or dress codes, con-flict resolution mechanisms, schedules, meet-ings, communications, rites, social events, etc.)

2. Espoused values (philosophies, goals, explicit rules, etc.)

3. Basic underlying assumptions (taken for granted beliefs, thoughts and feelings).

Only when we arrive at the third level can we grasp, in its whole essence, the organization-al culture, since it is here that we find cultural (intangible) elements that act as true engines of human behavior in the organization. Moreover, there are usually many inconsistencies between levels 2 and 3 that reflect the gap between ex-plicit perceptions and informal but actually as-sumed values.

Organizational Structure

We understand, like Mintzberg (1984:26), that the structure of an organization is the set of forms in which it divides its labor into distinct tasks and then achieves coordination among them. Division and coor-dination of labor, or in the words of Lawrence and Lorsch (1973) “differentiation and integra-tion,” are the poles between which structural de-sign operates.

We systematize the parameters of an orga-nizational structure design by distinguishing, like the Canadian author, four sequences:


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a) Design of positions, which implies conferring them with a certain degree of specializa-tion and behavior formalization, as well as defining the preparation and socialization required of their holders.

b) Design of superstructure, which establishes the criteria for grouping positions into units un-der a single, hierarchical control, as well as the unit size or span of control of the unit manager.

c) Design of lateral linkages, which defines the type of planning and control systems, as well as the liaison devices required to con-tain lateral or cross-sectional interdepen-dencies.

d) Design of decision-making system, which sets forth the degree of horizontal or vertical central-ization or decentralization of decisions to be made.

All the options opened up by the design of the organizational structure are highly rel-evant for HRM as situational factors, the con-sequences of which impact on almost all its subsystems.

Competency or Skills Profiles

A competency profile is a selection of basic com-petencies (see glossary for this word) that guar-antee that the candidate is qualified for a given job. We may call it a “blueprint” of the ideal job holder.

Having a good profile of the ideal job holder is key to ensuring a correct management of hir-ing processes, as well as the proper operation of other HRM areas, such as evaluation and devel-opment policies as they are intended to enhance employees’ most relevant skills.

Good profiles, applied particularly to the re-cruitment and selection processes, should only specify a few skills deemed crucial for success-ful performance. These requirements will enable the organization to contact the labor market with some reasonable expectation of success, to de-sign effective hiring processes at reasonable costs,

and to have a set of highly accurate predictors pointing to the desired results.

Specialization

Positions can be specialized (Mintzberg, 1984:99 and ff.) in two dimensions. Firstly, their breadth or scope (how many different tasks are performed in each position and how wide or narrow these tasks are). In one extreme, the em-ployee is a sort of jack-of-all-trades; in the other, he or she repeats the same task over and over again. Secondly, the depth of or control over the task actually performed. In one extreme, the employee is limited to following precise instruc-tions; in the opposite one, he or she performs and controls every aspect of the activity. The first dimension is the horizontal specialization of the position, while the second is known as vertical specialization. Their opposite pairs are known as “horizontal and vertical job enlarge-ment.”

According to the empirical evidence drawn from many cases, the grounds in favor of spe-cialization (the horizontal specialization of an expert performing a limited task or the vertical specialization of an employee performing tasks subject to strict external control) are the gains in productivity and coordination). The argu-ments against specialization are demotivation due to routine, rigidity in view of changes and loss in the quality of the work done, especially in highly qualified environments. “Job enrich-ment” techniques, created to deal with this ex-cess of specialization, are based on enlarging the position both horizontally and/or vertically. Following the same line, the term “empower-ment” has recently been coined to refer to job enlargement processes in the vertical dimen-sion.

Job designers should take into account and balance, in each case, the specialization/exten-sion binomial depending on the relevant con-tingency factors involved, among which the technology used and the job environment char-acteristics are decisive.



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Strategy

The term “strategy” in the text is used in the broadest sense of all the uses normally attributed to it in the theory of management. It means the set of basic or priority objectives of an organiza-tion (Note: as already stated, organization is to be understood as the multi-organizational insti-tutional system or complex whose CS system is being audited).

This broad notion of strategy includes:

a) The organization’s mission or raison d’etre b) Its lines of action or prioritiesc) Its operational objectives

The term is used to refer to both explicit statements, however formalized, as well as im-plicit preferences of leaders, so commonly found in the public sector, provided they can be reasonably detected with the tools used in the analysis.

As it was previously indicated, the macro-scale analysis inherent to CS system audits will force analysts to make highly generalized and ambiguous strategic definitions, which will in turn increase the interpretative dimension in their work.

Wage Equity

“Wage equity” refers to the quality of a com-pensation structure, consisting of a two-fold bal-ance:

a) On one hand, a balance between what each employee contributes to and receives from the organization, also taking into account how this contribution/compensation balance works for different employees and groups of employees.

b) On the other hand, a balance between the salaries paid by the organization and those offered in relevant job markets of reference.

In the first case, we talk about internal equity in the wage structure. A suitable HRM aims at being perceived as equitable and fair by employ-ees.

In the second case, we talk about external equity, which includes wage competitiveness and efficiency issues.

A wage system is competitive when it en-ables the organization to recruit and retain the employees it requires. The recruitment and staff turnover rates are a measure of wage competi-tiveness. A wage or pay system is said to be ef-ficient when the organization is competitive at a cost not higher than that in the markets of refer-ence.

The tension between internal and external equity is a typical HRM problem that takes place mainly when the increase in the market value of some specialties, professions or skills profiles—re-gardless of the causes—forces the organization to raise the salaries of some employees beyond the internal valuation of their positions, measured with strictly internal criteria, with the purpose of preventing a loss in wage competitiveness. This tension normally evolves into a loss of transpar-ency in wage management systems.


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APPENDIX 2

three basic models can be identified, that are named after the archetypical countries that best represent them:

Some countries follow the French model, which focuses on selection instruments (such as competitions), thus creating a system of predom-inantly formal guarantees.

The German model is also highly formal-ized and is designed to ensure theoretical and practical training, pointing to a long learning process.

The British model, more flexible in its methods, emphasizes the professionalism and independence of the bodies in charge of staff recruitment and selection.

CS Models Concerning Career Organization

Two CS models can be identified according to the type of career organization used (and im-plicitly, to the relation established with the labor market):

Position-based systems are organized according to the organization’s short-term staff-ing needs. Recruitment takes place in order to fill a particular vacancy or position rather than look for someone qualified to fulfill different tasks. It is normally an open system, in which any posi-tion can be occupied by external applicants, even though in some cases different conditions may be laid down for in-house or outsourced candi-dates.

Career-based systems have a hierarchi-cal public job design, whereby employees re-cruited at any certain level may progress through grades until they arrive at the highest level they can reach. Therefore, career-based systems as-sume that there are certain positions reserved to external recruitment, while the highest-ranking positions are filled with internally promoted staff members.

PECULIARITIES OF PUBLIC SYSTEMS

This Appendix includes some considerations that, even if they do not purport to modify our employment and human resources manage-ment model, help to frame it within the context of political-administrative systems. Firstly, we make reference to different CS models; secondly, we enumerate the dysfunctions most frequently identified by experts in public HRM systems, and finally the main trends in CS system reforms are described. Although these considerations are largely based on the experiences and analyses conducted within the OECD, we believe that they could be applied to a wider scope.

CIVIL SERVICE MODELS

Different CS Models

Each country has its own set of institutional ar-rangements for the employment and human re-sources management in the public sector, which we have designated as CS. This heterogeneous reality can be, however, ordered and system-atized by classifying existing arrangements to fit some basic models.

Based on a previous work (Longo 2001b, 7 and ff.), which may help gain a better insight into the criteria used, CS models are classified according to four central criteria or factors.

CS Models Concerning Employment Access Systems

With regard to the various systems in place to access public employment, CS models differ in the type of mechanisms chosen to guarantee the principle of merit against arbitrariness, po-liticization and nepotism. From this perspective,



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CS Models Concerning Public Employees’ Rights

A more relevant and useful distinction between different CS systems is that related to the rights recognized and granted to workers concerning two particularly significant issues:

On the one hand, all CS systems grant ten-ure rights that protect, to a greater or lesser ex-tent, public employees from arbitrary dismissals. However, some systems only allow dismissal on disciplinary grounds, while others have regu-lated labor contract termination to incorporate dismissal due to organizational, technical or eco-nomic reasons.

Another important distinction concerns col-lective rights. There are some CS systems that recognize the right to strike and collective bar-gaining for all public employees, while others deny these rights to some public employees or all of them, for reasons of public interest.

Current political-administrative systems have a tendency towards complexity and frag-mentation, which in turn triggers opposite re-sponses—i.e. towards diversification in order to adapt to a complex environment, and towards integration, in order to maintain global cohe-sion and control. CS systems do not escape these tensions. Based on which response is given in each case above, the following systems will be deduced:

Integrated systems, in which the figure of the public employer appears to be highly cen-tralized; and

Fragmented systems, in which decentralized personnel decision-making processes prevail.

DYSFUNCTIONS FREQUENTLY DETECTED IN PUBLIC hRM SYSTEMS

Merit and Flexibility as Key References

The most relevant dysfunctions or disorders of CS systems typically concern two major themat-ic areas:

On the one hand, dysfunctions may consist in violations to the principle of merit, which must be preserved and incorporated in all HRM sub-systems for public administrations to be regarded as professional, which is ultimately the purpose or raison d’être of CS systems.

On the other hand, they may result from ex-cessive rigidity, caused by abuses or distortions of the system of guarantees paradoxically designed to preserve the principle of merit.

It is important to note that neither of these dysfunctions excludes the other, but quite the op-posite. Merit and flexibility are key to ensuring an adequate operation of public HRM systems. Conversely, rigidity and the violation of the merit principle tend to feed one another, giving rise to a vicious circle, and coexist in some CS sectors, thus reinforcing each other.

Dysfunctions Related to the Merit Principle

When personnel decisions are made in any of the subsystems described on bases other than people’s qualifications and merits, the quality of the entire system deteriorates.

The merit principle can be violated due to a great number of reasons. The use of the public administration by political parties as if it were their own property is the most frequent reason and usually the root of most arbitrariness and political patronage practices.

In addition, these violations may affect any HRM subsystem: from nepotistic recruitment to the arbitrary application of compensation or promotion systems to benefit loyal employees, to the detriment of the best qualified.

Dysfunctions Related to Flexibility Issues

The existence of a great number of rigid ele-ments can be clearly disclosed in a diagnostic assessment of CS systems. Below there is a de-scription of such disorders as described in a re-cent paper (Longo:2001b, 19), within the scope of the OECD, with the sole purpose of further clarifying these types of dysfunctions:


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a) An excessively uniformed regulatory frame-work reduces the capacity of the CS to adapt to different environments and to respond to changes.

b) Too many regulations lead to an excessive standardization of personnel practices.

c) Management is so centralized that managers have little autonomy to exercise their respon-sibilities in the field of HR management.

d) The organization (structures and positions) is highly restricted and fragmented. It usu-ally derives from the law or from centralized collective agreements, rather than from the managers’ own criteria. Tasks have been ex-cessively specified, making job assignments highly rigid.

e) There is almost no mobility, neither internal nor external. Internal mobility is even more difficult owing to the excessive regulation of tasks already mentioned and sometimes due to horizontal and vertical barriers.

f) Recruitment and selection systems are long, complex, and excessively formalized. There is too much emphasis on formal merits and credentials.

g) Job security is excessively guaranteed (i.e. a high degree of stability is perceived).

h) Promotion is prevented by grade barriers that pose obstacles to progress. Excessive em-phasis is usually given to seniority or length of service.

i) Rewards are granted according to the grade rather than the position, and this does not help link wages to responsibilities assumed nor to actual workload. Grades may become barriers for a wage progression scheme.

j) There is an almost unbridgeable gap between performance, and promotion and reward systems. Performance-based compensation systems clash with the lack of effective per-formance evaluation mechanisms.

k) Systems have a poor capacity for producing skilled or qualified managers or leaders.

l) Management styles tend to be paternalistic, meaning that managers support their staff rather than make demand from them.

m) Labor relations are excessively collectivized (or unionized) and this comes into conflict with an increasing need for segmented and personalized human resources practices. Sometimes, a tendency towards conflict es-calation is perceived.

MAIN TRENDS IN CS SYSTEM REFORMS

From Personnel Administration to hRM

Taking into consideration public management reforms, however deep or broad, that are un-dertaken within the framework of the OECD, the HRM in the public sector is undoubtedly one of the fields in which the most substantial changes were introduced in the two last de-cades.

First of all, CS reforms have added value to HRM systems, which have become a central management function in the civil service, re-inforced by similar trends in the private sector. This added value has helped overcome the idea whereby personnel management was under-stood simply as personnel administration—i.e. an activity made up of mere procedures intend-ed to maintain the existing structure—and as-sume HRM as a strategically important system, regarded as essential for the accomplishment of public organizations’ mission.

This fundamental shift has resulted from four main courses of action that have managed to introduce changes as a response to the dys-functions previously specified. Such courses of action are the following:

Decentralize hRM

There has been a generalized trend towards the transfer of autonomy and the broadening of line managers’ discretion in the field of HRM. Re-sponsibilities in personnel issues are assumed in a more fragmented and decentralized manner. Central personnel services tend to evolve from direct management or primary control to the



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role of a partner, consultant or, at least, internal supplier of specialized services.

harness Managerial Roles

Public sector managers have become fundamen-tal actors in the institutional designs introduced by CS reforms. Their development and profes-sionalization are high-priority objectives.

The intensive use of managerial training is present in all reforms, without exception.

The professionalization goal has often led some organizations to separate a group of man-agers and differentiate them from th rest of the CS, by subjecting them to a more flexible regula-tion. These Senior Civil Service models (in United Kingdom, U.S.A., Australia, New Zealand, Italy, and the Netherlands, among other countries) are all based, without detriment to their diversity, on the separation of politics and management, and on the recognition that there should be a manage-ment level in the hands of professionals, opening such vacancies to eligible candidates from outside the public administration.

Make Managerial Practices More Flexible

Flexibility is the motto of CS reforms in the scope of the OECD and takes the largest share of the changes introduced to HRM policies and practices in the public sector. Flexible policies have been introduced in five main areas:

Numerical flexibility: this is reflected in a consistent tendency towards downsizing, i.e. reducing staff members on the operating public payroll, though with great differenc-es among countries as to the magnitude of such reductions and the methodologies used (global or sectoral plans, early retirement, re-tirement incentives, fixed number of vacan-cies to be filled, etc.)Contractual flexibility, which is mainly reflected in:

•

•

a) the introduction of dismissals on econom-ic, technical or organizational grounds.

b) the use of fixed-term labor contracts that do not ensure stability, and

c) the use of outsourced activities and ser-vices (contracting out).

Functional flexibility, which results in:

a) More decentralized and skills-based re-cruitment and selection mechanisms.

b) The design of more horizontally and vertically flattened positions, known as “broadbanding.”

c) The elimination of horizontal and verti-cal barriers to mobility and promotion.

d) The possibility of transferring personnel in the interest of the organization.

e) Replacing length of service by perfor-mance for promotion purposes.

f) The design and implementation of hori-zontal or on-the-job careers.

Wage flexibility, which has primarily in-volved:

a) A tendency to break uniformity in wage fixing policies, reducing the scale of sal-ary negotiations in order to come closer to each organizational context.

b) Wage progression tied to learning and performance improvement.

c) The introduction of variable pay formu-las based on performance.

Flexibility in the working time, mainly exemplified in:

a) The rearrangement of the workday, making schedules more flexible through the annualization of working hours, packages of available hours, compensa-tion of extra hours with free time (time off in lieu), and others.

•

•

•


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b) The expansion of part-time job modali-ties, especially in some countries, such as the Netherlands and United Kingdom.

Reorient Labor Relations

Lately, labor relations have experienced an expan-sion and intensification of collective bargaining agreements and trade unions’ participation in es-tablishing work conditions, in a context in which CS systems are adopting private sector practices. (Naturally enough, different national cultures have given this approach different shapes).

In addition and in seeming contradiction with the trend described above, attempts have been made to personalize the relationship with employees (e.g. individualized career plans, per-formance-based rewards, etc.), thus overcoming excessively collectivist approaches.

The importance gained by labor relations in determining working conditions has led gov-ernments to try to strengthen their position as employers. In some cases (Italy or Sweden), agencies have been created to concentrate the representation of public organizations in collec-tive bargaining.



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APPENDIX �

total positions that make up the administrative universe under analysis. In general, a low per-centage denotes a more professional and merit-based Civil Service.

Fiscal Weight of Public Employment

2. Central Government Wage Bill/ Gross Domestic Product

This measures the incidence of the former upon the latter. A high percentage indicates that the governmental wage bill may represent a burden on the country’s economy.

Civil Service Incentives

3. Vertical Wage Compression

This indicator measures the difference between the higher and the lower paying jobs in the cen-tral government’s wage scale. For the purposes of this measurement, the lowest pay corresponds to 1 on the scale. A high compression rate means less career and performance incentives. A high decompression rate reflects that the system is dominated by some elites and that there is a high degree of internal inequity in the compensation structure.

4. Average Central Government Wage/ Per Capita GDP

This ratio shows to what extent wages are satis-factory for public employees in a given national context. The report should indicate whether the average wage was calculated by dividing the cen-tral government wage bill by the number of cen-tral government employees, or through a wage survey.

DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS

Most indicators presented in this document have been drawn from the document “Second Gen-eration Indicators,” a World Bank report on the quantitative indicators of governance (World Bank, 2002). The indicators contained therein follow the description offered in that report and on the following website:

http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/cross.htm

All definitions and the following diagram have been drawn from the World Bank website. The definitions used by the OECD to construct the Public Sector Pay and Employment Data-base have also been taken into account. How-ever, the definitions adopted by the World Bank have been preferred since they are more general than those used by the OECD, and thus are bet-ter suited for less developed countries.

QUANTITATIVE DATA TO BE SURVEYED FOR ThE REPORTS

[The original version of the Analytical Framework requested information about 24 indicators in or-der to elaborate the Institutional Assessments. The Short Form Summary requests information about only the following seven]:

Professionalism of the Civil Service

1. Number of Political Appointments

This measures the percentage of positions in the civilian central government that are filled using political criteria and mechanisms vis-à-vis the


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5. Average Central Government Wage/ Average Private Sector Wage

This ratio measures how competitive public pay is vis-à-vis other sectors in the labor market.

Civil Service Employment

6. Total Number of Central Government Employees/Total Population

This measures the percentage of the former to the latter. In general and in relation to compara-

ble international figures, an excessively large per-centage would reflect an inefficient management of public employment, with signs of nepotistic practices. A very low percentage would reveal an insufficiently developed public sector, globally considered.

Indicator of Productivity and Efficiency

7. Central Government Expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/ Total Number of Central Government Employees

Total Public Employment

State-owned Enterprise Employees General Government

Total Subnational Government

Total Civilian Central Government*

Armed Forces

Total Education Employees

Total Health Employees

Total Police Employees Police

Civilian Central Government,

excluding education, health, and police

Health

Education

PermanentEmployees

TemporaryEmployees

Police

Subnational Government,

excluding education, health, and police

Health

Education

PermanentEmployees

TemporaryEmployees

NOTES FOR ThE CONSTRUCTION OF QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS

A. Main Components of Government Employment (World Bank)

Source: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/cross.htm * Civilian central government + armed forces = Central government



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B. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION DATA

Source: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/ cross.htm

Total Public Employment: includes employees from both state-owned enterprises (SOE) and the general government.

State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) employ-ees: people working in companies mainly or totally owned by the government.

General Government: refers to employment in “all government departments offices, organizations and other bodies which are agencies or instruments of the cen-tral or local authorities, whether accounted for or financed in, ordinary or extraordinary budgets or extra-budgetary funds. They are not solely engaged in administration but also in defense and public order, in the promotion of eco-nomic growth and in the provision of education, health, cultural and social services.” (International Standard of Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), Series M No. 4, Rev 3- 1990)

Within General Government we have distin-guished the following categories:

a) Central Government: includes armed forces and the civilian central government.

Armed Forces: (where possible, adminis-trative employees of the Ministry of Defense have been excluded and are accounted for as Ci-vilian Central Government employees.) Civilian Central Government: in-cludes central executive and legislative adminis-tration in departments directly dependent on the Head of State or the Parliament, together with all other ministries and administrative depart-ments, including autonomous agencies, together with education, health, and police employees paid by central government

•

•

The distinction between Central and Sub-national Government employment is budgetary, not geographic. If central government agencies are geographically scattered but are ultimately funded by the central government, then their staff members are included in the central gov-ernment tally.

Health employees: covers medi-cal and paramedical staff employed in government hospitals and other govern-ment health institutions. (Where possible, administrative employees working in the health sector have been excluded and are accounted for as Civilian Central Govern-ment).Education employees: covers pri-mary, secondary public education employ-ment. (Where possible, administrative employees working in the education sector have been excluded and are accounted for as Civilian Central Government).Police: includes all personnel—whether military, paramilitary or civilian—that exercise police functions. However, it does not normally include border guards. (Where possible, administrative employees working in the police sector have been ex-cluded and are accounted for as Civilian Central Government).

b) Subnational Government: encompasses all government administration employees who are not di-rectly funded by the central government. It includes municipalities, as well as regional, provincial, or state (in federal systems) employment.

Central Government Wage Bill: The sum of wages and salaries paid to civilian central government and the armed forces. Wages and salaries consist of all pay-ments in cash, but not in kind, to employees in return for services rendered, before deduction of withholding taxes and employee pension contributions. Monetary allowances (e.g. for housing, transportation) are included in the wage bill. Pensions are not.

•

•

•


��


Average Government Wage: represents the ratio of the Central Government Wage Bill to the total number of central government employees. Non-monetary benefits (e.g. free meals, transportation) and expected future ben-efits (e.g. pensions) are not included in this wage measure. (It should be noted, however, that in some countries these benefits make up a significant share of a public employee’s total rewards.)

ADDITIONAL NOTES

Take note of any deviations from these defi-nitions.

•

Take down both the year and source in all cases (for example, “Public expenditure data from the civilian central government, from [Title, year, and page number, and/or link to data].) Employment data should include full-time and part-time employees. Make reference to the type of employment , where possible. For all cases, if data on the government level requested were not available, report data on the level of government deemed most appro-priate for which data are available.

•

•

•



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APPENDIX �

Index 3. (SC) STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY

This index evaluates how sound and systemically integrated the CS system is, focusing on all the basic structural elements that a system of public employment and human resources management should have. It is broken down into three sub-indices:

(STC) STRATEGIC COHERENCE

This values the degree in which the different employment and human resource management policies and practices are linked to strategic gov-ernmental priorities. It is related to 7 critical points.

(DC) DIRECTIVE CONSISTENCY

This evaluates the degree of development of the directive function in the CS system, with special attention to the relationship between the central techno-structure and line managements. It is re-lated to 8 critical points.

(CP) CONSISTENCY OF PROCESSES

This sub-index measures, in the area under anal-ysis, the degree of development and integration of the basic processes that underpin an integrat-ed employment and HRM system. It is related to 14 critical points.

Index 4. (FC) FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY

This index evaluates the capacity of the ana-lyzed CS system to influence public employees effectively, encouraging behaviors in line with the organization’s priorities and aimed at im-proving public services. It is divided into three sub-indices:

INDICES FOR ThE EVALUATION OF CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS

1. DEFINITION OF INDICES AND SUB-INDICES

The institutional diagnosis of each CS system will concentrate on the following five indices:

1. Efficiency2. Merit3. Structural consistency4. Functional capacity5. Integrating capacity

Indices 3 and 4 are broken down into three sub-indices, as shown below.

Analysts will construct the indices and sub-indices based on their analysis of the critical points, following the order of the HRM subsys-tems, as described in the analytical framework. Each critical point is related to a minimum of one index and a maximum of two. Moreover, section 3 to this Appendix includes the critical points related to each index or sub-index , iden-tifying them with the number under which they appear in Appendix 6.

Index 1. (E) EFFICIENCY

This index evaluates the degree of optimization of the investment in human capital identified in the CS system, as well as its alignment with the fiscal policy scale and its reference markets. It is related to 13 critical points.

Index 2. (M) MERIT

This index assesses the extent to which the CS system incorporates guarantees of professional-ism to its different policies and practices, protect-ing them against arbitrariness, politicization and corruption. It is related to 10 critical points.


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(COM) COMPETENCY

This index evaluates personnel policies and prac-tices that most directly affect the design, supply, development and stimulus of employees’ capa-bilities, and tend to ensure that the main skills required by the public system are in place. It is related to 15 critical points.

(IE) INCENTIVE EFFECTIVENESS

This sub-index measures the extent to which ex-isting personnel management policies and prac-tices promote productivity, learning and service quality. It is related to 14 critical points.

(FL) FLEXIBILITY

This measures to what extent the analyzed poli-cies and practices incorporate guidelines that facilitate adaptation to change, by overcoming bureaucratic and rigid patterns and coming in line with the flexible tendencies that character-ize current personnel management policies. It is related to 12 critical points.

Index 5. (IC) INTEGRATING CAPACITY

This index evaluates the effectiveness with which the CS system ensures the harmonization of the expectations and interests of the different actors involved (management, employees and other stakeholders), reinforcing the sense of belonging and reducing conflict. It is related to 19 critical points.

2. hOW TO OBTAIN INDICES AND SUB-INDICES

The allocation of a score to these indices and sub-indices should follow the procedure be-low:

I. The critical points of all subsystems, jointly re-lated in Appendix 6, will be valued according to the following scale, which measures how close the real context under analysis comes

to the statements included in each critical point.

5 The real context analyzed is entirely or highly consistent with that expressed in the statement, in relation to both content and number of occurrences.

4 The real context analyzed is substantially comparable to the statement, but is not fully equivalent in content or there are exceptions that prevent the analyst from making a generalization of the match detected.

3 The real context analyzed is partially coincident with that reflected in the statement. There are some common ele-ments in content and number of occur-rences that enable the analyst to identify a high, though not substantial, degree of coincidence.

2 The real context analyzed is significantly different from the statement. There are some coincidences, but also some deep discrepancies of content and/or differ-ences in number of occurences.

1 The real context analyzed is completely different from that in the statement. Co-incidences of content are negligible or take place only in exceptional cases.

0 The real context analyzed is absolutely different from that expressed in the state-ment. No coincidences are identified.

II. The valuations of critical points, resulting from implementing this analytical scale plus any relevant weighing, according to section IV.2.3 of the analytical framework, shall be grouped by indices or sub-indices, as appropriate and indicated in the section of this Appendix, and in the checklist of Appendix 6.

III. Once grouped, all the valuations of one in-dex or sub-index shall be added and divided by the number of critical points under that index or sub-index, which will give a result-ing value (RV).



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IV. At this point, the procedure will differ de-pending on whether or not the index is bro-ken down into sub-indices:

IV.1. In the case of indices 1 (Efficiency), 2 (Merit) and 5 (Integrating Capacity), the resulting value (RV) shall be com-pared against the maximum reference value (MRV) of the index concerned, which can be seen at the end of this Appendix and which results from di-viding the maximum theoretical scores of the critical points (the maximum level of the scale times its correspond-ing weight in each case) by the number of critical points in the index.

For the purposes of this comparison, the maximum reference value (MRV) shall be understood to be 20 in all cas-es, for which purpose the following rule of three shall be applied:

RV x 20 ÷ MRV = VI(VI is the index value)

IV.2. In the case of indices 3 (Structural Consistency) and 4 (Functional Ca-pacity), in which additions have been

made separately for each of their sub-indices, the resulting value (RV) of each sub-index shall be compared with the maximum reference value (MRV) of the sub-index concerned, which can be found at the end of this Appendix and which is the result of dividing the maximum theoretical score of the criti-cal points (the maximum level of the scale times its corresponding weight in each case) by the number of critical points in the sub-indices.

For the purposes of this comparison, the maximum reference value (MRV) shall be understood to be 10 in all cas-es, for which purpose the following rule of three shall be applied:

RV x 10 ÷ MRV = VS(VS is the sub-index value)

Next, all the VS in the same index shall be grouped together and added up, and taking 20 as the maximum value for each index, the value of each index (IV) shall be calculated for each case by applying the corresponding rule of three.


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�. Critical Points Grouped by Indices and Sub-indices

(1) The critical points are identified by the number assigned to them in Appendix 6 checklist.

�. Maximum Reference Values of the Indices and Sub-indices

Indices/Sub-indices Mrv

EFFICIENCY (E) 9.23

MERIT (M) 13

STRATEGICCOHERENCE(STC) 10

DIRECTIVECONSISTENCY(DC) 8.75

CONSISTENCYOFPROCESSES(CP) 8.57

COMPETENCY(COM) 10.66

INCENTIVEEFFECTIVENESS(IE) 9.64

FLEXIBILITY(FL) 9.58

INTEGRATING CAPACITY (IC) 8.94

IndicesandSub-indices CriticalPoints(1)

EFFICIENCY (E) 5,6,7,8,36,41,56,57,62,63,75,76,89

MERIT (M) 24,25,26,27,30,31,32,38,60,68

STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY (SC)

STRATEGICCOHERENCE(STC) 1,2,3,11,42,50,75

DIRECTIVECONSISTENCY(DC) 10,23,45,49,90,91,92,93

CONSISTENCYOFPROCESSES(PC) 1,4,12,14,17,47,56,59,61,66,74,76,80,82

FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY (FC)

COMPETENCY(COM) 9,18,19,20,21,24,28,29,30,31,32,34,54,71,72,

INCENTIVEEFFECTIVENESS(IE) 16,37,39,42,43,44,45,46,47,51,55,58,64,67

FLEXIBILITY(FL) 3,13,15,16,22,35,39,40,53,69,70,73

INTEGRATING CAPACITY (IC) 27,33,44,48,51,52,65,77,78,79,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89



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�. Final Maximum Values of the Indices

FinalMaximumValuesoftheIndices

Index1.EFFICIENCY 20

Index2.MERIT 20

Index3.STRUCTURALCONSISTENCY 20

Index4.FUNCTIONALCAPACITY 20

Index5.INTEGRATINGCAPACITY 20

THEORETICALMAXIMUMTOTALVALUATION 100


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APPENDIX �

ThE FINAL REPORT SChEME (ShORT FORM)

From the formal point of view, the short form report is expected to be concrete and clear. Analysts, who will be well acquainted with the situation and context by the time they write the report, should convey the most relevant conclu-

sions to their target readers who are not familiar about their object of study. Therefore, analysts are required to do their best to make their con-clusions as easily readable as possible.

Please complete the spaces within brackets [ .. ], keeping the length of the text to the sug-gested maximum.



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Inter-American Development BankRegional Policy Dialogue

SUMMARY OF ThE

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

OF CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS

(ShORT FORM)

The Case of [country]

Assessment completed in [month] [year].


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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Analysis of the Subsystems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Human Resources Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Work Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Employment or Staffing Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Performance Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Compensation Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Professional Development Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Human and Social Relations Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Symbolic Valuation of the Human Resources Subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

INDICATORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

A) Quantitative Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

B) Indices for the Evaluation of Civil Service Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Table of Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Analysis of Causal Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Factors Related to the Internal Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Factors Related to the External Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Main Conclusions of the Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Proposed Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Further Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

SUMMARY TABLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

APPENDICES TO BE INCLUDED IN ThE ShORT FORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

[The purpose of this short form is to release a brief document (not longer than 15 pages), that will a) facilitate a summarized view of the civil service system in the country concerned, b) provide the IDB with a basic document to be regularly updated, and c) facilitate comparison with the rest of the countries in the region.]



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(Maximum length: 1 page, both sides)[Incorporate a summary of the main conclu-sions of the paper. There is a short summary of all the information that will be analyzed in the diagnosis below. Special emphasis should be given to the institutional context, the legislative framework, and the changes introduced in the period between the first report and this update (when appropriate).]

Analysis of the Subsystems

[Brief introduction, followed by an analysis of each of the subsystems (length: between one-half and one page per subsystem), following the methodology described. The table of subsystems will provide a panoramic view of how some sub-systems affect the way other subsystems work.]

Human Resources Planning(Length: between one-half and one page).

Work Organization (Length: between one-half and one page).Employment or Staffing Management(Length: between one-half and one page).

Performance Management(Length: between one-half and one page).

Compensation Management(Length: between one-half and one page).

Professional Development Management(Length: between one-half and one page).

Human and Social Relations Management (Length: between one-half and one page).

Symbolic Valuation of the human Resources Subsystems

[The purpose of this table is to summarize each subsystem’s global valuation by adding a sign:

+ overallpositive

+– intermediate,evolvingpositively

– negative


STRATEGY

WorkOrganization





RecruitmentMobility

Separation

PlanningEvaluation

Planning [valuation]




Career and Promotion Individual and Collective

Learning


payment

[valuation]

[valuation] [valuation] [valuation] [valuation]

[valuation]

When making the valuation, analysts should take into account whether all the subsystems are in place and operation as well as interconnected.]


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Tableofindices

Indexvalue Sub-indexvalueIndex (scale:0to20) Sub-Index (scale:0to10)

(E) EFFICIENCY [..]

(M) MERIT [..]

(SC) STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY [..]

(STC)STRATEGICCOHERENCE [..]

(DC)DIRECTIVECONSISTENCY [..]

(CP)CONSISTENCYOFPROCESSES [..]

(FC) FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY [..]

(COM)COMPETENCY [..]

(IE)INCENTIVEEFFECTIVENESS [..]

(FL)FLEXIBILITY [..]

(CI) INTEGRATING CAPACITY [..]

II. INDICATORS

A) Quantitative Indicators

[Until now, the Analytical Framework requested information about 24 indicators in order to make the Institutional Assessments. For this short form summary, analysts are required to provide infor-mation on only the following seven, whose defi-nitions are included in Appendix 3]:

1. Number of Political Appointments 2. Central Government Wage Bill /Gross Do-

mestic Product 3. Vertical Wage Compression4. Average Central Government Wage/Per

capita GDP 5. Average Central Government Wage/Aver-

age Private Sector Wage

6. Total Number of Central Government Em-ployees/Total Population

7. Central Government Expenditure (excluding pensions and debt service)/Total Number of Central Government Employees

B) Indices for the Evaluation of Civil Service Systems

[Analysts will construct the indices and sub-in-dices based on the analysis of the critical points, following the order of the HRM subsystems, as described in the analytical framework.]

[The reports should not only quantify indi-ces and sub-indices, but also include a qualitative analysis as well as an explanation of the method used to elaborate them.]



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III. CONCLUSIONS

(Length: no more than one page, both sides). [In this final part of his or her work, the SC

systems analyst will be in a position to briefly as-sess the context analyzed and draw some conclu-sions. These conclusions should focus on the key elements of the diagnosis as well as on any area deemed decisive for the potential improvement of the systems under analysis.]


[Conclusions related to the systems and subsys-tems]

Factors Related to the Internal Context

[Conclusions concerning the organizational cul-ture, budgetary adjustments, or any other rel-evant issue]

Factors Related to the External Context

[Conclusions concerning the legal framework, public policies, elections, economy of the coun-try or any other relevant issue]

Main Conclusions of the Assessment

[Executive summary of the conclusions]

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

(Length: 1 page maximum)[The recommendations on the system reform or modernization deemed appropriate for each case. The examination of the subsystems and of the mechanisms for the organization of the HR function will serve as the basis to account for the recommendations included].

Proposed improvements

Further Comments

V. SUMMARY TABLE

[This table will specify any information that ana-lysts may deem essential or at least very helpful to understand the conclusions of the report. It may include some brief keys to the interpreta-tion of the country, its critical points and the scores given to the quantitative indicators.]


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APPENDICES TO BE INCLUDED IN ThE ShORT FORM

1. Weighed description of the 93 critical points (Appendix 6 of the Analytical Frame-work, duly analyzed and valued).

2. Technical file: basic data about the meth-odology used for information collection pur-poses.

Date of completion of the report Consultants engaged in the collection of information and drafting of the report Information sources*

*Information sources:

••

•

a) Documentary:Rules of different types: laws, regu-lations, guidelines, collective bargaining agreements, etc.Management instruments of a gen-eral nature, such as staffing plans, budgets, organization charts, list of staff members, pay scales, job descriptions. Sample of instruments used, such as recruitment or promotion no-tices, performance evaluation reports, negotiation reports, and disciplinary actions.

•

•

•

TableofindicesCategories Factors Comments Introduced by the Analyst

BACKGROUND

Analysis of the Analysis of the legal Institutional framework Context

Functional Analysis Organizational analysis of the of the Civil Service Human Resources function

Quantitative indicators of the CS system analyzed

SUBSYSTEMS ANALYSIS Planning

Work Organization

Employment Management

Performance Management

Compensation Management

Professional Development Management


Comparison with other analyses

CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM INDICES



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Databases, such as age pyra-mids, mobility, training, veg-etative evolution, absenteeism, and staff turnover tables. In-house and external studies on the issue involved: white papers, previous diagnoses, and job sat-isfaction surveys, etc.

b) Opinions of informants:Central government leaders, either political or executive managers, responsible for the operation of the CS system. Technical experts in the different HRM areas of government.Line managers from the public administration, managers of various hierarchical levels from different types of organizations, encompassing the widest pos-sible diversity of public sector agencies, degrees of autonomy, and specific-sector characteris-tics.(The analyst should take special care in learning what consulted managers think about sensitive personnel-related areas, such as health and education, and

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

about other more specific issues, such as justice, police, etc.)External experts from the academ-ic, professional or other sectors, with a thorough knowledge and reliable opinions about the CS. Unions, associations or guilds of employees, especially for the analysis of labor relations.

Data-Gathering InstrumentsInterviews: open or semi-guided, of an individual or a group. In-terviews are a frequently used vehicle to get to know inter-viewees’ opinions and check the viability of other sources of information.Panels of experts, organized to share qualitative information and harmonize opinions on highly complex or controversial issues.Diagnostic techniques, like “brain storming,” the nominal group technique or others, focused on analyzing specific matters.Questionnaires and surveys on cer-tain topics and distributed to a significant number of represen-tative and relevant informants.

•

•

•

•

•

•


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GeneralChecklist

Indicesor Weigh ScoreSubsystems CriticalPoints Sub-Indices ED 0 1 2 3 4 5

Planning

Work Organization

1. TheprocessescomprisingaHRPsystemareadequatelydeveloped.

2. HRplanningdecisionsusuallyderivefromtheorganization’sstrategicprioritiesandguide-lines.Thereisaclosematchbetweenthem.

3. HRPmechanismsinplacemakepersonnelprac-ticesadaptabletochangesintheorganization’sstrategy.

4. Personnelinformationsystemsprovideknowl-edgeonthequantitativeandqualitativeavail-abilityofexistingandexpectedHRindifferentorganizationalsituationsandunits.

5. TheHRPpoliciesandinstrumentsinplacefavoroptimizationandfacilitateasuitabledistributionofresourcesandworkloadamongtheunits.

6. Theorganizationisneitheroverstaffednorunderstaffed.

7. Laborcostsinthepublicsectorarewithinreasonableparameters,compatiblewiththecountry’seconomy.

8. Staffmembersareredistributedwhenevernecessary.

9. Thetechnicalskillsofthestaffareinlinewiththeknowledgesociety.Theweightofqualifiedpersonnelissignificant.

10. LinemanagersareacquaintedwithHRPplansandareinvolvedintheirdesignandfollow-up.

11. Personnelpolicies,decisionsandpractices,ineachoftheHRMareas,respondtomeaningfulobjectivesconsciouslyestablishedintheplan-ningprocess.

12. TheprocessesthatcomprisethisWorkOrgani-zationsystemareadequatelydeveloped.

13. Jobdesignsfollowmanagementcriteriaratherthanlegalconsiderationsorcollectiveagree-ments.Thelegalframeworkorlaboragree-mentsonlyprovideageneralframewithinwhichtheworkisorganizedandmanagedaccordingtotheneedsoftheorganization.

STCCP

STC

STCFL

CP

E

E

E

E

COM

DC

STC

CP

FL

BB

A

BB

A

B

A

A

C

B

C

A

B

A

APPENDIX �



�8

GeneralChecklist(continued)


14. Jobsaredescribedaccurately,sothatthechainofresponsibilitiesisclear.Employeesknowwhattheyareaccountableforandwhytheircontributionisrewarded.

15. Jobdescriptionsarenotasexhaustivelydetailedastoprecludeproperadaptationtochangingorunexpectedcircumstances.

16. Jobdesigntendstoenrichorenlargethejobsbothhorizontallyandverticallyinordertoproducegainsinjobqualityandencourageemployeemotivationwithoutseriouslossesinproductivityorcoordination(see“specializa-tion”intheglossary).

17. Theclassificationandhierarchyofpositionsrespondtosoundcriteriaandareadjustedtoeachorganization.

18. Qualificationorskillsprofilesofjobholdersgobeyonddegrees,expertise,orformalmeritandidentifyothercompetencies(seeglossary).

19. Skillsprofilesaredefinedpriortothetechnicalstudiesconductedbyexperts.

20. Profilesincludethecompetenciesdeemedkeyforthesuccessfulperformanceofeachjobholder.

21. Taskrequirementsaregenerallyconsistentwiththeelementsthatmakeupthepositionprofiles.

22. Jobdesignsandprofiledefinitionsarereviewedonaregularbasistoadaptthemtotheevolu-tionofthetasksandtheirnewrequirements.

23. Linemanagershaveacrucialroleinthejobde-signandprofiledefinitionsthatconcernthem.

24. Recruitmenttofillvacantpositionsisopen,bothinfactandinlaw,toallcandidateswhomeettherequirementslaiddown.Thesere-quirementsareestablishedonthebasisofthecandidates’qualifications,whicharetechnicallyandnotarbitrarilyevaluated.

25. Thereareproceduresandmechanismsthrough-outthehiringprocesstoavoidarbitrariness,politicization,cronyismorpatronagepractices.

26. Onlyareasonablylimitednumberofpositionsarefilledwithpeopleappointedasaresultofpoliticalmechanisms.

CP

FL

FLIE

CP

COM

COM

COM

COM

FL

DC

MCOM

M

M

C

B

CC

C

C

C

B

B

C

C

AA

A

A



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27. Therearemechanismsinplacetoguaranteetheprinciplesofequalityandnon-discrimina-tion,intendedtoeliminateanydisadvantagebasedonsex,race,culture,ororigin,togainaccesstoorbepromotedinthepublicsector.

28. Themethodsusedforthesearch,communica-tion,andattractionofcandidatesnormallyresultinanadequatenumberofeligibleap-plicantsforthepositionstobefilled.

29. Selectionisbasedontheprofilesofcompeten-cies(seeglossary)preparedfortheapplicantstothevacantpositions.

30. Theselectioninstrumentsusednormallysuitthepreviouslydefinedprofiles,andtheirdesignisbasedontechnicallyvalidatedeffective-nesscriteriaapplicabletotheidentificationofprofessionalskills.

31. Selectioncommitteesorbodiesareformedonthebasisoftheprofessionalismandexpertiseofitsmembers,whoselectthebestcandidatesusingtheirindependentjudgment.

32. Hiringdecisionsarebasedontechnicallyprovenmeritandprofessionalskills.

33. Thereareadequateproceduresinplacetowelcomeemployees,facilitatetheirentryintotheorganizationandtheirfirststepsinthenewpositionandworkenvironment,andsuchproceduresarecorrectlyimplemented.Further-more,employeesareprovidedwithguidelinesonthecoreprinciplesandbehaviortheymustbeacquaintedwithatthetimeofentry.

34. Thereareadequateproceduresinplace(suchastrialperiods)toensurethattheselectionofcandidatesiscorrectandthatcorrectivemeasuresareadopted,ifappropriate.

35. Thefunctionalandgeographicmobilitymecha-nismsadoptedenabletheorganizationtobeflexibleenoughtorespondtostaffredistribu-tionneeds.

36. Absenteeismratesare,normally,acceptable.

37. Thedisciplinaryactionstakenallowtheorgani-zationtocorrectemployees’behaviorinafast,effectiveandexemplarymanner.

MIC

COM

COM

MCOM

MCOM

MCOM

IC

COM

FL

E

IE

AA

B

A

BA

AA

AA

C

C

A

B

C



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38. Therearenodismissalsorterminationsofpro-fessional,non-politicalpositionsresultingfromchangeofgovernment.

39. Employeescanbedismissedduetogrossnegligenceorlowperformance,foundedonobjectivefacts.

40. Employmentcontractsmaybeterminatedduetotechnical,economic,ororganizationalrea-sons,groundedonobjectivefactsthatimposetheneedforlay-offs.

41. Thereisnoexcessivestaffturnoverinanydepartmentorsector.

42. Topmanagementusuallydefinesstandardsofexpectedperformance,consistentwiththeorganization’sprioritiesandstrategy.Conse-quently,employeesareverywellawareofwhataspectsoftheircontributionwillbespecificallyvaluedinagivenperiod.

43. Performanceobjectivesaresetforthwithintheframeworkofimprovementplansresultingfromthepreviousmanagementcycle.

44. Performanceobjectivesarecommunicatedtotheemployeesinawaythattheirinvolvementandcommitmentareencouraged.

45. Throughoutthemanagementcycle,topmanagersactivelyfollow,observe,andsupportperformanceimprovementeffortsbyprovidingresourcesorremovingobstacleswherenecessary.

46. People’sperformanceisevaluatedbytheorga-nizationaccordingtotheexpectedstandards.

47. Evaluationcriteriaandpracticesenabletheor-ganizationtoefficientlydistinguishdifferencesinperformanceamongemployees.

48. Performanceevaluationcriteriaareregardedasreliableandobjectivebythoseresponsiblefortheirimplementation.

49. Linemanagerswhoareresponsibleforworkunitsatdifferenthierarchicallevelsplayalead-ingroleintheperformancemanagementoftheemployeesundertheirsupervision.

50. Thewagestructureandcompensationpoliciesderivefromasetofprioritiesandobjectiveslinkedtotheorganization’sstrategyratherthan

M

IEFL

FL

E

STCIE

IE

IEIC

DCIE

IE

CPIE

IC

DC

STC

B

BB

B

B

CA

C

BC

CC

A

CB

B

B

B




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toinertialpracticesorreactiveresponsestoclaimsandlaborconflicts.

51. Ingeneral,thepeopleintheorganizationhavetheperceptionthattheircompensationsareconsistentwiththeircontribution.

52. Peoplefeelthatthecompensationreceivedbyotheremployeesisequitablevis-à-vistheirownsalaries.

53. Jobclassificationstranslatedtosalarylevelscontributetoaflexibleprogression,basedonperformanceandtraining.

54. Thecompensationstructureisadequatetoat-tract,motivate,andretainskilledemployeesinthedifferenttypesofpositionsrequiredbytheorganization.

55. Thewagescaleisreasonable.Verticaldiffer-encesinsalaryrespondtothedifferentnatureofthepositions.

56. Thereissomebalancebetweenthestaffcom-pensationintheorganizationandthesalariesearnedbyequivalentemployeesindifferentsectionsandareasofthepublicservice.

57. Salarycostsateverylevelarenotexcessivelyhighvis-à-visthoseprevailinginthemarket.

58. Thecompensationpoliciesadoptedpromoteef-fort,improvedindividualandgroupperformance,aswellaslearningandskillsdevelopment.

59. Decisionsonsalaryadministrationareadoptedinaccordancewithpre-establishedcriteriaandinlinewiththestructuraldesignparameterslaiddownbytheorganization.

60. Noarbitrarypractice,rent-seeking,orpoliticalpatronageisdetectedinsalarydecisions.

61. TheHRinformationsystemhasalltheupdatedinformationoncompensationthatisrequiredforthecorrectmanagementofthesalarysystem.

62. Non-wagebenefitsgivenarecost-effective.

63. Thepensionplanforpublicemployeesmeetstheirsocialsecurityneeds,isfinanciallysound,doesnotcreateexclusiveprivilegesvis-à-visothersocialgroups,anddoesnotrepresentanexcessiveburdenontheeconomy.

ICIE

IC

FL

COM

IE

CPE

E

EI

CP

M

CP

E

E

BC

B

B

AA

BB

BC

A

A

A

B

A

C

A



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64. Usefulpoliciesandinstrumentsareinplaceforthenon-monetaryrecognitionofachievements.

65. Ingeneral,peopleperceivethattheirreason-ableexpectationsofpromotionaresatisfiedintheorganization.

66. Therearecareerandsuccessionplansthatharmonizeindividualexpectationswiththeforeseeableneedsoftheorganization.

67. Promotioncriteriaandmechanismsarebasedonperformance,potentialforgrowth,andskillsdevelopment.

68. Noelementsofabuseorpoliticalpatronageareverifiableinpromotionpractices.

69. Theorganizationmanagestheprogressmadebyitshumanresourceswithflexibility—i.e.withouttoomanyformalbarriersorrestrictions.

70. Thereareformulasotherthanthestrictlyhierarchicalcareer—e.g.horizontalcareersorchangeofpositions—basedontherecognitionofprofessionalexcellence,withoutnecessarilygrantingmoreauthoritytotheindividual.

71. Employeesreceiveadequatetrainingfromtheorganizationtosupplementtheirinitialtrain-ing,adaptthemtochangingtasks,solvepoorperformance,andsupporttheirprofessionalgrowth.

72. Trainingactivitiessupportcollectivelearning,thusstrengtheningadvancesintheorgani-zation’scapacitytodealwithproblemsandrespondeffectively.

73. Trainingactivitieseffectivelysupportinnovationandculturalchangeprocesses.

74. Trainingisbasedonareliablediagnosisofneeds.

75. Investmentsintrainingaremadethroughplansresultingfromthediagnosisofneedsandaredesignedtosupportclearorganizationalpriori-ties.

76. Trainingisevaluatedintermsofthesatisfactionproducedontraineestogetherwiththeresult-costratioanditsimpactontheemployees’performance.

EI

IC

CP

IE

M

FL

FL

COM

COM

FL

CP

STCE

CPE

C

B

C

A

B

B

B

B

C

C

C

CC

CC

Development Management


��




77. Theorganizationisconcernedwithevaluatingtheworkenvironmentorclimateonaregularbasisbyresortingtoreliableinstruments.

78. ClimateevaluationsaretakenintoaccountatthetimeofreviewingandimprovingHRMpoli-ciesandpracticesinforce.

79. Theorganizationmakesfrequentuseofdiffer-entmechanismstolearnabouttheemployees’initiatives,requests,suggestions,information,andopinions.

80. Ingeneral,all-levelmanagementdecisionsaswellasalltypesofrelevantinformationfedbytopmanagersfloweasilyandfluentlyintheorganizationandreacheverystakeholderinduetimeandmanner.

81. Theorganizationhasspecificcommunicationchannelstoreinforcethestaff’ssenseofbe-longingandinvolvementintheglobalproject.

82. Eachpartyplayshisorherrolewithoutstep-pingbeyondit,andtheserolesarereciprocallyrecognizedbytheotherparty.

83. Ingeneral,powerisreasonablybalancedbetweenmanagementandstaff.Negotiationsbetweenthepartiesusuallyreflectthisbalance.

84. Laborrelationsusuallyandpreferablychoosethepathofnegotiationandconsensusratherthanconfrontationordisrepute.

85. Intermediatedlaborrelations—i.e.thosecar-riedoutbyrepresentatives—donotexcludedirectorpersonalrelationsbetweenmanage-mentandemployeeswhereappropriate.

86. Laborconflictisnotintenseinnumber,impact,orintheradicalmethodsused.

87. Thereareeffectivemechanismsinplacetomanageandsettlelaborconflicts.

88. Occupationalhealthandsafetypracticesaresatisfactory.

89. Thereareadequatesocialsecuritypoliciesandbenefitsforemployeesthatdonotexceedthosethatarecharacteristicintheenvironmentinwhichtheorganizationoperates.Further-more,thebenefitsareappreciatedbystaffmembers.

IC

IC

IC

CP

IC

CPIC

IC

IC

IC

IC

IC

E

ICDC

C

C

C

C

C

BA

A

A

C

A

B

C

CC




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90. Managersareempoweredandautonomousenoughtodealwiththepersonnelassignedtotheunitsundertheirsupervision.

91. Managersaresuitablytrainedtoperformtheirtasks.

92. Managersareawareofandassumetheirre-sponsibilitiesashumanresourcesmanagersinrelationtothestaffmembersundertheirscopeofformalauthority.

93. ThecentralservicesresponsiblefortheCSsystemareperceived,bytherestoftheorgani-zation,asaddingvalueandcontributingtotheattainmentofcommongoals

DC

DC

DC

DC

B

C

A

A

The Human Resources Function Organization


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PART II

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS BY

COUNTRY



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ChAPTER 2

Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems:

The Case of BarbadosHedy Isaacs

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Conclusions

Since its independence from Britain in 1966, Barbados has made sustained efforts to reform its public sector—specifically, successive gov-ernments have undertaken reforms in order to improve the efficiency of the Civil Service Sys-tem (CSS). These reforms have sought to ad-dress constraints, including the centralization of human resource management and reactive decision-making processes that were arguably manifestations of historical antecedents.

In the 2004 reform ethos, the Ministry of the Civil Service (MCS), the premier actor with responsibility for human resource manage-ment policy-making, through its Office of Pub-lic Sector Reform (OPSR), coordinated related activities to pragmatically strengthen a range of human resource management subsystems, namely Human Resource Planning, Work Orga-nization, Performance Management, and Pro-fessional Development Management. In turn, the Human and Social Relations, Employment and Compensation Management subsystems are primarily being addressed at policy-making levels.

It should be noted that the Public Sector Re-form Program also emphasizes the optimization of human resources. There prevails a vision to modernize the legal framework for the CSS. The reform effort is underpinned by a client-centered philosophy.

The context of the reforms evidences so-cial capital and facilitates consultation between internal and external stakeholders, specifically public officials and the unions representing civil servants. Consequently, there is consensus on the appropriate reform direction. In this regard, Bar-bados’ Protocol Four of the Social Partnership 2001–2004, specifically sections 3.14 to 3.16, is strongly supportive of the continued reform of the public sector. Furthermore, this Social Com-pact clearly articulates the commitment of the social partners—namely, the Government, the Employers’ representatives and the Workers’ representatives—to collaborate and consult on “fundamental issues affecting their individual and collective contributions to all aspects of na-tional development.” Reference to the partners’ commitment to industrial relations (in section 6.4) proves existing concern for the efficiency of the CSS and, in particular, for human and social relations management.

Efforts to improve the operation of the cen-tral civil service overtime will be explained when



�0

discussing the genealogy of reforms in Barbados, while highlighting actions geared to improving specific HRM subsystems.

The OPSR, set up in 1997, with responsi-bility for developing strategic plans, introducing performance management, and conducting or-ganizational reviews, among other tasks, facili-tated related initiatives.

In 1999, efforts to strengthen the human re-source planning subsystem were underway with the purpose of strategically planning for human resource needs, optimizing availability and pre-venting reactive human resource management decisions. A core element of these efforts lies in the modernization of human resource man-agement systems. The Personnel Module of the SmartStream Human Resources, launched in July 1999, facilitated the maintenance of infor-mation on the requirements, duties and com-pensation of each position within ministries and departments, thereby creating ready access to information (Challenge to Change, the Newslet-ter for Public Sector Reform, July to September 2000, Vol.4, No. 3, page 19). Allied to this was the introduction of strategic planning in select agencies. This development resonated with the need for organizational as well as national plans to inform effective HR planning.

Reform of the Work Organization subsys-tem has focused mainly on efforts to provide for-mal training in job description writing at the line agency level where there is a dearth of trained personnel with this competence. The training exercise takes place following a “job evaluation for public sector employees that was completed in 2003” (Testimonial).

Under the aegis of the OPSR, the Per-formance Review and Development System (PRDS) was introduced in five pilot agencies. The introduction of standards as benchmarks for measuring performance and the allied use of performance appraisal as a developmental tool have implications for positive developments in the Performance Management subsystem.

In the area of Professional Development Management, the reform undertaken has sought

to bridge the gap between the opportunities for professional development offered to employees and the lack of training needs analysis. These re-forms are giving shape to the training policy that is currently being developed.

Changes in the Human and Social Rela-tions Management subsystem focus on the policy/planning area. There are expressed concerns regarding evidence of top-down com-munication within the CSS. The Internal Re-form Committees (IRCs) are “seen as avenues through which employees at all levels of the or-ganization are able to contribute to the change process. Many of these committees, however, are no longer functioning or are merely limp-ing along” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003:55, section 12.8). “A revitalization plan for the IRC program is ongoing” (PSR Program Plan 2003–2004, 2003:8). This plan is a positive development, particularly in light of the lack of formalized instruments for assessing the organizational climate in the central civil service. The OPSR/Network Services Centre Inc. (NSC) has facilitated employee assistance programs as well as training in the professional skills needed to support the program. Again, these efforts are contributing to the positive de-velopment of the Human and Social Relations subsystem.

Policy priorities are also evident in the Em-ployment Management and the Compensation Management subsystems. A new Public Service Act designed to address issues including im-proved accountability and expected standards of behavior as well as to support policy direc-tion and structural change is being drafted, giv-en the fact that the policy framework developed for this Act has been completed. “Legislation is now to be prepared” (OPSR: Select Modernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector 2003:3, item 13).

Efforts to strengthen the Compensation Management subsystem include the pension re-form, currently at the public education and con-sultation phase, which is being spearheaded by the National Insurance Department and is “ex-


�1

iNSTiTuTiONAL ASSESSmENT OF CiviL SERviCE SySTEmS: ThE CASE OF BARBADOS

pected to result in maintaining sufficient funds to pay for benefits in the future” (OPSR: Select Mod-ernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector 2003:3, item 9).

Collectively, these reforms address key ele-ments of the HRM system. However, the frame-work or foundation required to support these reform efforts have yet to be addressed. Such framework involves a coherent and clearly ar-ticulated HR strategy that specifies related goals and objectives, to which all stakeholders should commit, and an integrated HRM system that will facilitate interconnections between the HR sub-systems and will ultimately contribute to great-er efficiency of the CSS in Barbados. In other words, it is critical to create an HRM system that should not only integrate all the key elements of each subsystem, but have coherence among its subsystems as well.

Finally, with regard to the organization of this report, it should be pointed out that this chapter builds upon the author’s 2004 report to the Inter-American Development Bank entitled “Short Form for Institutional Assessment of Civ-il Service Systems: Case of Barbados,” which basically offered an overview of the CSS in the country. The present paper incorporates other sections relating to the country’s institutional context, its background and legal framework. In addition, the analysis of each of the seven HRM subsystems has been further enlarged to focus more sharply on each of the ninety-three critical points for assessing CSS. In general, this revised work conforms to the original methodological framework provided by Longo, F. (2002). To this end, interviews were conducted in June and July 2007 with appropriate persons having the in-stitutional memory of the CSS in 2004. Other elements of the original report were retained, namely the “indices for the evaluation of the CSS”, the internal and external environments, the critical points valuation, the summary table of preceding sections, and the conclusions of the diagnosis.

II. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The CSS of Barbados operates within a demo-cratic ethos that reflects politico-administrative and socio-economic stability. A constitutional monarchy, Barbados has a parliamentary form of government, and a plurality of political par-ties, namely: the Democratic Labour Party, the Barbados Labour Party and the National Demo-cratic Party. Arguably, the Westminster-White-hall politico-administrative system is most closely approximated in Barbados given the ideological similarities of the two most long-standing politi-cal parties and the existence of the House of As-sembly, an inherited institution.

It is also argued that centralized decision-making, another vestige of the colonial past, also influences the decision-making process within the CSS. Bissessar, A. (2002) asserted that the frag-mentation and centralization of HRM, which are reflected in the duplication of responsibili-ties, delays in decision-making, lack of account-ability, absence of planning and budgeting for human resources, were among major deficien-cies that policy-makers and reformers identified in the public sector in the 1960s-1980s period. These deficits have been receiving sustained at-tention, as available resources so permit.

As far as the country’s economic development is concerned, according to the Central Bank of Barbados, the “country has the demographic profile of a developed country” (Central Bank of Barbados: www.centralbank.org.bb/country.info_shtml; October 23, 2004). Furthermore, this view is shared by the World Bank. Indeed, economic stability is reflected not only in its per capita income, US$ 7,500, but in the quality of life in terms of its equitable distribution of in-come, owing to a “well-developed national secu-rity safety net for the disadvantaged and a virtual absence of social and political unrest,” among other factors (Barbados Vital Statistics, Central Bank of Barbados, 10/23/2004, page 1).

Overall, the institutional context reveals so-cio-economic and political stability. The CSS is characterized by both positive developments as



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well as by deficits. Strides, as positive outcomes of reform, in particular improvements to the CSS, are anticipated.

Background

The staff complement of the public sector is distributed among a range of ministries, depart-ments, statutory bodies and public enterprises. Overall, the civil service employs 21,000 persons.

A number of agencies are responsible for human resource management. The main ac-tors are the Ministry of the Civil Service (MCS) and The Service Commission (Public Service or PSC). The Personnel Administration Division, headed by the Chief Personnel Officer, provides administrative support for the PSC. The PSC has a constitutional mandate for employment management, while the MSC has a policy-mak-ing role with regard to the CSS. Primary actors within the MCS are the Office of Public Service Reform, which gives direction to reform efforts, and the Training Division.

Successive governments, fully aware of the critical importance of the CSS, have introduced related reforms over time. The impulses driving reforms during the 1960s-80s reportedly focused on the HR planning direction, related funding, and the organization of the HRM system, bear-ing in mind the need to reduce fragmentation, centralization, reactive decision-making, “over-emphasis on procedures and regulations” and improve productivity. Progress in the successful implementation of these reforms was arguably slow, largely because of resource constraints and resistance to change. These constraints appar-ently affected the pace of changes scheduled to be introduced to the CSS during those decades. In tandem with these reform efforts, there was reportedly a sharper focus on issues related to economic growth.

During the 1990s, reforms to the HR Plan-ning subsystem were given due support with the introduction of the Personnel Module of Smart-Stream Human Resources in July 1999. The HR Planning subsystem is now being formalized,

with the development of an HRM information system (HRMIS) that is in its “final stages of im-plementation” (Office of Public Sector Reform: Select Modernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector, item 1, updated August 2003).

Today, under the aegis of the MCS, the OPSR seeks to address elements of other HRM subsystems and modernize the legal framework.

Legal Framework

The CSS currently operates within the legal framework of the Constitution of Barbados, (1966); the Service Commissions (Public Ser-vice) Regulations (1978), the General Orders for the Public Service of Barbados (1970), The Civil Establishment Act and Orders, The Pen-sion Act (that governs the payment of pensions), and the Training Act. The General Orders for the Public Service of Barbados (1970) have an impact on the CSS; although they “have no legal force”, they address wide-ranging issues related to the conditions of service and help “to govern behavior”—in other words, informally speaking, they “constitute a manual”. “The General Or-ders, which were revised in 1997, are a code of conduct or a set of administrative procedures for public servants in Barbados” (Testimonials).

The Constitution provides for the setting up of the Service Commissions as well as for other Commissions, namely: the Judicial, Legal and Police Services Commissions. The Service Commissions (Public Service) Regulations issued in 1978 establish the Commissions’ functions, which involve the following: appointments and promotions, probationary service, termination of appointments, retirement and discipline. The Chairman, Deputy Chairman and members of the Service Commission (Public Service) are appointed by the Governor General on the rec-ommendation of the Prime Minister after con-sultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman generally hold office for not less than three years and no more than five years. Members of Parliament may not hold office on the Commission.


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The Civil Establishment Act provides for the establishment of offices in the Public Service and for the recruitment and remuneration of public officers. This is carried out through the Civil Es-tablishment Orders. In turn, “the Training Act provides for the establishment of the Training Fund as well as a Training Loan Fund used to make loans to public officers and public em-ployees” to facilitate their attendance at training courses “approved by the Minister.” (Bissessar, A. 2002: 18–19, partially paraphrased).

The legal framework for the CSS is being modernized. The leadership of the civil service and the unions representing civil servants have collaborated in keeping with the spirit of the So-cial Partnership to develop broad guidelines for a new Public Service Act that should address all the core elements of the Employment Management subsystem to ensure merit-based and transpar-ent approaches, as well as select elements of the Work Organization and Human and Social Re-lations subsystems. Specifically, the Act responds to the need to address the succession planning void and the safety of civil servants’ work envi-ronment.

The General Orders for the Public Service of Barbados (1970) will become an integral part of the Act. Additionally, a Code of Conduct and a Code of Discipline to complement the legal framework will appear as schedules to the Act (Testimonial).

III. ANALYSIS OF hRM SUBSYSTEMS

Longo’s (2002) methodological framework estab-lishes ninety-three critical points as the basis for the institutional assessment of the CSS. In ana-lyzing each of the seven HRM subsystems that constitute the CSS, the related critical points are specified. In keeping with Longo’s framework, the analysis emphasizes the “existence and in-tegrity of each of the HRM areas and processes, and the fulfillment of their basic purposes; the major connections with the other HRM subsys-tems, and the way each subsystem behaves in

relation to the critical points, which enable the analyst to prove its effectiveness and quality” (Longo, F. 2002:43).

human Resources Planning

HR planning “is the subsystem that contributes to ensuring the strategic coherence in all HRM policies and practices by linking them with orga-nizational priorities. Therefore, it may be con-sidered the ‘front door’ in any integrated HRM system” (ibid. 17).

Existence and Integrity of the System (Critical point 1)There is a vision of “a strategic approach to HR planning and the introduction of a computer-ized human resource management information system” (CARICAD 2001:12). Pending the ser-vice-wide formalization of the human resource management information system (HRMIS) to facilitate meaningful HR planning, so far deci-sion-making within this subsystem is generally reactive. Efforts to modernize the Government’s HRM systems and to improve the financial sys-tems were undertaken. “The first modules of the SmartStream Financials went live in April, 1998” while the personnel module started the following year. While the HRMIS system was centralized at the Ministry of the Civil Service, the Personnel Administration Division, the Treasury Depart-ment and the Data Processing Department, it is being rolled out to all governmental departments and ministries, thus allowing wider access to in-formation (Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Reform, July to September 2000, Vol. 4, No. 3, page 1, partially paraphrased).

Strategic Coherence (2–3)OPSR has been providing “government agen-cies with a management tool, i.e. strategic plan-ning, to assist them in producing fundamental decisions about their future” (ibid.), but this tool has not yet been institutionalized in all of the eighteen government ministries. Coherence between HR planning in the central Personnel



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Administration Division responsible for employ-ment management and strategic planning at line agency level is likely to become evident when an accurate and timely HRMIS is fully imple-mented. In the absence of HRMIS, there are challenges posed to the availability optimization. Strategic coherence between this subsystem and the other six subsystems is thus constrained.

Basic Information (4)The formalization of HRMIS is in progress. Ad-equate knowledge of qualitative and quantitative HRM requirements for today and the foreseeable future is contingent upon the institutionalization of the system in ministries and departments with responsibility for personnel matters.

Effectiveness (5–9)The usual practice is that agencies submit their requirements for posts to the MCS. These re-quirements are satisfied depending largely on the availability of resources. The effectiveness of employment management is limited in the ab-sence of adequate knowledge of qualitative and quantitative HR requirements.

The significance of HR planning is recog-nized by the MCS. It is expected that the “in-troduction of the SmartStream solution will provide management information to enable the MCS to better carry out workforce planning by enabling staff to run analyses on areas such as positions and employee skills. The Ministry will also be better equipped to do succession plan-ning, compensation management, including ‘what if ’ scenarios and the task associated with employee and labor unions relations (Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Reform, July to September 2000, Vol. 4, No. 3, page 4).

Administration (10–11)While the production model exists at the central level, the process of formalization is incomplete in the line agencies, thus precluding managers from participating in the implementation of ac-curate and timely HR forecasts.

Work Organization

Ideally, this subsystem reveals the “HRM po-lices and practices that define the characteristics of and conditions for performing the tasks con-cerned” (Longo 2002:20), as well as the compe-tencies, basic skills and attitudes necessary for the successful performance of tasks.

Existence and Integrity of the Subsystem (12)The job evaluation exercise in progress since 2000 has the potential for using the job analy-sis element as a basis for developing job descrip-tions (Fitt, R. in Challenge to Change, October to December 2000, pages 1 and 4). This exercise was “completed in 2003” (Testimonial). The cur-rent practice is that ministries and departments prepare job descriptions that include functions, responsibilities and qualification requirements.

This subsystem has an interconnection with the Employment Management subsystem, thus enhancing functional capacity. There is, howev-er, a concern regarding the adequacy of the line agencies’ capacities to prepare job descriptions, reflecting an apparent deficit and the need for a core of trained job analysts within the CSS in Barbados. Nevertheless, staff members in both the central and line agencies have apparently developed the skills of job description writing over time, even without the benefit of formal-ized training.

Technical Quality and Flexibility of Job Design (13–17)“Ministries and departments are responsible for the development of their job descriptions. Job de-scription was an important instrument in the re-cent job evaluation exercise, reflecting in general formal educational qualifications, professional requirements, tasks as well as skills” (Testimo-nial). Job design comprises the job title, its activi-ties, functions, responsibilities and the academic qualifications required. These instruments tend to be broadly framed, showing limitations in terms of rationality, flexibility and accuracy.


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These gaps are recognized; therefore, reform efforts emphasize the need to improve the com-petencies for developing job design. In tandem with the job evaluation exercise, steps are being taken to institutionalize training in writing job descriptions among ministries and departments’ staff members.

Quality of Profiles Definition (18–21)Job descriptions do not include skills or compe-tencies profiles. Given the practice of producing job descriptions that are too broadly framed, this is an area that requires strengthening.

Administration (22–23)This subsystem would benefit from creating a team of job analysts that regularly reviews the job descriptions resulting from job evaluations and classifications. The vision of the OPSR is to conduct “more job analyses to generate specific information on numbers of jobs available, job descriptions and training specification” (CARI-CAD 2001:12).


This subsystem focuses on the policies, prac-tices and procedures relating to an individual’s recruitment, selection, induction, mobility, and separation from an organization. Ideally, the philosophy that underpins these activities should be based on such values as transparency, equity and merit.

Equal Opportunity and Merit (24–27)Established criteria are used in making recruit-ment decisions. In line with this, the procedure in the central civil service reflects both equity and merit. Employment is open by law, and positions are generally filled according to such established technical and professional criteria. Depending on the job level and category, either a sub-com-mittee of the PSC or the Personnel Administra-tion Division makes up the recruitment panel. As it can be noted, this subsystem is centrally man-aged, since its key actors are the PSC, having the

constitutional mandate to approve employment decisions, and the Personnel Administration Division, acting as the Secretariat to the Com-mission. The purpose of the PSC is to prevent arbitrariness in the recruitment process. The Commission interviews candidates to ensure that they satisfy stipulated requirements.

Ethnicity, culture and gender are not factors that are generally considered for purposes of re-cruitment.

There are no designated political posts. The eighteen Permanent Secretaries “are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Public Service Commission after consultation with the Prime Minister. It is apparently a com-mon belief that consultation means approval” (Testimonial).

Yet, while employment decisions within the civil service are not generally challenged, docu-mentation suggests that related decisions taken with respect to public corporations are some-times politicized.

Despite the evident focus on merit, in excep-tional cases there are contested views concerning the quality of recruits into the public sector in general and the need to make the recruitment process more inclusive. There is the view that “given the current concerns about attitudes and the level of service delivery within the public ser-vice, more attention ought to be paid to the qual-ity of the employees recruited into and retained by the public sector. One participant in the Im-pact Study of the OPSR called for greater in-volvement from department heads or permanent secretaries in the recruitment and selection pro-cess” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003: 53, section 12.3).

Recruitment and Selection Quality (28–32)As already explained, depending on the job level and category, either a subcommittee of the PSC or the Personnel Administration Division con-stitutes the recruitment panel. The recruitment panels are manned by “high quality personnel” who generally act independently (Testimonial).



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Jobs are not widely advertised in all cases, as candidates are sometimes sourced internally—in other words, within the civil service or the min-istry or department concerned. Ministries and Departments submit requests for staff to the Per-sonnel Administration Division, which identifies suitable candidates that meet the division’s man-date. Usually, clerical, administrative and secre-tarial positions are filled internally with relative ease. Technical jobs, to the contrary, are gener-ally widely advertised, as it is sometimes more difficult to fill such positions. Reportedly, there are deficits in some occupational categories, such as lawyers, engineers, land surveyors and infor-mation technology experts (Testimonial).

Permanent secretaries have the power, under a Delegation of Functions Order, to hire people to fill temporary positions. In particular, “Gener-al Order 1970:2.5 reads as follows: “the approval of the Minister responsible for establishments is required for the creation of temporary posts.” While the number of individuals in temporary positions was not established, it is argued by an-other source that “the number of ‘temporary’ persons hired has increased over time as well as the duration of temporary assignments; in other words, individuals may hold temporary posts in-definitely” (Testimonial).

Induction Quality (33–34)Induction training is not formalized, although “there is an effort to expose newly recruited of-ficers to training early in their careers” (Testi-monial). With this in mind, there is an apparent need to strengthen orientation activities.

Mobility (35)Decisions concerning mobility are generally made centrally, based on recommendations from line agencies. These recommendations are not always accepted as the Personnel Administration Division may deem other candidates more suit-able, even if they are from outside of the public sector. There is a perception in exceptional cases that political pressure may influence such deci-sions (Testimonial).

Absenteeism and Discipline (36–37)These aspects of the Employment Management subsystem require strengthening. There is no evidence that absentee indices are maintained. “Personnel Officers monitor attendance” (Tes-timonial) to ensure that employees’ leave rights are observed and in turn that absences do not exceed prescribed limits.

The disciplinary procedure, apparently problematic, leads to calls for reform. “The dis-ciplinary procedure must also be addressed. Civil servants from all levels are frustrated with the fact that non-productive workers seemingly cannot be disciplined. Reference was made to the practice of transferring poorly performing employees and the influence which politicians wield in the pro-cess” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003:53, section 12.2). Apparently permanent secretaries have “limited powers as they relate to disciplining civil servants” (ibid., partially para-phrased). There are delays in enforcing discipline effectively and quickly. To obviate these delays and improve the effectiveness of the disciplinary process, a Code of Conduct and a Code of Disci-pline will be incorporated in the proposed Public Service Act. It is expected that the new Act “will be enacted before the end of this financial year, i.e. March 31, 2005” (Testimonial).

The Code of Conduct is expansive and will “cover areas such as punctuality, absence from duty, employment activities, gifts and bribes, handling of records, information and docu-ments, engagement in political activity, strikes, criminal conviction, sexual harassment, the use of information technology and the Internet, and adherence to legislation” (Brief on Policy Frame-work for Public Service Act 2002-01-10, OPSR, in Bissessar, A. 2002).

Separation (38–41)Separations are generally influenced by policy shifts rather than by changes in the administra-tion. Employees are not arbitrarily dismissed in the event that the government changes.

“Policy changes may, however, cause depar-tures as occurred when the Queen Elizabeth


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Hospital ceased to be a part of the Civil Service and was instead managed by a Board, resulting in some nurses opting to resign” (Testimonial).

Overall, while there are certain positive as-pects of the Employment Management subsys-tem, other aspects require strengthening.


Ideally, elements of this subsystem should in-clude stipulated performance guidelines framed within organizational goals and against which performance is measured, and a performance appraisal instrument that basically serves as a developmental tool for providing performance-related feedback to employees and for charting avenues for employees’ development.

Performance Planning and Follow-up (42–45)Performance standards and objectives have been established and communicated to employees in five pilot agencies.

Although not yet formalized throughout the entire civil service, this subsystem is devel-oping positively with the introduction of the Performance Review and Development System (PRDS) in pilot agencies. The PRDS Unit in the Personnel Administration Division plays a cru-cial role, since its stated purpose is “to assess per-formance in the workplace in relation to agreed performance standards” (Office of Public Sec-tor Reform: Select Modernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector, updated August 2003:3, item 10). “A prerequisite for participation in the PRDS is the requirement to have a strategic plan for the organization in place. Hence, the five ministries that are part of the pilot testing have strategic plans” (Testimonial).

Performance Evaluation (46–48)The PRDS has reportedly been effective. “There is now general acceptance of the new system as it is perceived to be less subjective than the old sys-tem and there is greater transparency” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group, 2003: 32–33).

Administration (49)Managers are being trained to use the system. However, as training is not a fait accompli, this presents a challenge to providing an accurate as-sessment of the management dimension.

The PRDS Unit has developed a cadre of trainers who will facilitate the training of man-agers and supervisors and other civil service staff in the use of the system. Training in counseling skills is ongoing.

The sustained development of this subsystem, leading to the institutionalization of the PDRS throughout the central civil service, will enhance the functional capacity of the CSS and the linkag-es between professional development management and compensation. Evidence of commitment to managing the system will also be critical.


This HRM subsystem seeks to strike a balance between an employee’s contribution in terms of “their contribution to achieving the organi-zation’s objectives” (Longo, F. 2002) and the rewards he or she receives. The monetary and non-monetary benefits that employees receive from an organization ideally compensate them equitably vis-à-vis others performing similar tasks within and outside the organization.

Compensation Strategy, Internal and External Equity (50–57)Wage decisions in the CSS do not reflect abu-sive practices and are based on established wage plans. The relevant ‘indicator’ suggests that wage costs for the public sector are a relative burden to the economy. The estimated wages bill for 2004/05 for statutory boards that depend on Government for funding and which have a total staff complement of approximately 7,000, is US$131,460,500. Estimated wages for central Government that has approximately 21,000 em-ployees is US$329,400,000. Wages in the civil service are tightly compressed within the com-pensation structure, as shown by the vertical wage indicator 1:5.5.



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As far as external equity is concerned, civil service salaries are apparently not considered competitive, thus suggesting some dissatisfac-tion with salaries and an inability of the public service to attract and retain skilled employees in certain fields. As already stated, there are deficits in some occupational categories.

In addition to salaries, employees receive su-perannuation and a range of allowances, many of which are linked to specific occupational cat-egories.

Effectiveness of Compensation Policies and Wages Administration (58)Incentive awards are not the norm, but their introduction is being analyzed as part of the PDRS. Other related initiatives at the agency level have been launched, such as the awards ceremonies to recognize employees’ achieve-ments, as in the case of the Barbados Statistical Service Employee of the Year Award (Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Re-form, October to December 2003:12). Other agencies grant awards in recognition of exem-plary conduct, performance and cooperation—including the Most Cooperative Employee for the Year Award granted by the Training Divi-sion of the MCS (Challenge to Change, the News-letter for Public Sector Reform, April to June 2000:4).

The pension reform, currently in the pub-lic education and consultation phase, is being spearheaded by the National Insurance Depart-ment and is “expected to result in maintaining sufficient funds to pay for benefits in the future” (OPSR: Select Modernization Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector 2003:3, item 9). It was not established whether the current pension scheme is considered adequate, although a minority so agreed.

Wages Administration (59–61)There is an element of transparency in the pay regime, as salaries are generally based on negotiations between the Government (MCS) and the unions, namely: the Barbados Work-

ers Union and the National Union of Public Workers.

It is argued that while the MCS through the Establishment Order creates permanent posts, the creation of temporary posts under General Orders 2.5, “particularly for indefinite periods, has the propensity to create anomalies” (Testi-monial).

Other Benefits (62–64)In “addition to salary and superannuation ben-efits, some employees receive travel, entertain-ment and telephone allowances” (Testimonial, partially paraphrased). There are also allowances that are unique to police, prison and nursing of-ficers—the flexibility responsibility allowance “is aimed at compensating police, prison and nurs-ing officers for the extra hours they are required to work” (OPSR 2003: 8, item 34).

Non-monetary benefits are mainly in the form of awards for exemplary service and rec-ognition of attendance. These awards are not institutionalized throughout the service.

The completed job evaluation exercise “to re-assess the relative values of jobs in the public service” (OPSR 2003:3, item 10) offers an op-portunity to link role classification with payment and to enhance the integrity of this subsystem. In addition, the integrating capacity of the CSS as well as the interconnections between this subsystem and the Work Organization, Profes-sional Development Management, and Perfor-mance Management subsystems are likely to be strengthened.


This subsystem focuses on the organization’s efforts to promote staff development and learning. These efforts are framed within de-fined “career paths that match the organiza-tion’s needs with the individual profile” (Longo 2002:34). The effectiveness of this subsystem is dependent on the extent to which appropri-ate career, promotion and training policies are adopted.


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Effectiveness of Promotion Policies and Career Design Quality (65–70)“Qualification constitutes the main promotion criterion; in other words, this criterion is heav-ily weighed. Other considerations may include performance, experience and seniority (Testimo-nial).

There is a current career/succession plan-ning void that has to be addressed as the vision of the OPSR in Barbados entails a “strategic approach to HR planning including succession planning” (Archer, M. in CARICAD 2001:12). This void limits the interconnections between this subsystem, and the Employment Manage-ment, Professional Development Management and Performance Management subsystems, and it ultimately undermines the integrating capacity of the CSS.

While there are no formal barriers to limit an individual’s mobility, in practice individuals only seldom move from one occupational cat-egory to the next. The notion of a technical staff member, such as an engineer or a chief technical director, moving into the administrative cadre to become, for example, a permanent secretary would be an exception (Testimonial).

Individual and Collective Learning Management (71–76)There are positive developments taking place in this subsystem. However, some aspects of this subsystem require strengthening. “A recently de-veloped training policy is expected to come on stream in five months (i.e. early 2005)” (Testimo-nial).

Under the Training Act, a Training Budget was created so that a wide range of training and development opportunities can now be offered to employees. But these training and development efforts are undertaken outside the framework of formalized training needs assessments.

“At present, Ministries and Departments in-form the relevant division of their training needs and the courses they wish to undertake. So, at the end of the day, the only information the divi-sion has to base its decisions upon is the number

of people who want to do a training course and when. Bearing in mind that the department op-erates under tight human and financial resources, this system of allocating training is not cost and time effective” (Challenge to Change, April to June 2001:14). “This sometimes creates a situation where individuals who attend courses are not necessarily members of the target population for the courses in question” (Testimonial). For train-ing activities to be adequate in complementing an individual’s initial skills and qualifications, it is necessary to strengthen mechanisms for accu-rately identifying the persons to be trained.

There is the perception that “training is like-ly to improve the capacity of the organization to solve problems, but this is constrained to the extent that trained individuals have the opportu-nity to apply learning appropriately.” The desire to harmonize organizational objectives and in-dividual development needs is evidenced in the gap between learning and application. This gap is exacerbated by the fact that even though the “importance of impact assessment is apparently recognized, the costs and benefits of training are not evaluated” (Testimonials).

human and Social Relations Management

This subsystem examines how relations between the organization and all its employees are man-aged. The capacity of the organization to deal with all the dimensions of the subsystem, i.e. work climate, labor relations and social policies, is critical.

Work Climate (77–78)This subsystem reflects conflicting trends. While there are no structured instruments to specifi-cally measure the organizational climate, there are positive developments intended to maintain open and effective communication channels and improve employee satisfaction. These undertak-ings include innovations such as the Internal Reform Committees (IRCs), an Employee As-sistance Program (EAP) that could provide some feedback regarding the organizational climate,



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and a Customer Charter Program to engage ex-ternal stakeholders.

The EAP “has developed quickly as a result of wide interest in the issues that it addresses” (The Public Sector Reform: Program Plan 2003–2004, 2003:6). It has been expanded to include all the services offered under an EAP according to the standards and practices of the Employee Assistance Professionals Association (EAPA). Its activities comprise contracting the services of an EAP vendor; individual and group counsel-ing for public employees and their immediate family; employee outreach and self-development through the provision of workshops on stress management, personal empowerment and mo-tivation, conflict resolution and anger manage-ment, team-building and improving workplace morale, change management, managing work-place violence, personal finance; critical incident stress debriefing and management on an ad hoc basis following any trauma or crises in depart-ments and for emergency and fire service person-nel; departmental interventions at the request of heads of departments in situations where work-place violence or a breakdown in interpersonal relationships results in a crisis. Naturally, staff satisfaction is limited to the extent that the ser-vices offered have not been used as extensively as originally thought.

Another positive development is the Cus-tomer Charter Program that aims to improve public services and is “ongoing in the Registra-tion Department, Licensing Authority, Land Tax Department and the Airport, and is already completed in the Immigration and Land Tax Department” (OPSR Program Plan 2003–2004, 2003:7).

Communication Effectiveness (79–81)Apparently, the internal dynamics for reform has not yet been fully developed in all the agencies throughout the civil service. This is exacerbat-ed by ambivalence and feelings of frustrations. This may be due to the apparent ambivalence of some individuals to “embrace change,” since they prefer the accustomed ways of doing things

and view the external change drive as embed-ded in the top-down communication process. It is proposed that “the current communications platform being used to disseminate information on public sector reform should also be reviewed and a communications audit considered to iden-tify possible barriers to effective communica-tion” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003:55).

Labor Relations Balance and Quality (82–85)In general terms, Protocol Four of the Social Partnership (2001–2004) embodies the signatory partners’ commitment to “industrial harmony by the application of the very concept of volun-tarism and through the observance of the prin-ciples of tripartism as established by the Labour Organization.” Labor conflict is not excessive nor are labor relations adversarial; in fact, there are mechanisms in place to resolve conflict.

Rights disputes are usually resolved to the satisfaction of the parties involved and labor re-lations ethos evidences a certain degree of trust; however, this does not preclude confrontational behavior from emerging from time to time. In short, positive developments in this subsystem are counterbalanced by dysfunctions.

Labor Conflict Management (86–87)Conflicts over policy change, safety and health issues, and allegations regarding employees be-ing ‘superseded’ have resulted in long-standing disputes. One example is the policy decision to remove the Queen Elizabeth Hospital from the civil service and make it a Board, a situation that raised the issue of the status of nurses. Some nurses wanted to retain their status as civil ser-vants, others migrated, while still others decided to await a new placement because they opted not to work with the Board. This dispute is still un-resolved.

Complaints by superseded civil servants have resulted in ongoing conflicts regarding promo-tions. A case in point is the appointment of an individual who was not a civil servant to the post


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of Chief Community Development Officer, af-ter which the union called a strike.

A long-standing dispute over a health and safety issue is the case of the Louis Lynch Second-ary School that was located in close proximity to a laundry allegedly exposing children to carcino-gens. Therefore, there is room for improvement in terms of health and safety practices.

Existing working conditions of some civil ser-vants are “decrepit” (Earle and Phillips Consult-ing Group 2003:27) and influence performance negatively, causing high “levels of frustration” (ibid. 2003:34). Consultants assert that civil ser-vants work in undesirable conditions, “yet they are expected to produce. Emphasis is placed on the external as opposed to the internal customer and the public gets better treatment than some staff ” (Testimonial).

Social Policies Management (88–89)It was not firmly established what the general perception was of the adequacy of the social care and benefits for civil servants as compared to the same practices in the private sector. A mi-nority view, however, purports that pension and leave benefits are adequate; moreover, pension-ers receive their expected benefits timely. Leaves of absence for education and profession-al development purposes are generous for civil servants, who are granted a maximum of three years. Employees enjoy vacation, maternity, sick and departmental leaves.

The Organization of the hR Function

The description of the HRM subsystems pre-sented above is complemented in this section with the analysis of the mechanisms used for the management of the system, particularly the dis-tribution of personnel decisions among the dif-ferent responsible parties (Longo F. 2002). This dimension addresses the extent to which HRM responsibilities are fragmented or unified as well as the degree of centralization or decentraliza-tion of the decision-making process concerning personnel-related issues.

Autonomy and Capacity of Supervisors (90–92)In 1970, the Ministry of Civil Service was em-powered to make temporary appointments through the General Orders. The rationale was that in the event that a vacancy arose for rea-sons of retirement, leave of absence for training or other purpose, permanent secretaries could expeditiously ‘fill’ such positions. However, the line agencies’ power was restricted to hiring new personnel, while dismissals, transfers and terminations were excluded. Decisions regard-ing wages and salaries, however, were not del-egated.

Managers have some decision-making re-sponsibilities over the Work Organization and Professional Development Management sub-systems. With no previous specific training, line managers are responsible for preparing job de-scriptions and for identifying training needs of the staff members under their supervision.

The managers’ capacity to perform ad-equately in the HRM arena is questioned. Ac-cording to some opinions, “in general, managers ‘across the board’ have not received training in HRM and are not sufficiently qualified to per-form HR functions.” There is also the related perception that “because of the dearth of HR training, a lot of related work converges at the top, but the ‘old guard’ are not trained in HRM and they take decisions on the basis of their gut feelings or because of pressure from the political directorate” (Testimonial).

Central HR Administration (93)As already explained, the central agencies re-sponsible for HRM are the MCS, commissioned with the task of formulating HRM policies, the Training Division, the PSC, which has the con-stitutional mandate for making employment management decisions, and the Personnel Ad-ministration Division, which acts as the Secre-tariat to the PSC.

“There is tension between the center and the line, particularly as this relates to recruitment decisions. The PSC has been bringing in perma-



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[+/–]


STRATEGY

WorkOrganization




Job descriptionProfiles definition

RecruitmentMobility

Separation

PlanningEvaluation

Planning [+/–]




[+] [+] [+]

[+/–]

[+/–]

Career and promotion Individual and collective

learning


payment

[+] Positive Thesubsystemisfullydevelopedoratamaturingstage

[+–] Intermediate Therearestillaspectstodevelop,butthetendencyispositive

[–] Negative Thesubsystemisveryweak

nent secretaries who are technical persons from outside. This causes conflict. The complaint is that these ‘outsiders’ do not know the culture of the civil service” (Testimonial).

Despite an inherent tension, central agencies are collectively seen as adding value.


The following chart shows a graphic representa-tion of the level of development of each of the subsystems previously analyzed.


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IV. INDICATORS

IV.1. Quantitative Indicators1

1.NumberofPoliticalAppointments

Totalnumberofpoliticalappointments 18 Source:MCSSeptember2004

TotalnumberofpositionsforthecentralGovernment 21,000 Source:MCSSeptember2004

Political appointments rate 0%

Therearenodesignatedpoliticalpostsinthecivilservice,indicatingthattheserviceisprofessionalandmerit-based.Thereare18PermanentSecretaries,whoareappointedbytheGovernorGeneralontheadviceofthePublicServiceCommissionafterconsulta-tionwiththePrimeMinister.‘Consultation’isunderstoodasapproval.

FiscalWeightofPublicEmployment2.CentralGovernmentWageBill/GrossDomesticProduct

Centralgovernmentwagebill(inmilliondollars) 329.4 EconomicReport,CentralBankReports,September2003, Barbados(658.8millionBarbadosdollarsx0,50)

GDP(inmilliondollars) 2,598 GDP(5,196millionBarbadosdollarsx0.50) Source:MCSOctober2004

Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product 13%

Thisisameasureoftheextenttowhichthecostofpublicemploymentisaburdenontheeconomy.Thewagebillexcludestraininggrantsandpensions.UsingtheWorldBankcomparatorof5–25%,thefiscalweightofpublicemploymentisarelativeburdenontheeconomy.

CivilServiceIncentives3.VerticalWageCompression

I.HighersalaryofciviliancentralGovernment(indollars) 50,961 MCS,PayscaleAugust2004.(101,922Barbadosdollarsx 0.50)

II.LowersalaryofciviliancentralGovernment(indollars) 9,244 MCS,PayscaleAugust2004.(18,488Barbadosdollarsx 0.50)

I/II. Vertical wage compression 5.5

CivilServiceIncentives4.AverageCentralGovernmentWage/PerCapitaGDP

I.Averagecentralgovernmentwage(indollars) Notavailable

II.PercapitaGDPbymonth(indollars) Notavailable

Average central government wage/Per capita GDP Not available

1 All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1Bds = 0.50 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Con-verter)



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5.AverageCentralGovernmentWage/AveragePrivateSectorWage


II.Averageprivatesectorwage Notavailable

Average central government wage/ Not available Average private sector wage

CivilServiceEmploymentFigures6.TotalNumberofCentralGovernmentEmployees/TotalPopulation

I.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 21,000 Source:MCSOctober2004

II.TotalPopulation 266,800 Source:EconomicReview,CentralBankofBarbados, September2003

Total number of central government employees/ 8%Total population

7.CentralGovernmentExpenditure(excludingpensionsanddebtservice)/TotalNumberofCentralGovernmentEmployees

I.Centralgovernmentexpenditure(inmilliondollars) 329.4 Source:MCSOctober2004(658.800millionBarbados dollarsx0.50)

II.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 21,000 Source:MCSOctober2004

I/II. Central government expenditure (excluding 15,805 pensions and debt service)/Total number of central government employees (in dollars)

Elaboration of Indices

The indices and sub-indices listed above were constructed on the basis of the analysis of 93 critical points that reflect key elements of HRM subsystems. Appendix A lists the valuation of such critical points and their corresponding number to which these values relate.

Efficiency [10.50]This index measures the degree of optimization of the investment in human resources identified in the CSS of Barbados, as well as its alignment with the fiscal policy scale and its reference mar-kets (Longo, F. 2002:77). This index, linked to thirteen critical points, is the basis for evaluat-ing the existing HR Planning subsystem, the cost of public employment relative to the state of the

economy, the adequacy of pensions and social care benefits, the current efforts to assess the costs and benefits of training, and the benefits of non-monetary incentives.

A HRMIS is in its final stages of implemen-tation. This development is likely to obviate the current reactive approach to HR planning. The cost of public employment is a relative burden on the economy. Relevant aspects of the Profession-al Development Management and the Human and Social Relations Management subsystems require strengthening.

Merit [14.15]This index assesses the extent to which employ-ment and wage decisions conform to profession-al criteria. The conclusion is that these decisions are not generally influenced by nepotistic prac-


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II.2 Indices for the Evaluation of the Civil Service System

TableofIndices Sub-index Index value Scale value Scale Index (scale: 0–20) Percentage Sub-Index (scale: 0–10) Percentage

(E) Efficiency 10.50 53%

(M) Merit 14.15 71%

(SC) Structural Consistency 11.27 56%

(STC) Strategic 4.43 44% Coherence

(DC) Directive 5.71 57% Consistency

(CP) Consistency 5.25 53% of Processes

(FC) Functional 10.75 54% Capacity

(COM) Competency 5.50 55%

(IE) Incentive Effectiveness 5.15 52%

(FL) Flexibility 5.00 50%

(CI) Integrating Capacity 10.12 51%

tices in the CSS in Barbados. The index is linked to 10 critical points.

Structural Consistency [10.75]This index measures the core building blocks in the HRM system, namely: the HR Planning, Work Organization and Performance Manage-ment subsystems. The index is interconnected to 3 sub-indices, Strategic Coherence, Directive Consistency, and Consistency of Processes that are collectively associated to 29 critical points.

Strategic coherence [4.43] measures the in-terconnection between the Government of Barbados’ strategic priorities and HRM poli-cies and practices. Directive consistency [5.71] measures the level of development of the directive func-

•

•

tion in the CSS in Barbados, specifically the alignment between the “central techno-structure and line managements” (Longo, F. 2002:78). This sub-index is related to 8 criti-cal points. Consistency of processes [5.25] measures the extent to which the processes that un-derpin an integrated HRM system are in place in the CSS in Barbados. The informa-tion system that supports HR planning is in its implementation stage. PRDS has been implemented in five pilot agencies and the Work Organization subsystem is being ad-dressed.

Functional Capacity [10.75] This index evaluates the extent to which the CSS in Barbados encourages behaviors that promote

•



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improvement in public services. This index is linked to three sub-indices, namely, Competency, Incentive Effectiveness, and Flexibility that are collectively related to 41 critical points.

Competency [5.50] values the extent to which HRM policies and practices facilitate an adequate supply of skilled personnel. This sub-index is linked to 15 critical points. Incentive effectiveness [5.15], associated with 14 critical points, measures the extent to which existing policies and practices pro-mote productivity, learning and improved service quality. The Flexibility index [ 5] measures the ca-pacity of existing policies and practices to adjust to changes in policy priorities.

Integrating Capacity [10.12]This index rates the extent to which the CSS in Barbados can align different stakeholders’ ex-pectations and interests in an effort to empower them and reduce conflicts.

V. CONCLUSIONS


The absence of an explicit, coherent and politi-cally supported organizational strategy for HR influences the efficiency of the CSS. The Gov-ernment of Barbados has implemented a public sector reform program that incorporates a vi-sion of a strategic approach to HR planning, a computerized HRMIS, policy initiatives includ-ing the development of a HRM policy, a train-ing policy and the modernization of the legal framework of the CSS that will ultimately lead to the enactment of a new Public Service Act, a Code of Conduct and a Code of Discipline. The implementation of these strategic activities will undoubtedly have a positive impact on the efficiency of the CSS.

All these positive developments taking place within the CSS in Barbados reflect the formal-

•

•

•

ization and strengthening of the HR Planning, Work Organization, Performance Management, and the Human and Social Relations subsys-tems within the context of an appropriate legal framework. Apparently the reform has some support from internal and external stakeholders, though there is still some inertia and resistance to change.

The formalization of the HR Planning sub-system depends on the implementation of an accurate and timely HRMIS. The current con-straints placed upon the optimization of HR planning availability are likely to be overcome once the information system, undoubtedly a core building block for the planning subsystem, is in place. The interconnections between this subsystem and Employment Management will also be strengthened with the introduction of HRMIS. The career/succession planning void in the Professional Development subsystem also undermines the integrating capacity of the CSS, specifically the linkages between Planning, Em-ployment Management and Professional Devel-opment Management.

In the wake of a job evaluation exercise, the Work Organization subsystem is being strength-ened, while the functional capacity of the CSS will be enhanced with the development and reg-ular review of job descriptions that incorporate competencies profiles. In order to sustain this thrust, a core of trained job analysts is required.

The formalization of the Performance Man-agement subsystem is ongoing in pilot ministries. This is a positive development with implications for the structural consistency of the CSS. The Human and Social Relations subsystem argu-ably reflect conflicting trends as efforts to reach out and respond to employees’ needs and to fa-cilitate employee satisfaction are in juxtaposition to concerns regarding top-down approaches to communication.

Although there is no evidence of abusive practices in wage decisions, the existing compen-sation structure is characterized by tightly com-pressed salaries that may not always contribute to motivating or attracting personnel.


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While the CSS in Barbados evidences posi-tive developments, these efforts are not framed within a coherent HR strategy that articulates related priorities and objectives and an integrat-ed HRM system.

Internal and External Factors

The reforms being undertaken by the Govern-ment of Barbados to improve the efficiency of the CSS are influenced by the existing organiza-tional culture, in particular the apparent ‘discon-nection’ of some civil servants from the reform endeavor and their resistance to change. Re-form-oriented decisions taken by top managers are seen to be far removed from the staff at other levels in the civil service. “The attitudes of pub-lic servants and their unwillingness to buy in to the reform program is one of the major barriers which the program has encountered. This obser-vation was made by Government Ministers, Per-manent Secretaries and the workers themselves” (The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group 2003: 52). It is argued that generally civil servants do not see the benefits to be gained from reform and they feel no sense of ownership as their views were not solicited. This disconnection or lack of engagement is exacerbated by a culture of resis-tance to change that prevails in some agencies. Some people have resisted change because they are comfortable with the status quo and because they are afraid of possible increased workload or job loss” (ibid.: 26). The consulting group also asserts that public sector reform in Barbados has lost its momentum and requires political as well as administrative leadership to publicly af-firm their commitment and support for planned change (ibid., partially paraphrased).

Legal factors also influence the efficiency of the CSS in Barbados. The main limitation is that the legal framework is adjusting too slowly to ef-fective HRM, since it does not respond readily to changes in policy priorities. It is also recognized that the existing legal framework constrains the Employment Management subsystem, specifi-cally the disciplinary process, which is described

as “inefficient and ineffective,” resulting in “too many non-productive persons against whom no sanctions are imposed.”

There is also a lack of a comprehensive le-gal framework, as it addresses only some aspects of three of the seven subsystems, namely, the Employment Management, Professional Devel-opment Management and Compensation Man-agement subsystems.

Main Conclusions

The Government of Barbados has embarked on a reform agenda that incorporates improvements to the HR Planning, Work Organization, Profes-sional Development Management, Performance Management, and Human and Social Relations Management subsystems and ultimately improves the efficiency of the CSS. Internal and external stakeholders have agreed on an appropriate path for such reforms. Key elements of the reform in-clude the modernization of the legal framework for the CSS to address changes in HR policy pri-orities, the development of a HR policy as well as a training policy, the formalization of the HR Planning subsystem, the introduction of a com-puterized HRMIS, and a PRDS. While these reforms are of significance, they are not framed within an integrated HRM system.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

In keeping with contemporary human resource management practices, a broad strategy that de-lineates related priorities and objectives and has all stakeholders’ support constitutes a core build-ing block for the development of an integrated HRM system. While current reforms address key elements of HR subsystems, the framework required to support these reform efforts, namely a coherent HR strategy, has yet to be addressed.

With this limitation in mind, two recommen-dations are made: (a) articulate a coherent HR strategy that specifies goals and objectives and to which all stakeholders commit, and (b) put all key



88

elements in place in order to ensure the integrity of an integrated HRM system. As an example, a main objective of HR Planning is the optimiza-tion of its availability. Institutionalizing HRMIS is a priority to supply timely and accurate infor-mation to decision-makers with responsibility for HR planning. The first recommendation is framed against a background of change dialec-tics and status quo retention. Despite the current consensus among Government and unions, there are on-the-ground counter-currents of resistance to change as well as evident signs of inertia. The strategy that addresses the priorities and objec-tives of contemporary HR practice comprehen-sively will require political endorsement, as well as support from leadership in government agen-cies, trade unions and other stakeholders includ-ing civil servants themselves. Civil servants will probably engage if they are able to identify ben-efits to be derived from reform efforts. The need for sensitization of civil servants to the likely benefits of CSS reforms may be facilitated by us-ing change management teams that incorporate agency leadership and a cross-section of agency personnel.

Other recommendations are offered in an attempt to articulate the systems and structures to support the HRM priorities and objectives as well as reinforce the linkages between the HRM subsystems, namely: (a) develop an integrated HRM system that will facilitate the linkages be-tween the HRM subsystems and will ultimate-ly contribute to greater efficiency of the CSS in Barbados, and (b) fill the void in succession planning, since this limits the linkages between Professional Development Management and Performance Management subsystems and in turn undermines the integrating capacity of the CSS. HR Planning is a core building block of an integrated HRM system and is linked to other HR subsystems.

The HRMIS will prove critical to the desir-able linkages between subsystems within the CSS and specifically for efficiency, structural consis-tency and strategic coherence.

Another key element is to create a legal framework that supports the related structures and systems. Therefore, sustaining current efforts to modernize the legal framework is desirable.


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VII. SUMMARY OF ThE INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

Factors Evaluator’s Comments

Analysis of the Analysis of the Legal ThelegalframeworkincludestheConstitution(1966),TheServiceCommissionsInstitutional Context Framework (PublicServiceRegulations(1978),TheCivilEstablishmentActandOrders,the PensionsActandtheTrainingAct.TheenactmentofanewPublicServiceActis imminentinordertoaddressdeficitsintermsoftheadequacyandconsistencyof employmentmanagement,specificallyenforcementofdiscipline,humanandsocial relationsmanagementandworkorganizationpractice.TheexistingGeneralOrders forthePublicServiceofBarbados(1970)isbeingintegratedintothenewAct.

Functional Analysis Analysis of the Human Collectively,thePSC,MCS,PersonnelAdministrationDivisionandtheTraining of the Civil Service Resources Organization Divisionhaveoverallresponsibility,showingacentralizeddecision-makingprocessin Function theCSSinBarbados.Decision-makingonaspectsofemploymentmanagement,work organizationandprofessionaldevelopmentmanagementaremadeattheline agencylevel.Permanentsecretariesmaketemporaryappointments,whileline managersidentifytrainingneedsandwritejobdescriptions.

Analyzed Quantitative Thestaffcomplementofthecivilserviceis21,000.Centralgovernmentwagebill Indicators of the CSS accountsfor13%oftheGDP,i.e.itrepresentsarelativeburdenofpublic employmentontheeconomy. Thereisalsoevidenceoftightcompressioninthecompensationstructure. Averagewagedatainboththepublicandprivatesectorswerenotestablished, thusprecludingcomparability.

Analysis by Subsystems

Planning TheHRMISproductionmodelisestablishedintheMCSandthePersonnel Administra tionDepartment.Thissubsystem,whichisbeing‘rolledout’toMinistriesandDepart- ments,isintransitionduetolimitedaccesstoinformationforHRplanningpurposes.

Work Organization Jobevaluationwascompletedin2003.Jobdescriptionsincludeformaleducational qualifications/professionalrequirementsandfunctionsandresponsibilities.The exclusionofcompetenciesprofileslimitsrationality,flexibilityandaccuracy.The potentialofthissubsystemforprovidingjobsatisfactionwillbemorefullyrealized whenthevoidintrainedjobanalystsisfilled.

Employment Employmentmanagementdecisionsarebasedonprofessionalcriteriaandingeneral Management precludearbitrariness.Butthesemeasuresaresometimescontested. Expresseddifficultieshavebeenencounteredinenforcingdisciplinequicklyand effectivelyincasesofnon-performance.Thishassometimesledtofeelingsof frustrationandlowmoraleamongcivilservantswithgoodperformance. Mechanismsforreception(induction)andabsenteeismcontrolsareinadequate.

Performance TheformalizationofthePDRSinfivepilotagenciesisapositivedevelopment. Management Sustainingthisthrusttoincorporateotheragencieswillleadtothestrengtheningof theinterconnectionsbetweenthissubsystemandtheProfessionalDevelopment ManagementandCompensationsubsystems.

Compensation Wagedecisionsdonotrespondtonepotisticpractices.Thereprevailsinternalequity. Management Wagesaretightlycompressedandthewagebillisaburdenontheeconomy. Non-monetarybenefitsarelikelytobeinstitutionalized. Whiletheadequacyofthepensionregimewasnotestablished,effortsarebeing madetoprotectpensions/pensionsrightsandtoensuretheircontinuity.

Professional Horizontalcareersarenotthenorm.Promotionisbasedlargelyonqualifications. Development Experience,performanceandsenioritymayalsobetakenintoaccount.Training Management needsarticulatedbyindividualstakeprecedenceintheabsenceoforganizational trainingneedsanalyses. AtrainingpolicyforthecivilserviceofBarbadosisexpectedtocomeonstreamin January2005.Trainingneedsassessmentsareyettobeformalizedandinvestmentin trainingtobeevaluated.



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Human and Social ProtocolFouroftheSocialPartnership(2001–2004)providesamacroframeworkfor Relations Management thesustainedinteractionbetweenunionsandGovernment.Intheabsenceof structuredinstrumentsforassessingtheorganizationalclimate,initiativessuchas IRCsandEAPsshouldbeusedmoreextensively.Top-downcommunicationwithin theCSSisapparentlyanissuetobeaddressed.

Comparison with TheCSSinBarbadosisbasedonitsrecruitmentsystemandsystemmanagement other analyses models.Its‘recruitmentsystem’isframedontheBritishmodel,wherebythe professionalismandindependenceofpersonsinchargeofpersonnelselectionare emphasized.TheCSSalsoreflects‘integratedsystems’inwhichthe“publicemployer appearstobehighlycentralized”(Longo,F.2002:59).

(continued)


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APPENDICES

Appendix A Critical Points Valuation – Comparative Table:

See Appendices section.

Appendix B Summary – Comparative Table:


Appendix C. Report Technical Information

Report Dates Diagnosis Dates: November 2004

Consultant Dr. Hedy Isaacs

Acknowledgements

2004: The relevant information was gleaned re-motely from interviews as well as from documen-tation. The consultant wishes to thank Mrs. Avril Gollop, Head of the Civil Service in Barbados, who facilitated access to Mr. Roland Fitt, Per-manent Secretary, Ministry of the Civil Service, with whom interviews were conducted in August, September and October 2004, during which he supplied relevant documentation.

The consultant is also grateful to Mr. Selwyn Smith, a retired Permanent Secretary, for shar-ing documentation on the current Public Sector Reform Program in Barbados.

The assistance of Ms. Ingrid Carlson, from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Washington, D.C, was invaluable. She supplied me with a copy of the evaluation of the CSS Bar-bados, prepared by Bissessar, A. (2002) as well as a letter of introduction to the IADB Country Of-fice in Barbados.

2007: Mr. Ellesworth Young, a retired Perma-nent Secretary and a lecturer at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, Barba-dos, and Mr. Selwyn Smith, a retired Permanent

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Secretary and current Deputy Chairman of the Service Commission (Public Service) in Barba-dos, shared valuable details through telephone interviews. I greatly appreciate their assistance.

Mr. Alyson Forte, a Deputy Permanent Sec-retary (Actg.), Ministry of Labor and Civil Ser-vice helped clarify some issues related to the performance evaluation exercise as well as the legal framework for the CSS. I wish to thank him for his help.

Works Consulted

Documents

Caribbean Centre for Development Adminis-tration (CARICAD). Strategic Planning in Caribbean Public Services; “Report of the Working Group on Public Sector Reform: Building Capacity for Better Governance.” A project of CARIFORUM and the Euro-pean Development Fund, March 2001.

The Earle and Phillips Consulting Group. “Re-port on the Impact of Programmes of the Office of Public Sector Reform.” April 10, 2003. Bridgetown: Barbados.

Office of Public Sector Reform. Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Re-form. October – December 2003. OPSR, Barbados.

Office of Public Sector Reform. Select Moderniza-tion Initiatives within the Barbados Public Sector. August 2003. OPSR, Barbados.

Office of Public Sector Reform. Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Re-form. October – December 2002, Vol. 6, No.3. The Performance Review and Development System (PRDS). OPSR, Barbados.

Office of Public Sector Reform. Challenge to Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Re-form. April – June 2000, Vol. 4, No.2. Excel-lence in Service.

OPSR, Barbados.Office of Public Sector Reform. Challenge to

Change, the Newsletter for Public Sector Re-form. July – September 2000, Vol. 4, No.3.



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SmartStream HR: Reforming Human Resource Management within the Civil Service. OPSR, Bar-bados.

Public Sector Reform Programme Plan (2003–2004). Office of Public Sector Reform. Up-dated August 2003. OPSR, Barbados.

The Central Bank of Barbados. Quarterly Re-port. September 2003. Bridgetown: Barba-dos.

The Central Bank of Barbados http://www.centralbank.org.bb/country_info.shtml Country Information 10/23/2004.

ListofAbbreviationsBSS BarbadosStatisticalService

CARICAD CaribbeanCenterforDevelopmentAdministration

CSS CivilServiceSystems

EAPA EmployeeAssistanceProfessionalAssociation

EAP EmployeeAssistanceProgram

HR HumanResources

HRM HumanResourcesManagement

HRMIS HumanResourcesManagementInformationSystem

IRC InternalReformCommittee

MCS MinistryoftheCivilService

NSC NetworkServicesCentre,Inc.

OPSR OfficeofPublicSectorReform

PRDS PerformanceReviewandDevelopmentSystem

PSC PublicServiceCommission


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ChAPTER �


The Case of BelizeMercedes Iacoviello

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Conclusions

Meritocratic criteria for Human Resource (HR) decisions and practices are reasonably well rooted in the Belizean civil service that inherited the tra-dition of the British colonial system. Over time the public service has been faced with a rapid in-crease in size, challenges regarding its systems of functional control, accountability, and decreas-ing standards of efficiency and quality of service. Concerns about the system are more related to efficiency issues than to transparency and merit. The country’s public service is still very much oriented to rule-following, because of its colonial heritage, but the enforcement of rules is weak in comparison with colonial times, when breaking the rules could have very serious consequences. In sum, the problem does not lie with the rules themselves, but with the low compliance level.

The application of merit criteria for recruit-ment decisions is one of the strongest aspects of the public service in Belize. Guarantees against arbitrariness are effective, although they do not apply for the temporary employee category (known as the “open vote” employees) that com-prises around 2,000 jobs out of a total of 12,000 public officers. There are adequate mechanisms

for reception, absenteeism control and mobility. Though infrequently used, legislation provides for the possibility of separation on the grounds of bad performance or economic reasons. An-other strength is related to the Labor Relations subsystem, given the various instances of inter-action between management and unions, with union representatives taking part in joint bodies that have responsibility in the design of HR poli-cies.

The Work Organization function is reason-ably developed, with job descriptions periodically reviewed, although job classification and profile definition processes are still rather formal. The Compensation Management function presents a salary strategy dominated by a budgetary focus, which compromises the possibility of establishing effective incentive schemes, especially for higher levels in the pay scale. The legislation sets forth incentives for good performers, but they are not effectively used. As for the Professional Develop-ment subsystem, careers in governmental agen-cies include vertical and horizontal tracks, but advancement is still heavily based on seniority and formal credentials. Training efforts are more oriented to the preferences of individual public officers than to organizational needs.

The HR Planning process is affected by the low development of an effective strategic plan-



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ning system for the Belize Government. In ad-dition, salary expenditures represent a heavy burden to public accounts. The Performance Management function, in turn, presents recur-ring problems to improving the performance evaluation process. Therefore, it is difficult to de-fine performance goals given the flaws already mentioned in the strategic planning system.

In sum, when comparing the different HR functions within the Belizean civil service system we can see that Employment and Human Rela-tions subsystems are more mature, while Work Organization, Professional Development, and Compensation Management subsystems are less developed, the weakest ones being HR Planning and Performance Management.

Many of the weaknesses identified in this study are widely known and publicly acknowl-edged, with accurate diagnoses on which reform plans are based. There is consensus across the board, in all areas and parties, that something has to be done to improve the efficiency of the public service, and in several instances the HRM aspects of the reform have been deemed crucial. There are many ongoing initiatives to solve these problems, although without an overall strategic plan coordinating them.

There is an effort undertaken by the authori-ties at the Ministry of Public Service and the Public Sector Reform Council to change from a rules-driven to a business-driven, result-ori-ented public service. However, the concentration of responsibility to gear the reform in the Min-istry of Public Service, without clear incentives for the rest of the ministers to follow the initia-tives, is challenging the implementation of the programmed changes. In that sense, one recom-mendation that can be derived from the study is that the institutions in charge of the reform should be reinforced, so that their initiatives are accompanied by the necessary actions in other government areas, and a real pressure for change is established. The need to maximize positive in-teractions with other ongoing reform initiatives should also be considered. The fact that there is an ambitious Financial Reform effort under-

way has to be used as a platform to introduce improvements in the civil service system.

From the analysis of each specific subsystem, several recommendations can be drawn. First, the focus on strategic planning should be em-phasized even further. Most of the weaknesses in several subsystems result from the fact that ef-forts to improve specific processes are isolated, i.e. not framed within a strategic plan. Second, it is central to develop performance management and incentive structures so that result-driven be-havior is rewarded. This is the only way to make sure that the process-oriented culture is gradu-ally replaced by a focus on results. Third, HR Development needs to be aligned with strategic objectives. Moreover, the ongoing process to de-velop an HRD plan is a key step to move in that direction. Fourth, even though the Work Orga-nization and Employment Management sub-systems are reasonably developed, more flexible and efficient procedures should be introduced in order to avoid bureaucratization.

The contents of this chapter build upon the author’s final report “Institutional Assessment of the Civil Service Systems: Case of Belize,” sub-mitted to the IDB in July 2005. The evaluation corresponds to the situation of the Belizean civil service as of that date.


Belize is a constitutional monarchy with a par-liamentary form of government based on the British model.1 The British monarch, Queen

1 The Government is a parliamentary democracy based on the Westminster System. Under its Consti-tution, members of the House of Representatives are elected by the people while members of the Senate are appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister (who is the head of the Cabi-net), the Leader of the Opposition, and the Governor General in his or her own deliberate judgment. The Constitution provides that the Cabinet is “collectively responsible to the National Assembly for any advice


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iNSTiTuTiONAL ASSESSmENT OF CiviL SERviCE SySTEmS: ThE CASE OF BELizE

Elizabeth II, is the Head of State and is rep-resented in Belize by a Governor-General, a position held since the country’s independence in 1981. The Governor-General has a largely ceremonial role and is expected to be politically neutral. The Constitution divides the Govern-ment into three branches—the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. Additionally, the civil or public service is overseen by an indepen-dent Public Services Commission. Belize has a functioning two-party political system revolving around the People’s United Party (PUP) and the United Democratic Party (UDP). The present Prime Minister, Said Musa (PUP), was re-elect-ed in 2003, and will be in power until 20082 (US Library of Congress).

Belize maintains strong ties to both the Unit-ed Kingdom, as a member of the Common-wealth, and to the English-speaking Caribbean, as a signatory member of the Caribbean Com-mon Market, CARICOM (WB 2002). Territo-rial disputes between the United Kingdom and Guatemala3 delayed the independence of Be-lize (formerly British Honduras) until 1981, and Guatemala refused to recognize the new nation until 1992.

The economy of Belize depends primar-ily on agriculture. Exports, which have recently increased by expanded production of citrus, bananas, seafood, and apparel, accounted for 13% of GDP and 68% of exports in 2000 (WB 2002). Domestic industry is limited, constrained by relatively high-cost labor and energy and a small domestic market. A combination of nat-ural factors—climate, the longest barrier reef in the Western Hemisphere, numerous islands, excellent fishing, safe waters for boating, jungle wildlife, and Mayan ruins—support the thriv-ing tourist industry. Development costs are high, but the Government of Belize has designated tourism as one of its major development priori-ties (US Department of State 2004). Continu-ing along the path of increasing diversity and improving international competitiveness in tra-ditional exports will help Belize consolidate its economic and social progress (WB 2002), and

since its main sources of growth activities are based on natural resources, sustainable develop-ment is critical (WB 2000).

Growth in Belize accelerated to 5% in fis-cal year 2003/04. This high growth was due to expanding exports and recovery of the agricul-tural sector from damages inflicted by the hur-ricanes in 2000 and 2001. Also, the shrimp and farmed fish industry received a major push last year when the sector gained access to the large European Union (EU) market. With a favorable external climate, growth in exports is expected to accelerate. Although the large bulk of export earnings come from traditional exports, non-tra-ditional sectors are expanding. The Belize’s dol-lar has been pegged to the US dollar since 1976. This means that the country has no monetary policy. As a result, fiscal policy becomes the only measure left to respond to external shocks or natural disasters. This makes it all the more im-perative that public debt levels be brought down so that the country has some room to increase expenditure and take on debt when exogenous shocks demand it (IDB 2004).

Background

The Belize Public Service is staffed with ap-proximately 12,000 public officers including the uniformed services, teachers, and open vote personnel. An estimate dated February 2004

given to the Governor General by or under the general authority of the Cabinet and for all things done by or under the authority of any Minister in the execution of his office.” 2 The PUP has won every national election between 1954 and 1989, with the exception of the 1984 elec-tion. 3 There is an article in the Guatemalan Constitution specifically related to the Belize situation “ARTICULO 19.—Belice. El Ejecutivo queda facultado para realizar las gestiones que tiendan a resolver la situación de los derechos de Guatemala respecto a Belice, de conformi-dad con los intereses nacionales…” (Political Constitu-tion of the Guatemalan Republic, 1985).



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indicates a total of 11,771 employees, of which the permanent establishment comprises 7,586 employees, open vote workers are estimated at 2,148, contract officers account for a total of 189, and Police and Defense force total 1,848 employ-ees (MAT 2004). Under the British model of par-liamentary government, public service employees are expected to execute the policies of the Cabinet ministers who head various executive ministries regardless of the ministers’ political affiliations. In turn, public service employees are to be insu-lated from overt political pressure (US Library of Congress 2005), and its role is “to provide the ser-vices of the State and implement programs and projects of the Government in a fair, accountable and efficient manner” (PRC 2000).

In 2000, the Government of Belize launched a Public Sector Reform (PSR), whose priorities comprised the following: a) transparency and ac-countability, b) rule by clear, rational, widely pro-mulgated code of law, c) checks and balances to reinforce appropriate incentives; d) ensuring the widest possible participation of the people of Be-lize in policies, programs and projects; e) leaving activities in the private and civil society sectors unless there is a compelling case for Government intervention; and f) improved professionalism and competence within the public administra-tion and accountability to the people (Govern-ment of Belize 2000). The Public Sector Reform Council was created in January 2000 with the mandate to advise on and coordinate the imple-mentation of the Public Sector Reform.

This initiative was attempted within a broad-er reform process aimed at modifying the politi-cal system that addressed the public service as one of the institutions to be evaluated and re-formed. The final report of the Political Reform Commission (PRC 2000) justified the need for reform in the criticism that the public service received from multiple actors, including pub-lic officers themselves: “The public complains of poor service, high levels of corruption and lackadaisical attitudes. The Executive complains of inefficiency, insufficient control, sabotage of programs, and archaic regulations. Public of-

ficers complain of the service having no direc-tion, of persistent political victimization, and of poor compensation.” Such a variety of positions explain the limited results obtained in previous attempts to reform the public sector.

The Public Sector Reform strategies urged the following be done: rationalize the roles and functions of ministries, improve policy develop-ment and coordination, public sector perfor-mance, Human Resource Management (HRM), Human Resource Development (HRD), finan-cial management systems, the application of information technology, and industrial relations (Government of Belize 2000). On the same ven-ue, the Cabinet approved a policy for the reform of the public service in order to “provide greater autonomy to the Executive Officers in each Min-istry/Department, to rationalize their functions, and to establish a human resource development committee” (WB 2002).

After a couple of years, the initiative lost its momentum and in June 2003, the Prime Minis-ter reactivated the Public Sector Reform Council formed by representatives from the Ministry of Public Service, the Ministry of Finance, public service unions, and the private sector (PSRC 2003). This Council meets on a monthly basis, acts as an advisory body to the Prime Minister and Minister of Public Service and monitors the implementation of reform initiatives. Based on an extensive consultation process and on a review of previous diagnostic documents, it developed a “list of recurrent topics,” and elaborated a work program for 2004–2005 that includes HRM as one of seven main issues to work on. Coincident with the consultations by the Public Sector Re-form Council, there was a detailed examination of the public sector finance system, which result-ed in a set of recommendations for the ministries in order to adopt strategic planning methods to formulate business plans.

From the initial official document about the Public Sector Reform published in 2000, about 75% of the programmed strategies were at least attempted, although many of them were discon-tinued and about 50% effectively implemented.


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The challenge that remains is to involve all min-istries in these initiatives, and also to establish a detailed prioritization of the goals to achieve, since all reform documents list a wide variety of goals that are difficult to obtain with the exist-ing financial and human resources (Universalia 2000). The only strategy that was fully imple-mented was the one related to the improvement of the financial management system (Testimo-nial). There are also several sector reform ini-tiatives, but there is no macro plan under which they can be coordinated.4

Legal Framework

The Constitution provides for a Public Services Commission which consists of a Chairman and eighteen other members (Belize Constitution 105–1). The function of the Commission is to make recommendations to the Governor-Gen-eral regarding the appointment of persons to the Public Service; the exercise of disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices; and the removal of such persons from office (Belize Constitution 106). It also has the responsibility for setting the code of conduct, fixing salaries, and generally managing the pub-lic service (PRC 2000). The power to carry out these recommendations lies with the Governor-General. The chairman and nine members of the Services Commission are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. The remaining nine members are ex-officio, which means that they become members by virtue of the position they hold and cease to be members as soon as they cease to hold that position. No member of this Commis-sion can be a member of the National Assembly or a holder of any public office except an ex-of-ficio member. A member can be removed from office by the Governor-General only after being so advised by the Belize Advisory Council and for reasons of inability to carry out his or her duties or for misbehavior, which must first have been referred to the Belize Advisory Council

for inquiry and report to the Governor-General with their advice (Government of Belize 1999). The Public Services Commission is organized in five sub-committees charged with dealing with specific areas of the public service: Police Force, the Military Service, the Prison Service, the Fire-Fighting Service, and one for the rest of the pub-lic service. (PRC 2000).

The rules for recruitment and selection were modified in 2001 through a constitutional am-mendment, following the recommendations by the Public Sector Reform Council, and new Ser-vices Commissions Regulations and Public Service Regulations were issued. The Services Commis-ion was divided into three areas: Public Services Commision (Constitution of Belize (BC) 105–1), Judicial and Legal Services Commission (BC 110 E), and Security Services Commision (BC 110 C). Each Commission has the power to appoint, transfer, confirm, exercise discipline and remove public officers in its own sphere of action.

The permanent (also called “established‘) of-ficers are governed by the Public Service Regu-lations, issued in 1997, revised and published in 2001. They are currently under another revision by the Joint Staff Relations Council, which in-cludes representatives for the Government and the unions. Temporary employees, also called “open-vote”5 workers, are covered by the Govern-ment Workers Regulations, issued in 1992. In ad-dition to these major regulations, guidelines and manuals were produced by the Ministry of Public Service for discipline, transfers, performance ap-praisal, merit awards and recruitment processes.

4 There are sectoral reform initiatives for the Judiciary (Delivering Justice), a Health Sector Reform, a com-prehensive change management process at the Minis-try of Natural Resources, and strategic planning being undertaken for the Ministry of Agriculture and Minis-try of Tourism (MAT 2004).5 According to the interviewees, this term was inherited from the British tradition, and its original meaning is not really clear. It is used to describe employees that are hired on a temporary basis.



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The Ministry of Public Service (MPS)6 is the organization in charge of personnel man-agement and industrial relations practices in the national government, namely: a) recruitments, transfers, promotions and disciplinary measures, b) promotion and development of training pro-grams, c) the Secretariat to the Public Services Commission,7 d) the Secretariat to the Joint Staff Relations Council, whose role is to oversee the conditions of service and welfare of public of-ficers. The Ministry works in close partnership with the Ministries of Finance and Budget Man-agement, advising on matters relating to the cre-ation and reclassification of posts, and to human resource requirements of Ministries, in terms of numbers and levels, rental of buildings and other matters (MPS 2000).


The analysis of the HR subsystems presented in this section follows the ninety-three criti-cal points established by the methodology used in this study (Longo 2002), which are listed to-gether with their corresponding valuation in Ap-pendix A. For each subsection the corresponding critical points are indicated between parenthesis, and a brief introduction is provided about the HR decisions and practices associated with each subsystem.


HR Planning constitutes the door to the HRM system, facilitating the comparison of qualitative and quantitative needs of human resources with its existing availability of internal resources in order to establish the HR gaps and the possible strategies to deal with them (Longo 2002).

Existence and Integrity of the System (Critical point 1) There is a strategic management process at the macro level, but it is not layered down, and each minister establishes his or her own priorities and

strategies without considering the national plan. This situation is recognized as a shortcoming by managers in the public sector. The problem does not lie in the lack of knowledge about planning, but rather in how to engage in a trustworthy process in the Belize environment (Universalia 2000). Cabinet members do not seem to appre-ciate Chief Executive Officers’ viewpoint as far as personnel needs in their areas are concerned. There is a vision of the public service in political parties’ manifestos, but the technical vision im-plied needs to be translated into a strategy to sup-port a plan. A Minister’s plan formally involves a 20-year vision for the sector, but it is a general statement from which no targets can be derived (Testimonial). Another important restraint is that the Ministry of Finance uses a straight-line ap-proach to cash flow management; one twelfth of the approved budget is released each month, independently of project revenue inflows and planned expenditures. This puts pressure on ministries with seasonal activities that result in negative effects on productivity and service de-livery (MAT 2004).

Strategic Coherence (2–3) According to the World Bank (WB, 2002) the Be-lizean public sector “suffers from being relatively large, with weak systems of financial control and accountability and quality of public services.” Central Government employees account for 8% of the total labor force. Total wage and salary expenditures increased from 33% of the total ex-penditure during 1994/95 to 40% in 1999/2000. One of the goals of the Public Sector Reform was to rationalize the roles and functions of the ministries, together with improving policy devel-

6 The Ministry is staffed by 40 public officers, 29 em-ployees for public service and 11 labor. 7 The MPS has traditionally served as a Secretariat to the Commission, but in June 2000 the Cabinet ap-proved the PS Commission’s functioning from its own office. To staff the Office, some members of the Min-istry were transferred to hold positions in the Office (MPS 2000)


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opment and coordination (PSR 2000), but other than a diagnosis of government agencies com-pleted in 2004 and a document with recommen-dations sent to the Cabinet, there was no attempt to implement this initiative (Testimonial).

Basic Information (4) It is important to mention that Information Tech-nology (IT) infrastructure is at its infancy in Be-lize, and only recently have electronic mail and Internet access begun to influence how informa-tion is shared (Universalia 2000). At present, the HR information available for managerial deci-sions is very limited, although the Ministry of Public Service (MPS) is involved in an ambitious project to solve the situation. Payroll was compu-tarized in 1998 through the incorporation of the SmartStream system, and the financial compo-nent of the system was immediately implement-ed. It was only in October 2004 that the Ministry of Public Service, with funding by the Ministry of Finance, embarked on the implementation of the HR component, which was expected to be completed by September 2005. Since there is already information in the system, it was neces-sary to clean up corrupted data that had been introduced without a focus on the HR processes involved. After completion of the implementa-tion phase, the system will provide inputs for HR planning, for the identification of training needs, and for the update of the job design system.

Effectiveness (5–9) There are serious limitations to the effective-ness of HR planning policies, although the HR system will provide tools to solve some of them. There is a deficit of skilled employees just as there is a surplus of unskilled employees in many governmental agencies. Overstaffing is still common in most ministries, especially at cleri-cal levels, while there is a shortage of specialized, technical and managerial personnel. There are large numbers of both established and open vote workers in the lower categories, along with the chronic overwork of qualified personnel (WB 1995). Moreover, there are situations of over-

qualification, like the case of secondary teach-ers with master’s degrees that are not required for the job (Testimonial). Personal emoluments have been held steady at around 50% of total recurrent expenditures, but the figure grows to 60% when it includes pensions, denominational teachers’ salaries and employees working on lo-cally funded capital projects. Materials, supplies and maintenance account for about a 10% of re-current expenditures; as a result, the civil service is seriously under-equipped with computers and materials, and not adequately supplied with the tools needed to accomplish its tasks (WB 1995; MAT 2004).

Administration (10–11) The SmartStream HR system makes provision for the monitoring and restriction of the number of officers employed within a ministry, and also of the employment of officers that are not quali-fied for a specified position. Through the system it is also possible to identify areas that either have a shortage or excess number of officers to be ad-equately staffed. Also, it can provide the employ-ment records of all employees on the horizontal grades across the public service, making it more efficient to reassign resources among agencies.

Work Organization

The Work Organization function establishes and specifies the contents of the tasks for each job, and the characteristics of the people who will carry them out. It includes both the description of the activities, functions, responsibilities and targets assigned to each position (job design) and the definition of the competencies, skills and atti-tudes required for the successful performance at each position (profile definition) (Longo 2002).

Existence and Integrity of the System (12)Presently, there are 16 ministries responsible for 44 departments (PRC 2000). The Ministry of Public Service assists the ministries by reviewing their personnel requirements and recommend-



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ing to the Minister of Finance the approval of the positions needed for the effective function-ing of the area, and it also reviews and approves the re-styling and upgrading of existing positions (MPS 2000). The Public Sector Reform called for flatter structures, through the development and implementation of a reclassified service scheme (PSR 2000), but beyond a preliminary diagnosis, this strategy was not attempted (Testimonial). A recent study concludes that there is a lack of in-formation at all levels within ministries on their organizational structures, with charts that do not reflect the real organization of the areas, and reporting lines that are not clear in some cases (MAT 2004).

Technical Quality and Flexibility of Job Design (13–17) Job classifications tend to represent rank rather than identify responsibilities (Universalia 2000). There has been an effort to revise the job de-scriptions and requirements for positions, a task undertaken on an “as needed” basis by the Min-istry of Public Service, responding to requests by the ministries (MPS 2000). At present, there is a more ambitious initiative to streamline the complete job classification. This is being de-veloped in parallel with the implementation of the HR component of the information system, the first phase of which includes the creation of jobs in the system, the grouping of positions into jobs, the verification of positions in accordance to the budget, the loading of position descrip-tions and skills required for each position, and the tranfer of all employees in the system to their correct position (Testimonial). The Ministry of Public Service is gathering information from the other ministries, but the response rate so far has been very low. They are expected to analyze the proposed job classification and see if every task conducted in their Ministry can fit the proposed job descriptions, and if the ranks proposed seem reasonable according to the tasks allocated to each position. The goal is to establish a list of less than 20 skills. An acknowledged weakness of the public service is that its functions are not

clearly defined. It is not clear for employees what is expected from them (Testimonial).

Quality of Profiles Definition (18–21) Profiles are technically defined, and the Minis-try of Public Service checks that the requisites correspond to the characteristics of the posi-tion to be covered. In defining profiles, emphasis on formal credentials is still very strong. Other competencies, as leadership, initiative, decision making and problem solving are starting to be recognized as critical for managerial positions (Waight 2004).

Administration (22–23) Job descriptions are periodically reviewed by the Ministry of Public Service at the request of the ministries, although it is still necessary to provide for mechanisms to make them more flexible and adaptable. It is very important to establish ag-ile procedures to update job descriptions, since changes are almost constantly taking place in the different agencies. There is an increasing custom-er service challenge for all areas in the Govern-ment, as well as increased expectations for rural development and greater access to government services for Spanish-speaking immigrants (Uni-versalia 2000). Moreover, new legislation can af-fect job descriptions and profiles in certain areas. For example, the new Finance Act establishes new responsibilities for the Ministry of Finance; therefore, its job classification may be subject to changes (Testimonial).


This subsystem covers the personnel policies and practices concerned with managing the process-es by which people enter, move within, and leave the organization. It involves all practices related to an individual’s recruitment, selection, induc-tion, mobility and separation from an organi-zation (Longo 2002). It is central to the HRM system, especially in the public sector, since it should be managed based on equity, merit and quality principles.


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Equal Opportunity and Merit (24–27) As a general principle, Ministers of Government have no say in the appointment of members of the public service, who are designated follow-ing the recommendations of the Public Services Commission. However, in the case of Permanent Secretaries (presently named as CEOs), Heads of Departments and other officers stipulated in section 107(1)8 of the Constitution, the Gover-nor-General makes the appointment of these of-ficers with the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Public Services Commis-sion.

Some criticism has been raised about the independence of the appointment process and of the members of the Public Services Commis-sion.9 In fact, one of the recommendations by the Political Reform Commission was to exclude its ex-officio members (PRC 2000). Nevertheless, the fact of having ex-officio members can be viewed as a positive factor. Other Civil Service Commissions in the Caribbean countries have been criticized for their prohibition of including public officers, because they attempt to guaran-tee impartiality, but they create commissions that are weak to protect public officers from political interference, and at the same time they interfere with the managerial responsibilities of senior public servants (Draper 2003).

There is a thirty-level hierarchy of positions. The five highest ones (level 26 to level 30) are reserved for the positions that follow a political appointment procedure, according to section 107(1) of the Belize Constitution. The rest of the public service (corresponding to levels 1 to 25 in the pay scale) is subjected to a merit-based selection procedure administered by the Public Services Commission. The procedure has been simplified and decentralized for the eight lowest levels (levels 1 to 8), which correspond to main-tenance and basic administrative tasks. For these eight levels, the authority for recruitment and selection was delegated to the CEO in each rele-vant ministry by the Public Services Commission Order in year 2000 (Clarke 2002). Even after this delegation process, the Commission checks that

vacant positions included in the budget are filled following the established procedures. It also con-trols the promotion process in middle-rank posi-tions (external recruitment is basically for entry levels). During the last two years there has been a curtailment of positions, and most movements are associated with promotions.

There is a category of employees that is not subject to this complex system of guarantees, which is called “open vote” workers. They corre-spond to temporary assignments, most of them in the lower classification levels, who are hired at the complete discretion of the ministries (WB 1995). According to the Public Services Com-

8 This article applies to the offices of Financial Secre-tary, Deputy Financial Secretary, Secretary to the Cab-inet, Solicitor General, Permanent Secretary, head of a department of Government, Commissioner of Police, Director, Security and Intelligence Service, Comman-dant, Belize Defense Force, Ambassador, High Com-missioner or principal representative of Belize in any other country or accredited to any international orga-nization. Permanent Secretaries used to be included in section 106, but moved to section 107 through a con-stitutional amendment after a recommendation by the PS Reform Commission that Permanent Secretaries no longer be the most senior permanent position in the public service but instead be political appointees of the government in office with responsibilities to coordinate the implementation of the Government’s policies in the ministry (PRC 2000). 9 The arguments were that: (a) the appointment pro-cess gives the Prime Minister and the political party in power significant control over the composition and this facilitates “rubberstamping” of the political director-ate instructions and encourages political victimization, (b) the composition is not necessarily sympathetic or understanding of particular concerns or features of certain disciplines of the public sector, for example, the military, the police, the prison and fire-fighting services, and (c) the composition facilitates partiality and subjec-tivity in the appeal process of public officers who are of the view that they have been unjustly disciplined or removed from office as it includes as ex-officio officers those who may have recommended the disciplinary measure or removal.



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mission they are not used in excess, even though some concerns arose in the Public Reform Com-mission regarding the possibility of the use of this provision to dispense partisan favors, hiring un-qualified personnel, and also because of the lack of limits of time of service for these employees (PRC 2000). There has been an effort to limit the number of open vote workers, which amounted to around 2,700 employees by 1993 (WB 1995) and declined to 2,060 in 2000. Of that total, 821 were skilled and semi-skilled workers, and 841 oc-cupied administrative positions (the status of the rest was not verified) (MPS 2000). Even though there is no conclusive evidence about the abusive use of this type of assignment, there is definitely potential for undermining the merit system as a whole if an increasing number of employees are hired under this category.

Discrimination does not seem to be an issue in the selection process. The composition of the selection panel is varied, and the Public Services Commission can ask for additional interviews if there is suspicion of bias in any of them. There is still a stronger presence of men in the top positions, but in the last years the situation has improved.10 One issue that should be taken into account is that almost half of its population is not fluent in Eng-lish, and therefore not eligible for public employ-ment. According to the last census (CSO 2000), 54% of the population speak English very well, 26% not so well, and 19% do not speak it at all.11 Also, illiteracy and lack of access to higher educa-tion are constraints to access to public positions. The literacy rate is around 70% according to the last census; however, 17% of the urban population and only 7% of the rural population have reached secondary school (CSO 2000).

Recruitment and Selection Quality (28–32) The Government is the largest employer in Belize, and is able to attract highly qualified workers. All positions are advertised in major weekly newspa-pers. Belizean citizenship is a requirement for all public service positions, but if some technical po-sitions cannot be covered with local professionals,

recruitment is opened to the CARICOM coun-tries. The Ministry of Public Service receives ap-plications for employment all year round, which are reviewed when requests for personnel are re-ceived by the ministries. The number of vacan-cies advertised for 2000 were 62, and the number of applications received, 492 (MPS 2000).

Selection procedures are very detailed, and in general terms complied with in the majority of the areas.

The question that remains unanswered is if such procedures are efficient enough to establish who the most competent candidate for a position is, since the alignment between job description and individual profiles is far from perfect. Ac-cording to the regulations, the appointment and promotion of public officers are based on three factors, in descending order of importance: per-formance/merit, integrity/professionalism and experience/employment history (Services Com-missions Regulations (SCR) art.16, PSR art. 11). Procedures are quite formal, and tend to empha-size paper qualifications over more general com-petencies (Testimonial).

The central selection tool used is a panel formed by four interviewers including a specialist in the area and a person with general knowledge of administration from another ministry. Direct supervisors are included only if they are special-ists in the area.

Induction Quality (33–34) A two-day induction program is offered to every new employee during the first three months in service. Meetings are held when there is a signifi-cant number of new hires, which means that a number of employees attend this meeting when

10 The first issue of the BelizeToday magazine, issued by the Ministry of Information, highlights ten women that have been appointed in top positions in a variety of organizations, most of them in governmental offices. 11 The second language is Spanish, with 44% that speak it fluently, 11% speak it not so well, and 45% do not speak it at all.


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they have already been working for a couple of months. Nevertheless, new hires appreciate this opportunity of getting to know how the Govern-ment works and what role they play in it. Every new hire receives a copy of the public service regulations.

In colonial days there used to be a two-year provisional appoinment, after which and provid-ed the appointed employee passed an exam he could become eligible for a permanent position. Nowadays, the provisional appointment is for-mally for one year (SCR 14), but most employees get into the permanent service after that period. Supervisors have to fill out two reports on the new hires during their first year in the public ser-vice. If both reports are qualified above average, the public officer is confirmed in the permanent position. There are documented cases of people who were not confirmed because this require-ment was not met (Testimonial).

Mobility (35) The Commission is in charge of approving tran-fers between ministries (SCR 43–49). The power to tranfer public officers within the clerical, sec-retarial, administrative and accounting grades (known as “horizontal grades”) was delegated to the Ministry of Public Service in 1994, and transfers within the Ministry were delegated to the CEOs in 2000 (MPS 2000). Geographic tran-fers are very common, and in such cases reloca-tion grants are assigned to the public officer. In the 1970s everything was concentrated in Belize City, but after years of decentralization, it is pos-sible to transfer employees without affecting their access to a variety of services (Testimonial).

Absenteeism and Discipline (36–37) The power to discipline public officers is vested in the Services Commission, and appeals against its decisions can be presented to the Belize Advi-sory Council (SCR, part IV, 23–42). The Public Service Regulations include a section about the expected conduct of public officers (PSR, part III, 19–43). Regarding the control of absentee-ism, the Ministry of Public Service reviews sick

leave requests and monitors how often officers proceed on sick leaves and recommends the convening of Medical Boards when appropriate (MPS 2000).

Separation (38–41) The regulations provide for the dismissal or re-moval of public officers in consequence of disci-pline proceedings, on the abolition of their office and on the need to improve the organization of their Ministry or Department (SCR, art. 22). The compulsory age for retirement is 55 years, and re-employment is allowed if there is a chronic short-age in a technical or professional field (SCR, art. 18). There is some concern regarding an increase in the number of re-hired pensioners in the last years (MAT 2004). Resignations are approved by the Ministry of Public Service in accordance to the Public Service Regulations, receiving around 12 requests per month (MPS 2000).


This subsystem refers to the process of planning and evaluating the employees’ contribution to the organization (Longo 2002). It should be man-aged so that individual and group performance is aligned with the organization’s priorities, and maintained at the highest possible level to enable sustained improvement of their contribution to the organization.

Performance Planning and Follow-up (42–45) The Public Sector Reform aimed at improving the public sector’s performance via a) the set-ting of standards through the review, develop-ment, publication and implementation of policy and procedure manuals and other management guidelines that may be necessary from time to time; and b) the enforcement of personal and institutional accountability through the devel-oping and strengthening of favorable work eth-ics; performance contracts for senior executives; comprehensive auditing procedures (including performance and financial audits of Ministries);



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strengthening of Parliamentary Committees, particularly the Public Accounts Committee, which would receive reports from Ministries on an annual basis and evaluate their perfor-mance; recognition of outstanding performance and prompt delivery of awards and incentives; enforcement of the disciplinary code. It also es-tablished the enforcement of the use of the new performance appraisal system and the develop-ment and institution of a transparent merit/award system (PSR 2000). In practice, most of these initiatives could not be applied, and it re-mains very difficult to define individual or group performance goals given the flaws in the strate-gic planning process (Testimonial). Most institu-tions and organizations operate in the absence of clear mandates and performance targets, not providing the necessary performance framework within which to address serious capacity and mo-tivational issues (Universalia 2000).

Performance Evaluation (46–48) The present system was established in 1997, and is experiencing an excessive benevolent bias (Tes-timonial). A new procedure was put recently in place after the Performance Appraisal (PA) Review process, in a more complex and rich form than the previous one issued. It is a good system from a technical point of view, but its use is far from being generalized. It is being updated once again, and the Cabinet established a moratorium in hir-ing and merit increments until the PA appraisal is fully developed and implemented (Testimonial). The performance contracts for CEOs planned in the Public Sector Reform were not implemented.

Administration (49) Line managers find it very difficult to assume their role in performance management, a situa-tion that is reflected in the generalized benevolent bias in performance evaluations. Performance appraisal forms are generally not completed on time, and the process—in a high incidence of the cases—has to be initiated by officers who demand to be paid increments that are overdue (MAT 2004).


This subsystem includes the management of monetary compensations (salaries and bonuses) and non-monetary benefits offered by the orga-nization to its employees to reward them for their contribution towards achieving the organiza-tion’s objectives (Longo 2002). It should be based on internal and external equity principles, with a compensation structure based on the assessment and classification of positions, and some vari-able compensation structure that link rewards to performance or results (either at the individual, group or institutional level).

Compensation Strategy, Internal and External Equity (50–57) Given the high proportion of recurring expendi-tures allocated to personal emoluments, the salary strategy is dominated by a budgetary focus (WB 1995). The wage compression is reasonable, re-flecting a ratio of 9.8 between the highest and the lowest salaries for career positions (see Indicator 3). In general, there is a balance among payments applied to similar positions for the established officers in different areas, and the Ministry of Public Service conducts salary reviews when ministries send requests for appointments or pro-motions (MPS 2000). The problem arises when comparing the terms and conditions of employ-ment of established officers with those of con-tract officers, since they are much more favorable for the latter. In general, contract officers have no previous exposure to public service operational regulations, and this situation combined with a more favorable payment scheme accounts for the negative effect on staff morale (MAT 2004). Re-garding external equity, the entry level salary is a bit higher in the public sector, but an employee can improve his/her situation much faster in the private sector as a result of good performance. As a consequence, at higher levels the public ser-vice loses people to the private sector, while at lower levels it still attracts competent candidates. Therefore, it is important to work on a strategy for the retention of managers.


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Effectiveness of Compensation Policies and Wages Administration (58) The Public Service regulations establish an auto-matic increment system (PSR art. 106) in which the annual increment is tied to performance (PSR art. 108). In practice it is assigned automatically to every officer (WBI 1995), instead of being based on a well conducted staff appraisal, despite the ex-istence of such a system (Universalia 2000). In the case of promotions, officers receive the minimum salary of the post to which they are being promot-ed, provided that the difference with the previous salary is not less than two increments on the higher scale (PSR art. 109). Incentive allowances are paid as an additional compensation for the additional job covered when an officer replaces another one that retires from the public service. There is also an award of one increment for passing clerical promotion examinations (PSR art.12) and a merit award for outstanding service (PSR art. 111). In sum, there are several tools that aim at establish-ing some incentives for good performers, although there is a generalized perception that they are not being effectively used for that purpose. The per-ception is that the structure of incentives attract candidates that are less result-oriented, reinforcing the existing focus on procedures (Testimonial).

Wages Administration (59–61) The Public Service Regulations establish the rules for salary management (PSR art. 105–128). Decisions about wage administration tend to fol-low the established procedures; therefore, there are no abusive practices associated with them. Information deficits will be solved after the im-plementation of the HR system.

Other Benefits (62–64) A variety of allowances are established in the Public Service Regulations, such as an acting al-lowance, a subsistence allowance for officers re-cruited abroad, subsistence and travel allowances for travel on duty overseas, transfer grants for re-location to a new station, and mileage and motor vehicle maintenance allowance for officers who use their personal vehicles (PSR art.114–128).

The Workers Compensation Act establishes a retirement system based on the social secu-rity, and on the results of the respective collec-tive agreement. The Pensions Act applies to the Public Service (SCR art. 52), and establishes a “non-contributing” scheme. There is a proposal to extend the retirement age from 55 to 60 years old, and to review the Pensions Act so that new hires start contributing to the Social Security system. Non-monetary compensation is not fre-quent. In a way, the merit award implies a non-monetary recognition, even though there is a lump sum payment associated to it.


The policies and practices of Development Man-agement should stimulate the professional devel-opment of the staff members according to their potential, encouraging learning and defining ca-reer paths that should match the organization’s needs with the individual profile (Longo 2002). Promotion policies, career design and training management are the main processes included in this subsystem, and should be managed with a clear focus on the priorities and needs of the or-ganization.

Effectiveness of Promotion Policies and Career Design Quality (65–70) Horizontal tracks have been established for sup-portive functions, which are grouped in the cleri-cal, secretarial, administrative and accounting grades (known as “horizontal grades”). Regula-tions in force establish examinations as a requi-site to cover positions in the clerical grade. The advance to an upper position in this grade de-pends on the results of the exam, seniority in lower level, and the evaluation of the candidate in terms of performance, integrity and experi-ence (PSR art. 12–13). There is a cadet or trainee-ship system, which takes the form of recruitment of qualified, but inexperienced candidates from outside and within the Service, into middle-man-agement positions. These officers are given “on-the-job” training with continuous supervision.



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The goal is that these officers provide improved support to senior management, and bring new insights, methodologies and professionalism to the organization (MPS 2000).

Each office uses informal succession plan-ning mechanisms, but it is not based on a com-prehensive HR planning system. There are large gaps between some Heads of Department and the next senior officer (MAT 2004).12

Individual and Collective Learning Management (71–76) The Ministry of Public Services is in charge of coordinating the training function, including the promotion and development of In-Service Train-ing Programs for the whole Public Service, and the coordination of scholarship programs (Govern-ment of Belize 1999). The regulations are heav-ily focused on the administration of study leaves, grants and allowances for trainees (PSR art. 78), and therefore the efforts have been focused on these formal issues more than providing a strate-gic direction to training activities.13 The result is a training function that is generally ruled by the in-dividual preferences of public officers,14 although the perception is that it is still better than in the private sector, where companies do not provide training to their employees. One of the strategies established for the Public Sector Reform pro-gram was the improvement of HRD, and it was announced that priority would be given to staff training and development. Of the specific actions that were planned, specialized training was not at-tempted in a formal way, and customer-oriented training was focused on immigration and customs officers (Testimonial). There is a complete lack of planning for staff training; hence, training ac-tivities continue to take place primarily on an ad hoc basis (MAT 2004), instead of being linked to performance problems and needs (Waight 2004). Public officers are not made responsible for self-development, and expect training to be offered by the Government (Testimonial).

Even though there is not a formal HRD body within the Ministry of Public Service,15 at the time of this evaluation there was an advanced

project to develop an HRD policy16 for Belize. That project reflected an effort to provide an am-ple focus on HRD policy, so that it included the needs of both public and private sectors (Testimo-nial). A need assessment for HR development in Belize was conducted recently and it established that the main flaw in the public sector is related to leadership rather than technical skills (Waight 2004) This confirms a previous diagnosis indicat-ing that many senior managers lack training to set direction, develop work plans and objectives, assign tasks to teams, and supervise and moni-tor progress (Universalia 2000). The eight criti-cal areas of HR needs identified in the public sector were reading, English competency, critical thinking, employability, entrepreneurship, man-agement, teacher training, and specializations. Public sector organizations are becoming more finance sensitive, with more expectation of cre-ativity and decision-making from line employees because of the need to provide just-in-time re-

12 For example, Director of Immigration PS 25 and Senior Immigration Officer PS 11 (MAT 2004).13 The MPS report for 2000 describes the training ac-tivities during that period, most of which consisted of announcing courses offered abroad, processing appli-cations for awards, approving study leaves and provid-ing direct financial assistance for bachelor degrees.14 In some cases, there is targeted training, like the continuous training for performance appraisal, but it is almost an exception. The Ministry of National De-velopment has a targeted development program, which is heavily focused on real projects conducted by the participants and monitored by the instructor. The pro-gram involves five classes offered by the local university and is funded by the participant’s organizations. 15 There used to be a Training Unit, whose functions were absorbed by a newly established Department of Management Services, created in year 2000 (MPS 2000).16 The consultant hired for this project had previously conducted a needs assessment at the request of the lo-cal university in order to establish the training needs re-quired by the industry from university programs, which provides a good starting point for the HRD policy.


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sponse. The educational system, however, is not producing problem solvers, critical thinkers and creative employees (Waight 2004).

There is still a major contextual factor that has an impact on the effectiveness of training and development programs. The changes that are expected to occur because of these programs require the goals to be clearly set for each posi-tion, and also that the areas have the necessary resources to develop the activities. Since salaries are a high percentage of the budget, those re-sources cannot be guaranteed with such limited funding for operations (MAT 2004).


This subsystem is concerned with the manage-ment of the relations between the organization and its employees regarding personnel policies and practices when these acquire, in a given context, a collective dimension (Longo 2002). It involves labor relations management, which includes the collective bargaining of pay and working conditions; the management of the or-ganizational climate in terms of communication policies and practices, and social benefits that are offered to employees in general or to aid particu-larly needy groups or individuals.

Work Climate (77–78) Some of the Public Sector Reform initiatives were indirectly related to the work climate (of-fice enhancement, reorganization of office hours, celebration of an annual public service week, simplification of public service procedures), but most of them have been only partially attempted. The excessive formality of the decision-making process results in a lack of concern for individual situations. There is the perception that little at-tention is paid to the everyday problems that indi-viduals and groups face in the public service, thus affecting the work climate (Testimonial). There are some initiatives regarding quality of work improvement, such as the Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) that started in 2000, intending to provide professional counseling services for em-

ployees that experience serious personal problems (MPS 2000). A recent survey indicates that there are environmental factors that affect productivity, such as health and safety concerns, as well as ex-cessive transportation costs that impact heavily on staff at lower pay scale levels, and also the urgent need to repair and provide security to several of-fices, especially in the districts (MAT 2004).

Communication Effectiveness (79–81). There are not many initiatives to improve com-munication in the Government, and there is a concern about the lack of interaction between offices that work on related areas: public of-ficers in one department can be unaware of developments in other areas even in their own ministry (MAT 2004). There is a publication by the Ministry of Information, BelizeToday.org, which—even though it is not aimed at being a house-organ since it is more of a general inter-est magazine—, is distributed for free to every public officer, and in a way acts as a channel to disseminate the vision of the Government. The first edition was issued in April 2005, as a sequel of a previous magazine published for many years by the Government of Information Service.

Labor Relations Balance and Quality (82–85) There are several instances of interaction be-tween management and the unions in the pub-lic sector, with union representatives taking part in several joint bodies with responsibility in the design and implementation of HR policies,17 like the Joint Staff Council, and the Human Re-source Development Committee.

Since the ratification of International La-bor Organization conventions (ILO Conven-tions Act, chapter 304:01) was registered in June

17 The PSR main document emphasizes the need of promoting multipartite approach to guarantee effec-tive and meaningful Public Sector Reform, expanding the role of the Unions through active participation, improved communication and appropriate representa-tion (PSR 2000).



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1999, both the Labor Relations Convention (ILO No. 151) and the Collective Bargaining Convention (ILO No. 154) have the force of law in Belize, providing a formal legal framework to the negotiations between management and the unions in the public sector.18 In 2003, the first collective agreement was subscribed, after a negotiation on salary increases, improvement of benefits and modification of tax structure. It was the result of a negotiating body formed by the Public Service Union (PSU), the Teachers Union and the Association of Public Service Senior Managers.19 More recently, there was a collective agreement for the Central Bank (De-cember 2004), which included a variety of is-sues (Testimonial).

The Joint Staff Relations Council represents a more informal but still important instance for discussion of issues between management and the unions, as a complement to other instances of collective bargaining. The chair of this Coun-cil is the CEO of the Public Service Ministry, and the co-chair is the president of the Public Service Union, who is responsible for the session in the absence of the chair. It was created as a “gentlemen’s agreement,” as a negotiation area, but there is no formal legislation supporting it (Testimonial). It is not an instance of conflict res-olution, but its advisory role to the Cabinet pro-vides an instance to discuss sensitive issues before they escalate into a conflict. From the Govern-ment’s perspective, it provides a good model of balanced labor relations. The Council reviews all regulations related to conditions of service (leaves, hours, benefits, allowances). It was con-sulted for the development of the new Perfor-mance Appraisal system and the merit award procedure. From the unions’ perspective, this is a valuable instance but it has a weak impact on the conditions of employment, since the final deci-sion lies with the Ministry of Public Service and the Cabinet, whose members decide whether to pass or not the legislation changes proposed. For example, when revising the Government Work-ers Regulations there was no agreement on some issues and the legislation was not changed. But

when the regulations are related to less sensitive issues, the legislation is passed with the proposed changes, specially if it does not have a financial impact (Testimonial)

Labor Conflict Management (86–88) From the unions’ perspective, labor relations in the past worked very smoothly, but the critical fiscal position made it more difficult to negotiate compensation, increments and grants, thereby deteriorating labor relations in recent years.20 For example, the union has been on grievance for four years on increments and salaries for public officers being moved to statutory bodies (paraestatal organizations—electricity, social se-curity, large hospitals). The agreeement was that movement would not affect their income and conditions of employment, but it resulted in a four-year lasting conflict that was solved only re-cently. According to the union’s position, there has also been an increasing degree of politiciza-tion of the decision-making process that makes it difficult to interact between politicians and public servants. The replacement of Permanent Secretaries by CEOs appointed by the minis-ters is seen as a negative change. The division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Pub-lic Service and the Services Commission is also seen as a negative factor. The Commission has

18 Even before that ratification, the right to negotiate was recognized to the Unions in Belize. The response from ILO to a complaint filed by the PSUB against the Belize Government in year 1994 says that “… none of the arguments formulated makes the ILO Commit-tee to think that the restrictions imposed on public of-ficers on the matter of negotiation are frequent, and the present restriction is considered as exceptional…” (ILO, Case 1775, par.514).19 There are eight unions in Belize. In addition to the three already mentioned, there are the Christian Work-ers, Communication Workers, Water Services, Belize Electricity Workers, and Belize Workers. The last one represents the cane industry workers. 20 In any case, conflicts do not escalate to the level of street demonstrations.


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been challenging the regulations issued on rec-ommendation of the Joint Staff Council. Since the Commission has a constitutional status, they do not pay attention to circulars and administra-tive directions from the Council. It was easier to negotiate when the CEO at the Ministry of Public Service was the only one empowered to make decisions on the majority of HR issues. The system became more complex and power “broke into pieces” among different institutions (Testimonial).

Social Policies Management (88–89) Public officers are entitled to paid leave of ab-sence for vacation, sickness, maternity, paterni-ty, illness of spouse or children, and training as well as up to 90 days of leave without pay (PSR art. 75). There are few aspects in which the pub-lic sector offers advantages. The vacation leave lasts 14 days in the Labor Law, while the Public Service Regulations concedes 20 days for junior officers and 30 days for senior officers (PSR art.56). Furthermore, public officers have access to advanced pay for certain purposes—e.g. the purchase of household items, a means of trans-portation, or for medical or maternity purposes (PSR art. 129(1)). On the other hand, private companies offer insurance benefits (life, dental insurance, for example) that are not granted in the public service. Until now, public employees have enjoyed the advantage of a “non-contrib-uting pension scheme,” but there is a project to change the system to match the situation in the private sector—i.e. urging public officers to contribute to the social security system (Testi-monial).


The description of each subsystem forming part of the HRM presented above is complemented in this section with the analysis of the mecha-nisms used for the management of the system, particularly the distribution of personnel-related decisions among the different responsible parties (Longo 22).

Autonomy and Capacity of Supervisors (90–92) In 2002, the Public Services Commission dele-gated all its powers of appointment, promotion, transfer, discipline and removal from office to CEOs where decisions concerned officers on pay scale 1 to 8,21 while keeping the power of and re-sponsibility for a general oversight and monitor-ing of the execution of such delegated powers. The authority for fixing salaries and privileges for officers on pay scale 1 to 8 remains with the Ministry of Public Service, which, regarding del-egated functions, still has to provide guidance to the ministries through the production of manu-als, the publication of job descriptions, and the training of all users of the new system (Clarke 2002). In the context of the decentralization pro-cess of the HR function and the delegation of power to the CEOs, managers in the different ministries are expected to assume more respon-sibility for the people assigned to their sphere of formal authority. In general, managers play this role, although it is sometimes difficult for them to make decisions that could create dissatisfaction in his or her unit (Testimonial). For example, the recurrent benevolent bias of performance ap-praisals clearly reflects this conflict.

Central HR Administration (93) Three institutions are involved in the central ad-ministration of the HR function: the Ministry of Public Service, the Public Services Commission and the Public Sector Reform Council.22 Even though legislation contemplates differentiated roles for the three of them, there is some degree of tension between them in terms of their re-

21 The PS Commission reserves the power of promo-tion unto itself on all Clerical Grade Officers. 22 Note that the Ministry of Public Service was dis-solved by the end of 2005, after this assessment was completed. Its personnel administration and develop-ment functions were transferred to the Office of Gov-ernance, which reports directly to the Prime Minister. The recruitment and selection functions are still under the purview of the Public Services Commission.



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sponsibilities. As already mentioned, the Public Sector Reform established the need to delegate powers from the Public Services Commission to the Ministry of Public Services, including the power to transfer, recruit and terminate employ-ees. In the last years, part of these responsibilities was taken back by the Commission, but consti-tutionally these policies are under the Ministry’s scope of action. These changes in competencies of both institutions reflect a political competition

over the control of these functions (testimonial), and this creates some overlapping of functions between the two of them (MAT 2004).



[+]


STRATEGY

WorkOrganization





RecruitmentMobility

Separation

PlanningEvaluation

Planning [+/–]




[+/–] [+] [+/–]

[+/–]

[+/–]


learning


payment





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When comparing the different HR func-tions within the Belizean civil service system, we can see that the Employment and Human Relations subsystems are more mature, the Work Organization, Development and Com-

pensation Management subsystems are less developed, while the weakest ones are the HR Planning and Performance Management sub-systems.

23 All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1Bds = 0.51 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Con-verter)

IV. INDICATORS

IV.1. Quantitative Indicators2�


Totalnumberofpoliticalappointments 18 Numberofofficialscoveringpositionsinpayranges26to 30(ConstitutionofBelizeart.107).Source:Numberof establishedstaffbygrade,1994(WorldBank1995)

Totalnumberofpositionsforthecivilian 3,392 Numberofofficialscoveringpositionsinpayranges1tocentralGovernment 25(ConstitutionofBelizeart.106).Source:Numberof establishedstaffbygrade,1994(WorldBank1995)



Centralgovernmentwagebill(inmilliondollars) 109,17 MinistryofFinance.CentralGovernment.Summaryof RecurrentandCapitalBudgetsfortheFiscalYear 2004/2005(214,06millionBelizedollarsx0.51)

GDP(inmilliondollars) 1,081.7 GDP,marketprices,year2004(2,121millionBelizedollars x0.51) Source:CentralStatisticalOffice,www.cso.gov.bz

Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product 10%


I.HighersalaryofciviliancentralGovernment(indollars) 34,082 Maximumsalaryforpayrange25(Belizedollars).Pay ranges26to30aredesignatedthroughpoliticalappoint- ments.MPS,Payscale2005.(66.808Belizedollarsx0.51)

II.LowersalaryofciviliancentralGovernment(indollars) 3,476 Minimumsalaryforpayrange1(Belizedollars).MPS,Pay scale2005.(6816Belizedollarsx0.51)

I/II.Verticalwagecompression 9.8



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I.Averagecentralgovernmentwage(indollars) 772.87 Personalemoluments,approvedestimates2004/2005 (214.05millionBelizedollars)/12months=17838138/ totalnumberofemployeesincentralgovernment(11,771) =1,515.43x0.51 Source:MinistryofFinance.CentralGovernment.Summary ofRecurrentandCapitalBudgetsfortheFiscalYear 2004/2005,andManagementAuditTeamreport(2004).

II.PercapitaGDPbymonth(indollars) 319 GDPMarketprices(2,121millionBelizedollarsx0.51)/ PopulationaccordingtoCensus2000(282,600)=7,521.28 /12months Source:www.cso.gov.bz

Average central government wage/Per capita GDP 2.4


I.Averagecentralgovernmentwage(indollars) 772.87 Personalemoluments,approvedestimates2004/2005 (214.05millionBelizedollars)/12months=17,838,138/ totalnumberofemployeesincentralgovernment(11,771) =1515.43x0.51 Source:MinistryofFinance.CentralGovernment.Summary ofRecurrentandCapitalBudgetsfortheFiscalYear 2004/2005,andManagementAuditTeamreport(2004).


Average central government wage/ NotavailableAverage private sector wage


I.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 9,923 Estimatednumberofpublicofficers,teachersandsupport staffinschools.ItdoesnotincludetheBelizeDefense ForceandthePolice. Source:ManagementAuditTeamReport(2004)

II.TotalPopulation 282,600 Source:Census2000,www.cso.gov.bz

Total number of central government employees 3%/Total population

(continued)


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I.Centralgovernmentexpenditure(inmilliondollars) 224.71 Source:MinistryofFinance.CentralGovernment.Summary ofRecurrentandCapitalBudgetsfortheFiscalYear 2004/2005(440.61millionBelizedollarsx0.51)

II.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 9,923 Estimatednumberofpublicofficers,teachersandsupport staffinschools.TheBelizeDefenseForceandthePoliceare notincluded. Source:ManagementAuditTeamReport(2004)


(continued)

IV.2 Indices for the Evaluation of the Civil Service System



(M) Merit 13.54 68%









(CI) Integrating Capacity 11.76 59%


The indices and sub-indices listed above were constructed on the basis of the analysis of 93

critical points that reflect key elements of the HRM subsystems. Appendix A lists the valua-tion of these critical points and their correspond-ing number to which these values relate.



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Efficiency This index, related to thirteen critical points, measures the degree of optimization of the in-vestment in human resources identified in the civil service system, as well as its alignment with the fiscal policy scale and its reference markets (Longo 2002). For this index, the performance of the Belizean civil service is relatively low (50% of the scale), reflecting the heavy burden that personnel costs represent if compared to the country’s economy and given the high propor-tion of the recurrent government expenditure that is allocated to personal emoluments. It also reflects the flaws in the strategic planning system that implies low grades for all items related to the strategic focus for each HR subsystem.

MeritThis index, linked to ten critical points, assess-es the extent to which employment, career and wage decisions conform to professional criteria. The relatively good performance of the Belizean civil service for this index (68% of the scale) re-flects the tradition of merit-based recruitment and selection inherited from the British colonial system.

Structural Consistency This index measures the core building blocks in the HRM system, namely: the HR Planning, Work Organization, and Performance Manage-ment subsystems. The index is interconnected to 3 sub-indices, Strategic Coherence, Directive Consistency, and Consistency of Processes, which are collectively associated to 29 critical points.

Strategic coherence measures the interconnection between the Government’s strategic priorities and HRM policies and practices. This sub-index obtains a valuation of less than 45% of the scale, reflecting the lack of maturity of the strategic planning system.

Directive consistency measures the level of develop-ment of the directive function in the civil service system, specifically the alignment between the

“central techno-structure and line directives” (Longo 2002). The valuation of the sub-index for Belize (44% of the scale) indicates the uneven development of the managerial function in the civil service, with a number of supervisors that do not have the competencies to effectively man-age their work groups.

Consistency of processes measures the extent to which the processes that underpin an integrated HRM system are in place in the civil service sys-tem. It is the best valuated of the three sub-indi-ces, reaching 52% of the scale, since it benefits from some degree of systematization of the HR function (in the sense that there are procedures in place effectively implemented for most of the subsystems), a reasonable level of internal equity of the compensation system, and a developed la-bor relations system.

Functional Capacity This index evaluates the extent to which the civil service system encourages behaviors that promote improvement in public services. This index is linked to three sub-indices, namely, Competency, Incentive Effectiveness, and Flex-ibility that are collectively related to 41 critical points.

Competency values the extent to which HRM poli-cies and practices facilitate an adequate supply of skilled personnel. It reaches 54% of the scale, reflecting a positive valuation of a reasonably developed employment system that compensates the Work Organization and Training functions, which are far less dynamic.

Incentive effectiveness measures the extent to which existing policies and practices facilitate produc-tivity, learning and improved service quality. This sub-index gets the lowest grade within this index (45% of the scale), showing the recurrent difficulties to effectively implement the perfor-mance evaluation process, and the inexistence of non-monetary incentives. Positive aspects that contribute to this index are the reasonable wage


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compression and the internal equity of the com-pensation system.

Flexibility measures the capacity of existing poli-cies and practices to adjust to changes in policy priorities, in this case getting the highest grade within this index (52% of the scale). One factor that contributes to this result is that Belize is one of the few countries in the region that has the ef-fective possibility of moving public officers from one position to another, even relocating them in different geographical regions. Other factors that contribute positively to this index are the possibility of separating employees for bad per-formance and for economic reasons, as provided for in the regulations, although this mechanism is infrequently used. These aspects counteract some rigidities of the system, such as the detailed and formal job description process, the lack of flexible career tracks, and the disarticulation of training efforts.

Integrating CapacityThis index, related to 19 critical points, rates the extent to which the civil service system can align different stakeholders’ expectations and interests in an effort to empower them and reduce con-flicts. This is one of the two indices (along with the Merit index) for which the Belizean civil ser-vice system performs reasonably well, reaching almost 60% of the possible maximum grade). This reflects the fact that labor relations in the public sector are well developed, with several in-stances of interaction between management and the unions.

V. CONCLUSIONS


Big efforts were made to develop a national strat-egy, specially from the Ministry of National Eco-nomic Development, but the Ministry of Finance is too strong and, therefore, budget restrictions dominate Public Service strategies. There are

some guidelines in the political parties’ manifes-tos, but once a political party takes office there is no process in place to lead to a strategy from such guidelines. Furthermore, there is also a mid-term plan that every ministry has to elaborate, but consultation with other ministries are not well articulated. Consequently, national plans in dif-ferent policy areas are not in line with ministries’ plans, with the responsibilities defined for each area, or with the job descriptions for individuals and groups in each agency (Testimonial).

In most interviews conducted for this study, a vision of a difference in the public service before and after independence prevailed. There were expectations of positive changes, i.e. getting rid of the formalities and inefficiencies of the rule-oriented colonial system, but there is a percep-tion that after almost 25 years “the public service could never progress from the colonial system” (Testimonial). Even though there was a very im-portant professionalization process in the last decades, with much better academic qualifica-tions in the public service today if compared to colonial times, there is now great concern about the lack of managerial skills, and the low moti-vation in public officers. Despite public officers’ competencies, the perception is that they are not as productive as could be expected according to their credentials. The public service is still very much oriented to rule-following, because of the colonial heritage; however, the enforcement of rules is weak in comparison with colonial times, when breaking the rules could have very serious consequences. In sum, the problem does not lie with the rules themselves, but with their low level of compliance.


One of the lessons that Draper (2003) derives from civil service reform processes in the Carib-bean is that the region needs to focus on devel-oping appropriate institutional mechanisms to coordinate the reform efforts. The fact that a sin-gle minister—or sometimes the Prime Minister’s office—is generally assigned with the responsi-



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bility of gearing a reform that affects all areas of government creates a major flaw in the change management strategy.24 The lack of support and participation of the other ministers will make it virtually impossible to implement the reform (Draper 2003). In the Belizean case, according to Reform 2000, the Ministry of Public Service is the agency commissioned with the task of imple-menting 20 out of 34 potential projects, while line ministries are in charge of implementing only three, and have joint responsibilities with the Ministry of Public Service on another one (Universalia, 2000). This highly concentrated re-sponsibility to gear the reform in the Ministry of Public Service, without clear incentives for the rest of the ministers to follow the initiatives, chal-lenges the implementation of the programmed changes.

The need for public service reform became evident and pressing with respect to both its scope and its ability to achieve social and economic objectives in an efficient and effective manner (Clarke 2002). There is agreement “across the board” that something has to be done to improve the efficiency of the public service, and in several instances HRM aspects of the reform have been recognized as crucial. At the time of the launch-ing of the reform, the three areas identified as having high potential to produce a measurable and positive impact on the public sector’s perfor-mance were governance, HRM and information technology (Universalia 2000).

Since the Public Sector Reform Council in-cludes a representative from the opposition in the National Assembly as well as representatives of all the political parties, the Plan is almost cer-tainly to be continued by the next administra-tion.25 It might be given more or less emphasis, but it will not be discarded (Testimonial).

Main Conclusions

Belize is a multicultural society with values and attitudes formed by a colonial administration, more closely geared to following procedures than to solving problems and measuring results (Uni-

versalia 2000). At the time of its Independence (1981), Belize inherited a well-functioning public administration of Westminster style based on a cabinet government, an independent judiciary, and a professional public service. Over time, the public service has been faced with a rapid increase in size, with challenges concerning its systems of functional control, accountability, and with decreasing standards of efficiency and quality of service. These challenges have been attributed to the breakdown of the traditional system of centralized personnel and financial control (Universalia 2000). Merit is reasonably rooted in the HRM system; hence, concerns are more related to the efficiency of HR functions.

There is consensus around the need for re-form, and there are several ongoing initiatives aimed at tackling identified weaknesses of the HRM system, in the context of an institution-alized public sector reform process. There is an effort by the authorities at the Ministry of Public Service to change from a rules-driven to a busi-ness-driven, result-oriented public service. This implies delegating not only responsibility, but also authority in order to get the expected results (Testimonial).

If compared with the situation in other coun-tries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the civil service in Belize has an intermediate level of development, more comparable to Costa Rica or Caribbean countries such as Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados than to the rest of the countries in Central America, which present highly po-liticized HR decisions in governmental orga-nizations, hence almost inexistent civil services

24 A diagnosis performed at the time of the Public Sector Reform launching process found out that some CEOs just “provided the document to their senior managers,” and some others admitted having little fa-miliarity with the document (Universalia 2000). These attitudes are a consequence of the lack of pressure ex-erted for the reform initiatives. 25 Both the UDP and PUP manifestos include a sec-tion on public service reform, emphasizing the need to improve its efficiency.


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(Iacoviello et al 2005). The fact of having a Brit-ish style civil service to start with makes a big dif-ference in Belize and the Caribbean. The main challenges are, therefore, different in nature—i.e. in Belize they are more concerned with avoiding the excessive bureaucratization of highly formal-ized procedures, rather than with dealing with excessively politicized decisions.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The role of both the Ministry of Public Service and the Public Sector Reform Council should be reinforced, so that their initiatives are supported by all actions needed from other governmental areas. There should be real pressure for change, and power should be vested on institutions so that they can exert pressure on the areas involved in the implementation of reform initiatives. Re-form efforts should be adopted by the public ser-vice at large, not only by the Ministry of Public Service. At the same time, the role of the Services Commission should be revised to guarantee that it oversees the central HR decisions throughout the government, without adding any unneces-sary bureaucratization to the decision process, while avoiding overlapping with the Ministry.

Another central issue that was addressed in previous diagnostic reports (Universalia, 2000;

PSRC, 2003; MAT, 2004) is that proposed ac-tions to improve the HRM system should be prioritized and assigned to an agency that must be clearly accountable for results. Another issue to take into account is that positive interactions with other ongoing reform initiatives should be maximized. The fact that there is an ambitious Financial Reform effort underway has to be used as a springboard from which to introduce im-provements into the civil service system.

From the analysis of each specific subsystem, several recommendations can be made. First, the focus on strategic planning should be em-phasized even further. Most of the weaknesses in several subsystems result from the fact that ef-forts to improve specific processes are isolated, i.e. not framed within a strategic plan. Second, it is central to develop performance management and incentive structures so that result-driven be-havior is rewarded. This is the only way to make sure that the process oriented culture is gradually replaced by a focus on results. Third, HR Devel-opment needs to be aligned to strategic objec-tives. Moreover, the ongoing process to develop an HRD plan is a key step to working in that direction. Fourth, even though the Work Orga-nization and Employment Management sub-systems are reasonably developed, more flexible and efficient procedures should be introduced in order to avoid bureaucratization.



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Analysis of the Analysis of the legal TheConstitution(1988)establishesCSCommission.PSRegulations(2001)and Institutional Context framework GovernmentWorkersRegulations(1992)makeupthebasiclegalframeworkfor publicemployment.

Functional Analysis Analysis of the Human TheMinistryofPublicService,ServicesCommission,PublicSectorReformCouncil of the Civil Service Resources Organization haveresponsibilitiesoverHRmanagementinthepublicsector.Thereissomedegree function ofoverlappingintheirroles.

Analyzed Quantitative Civilservicecomprisesaround12,000officers. Indicators of the CSS Thecentralgovernmentbillaccountsfor10%ofGDP. Thereisareasonablewagecompressionandcivilserviceincentives. Averagesalariesarehigherforpublicsector,butlesscompetitiveatmanagerial levels.

Analysis by Subsystems Planning Strategicplanningatmacrolevelisnotlayereddown.Systemsoffinancialcontrol andaccountabilityofthepublicserviceareweak.Salaryexpendituresrepresent heavyburdentopublicaccounts.TheITinfrastructureisnotdeveloped;thereare seriouslimitationstoaccessingbasicinformation.TheHRcomponentofinformation systemisbeingdeveloped.

Work Organization Jobclassificationandprofiledefinitionprocessesareratherformal,underan ambitiousstreamlininginitiative.Jobdescriptionsareperiodicallyreviewedbythe MPS.

Employment Meritocratictraditionforrecruitmentisinprocessofbeingpartiallydecentralized Management fromPublicServicesCommissiontoMPSandlineministers.Guaranteesagainst arbitrarinessareeffective,butdonotoperateforacategoryoftemporaryemployees (openvote)thatcomprisesaround2,000jobs.Adequatemechanismsforinduction, absenteeismcontrolandmobility.Possibilityofseparationforbadperformanceor foreconomicreasons(infrequentlyused).

Performance Recurrentproblemstoimplementinitiativestoimproveperformanceevaluation Management process.Itremainsdifficulttodefineperformancegoalsgiventheflawsinthe strategicplanningsystem.

Compensation Thesalarystrategyisdominatedbybudgetaryfocus.Reasonablewagecompression Management andinternalequity.Highersalariesinaverageforthepublicsector,butlesscompetitiveathigherlevels.Incentivesforgoodperformersareestablishedinlegislation,but arenoteffectivelyusedforthatpurpose.Non-monetarycompensationisinfrequent.

Professional Careersincludeverticalandhorizontaltracks.Advancementisbasedheavilyon Development seniorityandformalcredentials.Trainingeffortsaremoreorientedtoindividual Management preferencesofpublicofficersthantoorganizationalneeds.Thereisanongoing initiativetoestablishaHRDstrategyforBelize,includingpublicandprivatesectors.

Human and Social Therearenotmanyinitiativesfocusedonworkclimateandcommunication.Several Relations Management instancesofinteractionbetweenmanagementandunions,withunionrepresenta- tivestakingpartinjointbodiesthathaveresponsibilityinthedesignofHRpolicies.


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APPENDICES






Report Dates Diagnosis Date: July 2005

Consultants Mercedes Iacoviello Assistants: Paula Iacoviello and Cecilia Pivetta.

Acknowledgements

The consultant would like to emphasize the valu-able help that was provided by the staff of the IDB country office in Belize, especially by Mar-tha Mejia-Zampieri, Representative In-Charge, and Harold Arzu, Operations Specialist. At the Ministry of Public Service, Margaret Ventura, CEO, and Nuria Castellanos, Administrative Officer, organized a series of interviews with key informants, and facilitated a number of docu-ments and publications that were central for the assessment of the Belizean civil service.

Information Sources

Interviews

Meeting with Minister for the Public Service, Mr. José Coye.

Wednesday, 1st June 2005 at 1:30 p.m. – Be-lize City. Participants:

Margaret Ventura CEO, Ministry of Public Service

•

•

•

•

Nuria Castellanos Administrative Officer, Ministry of Public ServiceHarold Arzu IDB Office in Belize

Meeting with the Human Resource Develop-ment Committee.

Thursday, 2nd June 2005 from 9:30 a.m. to 10:30a.m – Ministry of the Public Service, Bel-mopan. Participants:

Marian Mc Nabb CEO, Ministry of Education. Chair of the HDR CommitteeMary Ann Sutherland Administrative Officer, Public Sector UnionHugh O Brien CEO, Ministry of National DevelopmentMargaret Ventura CEO, Ministry of Public ServiceConsuelo Waight External Consultant

Meeting with officials from the Office of the Ser-vices Commission.

Thursday, 2nd June 2005 from 1:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. Office of the Services Commission, Belmopan

Justin Palacios Director of the Public Service CommissionCharles Hyde Chairman of the Public Service Commission

Meeting with the Joint Staff Relations Council.Thursday, 2nd June 2005 from 3:30 p.m. to

4:30 p.m.Ministry of the Public Service, Belmopan.

Mary Ann Sutherland Administrative Officer, Public Sector UnionDylan Reneau President, Public Sector UnionCarla Burnett Ministry of FinanceMargaret Ventura CEO, Ministry of Public Service



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Meeting with the Public Sector Union President, Mr. Dylan Reneau.

Friday, 3rd June 2005 from 1 p.m. from 2 p.m., Ministry of the Public Service, Belmopan.

Meeting with the Coordinator of the Public Sec-tor Reform Council, Mrs. Diana Locke.

Friday, 3rd June 2005 from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m., Ministry of the Public Service, Belmopan.

Workshop-Institutional Assessment of Civil Ser-vice Systems-Case: Belize.

Friday, 3rd June 2005 from 10 a.m. to 12:30 a.m., Ministry of the Public Service, Belmopan.

Mary Ann Sutherland Administrative Officer, Public Sector UnionDylan Reneau President, Public Sector UnionMargaret Ventura CEO, Ministry of Public ServiceConsuelo Waight External ConsultantMarian Mc Nabb CEO, Ministry of Education. Chair of the HDR CommitteeDiana Locke Coordinator, Public Sector Reform Council

Documents

Clarke, Orton (2003). Delegation of powers of the Public Services Commission to Chief Executive Officers: the Belize experience. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/caricad/unpan010835.pdf

CSO 2000. Central Statistical Office (2000) Population Census 2000: Major findings www.cso.gov.bz

Draper, Gordon (2003). La situación y los retos futuros del servicio civil en el Caribe. In Ser-vicio Civil: Temas para un Diálogo. Koldo Echebarría (ed.) páginas 99–112. Washing-ton, DC. http://www.iadb.org/int/DRP/esp/Red5/Documentos/TemasParaUnDia-logo11-03esp.pdf

Government of Belize (1999). How we are governed. Retrieved on May 4, 2005 from http://www.belize.gov.bz/library/how_we_are_governed

Government of Belize (2000) Public Sector Re-form. Charting the Way Forward – 2000 and Beyond. April. http://www.belize.gov.bz/li-brary/public_sector_reform/page_04.html

Iacoviello, M.; Zuvanic, L., Rodríguez Gustá, A., Iturburu, M. and de la Cruz Orozco, I. (2005). Análisis de los sistemas de servicio civil en Latinoamerica: Estudios de caso de Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatema-la, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay, Perú, República Dominicana, Uruguay, Venezuela. Presented at the V Meeting of the Public Policy Management and Transparency Network, Mach 17–18 2005—Washington, D.C. http://www.iadb.org/int/DRP/ing/Red5/transpdoc5.html

IDB – Inter-American Development Bank (2004). Situación económica y perspec-tivas. Istmo centroamericano y República Dominicana. By Manuel Agosín, Regions Operations Department II, Inter-American Development Bank, final version, May 2004. Retrieved May 2005 from http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/SEPmayofinalMHung.pdf

ILO (1994). Case N° 1775, Queja contra el Gobierno de Belice presentada porel Sindi-cato del Servicio Público de Belice (PSUB) http://www.oit.org.pe/sindi/casos/bel/bel199401.html

ILO (1994). Case N° 1775, Complaint against the Government of Belize presented by the Public Service Union of Belize (PSUB) http://www.oit.org.pe/sindi/casos/bel/bel199401.html

Isaacs, H. (2004). Background Documents for the Caribbean Regional Policy Dialogue Meeting on Civil Service Reform. Presented in the Caribbean Subregional Meeting on Civil Service Reform. December 15, 2004 http://www.iadb.org/int/DRP/ing/Red5/transpdocSubCAR04.htm


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Longo, Francisco (2002). Analytical Frame-work for Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems. ESADE, Institute for Public Leadership and Management. http://www.iadb.org/int/DRP/ing/Red5/transpdoc3.htm.

MAT 2004, Management Audit Team (2004). Report of the Management Audit Team, through the Ministry of Public Service. Feb-ruary 26.

Ministry of Information (2005). BelizeToday.org. Number 1, Volume 1. Belmopan: Belize www.belize.gov.bz

MPS 2000, Ministry of Public Service (2000). Report of the Ministry of the Public Service, January – December 2000.

People’s United Party (PUP). Manifesto (1993–1998) “Building on success”

PRC (2000). Final report of the Political Reform Commission (PRC). January http://www.belize.gov.bz/library/political_reform/p11.html

Prime Minister Office (2005). Public Finance Re-form: a Working Paper. Presented by Prime Minister Said Musa to the Public Finance Reform Forum. January.

PSRC 2004, Public Sector Reform Council (2004). Update on the Work of the Reform Council. August.

U.S. Congress Library. Country Studies: Belize. Retrieved June 2005 from http://coun-trystudies.us/belize/73.html

United Democratic Party (UDP) Manifesto. Let’s get it right. 2003–2005.

Universalia (2000). Discussing the Way Forward. Final Report, January. www.universalia.com

US Department of State (2004). Background Note: Belize. Bureau of Western Hemisphere

Affairs. August. Retrieved June 2005 from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1955.htm

Waight, Consuelo (2004). Strengthening the Hu-man Resource Capacity in Belize. Diagnostic Report and Need Assessment Results. May. Funded by IDB.

WB (2000). The World’s Bank Group’s Country Loan Strategy for Belize. Belize Develop-ment Fund. http://belize1.com/BzLibrary/trust400.html

WB (2002). Belize: Country Brief. The World Bank Group (updated July 2002). Retrieved May 2005 from www.worlbank.org/bz

Legislation

http://www.belizelaw.org/lawadmin/index.html

BC – Constitution of Belize, 1981. Belize Public Authorities Protection Act. Chap-

ter 31. Revised Edition 2000, showing the law as at 31st December, 2000.

ILO (2003). International Labour Organization Conventions Act. Chapter 304:1. Approved in September 1999 (Revised Edition 2003).

Pensions Act, Chapter 30, Revised Edition 2003, showing the Substantive Laws as at 31st May, 2003.

Prevention of Corruption in Public Life Act, Chapter 12, revised edition 2000, showing the law as at 31st December, 2000.

PSReg (2001). Public Service Regulations. Min-istry of the Public Service, Belize.

SCReg (2001). Services Commissions Regula-tions, Ministry of the Public Service, Belize.



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WebsitesBelizeLegalInformationNetwork http://www.belizelaw.org/lawadmin/index.html

CentralIntelligenceAgency http://www.cia.gov

CentralStatisticalOffice http:/www.cso.gov.bz

Congresslibrary http://www.loc.gov

EconomicCommissionforLatinAmerican http://www.cepal.organdtheCaribbeean

GovernmentofBelize http://www.belize.gov.bz

Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank http://www.iadb.org/exr/espanol/index_espanol.htm

WorldBank http://www.bancomundial.org

WorldBankGroup–Belize http://www.worlbank.org/bz

ListofAbbreviationsBC ConstitutionofBelize

CARICOM CaribbeanCommonMarket

CEO ChiefExecutiveOfficer

EAP EmployeeAssistanceProgram

EU EuropeanUnion

GDP GrossDomesticProduct

HR HumanResource

HRD HumanResourceDevelopment

HRM HumanResourceManagement

HRP HumanResourcePlanning

IDB Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank

ILO InternationalLaborOrganization

IT InformationTechnology

MPS MinistryofPublicService

PA PerformanceAppraisal

PSReg PublicServiceRegulations

PUP People’sUnitedParty

SCReg ServicesCommissionsRegulations

UDP UnitedDemocracticParty

WB WorldBank


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ChAPTER �


The Case of JamaicaHedy Isaacs

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Conclusions

The Civil Service System (CSS) in Jamaica is in transition. However, despite the significant changes affecting CSS, the Public Employment and Human Resources Management (HRM) systems provide a stabilizing influence for the central Government and, by implication, aid in governance. The Government of Jamaica’s commitment to develop an efficient CSS is evi-dent from the imminent or ongoing moderniza-tion efforts made—a reform agenda, which is juxtaposed to a CSS that can be characterized as “fragmented, operating within a tradition of inherited hierarchical structures, and nodes for centralized decision-making.”

Against a background of stakeholders’ con-sensus regarding a reform direction linked to cost containment some elements of the legal frame-work—i.e. Staff Orders—for the CSS are being revised with the intention of “liberalizing the management of human resources to facilitate less central management” (Testimonial).

The constituent subsystems of the CSS are also being reformed in order to give HRM a stra-tegic direction. Specifically, in order to develop the institutional framework for HR Planning, a census

of public sector employees, a core building block for the HR Planning subsystem, is envisaged.

The Performance Management subsystem has been formalized through a Performance Management Appraisal System (PMAS) and in-troduced in five pilot ministries. HR personnel are being trained in the other agencies, in prepa-ration for introducing PMAS. Concurrently, the Work Organization subsystem is being reformed leading to the “revision of all job descriptions to make them more output-focused” (Testimonial). The Professional Development Management subsystem is soon to be reformed by incorporat-ing a policy framework and an analysis of the impact of training. These reform initiatives col-lectively constitute the bases for developing an integrated HRM system.

The Employment Management subsystem evidences a void in induction. In turn, the Com-pensation Management subsystem does not ad-dress the inclusion of non-monetary benefits in a structured way. The institutionalization of these benefits is likely to have merit, particularly in an ethos of cost containment. While modernization moves swiftly, this initiative places new demands on internal relationships in the CSS as well as on relationships with external stakeholders. The capacity to assess the organizational climate is desirable.



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In keeping with current HR practice, an in-tegrated system driven by a strategy for HR and underpinned by HR planning is required so as to optimize human resources. In Jamaica, there is no integrated HRM system in place. However, if the current drive to improve CSS efficiency is sustained together with the systematization of the other HR subsystems, namely Employment Management, Compensation Management and Human and Social Relations Management, the integration process is likely to be facilitated.

Finally, with regard to the organization of this report, it should be pointed out that this chapter builds upon the author’s 2004 report to the In-ter-American Development Bank entitled “Short Form for Institutional Assessment of CSS: Case of Jamaica,” which basically offered an overview of the CSS in the country at that time. The pres-ent paper incorporates other sections relating to the country’s institutional context, its background and legal framework. In addition, the analysis of each of the seven HRM subsystems has been further enlarged to focus more sharply on each of the ninety-three critical points for assessing CSS. In general, this revised work conforms to the original methodological framework provided by Longo, F. (2002). To this end, interviews were conducted in June 2007 with appropriate persons having the institutional memory of the CSS in 2004. Other elements of the original report were retained, namely the “ indices for the elaboration of the CSS,” the internal and external environ-ments, the critical points valuation, the summary table of preceding sections, and the conclusions of the diagnosis.


The Government of Jamaica is based on the Westminster-Whitehall (WW) politico-adminis-trative model, from which a parliamentary politi-cal system derives, pursuant to which the Head of Government is the Prime Minister and the Governor-General is the representative of the Head of State, Queen Elizabeth II of England.

A central tenet of this model is a politically neutral civil service. While the imported WW model is not a mirror image of its “parent,” there are efforts by the central civil service to avoid arbitrariness in employment management practices. These efforts are buttressed by a Public Service Commission with related responsibilities as well as by a recent innovation, the PMAS: se-lect ministries with delegated authority for em-ployment management are expected to observe the required principle of merit.

Each ministry is presided over by a perma-nent secretary, who is both the administrative head of the agency and the accounting officer, with responsibility for reporting to Parliament when there are instances of mal-administration or improper spending. Permanent appointments are made by permanent secretaries in agencies with delegated authority for the Employment Management function. In other words, in select agencies, permanent secretaries have delegated authority for recruitment, selection, promotion, mobility and termination.

In addition to the influence of historical antecedents, the CSS is also affected by other contextual elements, including economic and social factors. Critical to the achievement of the Government’s mandate for economic growth is the need for improving the optimization of the cadre of human resources as well as introduc-ing attitudinal and structural changes, among others.

The country’s policy mandates have shifted from its old practice of leading and controlling the economic activity since, even though the Government has not completely relinquished its leadership role in the economy, it also recognizes the critical role of the private sector in sustaining economic growth. The Government’s role is to facilitate the growth process, with the support of the civil service.

Jamaica’s economic growth path was ad-versely affected by the rise in the world oil prices and by a drop in foreign inflows. In its effort to regain economic stability, the country resorted to borrowing from international lending agencies.


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iNSTiTuTiONAL ASSESSmENT OF CiviL SERviCE SySTEmS: ThE CASE OF JAmAiCA

Reliance on borrowing and conformance to cer-tain structural adjustment loan program condi-tionalities led to a reduction in social programs, downsizing of the public sector and an existing debt burden of significant proportions. Accord-ing to the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) (2002:6), debt servicing—the largest component of government expenditure—was expected to amount to J$115.7 billion in 2001.

In February 2004, the Government of Ja-maica and the Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions arrived at a Memorandum of Under-standing for the Public Sector (MOU). As indi-cated in the MOU signed on February 17 2004, the parties or partners, recognizing that Gov-ernment faces a “high debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio, a large fiscal deficit, low economic growth and low employment creation” agreed to “pursue the appropriate macro-eco-nomic policies which provide a stable economic environment and encourage GDP growth and employment creation” (ibid). The partners also agreed on a policy of wage restraint in the pub-lic sector for the period April 1, 2004 – March 31, 2006 (ibid:2), as a “general policy of employ-ment constraint” (ibid:4) as well as expenditure restraint (ibid:5). Provision was made to deal with shortfalls in critical occupational catego-ries, including teachers, health sector employees, and members of the security forces. The part-ners also committed to the “development of the public sector that is modern, efficient, and of the optimum size, properly equipped and suitably rewarded” (ibid: 6).

The Cabinet Office was designated with the responsibility for preparing a training plan that would facilitate the preparation of the “public sector workforce for the needs of a modern la-bour market” (ibid:7).

Background

Public sector entities include public enterprises, local authorities, executive agencies, a network of parastatals, statutory bodies and the central civil service. The total public sector staff com-

plement is 97,434 while the civil service employs 32,067 persons (MoFP: Public Service Establish-ments Division, July 24, 2002).

Over time, the civil service has been char-acterized as large and centralized bureaucra-cies. Specifically, persistent concerns relate to the Government’s size and capacity, along with its lack of customer-centered orientation and of transparency (Isaacs 2002:18). Arguably, these may very well be exaggerated statements. What is apparent is that there is room for improvement in the way in which the Government functions (ibid). In 2002, some of these concerns were re-iterated by the Cabinet Secretary, who asserted that “traditionally, our public services have been designed for the convenience of the people who work in them, rather than for the people they are meant to serve. Even where performance stan-dards have been set, they have been set for man-agement purposes, rather than reflecting the real need of the customers.”

Responses to the complaints have taken shape in efforts to change the organization of the HRM function: “improve models of gover-nance through changing the rules by which pub-lic sector organizations are governed.” There is also emphasis on improving “the structure and staffing of public sector organizations, and the processes within the organizations” (21st Cen-tury Government Service – Decade of Excel-lence: Public Sector Modernization – Vision and Strategy 2002–2012, Cabinet Office; September 2002:3).

The CSS reform efforts undertaken since the country’s independence in 1962 evidence several landmarks, which are mentioned below.

Reforms in the Jamaican Civil Service were formalized under the Administrative Reform Programme (ARP I) in 1965. ARP I aimed at rationalizing HRM. In 1973, the Ministry of the Public Service (MPS) was created, with responsi-bility for developing systems for managing com-pensation, training and employee relations—i.e. industrial relations.

The Public Service Commission, established in the pre-independence period, is responsible for



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elements of employment management, namely: recruitment, selection, mobility and termination. The Office of the Services Commissions (OSC), headed by the Chief Personnel Officer (CPO), provides administrative support for the PSC. In the late 1980s, the MPS, under the aegis of ARP II, added the development and implementation of a HR Planning system to its responsibilities. Various training institutions dedicated to the training of civil servants were also established. ARP II also included a model for improving HRM, namely: delegations to line agencies.

In the 1990s, the MPS was subsumed by the Ministry of Finance and Planning and its responsibilities were assumed by the Cabinet Office. A comprehensive reform agenda was de-vised in order to improve the legal framework for the CSS, to address elements such as profession-alism, productivity and pay of public servants, and to introduce systems of accountability, im-proved customer service and a new organiza-tional form—decentralization.

Legal Framework

The legal framework is constituted by a collective of law, acts and regulations, namely: the Public Service Law, Public Service Regulations (1961), the Staff Orders for the Public Service (1976), the Civil Service Establishment Act and the Pensions Act. There are three Services Commissions: the Police Service, the Judicial Service Commission and the Public Service Commission or PSC (the latter with its own constitutional provisions and on which we will focus our attention).

The PSC Law gives overall responsibility for employment to the Commission. “The PSC is appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. Members are appointed for three years and may be removed on the grounds of ill health, resig-nation or if they run foul of the law. There is a caveat that members of the PSC should not hold other public office while a member of the PSC” (Testimonial).

The Public Service Regulations (1961) pro-vide criteria for appointment. These regulations and the Staff Orders “govern the conduct of public servants, setting out how they should un-dertake activities in an honest and accountable manner. The Regulations and Staff Orders are both in the process of review to bring them in line with effective modern principles and prac-tices” (Cabinet Office 2002:20).

The Civil Service Establishment Act controls the size of the central government. Positions on the establishment are permanent in nature. “Temporary appointments are generally made in posts where incumbents are on vacation or for probationary purposes” (Testimonial). “Con-tract officers are appointees in permanent posts; dependent on the level of post and age of the individual, these appointees are often recalled pensioners” (Testimonial). The intent of the Es-tablishment Act (MoFP 2002:33) is to contain the size of the central civil service to the level achieved after the downsizing exercise in 1992.

The Pensions Act governs the payment of pension to employees (on the establishment). The MoFP is responsible for the administration of both the Civil Service Establishment Act and the Pensions Act. “Other circulars and guide-lines issued by the Cabinet Office also guide the operations of the central civil service. The Cabi-net Office has a monitoring and standard-setting role” (Testimonial).

The Corruption Prevention Act sets the pro-visions for eliminating corruption and addresses the role of integrity in public life, specifically tar-geting public officers.


The analysis of the HR subsystems presented in this section follows the ninety-three critical points established by the methodology used in this study (Longo 2002), which are listed with their corresponding valuation in Appendix A. For each subsection, the corresponding critical points are indicated between parentheses, and


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a brief introduction is provided about the HR decisions and practices associated with each sub-system. In keeping with Longo’s framework, the analysis emphasizes the “existence and integrity of each of the HRM areas and processes, and the fulfillment of their basic purposes; the major connections with the other HRM subsystems, and the way each subsystem behaves in relation to the critical points, which enable the analyst to prove its effectiveness and quality” (Longo, F. 2002:43).


The HR planning constitutes the front door to the HRM system, and facilitates the comparison of qualitative and quantitative needs of human resources with its existing availability of internal resources in order to establish the HR gaps and the possible strategies to deal with them (Longo, 2002). This subsystem is the foundation of an in-tegrated system of human resource management “that contributes to ensuring strategic coherence in all human resource management policies and practices by linking them with organizational priorities” (ibid::17).

System Integrity and Existence (Critical Point 1)The existing Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS) is a prototype rather than a production model. A census of public sector employees, a core building block for planning purposes, is envisaged so as to de-velop the institutional framework needed for HR planning. This is likely to take place “in January 2005” (Testimonial). “The HRM user require-ments/software specification draft has been completed with a view to determining consistent and accurate user requirements in the HRM of the GOJ” (PSRU July 16th, 2004:12 Public Sec-tor Reform Unit, Cabinet Office—Annual Report 2003–2004). The Government of Jamaica, rec-ognizing the limitations of the existing HRMIS in terms of its capacity to proactively facilitate planning is currently in the process of acquiring

relevant software to “replace HRMIS within the 2004 financial year” (Testimonial).

The formalization of this subsystem is criti-cal even in an organizational environment that is characterized by “tighter management of the wage bill and a freeze on all categories of total employment,” particularly as there is a “Post-Operation Committee to deal with exceptions to the freeze” (Testimonial).

Strategic Coherence (2–3)In the absence of an overarching HR planning framework, the assessment of HR needs is driven by corporate plans and the budget exercise. This makes strategic coherence of HRM policies and practices problematic.

The MOU provides for a measure of finan-cial control, but there is room to employ new re-cruits if the need arises in critical occupational categories. The rationalization of roles and functions is framed within the planning exercise, while the degree of match is limited to the extent of the strictures of the MOU.

Basic Information (4)The census of public sector employees, which is integral to developing an information system to facilitate managerial decision-making, is report-edly imminent.

Effectiveness (5–9)Bearing in mind that this subsystem is in transi-tion and that relevant instruments are being de-veloped, and given the existence of the MOU, staff or human resources cannot be correctly distributed among agencies nor can their dis-tribution be optimized. In some instances, staff members indicated that their duties have ex-panded or they have taken on additional tasks. The additional tasks have sometimes proved to be onerous (Testimonials summarized).

Administration (10–11)To the extent that managers engage in corporate planning exercises, they do have a voice in deter-mining, even if only for indicative purposes, the



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HR and other resources requirements of their agencies. Managers’ participation in the formu-lation and implementation of meaningful HRP forecasts is, to a certain extent, conditional on the establishment of HRMIS, which is a produc-tion model at the central level.

Work Organization

The Work Organization function establishes and specifies the contents of the tasks for each job and the characteristics of the people who will carry them out. It includes both the description of the activities, functions, responsibilities and goals assigned to each position (job description) and the definition of the competencies, skills and attitudes deemed key for the successful per-formance of each job holder (profile definition) (Longo 2002).

Existence and Integrity of the Subsystem (12)The corporate planning framework provides, to some extent, a basis for deciding activities, func-tions and responsibilities. The PMAS specifically links the corporate/strategic planning processes (Civil Service of Jamaica – PMAS Guideline System and Reference Manual: Version 1, July 2004:2, Office of the Cabinet). In other words, the pilot agencies that have introduced PMAS are required to link their corporate plans with the Government’s priorities/ key objectives and goals.

Technical Quality and Flexibility (13–17)While a full-blown job evaluation was not done recently, job descriptions accurately reflect all the core elements, namely: job title, functions, re-sponsibilities and competencies. Specifically, job descriptions also include “purpose of job,” “key output/deliverables,” “performance criteria,” “key competencies, “core competencies” and “dimensions, authorities and decision-making.” Functions are clearly defined and employees know what is expected of them. This is particu-

larly true in the pilot agencies that have intro-duced performance management.

Positive developments are taking place within this subsystem as “all job descriptions are being revised to resolve an inherent weakness, namely: jobs are activity-oriented rather than output-ori-ented” (Testimonial, partially paraphrased). This exercise is being undertaken under the aegis of the Cabinet Office where the expertise for job description writing now resides. The linkages between effective job performance and job de-scriptions that incorporate personal profiles are recognized, and the revision exercise is precisely an attempt to address this. The revision exercise also aims at strengthening the interconnections between the Work Organization subsystem and the Professional Development Management and Performance Management subsystems (Testimo-nial paraphrased).

Quality of Profiles Definition (18–21)A team of consultants developed a competency framework or template of twenty six core com-petencies, while specific agencies define techni-cal competencies (Testimonial, summarized). Core competencies include oral communication, written communication, customer and quality focus, analytical thinking, problem solving, deci-sion-making and technical skills, among others. Competency levels as well as attributes describ-ing expected behaviors are stipulated and these requirements are being introduced in the pilot agencies for PMAS.

Administration (22–23)Job descriptions are reviewed periodically, in tandem with job evaluation or re-organization exercises.


This subsystem ideally focuses on the policies, practices and procedures concerning an individ-ual’s recruitment, selection, induction, mobility and separation from an organization. It is desir-able that these activities and the policy frame-


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work that guide them show transparency, equity and merit.

Equal Opportunity and Merit (24–27)In the central civil service, emphasis is placed on maintaining professionalism and merit. The Office of the Services Commissions “remains impartial, retains its monitoring/audit function for HRM and continues its role as an appellate body” (PSRU July 16th 2004:3). Recruitment for all positions is open by law to all candidates who meet the requirements. A practice of recent vin-tage is to advertise in the press all senior posts in-cluding those of permanent secretaries and chief executive officers, who head executive agencies.

“Agencies with delegations advertise inter-nally and among like agencies for all other posts. In ministries with delegated authority for re-cruitment, there are promotions committees that examine applicants, short list them and take de-cisions” (Testimonial).

Recruitment remains competitive and the selection committees generally reflect indepen-dence, technical competence and professionalism; there are established professional and technical criteria that recruits are expected to satisfy. The interconnection between this subsystem and the Work Organization subsystem is evident.

“Permanent secretaries have authority, under MoFP regulations, to appoint consultants. There has been a reduction in the number of political appointees, as advisors/consultants have now re-verted to substantive position holders. The vision is to employ “political advisors,” short-term tradi-tional consultants, as well as “specialist advisors” under the authority of the permanent secretary. The roles of designated political advisors will be clearly defined and guidelines for employment elaborated” (Testimonial, comments reportedly conform to the Report on Advisors/Consultants to Government July 2003). “Currently there are thirty-two posts of executive and special assis-tants to ministers. Each of the sixteen ministers is allowed to operate a total of two posts; execu-tive assistants help ministers in relation to their portfolio activities while special assistants do ad-

ministrative work /constituency activities” (Tes-timonial).

“Prospective employees are not generally discriminated against on the basis of gender, eth-nicity, or on cultural grounds. There are, how-ever, sometimes delays in finalizing recruitment procedures” (Testimonial).

Recruitment and Selection Quality (28–32)“Jobs are generally widely advertised for senior positions (for the senior executive group), the re-sponse rate is good and the posts are generally filled. It is, however, difficult to attract persons to fill positions in the information technology and planning fields, which are highly competitive and existing salaries are an apparent disincen-tive” (Testimonial, paraphrased).

Selections are generally based on skills pro-files. Selection at the CEO level relies on the “as-sessment centre methodology” and interviews conducted by the PSC. The PSC generally acts independently and with professionalism.

Induction Quality (33–34)There is a void in terms of the existence of an induction process/program. The practice is that the Cabinet Secretary usually meets with new permanent secretaries. At the entry level for the administrative, technical and professional cadres, graduates participate, from time to time and after having been on the job between six months and two years, in a “Graduate Entry Programme”. But “the letter of appointment of a new recruit usually advises him/her to familiarize him or herself with the Staff Orders and the Public Ser-vice Regulations” (Testimonial).

Mobility (35)“Usually on the advice of an agency (ministry or department), the PSC can act, transfer or rede-ploy an employee. Under delegation of author-ity, agencies may decide on transfers among the ‘delegated’ agencies. Individuals may also apply for transfers or appeal against transfers” (Testi-monial).



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Absenteeism and Discipline (36–37)Absenteeism indices are not maintained. Super-visors working with their agency’s HR section may resort to counseling, reprimand or giving assistance. “In practice, chronic absenteeism may lead to retirement in the public interest” (Testimonial).

Disciplinary procedures are set out in the Public Service Regulations, but in the interest of due process there are sometimes delays in the resolution of issues. “Decisions made on the basis of these procedures are rarely challenged successfully” (Testimonial). Arguably, there is a perceived need to strengthen the procedure relating to the enforcement of discipline to fa-cilitate timeliness and improve the perception of equity.

Separation (38–41)Generally, only ministers’ advisors or consul-tants leave their offices when there is a change in the administration. Dismissals/terminations follow set disciplinary procedures: when there is “abolition of office or when there is reorga-nization and posts are deleted, then individuals are retired on the ground of abolition of office if a similar position cannot be found elsewhere, or on the grounds of reorganization” (Testimo-nial).

“Persons are not disciplined for poor perfor-mance or incapacity; they are generally terminat-ed. In exceptional cases where poor performance is due to personal problems termination is not considered to be the appropriate response” (Tes-timonial).


This subsystem provides guidelines that are based on organizational goals, against which performance is measured. A performance ap-praisal instrument that facilitates feedback to employees regarding their performance and that provides them with a benchmark to engage in professional development is also integral to this subsystem.

Performance Planning and Follow-up (43–45)This subsystem is in transition, evidencing posi-tive developments, such as the development of a performance management policy and the intro-duction of a Performance Management and Ap-praisal System (PMAS). Since July 2003, six pilot agencies—the Ministry of Finance, Office of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Office, Office of the Ser-vices Commissions, Ministry of Transport and Works and the Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Works—have introduced the PMAS. “All other ministries will ‘come on stream’ in April 2005” (Testimonial). This subsystem is formalized at the permanent secretary level and in six of sixteen ministries permanent secretaries are assessed annually on the basis of established criteria outlined in their performance contract. “The Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Works is no longer a pilot agency effective April 2004” (Testimonial).

The process of specifying performance guidelines to employees is in progress in five pi-lot agencies. Individual work plans linked to the agencies’ corporate/strategic plans and to divi-sional/unit plans are being developed.

Training in performance management is be-ing carried out service-wide in support of the formalization of this subsystem. “The Cabinet Office trained individuals in pilot agencies to prepare work plans. Work plans stipulate output, standards and competencies. Performance stan-dards are specific and are developed by the em-ployee and his or her supervisor” (Testimonial). Performance is to be rated against standards, while pay is now linked to performance in the pilot agencies.

The perception is that “people feel that the PMAS can work and will reduce subjectivity in-herent in performance appraisal” (Testimonial), suggesting some level of trust in PMAS.

Administration (49)It is evident that while managers may trust PMAS there is a perception that “managers have some


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level of discomfort with their new role” (Testi-monial). Given the fact that the effectiveness of PMAS depends on managers dedicating signifi-cant amounts of time to the task of performance planning, standard setting, providing continuous feedback, among other aspects, it is understand-able that the process of reorientation to assume a relatively new role will take time.

There is no basis for assessing the timeliness with which managers complete performance ap-praisal forms, bearing in mind that PMAS is a recent initiative.


This subsystem balances employees’ contribu-tions and rewards. The monetary and non-mon-etary benefits offered by the organization to its employees ideally compensates them equitably for their contribution to achieving the organiza-tion’s objectives vis-à-vis others performing simi-lar tasks within and outside the organization. This subsystem should be connected with the Work Organization and Performance Manage-ment subsystems.

Compensation Strategy, Internal and External Equity (50–57)While the wage structure and payment policies generally follow a set of priorities and objectives, there is some evidence of reactivity attributable to a number of factors, namely: “relative job worth, wage negotiation/bargaining, fiscal pol-icy—the MOU that freezes wages, the market value of the job that affects some categories, in-cluding legal (lawyers) and medical occupational groups—and pay linked to performance” (Testi-monial paraphrased).

Salaries are considered to be competitive at lower and middle levels but not at top levels. This is reflected in the compression measure. Vertical wage compression of salaries is a mea-sure of the difference between the total pay re-ceived by employees at the top wage level and those at the lowest level of the wage scale. The ratios calculated, 1:15.3 and 1:16.4, were exam-

ined against the range 1:7 and 1:20. Overall, the ratios are within the range and suggest that there is relative internal equity in the compensa-tion structure.

In an effort to retain staff and to provide a decent living wage as well as internal equi-ty, the GoJ has brought salaries up to 40% of market.

In terms of external equity, the intent is to bring salaries to 80% of market, but this is con-strained by fiscal policy, specifically the MOU.

Effectiveness of Compensation Policies and Wages Administration (58)While compensation aims to attract and moti-vate, this is not necessarily a perception shared by all staff members. There is the view that this perception is likely to change when the PMAS is institutionalized service-wide. “The more we move toward performance-linked pay, the more employees will appreciate the equity in the pay structure” (Testimonial). The formalization of PMAS will also provide the information for vari-able payments.

Wages Administration (59–61)No abusive practices in wage decisions are evident in the central government. The MOU guides the transparency of the pay regime. While the wage range appears to be reasonable, wage costs are arguably excessive in the health sector “which contributes to 18.37% of the current wage bill” (Ministry of Finance, undated, “Contribution of Sectors to Wage Bill 2003/04”). Another source asserts that excessive salaries in health result from “the level of overtime paid to persons in that oc-cupational category” (Testimonial).

As for equity and transparency, persons on fixed-term contract, for example permanent sec-retaries, are all paid the same salary. “Permanent Secretaries recruited from outside the civil ser-vice are on fixed contract” (Testimonial).

Other Benefits (62–64) In addition to wages and non-contributory pen-sions, employees receive other benefits, including



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contributory health schemes and transportation allowances. Although pension is not considered adequate and the payment of this benefit is re-portedly subject to long delays, it is protected by law.

Longtime service awards are the norm whereas non-monetary benefits are not insti-tutionalized. Contemporary HR practice has shown that non-monetary incentives serve not only to recognize and reward but to motivate employees as well. Consideration may be given to introducing these benefits service-wide.

Congruence has been found between this subsystem and the Work Organization subsys-tem.


This subsystem focuses on the organization’s ef-forts to promote staff development and learning. These efforts are framed within defined “career paths that match the organization’s needs with the individual profile” (Longo 2002:34). The ef-fectiveness of this subsystem is largely dependent on the extent to which appropriate career, pro-motion and training policies are adopted.

Effectiveness of Promotion Policies and Career Design Quality (65–70)There is a vision of career paths, but this has minimal impact, with the exception of some occupational categories in the fields of law and medicine. Performance is the main criteria for promotion and, in general, organizations man-age the process flexibly, particularly those agen-cies with delegated authority for the employment function.

Alternatives to hierarchical promotions are not formalized, but there are opportunities for horizontal promotions and the practice bears this out. Indeed, professional and technical person-nel move into top management/corporate man-agement levels. Instances may be cited where engineers, health professionals and lawyers were promoted to positions of permanent secretaries or chief executive officers.

Individual and Collective Learning Management (71–76)Reportedly, it is difficult to say whether train-ing is adequate. People who are specifically tar-geted under the current modernization (reform) program are likely to receive adequate training. Training programs, under the aegis of the Cabi-net Office, were targeted to individuals working in the following areas: information technology, human resource management and corporate planning.

But training offerings may not be adequate in general, as most requests are focused on in-dividual development needs rather than on sat-isfying the organizational needs or objectives. Nevertheless, it is felt that training improves the capacity of the organization to solve problems as well as enhances the mobility of trainees.

The current priority lies in the development of a training policy and plan to facilitate central government employees’ professional develop-ment. The plan is required under the terms of the MOU (February 16th, 2004–2006), accord-ing to which “a training plan must be provided by the Government to the partners—the Jamaica Confederation of Trade Unions (JCTU)—with-in twelve months of signing the MOU” (MOU 2004: 7).

Instruments for training needs analysis, train-ing needs assessment, evaluation and impact evaluation were developed to facilitate training management and development efforts. Agen-cies with delegations are empowered to conduct training needs analyses and impact assessments. The needs analysis instrument was “tested” in the Ministry of Finance: in 2003–2004, ques-tionnaires were sent in an effort to secure a sense of the training needs of the civil service. Howev-er, the response rate was poor. What was evident was the need to train HR personnel to conduct needs analysis so as to be able to identify the skills needed in a modernizing ethos.

There is a vision to conduct needs analysis service-wide. The products of this survey will, in all likelihood, inform the training plan (Testimo-nial paraphrased).


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There is an apparent link between this sub-system and the Employment Management sub-system, although this is constrained by current limitations on promotion and employment op-portunities. There is also a career planning/suc-cession planning deficit.

The integrity of this subsystem will be en-hanced with the implementation of the training needs analysis, the development of a training plan and the evaluation of investments in train-ing.


This subsystem focuses on the relations between the organization and its employees. Emphasis is placed on the extent to which the organiza-tion evaluates its work climate and adequately addresses labor relations issues as well as institu-tionalizes adequate social policies.

Work Climate (77–78)There are no specific instruments for evaluating the organizational climate. “Human and social relations management in the CSS in Jamaica is perceived as fulfilling its purpose when manag-ers encourage a culture of concern. Managers require personal competencies to do this. Inno-vative approaches to managing the organiza-tional climate that encourage staff and improve their satisfaction sometimes clash with the tra-ditional civil service culture that tends not to encourage the use of specific communication instruments that reinforce employees’ involve-ment and feelings of being valued” (Testimo-nial).

In the field of social policy-making, the Pub-lic Sector Assistance Program constitutes a best practice and is preeminent among existing social policies and practices that provide benefits and assistance to central government employees.

Communication Effectiveness (79–81) The OSC in its HRM auditing capacity, the Staff Associations and Unions and the shift from a “personnel culture” to HRM collectively con-

tribute to providing an informal assessment of the work climate in the absence of formalized techniques. (Isaacs 2002:36)

Labor Relations Balance and Quality (82–85)The MOU, to which the Government of Jamai-ca and the Unions representing central govern-ment employees are signatories, is an evidence of an approach to labor relations management that reflects accommodation. It has been argued that “since the MOU, labor relations have not been adversarial” (Testimonial).

MoFP’s Industrial Relations Unit hosts workshops on industrial relations with HR prac-titioners from the central government, which are held bi-annually for the purpose of enhancing good industrial relations practices. “Resource persons include union officials, academics and in-house personnel” (Testimonial).

Labor Conflict Management (86–88)Readily resolved conflicts focus on salaries, allow-ances, training issues, new initiatives in training, non-monetary benefits (for example, the trans-portation service for civil servants arose from a union agreement), improved conditions of ser-vice, improvements in the work environment. In-stead, conflicts relating to job evaluations usually prove difficult to resolve, arguably “because of the unions’ perception in terms of what value to place on jobs” (Testimonial).

The MOU is considered to be an effective instrument for resolving conflict. Under the pur-view of the MOU there is a monitoring commit-tee comprised of both union leaders and MoFP officials, thus reinforcing the effectiveness of the mechanism.

Social Policies Management (88–89)Staff Orders 2004 specify health and safety re-quirements for the central civil service and a policy-making role for the agency with responsi-bility for the public service. Moreover, they stipu-late a role for permanent secretaries and heads of departments to ensure the implementation of



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related policies, by providing a “working envi-ronment, which is safe, environmentally friendly and accessible to persons who might be physi-cally challenged” (2004:59) and by designating a senior member of management with responsibil-ity for related matters. “These orders need to be fleshed out” (Testimonial).

Social care and benefits received by civil ser-vants are considered to be on par with existing benefits in the private sector. Civil servants are eligible for a range of leave facilities, including sick, departmental, vacation, maternity, no-pay leave as well as pension benefits. There is the view that “the old leave regime (before 2004) was arguably more generous than the private sector practices existing then” (Testimonial).

“A pensions working group examined ex-isting pension’s policy, legislation, schemes and administrative operations in the public sector to make recommendations for changes in the sys-tems. These changes are to optimize benefits to employees, ensure consistency and equity within the sector, and simplify and modernize adminis-tration of the schemes for greater timeliness and efficiency in payments. A White Paper on the reform of the Public Sector Pension System is

scheduled to be tabled early in the financial year 2004/2005” (Public Sector Reform Unit, Cabi-net Office July 16, 2004:8).


This function analyzes the extent to which HRM responsibilities are unified or fragmented as well as the locus of decision-making concerning per-sonnel, i.e. whether relevant decisions are cen-tralized or decentralized.

The PSC, the Cabinet Office and the MoFP are key actors among the central agencies re-sponsible for the CSS. Save for these agencies that have delegated authority, managers in line agencies have a limited decision-making role relative to HRM. The perception is that these central agencies add value.




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[+/–]


STRATEGY

WorkOrganization





RecruitmentMobility

Separation

PlanningEvaluation

Planning [+/–]




[+] [+] [+/–]

[+/–]

[+/–]


learning


payment






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IV. INDICATORS



Totalnumberofpoliticalappointments 32 PSRU,CabinetOffice(July2004)

Totalnumberofpositionsforthecivilian 32,067 MinistryofFinance(August2004)centralGovernment


Thepercentageofpoliticallydesignatedpositionsisnegligible,indicatingaprofessional,merit-basedcivilservice.

Thenumberofpostsfordesignated“politicaladvisors”hasnotyetbeenestablished.


Centralgovernmentwagebill(inmilliondollars) 886.2 MinistryofFinance(August2004)(59,079MillionJMDx 0.016)

GDP(inmilliondollars) 6,548.6 MinistryofFinance(August2004)(436,573MillionJMDx 0.016)

Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product 13.5%

Thisisameasureoftheextenttowhichthecostofpublicemploymentisaburdenontheeconomy.Thewagebillexcludestraininggrantsandnon-contributorypensions.ThisindicatoriswithintherangeusingtheWorldBankcomparatorof5–25%.


I.HighersalaryofciviliancentralGovernment(indollars) 58,860 Totalpayreceivedbyemployeesatthetopwagelevel 3,924,000JMDx0.016)

II.LowersalaryofciviliancentralGovernment(indollars) 3,588 Totalpayreceivedbyemployeesatthelowestwagelevel (239,200JMDx0.016)


Theratioscalculatedwereexaminedagainsttherange1:7and1:20.Overalltheratiosarewithintherangeandsuggestthatthereisrelativeinternalequityinthecompensationstructure.



II.PercapitaGDPbymonth(indollars) 114.6 (7,642JMDx0.016)


1 All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1JMD = 0.0150 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Con-verter)


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I.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 32,067

II.TotalPopulation 2,600,000

Total number of central government employees/ 1.2% Total population


I.Centralgovernmentexpenditure(inmilliondollars) 886.2 MinistryofFinance(August2004)(59,079MillionJMDx 0.016)

II.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 32,507


(continued)



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Elaboration of the Indices

The indices and sub-indices listed above were constructed on the basis of the analysis of 93 critical points that reflect key elements of HRM subsystems and of the comparability of the CSS in Jamaica. Appendix A lists the valuation of such critical points and their corresponding number to which these values relate.

Efficiency: [10]The Efficiency index, linked to 13 critical points, measures the degree of optimization of the in-vestment in human capital identified in the CSS of Jamaica, in particular the capacity of the in-stitutional framework for planning to proactive-ly facilitate accurate and timely forecasts of HR requirements. This index also values the align-

ment of the CSS with the scale of fiscal policy and its reference markets. Specifically, the index is interconnected to the fiscal weight of public employment relative to the state of the economy, to the evidence of evaluations of costs and ben-efits of training, to non-monetary benefits, the adequacy of pensions and social care benefits. A number of these elements require further de-velopment.

Merit: [14.92]This index assesses the extent to which policies and practices incorporate professional criteria. Employment and wage decisions do not general-ly reflect nepotistic practices. This index is linked to 10 critical points.




(M) Merit 14.92 75%









(CI) Integrating 11.65 58% Capacity


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Structural Consistency: [11.49]The Structural Consistency index evaluates whether the core building blocks required for an efficient CSS are in place. This index is linked to three sub-indices, namely: Strategic Coherence, Directive Consistency and Consistency of Pro-cesses, and to 29 critical points.

Strategic coherence [4.71] measures the alignment of HRM policies and practices to strategic gov-ernment priorities.

Directive consistency [5.57] values the extent to which the directive function is developed in the CSS “with special attention to the relationship between the central techno-structure and the line managements.”

Consistency of processes [5.42] values the capacity of the CSS to sustain an integrated HRM sys-tem. This index is related to 29 critical points that are linked to elements of the HR Planning, Work Organization and Performance Manage-ment subsystems. The HR Planning subsystem is yet to be formalized. The Performance Man-agement subsystem has been formalized in pilot agencies, while the Work Organization subsys-tem is being strengthened.

Functional Capacity [11.58]This index, linked to 41 critical points, measures the extent to which the CSS in Jamaica promotes behaviors that are in line with the organization’s priorities and lead to improved public services. The index is related to three sub-indices: Com-petency [6.00], Incentive Effectiveness [5.23] and Flexibility [5.64].

Integrating Capacity: [11.65]This index is related to 19 critical points and val-ues the effectiveness with which the CSS harmo-nizes expectations and interests of internal and external stakeholders, empowers them and re-duces conflict. The MOU (February 2004–2006) signed by the Government and the unions repre-senting the civil service is of significance.

V. CONCLUSIONS


The HR System: the existence of an integrat-ed HRM system is critical for an efficient CSS. Although the organizational design of the CSS emphasizes professionalism and positive devel-opments are taking place, the HRM system is still fragmented.

The Performance Management and Work Organization subsystems are developing posi-tively; reforms to the Professional Development Management and HR Planning subsystems are envisaged; however, the Compensation Man-agement, Employment Management and the Human and Social Relations Management sub-systems require strengthening.

The development of a training policy and plan, as required by the MOU—specifically a plan based on a reliable needs analysis to be ultimately evaluated in terms of costs and ben-efits—is likely to increase the efficiency of the CSS in Jamaica.

The CSS presents a void in the career/suc-cession planning in the Professional Development subsystem. In turn, the Employment Manage-ment subsystem evidences a weakness: there is no induction program in place. Finally, the non-monetary benefits are not institutionalized, while the Human and Social Relations Management subsystem needs to be strengthened in order to include an instrument for evaluating the organi-zational climate.


The legal framework and organizational culture influence the efficiency of the CSS. The existing legal framework—made up of Acts and Regula-tions, including the Public Service Regulations (1961) that “govern the conduct of public ser-vants”—does not address the HRM system holis-tically. The modernization of the Staff Orders to facilitate timely disposal of cases involving breach-es of the disciplinary “code” is in progress.



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The “entire question of reform has been accompanied by a steady battle to create an ac-ceptance, commitment and culture of change in order to win the confidence and patronage of all stakeholders, especially the unions, which have been wary of the recruitment and displacement issues associated with the reform” (CARICAD, March 2001: 15).

Socio-economic factors and local percep-tions continue to exert an influence on the CSS. The labor market is competitive. Professionals, in particular, lawyers, health professionals and teachers continue the migration trend. The ab-sence of a well-developed labor market informa-tion system reinforces the need to formalize the HR Planning subsystem that is supported by ac-curate and timely HRMIS.

In spite of the Government of Jamaica’s concerted efforts to address the public percep-tion that agencies lack transparency in their operations and need to improve accountabil-ity through the enactment of the Public Bodies Management and Accountability Act and the Access to Information Act, the perceptions still persist and influence the CSS.

Main Conclusions

“Public sector reform is driven at the highest lev-el in Jamaica, as the Prime Minister is involved” (CARICAD, March 2001:15). The reform agen-da incorporates the modernization of the legal framework for the CSS with the purpose of fa-cilitating a less centralized management of HR, the formalization of select HR subsystems and the strengthening of others. However, these re-forms to the CSS are not framed within an inte-grated HRM system.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The reason why there is no integrated HRM system for CSS in Jamaica lies in the fact that the CSS lacks the fundamental connections that must exist between the subsystems. In particular,

the succession planning void limits the intercon-nections between the Professional Development and Performance Management subsystems and ultimately limits the integrating capacity of the CSS. Furthermore, as HR Planning is linked to Employment Management and Work Organiza-tion, in the absence of an accurate, timely and relevant information base, determining the qual-itative and quantitative requirements of human resources would turn out to be ineffective. HR Planning informs other subsystems and related processes, such as recruitment, selection, induc-tion, mobility. Furthermore, availability opti-mization is constrained in the absence of HR Planning.

Moreover, improvements in optimization and the introduction of attitudinal and struc-tural changes are critical to the Government’s mandate for economic growth.

Therefore, it is desirable that current efforts to improve the efficiency of the CSS be sus-tained, together with the formalization of the other HRM subsystems, namely Employment Management, Compensation Management and Human and Social Relations Management.

In the field of Employment Management in particular, it is desirable that the impulse to for-malize the PMAS service-wide and revise all job descriptions to “make them output-oriented” is sustained.

As for the Compensation Management sub-system, the institutionalization of non-monetary benefits is likely to have merit, particularly in an ethos of cost containment. In addition, the capacity to assess the organizational climate is desirable, since no instruments are currently available for this purpose.

All these initiatives, if sustained, are likely to enhance the structural consistency and facilitate the integration process of the CSS in Jamaica.To sum up, with the existing limitations in mind, the following recommendations are made (a) de-velop an integrated HRM system; (b) formalize a service-wide induction program; (c) give con-sideration to the introduction of non-monetary benefits; (d) develop instruments for the regular


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assessment of the organizational climate, and (e) sustain the efforts to develop an institutional framework for HR Planning and for strength-

ening the Work Organization Management, Performance Management and Development Management subsystems.


Categories Factors Evaluator’s Comments

BackgroundAnalysis of the Analysis of the Legal TheConstitution(1962),thePublicServiceLaw,PublicServiceRegulations(1961), Institutional Context Framework TheStaffOrdersforthePublicService(1976),TheCivilServiceEstablishmentAct andthePensionsActconstitutethelegalframeworkfortheCSSinJamaica. ThisframeworkdoesnotaddresstheHRMsystemcomprehensively.

Functional Analysis Analysis of the Human TheCabinetOffice,thePSCandtheMoFParemaindecisionmakers.Selectagencies of the Civil Service Resources Organization alsohavedelegatedauthorityforHRM.Thecentralagenciesaddvalueintheiraudit- function ingandmonitoringroles.

Analyzed Quantitative ThestaffcomplementofthecivilserviceinJamaicais32,067.Centralgovernment Indicators of the CSS wagebillaccountsfor13.5%oftheGDP,evidencingarelativeburdenontheeconomy. Thecompensationstructurereflectsrelativeinternalequity. Governmentsalariesareat40%ofmarket.

Analysis by Subsystems Planning TheMOUatthemacrolevelaswellasthecorporateplanningframeworkatthe organizationallevelprovide,toalimitedextent,basesforHRPlanning. Acensusofcivilservants,acorebuildingblockforHRPlanning,isimminent. HRMISisaprototypeandnotaproductionmodel.TheformalizationoftheHRPlan- ningsubsystemthatincorporatesatimelyandaccurateHRMISwillenhancethe structuralconsistencyofthecorebuildingblocksofaHRMsystem,namely:HRP, PerformanceManagementandWorkOrganizationsubsystems.

Work Organization Jobevaluationhasprovidedabasisforthedevelopmentofoutput-orientedjobde- scriptionsthatincludedcompetenciesprofiles.Theexerciseofdevelopingappropri- atejobdescriptionshasbeguninpilotagenciesandisinprogress.

Employment Whileemphasiscontinuestobeplacedoninsulatingthoseresponsibleforemploy- Management mentmanagementdecisionsfrompoliticalinfluence,thissubsystemevidencesgaps inservice-wideinductionprograms,anddatabasesonstaffturnoverandabsenteeism.

Performance Theintroduction,inpilotagencies,ofPMAS—arecentinitiative—evidencesefforts Management toprovidestandardsagainstwhichtomeasureperformanceaswellasadequate instrumentsforappraisingperformanceanddevelopingemployees.Theformaliza- tionofthissubsystemservice-widewillprovidethebasisforvariablepaymentsand mayservetomotivatehighperformers.

Compensation TheMOUdictatestheoverarchingsalarystrategy.Thereisevidenceofinternaleq- Management uity.Avisiontocreateexternalequityis“onhold.”PMAShasbeenintroducedto facilitatemerit-basedpay.Asharperfocusonintroducingnon-monetaryincentivesis desirableinanethosofcostcontainment.

Professional Thereisadeficitincareer/successionplanning.Advancementofindividualsinthe Development professionalandtechnicaloccupationalcategoriesisbasedonprofessionalcriteria, Management withpossibilitiesforhorizontalmobility.Qualifications,experience,performance and,whenallotherfactorsareequal,seniorityarecriteriatakenintoaccountfor othercategories.Intheabsenceoforganizationaltrainingneedsassessments, trainingisbasedonindividualneeds.Investmentintrainingisnotevaluated.



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APPENDICES





Appendix C Report Technical Information

Report Dates Diagnosis Dates: November 2004


Acknowledgements

2004:Interviews were conducted with the persons whose names are listed:

Mr. George Briggs, Chief Technical Director/ Head, PSRU, Cabinet Office, was inter-viewed July 29th, 2004.

Mr. Dennis Townsend, Acting Deputy Financial Secretary, Public Service Establishment Di-

•

•

•

Categories Factors Evaluator’s Comments

Atrainingpolicyandplanisbeingdeveloped.

Human and Social TheMOUrepresentsapositivedevelopmentthatsignalsalaborrelationsethos Relations Management ofaccommodationratherthanconfrontation.Theformalizationofspecificinstru- mentstoevaluatetheorganizationalclimateandsustain“new”relationshipswith internalandexternalstakeholdersisdesirable.

Comparison with TheCSSinJamaicaisframedwithintheBritishmodel,whichisbasedonrecruitment other analyses systemsandemphasizestheprofessionalismandindependenceofindividualsre- sponsibleforthemanagementofemployment.TheorganizationaldesignoftheCSS alsoreflectselementsfromthesystemsmodel.

(continued)

vision, Ministry of Finance was interviewed jointly with Mrs. Maria Walters, Senior Pay Planning Officer, Compensation Officer, Compensation Unit, Ministry of Finance, on August 5th, 2004.

The consultant appreciates the information/documentation that these individuals shared.

2007:Interviews were conducted with the persons whose names are listed:

Mr. Charles Jones, a retired Chief Personnel Of-ficer (CPO) who held the position of CPO from 2000–2006, was interviewed on June 20th, 2007 from 10:a.m. to12:00 p.m.

Mrs. Sherrill Oreggio-Angus, Programme/Implementation Manager, PMAS, Cabinet Office, was interviewed on June 22nd, 2007 from 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Mr. Dennis Townsend, Deputy Financial Secre-tary (DFS), Public Service, Establishments Division, and

Ms. Charmaine Stephens, Executive Assistant to (DFS) Mr. Townsend, were interviewed jointly on June 25th, 2007 from 10.a.m. to 11:30 a.m.

Telephone interviews were conducted with the persons whose names are listed:


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Ms. Michelle Diaz, Director Planning and Re-search, Cabinet Office. The joint views that she presented were based on discussion with Mrs. Leonie Harris, Principal Director, Cor-porate Management and Development, Cabinet Office. Interview conducted June 27th, 2007.

Miss Halcian Gallimore, Director Scholarships and Financial Assistance, Cabinet Office, June 27th, 2007.

Works Consulted

Documents

Caribbean Centre for Development Adminis-tration (CARICAD). Strategic Planning in Caribbean Public Services; “Report of the Working Group on Public Sector Reform: Building Capacity for Better Governance.” A project of CARIFORUM and the Euro-pean Development Fund, March 2001.

Central Government Wage Bill 1996–2004/ Contribution of Sectors to Wage Bill 1999–2004. Ministry of Finance, August 5, 2004 Kingston: Jamaica.

Jamaica Memorandum on the Budget 2004/2005 Extract “Wage Bill and Projected Wage Bill (Nominal – $m)”, “Wage Bill and Projected Wage Bill (Real – $m).” Public Service Es-tablishment Division, Ministry of Finance, Kingston: Jamaica.

Jamaica Memorandum on the Budget 2004/2005 Extract “Wage Bill and Projected Wage Bil l(% Change – Nominal)”, “Wage Bill and Projected Wage Bil l(% Change-Real).” Pub-lic Service Establishment Division, Ministry of Finance, Kingston: Jamaica.

Isaacs, Hedy (2002). “Evaluation of Civil Service Systems. Case Study: Jamaica.” Final Report submitted to the Inter-American Develop-ment Bank.

Isaacs, Hedy (2004). Short Form for Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems. Case Study: Jamaica. Report submitted to the In-ter-American Development Bank.

Longo, Francisco. (2002) “Analytical Framework for the Institutional Assessment of Civil Ser-vice Systems.” ESCADE. Barcelona: Spain.

Memorandum of Understanding for the Public Sector, February 17, 2004.

Ministry of Transport and Works. Sample Job Descriptions for Senior Secretary in the Per-manent Secretary’s Office, Office Manager, 2004.

Performance Management & Appraisal System, Civil Service of Jamaica: “Guidelines and Reference for System Implementation.” Ver-sion 1.0, issued July 2004. PSRU, Cabinet Office, Kingston: Jamaica.

Public Sector Reform Unit. “Annual Report 2003–2004.” PSRU Cabinet Office, GoJ (July 16th, 2004). Kingston: Jamaica.

Public Sector Reform Unit, Cabinet Office: Ministry Paper 56/2002 “Government at Your Service: Public Sector Modernization Vision and Strategy 2002–2012.”

Public Sector Reform Unit, Cabinet Office: Ministry Paper 56/2002 “Government at Your Service: Public Sector Modernization Vision and Strategy 2002–2012.”

Action Plan Progress Report. May 2004.Public Service Training Education and Develop-

ment Policy [Draft]; undated Cabinet Office Kingston: Jamaica.

Report on Consultant Advisers in the Public Sector, June 30, 2003. Office of the Prime Minister, Kingston: Jamaica.

Staff Orders for the Public Service, Government of Jamaica, 2004.

The Statistical Institute of Jamaica: Employment Earnings and Hours Worked in Large Estab-lishments 2000–2002, Kingston: Jamaica.

The Statistical Institute of Jamaica: National In-come and Product 2003, Kingston: Jamaica.



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ListofAbbreviationsARP AdministrativeReformProgramme

CARICAD CaribbeanCenterforDevelopmentAdministration


GoJ GovernmentofJamaica

HR HumanResources


HRMIS HumanResourcesManagementInformationSystem

MOU MemorandumofUnderstanding

MoFP MinistryofFinanceandPlanning

OSC OfficeoftheServicesCommissions

PSEAP PublicSectorEmployeeAssistanceProgramme


PSRU PublicSectorReformUnit


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ChAPTER �


The Case of Trinidad and TobagoHedy Isaacs

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Conclusions

The twin island state of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is a former British colony. Draper, G. (2001), Mills, G. (1970 in Draper) and others ar-gue that while institutional forms—collectively a legacy of the historical past—were transplanted and ostensibly embraced in terms of agreement “on the civil service neutrality and acceptance of the permanent professional public service,” there is apparent inconsistency between the con-ceptualization of institutional forms and their implementation. Draper (2001:5) argues that the major challenge to implementation is based, in part, on the difficulties of forging productive relationships between politicians and senior civil servants, specifically permanent secretaries, the administrative heads of the ministries of Gov-ernment that constitute the central civil service. According to this author, the mistrust, anxiety, inadequate preparation of both parties, along with different management and organizational styles are “often grounds for tension, suspicion and unproductive behavior” (ibid).

While Civil Service Systems (CSS) may not preclude dysfunctional behavior from occurring, they may help ameliorate them. In these circum-

stances, an effective CSS is critical to facilitate governance and the delivery of public services. Commonwealth Caribbean countries with this legacy—and the twin island state is no excep-tion—recognize the importance of the CSS.

The Government of the Republic of Trini-dad and Tobago is engaged in a program of reform that incorporates a vision for the modern-ization of human resource management (HRM) subsystems, namely Employment Management, Performance Management and Professional Development Management. These reforms are being reinforced by the strengthening of the in-stitutional framework for HRM, specifically the restructuring of key agencies—the Personnel Department, The Services Commissions De-partment and the Pensions Division of the Min-istry of Finance—while the Ministry of Public Administration and Information is to play an enabling role. The decentralization of the HRM function is a component of this reform vision.

While the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago “has been pursuing public service reform since 1992,” an apparent empha-sis on HRM is evidenced in a “1997 White Paper on a Policy Addendum for the New Public Ad-ministration” (Draper, G 2001:19–20). The focus of the reforms that were articulated at that time to re-structure the public service—decentralize



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the HRM function, and strengthen the Perfor-mance Management subsystem, by introducing a new performance appraisal system, informa-tion technology, labor and industrial relations and undertaking job evaluations—has not re-mained static. On the contrary, since then the reform agenda has included plans to strengthen elements of the Professional Development Man-agement subsystem in order to facilitate the de-velopment of leadership. These plans “focus on succession planning for future Permanent Sec-retaries through targeted human resource de-velopment activities as well as a comprehensive hand over and mentoring period” (CARICAD 2001:13). HRM units have been set up in each ministry.

In addition, the introduction in 2002 of an automated human resource information system (HRIS) in the central personnel agencies, name-ly, the Public Service Commission Department, the secretariat to the Public Service Commission, and the Personnel Department, has provided a basis for the development of the Human Re-source (HR) Planning subsystem. Although not fully functional as an HR planning tool, HRIS has been networked to line agencies by the Pub-lic Service Commission Department.

Other relatively recent developments are also likely to affect the CSS in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. The Public Service Re-form Initiation Program was established in 2004 to develop related strategy, networks and capac-ity. The Public Service Transformation Division (PSTD) of the Ministry of Public Administration and Information, and the New Systems Facili-tators, characterized as “dedicated staff to lead each ministry in change management issues,” are now in place. Even though the reforms ar-ticulated so far are undoubtedly of significance, they address only some elements of select HRM subsystems. These reforms are also formulated without the benefit of a strategic approach to public Employment and Human Resource Man-agement that evidences sensitivity for clearly articulated HR priorities and objectives about which the views of government, civil servants

and unions converge and for introducing an in-tegrated HRM system.

The Service Commissions Department—mandated by the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago as the Secretariat to the Public Service Commission (PSC)—and the other three commissions, the Personnel Depart-ment, the Ministry of Public Administration and Information and the Ministry of Finance, are the main actors in the CSS. The Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (1976), the Civil Service Act Chapter 23:01, the Public Service Commission Regulations (1966) and the Pensions Acts collectively constitute the legal framework for the CSS.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) has a constitutional mandate to make employment management decisions relative to appointments, i.e. in the field of recruitment, selection, promo-tion, termination and the exercise of discipline. The structure and functions of the PSC conform to the Public Service Regulations.

The Civil Service Act addresses elements of the Human and Social Relations Management subsystem—specifically, procedures for disputes resolution as well as for negotiation and consulta-tion, between the Government and civil servants or their representatives, i.e. the associations of civil servants.

The Personnel Department is responsible for negotiating and consulting with existing civil service associations on civil servants’ terms and conditions of employment. In addition to the management of benefits, the Department is responsible for job evaluations, salary adminis-tration, industrial relations and employee devel-opment issues.

The Public Management Consulting Divi-sion in the Ministry of Public Administration and Information is engaged in providing policy advice on position management.

The Pensions Branch of the Ministry of Fi-nance is concerned with the administration of pensions, while the Treasury Department of the Ministry disburses compensation and other ben-efits.


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iNSTiTuTiONAL ASSESSmENT OF CiviL SERviCE SySTEmS: ThE CASE OF TRiNiDAD AND TOBAgO

The existing legal framework will require modernization as a response to the policy chang-es that will probably result from the reforms en-visaged, particularly, the decentralization of the HRM function. It is argued that revisions are not likely “in the near future, as this will require a constitutional reform, which calls for a two-thirds majority in Parliament. The two-party system which is polarized along ethnic lines, however, precludes” the required consensus (Bissessar, A. 2002:22, partially paraphrased). Nonetheless, a strategic approach to HR is advocated, for which goal both political will and consensus on HR pri-orities and objectives among internal and exter-nal stakeholders should be in place.

Finally, with regard to the organization of this report, it should be pointed out that this chapter builds upon the author’s 2004 report to the Inter-American Development Bank entitled “Short Form for Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems: The Case of Trinidad and To-bago,” which basically offered an overview of the CSS in the country at that time. In addition, the analysis of each of the seven HRM subsystems is more in-depth to reflect a sharper focus on each of the ninety-three critical points for assessing CSS. In general, this revised work conforms to the original methodological framework provided by Longo, F. 2002. Other elements of the 2004 report were retained, namely: the indices for the evaluation of the CSS, the internal and external environments, the critical points valuation, the summary table of preceding sections, and the conclusions of the diagnosis.


Initially, the influence of the Westminster-White-hall politico-administrative system initially re-sulted in a parliamentary political system, but this was later replaced. In 1976, Trinidad and Tobago relinquished its status as a constitutional monarchy to become a republic. The former Head of State, Queen Elizabeth II of England, was “replaced with a President who was elected

by an electoral college composed by members of Parliament. Executive power resides with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet” (Bissessar, A. 2002:10).

At the time of its independence, the coun-try had established a Public Service Commission (PSC) with executive power to make appoint-ments. When the country attained republican status, the power of the PSC to appoint public officers and its new responsibilities for their pro-motion, transfer, and termination as well as the exercise of discipline were vested in the Consti-tution (1976). A ministerial system was also es-tablished, whereby ministries and ministers were assigned specific portfolios, including education and finance.

The influence of the colonial past was ap-parently not as pervasive in the political domain as in the administrative sphere. This heritage made an impact on the administrative systems of the civil service as decision-making processes were centralized.

It has been argued that factors in the political arena, including ethnic cleavages and the lack of political will and stability have undermined the efforts to reform the public sector. Political par-ties are reportedly based “primarily along ethnic lines” (ibid), so it is only natural that these eth-nic cleavages had a bearing on the operations of the public sector. According to Hansard records, during the period of the People’s National Move-ment (PNM) dominated by Afro-Trinidadian many of the top positions within the public ser-vices, statutory authorities, police, armed forces and state-owned enterprises, were held by Afro-Trinidadians. The PNM held office from 1956 to 1986 and again in the 1991–1994 period. The PNM Government in 1991 “established the Cen-tre of Ethnic Studies whose major mandate was to investigate the extent of ethnic imbalances in both the public and private sectors” (ibid).

When the PNM demitted office in 1994, the United National Congress (UNC) the East In-dian-based political party, and the National Alli-ance for Reconstruction (NAR), a coalition party, assumed government until 2000. The UNC and



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the PNM formed the next Government until 2002, when the country returned to the polls and the PNM took office. NAR also held office for one term, only from 1986–1991, and “intro-duced a number of austerity measures, including the reduction of salaries” (ibid:6, partially para-phrased). It is said that “the lack of emphasis on reform is due to a lack of political will but an important factor too has been the lack of stabil-ity in the political arena during 1986 to present” (ibid:7).

In the field of economic development, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its Re-port No. 03/232 (July 2003:20), indicates that “Trinidad and Tobago has enjoyed an extended period of positive growth, low inflation and a steady decline in unemployment, but challenges remain. The authorities are commended for their prudent management of the economy in recent years despite the global and regional slowdown.” While the country was congratulated for the prudent management largely of its oil and gas wealth, “the overall fiscal position of the central government weakened somewhat in FY 2001–02 with an overall deficit of nearly one and a half percent of GDP, reflecting lower tax collections and a steady decline in the buoyancy of non-en-ergy revenues” (IMF Public Information Notice - PIN No. 03/85, August 13, 2003:1).

Background

Public sector entities comprise central Govern-ment, statutory bodies and staff of independent authorities including, the Office of the President, the Auditor-General’s Department, the Judiciary and the Industrial Court (Bissessar 2002:3). Ac-cording to the Ministry of Public Administration and Information (2004), the total staff comple-ment of the central civil service amounts to 30,000.

While reforms to the civil service have report-edly been ongoing since Trinidad and Tobago became independent, a more focused approach to reforming the CSS is said to have been taken since 1992. Some problems that have affected

the CSS over time include over-centralization, human resource management issues related to training and development, performance apprais-al and discipline (ibid:13, paraphrased). Reforms undertaken during the 1986–1991 period were not as sharply focused on these problems as they were on “conforming to structural adjustment conditions” (ibid.). Hence, it may be stated that the external dynamic for reform has diluted the a priori focus.

According to Bissessar (2002), the reforms introduced under the aegis of SAPS addressed a reduction in civil service salaries, the establish-ment of a civil service data bank and changes to the existing budgetary system. Other reforms undertaken by the administration were a job classification exercise, the introduction of per-formance management and appraisal systems, and the creation of new human resource agen-cies (ibid:13, partially paraphrased).

Legal Framework

The main building blocks of the legal framework are the Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (1976), the PSC Regulations and the Civil Service Act (1965). The powers of the PSC are laid down in constitutional provisions: it has executive powers for recruitment, selection, promotion and discipline. Although the focus is on the PSC, it is noted that there are four other Commissions, namely, the Teaching Services, the Police, the Judicial and Legal Services and Statutory Authorities Services.

The PSC Regulations provide for the struc-ture and functions of the PSC, which are mainly concerned with the Employment Management subsystem and include recruitment, selection, promotion, termination and discipline of civil servants and set out the procedures to put its functions into effect.

Given the influence of the Westminster Whitehall (WW) model on administrative struc-tures and functions of the PSC, specifically the requirement for impartiality, the PSC is expected to be politically neutral.


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As for its structure, a maximum of six and a minimum of four persons, including the chair-man and deputy chairman, constitute the mem-bership of the PSC, who are appointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Min-ister and the Leader of the Opposition.

The Civil Service Act (1965) makes provi-sion for the “establishment and the classification of the Civil Service, for the establishment of a Personnel Department, for the establishment of procedures for negotiation and consultation between the Government and members of the civil service, for the settlement of disputes and for other matters concerning the relationship between the Government and the civil service” (ibid:16).

As stated above, the Act provides for the set-ting up of the Personnel Department, which is headed by the Chief Personnel Officer, who is empowered to negotiate on the Government’s behalf with the unions that represent civil ser-vants.

Even though the Act provides for the civil ser-vice establishment—in general the permanent establishment—, Draper (2001:15) distinguish-es between permanent hiring and other hiring regimes, including daily paid employment, hir-ing for a limited time period as temporary staff and the use of service or term contracts. Many of the contracts for limited time periods tend to relate to special projects. In Trinidad and Tobago, civil servants may be contracted for projects while being given leave from their sub-stantive posts. According to Draper, the growth of project-related contract employment is due to the increasing use of program budgets and the growing role of international agencies in the financing of programs and projects. Drap-er’s assertions point to the dysfunctions inher-ent in the practice of the contract regime as it adversely influences the Employment Manage-ment and Compensation Management subsys-tems of CSS.

The Ministry of Finance is the body respon-sible for disbursing compensation (wages, salaries and other benefits) to civil servants.

In addition, there are concomitant rules re-garding disclosure at the leadership level in the civil service: for example, permanent secretaries as well as chief technical directors must declare their assets to the Integrity Commission under the Integrity in Public Life Act (2000).


The analysis of the HR subsystems presented in this section follows the ninety-three critical points established by the methodology used in this study (Longo 2002), which are listed with their cor-responding valuation in Appendix A. For each subsection, the corresponding critical points are indicated between parenthesis, and a brief intro-duction is provided about the HR decisions and practices associated with each subsystem.


This subsystem provides the linkages between HRM policies and practices and the organiza-tion’s priorities, which becomes evident in the timely provision of the desirable quality and quantity of staff in accordance with the needs of the organization.

Existence and Integrity of the System (Criti-cal point 1)

The Human Resource Planning subsystem is not yet formalized. The phased introduction of the computerized HRIS is indicative of the recognition of the significance of having timely and accurate information to identify HR deficits and surpluses. In 2002, HRIS was introduced “in three pilot agencies, namely, the Service Commission Department, the Personnel De-partment and the Treasury Division, Ministry of Finance” (Bissessar A. 2002:21), of which the designated central agency to “provide advisory and technical support services” to line agencies is the Personnel Department. Since the HRIS has been introduced, it has “been networked to line agencies” (Testimonial, paraphrased), but in re-ality, this is a work in progress. In the absence of



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an institutionalized HRIS, the common practice is that the different ministries and departments make requests for staff to the PSC when vacan-cies occur.

Strategic Coherence (2–3) HRIS is not a planning tool. Hence, strategic coherence between this subsystem and the Em-ployment Management subsystem is still con-strained.

Basic Information (4)Because HRIS is being implemented, it does not currently facilitate managerial decision making. The importance of the HR Planning subsystem, however, resonates within the policy planning arena at the macro level where, to its credit, the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago has embarked on an e-government pro-gram. The vision is that by “2005, 60% of all ministries and agencies will be at an advanced stage in terms of having in place Government-to-Government applications that enable the sharing and integration of national and local government agencies and those that bring best practices in key government operations, e.g. [...] human resource management.”1

Effectiveness (5–9)HRIS will no doubt facilitate the optimization of civil service staff when it is fully functional. In its absence, it is challenging to control employment costs and facilitate adequate staff skills.

Administration (10–11)As already stated, the networking of the HRIS system is underway; this limits the extent to which managers may participate in the formula-tion and implementation of HR forecasts.

Work Organization

The Work Organization function establishes and specifies the contents of the tasks for each job, and the characteristics of the people who will carry them out. It includes both the description

of the activities, functions and responsibilities as-signed to each position (job description) and the definition of the competencies, skills and atti-tudes required for the successful performance at each position (profile definition) (Longo 2002).

According to Longo (2002:20), the Work Organization subsystem reveals the “HRM poli-cies and practices that define the characteristics of and conditions for performing the tasks con-cerned.”

Existence and Integrity of the Subsystem (12)Job classification is, in general, the basis for job descriptions in the central civil service. However, there has been a lapse in time in terms of the previous job evaluation of the civil service, since “the last job classification was done in 1966” (Bissessar, A. 2002:22). Currently, an incremen-tal approach to job evaluation is apparently be-ing adopted in the central civil service.

The Work Organization subsystem is being formalized initially at the leadership level. To combat the succession planning void at the level of permanent secretaries, a deputy permanent secretary cadre was developed, a job evalua-tion exercise undertaken and job descriptions developed. “These job descriptions, including competencies profiles, will provide the bases for the recruitment of persons to the new posts. In 2003, a job evaluation exercise was also under-taken for the Police and Teaching services and a similar exercise is currently being undertaken for the central civil service” (Testimonial). Job descriptions have not been regularly updated over the years. The job descriptions prepared in 1966 did not include personal profiles. This deficit limits the interconnections between the Work Organization subsystem and the Employ-ment Management and HR Planning subsys-tems.

1 UNPAN, partially paraphrased: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CARI-CAD/UNPAN008482.pdf


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Technical Quality and Flexibility of Job Design (13–17)Only the permanent secretaries’ job descriptions reflect competencies. Instruments related to oth-er job categories are generally broadly framed to reflect job title, activities, responsibilities and academic qualifications.

Quality of Profiles Definition (18–21)A core element that is integral to the accuracy of a job description is the competency profile. The absence of this element in most job descriptions represents a deficit.

Administration (22–23)The job evaluation exercise being currently un-dertaken for the central civil service will provide sharper focus on the quality of persons required in terms of skills and competencies; this will con-tribute to a more effective management of the Work Organization subsystem.


This subsystem ideally focuses on the poli-cies, practices and procedures relating to an individual’s recruitment, selection, induction, mobility and separation from an organization based on such values as merit, transparency and equity.

Equal Opportunity and Merit (24–27)The “criterion used for the selection and entry of employees in the public administration” is described as relying on the “generalized use of selection procedures based on competition (open or closed), objective and transparent criteria, tests, competent neutral selection panels, and other guarantees to ensure that the best candi-dates are hired” (Draper, G. 2001:14). There are, however, conflicting views regarding how the subsystem actually operates.

Despite the presumed equality and merit present in the enrollment process, the “under-representation of one of the two dominant ethnic groups has been perceived as discrimina-

tory” (Bissessar A. 2002: 27–28, paraphrased). Although the number of political appointees was not established, ethic cleavages along politi-cal party lines is said to be sometimes reflected in the management of this subsystem (ibid).

Recruitment and Selection Quality (28–32)According to Draper,G. (2001:14), selection and entry of employees in the public administration of the country incorporate all the mechanisms described above to ensure that the best candi-dates are hired. However, apparently these mea-sures are not consistently applied .

Induction Quality (33–34)Induction programs are deemed important, but related programs are not yet in place. To date, a probationary period of a year has helped facili-tate the process of socialization.

Mobility (35)Some level of horizontal occupational mobility is possible, but “this tends to be limited within the same sector. Geographic mobility is possible if required by the organization,” according to Draper, G. (2001:16).

Absenteeism and Discipline (36–37)Generally, there “tends to be significant job se-curity in the public service. Employees’ services may be terminated if regulations are breached. Nevertheless, these regulations are “seldom ap-plied and the process for their application is too long” (ibid:15). It is also argued that “many cases of indiscipline are overlooked” to avoid job loss. Cultural factors also preclude the imposition of sanctions for breaches of the disciplinary pro-cedures” (Bissessar A. 2002: 29, partially para-phrased).

Absenteeism indices are not maintained.

Termination (38–41)There is no evidence to suggest that rank-and-file civil servants are arbitrarily dismissed with a change in administration. Overall, while there is



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professionalism in the recruitment and selection process, there is room for strengthening the other elements of this subsystem.


This subsystem articulates performance guide-lines based on organizational goals, against which performance is measured, and a perfor-mance appraisal instrument that basically serves as a developmental tool for providing feedback to employees concerning performance and di-rection to employee development.

Performance Planning and Follow-up (43–45)Positive developments are taking place within this subsystem, which is being “formalized at the permanent secretary level” (Testimonial). A Performance Management subsystem is planned to be introduced throughout the civil service.

Performance Evaluation (46–48)The existing performance appraisal tool tends to be uniformly applied “to give employees rat-ings on the higher end of the scale” in order to avoid internal conflict. In these circumstances, their usefulness for HRM decision-making pur-poses is seriously compromised. “There is no merit pay system in place” (Draper, G. 2001: 16).

A previous report on the institutional assess-ment of the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago also makes reference to the introduction of a “per-formance management and appraisal system” in the 1990s that focused on performance plan-ning, performance appraisal and feedback. The report also highlighted factors that confounded the successful implementation of the system, namely: the absence of job descriptions, the dif-ficulty with setting standards, as well as other constraints “when the objectives of Government are constantly being changed” and there is “dis-trust among the two races” (Bissessar, A.2002:33, partially paraphrased).

Administration (49)The formalization and strengthening of this sub-system will facilitate the necessary linkages with the Compensation Management and Profession-al Development subsystems, interconnections deemed critical for an integrated HRM system.


Central to this subsystem is the contribution that an employee makes towards the achievement of the organization’s objectives relative to the rewards received for making such contribution. Specifically, it is desirable that the monetary and non-monetary benefits that employees receive from an organization compensate them equi-tably relative to others performing similar tasks within and outside the organization.

Salary Strategy, Internal and External Equity (50–57)This subsystem does not reflect nepotistic or abusive practices, as there is emphasis on “equal pay for equal work” (Draper, G. 2001: 17). There is generally an element of reactivity in the com-pensation strategy as the civil service responds to the demands of the Public Services Association of Trinidad and Tobago, as well as to other rec-ognized unions that represent the civil servants.

Effectiveness of Compensation Policies and Wages Administration (58)While the salary structure aims to attract and retain new recruits, it is reportedly not competi-tive, particularly at the senior level. The measure of the difference between the total pay received by employees at the top wage level and that re-ceived at the lowest level of the wage scale evi-dences tight compression. The ratio calculated was examined against the range: 1:7 and 1:20. The ratio derived (1:4.71) is outside the range and reflects tightly compressed salaries.

It is also argued that since the appointment of serving officers to fill posts under a contract—currently a common practice—is usually accom-panied by their receipt of higher salaries, wage


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administration is often distorted and morale be-comes adversely affected (ibid:15).

The current job evaluation exercise will in all likelihood facilitate the classification of roles and positions linked to pay and a salary structure de-sign that balances employees’ relative contribu-tion to the organization’s results with applicable salaries in the market.

In addition, civil servants receive incentives.

Wage Administration (59–61)In general, the salary regime is transparent. “In Trinidad and Tobago, the Public Sector Salary System covers the civil service, statutory authori-ties and protective services and the principle of equal pay for equal work is applied across the services” (ibid:17). The methodology used to maintain internal equity in the civil service is the position classification method.

The growing trend in project-related con-tract employment lends itself to atypical salaries (ibid:15, paraphrased).

Other Benefits (62–64)In addition to salary, civil servants also receive non-monetary incentives. These benefits, accord-ing to Bissessar (2002:35), “include recognition and awards, family days, and the introduction of the ‘Public Service Week’, Wage, which compris-es other benefits such as a cost of living allow-ance and incremental payments that are paid on the officer’s anniversary date. Some categories of officers are also entitled to traveling allowances, housing allowances and at higher levels enter-tainment allowances.”

Of significance is the Prime Minister’s In-novating for Service Excellence Award Scheme, which was introduced in April 2004 to “reward and recognize innovative initiatives, encourage innovation in the public service and improve the image of the public sector” (The Newslet-ter of the Commonwealth Association for Pub-lic Administration and Management CAPAM 2004:15, Vol. 10, No. 3).

Civil servants also receive pension benefits. Even though the “perceived” adequacy of pen-

sion was not established through testimonials, an International Monetary Fund Report (2003: 20) asserts that this benefit is “generous.”

While positive developments are taking place within this subsystem, the updated valuation in-struments will facilitate role classification linked to pay and ultimately strengthen the subsystem.


This subsystem ideally evidences organizational efforts to advance staff development and learn-ing. These efforts are undertaken with an eye to complying with the idea of encouraging “learn-ing and defining career paths that should match the organization’s needs with the individual pro-file” (Longo 2002:34). The effectiveness of this subsystem is dependent on the extent to which appropriate career, promotion and training poli-cies are in place.

Effectiveness of Promotions and Career Design Quality (65–70)This subsystem is being formalized and does not currently reflect strong linkages with the Employ-ment Management, Performance Management and the Compensation Management subsys-tems. In terms of career design quality, “senior-ity is generally acknowledged as an important factor in promotion decisions” (Draper 2001:15). The results of training are not necessarily taken into account (ibid., paraphrased). There is also a career planning void.

The former Central Training Unit—within the Ministry of Public Administration and In-formation—, which has been re-structured and renamed the Public Services Academy, has as its vision corporate training and policy-making regarding this subsystem. The Human Resource Units that were established in respective line agencies, as part of the thrust to decentralize the HRM function, are expected to undertake rel-evant in-house training.

The Personnel Department is responsible for developing training policies. It is desirable that these policies be “aimed at ensuring the indi-



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vidual and collective learning required to attain organizational objectives, at developing com-petencies among employees, and at stimulating their professional progress” (Longo, F. 2002: 34). The Personnel Department aims to revise exist-ing policies.

Individual and Collective Learning Management (71–76)The training conducted is not based on needs analysis and the investment in training is not evaluated in terms of costs and benefits. There was an apparent hiatus in departmental training during the period 1997–2002, with the “excep-tion of training in performance management systems.” Apparently funding constraints was the major contributory factor (Bissessar, A. 2002:37, partially paraphrased).

Although it is evident that training and de-velopment are recognized as important, this subsystem requires formalization to facilitate the delivery of training based on a needs analysis that satisfies service specific needs. In other words, a “training system must be designed to serve the organizational strategy” (Longo, F. 2002:36).


This subsystem is concerned with the manage-ment of the relations between the organization and its employees. Integral to the effectiveness of this subsystem is the organization’s capacity to manage the dimensions inherent to the sub-system, namely: the work climate, labor relations and social policies.

Work Climate (77–78)Although there are generally no structured in-struments in place to assess the organizational climate, a Public Service Employee Survey ad-ministered in partnership with the Public Service Union in March 2004 served this purpose. All 30,000 civil servants were surveyed with a 46% response rate. Questions were posed concerning communication, equity, opportunities for train-ing, knowledge of organizational objectives,

leadership, 20/20 vision, among others, in an ef-fort to elicit feedback regarding the civil servants’ feelings. The management of the organizational climate is framed within an institutionalized cen-tralized decision-making ethos and is character-ized by top-down communications.

Communication Effectiveness (79–81)The Public Service Employee Survey that was administered in partnership with the Public Ser-vice Union, in March 2004, is a step in the direc-tion to learn employees’ opinions, requests and initiatives.

Labor Relations Balance and Quality (82–85)Labor relations are characterized as adversarial. Conflicts concerning wages and accommodation are generally more readily resolved than conflicts related to job evaluation or the value to be placed on jobs in the civil service.

Labor Conflict Management (86–87)Concerning labor relations management, there are well established mechanisms in place to fa-cilitate collective negotiation of pay and work-ing conditions at the national level. Relations between the union and the Government are ar-guably adversarial: “generally the environment between union and government is adversarial, and many of the disputes by the union are reac-tive and centre mainly around the issue of wages or accommodation” (Bissessar, A 2002: 38).

Within each government agency there is a shop steward that represents the daily paid em-ployees and who facilitates the airing and resolu-tion of concerns of this category of employees. It is stated that there is room for improving the quality of communication and interaction be-tween the Government and the unions, as this is likely to reduce resistance to reforms. “The union has resisted attempts by the Government to introduce new systems. For example, the delay experienced in implementing the job classifica-tion exercise was due to the fact that the union instructed public officers not to fill out the re-


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quired forms since it may lead to downsizing in the organization” (ibid ).

Maintaining high morale is sometimes an is-sue in the CSS of Trinidad and Tobago. This feature is usually linked to the convention of “special hiring regimes” including daily paid employment and service and term contracts. As already stated, “in Trinidad and Tobago, civil servants may be appointed to projects on con-tracts while being on leave from their substantive posts. The appointment of serving officers on a contract basis is usually accompanied by their receipt of higher salaries. This very often ad-versely affects morale. Many contracts tend to be for three to five years. In some cases, renewal of contracts may be granted even after the original justification for the contract has passed” (Draper, G. 2001: 15).

Positive developments are taking place within this subsystem; however, there are also elements that require strengthening.

Social Policies

Civil servants receive a pension that the IMF has described as ”generous.” The IMF has also rec-ommended that “pension reform in the public sector is needed to harmonize benefits and pro-tect against a build-up of unsustainable liabilities as the population ages.” Specific related recom-mendations include “the introduction of a fully-funded pension scheme to replace the current advance-funded program; a gradual increase in the retirement age to 65; and a reduction in the generosity of civil service pensions for new hires” (IMF Country Report No. 03 /232 2003:20). Other benefits include old age pension and a na-tional insurance scheme.


The description of each subsystem forming part of the HRM presented above is complemented in this section with the analysis of the mechanisms used for the management of the system, par-

ticularly the distribution of personnel decisions among the different responsible parties (Longo 2002). This dimension addresses the extent to which HRM responsibilities are fragmented or unified as well as the degree of centralization or decentralization of the decision-making process concerning personnel-related issues.

Autonomy and Capacity of Supervisors (90–92)Managers in line agencies have limited autonomy in making decisions on HRM-related matters. While decisions regarding training and routine decisions concerning employment management and human and social relations management are made by managers in line agencies, other HRM decisions are made at the central level. Decisions made by line managers relate to the approval of acting appointments for designated offices, maintaining records of appointments and sepa-rations, “dealing with all disciplinary matters of a minor nature, leave administration, some aspects of benefits administration and some as-pects of grievance handling” (Bissessar, A. 2002: 38–39, partially paraphrased). Decision-making in the CSS is inherently highly centralized. Line managers would also benefit from training in HRM.

Central HR Administration (93)Four central agencies—the Services Commis-sions Department, the Personnel Department, the Pensions Division of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Administration and Information—are the major HR actors; hence, HRM is fragmented. However, there are no ex-plicit inter-agency power struggles and the agen-cies are perceived to add value.


The following chart presents a graphic represen-tation of the level of development of each of the subsystems previously analyzed.



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[+/–]


STRATEGY

WorkOrganization





HiringMobility

Separation

PlanningEvaluation

Planning [+/–]




[+/–] [+] [+/–]

[+/–]

[+/–]


learning


payment





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IV. INDICATORS



Totalnumberofpoliticalappointments NotAvailable

Totalnumberofpositionsforthecivilian 30,000 MinistryofPublicAdministrationandInformationcentralGovernment November2004

Political appointments rate Not Available


Centralgovernmentwagebill(inmilliondollars)

GDP(inmilliondollars)

Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product 7.8% IMFCountryReportNo03-232-Table2Page24,Trinidad andTobago:SummaryofCentralGovernmentOperations InternationalMonetaryFundWashingtonD.C.

Thisisameasureoftheextenttowhichthecostofpublicemploymentisaburdenontheeconomy.Thewagebillexcludestraininggrantsandpensions.UsingtheWorldBankcomparatorof5–25%,thefiscalweightofpublicemploymentisnotarelativeburdenontheeconomy.[Thepercentquotedisaprojection.]ThesamesourceindicatesthatoverallcentralgovernmentexpenditureasapercentageofGDPis25.1%.


I.HighersalaryofciviliancentralGovernment(indollars) 1,626 Source:BissessarA.(2002)InstitutionalAssessmentofCivil ServiceSystems:TrinidadandTobagoIDB,WashingtonD.C. (10.164TT$x0.16)

II.LowersalaryofciviliancentralGovernment(indollars) 344.6 Source:BissessarA(2002)AnalyticalFrameworkforthe InstitutionalAssessmentofCivilServiceSystems:Trinidad andTobagoIDB,WashingtonD.C. (2.154TT$x0.16)


Thisisameasureofthedifferencebetweenthetotalpayreceivedbyemployeesatthetopwagelevelandthatatthelowestlevelofthewagescale.Theratiocalculatedwasexaminedagainsttherange1:7and1:20.Theratioderivedisoutsidetherangeandreflectstightlycompressedsalaries.

2 All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1TTD = 0.16 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Converter – Oct 2006 )



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II.PercapitaGDPbymonth(indollars) Notavailable







I.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 30,000 Source:MinistryofPublicAdministrationandInformation, November2004

II.TotalPopulation 1,300,000 Source:MinistryofPublicAdministrationandInformation, November2004

Total number of central government employees/ 2.31% Total population

Thenumberofcentralgovernmentemployeesislowinrelationtocomparableinternationalfiguresintherange0-100andsuggestsinsufficientdevelopmentofthecentralgovernment.


I.Centralgovernmentexpenditure(inmilliondollars) 2,363.8 Source:IMFCountryReportNo.03/232Table2,Page24, TrinidadandTobago:SummaryofCentralGovernment OperationsInternationalMonetaryFundWashingtonD.C. (14.774MillTT$x0.16)Note:Thisfigurerelatestothe fiscalyearOctober1toSeptember302002/03

II.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 30,000 Source:MinistryofPublicAdministrationandInformation, November2004


(continued)


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The indices and sub-indices listed above were constructed on the basis of the analysis of 93 critical points that reflect key elements of HRM subsystems. Appendix A lists the valuation of such critical points and their corresponding number to which these values relate.

Efficiency [9.00] This index, related to thirteen critical points, values the existing HR planning framework, the cost of public employment relative to the state of the economy, adequacy of pensions and social care benefits, current efforts to assess the costs and benefits of training and the benefits of non-monetary incentives.

The HRIS, although not yet a planning tool, has been networked to the line agencies. Pen-

sions are characterized as generous and social care benefits are in place. Some aspects of the Professional Development Management subsys-tem require formalization. The institutionaliza-tion of instruments to assess the organizational climate deserves due consideration.

Merit [11.85]This index, linked to 10 critical points, measures the extent to which employment and wage de-cisions are influenced by nepotistic practices. In the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago, these decisions generally conform to professional criteria.

Structural Consistency [8.68]This index evaluates the extent to which the HR Planning, Work Organization and Performance Management systems are formalized. The in-dex is interconnected to 3 sub-indices, namely:




(M) Merit 11.85 59%









(CI) Integrating 10.00 50% Capacity



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Strategic Coherence, Directive Consistency and Consistency of Processes, which are collectively associated to 29 critical points.

Strategic Coherence [3.86] values the linkages be-tween the strategic priorities of the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and HRM policies and practices.

Directive Consistency [4.00] assesses the extent to which the directive function in the CSS in Trini-dad and Tobago is developed. This sub-index is linked to 8 critical points.

Consistency of Processes [4.00] is linked to 14 criti-cal points and measures the extent to which core processes, particularly planning, work organiza-tion and performance management, that un-derpin an integrated HRM system are in place in the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago. The infor-mation system that supports HR planning is in place. While the Work Organization subsystem requires formalization, the Performance Man-agement subsystem has been formalized at the permanent secretary level.

Functional Capacity [9.66]This index evaluates the extent to which the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago encourages behaviors that promote improvement in public services. This index is related to 41 critical points and three sub-indices, namely: Competency, [4.94] Incentive Effectiveness [4.31], and Flexibility [4.82]. The former, linked to 15 critical points, values the capacity of HRM policies and prac-tices to furnish an adequate supply of skilled personnel. Incentive effectiveness evaluates the extent to which HRM policies and practices fa-cilitate productivity, learning and improved ser-vice quality. In turn, the flexibility index values the responsiveness of the existing policies and practices to changes in policy priorities.

Integrating Capacity [10.00]This index is related to 19 critical points and val-ues the effectiveness of the capacity of the CSS

to harmonize the internal and external stake-holders’ expectations and interests to empower them and reduce conflict.

V. CONCLUSIONS


The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago has a reform agenda that envi-sions the decentralization of the HRM function, formalizing the HR Planning subsystem and strengthening the Professional Development Management and Performance Management subsystems. These efforts are likely to affect the CSS positively. Nevertheless, there are other aspects of these and other HR subsystems that need to be developed.

With regard to the decentralization process, while each ministry has established its own the HR unit, it is argued that staff competencies require development for the units to work opti-mally. It is also argued that there is limited del-egation of functions from the center to the line. “Training has been the only responsibility that has been fully devolved” (Bissessar 2002:39). Yet, the delivery of training has been stymied by re-source constraints as well as lack of capacity.

Only routine aspects of the Employment Management and Human and Social Relations Management subsystems have been decentral-ized, namely: approving acting appointments for designated offices, maintaining records of appointments and separations, “dealing with all disciplinary matters of a minor nature, leave ad-ministration, some aspects of benefits adminis-tration and some aspects of grievance handling” (ibid:38–39, partially paraphrased).

Although HR Planning is recognized as a core building block of the HRM system, the ex-isting HRIS is not yet a planning tool and this restricts any formalization effort of the HR Plan-ning subsystem.

The development of the Performance Man-agement subsystem focuses initially on the career


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planning and developmental components for the leadership cadres, i.e. permanent secretar-ies and deputy permanent secretaries. The vi-sion to strengthen the Professional Development Management subsystem incorporates the devel-opment of a training policy. There are deficits in other key elements of this subsystem, includ-ing the need to conduct an organizational needs analysis and to evaluate the benefits of invest-ment in training.

Voids are identified in the Work Organiza-tion and Employment Management subsystems, limiting the optimization of human resources and the linkages between these subsystems. The current job evaluation exercise in the civil service is expected to address the deficit of job descrip-tions. The Employment Management subsystem will be strengthened with the institutionalization of induction programs.

The Public Service Employee Survey admin-istered in March 2004 is important. Nonetheless, the development of structured instruments to as-sess the organizational climate on a regular basis would contribute to strengthening the Human and Social Relations Management subsystem.

The establishment of the Public Service Re-form Initiation Program will provide the impulse for developing related strategy, networks and ca-pacity. These efforts are supported by the New Systems Facilitators that lead each ministry in change management issues. The Service Com-missions Department, the Personnel Depart-ment, and the Ministry of Public Administration and Information are designated as active partici-pants and facilitators of the reform process. The focus on developing networks evidences recog-nition of the importance of engaging all stake-holders in the planning and implementation of reforms.

The initiatives undertaken by the Govern-ment of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reflect efforts to modernize systems and struc-tures in the CSS. These modernization efforts are being undertaken without the benefit of a clearly articulated strategy for managing human resources and public employment and of an

HRM system that should evidence connectivity among the seven subsystems.


The existing organizational culture in the coun-try, characterized by inertia, resistance to change, and mistrust, affects all efforts to improve the efficiency of the CSS. “There is resistance by the public servants, but others allege that there is resistance by the unions.” According to oth-ers, delays in reforming the CSS are “due to bureaucratic apathy” (Bissessar A. 2002:8). In turn, Draper (2001: 5) characterizes the minis-terial permanent secretary interface as evidenc-ing tension and mistrust. “In the mind of the senior public servant, trust issues emerge at times when governments change or even in the same government when ministers change” (ibid). Furthermore, it is said that mistrust, sometimes evident in the society and exacerbated by ethnic concerns, also resonates at other levels within or-ganizations. Mistrust between the ministers and senior public officials is a source of delays in the implementation of reforms.

Political and legal factors influence reform efforts and ultimately the efficiency of the CSS. “Managers claim that there is a lack of politi-cal will and therefore they are unsure of the di-rection that should be taken by their ministries. There is no doubt that there is validity in these claims. Indeed, it should be recalled that for the past three years, Trinidad and Tobago went to the polls three times because of deadlock be-tween the major political parties. During this time, reform of the public service was virtually at a standstill, since there was or could not be any clear directions from the political director-ate” (Bissessar A. 2002: 8).

A related issue is the “distance” between the Government and the unions—elaborated on in the section of this report devoted to the human and social relations management subsystem—that affects the pace of reform.

The legal framework is not responsive to changes in policy priorities. Specifically, the vi-



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sion to decentralize the HRM function will re-quire fundamental changes in the existing legal framework for the CSS, since they are likely to be stymied by the politico-ethnic divide.

Main Conclusions

The Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is pursuing a reform agenda that emphasizes the decentralization of the HRM function, the strengthening of the Performance Management and Professional Development subsystems and the formalization of the HR Planning subsystem. The decentralization of the HRM function is stymied by the legal frame-work, which requires modernization, as well as by the need to develop the capacity to manage a devolved function. The emphasis on strengthen-ing the Professional Development Management subsystem by developing a training policy and plans does not take into account the need for ad-dressing voids in career and succession planning. While there are plans to address the Work Orga-nization subsystem, there are deficits in the Em-ployment Management and Human and Social Relations Management subsystems that require attention and affect the coherence of the CSS.

Internal and external factors constrain the reform impulse to improve the efficiency of the CSS. Reforms are framed within an organization-al culture that shows some resistance to change as well as mistrust. There is recognition of the need to develop networks of stakeholders and an ethos that engenders participation and empow-erment. The commitment of stakeholders to the reform agenda, particularly at leadership levels in the political and labor relations arenas, is criti-cal to sustaining the reform endeavor.

Proposed and current reforms are significant in terms of the positive impact that they are likely to have on the CSS. However, these reforms are neither framed within a clearly articulated HR strategy to which all stakeholders agree nor an integrated HRM system; indeed, these deficits affect availability optimization and the strategic coherence between the HRM subsystems.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

As explained, the Government of the Repub-lic of Trinidad and Tobago has embarked on a reform agenda that incorporates an HRM component and addresses critical elements of HR subsystems. These reforms are not framed within an HR strategy and it is well known that a broad strategy capable of delineating related priorities and objectives and having the support of all stakeholders is consistent with contempo-rary human resource management practice and is the foundation for an integrated HRM system. In addition, reforms to the CSS are also con-strained by the legal framework that does not readily respond to stated changes in policy pri-orities, in particular the stated thrust to decen-tralize the HR function.

Given these limitations, three recommenda-tions are made: (a) articulate a broad HR strat-egy that all stakeholders agree to; (b) develop an integrated HRM system; and (c) modernize the legal framework to accommodate the current re-form initiatives.

Proposed Improvements

Within the framework of the recommendations made, the HR strategy would serve as a guide to policy-makers, practitioners and other stake-holders and become a building block for an inte-grated HRM system.

Specific improvements to the HR subsystems are likely to include the formalization of HR Planning and the use of the HRIS as a planning tool. HR planning constitutes “the front door in any integrated HRM system and allows the defi-nition of coherent policies in all the remaining subsystems to which it is connected” (Longo, F. 2002:14).

The optimization of human resources is gen-erally facilitated by the inclusion of personal pro-files in job descriptions to establish and specify the contents of the tasks and the specific charac-teristics of the individuals who will perform the tasks. This is a likely outcome of the current job


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evaluation exercise and will serve to strengthen the Work Organization subsystem.

The integrated HRM system will probably address the ‘induction program’ void in the Em-ployment Management subsystem.

A formalized performance management subsystem is likely to stimulate as well as plan and evaluate civil servants’ contributions. The strategic coherence between this subsystem and the Professional Development Management and Compensation Management subsystems will be enhanced.

The sustained use of structured instruments to assess organizational climate will help inform

HR policies and programs. The Public Service Employee Survey undertaken in collaboration with the unions is a positive development in this direction.

In a dynamic reform ethos, engendering the internal dynamic to manage change in each central government agency is an important consideration. The New Systems Facilitators, “dedicated staff to lead each ministry in change management issues,” is a positive development that may lead to greater understanding about the change process and reduce the current resis-tance to change.


Factors Evaluators Comments

BackgroundAnalysis of the Analysis of the legal TheConstitution(1976),PSCRegulations(1966)theCivilServiceActandthe Institutional Context framework PensionsActarethemainbuildingblocks. Thereisavisiontomodernizethelegalframeworktofacilitatedecentralizationof theHRMfunction.

Functional Analysis Analysis of the Human TheServiceCommissionsDepartment,thePSC,thePersonnelDepartment,theMinis- of the Civil Service Resources Organization tryofPublicAdministrationandInformationandtheMinistryofFinancearethemain function actors.TheCSSisepitomizedbycentralizeddecision-making.Withtheexceptionofthe decentralizationoftrainingandsomeroutineaspectsoftheEmploymentManagment subsystem,managersinlineagenciesdonothaveautonomytomakeHRM-related decisions.

Analyzed Quantitative Thecivilservicestaffcomplementis30,000.Thestaffcomplementislowrelativeto Indicators of the CSS internationalcomparatorsandsuggestsinsufficientdevelopmentofthecentralgov- ernmentoverall. Thecentralgovernmentwagebillaccountsfor7.8%ofGDP.Thefiscalweightofcen- tralgovernmentemploymentisnotarelativeburdenontheeconomy.Thereisevi- denceoftightcompressioninthecompensationstructure.

Analysis by Subsystems Planning ITinfrastructurehasbeendevelopedinthreepilotagencieswithHRdecision-making function.WhiletheHRISisaproductionmodelinthecentralagenciesandisnet- workedtoministriesanddepartments,thissystemisnotyetformalizedintoaplan- ningtoolandlimitsaccesstoinformationandrelateddecision-makingbyline managers. Work Organization Jobevaluationisbeingundertakeninthecentralcivilservice,afterahiatusofthree decades. Thereisevidenceofsuccessionplanningatleadershiplevelwiththedevelopmentof thepermanentsecretarycadre.Jobdescriptionsforthiscadreincludecompetencies profiles. Employment Employmentdecisionsgenerallyconformtoprofessionalcriteria.Merit-basedrecruit- Management mentmeasuresaresometimescontestedwhenoneofthetwodominantethnic



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Factors Evaluators Comments

groupsisperceivedtobeunder-representedinthecivilservice,leadingtoadvocacy fortheestablishmentofmonitoringmechanisms. Nostructuredmechanismforinductionisinplace.Absenteeismindicesarenot maintained.

Performance Performancemanagementisformalizedforthepermanentsecretarycadre,an Management initiativeofrecentvintage.Implementationofaperformancemanagementsystem introducedservice-wideinthe1990swasproblematicbecauseoflackofjobdescrip- tions,difficultywithstandardsettingaswellasthecultureofdistrust.

Compensation Thecompensationstrategytendstobereactiveinresponsetounions’demands.The Management salarystructureisnotcompetitiveattheseniorlevels.Thereisevidenceoftightcom- pression.Otherbenefits,includingpensionandnon-monetarybenefits,areinplace andareadequate.

Professional Thereisadeficitincareerplanning.Seniorityisanimportantfactor.Theexisting Development careerplanningvoidinfluencescareerdesignquality,aspromotiondecisionstendto Management relyonseniorityratherthanontheresultsoftraining. Atrainingpolicywillbedeveloped. Ideally,trainingmanagementwillemphasizetrainingdeliverybasedonneedsanaly- sisandevaluatedintermsofcostsandbenefits.

Human and Social WhiletheGovernmenthashadthevisiontoadministeraPublicServiceEmployee Relations Management SurveyinMarch2004inordertoassesstheorganizationalclimate,thereportedly adversariallaborrelationsethosaswellasanapparentneedtobuildsocialcapital influencesthissubsystemadversely. Civilservants’pensionisconsideredgenerous.Otherbenefitsincludeoldagepen- sionandthenationalinsurancescheme.Onesourceofdisquietthataffectsthe moraleofcivilservantsislinkedtotheconventionofspecialhiringregimesthat facilitatecertainservingcivilservants’extendedappointmentstoprojectsoncontract,andathigherpaythantheircounterpartsinservice.

Comparison with Thesystemmanagementmodelfeaturesprominently.TheCSSinTrinidadandTobago other analyses evidencesintegratedsystemsinwhichthe“publicemployerappearstobehighly centralized”(Longo,F.2002:59).Yetthereisaconflictingtrendreflectingthefrag- mentationofthesystematthecentrallevel:fourcentralagenciesarethekeyactors. Theprofessionalismandindependenceofpersonsinchargeofselectionareman- datedintheConstitution,evidencingtherecruitmentsystemmodel.

(continued)


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APPENDICES






Report Dates Diagnosis date: November 2004


Acknowledgements

2004: The researcher relied heavily on docu-mented sources as a collective frame of reference for analyzing the existing CSS, and developing recommendations.

I wish to express appreciation to Mrs. Jac-queline Wilson, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Public Administration and Informa-tion, and to Ms. Donna Ferraz, Director, Public Service Transformation Division (PSTD), of the same ministry, for sharing information regarding recent initiatives that affect the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago. I am grateful to Ms. Ingrid Carl-son, Consultant to the Regional Policy Dialogue, Public Policy and Management Network, IDB Office, Washington, for providing a copy of the previous (2002) Institutional Assessment of the CSS in Trinidad and Tobago.

2007: Content analysis [Documentary sources]

•

•

•

Works Consulted

Documents

Bissessar, A. “Analytical Framework for the Insti-tutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems: Trinidad and Tobago.” IDB, Washington, D.C. 2002.

Caribbean Centre for Development Administra-tion (CARICAD) (2001). “Strategic Planning in Caribbean Public Services; Report of the Working Group on Public Sector Reform: Building Capacity for Better Governance.” A project of CARIFORUM and the Euro-pean Development Fund.

Commonwealth Association for Public Adminis-tration and Management Innovations (2004). The Newsletter of the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management (CA-PAM). Vol.10, No.3; pages 15–17. Ontario: Canada

Draper, G (2001). “Public Policy Management and Transparency: Civil Service. The Civil Service in Latin America and the Caribbean: Situation and Future Challenges: The Carib-bean Perspective.” Draft Working Paper.

International Monetary Fund (2003). Country Report No. 03 /232. “Trinidad and To-bago:2003”, Article IV Consultation Staff Report; International Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C.

International Public Management Association for Human Resources (2002). “Human Re-source Developments in the Public Service of Trinidad and Tobago.”

http://www.ipma-hr.org/index.cfm?id=57&navid=73&tcode=nws3

Longo, Francisco (2002). “Analytical Framework for the Institutional Assessment of Civil Ser-vice Systems.” ESCADE, Institute for Public Leadership and Management. Barcelona: Spain



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ListofAbbreviationsCAPAM CommonwealthAssociationforPublicAdministrationandManagement

CARICAD CaribbeanCentreforDevelopmentAdministration


HR HumanResources

HRIS HumanResourcesInformationSystem


IMF InternationalMonetaryFund

NAR NationalAllianceforReconstruction

PNM People’sNationalMovement


PSTD PublicServiceTransformationDivision

UNC UnitedNationalCongress


PART III

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS



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INTRODUCTION

This final chapter has two objectives. It seeks to characterize and compare the civil services of Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Belize. The previous chapters have presented an institutional assessment of each country in detail, providing the basis for the cross-cutting analysis proposed here. This comparative analysis will serve to provide an overarching view of the de-velopment of the civil service in the region.

This chapter attempts to provide a flavor of the development and institutionalization of the civil service in the four countries vis-à-vis the larger Latin American and Caribbean region. As we will see, the four countries are unique in the weight they give to merits, the development of human resources information systems, the struc-ture of the organization of the human resources function and other important aspects of the civil service structure and practice. In other words, there are differences among the four countries under analysis, for which reason the comparative lens should protect us from sweeping generaliza-tions about the civil service development in the sub-region concerned.

The paper is organized as follows. First, we will very briefly present a dynamic overview of the reforms conducted in the four countries, de-

scribing their implementation stages as well as other countries’ features deemed relevant in or-der to understand the development of the civil services in the sub-region. Second, we will exam-ine the quantitative information, by reviewing the countries’ scores on the subsystems. Then, we will enter into the core analysis of this chapter: the comparison and interpretation of the ratings of the five indices corresponding to civil service development. Finally, we will conclude by high-lighting that the intermediate levels of the indi-ces reflect both the changes recently introduced and the more historical emphasis on structural procedures concerning the management of the civil service. A more consistent set of reforms would probably increase the good development levels shown by the five indices discussed here, though these reforms should take advantage of the well-established merit systems in recruiting and promoting employees.

I. ThE STAGE: MANAGERIALLY-INSPIRED REFORMS

Conducting an institutional assessment of the civ-il service in these countries is a relevant endeavor since the public sector is the largest employer, thus assuming a pivotal role in the labor market

ChAPTER �

Comparing the Civil Service in Four English-Speaking Caribbean Countries:

a Quantitative and Qualitative ApproachAna Laura Rodríguez Gustá and Mercedes Iacoviello



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and the economy. The previous chapters suggest three distinct features of the civil service in the sub-region. First, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Belize are former British co-lonial countries, having inherited a merit-based employment management system. Overall, the civil service is protected from overt political in-terference, with some caveats. Additionally, ac-cording to their Constitutions, the responsibility for recruitment, selection, promotion, discipline, and termination of employment rests for the most part with the Public Service Commissions. These are professional and autonomous bodies that have protected the civil service from particu-laristic influences.

The four countries have been engaged in ac-tive reforms gearing towards modernizing their human resources instruments, practices, and sys-tems since the early nineties. The New Public Man-agement philosophy inspires these changes. Indeed,

the reform efforts seek to instill a civil service based on results rather than formal rules, with a business rather than procedure orientation, and an emphasis on client satisfaction (see Table 1 be-low). In Jamaica, for example, the changes have led to the creation of Executive Agencies and to an attempt to reduce the size of the public sector employment or, at least, contain it.

Yet, some aspects of the reform seem to re-inforce the more classic bureaucratic aspects rather than introducing an ideal-type manage-rial reform. For illustration purposes, there is an emphasis on formalizing existing practices and transforming them into clear written rules in-stead of leaving them to the realm of customary practices, such as the formalization of perfor-mance management and human resources plan-ning systems.

At the risk of oversimplifying the complex-ity of the current reform drives, the unifying

Table1.SelectedHumanResourcesManagementInitiatives

Country InitiativesinHRMBarbados • Introductionofinformationsystems(SmartStream) • PerformanceReviewandDevelopmentSysteminpilotagencies • EmployeeAssistanceProgramme • InternalReformCommitteesineachagency • Jobclassification(system-wide)andperformancemanagementplans • ModernizationoflegalframeworkofCivilServiceCommissions • DevelopmentofStrategicPlans

Belize • Improvementofthefinancialmanagementsystem • Introductionofinformationsystems(SmartStream) • Jobclassification(system-wide)andperformancemanagementplans • HRdevelopmentplan • Workclimateinitiatives • EmployeeAssistanceProgramme • Politicalandfiscalreforms

Jamaica • Introductionofahumanresourcedatabasealongwithanumberofhumanresourcespoliciesincludingcom- pensation,training,theintroductionofperformancestandardsandaperformanceappraisalsystem,andanew jobclassificationsystem

TrinidadandTobago • EstablishmentofHumanResourcesUnitsineachMinistry • Introductionofanautomatedhumanresourcesinformationsystem(2002)inpilotagencies • PublicSectorReformInitiationProgramme(2004) • E-Government • Newjobclassificationandcompensationplans,andperformanceappraisalsystems • “NewSystemFacilitators”orstaffdealingwithchangemanagementineachMinistry • PublicEmployeeSurvey(withunions)

Source:Authors’compilationbasedonIsaacs(2004)andIacoviello(2005)


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COmpARiNg ThE CiviL SERviCE iN FOuR ENgLiSh-SpEAkiNg CARiBBEAN COuNTRiES: A QuANTiTATivE AND QuALiTATivE AppROACh

foci common to the four countries are the fol-lowing:

Decentralization of the human resources func-tion Formalization of the human resources plan-ning and performance management Implementation of job evaluation and employ-ee monitoring Strengthening of leadership and constant learn-ing Development and update of managerial func-tions Development of strategic plans within public sector organizationsFormalization of multiple instruments for hu-man resources management (job descriptions with competencies, modern training, reliable evaluations, etc.)Introduction of changes in the legal frameworkPromotion of customer and client satisfaction

Third, the previous chapters show that the four countries vary in how far the reforms have been implemented. As this chapter analyzes, the systems for managing public employment and human resources are in transition and as such, in a hybrid stage. Program implementation may oc-cur in isolation, losing sight of the larger picture of an integrated human resources system. Ad-ditionally, there are tensions and contradictions: the impulse for more coordination across the various subsystems collides with the tradition-

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

••

ally centralized human resources management. The five civil service indices developed by Longo (2002) reflect these tensions. This chapter will describe and explain such indices—efficiency, merit, structural consistency, functional capacity and integrating capacity—by comparing the re-sults obtained for the four countries.

Before turning to such comparison, it will be helpful to refresh some selected aspects of each country’s situation in order to highlight the fact that they face tensions and contradictions mostly at the implementation level. Overall, in the re-gion, the modernization efforts are not neces-sarily implemented within an articulated human resources strategy management system (see Ta-ble 2 below).

Trinidad and Tobago, despite its decentral-ization goal, has not truly transferred decision-making of human resources issues to the line level (except for training activities). The Prime Minister of Belize has reactivated the reform of the public sector, in light of the fact that many previous programs had been discontinued while others have not even been initiated. In Barba-dos, the internal dynamics of the reform have not taken root in the entire civil service, and pub-lic officers remain ambiguous about embracing the reform proposals. The reforms in Jamaica are implemented in a context of economic re-strictions and cost containment, and they are not always articulated in a smooth fashion.

Why does the actual implementation depart in extent and scope from the original reform

Table2.TheReformEvolutionintheFourCountries

Barbados Belize Jamaica TrinidadandTobago• Slowimplementation • Partialimplementation • Implementation,sometimesnot • Slowandpiecemeal• Fewreformshavebeen • Lowresponseratebyministries interconnected implementation institutionalizedsystem-wide

• Reformeffortsseemtohave • PrimeMinisterreinforced • Reformsareon-goingwithin • Someeffortsseemtohave lostmomentum reformthrustin2003 thecostcontainmentstrategy, reachedastandstill whichcouldeventually • Broaderstakeholdercommit- underminereforms mentrequired,particularlyat theimplementationstage




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plans? Each country has its own reasons. Trini-dad and Tobago faces clear political constraints, such as lack of political will and consensus, and a context of two political parties highly divided along racial lines (Isaacs 2004). To this we should add certain discomfort between the union and the Government to the point that the union has actively hindered some reforms (such as complet-ing job classifications). In short, we may affirm that implementation in Trinidad and Tobago has been piecemeal, and slowly implemented.

By contrast, the reform in Barbados shows an overall smooth albeit slow pace implemen-tation process. This has been possible due to the fact that the two major political parties are ideologically alike, thus bringing about political stability in the country. Yet, the reform packages have not necessarily been interrelated strategi-cally and there are important efficiency losses. Not surprisingly, the reform in this country has “lost momentum”, as well as administrative and political leadership (Isaacs 2004).

In Belize, the involvement of the Prime Min-ister in 2003 has been pivotal in the continuity of the reform effort. There has been an explicit polit-ical will to establish a partnership body: the Public Sector Reform Council, formed by representatives from the Ministry of Public Service, the Ministry of Finance, unions, and the private sector. This Council should monitor the implementation of re-form. Nonetheless, a major reform challenge con-sists in involving all ministries in the initiatives.

In Jamaica, the civil service reform is con-sidered a pre-requisite for achieving the national goals for sustainable development and economic growth of this small and open economy. Despite the lack of a fully strategic and interrelated hu-man resources management system, public sec-tor reforms have been fairly continuous. In all likelihood, this occurs because of the strong po-litical commitment of the Prime Minister as well as the trade union. This commitment is reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding, where the union agrees to accept some of the fiscal con-straints under the expectation that the person-nel-related reforms will benefit public officers.

Still, the measures to control the fiscal deficit pose serious constraints to the human resources reforms, for instance, limiting promotion oppor-tunities and not allowing public sector salaries to become truly competitive relative to the market.

Having provided this more dynamic over-view about the recent historical conjuncture, let us now turn to the comparative analysis of the civil service organization. We will start by briefly describing the main functions of the civil service along the 8 sub-systems provided by the method-ology (Longo 2002): human resources planning, work organization, employment, performance management, professional development man-agement, compensation management, human and social relations management, and the orga-nization of the human resources function.

II. A COMPARATIVE LENS ON CIVIL SERVICE DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF ThE CIVIL SERVICE INDICES

An Overview of the SubsystemsIn examining the scores for each subsystem pro-posed by the methodology, we observe the follow-ing facts. First, the employment function is the most developed subsystem in the four countries, whereas human resources planning is the most incipient. Second, when compared with Latin America, the four countries tend to score above the average for all subsystems, except for human resources planning (See Table 3 below).

The employment subsystem reveals the larg-est difference between the four countries and the rest of Latin America, mostly due to the former´s merit-based route for selecting and recruiting employees. This is not the rule in the rest of the region (Iacoviello and Zuvanic 2006).

On performance management, the four countries together score above the region’s aver-age. Moreover, individually taken, Barbados and Jamaica have the highest scores of the whole region (2.9), except for Chile that scores 3.4. Despite this, performance management is incipi-ent in the four countries examined here, though


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Table3.ASubsystemPerspective:RegionalandSub-regionalscores

Latin Trinidad Regional America’s Barbados Belize Jamaica andTobago average average*

HumanResourcesPlanning:constitutesthefrontdoorinanyhumanresourcesmanagementsystem,andenablesanorganizationtoevalu-ateitsqualitativeandquantitativeneedsofhumanresourcesfortheshort,medium,andlongterminordertoconfrontidentifiedneedswithitsexistingcapacitiesandtoidentifyanyactionsthatneedtobeundertakentobridgethegap.

2.1 2.0 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.9

WorkOrganization:anticipatesandspecifiesthetaskstobeperformedaswellastheprofileofthepeoplequalifiedtocarrythemout.Itincludesboththedescriptionoftheactivities,functions,andresponsibilitiesassignedtoeachposition(jobdescription)andthedefinitionofthecompetencies,skills,andattitudesthatarenecessaryforsuccessfulperformanceateachposition(profiledefinition).

2.8 2.4 2.9 1.8 2.5 1.7

EmploymentManagement:involvespersonnelpoliciesandpracticesconcernedwithmanagingtheprocessesbywhichpeopleenter,movewithinandleavetheorganization.Itiscentraltothehumanresourcesmanagementsystem,especiallyinthepublicsector,sinceitshouldbemanagedbasedonequity,merit,andqualityprinciples.

3.2 3.2 3.2 2.8 3.1 2.0

PerformanceManagement:referstotheprocessofplanningandevaluatingthecontributionofemployeestotheorganization.Itshouldbemanagedsothatindividualandgroupperformanceisinlinewiththeorganizations’prioritiesandkeptatthehighestpossibleleveltoen-ablesustainedimprovementoftheircontributiontotheorganization.

2.9 2.0 2.9 2.0 2.4 1.5

CompensationManagement:entailsthemanagementofalltypesofmonetary(i.e.wageornon-wage)andnon-monetarybenefitsofferedbytheorganizationtoitsemployeestorewardthemfortheircontributiontoachievingtheorganization’sobjectives.Itshouldbebasedoninternalandexternalequityprinciples,withasalarystructurebasedonthevaluationandclassificationofpositions,andsomekindofvari-ablepaymentschemethatlinkrewardstoperformanceorresults(eitherattheindividual,group,orinstitutionallevel).

2.5 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.5 1.7

ProfessionalDevelopmentManagement:thepoliciesandpracticesofdevelopmentmanagementaimatstimulatingtheprofessionaldevelopmentofthestaffmembersaccordingtotheirpotential,encouraginglearninganddefiningcareerpathsthatshouldmatchtheorganization’sneedswiththeindividualprofile.Promotionpolicies,careerdesign,andtrainingpoliciesarethemainprocessesincludedinthissubsystem,whichshouldbemanagedwithaclearfocusontheprioritiesandneedsoftheorganization.

2.5 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.4 1.6

HumanandSocialRelationsManagement:isconcernedwiththemanagementoftherelationsbetweentheorganizationanditsemployeesregardingpersonnelpoliciesandpracticeswhentheseacquire,inagivencontext,acollectivedimension.Itinvolveslaborrelationsmanage-ment,whichincludesthecollectivenegotiationsofpayandworkingconditions,themanagementoftheorganizationalclimateintermsofcommunicationpoliciesandpractices,andsocialbenefitsthatareofferedtoemployeesingeneralortoaidparticularlyneedygroupsorindividuals.

2.5 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.6 1.7

OrganizationofHumanResourcesfunction:referstothemechanismsusedforthemanagementofthesystem,particularlythedistributionofpersonneldecisionsamongthedifferentresponsibleparties.

3.0 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.6 1.7

*Includes18countries’scores,thusexcludingthefourcountriesofinteresthere.Fordetailsonthescoresforeachcountry,refertoAppendixE.




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there are observable developments at the higher managerial levels such as the performance as-sessments of Permanent Secretaries. In the rest of the region, by contrast, evaluations remain ceremonial even at managerial levels.

In Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and To-bago, and Belize, we observe attempts to create job profiles that truly map job competencies and personality traits beyond formal education require-ments—as it has been the tradition in the Work Organization subsystem. In comparison with the rest of the region, however, the four countries re-flect a more developed situation given for the most part by their current updates of job profiles and classifications. Indeed, on work organization, only Brazil (2.9) has a score comparable to those of Barbados and Jamaica (2.8 and 2.9, respectively).

In the four Caribbean countries studied, the Compensation Management subsystem reflects the general principle of “equal pay for equal work” but it is not competitive with private sec-tor salaries for the high-skilled jobs, at the top of the employment pyramid. By contrast, there is a generalized lack of internal equity in the region. Not surprisingly, these four countries’ average is higher than the region’s score. Individually, only Chile and Brazil obtain higher scores on this subsystem (2.9).

With regard to professional development, as with the rest of the region, Barbados, Belize, Ja-maica and Trinidad and Tobago, present some structural rigidities in the internal mobility and contract termination of public officers, due to the fact that mobility remains largely informed by seniority criteria (hindering strategic suc-cession planning), to which we should add the absence of pay for performance practices. If compared with the whole region, in addition to presenting higher averages, these countries are amongst those with the highest individual ratings on this subsystem.

In relation to the Human and Social Rela-tions Management subsystem, we also observe the subregion’s higher average ratings. The integra-tion of unions—with varying degrees of conflict and trust—into the bargaining and negotiation

system pulls the score up, in absence of institu-tionalized practices concerning the quality of the organizational climate. The institutionalization of labor relations and the incidence of unions on key aspects of the human resources management are precisely what makes the difference between these four countries and the rest of Latin America.

Lastly, the Organization of the Human Re-sources Function subsystem in the four countries shows an intermediate development due to the prestige and professional autonomy of the Pub-lic Service Commissions. Barbados and Jamaica obtain the highest ratings in this subsystem vis-à-vis the rest of the Latin American countries indi-vidually taken.

In short, an analysis of the four countries from the perspective of the subsystems reveals that their civil services have reached intermedi-ate levels of development and in some cases, up-per levels relative to the regional context.

An Analytic Note on the Use of the IndicesThe methodology developed by Longo (2002) offers the possibility of looking at these eight subsystems transversally, by the use of indices. The indices are quantitative measures derived from the critical points used to evaluate the sub-systems. Interestingly, these indices, as will be seen later on, actually reveal deeper differences between the four countries than a first glance at the subsystems would suggest. Before turning to the analysis of the indices, we have to be clear about how they are used for assessing the strate-gic development of civil services.

The indices, by design, require a quantita-tive reading because they are numeric summary measures. Indeed, they provide a normalized score ranging from 0% to 100%.1 We use these indices to compare the countries, and in this sense, the indices provide interpretations about the variation existing among them.

1 A score of 100% suggests the maximum development possible.


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Because the 93 critical points evaluate ide-al-type models of strategically-managed civil services, contrasting the indices ratings against this “ideally perfect” civil service model could be somewhat misleading if this is not placed into context. Taking into account this appreciation, we have compared the four countries’ results with the scores obtained for 18 Latin American countries. This could provide a more realistic appreciation of the extent of development and consolidation of strategic civil services in these four English-speaking Caribbean countries rela-tive to the region.

Considering the rest of the region has led us to recode some of the original quantitative eval-uations of the critical points, in order to ensure reliability and consistency in the comparison. In all likelihood, this reflects the richness and flex-ibility of the methodology employed here: its ref-erence point may vary depending on contextual considerations.

Because the indices are quantitative summa-ries of rich and detailed information contained in the institutional assessments presented in the previous chapters, we utilize qualitative data in the analysis to give substance and nuance to the comparison. More importantly, the qualitative evidence provides substantive interpretations of the indices beyond their quantitative results.

The remaining analysis is organized as fol-lows. First, we will describe each index and, if applicable, the sub-indices; then we will high-light the most significant quantitative outcomes in a comparative spotlight (taking the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole). Second, we will turn to the qualitative discussion by focusing on the most salient empirical issues underscored by the institutional evaluations. Fi-nally, we will discuss in all cases the differences as well as the common traits along the stylized qualitative information.

II.1. Efficiency

Does the structure and practices of the civil ser-vice respond to cost benefit calculations? Are bu-

reaucratic processes costly to the economy or are they within accepted boundaries? Are human resources used efficiently, timely and adequately in the civil service? These questions refer to the efficiency of the civil service.

Captured by 13 critical points, this index measures the optimal distribution and use of people and resources across organizations and sectors: it evaluates the degree of optimization of the investment in human capital detectable in the civil service system, its alignment with the scale of the fiscal policy, and its reference markets. Consequently, high efficiency scores would imply managing slack resources as well as preventing resource deficits. These are capacities usually associated with adequate planning systems, and its coordination with employment management, training investments, and compensation strate-gies.

The Latin American region presents an aver-age of 32% of the scale on efficiency (see Appen-dix D). Chile, Brazil and Argentina are the three countries with the highest values (59%, 56% and 50%, respectively). The lowest index score is 8%. The four countries studied here score well above the region’s average (see Figure 1 and Table 4 be-low). Barbados obtains 53% of the scale, prob-ably because of the implementation of a human resources information system, with its associated training given by the Office of Public Sector Re-form. Belize and Jamaica follow, with 50% of the scale. Trinidad and Tobago scores slightly lower (45%), but still relatively high when compared with the broader region.

The efficiency scores indicate that the four countries have reached intermediate levels of development. The following empirical issues are highlighted by the institutional evaluations and deserve closer attention: a) the integration of planning and human resources management in order to assess the qualitative and quantitative needs of personnel and the distribution of work among units, b) the weight of the government wage bill on the economy, and c) the efficiency of the compensation structure and the investments in employee training.



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Note:Thepossiblerangeofvariationforthemeritindexisfrom0to100%.

Source:Authors’compilationbasedonIsaacs(2004),Iacoviello(2005)

Table4.EfficiencyIndex–QualitativeAssessment

Country Efficiency IndexQualitativeAssessment

Strengths WeaknessesBarbados

Belize

Jamaica

Trinidad and Tobago

53%

50%

50%

45%

• Advancedhumaninformationsystemforplanningefforts

• Soundanddigitalizedfiscalinformation

• Goodimplementationprogress

• Lowfiscalweightofgovernmentwagebillintherestofeconomy

• Fiscalweight

• Fiscalweight• Deficitofskilledandsurplusofunskilledof-

ficers

• Fiscalweight• Migrationoflawyers,healthprofessionals

andteacherstotheprivatesector

• Implementationdelaysandobstacles• Smallsizeofcentralgovernmentsuggests

insufficientdevelopment

•Hu

man

reso

urce

sm

anag

emen

tsys

-te

ms

and

plan

ning

effo

rts

unco

uple

d•

No

cost

sca

lcul

atio

nsa

ssoc

iate

dw

ith

trai

ning

pla

ns

60

70

80

90

(E) Efficiency

100

50

40

30

20

10

0

Trinidad and Tobago

Jamaica

Belize

Barbados

LA Avg

Figure1.EfficiencyIndex

Sources:Isaacs(2004)andIacoviello(2005)

Uncoordinated Planning: Effects on EfficiencyIn the four countries, the civil service reform has instilled a conception of strategic approach to human resources planning. Still, the new instru-ments and systems have to take more grounds

on the public sector as a whole. In Barbados and Belize, the efficiency in the use of these instru-ments and the consequent operations are mid-way from a full-fledged strategic planning.

As Isaacs (2004) observes, in Barbados plan-ning remains “reactive.” Nonetheless, there is


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evidence of promising developments. Indeed, the Office of Public Sector Reform (OPSR) has been assisting government agencies with strate-gic planning tools, though these tools are not yet institutionalized in the 18 ministries.

In Belize, planning is hindered by a climate of a low level of trust between ministers and se-nior public officers. There are no integrated hu-man resources planning, which if added to the feeble information system, probably explains the observed shortcomings concerning employee re-distribution and task allocation among units. Not surprisingly, Iacoviello (2005) identifies a deficit of skilled personnel, and a surplus of unskilled ones. Particularly at clerical levels, overstaffing is common while there is a shortage of special-ized (technical and managerial) personnel. This leads, according to Iacoviello (2005), to a chronic “overwork” of qualified personnel.

Following Bissessar (2000), Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago seem to be opposite cases on this theme. Jamaica appears to move towards a quite articulated human resources manage-ment systems, while Trinidad and Tobago lags behind trying to cope with few implementation problems—some of them concerning employee resistance to the reform changes and the climate of little trust between ministers and senior public officers—as in Belize.

From the institutional diagnostics, there is no evidence of excessive staff turnover, probably as-sociated with the fact of few designated political posts. Admittedly, there is an important deficit in some occupational categories in some countries such as Barbados, particularly those demanding more specialized personnel—namely: lawyers, engineers, land surveyors and information tech-nology personnel. Jamaica and Belize also pres-ent deficits in some professional occupational groups. In Jamaica, certain high-skilled jobs are difficult to fill, such as corporate planners, hu-man resources planners and office managers.

Fiscal Weight In Belize, Jamaica, and Barbados salary expen-ditures seem to pose a burden on the public ac-

counts. If we take Belize as an example, personal emoluments have held steady at around 50% of the total recurrent expenditures, a figure that in-creases to 60% when considering other indica-tors. Still, even beyond costs and size, efficiency in Belize is also affected by practices of rule-fol-lowing and excessive bureaucratization of for-malized procedures (Iacoviello 2005).

Yet, some efforts undertaken to control pub-lic expenditures are worth mentioning—Jamaica leads the way in these endeavors. The attempt to tightly manage salary expenditures has led to a freeze in employment and promotions, thus affecting other indices such as consistency and incentive capacity.

Fiscal weight, expenditures and public sector size should be read with caution. We admit that public sector size and the wage bill in particular affect the efficiency of the civil service in Barba-dos, Belize and Jamaica. Still, the small size of the civil service in Trinidad and Tobago is taken as a suggestion of an insufficient development of government functions (Isaacs 2004).

Compensations and Training InvestmentsOn the items measuring efficiency in compensa-tions, the tendency is that similar positions for established officers in different areas are simi-larly paid.2 Public sector salaries are higher than those paid in the private sector. Paradoxically, when it comes to specialized jobs, the salaries are not competitive enough among higher level jobs and qualified personnel. Other benefits seem adequate, with the exception of pensions but in most countries pensions are being revised.

For the most part, the costs and benefits of training are not evaluated. Also, training is yet to be based on planning and on a “needs

2 Inequalities are reported between tenured and on-contract employees in Belize and Barbados, since salaries are more favorable to the latter even with comparable tasks and responsibilities. This will be ad-dressed later on.



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analysis” and there is no reliable instrument to identify “skills gaps.” In Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, training has been discontinued for some years (due to budget constraints). In Be-lize, training is oriented towards the preferences of individuals and not to the strategic needs of organizations, although this issue is being ad-dressed through an ambitious initiative to de-velop a national Human Resource Development plan (Iacoviello 2005).

Jamaica and Barbados seem the most prom-ising countries on this point. In Jamaica, under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Congress of Trade Unions, a training plan is required. Also, the training needs analysis has been tested in the Ministry of Finance; train-ing priorities have been placed on the medical and health areas. In Barbados, a training policy should be implemented in the short-term, with a training budget established by law. Yet, funds for training are limited, which is a feature that the four countries share.

Overall, the efficiency index is affected by the high costs of the public salaries, the low in-vestments in strategic training and, above all, the weak planning tools mentioned earlier. A more qualitative look at this problem would lead us to argue that efficiency is negatively affected by the cumbersome rules inherited from the British sys-tem, which paradoxically favor merit, as we will see next.

Above all, efficiency seems to be affected by the actual transitional stage of the four coun-tries, with reforms implemented half-way and

programs incepted in isolation from each other rather than as a unified package. This is particu-larly so in Trinidad and Tobago (Bissesar 2002). About this country, Bissessar (2000) suggests that there has been a change in the name of man-aging human resources, calling it “strategic” but remaining very traditional in substance and, as such, losing efficiency.

II.2. Merit

Are recruitment processes fair? How are the most capable candidates selected from the pool of applicants? Is this a concern in the civil service practices and procedures? Are there political ties affecting important matters such as salary and promotion decisions, even access to bureaucratic jobs? The merit index addresses these questions. It evaluates the extent to which professional crite-ria are used to make employment decisions thus protecting employees from abuse, politicization and corruption.

Essentially, this index measures where there exist professional, technical and objective proce-dures in recruiting and selecting employees, pro-moting them, and terminating the employment relation. While low values in this index would suggest the presence of particularistic and non-technically based criteria, high values would in-dicate the presence of technical and professional criteria in employment management.

In the Latin American region, only Brazil and Chile present comparable merit indices, with 87% and 58% of the scale, respectively (see

Table5.FutureProspectsConcerningEfficiency:SomePromisingDevelopmentsJamaica • DevelopmentofatrainingpolicyasrequiredbytheMemorandumofUnderstanding(MOU)withtheUnions

Trinidad and Tobago • E-governmentinitiativethatwouldconnectallagenciesandprovideaccesstoinformationandstandardized planninginstruments

Barbados • Trainingpolicywithabudget(underTrainingAct)

Belize • FullimplementationofHumanResourcesInformationSystemthatwillprovideinformationonidentifyingtrain- ingneedsandprovideinputforhumanresourcesplanning

• AdvancestoestablishanationalHumanResourceDevelopmentplan



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60

70

80

90

(M) Merit

100

50

40

30

20

10

0

Trinidad and Tobago

Jamaica

Belize

Barbados

LA Avg

Figure2.MeritIndex


Note:Thepossiblerangeofvariationforthemeritindexisfrom0to100%.

Source:Authors’compilationbasedonIsaacs(2004),Iacoviello(2005)

Table6.MeritIndex–QualitativeAssessment

MeritIndex Country Score IndexQualitativeAssessment

Strengths Weaknesses

Barbados

Belize

Jamaica

Trinidad and Tobago

71%

68%

75%

59%

• Opensystemthatoperatesuponavailablevacancies• Technicalcriteriaforrecruitment• Personneladministrationishighlytechnical• Nopoliticalinterferencewithpromotions• Extremelyfewpoliticaljobs

• Opensystem(eventoCARICOMcountriesforsomejobvacancies)

• Personneladministrationishighlytechnical• Technicalcriteriaforrecruitment• Extremelyfewpoliticaljobs

• Opensystem• Personneladministrationishighlytechnical• Selectionbasedontechnicalcriteriaandconnectedtospecific

jobdescriptions• Extremelyfewpoliticaljobs(1%duetorounding)

• Personneladministrationishighlytechnical• Technicalcriteriaforrecruitment• Extremelyfewpoliticaljobs

• Selectioncriteriamaybetooformal(e.g.,academicqualifica-tionsmeasuredascredentialsonly)

• Selectioncriteriamaybetooformal(“paperqualifications”)

• Categoriesfordiscretionaryre-cruitment(“openvote”workers)isofconcern

• Emphasisontooformalaspects• Cumbersomeprocedures

• Racialbiasesattherecruitingstage



180

Appendix D). Overall, particularistic ties of all sorts affect the recruitment and selection of per-sonnel in the region. By sharp contrast, the four English-speaking Caribbean countries examined here score quite well on this index, despite coun-try variations (See Figure 2 and Table 6 below). For the most part, the index reflects the use of merit in recruiting and selecting personnel. In-deed, the merit index is the highest score in the four civil services studied here. In contrast with other Latin American countries, the absence of relations of political clientele as a mechanism for accessing public jobs is practically unheard of in these four countries.

Certainly, the weight placed on the assess-ment of merits at the recruitment stages relates to the famous Public Service Commissions, in-herited from the British system. Stated in the countries’ Constitutions, these Commissions are independent and autonomous bodies that gov-ern the appointment, discipline and removal of nearly all public officers (Draper 2001). Howev-er, given their high technical nature, they have more recently been questioned for instilling too much rigidity into the human resources manage-ment system, but they are pivotal in accounting for the high levels of merits in the four countries examined.

Jamaica presents the highest merit index in the English-Caribbean region (75%). Certainly, this score reflects the well-developed employ-ment management system. We can observe a very low percentage of politically-driven posts (1% as per data provided by Isaac, 2002). In addition to an emphasis on professionalism for bureaucratic positions, the recruitment is open, universal and widely disseminated. Selection de-cisions are made on the basis of technical and proved credentials and on the basis of a job pro-file of the vacancy to fill. In essence, recruitment is competitive and the requirements are clear for different types of jobs rather than arbitrary or random. The selection bodies are representative, independent and autonomous from the political system. Consequently, employment decisions are transparent, accompanied by rigorous selection

procedures that may include interviews and even examinations (Isaacs 2002).

In Barbados, merit reaches 71% of the scale. Briefly, recruitment is open by law and positions are filled according to established technical cri-teria whenever there is a vacancy available. In addition to basic qualifications, usually academ-ic degrees, a job applicant may be interviewed (IADB 2002). The personnel recruiting bodies are of good technical quality. Political appoint-ments beyond those legally stipulated are rare, with the notable exceptions of state-owned cor-porations and selected agencies such as hospitals and airports (IADB 2002). Basically, merit con-siderations in recruiting and selecting personnel are fairly respected.

If anything, inherited rigidities inhibit the merit index from being even higher, such as an over-reliance on too formal procedures in re-cruiting new public officers, which sometimes miss more substantive aspects of an applicant’s abilities. Yet, with the full implementation of the human resources software package (SmartStream), selecting employees will more actively incorpo-rate abilities and competencies (Isaacs 2004).

The 68% of the merit scale found in Be-lize relates to a strongly developed employment management subsystem that has served to instill reasonable practices about how people enter the organization, move and leave. Consider some of the ten critical points in more detail. Public Ser-vice Commissions designate personnel, isolating employment decision from direct political ma-neuvers. Politics and discretion do not influence salary decisions or promotions. The distinction between bureaucratic and political appointments is institutionalized, largely guaranteed by an in-dependent Public Service Commission.

There are some exceptions, for which the merit index is lower in Belize than in Jamaica or Barbados. Politically appointed CEOs (the func-tional equivalent of Permanent Secretaries) are empowered to recruit and select personnel for low administrative and maintenance jobs since year 2000. Still, the Commission monitors that the re-cruitment procedures be adequately employed.


181


A more problematic exception is the hiring of the so-called “open vote” workers—temporary assignments usually at the lowest classification levels—because this hiring decision directly de-pends on the will of the Ministers (Iacoviello 2005). Possibly, if these employees become used in excess, this may undermine the merit system due to the discretionary component of their ad-ministration. So far, there is no major evidence of abuse of this exceptional procedure.

Additionally, Belize includes procedures to overcome potential biases and discrimination at the recruitment stage—the composition of the recruitment panel is varied. Vacancies are well advertised. In some cases—when no applicant fulfills the job requirements—the vacancy is then opened for the whole set of CARICOM coun-tries. Yet, it is difficult to overcome a situation of structural discrimination, beyond the institution-al capacities of the State: half of the population in Belize is not fluent in English, a requisite for accessing jobs in the public sector, in addition to low levels of overall literacy.

The selection instruments and procedures are quite sound: they are detailed and there are high levels of compliance with them. Nonetheless, a major drawback seems that formal credentials and “paper qualifications” take precedence over more dynamic considerations about a candidate’s competencies and his/her intangible job abilities. Still, the expert panel making personnel recruit-ment decisions is of high technical quality.

Lastly, in Trinidad and Tobago merit com-prises 59% of the scale. This value reflects the professionalism at the moment of recruiting per-sonnel, as well as the solid background and his-tory of the recruiting organizations, such as the Public Service Commission. There are competi-tions based on objective criteria, tests and exami-nations (Draper 2001).

Yet, the existence of an unequal represen-tation of ethnic groups in the civil service pulls the index down, for it suggests possible forms of discrimination or unintended biases at the selec-tion stage. Indeed, Afro-Trinidadians are more favored than Indo-Trinidadians, an imbalance

reported by the Centre for Ethnic Studies of the University of West Indies in 1994 (Bissessar 2000). Not surprisingly, there have been efforts to establish an Equal Opportunities Commission.

To summarize, Barbados, Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago present well-developed em-ployment subsystems, whose major contribution is the enforcement of merit considerations when selecting public officers. These four civil services have solid recruiting bodies that are independent from political pressures. The country’s evalua-tions do not present evidence of major political interference in the human resources manage-ment of employees.

II.�. STRUCTURAL CONSISTENCY

Are the various mechanisms, practices and proce-dures of human resources management integrat-ed? Do organizational structures and procedures converge into a consistent public employment system? What about the consistency in attitudes and behaviors of those in charge of managing public employees? The structural consistency in-dex measures all these important questions and it is, in turn, divided into three sub-indices add-ing up to twenty nine critical points altogether: a) strategic coherence, b) directive consistency and c) consistency in processes.

II.�.1. An Overview of the Structural Consistency Index

In the Latin American region, the structural con-sistency index reflects a general lack of coher-ence among the different aspects concerning the strategic management of human resources. Ex-ceptions to this are Brazil and Chile, with 58% and 65% on the structural consistency index, respectively. The country average is 30, with a range from 9 to 65 (see Appendix D).

By contrast, the four countries studied here reflect relatively higher degrees of internal con-sistency in their civil services, for they take the following values: Barbados 56%, Belize 51%, Ja-



182

maica 57%, and Trinidad and Tobago 43% (see Table 7 below). What are the characteristics of the structural consistency of these civil services? Additionally, what accounts for the differences between them? To answer to these questions, we must examine each sub-index individually.

Clearly, most of the problems affecting the mechanisms and practices concerning strategic coherence in all the countries are found in the civil service, thus impacting negatively on the structural consistency index. Some countries have their structural strengths in the consistency of managers and directive lines, such as Barba-

dos and Jamaica. Others, such as Belize, have instead their structural strengths in the consis-tency of their processes, while they show clear weaknesses in the strategic coherence of civil service processes and mechanisms. Other coun-tries, such as Trinidad and Tobago, score evenly across the sub-indices.

II.�.2. Strategic coherence

We will start with strategic coherence, which refers to the extent of connection between the organization’s employment and human resourc-

Table7:StructuralConsistency:Sub-indicesScores

Strategic Directive Consistency Structural Country Coherence Consistency ofProcesses Consistency

Barbados 44% 57% 53% 56%

Belize 43% 44% 52% 51%

Jamaica 47% 56% 54% 57%

TrinidadandTobago 39% 40% 40% 43%


60

80

100

40

20

0

Trinidad and Tobago

Jamaica

Belize

Barbados

LA Avg

(STC) Strategic Coherence (DC) Directive Consistency (CP) Consistency of Processes

Figure3.StructuralConsistency:ResultsbySub-indices



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es management practices with the government’s strategic priorities. Measured by a total of seven critical points, it mostly refers to the planning of human resources at all levels of the public sector, thus connecting macro with micro dynamics.

Disjointed PlanningAs observed for the rest of the region, the main shortcoming of strategic coherence is the lack of connection between each government’s plans and the organizations’ human resources plan-ning. Forecasts on personnel needs, qualitative and quantitative projections, and organizational priorities are separate tasks rarely informing each other. As a result, the expected strategic coher-ence turns out to be a set of uncoupled decisions and plans about human resources management.

In the four cases examined here, these ob-servations are true but these countries are in a state of transformation towards more consistent

interconnections between the overall plans and organizations’ lower-level planning. In fact, these interconnections have largely improved with the New Public Management reforms experienced since the late 1980s, simultaneously aiming at developing strategic plans and conducting orga-nizational reviews. Paradoxically, in many cases, these plans have not further prospered because the different initiatives have been introduced in isolation (IADB 2002), reinforcing in many cases the previous lack of connection between the various dimensions of the human resources management.

Particularly in Barbados, “reformers failed to conceive of Public Sector or Human Resources Management reform as an integrated system” (IADB 2002: 9). The Office of Public Sector Re-form (established in 1997) has been attempting to introduce and institutionalize planning mech-anisms for the management of human resources.

Note:Thepossiblerangeofvariationfortheindexisfrom0to100%.

Paragraphsinitalicsrefertothecriticalpointsconcerningplanning.Paragraphsinregularfontrefertostrategiccoherenceinperformance,com-pensations,anddevelopmentmanagement.


Table8.StrategicCoherenceSub-index–QualitativeAssesment

Strategic Country Coherence IndexQualitativeAssessment


Barbados

Belize

Jamaica

Trinidad and Tobago

55%

50%

57%

45%

• On-goingstrategicplanningwithorganiza-tionalreviews

• Pilotprojectsonperformancemeasurement

• ThereisaNationalPlanatthemacrolevel,fromwhichspecificorganizationalplanscouldbederivedconsistently

• Salaryreviewsarerelativelyfrequent,rein-forcingcoherenceincompensations

• Corporateplanningprocesswithanemphasisonbudgetneeds

• Performancecontractsandevaluationofup-perlevelmanagers

• E-Governmentinitiativewillservetointe-gratedifferentagencies

• On-goingeffortsatperformanceplanning

• Implementationinisolation,uncoupledfromotherhumanresourcespractices

• Wageplansforcompensationsarenotneces-sarilystrategic

• Eachministerestablishesprioritiesandstrate-gieswithoutconsideringtheNationalPlan

• Nostrategicplantoaddressskillsgapsandemployeetrainingneeds

• Humanresourcesplanninglacksformalinstru-ments

• Strategicperformancetargetsarenotwide-spread

• Lackofformalinstrumentsaswellaswide-spreadinformationsystems

• Reactivecompensationstructureandlackofperformanceindicators



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It is due to these efforts and the shortcomings just mentioned that the strategic coherence index re-flects what we could call a “transitional stage.”

On the one hand, a Strategic Plan at the government’s level is lacking. To this we should add the incipient institutionalization and diffu-sion across all ministries of the human strategic management systems introduced by the manage-rial state reform just mentioned. The planning subsystem, according to Isaacs (2004), remains reactive. On the other hand, Barbados’ civil ser-vice is promising due to the current implementa-tion of modern planning systems. These systems allow organizational diagnostics of their needs and priorities, including budgeting and human resources planning by means of computerized information records.

In connecting the government’s priorities with the organizational human resources needs, Jamaica has developed some strategic planning but with shortcomings. Indeed, as Isaacs points out (2002), there is a corporate planning process that operates as the overarching planning frame-work, on the basis of the national priorities and the budget process. By contrast, the human re-sources planning process is not formalized, hap-pens de facto and ends up being idiosyncratic for each organization. Testimonial evidence sug-gests, though, that there is awareness of the im-portance of strategic human resources planning.

In Belize, strategic coherence reflects a still weak strategic planning system in human re-sources management. There is no organizational process by which the amount and type of per-sonnel needed is actually calculated and project-ed. The strategic planning “at the macro level is not layered down” (Iacoviello 2005). Ministers, then, “capriciously” make their human resourc-es planning.

Further, the budget release process under-mines any planning effort. Rather than releas-ing funds on the basis of needs and priorities, the “cash flow” management system means that the Ministry of Finance dispenses one twelfth of the approved annual budget on a monthly basis (Iacoviello 2005), irrespective of the actual needs

of an organization. So far, efforts towards ratio-nalizing roles and functions have not been imple-mented, for which the critical points measuring the strategic coherence of human resources planning obtain very low scores.

We should also take into account the political underpinnings of the reform process. The con-centration of responsibility has been in the hands of the Ministry of Public Service—and more recently in the Office of Governance—without actively engaging the ministers in the various ini-tiatives. This precludes organizations from inte-grating the design of the changes themselves, an aspect that in all likelihood affect the planning of human resources.

In Trinidad and Tobago, as Isaacs (2004) ob-serves, the human resources planning is not yet formalized, and important aspects, such as the information system, have been implemented in pilot organizations only. Still, as with the rest of the four countries, the interconnection between the government’s priorities and organizational human resources strategies and needs is in tran-sition towards a more developed stage. Under the E-Government program, the expectation is to integrate all agencies for sharing information and emulating best practices in selected opera-tions.

Strategies in Compensation and Performance StandardsWhereas it is a fact that strategic coherence is largely determined by the quality of human resources planning (four out of seven critical points refer to this subsystem), we must take into account strategic coherence in compensations, performance management and training to get a full panorama on this index. Overall, all four countries are affected by shortcomings in the hu-man resources planning, as is the case with the rest of the region, thus reducing the degree of strategic coherence.

In Barbados, there are pilot projects for per-formance review and development systems that suppose strategic organizational plans vis-à-vis individual performance evaluations. Yet, while


18�


compensations do respond to wage plans, these plans are not necessarily strategic. Lastly, train-ing plans designed beforehand for devising train-ing needs are scarce, getting the lowest score of the items of the sub-index.

In Jamaica, the performance measures of public managers (e.g. Permanent Secretaries and administrative heads) increase the value of the index. This is worth mentioning because, despite the shortcomings of having only a process of corporate planning, this process allows for per-formance guidelines to become an integral part for monitoring the work of high-ranking posi-tions.

In Belize—probably associated with a weak planning process—there are no clear organi-zational performance targets in place, which could serve to guide and evaluate individuals’ work contributions. In the same line, there is a shortage of planning concerning the skills gaps and employee training needs, for which invest-ments along these lines might be erratic or at least less consistent. About the strategic coher-ence in compensations, the Belize’s civil service offers similar salaries for similar positions for es-tablished officers. Salary reviews are conducted when requesting appointments and promotions. No discretionary practices are observed, as the responsibility of fixing salaries remains in highly professional bodies.

Finally, in Trinidad and Tobago, many per-sonnel policies have not actually translated into actual practices (Bissessar 2000). Other issues af-fecting strategic coherence refer to the reactive compensation structure and the lack of appraisal systems and performance indicators.

Despite shortcomings in the instruments and practices of human resources planning, in incipient stages, the four countries do show a transitional stage towards more formalized, inte-grated, and strategic human resources planning. This makes them different from the rest of the Latin American region, where such tendency is unclear. In all likelihood, future measurements of strategic coherence in Barbados, Belize, Ja-maica, and Trinidad and Tobago should reveal higher scale values if current reforms actually consolidate.

II.�.�. Directive Consistency

Directive consistency is the second sub-index of structural consistency. For organizational struc-tures to be handled strategically, managers and supervisors must play active roles and gain in-creased responsibilities. Precisely, directive con-sistency values the extent of development of the directive function in the civil service system. It includes eight critical points, most of them as-sessing the organization of line and central hu-



Table9.DirectiveConsistencySub-index–QualitativeAssessment

Directive Country Consistency IndexQualitativeAssessment


Barbados

Belize

Jamaica

Trinidad and Tobago

57%

44%

56%

40%

• Goodimageofcentralbodiesinchargeofhumanresources

• Professionalismofcentralbodies

• Toomuchcentralizationandscarceroomforlinemanagers’involvement

• Unevendecentralization



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man resources management and their leadership in administering human resources.

How does the region look like on this sub-in-dex? Costa Rica (59%), Colombia (58%), Chile (53%) and Brazil (50%) are the countries with the highest values on the scale. On average, Latin America scores 30%. Country scores range from 7 to 59 (see Appendix D).

Barbados and Jamaica show civil services with high scores on directive consistency (see Table 9). Belize and Trinidad and Tobago pres-ent more intermediate levels of development in this index, although certainly above the average mean for Latin America.

Excessive centralization but highly appraised central human resources bodiesA common contradiction among the four coun-tries is the good image of the central human resources bodies combined with a simultaneous tendency towards an excessive centralization.

In Barbados, Permanent Secretaries have restricted power to discipline officers. Further-more, Draper (2001) observes that the operations of the Public Service Commissions have over-centralized the personnel function to the point that often public managers feel they have little control over employees.

Certainly, this is one major target of transfor-mation and there are efforts aiming at decentral-izing prerogatives to reach lower-level managers. Therefore, we can speculate that the directive consistency index seems to be affected by the continuing difficulties over the roles of the Public Service Commissions and public managers.

In Jamaica, the central human resources bodies are comprised by technical personnel and follow clear rules and standards, for which they have a good image in the public sector. Yet, these highly valued bodies are simultaneously criticized for not leaving enough room for orga-nizations’ line managers to manage. Currently, there are continuous decentralization efforts to pass human resources monitoring to the organi-zations. In terms of assuming responsibility for

their employees, line managers seem to conduct follow-ups and support their staff, though these activities are rarely formalized and weakly insti-tutionalized. This is expected to change in the short term.

In Belize, a major constraint is the fact that the large bulk of personnel decisions remain centralized, thus leaving little participation and room for maneuver to line managers about their own personnel. In Trinidad and Tobago, decentralizing responsibilities to line managers has been extremely difficult, contrasting with Jamaica, for instance, where the process seems smoother (Bissessar 2002). Consequently, while key decisions remain in the hands of the Pub-lic Service Commission and the Personnel De-partments, the human resources departments introduced in Ministries and line agencies dur-ing 1991 and 2001 still struggle to obtain more functions. If anything, both the Public Service Commission and the Personnel Department have increased personnel instead of reducing it (Bissessar 2000).

Returning to the regional comparison, a ma-jor aspect in which these four countries notably differ from the rest of Latin America is in the im-age of the central services. Indeed, Longo (2006) shows that in many countries the central human resources organizations have an impoverished image. By contrast, the central human resources bodies are usually valued in the countries exam-ined here. Admittedly, this is not to deny that they may have too formalized or cumbersome procedures as well, but they are highly respected for their autonomy and professionalism.

The changing role of line managers and supervisors: skills, training and prerogativesThe responsibilities and managerial competen-cies of line managers and supervisors need to be reinforced in the four countries. Despite this common trend, there are differences concern-ing the degree of decentralization of decisions to line managers, the extent of development of a managerial function, and the skills needed


18�


by supervisors under modern civil service con-texts.

In Barbados, the emerging picture is one of transition from a more traditional style of leadership to one based on the involvement of managers and supervisors in the performance of their employees. On the one hand, manag-ers and supervisors are currently encouraged to take more direct responsibilities. Specifically, they receive training in the management of the new Performance Review and Development System (PRDS). These actors tend to accept this system much more than previous ones, because they consider it to be more objective (IADB 2002). Also, the Internal Reform Committees es-tablished within each agency provide more of a flavor of the new impetus to assume true mana-gerial prerogatives.

On the other hand, Isaacs (2004) mentions that supervisors and managers are still reluctant to assume the renewed responsibilities under the on-going managerially-oriented changes. In all likelihood, this occurs because managers are re-luctant to disregard seniority and become more directly responsible for monitoring their employ-ees’ productivity and performance. In many cas-es they are less prone to use modern technologies that could facilitate their managerial functions. Additionally, whereas supervisors and managers have a clear focus on their areas of responsibil-ity, they do not necessarily hold a broader per-spective related to the strategic considerations of the organization. For these reasons, IADB (2002) suggests giving more strategic time to these man-agers by reducing their routine tasks.

In Jamaica, directive consistency is the high-est among the three sub-indices of structural consistency (59%), albeit second in this index if compared to Barbados. Framed within the current modernization initiatives, Isaacs (2002) indicates that a Senior Director of Human Re-sources Management typically heads the Human Resources Department of his/her organization. In turn, this Senior Director is also a member of the Ministry’s senior management team. Ad-ditionally, because these Senior Directors report

to the Director of Corporate Services when pre-paring the corporate plan, they are likely to gain a more strategic role.

A drawback of this managerial development at the line level is the fact that whereas managers are adequately trained and educated, they may lack expertise in the more specific competencies for dealing with personnel (Isaacs 2002). There-fore, the evidence about the true managerial credentials among line managers remains incon-clusive.

In Belize, given the context of excessive cen-tralization, managers may not necessarily have the adequate skills or the responsibilities for the tasks of supervising and motivating people. In this context, line managers have reduced pre-rogatives over the employees under their span of control. We should add certain reluctance to actually enforce performance appraisals and ratings. It remains to be seen whether the con-straining environment for supervisors will actu-ally change given the recent decentralization of personnel functions to each ministry.

Trinidad and Tobago has the lowest value in directive consistency among the four coun-tries, with 40% of the scale. Institutional cen-tralization in decision-making seems difficult to erode. Additionally, top-down communications dominate (Isaacs 2004), replacing more dy-namic flows of responsibilities across the vari-ous directive levels. Probably as a consequence of this, supervisors are benevolent when rating employees, to the point that performance ratings become ceremonial and supervisors lose actual leadership in shaping their employees’ quality of work. In addition, following Draper (2001), there is not yet a human resources management system by which high-level line managers (such as Permanent Secretaries) acquire the necessary competencies to function. There have been dif-ficulties in forging productive relationships be-tween ministers and senior public services in the region (Draper 2001), for which this may affect senior managers’ participation and knowledge in planning the human resources needs of the organization.



188

II.�.�. Consistency of Processes

Finally, we ought to consider the consistency of processes in order to have a complete picture of the structural consistency of the civil service. This sub-index values the degree of development and integration of the basic processes that sustain an integrated employment and human resources management system. Because processes are pres-ent in all subsystems, fourteen critical points pro-vide the information about process consistency, which cross-cut human resources planning, work organization, performance, compensation, ca-reer development and human resources and so-cial relations.

Comparative evidence from the Latin Amer-ican region (Echebarría 2006) shows that con-sistency in processes is affected by incomplete personnel information systems, lack of reliable performance evaluation instruments and unjusti-fied salary differences in compensation structures not informed by rational mechanisms. Brazil (68%) and Costa Rica (66%) have the most con-sistent processes. The region’s average is 32% and the lowest value is 11% (See Appendix D).

Our four countries show an upper-interme-diate development in the consistency of the civil service processes, with Jamaica and Barbados

having higher values than Belize and Trinidad and Tobago (See Table 10 below).

This index benefits from actual compliance with the stated procedures and a fairly reason-able compensation equity. Certainly, some criti-cal points suggest that there are pitfalls in some human resources systems. Yet, in the four coun-tries, seniority remains the regulatory mechanism informing promotions with exceptions. Succes-sion plans (when designed) are not implemented. Whereas training has been based for the most part on agencies’ isolated needs, they are now gearing towards formalizing training evaluation to gain a better sense of training results and its associated costs. By contrast, training schemes are rather inconsistent, and there are problems with the availably of funds. To this, we should add that there is no overarching identification of needs informing training packages.

Consistency in compensation One of the most striking features of the four national civil services compared here is the rela-tive compliance with the principle of “equal pay for equal work.” A couple of exceptions are the higher salaries in Trinidad and Tobago and Belize when it comes to the “contract posts.” Still, the dominant rule is a relatively equitable

Note:Thepossiblerangeofvariationforthisindexisfrom0to100%.


Table10.ProcessConsistencyIndex–QualitativeAssessment

Process Country Consistency IndexQualitativeAssessment


Barbados

Belize

Jamaica

Trinidad and Tobago

53%

52%

54%

40%

• Humanresourcesinformationsystemup-datedandquitecomplete

• Adequatewagecompressionratioprovidingconsistencytostructuralmobility

• Jobprofiles• Bi-annualreviewofcompensationstructure• Adequatewagecompression

• Compensationstructureratherconsistent

• Tightwagecompression

• Importantinformationsystemshortcomings

• Informationsystemshortcomings

• Slowimplementation• Lowwagecompressionratio


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compensation structure with some selected changes.

In the four countries, job classification exer-cises are currently being conducted, renewing rational parameters for setting compensations. Overall, compensation equity tends to be strong despite the tight compression ratios in Barbados and Jamaica. Jamaica scores quite well in the consistency of compensation, given the fact that salaries are decent and competitive with the pri-vate sector, and are reviewed bi-annually accord-ing to set parameters.

Human Resources InformationWith the exception of Barbados, the other three countries evidence shortcomings in the avail-ability of digitized information for informing human resources decisions. In Barbados, some of the modules of the human resources software (SmartStream) are in place. The system provides individual-level information from hiring through contract termination, including personnel ad-ministration, payroll and benefits. This informa-tion allows a more precise description of needs and costs as well as a better knowledge of the individuals’ differential work situations.

In Belize, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica there is a deficit in the quality and quantity of information available: in many cases data are absent while in others information is not digi-talized. Iacoviello (2005) observes that, in Belize, information is barely digitized and new infor-mation technologies are in their infancy. As an exception, financial information (including com-pensations) is updated and adequate.

Job ProfilesThere is a tendency to have job descriptions and profiles, but with varying content and renewal in each country.

Jamaica has formal job descriptions, which actually include relevant job information: the role and core functions of the job, the required skills, the working conditions, the qualifications and experience demanded. The reverse of the coin is that these jobs descriptions are not routinely reviewed, nor do they tap into more substantive job aspects such as competency requirements, learning and behavioral capacities and personal-ity traits (Isaacs 2002). While a major criticism can be raised about job descriptions and profiles being too rational-formal and less rational-sub-stantive, we still argue that relative to the rest of the Latin American region Jamaica stands out.

Currently, Barbados’ civil service is witness-ing the furthering of the consistency of processes associated with job classification schemes, job descriptions, and performance evaluations. In Belize, organizations do not have clear perfor-mance targets, and the lack of reliable instru-ments hinders establishing existing differences among employees.

Table11.TwoVersionsofContractPosts:BelizeandBarbados

Belize Barbados• Contractofficersobtainhighersalariesthanpublicofficers • Contractofficersobtainhighersalariesthanregularofficers

• Usuallyoccupylowerleveljobs • Contractofficersarepublicofficerswithtenure,appointedtospecialposts

• Contractofficerscomefromoutsidethepublicsector


Table12.CompressionRatios(Lower:Highestsalary)

TrinidadandTobago 1:4.7

Barbados 1:5.5

Belize 1:9.8

Jamaica 1:15




1�0

In Trinidad and Tobago, there is yet no in-tegral process managing all aspects of the orga-nization of work such as job descriptions and profiles. Job descriptions and evaluations are not widespread, and remain mostly confined to higher-ranking positions.

In sum, structural consistency in these four countries civil services presents good development levels. Certainly, most of the difficulties lie in the weak connections across the different planning levels and efforts. Additionally, human resourc-es planning is barely strategic and coordinated. There is consistency in the managerial structures, but this is due to the high prestige of the central-ized structures rather than to the dynamism of middle-level human resources managers. There is some way ahead before this managerial level becomes truly involved in employee performance. Overall, the information systems concerning hu-man resources are weak as well, with exceptions (such as Barbados). Some improvements are seen in the relationship between employment and job profiles, where Jamaica is the most advanced of all by instilling more substance to the competen-cies required by individuals in performing their tasks. Still, structural barriers become exponen-tial when weak planning systems combine with not updated or incomplete information, and when formal processes rather than substantive procedures take precedence over the manage-ment of people and jobs.

II.�. FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY

Are the civil service subsystems able to influence employees’ behaviors? Are there mechanisms and practices promoting the development of a work conduct and ethics capable of developing the priorities of the public sector? All these im-portant themes refer to the functional capacity of the civil service. Thus, the index measures the capacity of the civil service to positively influence on employee behavior. Because such capacities are complex, the index seeks to account for three distinct types of capacities geared towards mo-

tivating employees: a) competency, b) incentive effectiveness and c) flexibility.

II.�.1. An Overview of the Functional Capacity Index

Evidence from the regions indicates that Brazil and Costa Rica obtain the highest scores: 61% and 57% of the scale, respectively. The region’s average is 30%, with a minimum value of 9 and a maximum of 61 (See Appendix D).

Comparatively, the English-speaking Carib-bean countries score quite well on this index. Ja-maica has the highest scale score (58%), followed by Barbados (54%), Belize (52%) and Trinidad and Tobago (48%) (See Table 13 and Figure 4 below). With regard to competency, the four countries consistently obtain the highest scores. As for incentive effectiveness, the civil processes and mechanisms tend to become the weakest. Exceptionally, Barbados is quite even across the three sub-indices, as summarized in the table be-low. On average, Jamaica is the country with the highest score on functional capacity.

II.�.2. Competency

Let us consider competency first. By means of 15 critical points, this index refers to the use of personnel policies and practices that most di-rectly affect the design, supply, development and stimulus of employees’ capabilities or, broadly speaking, their “competence.” Nearly all of the critical points concern the work organization and the employment subsystems. The index suggests seeing a modern civil service as a knowledge system, with competent and technically-trained employees recruited with adequate procedures and receiving reasonable incentives to continue learning.

In this section, we will not discuss the issues concerning the quality of selection and recruit-ment, for they have already been addressed in depth when examining merit. Nevertheless, the reader should recall that the critical points mea-suring the inclusion of merit considerations in


1�1


Table13.FunctionalCapacity:Sub-IndicesScores

Incentive Functional Country Competency Effectiveness Flexibility Capacity

Barbados 54% 52% 50% 54%

Belize 54% 45% 52% 52%

Jamaica 60% 52% 56% 58%

TrinidadandTobago 49% 43% 48% 48%


60

80

100

40

20

0

Trinidad and Tobago

Jamaica

Belize

Barbados

LA Avg

(COM) Competency (IE) Incentive Efectiveness (FL) Flexibility

Figure4.FunctionalCapacity:ResultsbySub-indices


employment management rank very high for the four countries studied. Consequently, a large bulk of the high scores of competency is actually ac-counted for by the professionalism in recruiting, selecting, and promoting employees (Four criti-cal points concerning employment practices are shared by the competency and merit indices).

On average, the region scores 35% on com-petency. Brazil shows the highest score (78%), followed by the more distant score of 56% pre-sented by Costa Rica. After Brazil, therefore, Jamaica has the region’s highest value in com-petency. The lowest range in the region for this

index is 13% (see Appendix D). By sharp con-trast, the lowest value among these four Eng-lish-speaking countries is 48% (see Table 14). Consequently, we can assert that this subregion obtains outstanding results in the competency of their civil services relative to the rest of the Latin American countries.

We have organized the discussion into three empirical themes that directly affect individual and collective competencies to conduct work of increasing value: job descriptions and profiles, the compensation structure, training and collec-tive learning.



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Table14.CompetencyIndex–QualitativeAssessment

Country Competency IndexQualitativeAssessment


Barbados

Belize

Jamaica

Trinidad and Tobago

54%

54%

58%

48%

• On-goingreviewofjobclassificationschemes• Managersprovideinputtojobdescriptions

• Moreawarenessoftheneedforincreasedflexibilityinjobprofiles

• Acadetsystemasacadreofofficersprovid-ingsupporttoseniormanagersonnewmeth-odologiesandperspectives

• Revisionofjobdescriptionstobemoreactiv-ity-oriented

• Specialcompensationsforcategoriesexposedtomarketpressures

• Substantivejobdescriptionsforupperlevelmanagement

• Compensationstructurenotverycompetitivevis-à-vistheprivatesector

• Jobdescriptionswithemphasisonformalas-pectsalone

• Needforpersonnelwithproblem-solvingskills

• Privatesectorcompetitivepressuresnotac-curatelymappedintocurrentcompensationstructure

• Notupdatedjobprofilesformostofthepublicstructure

• Currentsalarystructuredoesnottakeintoac-countprivatesalaries

Job Descriptions and ProfilesThe four countries are engaged in a review and update of job profiles and classifications. Many of the national differences occur due to the stage of the process implementation. Current efforts show that authorities are aware that personal skills and competencies should be integrated into the job descriptions, and these should not be confined to formal credentials or other measur-

able qualifications (such as knowledge or experi-ence).

Coinciding with its high score, Jamaica is the most advanced in process implementation. Currently centralized in the Cabinet Office, all descriptions are being revised to become more activity-oriented (Isaacs 2004). In Barbados, with the involvement of line managers giving input to job descriptions, tasks and skills are added to pre-

Source:Authors’compilationbasedonIsaacs(2004)

Table15.ATransitionalStage:AnillustrationfromJamaica

Oldjobdescriptionsystem IntendedjobdescriptionsystemFocusontechnicalspecialties:• technicalskills• educationalcredentials• knowledge• experience• workingconditions• roleandcorefunctionsofjobs

Narrowmanagerialprofiles

Expertisecentralized

Additionalfocusonpersonalcompetencies:• learningcapacities• behavioralcapacities

Broadermanagerialprofiles

ExpertiseledbyCabinetOfficebutinputfromlinemanagementateachorganization


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viously formal job descriptions concerning only formal qualifications and professional require-ments. In Belize, job profiles emphasizing for-mal credentials persist, but there is an increased awareness that they should be more flexible and adaptable. In Trinidad and Tobago, more sub-stantive job descriptions are being made for Per-manent Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, but the implementation for the entire civil service is slower and many job descriptions date back to 1966 (Isaacs 2004).

The compensation structure as a motivating forceAs nearly all the countries in the region, the com-pensation structure is less competitive with the market in the higher level jobs. Relative to their private counterparts and even in some techni-cal categories, public officers are paid less. Such competition does not occur at the entry or mid-dle levels.

In Barbados, the on-going revision of the job classification schemes could eventually change this situation. The current compensation struc-ture has partially led to a shortage of lawyers, engineers, surveyors and information technol-ogy specialists. In Jamaica, the groups exposed to market competitive pressures receive special compensations (including teachers and nurses). We also observe brain-drain to the private sector in Belize’s civil service. Actually, there is a need for personnel with problem-solving skills, criti-cal as well as creative thinking in order to pro-vide just-in-time responses (Iacoviello 2005). Yet, these skills do not necessarily abound among line public officers.

Similar processes happen in Trinidad and Tobago. Unfortunately, in designing the com-pensation structure through the recent Position Classification Method (Draper 2001), private sector salaries have not been taken into account.

Training and collective learningTraining operates as an instrument for increased competency insofar as it encourages constant learning, and individual’s educational invest-

ments are translated into collective work. The four countries present, however, a gloomy pic-ture.

Consider Barbados. According to Isaacs (2004), middle level managers have actually re-ceived training and are willing to use their knowl-edge in renewing processes and systems at their individual organizations. Nonetheless, their train-ing has been largely ignored in daily organization-al practices. This gap undermines organizational capacities to both deal with new problems and provide fresh and efficient answers.

Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago face bud-get constraints for offering adequate training ac-cording to organizational needs. Belize reveals a lack of strategic direction in its training efforts and planning, thus not being necessarily tied to the competency needs of organizations. We may wonder if the currently required leadership skills over technical skills are truly satisfied with Belize’s ad hoc training efforts.

Still, Belize offers an interesting innova-tion promoting collective learning among their senior managers. For this, the government has implemented a cadet system, which offers to their qualified but not necessarily experienced middle managers on-the-job training opportunities with the aim of providing support to senior officers. In essence, the cadets should provide new insights and fresher methodologies to more experienced managers, thus complementing experience with novel perspectives and innovation.

Table16.AnImplementationonCourse:AnIllustrationfromBarbados

HumanResourcesInformationSystem: JobClassificationComponent

• Creationofthejobsinthesystem• Groupingofpositionsintojobs• Verificationofpositionsinaccordancetothebudget• Loadingofpositiondescriptionsandskillsrequiredforeach position• Transferenceofallemployeesonthesystemtotheircorrect position

Source:Authors’compilationbasedonIsaacs(2004)



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II.�.�. Incentive Effectiveness

As its name denotes, by means of 14 critical points incentive effectiveness provides a picture of how personnel management policies and practices in-corporate positive stimuli for productivity, learn-ing and service quality. To this end, the critical points assess themes such as job enrichment, the adequacy of the corrective mechanisms, the or-ganizational standards in place, and the like. Not surprisingly, six of the items refer to the perfor-mance management function, its mechanisms, incentives and actual practices.

With reference to this sub-index, the Latin American region averages 25% of the scale. Brazil and Costa Rica present the highest values, with 50% and 66% of the scale respectively. The minimum value is 5, this score belonging to a few Central American countries (See Appendix D). In the larger region, performance management instruments are rarely used, and if so, they only have ceremonial value. Also, the compensation structure does not offer enough incentives, for which material rewards are only weak motiva-tional instruments in the civil services. Addition-ally, negative incentives given for the most part by disciplinary mechanisms and dismissal due to bad performance are not enforced for multiple reasons. Let us turn now to our four countries of interest. What are their scores for incentive effectiveness and why?

The four countries reveal upper-intermediate developments, presenting the following scores: Jamaica and Barbados reach 52% of the scale, while Belize and Trinidad and Tobago, 45% and 43% of the scale respectively (See Table

18 below). Two empirical themes emerge force-fully from the data presented in the country’s institutional assessments: the monetary and non-monetary compensations as non-linear systems of incentives, and the tendency of performance evaluation instruments to have ceremonial roles. All countries’ scores fall in this index as com-pared with competency and flexibility. This in-dicates that incentive effectiveness is probably one of the most challenging and difficult tasks for civil services.

Monetary and Non-monetary Compensations: Positive Incentives?Salaries and social benefits are common in-centives for employees of all kinds and across different organizations. When there are prob-lems related to low salaries or inadequate social benefits, problems in organizational behaviors arise, such as absenteeism, unwillingness to work, apathy, industrial sabotage and above all, a deep sense of unfairness. More intangible benefits such as social recognition and support are increasingly seen as key work incentives as well.

Let us start with salary or wage compres-sions, a frequent scapegoat for the lack of in-centives in the public sector, particularly in the middle and higher level positions. Recall from Table 12 above that vertical compressions are tight in Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, while they are reasonable in Belize and Jamaica. In principle, one would suppose that the wider the salary compression, the more the structure motivates individuals. Country-level evidence re-veals a more complex picture, though.

Table17.AnInnovativeWayofPromotingCollectiveLearning:Belize’sCadetSystem

Who are the cadets? Qualifiedofficers,recentlyrecruited,notnecessarilyexperiencedinthepublicsector

What is their position? Middlemanagement

How are they trained? Cadetsaregivenon-the-jobtraining,withintensivesupervision

What is the aim of the system? Provideimprovedsupporttoseniormanagersbyfurnishingthemwithnewmethodologiesandin sightsfortheorganization

Source:Authors’compilationbasedonIacoviello(2005)


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Indeed, other aspects concerning compen-sations largely influence how well incentives op-erate, beyond salary compressions strictly seen. Iacoviello (2005) indicates that there is a general-ized perception that “they are not being effec-tive for that purpose.” And she further adds that “the perception is that the structure of incentives attracts candidates that are less result-oriented.” In all likelihood, this explains why incentive ef-fectiveness is the lowest index of the trio of func-tional capacity, reaching only 45% of the scale.

For some work categories, there are special monetary allowances, as indicated for example in the Flexibility Responsibility Allowance in Barbados, a kind of compensation granted to police, prison and nursing officers for their ex-tra hours. How much these allowances actually motivate is unclear, but they are nonetheless ade-quate instruments for these professions that deal with more stressful human situations.

In essence, salary compressions matter, but their effects on incentive effectiveness cannot be separated from the remaining system of com-pensations and from the performance measure-ment instruments, to which we turn next. Still, it is surprising that Barbados and Jamaica have few non-monetary benefits aimed at collective recog-nition and intangible incentives.

Performance Evaluation Instruments and Practices: Real or Ceremonial?Both Barbados and Jamaica are in a state of transition: performance evaluation mechanisms have not necessarily been effective in the past, but new procedures are being implemented.

Indeed, there is hope that the new perfor-mance management system will replace the

Note:Thepossiblerangeofvariationforthisindexisfrom0to100%.


Table18.IncentiveEffectivenessIndex–QualitativeAssessment

Incentive Country Effectiveness IndexQualitativeAssessment


Barbados

Belize

Jamaica

Trinidad and Tobago

52%

45%

52%

43%

• Specialmoneyallowancesforselectedpro-fessionsdealingwithdelicatesituations

• Pilotprojectswithperformancemanage-mentsystems

• Cabinethasshownpoliticalinterestinintroducingperformanceappraisal

• Performanceevaluationoftop-levelmanagers

• Presentsawiderangeofnon-salarycompensations

• Deeplyingrainedsenioritycriteria

• Incentivesattractcandidates“lessresultoriented”

• Onlyinformalmonitoringoflowerlevelofpublicofficers’work

• Implementationobstacles

No

nega

tive

ince

ntiv

es:p

ublic

of

ficer

sar

eno

tpen

aliz

edfo

rpoo

rpe

rform

ance

Table19.ExamplesofOtherNon-salaryCompensations(excludingpensions)

Country Non-monetarycompensationsTrinidad and • Recognitionandawards Tobago • Familydays • “PublicServiceWeek” • PrimeMinister’s“InnovatingforService ExcellenceAwardScheme”

Belize • MeritAwardforOutstandingService • Subsistenceandtravelallowances • Transfergrants(reallocation) • Mileageandmaintenanceallowance

Barbados • Travelallowances • Telephoneallowances • Entertainmentallowances

Jamaica • Contributoryhealthschemes • Transportationallowances




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deeply-ingrained seniority criteria informing promotions. Within the new scheme, individual tasks and organizational priorities should con-verge. In Barbados, there are pilot projects in selective Ministries working with Performance Review and Development Systems. In turn, this will also require a change in the mental frame-work of supervisors, who will have to become more directly responsible for their employees’ actions.

Jamaica witnesses the implementation of a Performance Management Assessment System (PMAS). Performance evaluations on the work of Permanent Secretaries are made annually and the system had been implemented in six out of 16 ministries at the time of the assessment. The innovation here is that the evaluations are linked to a pay for the performance system. Still, formal and reliable performance appraisal instruments serving managers to obtain precise measures about employees’ performances are absent. In-stead, we observe informal and customary prac-tices for employee monitoring and feedback.

Recurrent obstacles in implementing perfor-mance evaluations take place in Belize. The ab-sence of strategic organizational goals produces a “dysfunctional” dynamic: supervisors are not motivated to set work standards for their employ-ees because they do not participate in a strategic planning process, and in turn, the absence of an organizational process of target and standard setting inhibit committed individuals to set cri-teria for monitoring their employees’ work. By contrast with Jamaica, the performance evalua-tions planned for the CEOs have not yet been implemented.

In Trinidad and Tobago, there are also re-current problems in implanting an effective sys-tem of performance follow-up and evaluation. There is a “vision” to introduce an integral per-formance management system throughout the civil service (Isaacs 2004). Yet, there is no for-mal procedure or informal practice monitoring the work of employees and providing work with feedback that could encourage higher levels of job commitment.

In short, positive incentives upon perfor-mance have been difficult to implement, though there are promising changes, particularly for higher level jobs. In Belize, there is some hope that performance evaluation may actually take place in the near future. As Iacoviello (2005) mentions, the Cabinet has put a moratorium on hiring and merit increments until the recent performance appraisal instrument is imple-mented.

Instead, negative incentives based on poor performance are never put into practice, even though provided for in laws and regulations. Eventually, disciplinary matters can take years to solve. In this point, these four Caribbean coun-tries resemble the rest of the region.

II.�.�. Flexibility

This is the last index within functional capac-ity. It measures the degree in which policies and practices incorporate guidelines that facilitate: a) the organizational and individual adaptation to external and internal changes, and b) the align-ment to flexible tendencies that characterize the current personnel management policies. It is related to 12 critical points measuring human resources planning, work organization, employ-ment, and career development.

In the region, Brazil, Costa Rica and Colom-bia have the highest scores (52%, 48% and 49%, respectively). Overall, the region shows rigidities in the structure of jobs, in the jobs descriptions (when these exist) and in the mobility opportuni-ties available for employees. The region’s average is 30%, and 10 is the lowest score for flexibility (see Appendix D).

Comparatively, Barbados, Trinidad and To-bago, Jamaica, and Belize rank very well in this index, for their values are 50%, 48%, 56% and 52% respectively (See Table 20 below). There-fore, Jamaica shows the highest value in flexibil-ity taking the entire set of Latin America and Caribbean countries. Interestingly, Barbados, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago seem unified by alternative career moves. By contrast, Jamaica’s


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flexibility leans on the new competency-based job descriptions.

Jamaica: A Distinctive StoryIn this country, the recent considerations about competence in the job descriptions pull the index up. As has been mentioned, the Cabinet Office is revising the job descriptions to include learn-ing and behavioral capacities. Yet, the Jamaican civil service lacks an adequate structure of op-portunity providing employee with more pro-motion opportunities and lateral moves. Despite succession plans being designed, these are barely implemented. Additionally, there are no true al-ternatives such as horizontal careers, except for few cases where employees move from technical to managerial jobs. In essence, flexibility is af-fected by promotion barriers that are not formal, but rather related to having enough vacancies for a large number of qualified personnel.

Lateral moves: Barbados, Belize, and Trinidad and TobagoIn Barbados, there is enough mobility across the whole public sector, thus introducing important alternatives to otherwise rigid career structures. As already mentioned, the current organiza-tional changes will probably produce a structure of mechanisms that will speed up adjustments to the environmental needs. Nonetheless, seniority remains one of the major obstacles for an in-creased flexibility.

As in Barbados, Belize’s flexibility is account-ed for by the fact that it is possible for employ-ees to move between positions and be relocated even in different geographic regions—and em-ployees obtain relocation grants in those cases. Moreover, the support functions (clerical, sec-retarial, administrative and accounting grades) have horizontal career tracks, for which they are called “horizontal grades.” Countervailing these flexible aspects of the civil service system are the formal job description and classification schemes and the absence of a substantive training plan.

Lastly, in Trinidad and Tobago, flexibility is the highest among the three indices of func-tional capacity mostly because of the existence of alternative career paths to the hierarchical ones. Indeed, horizontal mobility is possible, al-beit within the same segment of the public sector (Draper 2001). If required by the organization, geographic mobility is possible as well. Employ-ees can also “move” from tenured jobs to con-tract positions, which are better paid and can be renewed (Isaacs 2005).

To summarize the main features of the func-tional capacity index, we can assert that there are different practices and mechanisms seeking to motivate individual and collective behavior. The four countries have been relatively success-ful, a fact that is reflected in an index of inter-mediate development. They have done better in emphasizing competency, and to a lesser extent, in introducing some flexible mechanisms such



Table20.CompetencyIndex–QualitativeAssessment

Country Competency IndexQualitativeAssessment


Barbados

Belize

Jamaica

Trinidad and Tobago

50%

54%

56%

49%

• Sector-widemobility

• Lateralandgeographicmobility

• Competence-basedjobdescriptions

• Alternativecareerpaths

• Seniorityunderminesflexibility

• Noreliablejobclassificationanddescriptionsystems

• Toomuchemphasisonverticalmobility

• Noreliablejobclassificationscheme



1�8

as some career routes concerning lateral moves. Nonetheless, a system of well-structured posi-tive and negative incentives, with performance appraisals and evaluations at its core, is a major omission. Current implementation changes may transform this situation: at least there are some efforts for selected job categories (Performance Secretaries in Jamaica) or explicit political will to introduce such a system (as in Belize).

II.�. INTEGRATING CAPACITY

Do organizations have mechanisms that foster employee commitment and a sense of organiza-tional belonging? How do the varying expecta-tions and interests of contending stakeholders get solved? Does the civil service have institution-alized means to do so or only informal practices? By means of nineteen critical points, integrating capacity measures how well the organization develops a sense of belonging and community among its members. Expectedly, most of the

critical points refer to the human and social rela-tions management subsystem.

On average, the Latin American region scores 32% on integrating capacity. Argentina and Bra-zil are the two countries with the highest scores (56%) while very low values are observed for few Central American countries (see Appendix D). In terms of actual dynamics, the low emphasis on mechanisms promoting and measuring orga-nizational climate is striking. Despite this com-mon feature, the quality of industrial and labor relations varies across countries (Longo 2006).

Barbados, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica score relatively well on this index. In-deed, Belize takes a value of 59% on the scale while Jamaica 58%, followed by Barbados with 51% and Trinidad and Tobago with 50% (See Table 21 and Figure 5 below). In comparison to the region, our four cases can be regarded as “model” countries in their integrating capacity. They have an outstanding record of relations with public sector unions, relations which in turn are institutionalized. Actually, several re-

60

70

80

90

(IC) Integrating Capacity

100

50

40

30

20

10

0

Trinidad and Tobago

Jamaica

Belize

Barbados

LA Avg

Figure5.IntegratingCapacityIndex



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form activities have been carried out jointly with unions.

For an accurate interpretation of integrat-ing capacity, we should concentrate on three emerging empirical trends: a) the perceptions of inequality within the workplace, which albeit subjective affect the employees’ sense of belong-ing, b) the relations between the government and public sector associations, which shows some variation among the four countries, and c) the overall organizational climate and organization-al dynamics that despite the mature labor rela-tions seem to be hierarchical.

Perceptions of InequitySocial benefits and pensions seem adequate in the four countries. Possibly, pensions in Trinidad and Tobago are too generous from the perspec-tive of the IMF. Perceptions of inequity within the workplace exist, though. In Trinidad and Tobago, among other issues, this perception re-lates to the presence of “special hiring regimes” or tenured public officers who have access to contracts that imply higher pays. This causes a feeling of injustice when these contracts remain

after the initial motive for them disappears. Also, we should recall the existence of perceptions of racial inequality.

Also in Barbados, Jamaica, and Belize, some sense of inequity may persist. In Barbados, pubic officers perceive that, on average, they are rela-tively better off than those in the private sector. Despite this, a sense of frustration prevails re-lated to the poor working conditions, to the lack of satisfaction with salaries, and to the fact that many public officers become frustrated because “non-productive employees” and work-to-rule officers do not get penalized. In Belize, there is a sense of frustration arising from the fact that some temporary officers obtain higher salaries than permanent ones.

Unions and labor relations negotiations with governmentIn Trinidad and Tobago, the negotiations with civil service union associations are institutional-ized. The Personnel Department is responsible for negotiating and consulting unions on the terms and conditions of employment. These negotiations occur at the national level. Addi-



Table21.IntegratingCapacityIndex–QualitativeAssessment

Integrating Country Capacity IndexQualitativeAssessment


Barbados

Belize

Jamaica

Trinidad and Tobago

51%

59%

58%

50%

• EmployeeAssistanceProgram• InternalReformCommittees

• CollectiveAgreement• Unionparticipationinjointbodiesconcerning

HHRRandreform• EmployeeAssistanceProgram

• MemorandumofUnderstandingrecentlysignedbetweengovernmentandunion

• PublicSectorAssistanceProgram(bestpractice)

• Culturaltransformation

• Institutionalizedmechanismsforlabornego-tiations(nationalandorganizationallevels)

• Lowtrust• Lowworkclimate• Lowmorale• Noregularpracticesofmeasuringorganiza-

tionalclimate• Non-smoothcommunicationflows

• Racialinequalityinrepresentation



200

tionally, unions have a shop steward within each agency for protecting the collective interests of public officers in their specific workplaces. De-spite these in-roads for fostering an institutional infrastructure for negotiating different interests, the reality is that an adversarial climate exists. Indeed, evidence indicates that the selected as-pects of the personnel reforms (such as the job classifications) are delayed due to explicit resis-tance by unions, possibly related to fears of re-trenchment and job loss (Bissessar 2000).

In Jamaica, there is an emerging trend to-wards labor relations characterized by mutual understanding and accommodation rather than low trust, but negotiations are still largely reac-tive. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has been signed by the unions and the public sec-tor, which is considered a major milestone in the already low conflictive labor relations.

By contrast, Belize has mature labor relations, accounting for the high value of integrating ca-pacity. There are several instances of interaction between management and unions, thus partici-pating in the design of human resources policies (see the table below for more details).

Organizational climate and communicationsWhat is the resulting organizational climate? There are problems concerning the quality of communications and there is some degree of discomfort among public officers. Despite this, none of the four countries has incorporated for-mal instruments for monitoring organizational climate. Instead, there are informal practices intended to obtain information about employee satisfaction. The management of organizational climate ends up depending on specific organiza-tional leadership, if at all, rather than being an organizational initiative. Essentially, better for-malized instruments would be welcome.

Let us first consider Trinidad and Tobago. Organizational climate and communications present serious shortcomings, despite the pres-ence of unions. Isaacs (2004) observes that high work morale is an aim often difficult to achieve.

Additionally, the decision-making ethos is cen-tralized and communications are top-down (Isaacs 2004). This communication flow leaves little room for employees to present their ideas. To this we should add the social inequities along racial bases mentioned before in this text.

We observe positive developments aiming at maintaining open and effective communication channels between line and higher level public of-ficers. Unfortunately, in Barbados, the Internal Reform Committees originally envisioned as av-enues through which employees could participate in organizational changes, have only played lim-ited roles. More hope is currently placed on the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), intended among other goals to provide feedback concern-ing the work climate.

Similarly, Belize has also established Human Resources Development Committees within each agency as well as an Employee Assistance Program. Yet, the work climate reflects some pit-falls. For illustration purposes, individual promo-tions and expectations are not taken into account for organizational management in a systematic fashion and individuals’ opinions and initiatives are not integrated into daily organizational op-erations. Additionally, public officers complain of the service “having no direction, of persistent political victimization, and of poor compensa-tion” (Iacoviello 2005).

In Jamaica, there are expectations placed on the Public Sector Assistance Program, seen as

Table22.Belize:ACaseofMatureLaborManagementRelations

Union JointStaffCouncil(informalinstance) Participation HumanResourcesDevelopmentCommittee (formalnegotiationspace) PublicSectorReformCouncil(monthlymeet- ings)

Formalized 2003firstCollectiveAgreement agreements

Negotiation Formal framework

Source:Authors’compilationbasedonIacoviello(2005)


201


a best practice. A more traditional civil service culture is leaving room for one less adversarial and with room for more accommodation (Isaacs 2004).

In short, integrating capacity shows inherent contradictions. On the one hand, we see some developments in the labor-government rela-tions. On the other, the daily work climate has problems to the point of low morale, which do not seem easy to overcome in light of central-ized decision-making and unilateral top-down communications, and in the absence of formal instruments measuring organizational climate that could serve to correct pitfalls. Recall the paradoxical Belizean case: this is probably the more advanced country in integrating collective actors’ organizations and their claims, but not individuals’ preferences and needs. This mis-match between levels of organizational integra-tion may pose strains on the civil service system as a whole.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The civil service in Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago presents an interme-diate level of development relative to the rest of the region. Regarding some selected aspects, mostly related to merit, they reflect upper levels. As observed before, these countries are in a tran-sitional stage, trying to instill more managerially-oriented aspects into the structure and practices of their civil services. Indeed, many of these ef-forts have been slow, piecemeal, and only par-tially implemented.

The four cases are outstanding in the Latin American region for the enforcement of merit considerations when selecting public officers. They have solid recruiting bodies that are inde-pendent from political pressures, in addition to an emphasis on objective and technical criteria for selecting public officers. We could affirm that the overall civil service presents relatively good development ratings due to the weight of merits, thus reinforcing the idea that formal credentials

and universal and open recruiting methods and practices are pivotal for well-developed civil ser-vice, even when all else may fail.

Despite important developments in merits and the extensive use of professional criteria in personnel recruitment and selection, we observe some pitfalls in the areas of human resources strategic planning. In particular, the lack of a more articulated human resources planning is a major weakness. This occurs due to a combina-tion of factors. Many of the reform efforts are implemented in isolation rather than in an inter-related and mutually reinforcing fashion, and, in turn, some changes are not sufficiently strategic. In the political realm, some reformers lack in-tegral visions of the transformations promoted, to which we should add existing political apathy and/or lack of consensus on certain areas.

The structural consistency of the civil ser-vice is therefore affected by the fact that strategic functions (such as forecasts as to personnel needs, qualitative and quantitative projections, and or-ganizational priorities) are tasks conducted in isolation, many times informally rather than with accurate information and formal proce-dures, and rarely informing each other. Yet, as observed before, there is a trend towards more formalized, integrated and strategic human re-sources planning. If anything, the subregion seems quite vital in reform efforts and initiatives. More than reform initiation, the challenge seems to be implementation and consolidation across the whole civil service.

Considering the civil service culture and its effects on the functional and integrating capac-ity measures, the existing organizational climate remains very traditional and there is little formal concern about improving it. It seems problem-atic that middle-level managers and public offi-cers do not necessarily perceive benefits from the reforms, thus not committing themselves to their implementation; to some extent, Jamaica is an exception.

Shortcomings in the efficiency of the civil service are a main issue in the four countries, but this is so for different reasons. In Trinidad



202

and Tobago, the small size of the public sector suggests an insufficient development of a pub-lic sector apparatus to attend the needs of the population. Ironically, the uncontrolled increase of the public sector size in Belize also affects ef-ficiency, but for its weight on the wage bill.

Brain-drain to the private sector of skilled and managerial staff occurs in the four countries, due to the more competitive salaries—within a compensation structure that guarantees relative internal equity but is less efficient in retaining highly skilled personnel. This issue of having ad-equate personnel goes hand in hand with prop-erly designed incentive systems, such as pay for performance at the top levels. Such practice has not been institutionalized yet, and it is a chal-lenge how it will be finally amalgamated to the current equal pay for equal work practices, for it will imply some degree of individual (rather than job) differentiation. In essence, a balanced incentive structure of monetary and non-mon-etary benefits is a surprising omission.

Along with the absence of a well-defined strategic human resources management is the fact that collective learning and training are barely envisaged in formal plans and established practices. There is some expectation that in the short-run this will change, for training plans are currently priorities in the countries of interest. This will certainly give impetus to more strategic planning in general within organizations, since mapping a skills gap should imply collecting systematic information about job requirements on the one hand, and individuals’ needs and ac-quired skills, on the other.

Overall, the four countries reveal current processes towards solving the problems high-lighted here, for which we have also emphasized, during the comparison exercise, the promising roads taken. We have also stressed the relevance of well-developed formal procedures, such as those concerning merits. The major bottleneck, strategic planning, would require more than “mechanics” (introducing information technolo-gies and disseminating procedures). It will also require important cultural changes such as the

furthering of trust between the different man-agement levels and between the reformers and public officers in order for the entire civil service system to embrace the proposed changes.

References

Bissesar, Ann (2000). The Difficulty of Protecting Merit in a Plural Society: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago. Review of Public Personnel Ad-ministration 26: 74–90.

Bissessar, Ann (2002). Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems: Trinidad and Tobago. Pub-lic policy management and Transparency Network, Regional Policy Dialogue. IADB, Washington, D.C.

Draper, Gordon (2001). The civil service in Latin America and the Caribbean. Situation and future challenges: The caribbean perspective. Public Poli-cy Management and Transparency Network, IADB, Regional Policy Dialogue, Washing-ton, D.C.

Echebarría, Koldo (2006). Informe sobre la Situ-ación del Servicio Civil en América Latina. Diálo-go Regional de Política, Red de Gestión y Transparencia de la Política Pública. BID. Washington, DC.

Iacoviello, Mercedes (2005). Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems: the Case of Belize. Pub-lic Policy Management and Transparency Network, Regional Policy Dialogue, IADB, Washington, D.C.

Iacoviello and Zuvanic (2006). Desarrollo e in-tegración de la gestión de recursos humanos en los estados latinoamericanos. In: Revista Documentos y Aportes en Administración Pública y Gestión Es-tatal. Year 6, Nº 7. Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Santa Fe. Argentina.

Isaacs, Hedy (2002). Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Systems: the Case of Jamaica. Pub-lic Policy Management and Transparency Network, Regional Policy Dialogue, IADB, Washington, D.C.

Inter-American Development Bank, IADB (2002). Institutional Assessment of Civil Service


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Systems: Barbados. Public Policy Management and Transparency Network, IADB, Regional Policy Dialogue, Washington, D.C.

Isaacs, Hedy (2004). Background Documents for the Caribbean Regional Policy Dialogue Meeting on Civil Service Reform. Institutional Assessment of the Civil Services in the Caribbean: the Cases of Barba-dos, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Presented in the Caribbean Subregional Meeting on Civil Service Reform, Trinidad and Tobago, December 15, 2004.

Longo, Francisco (2002). Analytical Framework for the Institutional Assessment of Civil Service Sys-tems. Public Policy Management and Trans-parency Network, Regional Policy Dialogue, IADB, Washington, DC.

Longo, Francisco (2006). Análisis comparativo por indices. In Echebarría, Koldo (Editor) In-forme sobre la Situación del Servicio Civil en América Latina. Diálogo Regional de Política, Red de Gestión y Transparencia de la Política Pública. BID. Washington, DC.



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EVALUATION LEVELS:

5 The context analyzed is entirely or highly consistent with that expressed in the propos-al in relation to both content and number of occurrences.

4 The context analyzed is substantially compa-rable to the proposal, but is not fully equiva-lent in content or there are exceptions that prevent the analyst from making a general-ization of the match detected.

3 The context analyzed is partially coincident with that in the proposal. There are some common elements in content and number of occurrences that enable the analyst to iden-tify a high, though not substantial, degree of coincidence.

2 The context analyzed is significantly differ-ent from the proposal. There are some coin-cidences, but also some deep discrepancies of content and/or differences in number of occurrences.

1 The context analyzed is completely different from that in the proposal. Coincidences of content take place in exceptional cases.

0 The context analyzed is completely different from that expressed in the proposal.

Appendix A. Critical Points Valuation –

Comparative table



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CRITICALPOINTSVALUATION

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PLANNING–HRPlanning(HRP)enablesanorganizationtoevaluateitsqualitativeandquantitativeneedsofhumanresourcesfortheshort,medium,andlongterm,confrontidentifiedneedswithitsexistingcapacitiesandidentifyanyactionsthatneedtobeundertakentobridgethegap.

Existence 1. TheprocessescomprisingaHumanResourcesPlanning(HRP)systemareadequatelydeveloped 2 3 2 2andIntegrity

Strategic 2. HRplanningdecisionsusuallyderivefromtheorganization’sstrategicprioritiesandguidelines. 2 2 2 2Coherence Thereisaclosematchbetweenthem. 3. HRPmechanismsinplacemakepersonnelpracticesadaptabletochangesintheorganization’s 2 2 2 2 strategy.

Basic 4. Personnelinformationsystemsprovideknowledgeonthequantitativeandqualitativeavailabilityof 2 2 2 2Information existingandexpectedHRindifferentorganizationalsituationsandunits. 5. TheHRPpoliciesandinstrumentsinplacefavoroptimizationandfacilitateasuitabledistributionof 2 2 2 1 resourcesandworkloadamongtheunits. 6. Theorganizationisneitheroverstaffednorunderstaffed. 2 2 2 1

Effectiveness 7. Laborcostsinthepublicsectorarewithinreasonableparameters,compatiblewiththecountry’s 2 2 2 3 economy. 8. Staffmembersareredistributedwhenevernecessary. 3 3 3 3 9. Thetechnicalskillsofthestaffareinlinewiththeknowledgesociety.Theweightofqualified 2 2 2 2 personnelissignificant.

Management 10. LinemanagersareacquaintedwithHRPplansandareinvolvedintheirdesignandfollow-up. 1 2 2 1 11.Personnelpolicies,decisionsandpractices,ineachoftheHRMareas,respondtomeaningful 2 2 2 2 objectivesconsciouslyestablishedintheplanningprocess.

WORKORGANIZATION–ThesubsystemofworkorganizationcomprisestheHRMpoliciesandpracticesthatdefinethecharacteristicsofandconditionsforperformingthetasksconcerned,andtherequirementstobemetbythepeoplehiredtocarrythemout.

Existenceand 12. TheprocessesthatcomprisethisWorkOrganizationsystemareadequatelydeveloped. 3 3 3 2Integrity

Technical 13. Jobdesignsfollowmanagementcriteriaratherthanlegalconsiderationsorcollectiveagreements. 2 4 2 2qualityand Thelegalframeworkorlaboragreementsonlyprovideageneralframewithinwhichtheworkisflexibility organizedandmanagedaccordingtotheneedsoftheorganization.ofrole 14. Jobsaredescribedaccurately,sothatthechainofresponsibilitiesisclear.mployeesknowwhatthey 2 3 3 1descriptions areaccountableforandwhytheircontributionisrewarded. 15. Jobdescriptionsarenotasexhaustivelydetailedastoprecludeproperadaptationtochangingor 2 3 2 2 unexpectedcircumstances. 16. Jobdesigntendstoenrichorenlargethejobsbothhorizontallyandverticallyinordertoproduce 2 3 3 2 gainsinjobqualityandencourageemployeemotivationwithoutseriouslossesinproductivityor coordination(seespecializationinglossary). 17. Theclassificationandhierarchyofpositionsrespondtosoundcriteriaandareadjustedtoeach 3 3 3 2 organization.

Qualityof 18.Qualificationorskillsprofilesofjobholdersgobeyonddegrees,expertise,orformalmeritand 2 3 3 2profiles identifyothercompetencies(seeglossary).definition 19. Skillsprofilesaredefinedpriortothetechnicalstudiesconductedbyexperts. 2 3 2 2 20.Profilesincludethecompetenciesdeemedkeyforthesuccessfulperformanceofeachjobholder. 2 2 2 2 21. Taskrequirementsaregenerallyconsistentwiththeelementsthatmakeupthepositionprofiles. 3 3 3 2

Administration 22. Jobdesignsandprofiledefinitionsarereviewedonaregularbasistoadaptthemtotheevolution 4 3 3 1 ofthetasksandtheirnewrequirements. 23. Linemanagershaveacrucialroleinthejobdesignandprofiledefinitionsthatconcernthem. 2 2 4 2


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EMPLOYMENTMANAGEMENT–ThissubsystemoftheHRMinvolvespersonnelpoliciesandpracticesconcernedwithmanagingtheprocessesbywhichpeopleenter,movewithinandleavetheorganization.Itisacomplexsubsystem,withinwhichsomeofthemostimportantareasofHRMhavetobeanalyzed.

Equal 24.Recruitmenttofillvacantpositionsisopen,bothinfactandinlaw,toallcandidateswhomeetthe 3 4 4 4opportunity requirementslaiddown.Theserequirementsareestablishedonthebasisofthecandidates’andmeritin qualifications,whicharetechnicallyandnotarbitrarilyevaluated.thehiring 25. Thereareproceduresandmechanismsthroughoutthehiringprocesstoavoidarbitrariness, 3 3 4 2process politicization,cronyismorpatronagepractices. 26.Onlyareasonablylimitednumberofpositionsarefilledwithpeopleappointedasaresultof 4 5 5 3 politicalmechanisms. 27. Therearemechanismsinplacetoguaranteetheprinciplesofequalityandnon-discrimination, 4 3 3 2 intendedtoeliminateanydisadvantagebasedonsex,race,culture,ororigin,togainaccesstoorbe promotedinthepublicsector.

Recruitment 28. Themethodsusedforthesearch,communication,andattractionofcandidatesnormallyresultinan 3 3 2 3quality adequatenumberofeligibleapplicantsforthepositionstobefilled.

Selection 29. Selectionisbasedontheprofilesofcompetencies(seeglossary)preparedfortheapplicantstothe 2 2 3 1quality vacantpositions. 30. Theselectioninstrumentsusednormallysuitthepreviouslydefinedprofiles,andtheirdesignis 3 3 3 3 basedontechnicallyvalidatedeffectivenesscriteriaapplicabletotheidentificationofprofessional skills. 31. Selectioncommitteesorbodiesareformedonthebasisoftheprofessionalismandexpertiseofits 3 4 3 3 members,whoselectthebestcandidatesusingtheirindependentjudgment. 32.Hiringdecisionsarebasedontechnicallyprovenmeritandprofessionalskills. 3 4 3 3

Induction 33. Thereareadequateproceduresinplacetowelcomeemployees,facilitatetheirentryintothe 3 2 3 2quality organizationandtheirfirststepsinthenewpositionandworkenvironment,andsuchprocedures arecorrectlyimplemented.Furthermore,employeesareprovidedwithguidelinesonthecore principlesandbehaviortheymustbeacquaintedwithatthetimeofentry. 34. Thereareadequateproceduresinplace(suchastrialperiods)toensurethattheselectionof 3 3 3 3 candidatesiscorrectandthatcorrectivemeasuresareadopted,ifappropriate.

Mobility 35. Thefunctionalandgeographicmobilitymechanismsadoptedenabletheorganizationtobeflexible 4 3 3 3 enoughtorespondtostaffredistributionneeds.

Absenteeism 36.Absenteeismindicesare,normally,acceptable. 3 3 3 3

Discipline 37. Thedisciplinaryactionstakenallowtheorganizationtocorrectemployees’behaviorinafast, 3 2 2 2 effectiveandexemplarymanner.

Separation 38. Therearenodismissalsorterminationsofprofessional,non-politicalpositionsresultingfrom 4 4 4 4 changeofgovernment. 39.Employeescanbedismissedduetogrossnegligenceorlowperformance,foundedonobjectivefacts. 3 3 3 3 40.Employmentcontractsmaybeterminatedduetotechnical,economic,ororganizationalreasons, 3 3 3 3 groundedonobjectivefactsthatimposetheneedforlay-offs. 41. Thereisnoexcessivestaffturnoverinanydepartmentorsector. 3 3 3 3

PERFORMANCEMANAGEMENT–PerformanceManagementisaimedatinfluencingtheworkforceperformancesothatitisinlinewiththeorganization’sprioritiesandkeptashighaspossible,enhancingtheemployees’contributiontotheorganization’sobjectivesandfacilitatingthegatheringofinformationthatwillhelpimprovetheHRMdecision-makingprocessindifferentareas.

Planningand 42. Topmanagementusuallydefinesstandardsofexpectedperformance,consistentwiththe 2 3 3 2follow-up organization’sprioritiesandstrategy.Consequently,employeesareverywellawareofwhataspects oftheircontributionwillbespecificallyvaluedinagivenperiod. 43.Performanceobjectivesaresetaccordingtotheimprovementplansagreedintheperformance 2 3 3 2 evaluationofthepreviousmanagementcycle. 44.Performanceobjectivesarecommunicatedtotheemployeesinawaythattheirinvolvementand 2 3 3 2 commitmentareencouraged. 45.Performanceobjectivesaresetforthwithintheframeworkofimprovementplansresultingfromthe 1 3 3 2 previousmanagementcycle.



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Evaluation 46.People’sperformanceisevaluatedbytheorganizationaccordingtotheexpectedstandards. 2 3 3 2 47.Evaluationcriteriaandpracticesenabletheorganizationtoefficientlydistinguishdifferencesin 2 2 3 2 performanceamongemployees. 48.Performanceevaluationcriteriaareregardedasreliableandobjectivebythoseresponsiblefortheir 3 3 3 2 implementation.

Administration 49. Linemanagerswhoareresponsibleforworkunitsatdifferenthierarchicallevelsplayaleadingrole 2 3 2 2 intheperformancemanagementoftheemployeesundertheirsupervision

COMPENSATIONMANAGEMENT–Thissubsystementailsthemanagementofalltypesofmonetary(i.e.wageornon-wage)andnon-monetarybenefitsofferedbytheorganizationtoitsemployeestorewardthemfortheircontributiontoachievingtheorganization’sobjectives.

Existenceofa 50. Thewagestructureandcompensationpoliciesderivefromasetofprioritiesandobjectiveslinkedto 3 3 3 2compensation theorganization’sstrategyratherthantoinertialpracticesorreactiveresponsestoclaimsandlaborstrategy conflicts.

Internaland 51. Ingeneral,thepeopleintheorganizationhavetheperceptionthattheircompensationsare 3 2 2 3external consistentwiththeircontribution.equity 52.Peoplefeelthatthecompensationreceivedbyotheremployeesisequitablevis-à-vistheirown 2 3 2 2 salaries. 53. Jobclassificationstranslatedtosalarylevelscontributetoaflexibleprogressionbasedon 2 2 2 2 performanceandtraining.

54. Thecompensationstructureisadequatetoattract,motivate,andretainskilledemployeesinthe 3 3 2 2 differenttypesofpositionsrequiredbytheorganization. 55. Thewagescaleisreasonable.Verticaldifferencesinsalaryrespondtothedifferentnatureofthe 3 2 2 2 positions. 56. Thereissomebalancebetweenthestaffcompensationintheorganizationandthesalariesearned 3 3 3 2 byequivalentemployeesindifferentsectionsandareasofthepublicservice. 57. Salarycostsateverylevelarenotexcessivelyhighvis-à-visthoseprevailinginthemarket. 3 3 3 3

Effectiveness 58. Thecompensationpoliciesadoptedpromoteeffort,improvedindividualandgroupperformance,as 2 2 2 2 wellaslearningandskillsdevelopment.

Administration 59.Decisionsonsalaryadministrationareadoptedinaccordancewithpre-establishedcriteriaandin 3 3 3 2 linewiththestructuraldesignparameterslaiddownbytheorganization. 60. Noarbitrarypractice,rent-seeking,orpoliticalpatronageisdetectedinsalarydecisions. 3 3 3 3 61. TheHRinformationsystemhasalltheupdatedinformationoncompensationthatisrequiredforthe 3 2 2 2 correctmanagementofthesalarysystem.

Otherbenefits 62.Non-wagebenefitsgivenarecost-effective. 3 3 3 2 63. Thepensionplanforpublicemployeesmeetstheirsocialsecurityneeds,isfinanciallysound,does 2 2 3 2 notcreateexclusiveprivilegesvis-à-visothersocialgroups,anddoesnotrepresentanexcessive burdenontheeconomy. 64.Usefulpoliciesandinstrumentsareinplaceforthenon-monetaryrecognitionofachievements. 1 2 2 3

PROFESSIONALDEVELOPMENTMANAGEMENT–TheDevelopmentManagementpoliciesandpracticesaimatstimulatingtheprofessionaldevelopmentofthestaffmembersaccordingtotheirpotential,encouraginglearninganddefiningcareerpathsthatshouldmatchtheorganization’sneedswiththeindividualprofile.

Effectiveness 65. Ingeneral,peopleperceivethattheirreasonableexpectationsofpromotionaresatisfiedinthe 2 2 2 3ofpromotion organization.policies 66. Therearecareerandsuccessionplansthatharmonizeindividualexpectationswiththeforeseeable 2 2 2 2 needsoftheorganization. 67.Promotioncriteriaandmechanismsarebasedonperformance,potentialforgrowth,andskills 3 3 2 2 development.


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68.Noelementsofabuseorpoliticalpatronageareverifiableinpromotionpractices. 4 4 3 3 69. Theorganizationmanagestheprogressmadebyitshumanresourceswithflexibility—i.e.without 2 2 2 3 toomanyformalbarriersorrestrictions. 70. Thereareformulasotherthanthestrictlyhierarchicalcareer—e.g.horizontalcareersorchangeof 3 2 3 3 positions—basedontherecognitionofprofessionalexcellence,withoutnecessarilygrantingmore authoritytotheindividual.

Careerdesign 71.Employeesreceiveadequatetrainingfromtheorganizationtosupplementtheirinitialtraining, 3 2 2 2quality adaptthemtochangingtasks,solvepoorperformance,andsupporttheirprofessionalgrowth. 72. Trainingactivitiessupportcollectivelearning,thusstrengtheningadvancesintheorganization’s 2 3 3 2 capacitytodealwithproblemsandrespondeffectively. 73. Trainingactivitieseffectivelysupportinnovationandculturalchangeprocesses. 2 3 3 2 74. Trainingisbasedonareliablediagnosisofneeds. 2 3 3 1

75. Investmentsintrainingaremadethroughplansresultingfromthediagnosisofneedsandare 2 2 2 1 designedtosupportclearorganizationalpriorities. 76. Trainingisevaluatedintermsofthesatisfactionproducedontraineestogetherwiththeresult-cost 3 3 3 2 ratioanditsimpactontheemployees’performance.

HUMANANDSOCIALRELATIONSMANAGEMENT–ThisHRMsubsystemisconcernedwiththemanagementoftherelationsbetweentheorganizationanditsemployeesregardingpersonnelpoliciesandpracticeswhentheseacquire,inagivencontext,acollectivedimension.

Workclimate 77. Theorganizationisconcernedwithevaluatingtheworkenvironmentorclimateonaregularbasis 2 2 2 3 byresortingtoreliableinstruments. 78.ClimateevaluationsaretakenintoaccountatthetimeofreviewingandimprovingHRMpolicies 1 2 2 2 andpracticesinforce.

Communi- 79. Theorganizationmakesfrequentuseofdifferentmechanismstolearnabouttheemployees’ 2 2 2 2cation initiatives,requests,suggestions,information,andopinions.effectiveness 80. Ingeneral,all-levelmanagementdecisionsaswellasalltypesofrelevantinformationfedbytop 2 2 3 2 managersfloweasilyandfluentlyintheorganizationandreacheverystakeholderinduetimeand manner. 81. Theorganizationhasspecificcommunicationchannelstoreinforcethestaff’ssenseofbelonging 2 2 2 3 andinvolvementintheglobalproject.

Laborrelations 82.Eachpartyplayshisorherrolewithoutsteppingbeyondit,andtheserolesarereciprocally 3 4 3 3balanceand recognizedbytheotherparty.quality 83. Ingeneral,powerisreasonablybalancedbetweenmanagementandstaff.Negotiationsbetween 3 3 3 3 thepartiesusuallyreflectthisbalance. 84. Laborrelationsusuallyandpreferablychoosethepathofnegotiationandconsensusratherthan 4 4 3 2 confrontationordisrepute. 85. Intermediatedlaborrelations—i.e.thosecarriedoutbyrepresentatives—donotexcludedirector 3 3 3 3 personalrelationsbetweenmanagementandemployeeswhereappropriate.

Laborconflict 86. Laborconflictisnotintenseinnumber,impact,orintheradicalmethodsused. 4 3 2 2management 87. Thereareeffectivemechanismsinplacetomanageandsettlelaborconflicts. 3 3 2 3 88.Occupationalhealthandsafetypracticesaresatisfactory. 2 3 2 3

Socialpolicies 89. Thereareadequatesocialsecuritypoliciesandbenefitsforemployeesthatdonotexceedthosethat 3 3 3 3management arecharacteristicintheenvironmentinwhichtheorganizationoperates.Furthermore,thebenefits areappreciatedbystaffmembers.



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oftheHRMisnotcompleteunlessweanalyzethemechanismsusedforthemanagementofthesystem,particularlythedistributionofpersonneldecisionsamongthedifferentresponsibleparties.

90.Managersareempoweredandautonomousenoughtodealwiththepersonnelassignedtothe 3 3 3 2 unitsundertheirsupervision. 91.Managersaresuitablytrainedtoperformtheirtasks. 2 2 3 3 92.Managersareawareofandassumetheirresponsibilitiesashumanresourcesmanagersinrelation 2 3 3 2 tothestaffmembersundertheirscopeofformalauthority. 93. ThecentralservicesresponsiblefortheCSsystemareperceived,bytherestoftheorganization,as 3 3 3 2 addingvalueandcontributingtotheattainmentofcommongoals.


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Appendix B. Summary of the Institutional

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TheConstitution(1988)establishesCSCom-mission.PSRegulations(2001)andGovernmentWorkersRegulations(1992)makeupthebasiclegalframeworkforpublicemployment.

TheMinistryofPublicService,ServicesCommis-sion,PublicSectorReformCouncilhaveresponsibili-tiesoverHRmanagementinthepublicsector.Thereissomedegreeofoverlap-pingintheirroles.

ThelegalframeworkincludestheConstitution(1966),TheServiceCom-missions(PublicServiceRegulations(1978),TheCivilEstablishmentActandOrders,thePensionsActandtheTrainingAct.TheenactmentofanewPublicServiceActisim-minentinordertoaddressdeficitsintermsofthead-equacyandconsistencyofemploymentmanagement,specificallyenforcementofdiscipline,humanandsocialrelationsmanage-mentandworkorganiza-tionpractice.TheexistingGeneralOrdersforthePublicServiceofBarbados(1970)isbeingintegratedintothenewAct.

Collectively,thePSC,MCS,PersonnelAdministrationDivisionandtheTrain-ingDivisionhaveoverallresponsibility,showingacentralizeddecision-makingprocessintheCSSinBarbados.Deci-sion-makingonaspectsofemploymentmanagement,workorganizationand

TheConstitution(1962),thePublicServiceLaw,PublicServiceRegulations(1961),TheStaffOrdersforthePublicService(1976),TheCivilServiceEstablishmentActandthePensionsActconstitutethelegalframeworkfortheCSSinJamaica.Thisframeworkdoesnotad-dresstheHRMsystemcomprehensively.

TheCabinetOffice,thePSCandtheMoFParemaindecisionmakers.SelectagenciesalsohavedelegatedauthorityforHRM.Thecentralagenciesaddvalueintheirauditingandmonitoringroles.

TheConstitution(1976),PSCRegulations(1966)theCivilServiceActandthePensionsActarethemainbuildingblocks.

ThereisavisiontomodernizethelegalframeworktofacilitatedecentralizationoftheHRMfunction.

TheServiceCommissionsDepartment,thePSC,thePersonnelDepart-ment,theMinistryofPublicAdministrationandInformationandtheMin-istryofFinancearethemainactors.TheCSSisepitomizedbycentralizeddecision-making.Withtheexceptionofthedecen-

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Civilservicecomprisesaround12,000officers.Thecentralgovernmentbillaccountsfor10%ofGDP.

Thereisareasonablewagecompressionandcivilserviceincentives.Averagesalariesarehigherforpublicsector,butlesscompetitiveatmanageriallevels.

Strategicplanningatmacrolevelisnotlayereddown.Systemsoffinancialcontrolandaccountabilityofthepublicserviceareweak.Salaryexpendituresrepresentheavyburdentopublicaccounts.TheITinfrastructureisnotde-veloped;thereareseriouslimitationstoaccessingbasicinformation.TheHRcomponentofinformationsystemisbeingdeveloped.

professionaldevelopmentmanagementaremadeatthelineagencylevel.Per-manentsecretariesmaketemporaryappointments,whilelinemanagersiden-tifytrainingneedsandwritejobdescriptions.

Thestaffcomplementofthecivilserviceis21,000.Centralgovernmentwagebillaccountsfor13%oftheGDP,i.e.itrepresentsarelativeburdenofpub-licemploymentontheeconomy.

Thereisalsoevidenceoftightcompressioninthecompensationstructure.

Averagewagedatainboththepublicandpri-vatesectorswerenotes-tablished,thusprecludingcomparability.

TheHRMISproductionmodelisestablishedintheMCSandthePersonnelAdministrationDepart-ment.Thissubsystem,whichisbeing‘rolledout’toMinistriesandDepart-ments,isintransitionduetolimitedaccesstoinfor-mationforHRplanningpurposes.

ThestaffcomplementofthecivilserviceinJamaicais32,067.Centralgovern-mentwagebillaccountsfor13.5%oftheGDP,evi-dencingarelativeburdenontheeconomy.

Thecompensationstruc-turereflectsrelativeinter-nalequity.

Governmentsalariesareat40%ofmarket.

TheMOUatthemacrolevelaswellasthecorpo-rateplanningframeworkattheorganizationallevelprovide,toalimitedextent,basesforHRPlan-ning.

Acensusofcivilservants,acorebuildingblockforHRPlanning,isimminent.

HRMISisaprototypeandnotaproductionmodel.TheformalizationoftheHRPlanningsubsystemthatincorporatesatimelyandaccurateHRMISwillenhancethestructuralconsistencyofthecorebuildingblocksofaHRMsystem,namely:HRP,PerformanceManagementandWorkOrganizationsubsystems.

tralizationoftrainingandsomeroutineaspectsoftheEmploymentManage-mentsubsystem,manag-ersinlineagenciesdonothaveautonomytomakeHRM-relateddecisions.

Thecivilservicestaffcom-plementis30,000.Thestaffcomplementislowrelativetointernationalcomparatorsandsuggestsinsufficientdevelopmentofthecentralgovernmentoverall.

Thecentralgovernmentwagebillaccountsfor7.8%ofGDP.Thefiscalweightofcentralgovern-mentemploymentisnotarelativeburdenontheeconomy.Thereisevi-denceoftightcompres-sioninthecompensationstructure.

ITinfrastructurehasbeendevelopedinthreepilotagencieswithHRdecision-makingfunc-tion.WhiletheHRISisaproductionmodelinthecentralagenciesandisnetworkedtoministriesanddepartments,thissys-temisnotyetformalizedintoaplanningtoolandlimitsaccesstoinforma-tionandrelateddecision-makingbylinemanagers.

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Work Organization



Jobclassificationandprofiledefinitionprocessesareratherformal,underanambitiousstreamlininginitiative.JobdescriptionsareperiodicallyreviewedbytheMPS.

Meritocratictraditionforrecruitmentisinprocessofbeingpartiallydecen-tralizedfromPublicSer-vicesCommissiontoMPSandlineministers.Guar-anteesagainstarbitrari-nessareeffective,butdonotoperateforacategoryoftemporaryemployees(openvote)thatcom-prisesaround2,000jobs.Adequatemechanismsforinduction,absenteeismcontrolandmobility.Pos-sibilityofseparationforbadperformanceorforeconomicreasons(infre-quentlyused).

Recurrentproblemstoimplementinitiativestoimproveperformanceevaluationprocess.Itremainsdifficulttodefineperformancegoalsgiventheflawsinthestrategicplanningsystem.

Jobevaluationwascom-pletedin2003.Jobde-scriptionsincludeformaleducationalqualifications/professionalrequirementsandfunctionsandrespon-sibilities.Theexclusionofcompetenciesprofileslimitsrationality,flexibilityandaccuracy.Thepoten-tialofthissubsystemforprovidingjobsatisfactionwillbemorefullyrealizedwhenthevoidintrainedjobanalystsisfilled.

Employmentmanagementdecisionsarebasedonprofessionalcriteriaandingeneralprecludearbitrari-ness.Butthesemeasuresaresometimescontested.

Expresseddifficultieshavebeenencounteredinenforcingdisciplinequicklyandeffectivelyincasesofnon-performance.Thishassometimesledtofeelingsoffrustrationandlowmoraleamongcivilservantswithgoodperfor-mance.Mechanismsforreception(induction)andabsenteeismcontrolsareinadequate.

TheformalizationofthePDRSinfivepilotagenciesisapositivedevelopment.SustainingthisthrusttoincorporateotheragencieswillleadtothestrengtheningoftheinterconnectionsbetweenthissubsystemandtheProfessionalDevelopmentManagementandCom-pensationsubsystems.

Jobevaluationhaspro-videdabasisforthedevelopmentofoutput-orientedjobdescriptionsthatincludedcompeten-ciesprofiles.Theexerciseofdevelopingappropriatejobdescriptionshasbeguninpilotagenciesandisinprogress.

Whileemphasiscontinuestobeplacedoninsulat-ingthoseresponsibleforemploymentmanagementdecisionsfrompoliticalinfluence,thissubsystemevidencesgapsinservice-wideinductionprograms,anddatabasesonstaffturnoverandabsenteeism.

Theintroduction,inpilotagencies,ofPMAS—arecentinitiative—evi-denceseffortstoprovidestandardsagainstwhichtomeasureperformanceaswellasadequatein-strumentsforappraisingperformanceanddevelop-ingemployees.Theformal-izationofthissubsystemservice-widewillprovidethebasisforvariablepay-mentsandmayservetomotivatehighperformers.

Jobevaluationisbeingundertakeninthecentralcivilservice,afterahiatusofthreedecades.

Thereisevidenceofsuccessionplanningatleadershiplevelwiththedevelopmentoftheper-manentsecretarycadre.Jobdescriptionsforthiscadreincludecompeten-ciesprofiles.

Employmentdecisionsgenerallyconformtoprofessionalcriteria.Merit-basedrecruitmentmeasuresaresometimescontestedwhenoneofthetwodominantethnicgroupsisperceivedtobeunder-representedinthecivilservice,leadingtoadvocacyfortheestab-lishmentofmonitoringmechanisms.

Nostructuredmechanismforinductionisinplace.Absenteeismindicesarenotmaintained.

Performancemanagementisformalizedfortheper-manentsecretarycadre,aninitiativeofrecentvin-tage.Implementationofaperformancemanage-mentsystemintroducedservice-wideinthe1990swasproblematicbecauseoflackofjobdescriptions,difficultywithstandardsettingaswellasthecul-tureofdistrust.

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Professional Development Management

Thesalarystrategyisdominatedbybudgetaryfocus.Reasonablewagecompressionandinternalequity.Highersalariesinaverageforthepublicsec-tor,butlesscompetitiveathigherlevels.Incentivesforgoodperformersareestablishedinlegislation,butarenoteffectivelyusedforthatpurpose.Non-monetarycompensa-tionisinfrequent.

Careersincludeverticalandhorizontaltracks.Ad-vancementisbasedheav-ilyonseniorityandformalcredentials.Trainingeffortsaremoreorientedtoindividualpreferencesofpublicofficersthantoor-ganizationalneeds.ThereisanongoinginitiativetoestablishaHRDstrategyforBelize,includingpublicandprivatesectors.

Wagedecisionsdonotrespondtonepotisticpractices.Thereprevailsinternalequity.Wagesaretightlycompressedandthewagebillisaburdenontheeconomy.

Non-monetarybenefitsarelikelytobeinstitutional-ized.

Whiletheadequacyofthepensionregimewasnotestablished,effortsarebe-ingmadetoprotectpen-sions/pensionsrightsandtoensuretheircontinuity.

Horizontalcareersarenotthenorm.Promo-tionisbasedlargelyonqualifications.Experience,performanceandsenioritymayalsobetakenintoaccount.Trainingneedsarticulatedbyindividualstakeprecedenceintheabsenceoforganizationaltrainingneedsanalyses.

AtrainingpolicyforthecivilserviceofBarbadosisexpectedtocomeonstreaminJanuary2005.Trainingneedsassess-mentsareyettobefor-malizedandinvestmentintrainingtobeevaluated.

TheMOUdictatestheoverarchingsalarystrat-egy.Thereisevidenceofinternalequity.Avisiontocreateexternalequityis“onhold.”PMAShasbeenintroducedtofa-cilitatemerit-basedpay.Asharperfocusonintroduc-ingnon-monetaryincen-tivesisdesirableinanethosofcostcontainment.

Thereisadeficitinca-reer/successionplanning.Advancementofindividu-alsintheprofessionalandtechnicaloccupationalcategoriesisbasedonprofessionalcriteria,withpossibilitiesforhorizontalmobility.Qualifications,experience,performanceand,whenallotherfactorsareequal,seniorityarecriteriatakenintoaccountforothercategories.Intheabsenceoforganizationaltrainingneedsassess-ments,trainingisbasedonindividualneeds.In-vestmentintrainingisnotevaluated.

Atrainingpolicyandplanisbeingdeveloped.

Thecompensationstrat-egytendstobereactiveinresponsetounions’demands.Thesalarystruc-tureisnotcompetitiveattheseniorlevels.Thereisevidenceoftightcom-pression.Otherbenefits,includingpensionandnon-monetarybenefits,areinplaceandaread-equate

Thereisadeficitincareerplanning.Seniorityisanimportantfactor.Theexistingcareerplanningvoidinfluencescareerde-signquality,aspromotiondecisionstendtorelyonseniorityratherthanontheresultsoftraining.

Atrainingpolicywillbedeveloped.

Ideally,trainingmanage-mentwillemphasizetrainingdeliverybasedonneedsanalysisandevalu-atedintermsofcostsandbenefits.

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Therearenotmanyinitia-tivesfocusedonworkclimateandcommunica-tion.Severalinstancesofinteractionbetweenmanagementandunions,withunionrepresentativestakingpartinjointbodiesthathaveresponsibilityinthedesignofHRpolicies.

ProtocolFouroftheSocialPartnership(2001-2004)providesamacroframe-workforthesustainedin-teractionbetweenunionsandGovernment.Intheabsenceofstructuredinstrumentsforassess-ingtheorganizationalclimate,initiativessuchasIRCsandEAPsshouldbeusedmoreextensively.Top-downcommunicationwithintheCSSisappar-entlyanissuetobead-dressed.

TheMOUrepresentsapositivedevelopmentthatsignalsalaborrelationsethosofaccommodationratherthanconfrontation.Theformalizationofspe-cificinstrumentstoevalu-atetheorganizationalclimateandsustain“new”relationshipswithinternalandexternalstakeholdersisdesirable.

WhiletheGovernmenthashadthevisiontoadministeraPublicSer-viceEmployeeSurveyinMarch2004inordertoassesstheorganizationalclimate,thereportedlyadversariallaborrelationsethosaswellasanappar-entneedtobuildsocialcapitalinfluencesthissubsystemadversely.

Civilservants’pensionisconsideredgenerous.Otherbenefitsincludeoldagepensionandthena-tionalinsurancescheme.Onesourceofdisquietthataffectsthemoraleofcivilservantsislinkedtotheconventionofspe-cialhiringregimesthatfacilitatecertainservingcivilservants’extendedappointmentstoprojectsoncontract,andathigherpaythantheircounter-partsinservice.

SUBS

YSTE

MA

NAL

YSIS

(con

tinue

d)



21�

Appendix C. Quantitative Indicators –

Comparative Table1, 2


Trinidad Barbados Belize Jamaica andTobago

Totalnumberofpoliticalappointments 18 18 32 NotAvailable

Totalnumberofpositionsfortheciviliancentralgovernment 21,000 3,392 32,067 30,000

Political appointments rate 0% 0% 0% Not available

2.CentralGovernmentWageBill/GrossDomesticProduct


Centralgovernmentwagebill(inmilliondollars) 329.4 109.17 886.2 —

GDP(inmilliondollars) 2,598 1,081.7 6,548.6 —

Central government wage bill/Gross Domestic Product 13% 10% 13.5% 7.8%

3.VerticalWageCompression


I.Highersalaryofciviliancentralgovernment(indollars) 50,961 34,082 58,860 1,626

II.Lowersalaryofciviliancentralgovernment(indollars) 9,244 3,476 3,588 344.6

I/II. Vertical wage compression 5.5 9.8 16.4 4.72

1 All figures expressed in US Dollars. 1Bds = 0.50 US Dollars/1Bzds = 0.51 US Dollars/1 JMds = 0,015 US Dollars/1TTD = 0.16 US Dollars (Source: www.xe.com Universal Currency Converter) 2 Sources for these figures and notes about their calculation can be found in the Institutional Assessments by Country (see Section II)



218

4.AverageCentralGovernmentWage/PerCapitaGDP


I.Averagecentralgovernmentwage(indollars) Notavailable 772.87 Notavailable Notavailable

II.PercapitaGDPbymonth(indollars) Notavailable 319 114.6 Notavailable

Average central government wage/Per capita GDP Not available 2.4 Not available Not available



I.Averagecentralgovernmentwage(indollars) Notavailable 772.87 Notavailable Notavailable

II.Averageprivatesectorwage Notavailable Notavailable Notavailable Notavailable

Average central government wage/Average private Not available Not available Not available Not available sector wage

6.TotalNumberofCentralGovernmentEmployees/TotalPopulation


I.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 21.000 9,923 32,067 30,000

II.Totalpopulation 266,800 282,600 2,600,000 1,300,000

Total number of central government employees/ 8% 3% 1.2% 2.31% Total population



I.Centralgovernmentexpenditure(inmilliondollars) 329.4 224.71 886.2 2,363.8

II.Totalnumberofcentralgovernmentemployees 21,000 9,923 32,507 30,000

I/II. Central government expenditure (excluding pensions 15,805 44,402 27,635 78,794 and debt service)/Total number of central government employees (indollars)


21�

Appendix D. Civil Service Indices for Latin America

and the Caribbean – Summary Table



220

St

ruct

ural

Con

sist

ency

Fu

ntio

nalC

apac

ity

St

ruct

ural

St

rate

gic

Dir

ecti

ve

Cons

iste

ncy

Func

tion

al

In

cent

ive

In

tegr

atin

g

Effic

ienc

yM

erit

Con

sist

ency

Coh

eren

ce

Cons

iste

ncy

ofP

roce

sses

Ca

paci

ty

Com

pete

ncy

Effe

ctiv

enes

sFl

exib

ility

Ca

paci

tyAr

gent

ina

50

52

43

40

40

49

47

53

40

48

56

Barb

ados

53

71

56

44

57

53

54

55

52

50

51

Beliz

e 50

68

51

43

44

52

52

54

45

52

59

Boliv

ia

32

22

18

17

14

24

19

26

12

19

21

Braz

il56

87

58

57

50

68

61

78

50

52

56

Chile

59

62

65

44

53

46

57

54

40

45

51

Colo

mbi

a42

52

48

40

50

45

47

55

38

48

42

Cost

aRi

ca

40

58

45

69

59

66

48

56

66

49

47

Dom

inic

an

38

19

21

13

16

11

26

19

12

11

30

Re

publ

ic

Ecua

dor

16

18

14

13

17

13

19

19

15

22

19

ElS

alva

dor

89

12

14

714

17

18

14

18

6

Gua

tem

ala

29

18

19

16

21

19

17

21

822

26

Hond

uras

19

17

15

13

7

19

11

13

510

16

Jam

aica

50

75

57

47

56

54

58

60

52

56

58

Mex

ico

39

41

41

33

43

50

40

48

37

35

41

Nic

arag

ua

28

15

20

14

23

23

15

18

523

27

Pana

ma

10

214

13

11

18

13

18

5

15

18

Para

guay

16

20

9

79

12

12

16

911

19

Peru

16

18

13

10

36

18

14

33

18

26

18

Trin

idad

45

59

43

39

40

40

48

49

43

48

50

a

nd To

bago

Urug

uay

47

52

45

44

44

48

44

43

43

45

42

Vene

zuel

a38

35

36

31

40

38

38

40

30

45

39

Aver

age

32

.4

33.2

29

.8

27.1

30

.0

32.3

30

.3

34.9

24

.8

30.2

31

.9

Lat

in

Am

eric

a

Aver

age

49

.5

68.2

51

.8

43.2

49

.2

49.7

53

.0

54.5

48

.0

51.5

54

.5

Car

ibbe

an

Cou

ntri

es

Indi

ces

scal

e:0

-100

Hig

hers

core

sim

ply

high

erd

evel

opm

ento

fthe

civ

ilse

rvic

e.

Sour

ces:

Eche

barr

ía(2

006)

,Iac

ovie

llo(2

005)

and

Isaa

cs(2

004)


221

Appendix E. Civil Service Development

by Subsystems

Argentina 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.0

Barbados 2.1 2.8 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0

Belice 2.0 2.4 3.2 2.0 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5

Bolivia 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.5 1.1 0.6 1.0 0.8

Brazil 3.0 2.9 3.8 2.3 2.9 3.4 2.8 2.5

Colombia 2.4 1.9 2.6 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.1 3.0

CostaRica 1.8 2.1 2.8 1.6 2.0 2.6 1.9 3.0

Chile 3.5 2.4 2.7 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.3 2.5

DominicanRepublic 0.8 1.8 1.1 0.6 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.0

Ecuador 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.8

Guatemala 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.3 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.3

Honduras 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3

Jamaica 2.2 2.9 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.8

Mexico 1.6 2.6 1.9 1.8 2.1 1.8 2.1 2.0

Nicaragua 1.0 1.4 0.8 0.1 1.0 0.6 1.5 1.5

Plan

ning

Wor

k

orga

niza

tion

Empl

oym

ent

M

anag

emen

t

Perf

orm

ance

M

anag

emen

t

Com

pens

atio

n

Man

agem

ent

Prof

essi

onal

M

anag

emen

t

Hum

ana

ndS

ocia

lRe

lati

ons

Mgm

t

Org

aniz

atio

nM

anag

emne

nt




222

Panama 0.5 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.0 0.8

Paraguay 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.5

Peru 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.8

Salvador 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5

Trinidad and 1.9 1.8 2.8 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.6 2.3 Tobago

Uruguay 2.5 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.1 1.8 2.0

Venezuela 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.4 1.8 1.1 2.3 2.3

AverageLatin 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7America

Average Caribbean 2.0 2.5 3.1 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.6 Countries

Scale:0to5.Higherscoresimplyhigherdevelopmentofthesubsystem.

Sources:Echebarría(2006).Isaacs(2004).Iacoviello(2005)

Plan

ning

Wor

k

orga

niza

tion

Empl

oym

ent

M

anag

emen

t

Perf

orm

ance

M

anag

emen

t

Com

pens

atio

n

Man

agem

ent

Prof

essi

onal

M

anag

emen

t

Hum

ana

ndS

ocia

lRe

lati

ons

Mgm

t

Org

aniz

atio

nM

anag

emne

nt

(continued)
