PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND POLICY NETWORKS

Foundations of a network approach to governanceErik-Hans Klijn and

Joop F. M. Koppenjan

E. H. KlijnDepartment of PublicAdministrationErasmus UniversityRotterdamP.O. Box 17383000 BA Rotterdam, TheNetherlandsTel:  +31 10 408 2069  +31 10 408 2069 Fax: +31 10 408 9099E-mail: Klijn@fsw.eur.nl

J. F. M. KoppenjanFaculty of Technology, Policyand ManagementDelft University ofTechnologyJaffalaan 52628 BX Delft, TheNetherlandsTel:  +31 15 278 8062  +31 15 278 8062 Fax: +31 15 278 6439E-mail: J.F.M.Koppenjan@sepa.tudelft.nlVol. 2 Issue 2 2000 135–158Public Management ISSN 1461–667X print/ISSN 1470–1065  1470–1065 online© 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals

AbstractIn this article we address the elaboration of the central concepts of a theory of networks and of network management. We suggest that the network approach builds on several theoretical traditions. After this we clarify the theoretical concepts and axioms of the policy network approach and argue that this framework has important explanatory power both on the level of strategic interaction processes as well as on the level of institutional relations. We argue that government’s special resources and its unique legitimacy as representative of the common interest make it the outstanding candidate for fulfilling therole of network manager, a role which means arranging and facilitating interaction processes within networks in such a way that problems of under or non representation are properly addressed and interests are articulated and dealt with in an open, transparent and balanced manner. INTRODUCTION: NETWORKS AND THE GOVERNANCE DEBATEThe apparently broad consensus that has developed around the idea that governmentis actually not the cockpit from which society is governed and that policy makingprocesses rather are generally an interplay among various actors has led to a full-scalesearch for new governing methods and a discussion on governance and publicmanagement (Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1996). This has fused with discussions in publicadministration on managerial reform and the adoption of business managementtechniques under the heading of new public management (NPM), a framework forimplementing these reforms (Pollitt 1990; Kickert 1997).Governance, public management and network managementGovernance can roughly be described as the ‘directed inuence of societal processes’.Many kinds of mechanisms, some of them quite complex, are involved and these donot only originate from public actors (Kooiman 1993; Kickert et al. 1997). Thus it is

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no surprise that the word ‘governance’ has become a catchword in the last few yearsand that it has been used in many different contexts. Rhodes (1996) nds at least sixdistinct uses of the concept. These seem to fall largely into two groups of de nitions.In one case, governance pertains to notions of reducing the state and distinguishingbetween government and governance. Government should be reduced or more donewith less (Osborne and Gaebler 1992), mainly by employing new public managementtechniques. In the other case, the term governance is reserved for theories and casesthat take into account the interdependencies of public, private and semi-private actors.In this denition governance refers to self-organizing networks. Ideas on networkmanagement, which are the focus of this article, t in this category. The twoconceptualizations of governance have totally different perspectives on public manage-ment and the role of government in society, and they draw their theoretical inspirationfrom very different sources.While ‘new public management’ represents an attempt to translate managerial ideasfrom the private sector to public organizations, such as contracting out, clientorientation and the introduction of market mechanisms (Pollit 1990; Kickert 1997),‘network management’ focuses more on mediating and co-ordinating interorganiza-tional policy making. The theoretical basis for this alternative view is found in thenetwork approach to policy. This has acquired a prominent position in policy scienceand public administration, demonstrated by the number of publications on policynetworks and network management in Europe (Wilks and Wright 1987; Rhodes 1988;Marin and Mayentz 1991; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Glasbergen 1995; Kickert et al.1997) and in the United States (Milward and Wamsley 1985; Provan and Milward1995; O’Toole 1997). Along with its growth in popularity, however, the policy network approach and ideas on network management also have met with frequentcriticism.136Public Management: an international journal of research and theory

Criticism of the network approachThe most important critical remarks can be categorized under ve headings:(1) Lack of theoretical foundations and clear concepts. A major point of criticism is thatthe network approach is not based on a solid theoretical body of knowledge asa result of which a coherent theoretical framework is lacking and its concepts areunclear (Borzel 1998).(2) Lack of explanatory power. According to some critics the network approach isprimarily ‘metaphoric’. It is highly descriptive and does not provide for theexplanations of outcomes of policy processes (see Dowding 1995; Salancik 1995;Blom-Hansen 1998; Borzel 1998).(3) Neglect of the role of power. Another criticism is that the network approach, andespecially that part which focuses on network management, places too muchemphasis on the role of co-operation and consensus and ignores conict, powerand power differences (Brans 1997).(4) Lack of clear evaluation criteria. Because the network approach rejects the use ofex ante formulated goals as evaluation criteria, it is said that the approach doesnot offer a clear framework for evaluation. The evaluation criteria it suggests areconsidered to be vague and lacking a substantive norm. Thus the approachinsufciently acknowledges the inuence of the goals of governments (Propper1996; Brans 1997).(5) Normative objections against networks and the role of public actors within them. Criticsargue that the network approach considers government organizations to be thesame as any other organization, and neglects their role as guardian of the publicinterest. They further contend that government strategies based on networktheory can seriously jeopardize policy innovation, the pursuit of the common

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good and the primacy of politics (Ripley and Franklin 1987; Marin and Mayentz1991; Rhodes 1996; De Bruijn and Ringeling 1997).

The focus of this articleWe believe that some of this criticism is right and justied, and should be taken veryseriously. But in many cases, the criticism does not do justice to the networkapproach. The aim of this article is to critically evaluate both the network approach and thecriticism it has encountered in order to clarify existing misunderstandings and to improve networktheory as a framework for the explanation, evaluation and improvement of public policy andpublic management.

Klijn & Koppenjan: Public management and policy networks137

We do this by systematically addressing the above mentioned ve categories ofcriticism. We rst review the theoretical background and concepts underlying thenetwork approach (section 2). We show that the network approach is solidly rooted inthe theoretical history of policy science and organization theory and that it has a ratherwell developed set of concepts. In section 3 we try to systematize the explanations ofinteractions and outcomes of policy processes that the network approach offers. We tryto strengthen the framework on the institutional level by introducing the concept ofrules and trust. In section 4 we clarify the role of power and conict in networks, andin section 5 we address the problem of evaluation and evaluation criteria in networks.Section 6 elaborates upon the misunderstandings that surround the role of publicorganizations in networks and here we provide management strategies that can helpgovernments to adequately operate under network conditions. In the last section wediscuss some topics which need further theoretical, empirical and normative con-sideration.

THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE NETWORK APPROACHA major point of criticism of the network approach is that it lacks both a theoreticalfoundation and clear concepts. But is this true? In this section we reject the suggestionthat the network approach has no theoretical basis. On the contrary, there is a richtheoretical tradition on which the approach is founded. And in response to confusionover what the core concepts of the network approach are, we suggest a framework thatcan satisfy the demand for conceptual clarication.

The theoretical roots of the policy network approachThe use of the network concept in policy science dates back to the early 1970s. Inimplementation studies, especially in what has become known as the ‘bottom-upapproach’ (see Hjern and Porter 1981), as well as in intergovernmental relationsliterature (see Friend et al. 1974; and the very inuential work of Scharpf: Scharpf etal. 1978), the concept has been used to map relation patterns between organizationsand to assess the inuence of these patterns for policy processes. In these two earlyuses of the network approach to policy one can nd the inuence of theoretical notionsfrom interorganizational theory and insights from the interactive perspective on publicpolicy (Hufen and Ringeling 1990; Klijn 1997).The interactive policy approach in policy science is visible in the work of authorssuch as Allison (1971), Cohen et al. (1972) and Lindblom (Lindblom 1965; Lindblomand Cohen 1979). In their work policy appears as the result of an interaction betweena multitude of actors. Con icting interests characterize policy processes and problemdenitions are dynamic and unpredictable.138Public Management: an international journal of research and theory

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The policy network approach builds on this process model since it also focusesattention on the interaction processes between interdependent actors and the com-plexity of objectives and strategies as a consequence of that interaction. An importantdifference with the process model is that in the network approach, more attention isgiven to the institutional context in which complex interactions take place. In anattempt to elaborate the institutional context of complex interaction processes,network theoreticians are inspired by interorganizational theory (Levine and White1961; Negandhi 1975; Aldrich 1979).The central starting point of the interorganizational approach is that the environ-ment of organizations consists of other organizations. In order to survive, anorganization requires resources from other organizations. These organizations engagein exchange relations with each other and a network of mutually dependent actorsemerges. There is substantial attention in interorganizational theory for the linksbetween organizations and the strategies used by organizations to inuence theexchange processes (see, for example, Levine and White 1961; Cook 1977; Aldrichand Whetten 1981; Benson 1982).As it has evolved, the policy network approach has developed its own, distinctivetheoretical framework. The network approach assumes that policy is made in complexinteraction processes between a large number of actors which takes place withinnetworks of interdependent actors. These actors are mutually dependent so policy canonly be realized on the basis of co-operation. This co-operation, however, is by nomeans simple or spontaneous, and it requires types of game management and networkconstitution. The central starting points of the network approach are elaboratedbelow.

Clarication of central concepts: Policy networks as a context of interactionsThe network approach assumes that actors are mutually dependent. Actors cannotachieve their objectives without resources that are possessed by other actors (Scharpf1978; Benson 1982; Rhodes 1988). Interaction patterns between actors emergearound policy problems and resource clusters, and these patterns acquire a degree ofsustainability because of the limited substitutability of resources. Rules develop whichregulate the behaviour of actors and resource distribution in the network, and this alsoinuences interactions within networks. Resource distribution and rules are graduallyshaped in interactions, but they are also solidied and altered in these interactions(Giddens 1984). Thus the created policy networks form a context within which actorsact strategically and in which strategic action is confronted by the strategic action ofothers.Within networks,1

series of interactions occur around policy and other issues.Theseseries of interactions can be called games (Crozier and Friedberg 1980; Rhodes 1981; Klijn & Koppenjan: Public management and policy networks139

Scharpf 1997). Their positions in the network and the strategic action in the gamedetermine the positions of the players. During the game, actors operate within theestablished resource distribution and set of rules, which are to a large extent framedby the network. In addition, they have to operate strategically in order to handle thegiven dependencies in the game so that they can achieve their own objectives. Duringthis action, they interpret the existing rules that are, after all, ambiguous (March andOlsen 1989; Klijn 1996b).Policy processes can thus be seen as a collection of games between actors. In thesegames, each of the various actors has its own perceptions of the nature of the problem,

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the desired solutions and of the other actors in the network. On the basis of theseperceptions, actors select strategies. The outcomes of the game are a consequence ofthe interactions of strategies of different players in the game. These strategies arehowever inuenced by the perceptions of the actors, the power and resource divisionsin the network and the rules of the network. We will elaborate on this in the nextsection.

Concerted action and network managementA central question within the network approach is how concerted action is establishedaround a concrete issue. Actors need to co-operate in order to achieve satisfyingoutcomes. This is not always easy, despite durable dependencies, since major conictmay arise at the process level about, for instance, the distribution of costs and bene tsof a solution. Policy is made and policy processes occur in the tension betweendependency and the diversity of goals and interests. And while this tension can bemore or less regulated by the rules and resource distribution in the network, thetension will exist and needs to be solved in any policy game.Since co-operation and collaboration of goals and interests does not happen of itsown accord, steering of complex games in networks is necessary. These steeringstrategies, i.e. network management, are primarily focused on the improvement of co-operation between involved actors (O’Toole 1988). The sometimes implicit assump-tion is that satisfying outcomes for actors are not possible without networkmanagement. Network management is thus an independent variable in the develop-ment of policy processes.In the literature on network management, a distinction is made between two typesof network management strategies: process management and network constitution (forextensive discussion, see Klijn et al. 1995; Kickert et al. 1997). Process managementintends to improve the interaction between actors in policy games. In essence thisconcerns steering strategies that seek to unite the various perceptions of actors andsolve the organizational problem that various organizations, in having autonomouslydeveloped their own strategies, are not automatically in concert with one another. Indoing so, actors cannot unilaterally determine each other’s strategy. What is important140Public Management: an international journal of research and theory

is that strategies of process management assume the structure and composition of thenetwork as given. So, rules (formal or informal), resource divisions and existing actorsare treated as a given starting point for the management strategies. Important processmanagement strategies are:cthe selection and activation of actors (Friend et al. 1974; Hanf and Scharpf1978); to take successful policy initiatives actors with the necessary resourcesmust be selected and motivated to participate;cthe improvement of mutual perception about an issue or solution; given the factthat actors have different perceptions of the problem, solution and existingsituation, network management must be aimed at creating a minimum con-vergence of perceptions and at creating packages of goals which are acceptablefor a workable coalition of actors;cthe creation of temporary organizational arrangements between organizations;because co-ordination between different actors is not secured, organizationalarrangements have to be created to sustain interactions and co-ordinate strate-gies;c

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the improvement and supervision of interactions by means of process andconict management (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Mandell 1990).Network constitution is focused on realizing changes in the network. Based on theassumption that the institutional characteristics of the network also inuence strategiesand co-operation opportunities of actors, attempts can be made to change one ormore of these characteristics. In general, these strategies are time consuming sincethey seek institutional change. As a result, they are usually unsuitable for inuencingpolicy games that are already underway. Network constitution strategies can befocused on:cchanging the position of actors or the introduction of new actors; introducingnew actors into the network can bring new perceptions but can also changegiven positions of power and regularities in interaction;cchanging the rules (for instance those that regulate access to a process) (Ostrom1986); changing both formal and informal rules can lead to different patterns ofinteractions of frames. Changing conict-regulating mechanisms, for instance,can lead to other strategies and interaction patterns because actors want to avoidbinding conict resolution;creframing (fundamentally alter ideas about the functioning and the substantiveproblems of the network) (Rein and Schon 1992); sometimes it seems necessaryto initiate radical changes in perceptions of sectoral problems or ways of doingthings. Mostly central government tries to achieve this by radical systemchanges, but sometimes actors within networks themselves try to achieve this.The literature on the network approach explicitly mentions that network managementis far from easy. It requires knowledge of the network and numerous skills includingKlijn & Koppenjan: Public management and policy networks

negotiation skills since network management strategies are conducted in a situation ofmutual dependency. Thus a network manager is not a central actor or director, butrather a mediator and stimulator (Forester 1989). This role is not necessarily intendedfor only one actor. Even though public actors often assume the role of networkmanager, other actors can do so as well. Which actor has the authority and opportunityto full the role of network manager is most certainly in uenced by the strategicposition of actors and the rules, including rules of behaviour, in use in the network(Ostrom 1986; Burns and Flam 1987). The most important theoretical assumptions ofthe network approach are summarized in Table 1.

THE NETWORK APPROACH AS AN EXPLANATORY MODELThe network concept is said to be merely a metaphor, and that because of this thenetwork approach lacks real explanatory power. The question is: to what extent can

Table 1: Theoretical assumptions of the policy network approach

Policy Network Policy processes Outcomes Network management

Actors are mutually dependent for reaching objectives.

Within networks, interactions between actors over policy and issues take place focused on solving the tension between dependencies on the one hand and diverging and con icting interests on the other.

Policy is the result of complex interactions between actors whoparticipate in concrete games in a network.

Given the variety of goals and interests and – as a result – the actual and potential con ict over the distribution of costs and benefits, co-operation is not automatic and does not develop without problems.

Dependencies create sustainable relations between actors.

In doing so actors depart from perceptions they hold about the policyarea, the actors and the decisions at stake.

Concerted action can be improved through incentives for co-operation,through process and con ict management, and through the reduction of risks linked

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to co-operation.

Dependencies create some veto power for various actors.

Actors select specific strategies on the basis of perceptions.

The sustainability of interactions creates and solidies a distribution of resources between actors.

Policy processes are complex and not entirely predictable because of thevariety of actors, perceptions and strategies.

In the course of interactions, rules are formed and solidied which regulate actor behaviour.Resource distribution and rule formation lead to a certain closeness of networks for outside actors.

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structural approaches to networks explain policy outcomes and processes? How dothese network features relate to actor behaviour and their interactions (see Downing1995; Blom-Hansen 1997; Borzel 1998)? In this section we examine the nature of theexplanations the network approach comes up with and how they deal with the multi-level character of policy processes in networks.We suggest that the issue of co-operation is central to the policy network approach.Given the dependency of actors on each other’s resources, policies can only bedeveloped when actors make their resources available. Therefore, in the networkapproach, explanations for the success or failure of policy processes are based on theextent to which co-operation has been achieved. Co-operation cannot be achievedwhen interactions between actors stagnate, are blocked or have led to undesired orunforeseen consequences, or because interactions are inuenced by institutionalcharacteristics. Explanations that fall into this latter category are based on the premisethat rules limit the behaviour of actors even when the actors themselves may haveviolated these rules consciously or unconsciously.Thus, explanations for the development ofinteraction processes in networks are foundboth in institutional characteristics – the resources and the rules – and in the character-istics of the interaction situation – the players, their stakes and their strategies (also see,for instance, Scharpf 1997). As both Dowding (1995) and Blom-Hansen (1997) state, toarrive at explanations network orientations which focus on the structural dimensions ofnetworks should be combined with an actor and interaction approach.Process variables as factors for success and failureThe network approach assumes that policy outcomes are the result of interaction ofstrategies of various actors. The involvement of these actors is a consequence of thefact that they possess resources that require their involvement in the handling andsolution of a particular problem. They can block interaction processes by withdrawingtheir resources: they have veto power. Replacement of these resources is not alwayspossible and when it is, it might be costly and time consuming. The same can be saidfor attempts to coerce co-operation, for instance by ordering a municipality to changeits zoning plan if it does not do so of its own accord.An important explanation for failing to realize concerted policy outcomes is the factthatactorsareinsufciently aware of theirexternal dependencies. In this casethey assumethat they can solve the problem alone or that they can impose their solution on otheractors. But even when actors are awareof their external dependencies, it is often quite anundertaking to bring the various goals and interests together. Differences and disagree-ments in perceptions between actors may cause conicts and block the interaction. Onlywhen actorsareable to bring their perceptions together and formulate commongoals andinterestswill policy games lead tosatisfactory outcomes. Learning processesarethus very

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important in policy games and process management seeks to stimulate these. PreferencesKlijn & Koppenjan: Public management and policy networks143

of actors are not xed (Weick 1979; March 1988). Discovering new goals that areinteresting to actors can prevent stagnation.On the other hand, actors may lose interest in policy games so that stagnationoccurs. These can be the consequence of the low priority that a policy problem has inthe perception of one or more actors. Stagnation and blockades may also be aconsequence of an undesirable balance between interaction costs and expectedoutcomes of policy games or of risks related to policy games as a consequence ofunexpected strategies of others. Thus there is a risk that as soon as they have protedin the interaction process, actors exit or threaten to exit, which leaves other actorsempty-handed. This problem typically exists when parties commit to transaction-speci c investments that cannot, or not easily, be used for other transactions(Williamson 1979; Barney and Hesterly 1996). And then there is always the dangerthat outsiders may prot from the mutual efforts of a particular group without havingmade any contribution to the endeavour (free-rider problem). In this case, networkmanagement should focus on the organization of interactions and protection ofinterests of the actors involved (De Bruijn et al. 1998).Concerted action thus requires that actors are able to assess their mutualdependencies and possibilities of co-operation and that the risks and costs involved arelimited. Lack of awareness of mutual dependencies, con icts of interests, interactioncosts and risks are important explanations for the failure of concerted policy.Conversely, the emergence of concerted action is explained through the acknowl-edgement of mutual dependencies, converging perceptions, the existence of incentiveswhich improve co-operation and the limitation of interaction risks through theapplication of types of game management.

The structure of the network as explanationAs argued, explanations for the success or failure of policy processes are divided intoprocess variables and factors connected to the structure of the network. Concertedsolutions have to be established in games. When network level factors for theexplanation of success and/or failure of policy and policy processes are included, gameand network are linked; after all, it concerns the question of how characteristics at thenetwork level inuence the development of the game.Intensive interaction between actors creates a specic resource distribution thatinuences the functioning of the network. Actors recognize/acknowledge that certainresources are relevant or even necessary to the realization of policy outcomes. Theseresources provide actors with veto power. The resources enable them to vetointeraction processes and they thus acquire a privileged position in the network and inthe games within that network. The greater the veto power of an actor, the moreindispensable the actor is to the policy games. The success of policy games is thuspartially determined by the degree to which indispensable resources, and the actors144Public Management: an international journal of research and theory

who own them, are involved (Scharpf 1997). Changes in the resource distribution inthe networks are, therefore, reected in the policy games. Thus, ten years ago it wouldhave been unthinkable that commercial project developers would have any role at allin urban renewal policy in The Netherlands. But now that resources in the housingnetwork have been redistributed and national government subsidies for public housinghave declined, these actors are involved.In addition, the degree to which actors participating in an interaction process are

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also connected in more encompassing interaction patterns and rules is important(Ostrom 1986; Burns and Flam 1987; Ostrom et al. 1994; Klijn 1996b). Interactionsbetween actors from various networks may be difcult because they do not interactotherwise or have few rules to regulate their interactions. In other words, automaticco-ordination mechanisms and a degree of trust are lacking, and this results in higherinteraction costs (see Hindmoor 1998, on the embeddedness of interactions).Rules play an important role in the development of policy processes. Rules enableactors to depart from minimal institutional agreements in their interaction. Thisreduces transaction costs and simpli es collaboration (Scharpf 1997; Hindmoor 1998).Initially, without knowledge of the network, it is difcult to arrive at generalstatements about the inuence of rules on policy networks. Rules are socialconstructions of actors in a network, and they differ from network to network.Research has shown, however, that rules of conict management and mediation, aswell as rules to protect autonomy and position, are important for determining thepossibility of co-operation (Klijn 1996a; Scharpf 1997). The stronger the territorialdemarcations in a network and the weaker the rules for conict management andmediation, the more difcult decision making will be. The lack of trust and usefulsanctions makes it dif cult to prevent exploitative behaviour on the part of actors.These examples illustrate the structuring nature of rules in networks. They canimprove or limit certain styles of interaction. Thus the lack of conict regulatingmechanisms and trust will more quickly lead to non-co-operative outcomes of ‘mixed-motive’ policy games which usually result in less for the actor than more co-operativestrategies.There are no mechanisms to prevent or decrease incidences of opportunisticbehaviour (Scharpf 1997). The central characteristic by which these outcomes areproduced is trust. Scharpf concludes: ‘In other words, being able to trust, and beingtrusted, is an advantage – but exploiting trust may be even more advantageous’(Scharpf 1997: 89). Rules are one of the most important pillars of trust, but hereinlies a problem. Actors can violate rules, whether formal or informal, because theresult might be attractive to the actor. In this sense, rules do regulate but notdetermine and they can be changed. Each analysis of decision making in networks musttake this into account. Particular attention should be focused on the process ofreformulation and reinterpretation of rules as a consequence of circumstances externalto the network and the strategic choices of actors. Table 2 summarizes the mostimportant explanations for the success and failure of policy processes in networks.Klijn & Koppenjan: Public management and policy networks145

THE ROLE OF POWER AND CONFLICT IN NETWORKSWithin the network approach literature, works that emphasize network managementare critiqued for elevating co-operation to a norm and for insuf ciently considering therole of conict and differences in power (Brans 1997; De Bruijn and Ringeling 1997).Indeed, co-operation is an important element of network theory, both with respect tothe explanations of success and failure and the development of prescriptions. Butpower and conict are not excluded from consideration.

Power, con ict and durable relationsWithout co-operation, actors who nd themselves in situations of mutual depend-encies cannot realize their objectives. This does not mean that co-operation isestablished without conict. Nor does it mean that actors will manage to co-operate.Durable dependency relations do not necessarily mean that no conict will emergeover the distribution of costs and bene ts in concrete policy processes. As an example,one need only consider labour relations where employers and labour unions maintaina durable relationship characterized by both co-operation and conict. It is exactly this

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Table 2: Some of the more important explanations for success and failure from the perspective of the network management approach

Explanations for success and failureAt interaction level

At network level

The degree to which actors are aware of their mutual dependencies. The degree to which actors possess veto power because their resourcesare indispensable.

The degree to which actors succeed in redi ning diverging andcon icting interests into a common interest.

The degree to which actors with veto power are actually involved in theprocess.

The degree to which interaction costs are balanced favourably orunfavourably with perceived outcomes of the interaction.

The degree to which actors in a game belong to the same network, sothat they also interact with each other elsewhere and have developedmutual rules.

The degree to which risks of the interaction within the game as aconsequence of strategies of other actors are limited.

The degree to which dened problems and solutions, and the way theseare handled, t within the rules developed in the network.

The degree to which game management is foreseen (mutual perceptiondevelopment; arrangements; game and con ict management).

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tension between co-operation and conict which needs to be resolved (Scharpf 1997).The lack of a dominant actor does not imply that resources are equally distributedamong actors (Knight 1992). Also, rules may operate to the advantage of some, andto the disadvantage of other actors. This is implied by the fact that rules have beenformed during earlier interactions. The inequalities resulting from earlier interactionsare incorporated into the existing rules. A change of rules is thus also (but notexclusively) a battle for power between actors (Burns and Flam 1987). In this sensethe network approach is quite attentive to ‘invisible’ forms of power, traditionallyknown as ‘the mobilisation of bias’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1962) such as rules whichshape the problem denitions and entrees of the actors in games and networks.In short: the differences in the distribution of resources matter. Actors will usethem to inuence the process and the substance of the interaction. A project developeror a municipality will generally be able to wield more inuence over building plansthan citizens’ organizations. Citizens lack the ‘know how’ and organizational capacityto be present throughout the process and provide input.

Veto power, network management and less privileged interestsNevertheless, less powerful actors may influence decision making. They can use theirveto power and their ability to use resources for blocking decision making and thuscreate stagnation or blockade. Since stagnation and blockade result in extra costs – atthe very least – more powerful actors need to consider their less powerful colleagues.In order to encourage actors not to use their veto power, some degree of convergenceof perceptions must be achieved. This is also a demonstration of the importance andthe need for process management. Furthermore, and certainly as important, this leadsto the consideration of information and interests of other actors to enhance the qualityand support of policy initiatives. The starting point of process management is toenhance the learning capability of policy processes by including information andinterests of various actors so that more complete policy initiatives can be developed.From a network approach, the involvement of actors is not only recommended fornormative reasons, but also for reasons of effectiveness and eficiency. Expertise andknowledge for handling policy as well as other sorts of problems is not available in oneplace only and thus a confrontation of policy initiatives with information and interestsof other actors is necessary. Power differences influence the way in which this process

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evolves. As long as actors hold veto power, they have influence.A more serious problem occurs when actors have no veto power and/or areexcluded from interaction by other parties.This can happen when interaction patternsbetween actors result in a certain degree of network insularity (Laumann and Knoke1987; Rhodes 1988). Outsiders can only access the network if they familiarizethemselves with the rules of behaviour and the language of the network (Klijn 1996a).Klijn & Koppenjan: Public management and policy networks147

In the development of theory in network management, substantial attention is given tothis aspect of networks and to the negative policy effects this may have for theenvironment. When formulating prescriptions, opportunities for dealing with thelimitations of this closed nature are sought in network constitution and in the use ofprocess norms. These will be clari ed in the next section.

SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF POLICY: THE SEARCH FOR EVALUATIONCRITERIAThe way in which success and failure are assessed in policy analysis is affected by useof the network approach.The criteria that have been proposed for evaluating outcomesand policy processes in networks have been criticized for being too vague and notsufciently taking into account the goals of public actors (Marin and Mayentz 1991;Propper 1996). If, however, we start from the premise that a variety of actors isinvolved and that they all have different objectives, then it should not be expected thatthe process and outcome can be evaluated in terms of the objectives of one actor, evenif this is a public actor.This type of top-down approach is not in tune with the networkapproach. Instead, criteria are needed which consider the multi-actor, dynamiccharacter of interaction in networks.

A unilaterally determined substantive criterion is not tenableIn classic top-down approaches, success and failure of policy processes are measured interms of a public actor’s effectiveness in achieving goals. The justi cation for this normis that this actor represents the public interest and is the central manager in policyprocesses. We argue that this yardstick is not appropriate in the network approach fora number of reasons.First, there is the problem of the ‘classic goal achievement method’, namely theaccurate determination of the formulated objective. In networks actors are relativelyautonomous and there is no central, co-ordinating actor. Each of the actors has theirown objectives, so it is unclear whose objective should serve as the yardstick. Thepragmatic choice of the public actor’s objective is not helpful. Frequently, severalpublic actors are involved in decision-making processes so that it is even difcult todetermine what ‘the public interest’ is. The solution of de ning the public or commoninterest in terms of elected political representation is based on an unrealistic and naiveassumption about the accumulation of preferences of citizens that has long since beenfalsi ed by theory and research. Calling upon the common interest is increasinglydifcult in a society that continues to fragment (see next section).The problem of nding the right evaluation criterion is not solved by using acollectively achieved formulation of a societal problem or objectives as a yardstick148Public Management: an international journal of research and theory

either (compare Glasbergen 1995). It is unlikely that actors possess a commonperception of the problem or objective at the beginning of a process given the largenumber of parties involved and their diverging interests.There is an additional problem that makes the use of ex ante formulated objectives

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in the network approach untenable. In interaction processes, actors adapt theirperceptions and objectives based on the responses of other parties and events in theenvironment. As a result, they arrive at a conclusion through a goal-seeking process.Ex ante problem formulation or objective setting as a yardstick, whether or not it hasbeen arrived at collectively, does not take this into account. After all, the problemformulation and the objective(s) will change in the course of the process. If theevaluator only focuses on initial problem de nitions or objectives, an importantelement of interaction processes may be ignored – namely that the perceptions ofproblems and solutions are subject to constant change – and learning processes will beevaluated negatively.A nal problem with evaluating success and failure by means of a prior and collectivelyagreed upon yardstick is the following: if parties do not participate in the interactionprocess, the chances are high that their interests and preferences will not be represented.The question of the degree to which the nal solution furthers or jeopardizes theirinterestsis not considered in the evaluation. In the network approach, the process used toarrive at a possible common problem formulation is critical.Assessment of substance: ex post satisfying and win-win situationsAn adequate yardstick should take into consideration the fact that various actors withdiverging interests interact, that objectives are dif cult to measure, that objectives shiftand that the interests of those involved may be overlooked. In the networkmanagement literature, the solution to this is found in the ex post satisfying criterion(Teisman  1992/1995  1992/1995 ). This means that the starting point of the assessment of policyprocess outcomes is based on the subjective judgements of individual actors. Thepractice of interviewing various actors about their satisfaction after the conclusion ofthe process can solve several problems.At the end of the process the actors have to determine how the outcome hasbeneted them, what the outcome has cost them and how the outcome ts in thechanging environment. In this assessment, both substantive and process elements areweighted, something that a researcher cannot possibly do. Since this is an evaluationviewed in hindsight, justice is done to the development of objectives and problemformulation during the process. Learning behaviour receives the appreciation itdeserves. One potential danger is that actors will, in retrospect, suggest rationaliza-tions that mask possible de ciencies. Comparing the subjective judgement of actors toactual achieved outcomes and to the interests of the actors involved might alleviate thisproblem. Also, an assessment of learning results should take into account theKlijn & Koppenjan: Public management and policy networks149

development of the substantive content of policy proposals. Policy proposals are betterwhen they have been able to incorporate the various goals and desires of actors andhave included or explicitly rejected criticism of earlier policy proposals. The ex postsatisfying criterion solves problems of measurability, assessment and dynamics.What remains are problems of intersubjectivity and exclusion. The problem ofintersubjectivity refers to the fact that actors’ statements may diverge strongly and willnot directly lead to a general assessment of success or failure of the policy process. Inother words, there is a need to assess the individual judgement of actors at a higherlevel. For this, the win-win situation criterion is used in the network approach. Whenactors have succeeded in reaching an outcome that represents an improvement fromthe earlier situation for all, or when an undesirable situation is avoided through co-operation, we speak of a win-win situation (compare the Pareto criterion, see forinstance Dery 1984). The nature of the improvement may differ for the variousparties.Also a party may have actually lost, but this is compensated by other elements.A win-win situation can be assessed by aggregating the individual ex post judgement

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of actors at a more collective level. It is also conceivable that the actors involved aregiven the opportunity to arrive at an assessment of the process and its outcometogether. Here too, statements will have to be validated in relation to objectivesformulated by actors and realized outcomes.The necessity of process normsNot all forms of co-operation are of equal interest to all parties, nor are they alwaysdesirable from a wider perspective. It is conceivable that actors who worked togetheron a problem nd themselves in a type of group-think situation, with the interests ofthe outside world insufciently considered or not considered at all. Win-win situationsmay have been achieved precisely because certain actors were excluded from thedecision making or because costs were placed elsewhere.It is important that interaction processes are accessible to third parties, that carefulassessments are possible and that contact is maintained with the outside world. Thismeans that in addition to the win-win situation criterion, process criteria such asopenness, carefulness, reliability and legitimacy are included when evaluating inter-action processes in networks. Also, the external effects of these processes should beincluded (Kickert et al. 1997).Thus in the network approach, the ex post judgement of actors about the processand the outcome, in combination with process criteria and concern for externaleffects, are used in order to determine the success or failure of policy processes. Theseare considered to be better indicators for success and failure than the ex anteformulated objectives of one actor.150Public Management: an international journal of research and theory

PUBLIC ACTORS AND POLICY NETWORKSIn the network approach, public actors do not play the dominant role they often areascribed in other public administration perspectives. This has evoked criticism. Thenetwork approach is accused of considering government merely as ‘an actor amongactors’, which can lead to problems of democratic legitimacy or accountability (Hirst1994; Rhodes 1997). Sometimes critics describe networks as closed subsystemsdominated by established interest groups, which impede innovation and maximizetheir private interests at the cost of others. As a result the common interest isneglected and the primacy of politics is eroded (Ripley and Franklin 1987; Marsh andRhodes 1992; De Bruijn and Ringeling 1997). From this point of view it isinconceivable to present a network approach as a normative theory. Yet this is what wedo when we derive evaluation criteria and prescriptions from network theory.In this section we warn against mixing up the real world and the theoreticalframework that is used to analyse, evaluate and improve it. If the real world does nott our norms, this does not mean we can refrain from it, or that our attempts toimprove it are not subject to the same normative shortcomings. The fact thatgovernment is confronted with the reality of its dependency upon other actors doesnot imply that its position is not special. Nor does developing network strategies andstrategies for network management imply that the shortcomings of existing realitiesare accepted and elevated to guiding principles. So, there are clearly misunderstand-ings about the position of government in network theory. In this section we will clarifythe ideas within network theory on the role of governments as public managers innetworks and the risks and potential these have for representation of the public interestand the primacy of politics.

The special position of governmentNetwork theory by no means presumes that governments are like other actors.Governments have unique resources at their disposal and work to achieve unique goals.

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They occupy a special position, which in most cases cannot be lled by others.Resources that determine this special position include: sizeable budgets and personnel,special powers, access to mass media, a monopoly on the use of force and democraticlegitimization. Access to these resources provides governments with considerablepower. However, they also encounter certain limitations as a function of theiruniqueness (Kickert et al. 1997):

The tasks of government de ne to a great extent its interdependence and oftencondemn it to interactions with particular social and administrative partners thatit cannot freely choose.

In performing its duties, government is frequently not allowed to ‘goal bargain’.In this respect, it often does not have the option of carrying out tasks throughnegotiation.

Governments are bound to the norms and rules they wish to impose on others:principles of good government, consideration for minorities and adversaries,guidelines of democratic regulations, et cetera.Where other actors operate withstrategic ingenuity, governments are expected to show exemplary behaviour.

Because of its public nature and democratic monitoring, more demands aremade on government’s strategic interactions.These actions are scrutinized by thewatchful eye of the media.

Government is not only expected to operate effectively and efciently, its actionsmust also be legitimate: they must be ‘backed’ by politicians and politicalparties, but there must also be social acceptance of public policy.

So, while their unique position means governments have access to special resources, italso limits their possibilities to use them in order to attain their goals in networksituations.But the objective statement of these conditions may not be getting at the real coreof the debate about the role of governments in networks. The debate is mainly aboutthe normative implications of becoming engaged in networks: public actors representthe common interest and that is why they should not enter into interactions andpartnerships with other parties in society. One counter argument that makes such anormative position problematic is that since governments are indeed dependent, thisway of thinking simply does not help when they have to deal with the genuinecomplexities of their tasks and environment. But we may also go more deeply into thequestion regarding why the representation of the common interest is at odds withengaging in network processes. What does representation of the common interest mean?Does it imply that the objectives of governmental organizations are superior to those ofother actors, because they are mandated by elections (i.e. the will of the people)?Political science and public administration research of the last fty years has shownthat there are many problems with the aggregation of the preferences of voters ingovernmental policies and that representative bodies function far from optimally. Inconcrete game situations it appears that public organizations de ne the commoninterest in a variety of ways and frequently use it to legitimize their own organizationalobjectives. This situation is bound to inuence our appreciation of the concept of‘common interest’.If common interest has any meaning at all, it is because it refers to the importanceof criteria such as proportional representation, openness, equity, fairness, reliability, etcetera. Note that these are all criteria that concern the quality of the interactionprocess rather than the content of policies or decisions. And that it is precisely networkmanagement that has been developed as an instrument to ensure that interactionprocesses have these qualities. Network management is the means by which the quality152Public Management: an international journal of research and theory

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and openness of processes can be achieved. If the representation of the commoninterest is dened in this way, there is no reason to persist in the claim that enteringinto network-oriented processes is contrary to the representation of the commoninterest. Quite the contrary: because it is the task of governmental organizations touphold and further the common interest, they should, rather than refraining fromnetwork games, actively seek to organize and manage them.However, there remains the criticism that the position of representative bodies willbe eroded by engaging in negotiation processes with private and semi-private partners(Rhodes 1997). Because of the non-transparent and uncontrolled processes innetworks, the primacy of politics will be threatened. But then again, the position canbe taken that by responsible and prudent engagement in networks, government canhelp prevent processes from succumbing to these shortcomings. The networkapproach, with its ideas about process management and network constitution, seeks tocontribute to the improvement of the open and democratic nature of interactionprocesses in policy networks.Public management in networks: Roles for governmental organizationsWhen confronted with a network-like situation, governments may choose among thefollowing options.First, they may choose not to join in network games. This means that they will tryinstead to unilaterally impose their ideas and goals on other social actors. This willrequire a huge investment in decision-making and implementation activities since thereare existing dependencies that will need to be dealt with and the power of theopposition will need to be broken. The risks are high: is there sufcient and stablepolitical support for such a strategy? How sure can we be that goal attainment meanseffectiveness and efciency, given that policy development is based on imperfectinformation and that the strategic behaviour of target groups must be taken intoaccount? And what does this mean for relations with parties on whom governmentsremain dependent both in the future and in parallel situations?Second, governments may decide to carry out their tasks in co-operation with otherpublic, semi-public and private actors. Often, entering into dialogue with non-governmental organizations is considered quite legitimate and a standard operatingprocedure. We explicitly mention co-operation with other public actors because it isentirely possible that various governmental organizations, in performing their tasks,discover that they are dependent upon each other. But not every form of co-operationis acceptable or manageable. For instance, hierarchical supervisory relations betweenpublic actors may limit the possibilities of horizontal co-operation.Third, government can take up the role of process manager and try to facilitateinteraction processes aimed at the resolution of certain problems or the realization ofprojects. The fact that government is supposed to protect the common interest,Klijn & Koppenjan: Public management and policy networks153

safeguard democratic values and be publicly accountable for its actions frequentlymakes it acceptable to others as a process manager. However, it is not always possibleor sensible for governmental organizations to accept such a role. For instance, theDutch Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment was project leader ofthe planning process regarding expansion of the national airport in the second half ofthe 1980s. It was very difcult for the ministry to protect environmental interestswhile it was supposed to be performing the role of a non-partisan process manager.Fourth, governments may choose to take up the role of network builder. Given thespecial resources of governments and their role as representative of the commoninterest, governments seem to be eminently suited for this role. But at the same time,

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strategies aimed at changing network features have to themselves be handled in gamesituations and need to be negotiated with other involved parties in order to result instable network changes. These changes cannot be achieved instantaneously. This meansthat network constitution is not instrumental to the realization of substantivegovernment goals in concrete game situations (compare Hood and Jackson 1991). Aserious danger in operating within games for governments is that these four roles getconfused. This may occur for strategic reasons, or if government is inexperienced witha new role and, in the middle of a difcult situation, reverts to old routines. TenHeuvelhof (1993) mentions the risk of alternating between the roles of imposing andnegotiation. We have already referred to the danger of pursuing a substantive objectivewhile acting as network manager. Also, network constitution and process managementare not necessarily compatible. Clearly confusion of roles can lead to misunderstand-ings and conict among actors and can prove to be costly in terms of effectiveness andef ciency, but especially with regard to the reliability and legitimacy of govern-ment.

CONCLUSIONIn this article, we have argued that the policy network approach has developed into arelatively elaborate, empirically grounded and recognizable theoretical framework.With the help of this framework, policy processes can be analysed, explained andevaluated. And it offers clues on which prescriptions regarding strategies, gamemanagement and network structuring can be based.Despite this scholarly and substantial work, the network approach can hardly beconsidered to be widely accepted as a theory on which practitioners in the publicsector base their actions. It is therefore not surprising that the descriptive andexplanatory aspects of the theory until now have received more attention than itsprescriptions. However, we believe that network theory will prove to be an importantsource of inspiration for the development of public management. The nature of tasksthat governments in contemporary complex societies are confronted with will notallow for command and control reactions. Because of the ambiguity and complexity of154Public Management: an international journal of research and theory

these tasks, governments will have to learn to enter into partnerships with otherparties. Network management strategies will have to become part of their standardoperating procedures.In The Netherlands, for instance, this view is widely recognized and experimentshave even been started to develop public policies in co-operation with politicians, civilservants, private companies, pressure groups and citizens. But at the same time thereis a hesitation and resistance to abandoning existing routines and to giving up thepower to determine the content of policies unilaterally. As a result these experimentsoften remain marginal and half-hearted.So, where do we go from here? We think it is important that the content, conditionsand implications of the network approach as a prescriptive theory for publicmanagement be further developed, tested and evaluated. In the rst place this willmake it possible to further elaborate network management strategies on the level ofconcrete techniques and supporting instruments. Until now this part of the networkapproach has been the subject of mostly conceptual and theoretical work. It is nowtime to apply these ideas in practice and to test them empirically. This new phase willopen up a whole new range of practical challenges and research questions.A second theme that deserves attention is that of the institutional conditions for theintroduction of network management strategies. What are the institutional barriers andhow can they be removed? For instance, what are the positive and negative incentives

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for interorganizational co-operation that exist within governmental organizations? Andwhat interorganizational arrangements for mediation and arbitrage are available withinpolicy sectors at the different governmental levels? This institutional theme brings usalso to the potential of international comparative studies. Is network theory a typicalproduct of countries with coalition governments, a strong consensual political cultureand a decentralized state system? Can it be applied in unitary states with a majoritysystem? If so, are network management strategies universal or subject to pathdependent developments?Third, there is the question of the implications of applying network theory.Applying ideas of network management means a rede nition of the traditional roles ofpoliticians, civil servants, interest group involvement and citizen participation. Wementioned earlier the need to rede ne the concept of the common interest. The sameis true for ideas about the primacy of politics and accountability. Does networkmanagement mean the end of politics or can politicians develop new leading roles?Does co-operation between governments and other parties result in the blurring ofresponsibilities, or can new arrangements and procedures be found which allow forboth co-operation and accountability?NOTE1We dene policy networks as a (more or less) stable pattern of social relations betweeninterdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes.Klijn & Koppenjan: Public management and policy networks155

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