Public Corporation Ulep Notes[1]

8/8/2019 Public Corporation Ulep Notes[1]

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12I. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

A. In General

B. Pre-Spanish Timesb. 1 The Sumakwel CodeIn 1212, after fleeing from the oppressive regime of Datu Makatunaw in Borneo, 10 datus set up their own triba

colonies in the Visayan Islands. One of them, Datu Sumakwel, established on the Island of Panay the Confederation ofMadiaas and its constitution, the Code of Maragtas or the Code of Sumakwel. The Code of Sumakwel was consideredamong the first Filipino laws enacted before the Pre-Hispanic times. It consisted of 10 articles, mainly focusing onpunishment for laziness.

An American historian, Paul Morrow debunks the Sumakwel Code as nothing more than the product of GuillermoCuinos imagination. Cuino was the first person to write about the Code Sumakwel in an essay in 1858 wherein heclaimed to have translated the Code from an ancient Filipino document. However, Cuino presented no other proof otherthan his dubious essay. Nevertheless, Paul Morrow laments, much of the Filipino education system to this day stillpreaches the Sumakwel Code as gospel historical truth.

b. 2 The Code of KalantiawDatu Kalantiaw was among the ancient Visayans who built a kingdom with its own tribal code known as the Code

of Kalantiaw, supposedly around 1150. It contains 18 articles, which consists mainly of punishment for criminal actsranging from the traditional ones such as homicide, theft and nonpayment of debts to the bizarre and superstitious suchas disrespect for revered trees or killing black cats during the new moon. The Code of Kalantiaw also has feudalisticovertones such as obligating those with the beautiful daughters to give them up to the sons of chiefs as well as providing

special punishment for those who commit particular crimes against the tribal headmen as stated in the Code.Punishments for the crimes stated in the Code are cruel by todays standards; for example, those who sing while

traveling by night are beaten for two days while those who commit homicide and theft are condemned to death by beingdrowned in the river or in boiling water.

In 1968, William Henry Scott, another American historian revealed the Code of Kalantiaw as an outright hoaxperpetuated by forger Jose Marco. Marco gave the Philippine Library and Museum as ancient document claiming to bethe Code of Kalantiaw in 1912. The supposed Code and Marcos claims on how he obtained the ancient document hadtoo many discrepancies and anomalous reference to historical facts that could not have existed during the time of theCodes supposed existence. Only recently have a few historians such as Sonia M. Zaide regarded the Code as a fraudbut, as Paul Morrow says, the lie still lives on.

C. The Spanish Erac. 1 Harty v. Mun of Victoria 13 Phil. 152

Facts: Monsignor Harty, an archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church based in Manila, claims that his parishowns the plaza located in the municipality of Victoria, Tarlac, claiming to be in peaceful possession of it for more than 60years up to 1901. The defendant municipality replied that Victoria was constituted into a town in 1855 and that the parishof Tarlac was established many years afterwards; therefore the latter cannot claim title to the plaza. Evidence seemed toshow that the original owner, Casimiro Tanedo, of the land wherein the plaza is located, donated said land to the churchin general and not to the town curate, since a permanent curate was not appointed in Victoria until 1867. However, fromthe moment the town was created, both the town curate and the townspeople have enjoyed free access of the plaza. StillMonsignor Harty claims the parish of Tarlac owns the plaza on the grounds of 1) prescription and 2) that the act of thecurates and the gobernadorcillos of planting fruit trees and plants on the plaza constituted private ownership.

Held: Monsignor Hartys contentions are incorrect. Reasons:

1. It was a Philippine custom then that upon the establishment of a new town, a large tract of land is alwaysreserved in its center for the creation of a plaza. Before Victoria became a town it was a mere barrio. It must be assumed

that the principal residents of Victoria wanted to have a public plaza should their barrio be converted into a townTherefore, even before Victoria became a town, the land now in dispute was always intended to be a public plaza.

2. There was no sufficient proof that the late Casimiro Tanedo intended to donate the portion of the land intendedto be a public plaza to the church in general

3. It has been fully proven that the plaza has always been used by the people of Victoria from the moment thetown was created

4. Plazas destined for public use are not subject to prescription (Art. 1936, the Old Civil Code)

5. Planting of fruit trees by the curates, etc. do not constitute an act of private ownership but either evidence ofpublic use or as embellishments for the benefit of the townspeople.


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c. 2 Rubi v. Provincial board of Mindoro 39 Phil. 660

Facts: Rubi and his fellow Manguianes filed an application for habeas corpus on the ground that they were beingdeprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of Mindoro. Rubi claimed they were being held against their will at areservation in Tigbao, Mindoro while one Dabalos was imprisoned for having run away from the reservation. Theprovincial officials of Mindoro however, countered that they were authorized under section 2145 of the AdministrativeCode of 1917 to implement measures for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro by obliging them to livein one place in order to educate them.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the provincial officials of Mindoro on the grounds that:

1. They were merely exercising the police power of the state for a lawful purpose and through lawful means,which can validly limit the exercise of Civil liberty. The Supreme Court cited past legislation implemented in the Philippineswhich justified the placing in a reservation of the Manguianes such as:

a. Book 6, Title 3 A compilation of laws implemented during the Spanish forcing the Indios to leave poblaciones(communities) or reducciones in order to instruct them to the Catholic faith and enable them to live in a civilized manner.

b. Decree of the Governor-General of January 14, 1881- Decree ordering the Indios to be governed by thecommon law and not allowing them, unless with absolute necessity, to change their residence.

c. Letter of Instructions by President McKinley Uncivilized tribes are allowed to keep their tribal governments,subject to regulation by the Americans.

d. The Philippine Bill of 1902 The Philippine Commission (which composed of the Philippine Legislature, theother being the Philippine Assembly) was given exclusive jurisdiction over the territory inhabited by the Moros and othenon-Christian tribes of the Philippines

e. The Jones Law

2. Although the Maguianes were labeled as non-Christian, the intent of the law was not to refer to any particularreligions or geographical discrimination but is predicated on the lack of civilization by them, which the measureimplemented by the provincial officials of Mindoro intended to correct.

3. The measure implemented was a valid delegation of legislative power by the Philippine legislature as it wasdone in accordance with Administrative Code of 1917

c.3 The Maura Law

Queen Regent Maria Cristina of Spain, upon the recommendation of Colonial Minister Antonio Maura,promulgated the Royal Decree of May 19, 1893 which provided for an autonomous local government in the PhilippinesUnder the Maura Law there was constituted a Municipal Tribunal of five, the captain and 4 lieutenants. It was givencharge of the active work of governing the municipality, such as administration of public works, etc. and the details oftaxation. In addition, each of its members was required to have special qualifications. These positions were honorary. Theterm of office was 4 years. The officers, together with 2 substitutes, were elected by 12 delegates of the principalia. Theprincipalia was composed of all persons who has held certain offices (such as cabeza de barangay or former captains) orwho has paid a land tax of P50. The Governor General and the provincial governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction overthe council and its individual members, the Provincial Board also had supervision of the municipal council (Malcolm, Govtof the Philippines Islands, pp. 69-71, Document 362, The Maura Law of 1893)

c. 4 The Treaty of Paris

The Treaty of Paris officially ended the Spanish-American War of 1898. It was ratified by Spain and the UnitedStates on December 10, 1898. It contained 17 articles, important provisions including:

Art. 1 Relinquishment by Spain of its claim of sovereignty and title to Cuba. Art. 2 Cession to the U.S. of theislands of Puerto Rico and Marianas. Art. 3 Cession to the U.S. of the Philippines for the sum of $20 million. Art. 9

Allowing Spanish subjects which are natives of the Philippines to remain in the Philippines if they so desire. The civil rightsand political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the U.S. shall be determined by Congress.

Art. 11 Relinquishment of all civil and criminal jurisdictions over all territories ceded. Art. 12 Provides for rules ondeciding judicial proceedings pending at the time of the ratification of the treaty.


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D. The American Period

d.1 The Jones Law

The Jones Law of 1893 was virtually an American-made constitution providing for a complete form of semi-autonomous government in the Philippines. It defined government functions into an executive to be appointed by the U.SPresident with the consent of the Senate, who was called the American Governor-General in the Philippines. Thelegislative power was vested in an elective bicameral/legislature a Senate and a House of Representatives. The judiciapower was exercised by the Supreme-Court and other lower courts, with Filipino and American justices. The Jones Lawalso extended the Bill of Rights, defined Filipino citizenship and provided for other safeguards and restrictions.

The bulk of the Jones Law comprised mainly of defining the executive, legislative and judicial powers of thegovernment.

E. The Japanese Occupation

e.1 Topacio Nueno Angeles, 76 Phil. 12

Facts: Jose Topacio Nueno and 3 other petitioners ran for and eventually obtained seats in the Municipal Boardof Manila in 1940. World War II and the subsequent Japanese occupation however took place. After the war, 6 new boardmembers were appointed by the President. Nueno, et. al. claimed that the appointment was null and void because 1) theiterm of office had not expired due to the world war and 2) even if 1) were not true, they still had the right to hold over theiofficers until their new successors were elected and qualified.

Held: Nueno and his goons were incorrect. Reasons: 1) The word term isdifferent from tenure. There is no law which allows the extension of terms of office by reason of war. 2) As for tenure, thesame may be shortened or extended for various reasons, such as the death of the incumbent or as otherwise provided bylaw. The principle of the right to hold over may validly extend the tenure of office. However, Nueno, et. al. cannot invokethis right because under 16 (a) of the Commonwealth Act, the President has the discretion of appointing temporary boardmembers until duly elected board members can be qualified.

F. The Post War Years

f. 1R.A. 2264, as amended The Local Autonomy Act

Entitled, An Act Amending the Laws governing Local Governments by Increasing their Autonomy andReorganizing the Provincial Governments, the Act provides for, among other things: Procedure in establishing theprovincial, city, municipal and regularly organized municipal district budgets for each fiscal year, taxation sourcesappropriation of funds for the general welfare of the public; grant of the power of eminent domain; composition of theprovincial board; qualifications of members of the provincial board, governors, vice-governors, mayors and vice-mayorappointment power of provincial governor, city mayor and municipal mayor; and assignment of other powers to theprovincial board, municipal board or city councils. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the interpretation of the Loca

Autonomy Act shall be resolved in favor of the local government and shall be presumed to exist.

f. 2 R.A. 2370 The Barrio Charter Act

Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are located. They are quasi-municipacorporations endowed with such powers as herein provided in said Act for the performance of particular governmentfunctions to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in conformity with law.

Barrios may be created or its name changed by a petition of the majority of voters in the areas affected. They maysue and be sued and may be deal with any real or personal property in the manner provided by law.

No barrio may be created if its population is less than 500 people or out of chartered cities, or poblaciones ofmunicipalities.


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The Act also provides for the barrio council headed by the barrio lieutenant. The barrio council shall meet with thequalified voters of the barrio at least once a year in a barrio assembly to discuss, among others, election of new officers,raising of funds and adopt measures for the welfare of the barrio. The Act also provides for the qualifications of the barriocouncil members and their powers and responsibilities, such as the taxation power and its sources.

f. 3 R.A. 3590 Revised Barrio Charter Act

This Act is essentially the same as its predecessor, with the following pertinent amendments;

1) A plebiscite may be called to decide on the recall of any member of the barrio council member or approve anybudgetary, supplement appropriations or special tax ordinances.

2) Renaming the barrio lieutenant as barrio captain

3) Right of succession in case of vacancy in the barrio captain position (there is no vice-barrio captain in both Acts).

4) The municipal mayor shall have power of supervision over barrio officials\

5) Procedure in barrio council, such as holding of meetings every month

6) Effectively of barrio ordinances (unless otherwise, after 60 days after its passage or 15 days after its confirmation in aplebiscite)

f. 4 R.A. 5185 The Decentralization Act of 1967

This Act further strengthens the autonomous powers of local governments by providing for the following pertinentprovisions:

1) Provincial and city governments are empowered to undertake field agricultural work and rural health workwhenever deemed to be necessary to assist in national programs or services.

2) Appointment of heads, assistant heads of local officers and their subordinates 3) Suspensionand removal of elective local officials (grounds: disloyalty to RP, dishonesty, oppression and misconduct in the office)

4) Restriction in practice of law by members of provincial, city or municipal board 5) Succession to officeof vice-governor and vice-mayor.

6) Filling of special vacancies in local legislative bodies.

7) Filling of elective officers in newly created and newly classified provinces, cities, municipalities or municipadistricts

8) List of actions of provincial, city and municipal officials and provincial boards declared immediately effective.

9) Certain duties and powers of local chief executives not to be subject to direction and review of any nationaofficial

10) Release and apportionment of certain government funds 11) Creation of followingpositions: provincial engineer, city public works official, provincial attorney and city legal officer

12) Creation of Joint Local Government Reform Commission (for continuing studies on local autonomy of LocaGovernment andprepare local government code)

G. The Martial Law Epoch

g. 1P.D. 145

This decree amended Section 2 of R.A. 2264 or Local Autonomy Act because the said section was ineffective incarrying out the Secretary of Finances power to suspend the effectively of any local tax ordinance which in his opinion is


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unjust, excessive or oppressive or contrary to national policy. Said decree improves this situation by giving the localegislative body either 30 days to modify the tax ordinance or appeal the suspension order of the Secretary of Finance in acourt of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or its part of parts in question is considered revoked

g. 2B.P. 337 The Local Government Code of 1983

This Code provides for the pertinent following provision:

1) General powers and attributes of local government units.

2) Powers and restrictions of Local Government Units to: Create sources of revenue; eminent domain; closure of roadssuability; enter into contracts; convey property; limited non-liability for damages.

3) National supervision over local governments

4) Relationship between Province-city, province-municipality; city-barangay, municipality-barangay; city-barangay; publicofficials-LGUs

5) Fiscal matters; Expenditure of government funds; preparation of budget

6) Requirement and prohibitions of local govt. officials; vacancy and succession

7) Qualification and election of local govt. officials; vacancy and succession

8) Recall, suspension and removal of elective officials

9) Creation of local school boards

10) Personnel Administration

11) Settlement of municipal and barangay boundary disputes

12) Details on barangay and barangay officials; municipal and municipal officials; city and city officials; province andprovince officials

H. The Present

h. 1 R.A. 7160 The Local Government Code of 1991. From the LGC of 1983, the following pertinent provisionswere added:

1) Operative principles of decentralization

2) Authority by Congress or any political subdivision to create, divide, merge, abolish or alter boundaries

3) Emphasis on general welfare and imposition of basic services and facilities on political subdivisions

4) Reclassification of lands

5) Authority of LGUs to secure and negotiate grants

6) Creation of Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee

7) Other procedural and technical changes

II. PRIMARY LAW AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. Read Article X, Section 9 and Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution


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a.1 Article X, Section 10 No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged abolishedor its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code andsubject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.NOTE: Read the whole of Article X of the 1987 Constitution as well, as it refers to local, governments in general. Icontains 21 sectors. Also Prof. Ulep must have meant Season 10 and not 5 in his outline.

a. 2 Article XVIII, Sec. 8 - Unless otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Authorityto be composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila Area.

Article XVIII, Sec. 9 A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular province or itscomponent municipalities are reverted to the mother province.

NOTE: Theres no point in reading all other sections of Article XVIII. See for yourself.

B. Read R.A. 7924(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)

This Act states the policy of the State to treat Metro Manila as a special development and administrative regionand certain basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila as metro wide services more efficiently and effectivelyplanned, supervised and coordinated by a development authority as created herein, without prejudice to the autonomy ofthe affected LGU. Among its pertinent provisions are:

1) Scope of MMDA (metro-wide) services: Development planning; transport and traffic management; solid wastedisposal and management; Flood control; Urban renewal; zoning and land use planning; health sanitation

Urban protection and pollution control; pu8blic safety;2) Creation of Metro Manila Council (MMC) consisting of all mayors in Metro Manila3) Powers and Functions of MMDA, mainly to formulate, coordinate, and regulate implementation of above

metro-wide services4) Functions of MMC, mainly to approve projects of MMDA5) Function of MMDA chairman: Execute policies of MMC and manage operations of MMDA; appointmen

power; prepare budget of MMDA; disciplinary power on subordinates; ex officio board member (or hisrepresentative) of departments related to activities of MMDA such as DOTC, DOH, etc.

6) Institutional linkages of MMDA: NEDA, NGOs , accredited peoples organizations

b. 1 Lopez, Jr. v. COMELEC, 136 SCRA 633Facts: Mel Lopez, et. Al. questioned the validity of P, D. 824 which provides for the creation of Metro Manila

Commission which shall hold sway over 4 cities (Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and Pasay) and 13 municipalities. P.D. He

says it runs counter to Art. 11, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution which states that: No province, city, municipality or barriomay be created, divided, abolished, merged or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteriaestablished in the Local Government Code and subject to the approval of the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in theunit or units affected. No plebiscite was conducted to vote for the creation of Metro Manila. He also claims the P.D. is adenial of the equal protection clause as other cities and municipalities were not similarly organized into such. Also thePresident cannot exercise direct supervision and control over the Metropolitan Manila Commission as it runs counter tothe autonomy of local governments.

Held: Mel Lopez is incorrect. Reasons:1. Although a plebiscite was not conducted, a referendum was held Feb. 27, 1975 wherein the residents of the

Greater Manila area authorized the President to reorganize the cities and municipalities under the Metro ManilaCommission. The requirements for a plebiscite were therefore deemed satisfied. Besides, at the time of the referendumthere was no Local Government Code in existence then which provided the need for a plebiscite. By virtue of martial lawand the absence of an interim Batasang Pambansa at that time, the President had authority to enact said P.D.

2. There is reasonable classification in organizing said 4 cities and 13 municipalities into a metropolitan area3. Article 8, Sec. 2 of the 1973 Constitution expressly recognizes the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila4. There is presumption of constitutionality in the Presidents power of direct supervision and control over the

Metropolitan Manila Commission. The presidential power of control can and should be constructed to mean that saidcontrol is limited to those that may be considered national in character.

b. 2 MMDA v. Bel-Air Assn, Inc., 328 SCRA 836Facts: Pursuant to R.A. 7924 which created the MMDA, MMDA issued a notice to the Bel-Air Village Assoc.

(BAVA) that the former will open Neptune Street owned by the latter in Bel-Air Village, as well as tear down a perimeterwall owned by said village. Both actions, the MMDA said, is necessary for the decongestion of traffic along the said areas.


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BAVA petitioned the trail court and later on the Court of Appeals to enjoin the implementation of MMDAsproposed actions. BAVAs petition was granted. The MMDA thus now seeks recourse with the Supreme Court, claimingamong others that its proposed actions were in the exercise of the police power.

Held: MMDA is wrong. The reason is that R.A. 7924 did not expressly or impliedly delegate any police power tothe MMDA, most notably the power to enact ordinances necessary for the implementation of its plans, programs andprojects aimed at the delivery of metro-wide services in Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the LGUsconcerning purely local matters (See. 2, R.A. 7924) MMDAs proposed actions were not under the authority of anyordinance (Whats funny is that the MMC, the governing board of the MMDA, is composed of the different mayors of MetroManila, and these guys, as mayors per se, have the power or at least, the political will to enact ordinances)

C. Read R.A. 6732 (Organic Act for ARMM [Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao])

Mindanao, encompassing 13 provinces and 9 cities, through a plebiscite for that purpose. This government shaloperate within the framework of the Regional Government. The executive power is conferred on the Regional GovernorThe legislative power is conferred in the Regional Assembly. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the lowercourts shall continue to exercise their power as mandated in the Constitution; however, there shall be a Shariah AppellateCourt which shall also be learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence. The Shariah Courts decisions shall be final andexecutory subject to the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Tribal Appellate Courts for cases dealingwith tribal codes shall also be established.

The Regional Government shall have fiscal autonomy or the power to create its own sources of revenue, subjectto the limitations of the Constitution and this Organic Act. The Organic Act also provides for: Protection of ancestral landsancestral domain and indigenous cultural communities; urban and rural planning and development; power to enact lawspertaining to the national economy and patrimony responsive to the needs of the Regional Government; public order and

security; education, science and technology and sports development; social justice and services; and power to amend orrevise the Organic Act, either by Congress or by the Regional Assembly, the latter being subject to approval by Congress.

c. 1 Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287Facts: Datu Firdausi Abbas, et.al. challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 6734 on the following grounds:1) R. A. 6734 conflicts with the Tripoli Agreement (what conflicts the case doesnt say)2) R. A. 6734 provides for the unconditional creation of the ARMM and not through the mode of a plebiscite

as provided in the Constitution3) The Constitution provides that ARMM shall be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite by al

voters residing in the provinces and cities affected, but R.A. 6734 says by a majority or votes cast by the constituent unitsin a plebiscite and only those provinces and cities where a majority of votes cast in favor of the Organic Act shall beincluded in the Autonomous Region. R.A. 6734 thus conflicts the Constitution

4) R. A. 6734 includes provinces and cities which do not have the same cultural and historical heritage and

other relevant characteristics needed for admission to the ARMM5) R. A. 6734 violates constitutional guarantee on freedom of exercise of religion as some its provisions runcounter to the Koran

6) The creation of an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of power to the ARMM is contrary to theconstitutional mandate that the creation of the autonomous region hinges solely on the result of the plebiscite

7) R. A. 6734 says that only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be includedin the ARMM. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shalremain in the existing administrative regions: Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determinationmerge the existing regions. This provision, Abbas claims, is contrary to the Constitutional mandate that, No province citymunicipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except inaccordance with the criteria established with the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votescast in a plebiscite in the units directly affected. (Art. 10, Sec. 10, 1987 Constitution)

Held: Abbas is wrong. Reasons:1) R. A. 6734 as an enactment of Congress, is superior to the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law to

the Tripoli Agreement (though in my opinion it wouldnt matter if R. A. 6734 was prior to the Tripoli Agreement)2) The transitory provisions of R. A. 6734 does provide for a plebiscite (1 guess nobody reads the transitory

provisions)3) The framers of the Constitution must have intended that the majority of votes must come from each of the

constituent units and not all the votes of the provinces and cities (I couldnt understand how the justices arrived at thisconclusion)

4) It is not for the Court to decide on the wisdom of the law concerning the inclusion of provinces and citieswhich Abbas claims should not be included in a plebiscite

5) There is no actual controversy yet as to any violation of freedom of religion, only a potential one6) The creation of an Oversight Committee is merely procedural and in fact will aid in the timely creation o

the ARMM


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7) The power of the President to merge administrative regions is inherent in his power of generasupervision over local governments. Besides, administrative regions are not territorial or political regions. Examples ofadministrative regions are Regions I to XII and the NCR

c. 2 Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253Facts: In 1990, President Aquino issued E. O. No. 439 wherein she picked certain provinces and cities, some o

which did not participate in the inclusion to the ARMM, to the reorganized to new regions (e.g. Misamis Occidental, whichdid not participate in the ARMM plebiscite, was transferred from Region X to Region XI). Aquino issued said E. Opursuant ant R. A. 6734, which says: That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in suitable plebiscites shall beincluded in the ARMM. The provinces and cities which plebiscite no vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shalremain in the existing administrative regions. Provided however, that the President may, by administrative determinationmerge existing regions. James Chiongbian, a Sultan Kudarat congressman, filed a certiorari prohibition to protest the EO., claiming that President Aquino had no power to reorganize administrative regions because said provision in R. A6734 1) also states that provinces, cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shallremain the existing administrative regions 2) the Constitution does not expressly provide the President the power tomerge administrative regions; in fact Art. 10, Sec. 10 of the Constitution (see II of your outline) prohibits this and 3) evengranting that the President is allowed to merge administrative regions, there is law setting standard on how it is to bedone.

Held: Chiongbian is wrong. Reasons:1) The sentence shall remain in the existing administrative regions, is further qualify by the phrase, Provided

however that the President may, by administration determination merge the existing regions.2) Past legislation, particularly R. A. 5345 issued in 1968, authorized the President the help of a Commission on

Reorganization, to reorganize the different example departments including administrative regions. This showsthat traditional power to reorganize administrative regions has always been lodged in the President

3) The standard is found in R. A. 5345 which states to promote simplicity, economic efficiency in thegovernment to enable it to pursue programs consistent with no goals for accelerated social and economicdevelopment and to improve service transaction of the public business.

D. Read R. A. 6766 (Organic Act for Cordillera Autonomous Region of 1989)

This Act provides for creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) shall consist of the cities and provincesthat shall vote favorable in a plebiscite pursuant ant 10, Sec. 18 of the Constitution. Those cities and provinces areBenguet, Ifugao, Muslim Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio

The Act consists of the following pertinent articles:1) Guiding principles and policies similar to that of Art. 2 of the 1987 Constitution

2) Vesting of legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly; executive power Cordillera governor with a deputygovernor as well; creation of indigenous special courts whose decisions are final and executory but subject tothe original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

3) Creation of a Regional Commission on Appointments4) Measures to protect and develop the ancestral lands and ancestral domains of indigenous cultura

communities as well as the national economy and patrimonyThe rest of its provisions are roughly similar to the Organic Act for ARMM (see11-c) CAR never came toexistence. Only Ifugao province voted in favor of CAR, so the Supreme Court in Ordillo v. COMELEC ruled thatIfugao could no constitute itself into the CAR>

d. 1 Ordillo v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100Facts: CAR Regional Assembly member Alexander Ordillo raised the question in his petition on whether the

province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the CAR, can alone legally and validlyconstitute such region.

Held: Ordillos petition is meritorious. Reasons:1) Statutory construction of Art. X, Sec. 15 of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word region is to be made

up of more than one constituent unit2) Section 2 or R. A. 6766 says The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary fo

the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, barangays and municipalities within theCAR. Therefore, Congress could not have intended that only a single province would constitute CAR

3) It would be illogical for Ifugao to have 2 sets of officials, one for Ifugao and one for the CAR, when Ifugao isthe only member of the CAR

d. 2 Cordillera Board Coalitions v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 495Facts: Pending the convening of Congress after President Aquino was swept into power in 1986, she issued E.

O. 220 which petitioner Cordillera Board Coalitions claimed created the CAR, thus preempting the constitutional mandate


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that Congress shall be the one to pass an Organic Act providing for the creation of CAR. Petitioner also questions theconstitutionality of the CAR as it runs contrary to Article 10, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution (See 11-1). Finally petitioneclaims the CAR will interfere with the local autonomy of individual cities and provinces in general.

Held: Cordillera Board Coalition is wrong. Reasons:1. The presumption of constitutionality of laws shall be applied in the case. E. O. 220 was actually envisioned to

consolidate and coordinate the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in theareas covered by the CAR as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordillera. It was not intended to preempCongress

2. CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial or political subdivision. It is in the same genre as anadministrative region for the purpose of coordinating the planning and implementation of program and services in thecovered areas. Thus no new territorial or political subdivision was created or merged with another.

3. Local autonomy is administrative autonomy. In the case of CAR and Muslim Mindanao, they are granted bothadministrative and political autonomy. Petitioner has failed to show specifically how the creation of administrative regionswill interfere with local autonomy.

d. 3 E.O. 459 dated May 17, 1991This E. O. is entitled Devolving to the Autonomous Region Government of the Autonomous region in Muslim

Mindanao Certain Powers of the DECS, the Control and Supervision Over Its Offices in the Region and for other Offices.The E. O. aims to implement Sec. 1, Article XV of R. A. 6734 which states that, The Autonomous Region shall

establish, maintain and support a complete and integrated system of quality education and adopt an educationaframework that is meaningful, relevant and responsive to the needs, aspirations and ideals of the people in the region.

To this end, the Regional Government is made responsible for the regional educational framework of the ARMMsuch as formulating and implementing programs to improve education in general in the region.

E. Read R. A. 7901, dated Feb. 23, 1995(Creating the CARAGA Administrative Region)

This Act is entitled An Act Creating Region 13 to be known as the CARAGA Administrative Region, and ForOther Purposes. It consists of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur andthe cities of Butuan and Surigao. The Act also transfers Sultan Kudarat to Region 11.

F. Local Government Unit DefinedDefinition: A political subdivision of the state constituted by law and possessed a substantial control over its own

affairs.Supporting Definition: The LGU is autonomous in the sense that it is given more power authority, responsibilities

and resources remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of a sovereign nation, but no intended to be an imperium inimperia state within a statef. 1 Alvarez v. Guingona, Jr. 252 SCRA 695

Facts: Senator Heherson Alvarez, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with prayer TRO and preliminary prohibitoryinjunction assailing R. A. 7720, Said R. A. provides for a conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into a City

Alvarez said the municipality of Santiago failed to meet the requirement of Sec. 450 of the LGC that, for a municipality tobecome a component city, it must have an annual income of P20M. The reason is that in the computation of the averageannual income, the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) should have been deducted from the total income. Instead, theIRAs were added to the total income.

Held: Alvarez is wrong. IRAs are the local government units rightful share to the national taxes. Section 450(c) othe LGC provides that the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive ofspecial funds, transfers, and any recurring income. IRAs are a regular, recurring source of income; they are not speciafunding transfers since Sec. 17(g) of the LGC gives a technical description for the IRA for purposes of the LGC

G. Local Autonomy explained1. Autonomy either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power (Limbona v. Mangelin)2. Decentralization of Administration Occurs when the central government delegate administrative powers to politicasubdivision in order to broaden the basic government power and in the process to make local government moreresponsive accountable and Ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities make them more effectivepartners in the pursuit of national development and progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of thebureau managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate or national concerns (Supra)3. Decentralization of power An abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared to beautonomous. In that case the local government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimumintervention from central government authorities. According to a constitution author (Father Bernas) decentralization ofpower amounts to self-immolation since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to thecentral authorities but to its own constituency (Supra)


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4. Local Autonomy, Philippine Concept The national government does not completely relinquish all its power over locagovernments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to politicasubdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the locallevels. In turn, economic, political and social developments at the smaller political units are expected to propel social andeconomic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as whole the programs and policies effectedlocally mustbe integrated and coordinate towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country stillies in the President and Congress. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc., municipal governments are still agents othe national government (Pimentel v. Aguirre)5. Fiscal autonomy Local government have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to theirequitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to the allocate theirresources in accordance with their own priorities.

g. 1 Malonzo, et, al v. Zamora, et, al 311 SCRA 224NOTE: Dates and peso figures are crucial to this case.Facts: In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City issued Ordinance No. 0168, authorizing Caloocan

City mayor Macario Asistio Jr. to initiate expropriation proceedings for lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate owned by the CLTRealty Development Corp. An amount of P39, 352,047.75 was appropriated for this purpose. CLT however countered withan interpleaded and prayer for TRO on August 6, 1997, on the ground that Maysilo estate actually straddled bothCaloocan City and the municipality of Malabon; therefore the Caloocan City and Malabon municipal governments shouldbe restrained and CLT must interplead and litigate among themselves their conflicting rights to claim such taxes.

In the meantime, the voluntary sale of the CLT property failed to push through so the city government field a suitfor eminent domain against CLT on March 23, 1998.

Some months afterwards, Rey Malonzo became mayor of Caloocan City. The expropriation of the CLT property

was then declared discontinued, thus the appropriation of P50M for the budgetary item Expropriation of properties couldnow be reverted for use in supplement budget. Ordinance No. 0254 was then passed appropriating an amount of P39,343,028.00 for the immediate repair of offices and hiring of additional personnel.

Because of this, the office of the President (OP), acting on an administrative complaint filed against Malonzo etal., were adjudged guilty of misconduct and meted the penalty of suspension. Malonzos refuted the decision, claimingthat 1) the interpleader filed by CLT was an unavoidable discontinuance of the expropriation project; thus the amount ofP39, 352,047.00 could be reverted into savings and 2) said amount was could be denominated as Expropriation ofProperties and classified under Current Operating Expenditures. The OP countered that the amount of P39, 352,047.75was a capital outlay that must be spent for the project it is intended for, thus under Sec. 322 of the LGC it could not bereverted into savings for another use 2) the filling of the interpleader could not be considered as an unavoidablediscontinuance since months after the interpleader, the Caloocan City government even filed an expropriation case for theCLT property 3) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, at the time of passing Ordinance No. 0254 did not adopt new or updatedrules of procedure for the current year; this was shown by the hurried passage in one day of the said ordinance and 4) the

appropriation of P50M for Expropriation of Properties actually did not exist this was merely a subterfuge by Malonzo todip his hands into the P39, 352. 017.75 intended for the CLT property expropriation project.

Held: Malonzo is correct. Reasons:1) During the oral arguments and pleadings, it was clear that the amount of

P39, 352, 017.75 and whether it was a capital outlay or continuing appropriation was not the issue; rather the issue wasthe budgetary item Expropriation of Properties wherein the amount of P50M was appropriated for said use but was laterdiscontinued, and later on, an amount of P39, 313, 028.00 from the P50M was appropriated for office repair and othermiscellaneous expenses. Malonzos explanation that the P50M was not intended for the purchase of CLT property but forexpenses incidental to expropriation, such as relocation of squatters, appraisal fee, etc. was believed by the Court. (Sowhat happened to the P39, 352, 047.75, if Malonzos explanation is to be believed? Justice Kapunan and 2 othersdissented, believing the OPs argument that there was actually no P50M existing to fund the Expropriation of Propertiesitem. In fact, Malonzo used the nonexistent P50M appropriation as a cover-up to illegally spend the P32, 352, 047.75 forepair of offices and hiring of personnel. Can you say kickback?)

2) The failure to adopt new or updated rules of procedure of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as mandated by Sec50 and 52 of the LGC is not intended to paralyze said Sanggunian from doing its job. An interpretation of Sec. 50 and 52of the LGC that will avoid inconvenience and absurdity must be adopted, thus the OPs contention is mistaken.

g. 2 Sec. 1, Chapter 1, Title XII, E. O. 292Declaration of policy. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. For this purpose, it shall

provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralizationThe allocation of powers and resources to loose government units shall be promoted and inter-local government groupingconsolidation a coordination of resources shall be encouraged. The state shall guarantee the local government units their

just share in national taxes and their equitable shares in proceeds from the use natural resources, and afford them widerlatitude for resource generation.


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g. 3 Pimentel v. Aguirre, G. R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000Facts: In 1997, President Ramos issued A. O. No. 372 which caught the ire of Senator Aquilino Pimentel because

of certain 2 provisions which state 1) All government departments and agencies, including state universities and collegesgovernment-owned and controlled corporation and local government units will identify and implement measures in FY1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation for non-personalservice items, along the following suggested areas and 2) Pending of assessment and evaluation of the DevelopmentBudget Coordinating Committee of the emergency fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the Internal Revenue

Allotment (IRA) to LGUs shall be withheld. Pimentel claims that both provisions do not comply with Section 284 of LGC,which provides for the 4 requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters 1) an unmanaged publicsector deficit of the national government 2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives and the presidents of various local leagues 3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries ofthe DOF, DILG and DBM and 4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection ofnational internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Specially, Pimentel claims that there wasno showing that there was actually an unmanaged public sector deficit and that there was no consultations conducted withthe different leagues of local governments.

Held: Pimentel is partly correct. Reasons:1. The Supreme Court is prepared to believe the Solicitor Generals assurance that the first provision above

stated is merely an advisory or guiding policy for local executives to follow, thus local autonomy is not interfered upon.2. The second provision is violative of local fiscal autonomy because its basic feature, the automatic release of

the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue, is missing. This is mandated in Article 10, Sec. 6 of the ConstitutionFurthermore, Section 286 of the LGC provides that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within 5 daysafter every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the nationa

government for whatever purpose. The withholding of 10% of the IRA is definitely a holdback.

H. Public Corporation definedDefinition 1: Those formed or organized for the government of a portion of the State (Act 1459, Sec.2)Definition 2: Those corporations created by the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of itsown public works (Eliot, Mun. Corp. p. 1)

I. Essential Elements of a Municipal Corporation1) A legal creation or incorporation2. A corporate name by which the artificial personality or legal entity is known and in which all corporation acts aredone.3) Inhabitants constituting the population who are invested with the political and corporate powers which are

executed through duly constituted officers and agents;4) a place or territory within which the local civil government and corporate functions are exercised (Martin, PubCorp., 1971)

J. Two fold character of a municipal corporation; its significance1) Government the municipal corporation is an agent of the State for the government of the territory and theinhabitants within the municipal limits. The municipal corporation exercises by delegation a part of the sovereigntyof the State.2) Private the MC acts in a similar category as a business corporation, performing functions not strictlygovernment or political. The MC stands for the community in the administration of local affairs w/c is whollybeyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred

K. What is Federalism?Definition: A system in which political power is divided between a central (national) government and smallergovernment units.

Supporting Definition: The central government is often called the federal government and the smaller units, states orprovinces. In a true federal system, citizens owe their loyalty directly to

the central government, even though they live in states or provinces. The central government has direct authority over thepeople concerning powers granted to it in the constitution.

III. CREATION AND ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

Sec. 6, LGC: Authority to create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created dividedmerged, abolished or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a provincecity, municipality or any other political subdivision of by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or


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Sangguniang Panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to suchlimitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.

A.Requisites for creation of Local Government Units1. Income. It must be sufficient based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities

and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the LGU concerned.2. Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants of the within the territorial jurisdiction of the

LGU concerned.3. Land Area. It must be contiguous unless it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by an LGU independen

of the other properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basicservices and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be arrested by the Department of Finance, the NSO and the LandManagement Bureau of the DENR.

B. Decided cases:b. 1 Pelaez V. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569Facts: In 1964, President Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 new municipalities, mainly in Northern

Luzon and Mindanao. The President based his power from Sec. 68 of the Revised Penal Code of 1917. Vice PresidentEmmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, restraininghim from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive order and/or anydisbursement by said municipalities.

Pelaez contends that: 1) Sec 68 of the Revised Administration Code has been impliedly repealed by R.A 2370,

the Barrio Charter Act. 2) Sec. 68 is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and 3) Sec. 68 can allowthe president to interfere in local government affairs.

Held: Pelaez is correct. Reasons:1. The Barrio Charter Act states that barrios may not be created nor their boundaries altered or their names

changed except by act of Congress of the corresponding municipal board upon petition of the majority of voters in theareas affected and the recommendation of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated Thisimplies that if the President cannot create barrios, what more municipalities? (But I think this is not a very good argumentcoz its implying way too much).

2. A law must be: a) Complete in itself so that there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to implement thestatute and b) Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable The standard set by Sec. 68 is as the publicwelfare may require This standard, in relation to the law in question, is so broad that is virtually unfettered.

3. The creation of Municipal Corporation is essentially legislative in character. If the president can create

municipalities, situations may arise where he can submit local officials to his dictation by creating a new municipality andincluding therein the barrio wherein the officials preside, thus said officials positions would suddenly becomes vacantThe power of control by the president over local government is denied by the 1935 Constitution

b. 2 Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727Facts: B.P. No. 885 was passed allowing for the creation of the province of Negros del Norte on the Island of

Negros. Petitioner Patricio Tan claimed that B.P. no 885 violated Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution which states: Noprovince, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered,except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majorityof the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Specifically, the remaining areas in the province of NegrosOccidental were not allowed to participate in the plebiscite for the creation of Negros del Norte. Petitioner also claims theproposed province of Negros del Norte failed to meet the requirements of Sec. 197 of the LGC of 1983, specially that afuture province must have at least an area of 3,500 sq. km. Negros del Norte, Petitioner avers, is actually only 2,856.56 sqkm. Respondent claims the issue was already rendered moot and academic as the new province of Negros del Norte wasalready proclaimed. Moreover, the area of Negros del Norte is really 4,019.95 sq km, since the waters falling under the

jurisdiction and control of Negros del Norte must be included in the total area of the province.

Held: Tan is correct. The plebiscite is declared null and void Reasons:1) The phrase subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected

must be construed to mean that the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed toparticipate in the said plebiscite. The reason is that cities belonging to Negros Occidental will be added to Negros deNorte, thus Negros Occidentals land area will be dismembered. Certainly, the people of Negros Occidental should havebeen allowed to vote in the plebiscite as they are directly affected by the diminution in land size of their province.

2) A reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC of 1983 says. The territory neednot be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands. The use of the word territory clearly reflects that the law refers only


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to the land mass and excludes the waters over which the political unit has control. In other words, Negros del Norte failedto meet the required land area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a province.

b. 3 Paredes v. Executive Secretary 128 SCRA 6Facts: By virtue of B.P. Blg 56, certain barangays in the municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao held a plebiscite to

determine whether they want to constitute themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Governor Zosimo Paredeset. al. however claimed that the rest of the barangays on Mayoyao should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite byvirtue of Art. XI, Sec of the 1973 Constitution as the other barangays are also affected by the creation of the municipalityof Aguinaldo.

Held: Paredes is wrong. Presumption of constitutionality should be applied in this case. B.P. Blg. 56 is a reflection olocal autonomy on the part of the barangay wanting to constituent themselves into a new municipality. Said barangaysshould be given leeway in becoming self-reliant communities. Moreover, the people in said barangays are the ones whowill constitute the new municipality of Aguinaldo, not the other barangays of Mayoyao excluded from B.P. Blg. 56

b. 4 Mun. of Candijay, Bohol v. Ca 251 SCRA 182Facts: The municipality of Candijay petitioned the RTC of Tagbilaran, Bohol, claiming that its boundary line actually

covered barrio Pagahat, since the municipality of Alicia claims to have current territorial jurisdiction over said barrio. TheRTC awarded Pagahat to Candijay Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Alicia on the groundsthat 1) applying the rule of equiponderance of evidence (a principle in Civil Procedure) with Candijay as plaintiff and Aliciaas defendant in the lower court, the court must rule in favor of the defendant. The equiponderance of evidence rule statesWhere the scale shall stand upon equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or theother, the court will find for the defendant. Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and

not on the weakness of defendants claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendantthere is no preponderance of evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.In this case, both municipalities failed to satisfactorily back their claims that they owned barrio Pagahat: and 2) ifCandijays boundary line claim was true, then not only would they claim Pagahat but also other certain barrios as well,which would as a result, certainly expand Candijays territory far beyond than what the law allows her, Candijay petitionedis review on certiorari with the SC, claiming that 1) the CA misapplied the equiponderance of evidence rule and 2) themunicipality of Alicia had no juridical personality, having been created under avoid E.O. ( E.O. No.265) since Sec. 68 ofthe RAC of 1917 from which the said E.O. derived its authority, was declared unconstitutional in Pelaez v. AuditionGeneral (See III-b 1).

Held: The Municipality of Candijay is incorrect Reasons:1. The SC sees no need in reviewing the equiponderance rule as it was not arrived whimsically or capriciously by the

CA

2. The Municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of E.O. 265 in 1949. 16 years late when Pelaez v. Auditor Generawas promulgated. And yet even after, various government acts, most notably the recognition by the 1987 Constitution ofAlicia as one of the 20 municipalities of the Third District of Bohol, indicate the States recognition and acknowledgemenof the existence thereof. Alicia therefore, can claim the benefits of Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC of 1991 which statesMunicipal District organized pursuant to presidential issuances and E.O. and which have their respective set of municipaofficials holding officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regularmunicipalities. Sec. 442 (d) is therefore a curative law in favor of Alicia. The objection against it being a municipalcorporation should have been done before the LGC was enacted in 1991.

b. 5 Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr. 265 SCRA 182NOTE: Dates in this case are important because essentially Jimenez lost on account of the slow wheels of justiceFacts: In 1949, President Quirino issued E.O. 258, creating the municipality of Sinacaban in the Province of

Misamis Occidental. In 1988 by virtue of said E.O. Sinacaban filed a claim with the provincial Board of Misamis Occidentaagainst the municipality of Jimenez territorial possession of about 5 barrios. Jimenez in its reply with the provincial Boardthat same year and later on with the RTC in 1990, said that Sinacaban had no juridical personality to file a suit because itwas created under a void E.O. as promulgated in Pelaez Auditor General and 2) the disputed barrios belong to Jimenezsince in 1950 the municipalities entered into an agreement duly approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidentaback then which recognized Jimenezs jurisdiction over the disputed barrio in 1992, the RTC ruled in favor of Sinacabanusing as its basis the curative benefits of Sec. 2 of the LGC of 1991. Angrily, Jimenez added in its petition with theSupreme Court the RTCs decision was null and void because it failed to decide the case within one year mandated bythe LGC of 1983 and the Constitution.

Held: Jimenez is incorrect Reasons:1. Sinacaban can claim the benefits of Sec.442 (d) of the LGC of 1991, since various government acts through

the years after the Pelaez case of 1965 indicate the recognition by the years after the Pelaez case 1965 indicate the


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recognition by the state of the municipality of Sinacaban, most notably when the 1987 Constitution recognized Sinacabanas part of the 2

ndDistrict of Misamis Occidental.

2. Whatever agreement Sinacaban and Jimenez entered into 1950 must still conform with the territorial metes andbounds set forth in E.O. 258, otherwise the agreement in void (A relocation survey was ordered but the results of thesurvey was not stated in the case)

3. Even granting that the RTC was deliberately slow, its decision is not rendered void. The only remedy left wouldbe to file administrative sanctions against it.

b. 6 Mendenilla v. Onandia 5 SCRA 536Facts: In 1954, the mayor of the municipality of Legaspi appointed Emilio Mendenilla as Chief of Police. Then, in

1959, Congress passed R.A. 2234 converting the municipality of Legaspi into the City of Legaspi R.A. 2234 provides thatthe position of Chief of Police of the city of Legaspi is to be appointed by the President. Therefore, when Jose ManuelOnandia was appointed by the President City Chief of Police, Mendenilla assailed the legality of such a move, claimingthat his position as chief of police was not abolished when Legaspi was converted from a city to a municipality 2) UndeR.A. 557 his employment status as Chief of Police may not be abolished except in the manner specified in R.A. 557 and3) The Civil Service Law guarantees his security of tenure.

Held: Mendenilla is incorrect Reasons:1. The position of Chief of Police of a municipality is totally different from the position of the Chief of Police of a cityTherefore, R.A. 2234 abolished the position of municipality Chief of Police and replaced it with a city Chief of police. Insupport of this contention, the Supreme Court cited Sec. 96, Article XVII of the charter which provides that the City Mayothe Vice Mayor, etc. are allowed to continue in office upon the effectivity of the charter until the expiration of their terms inoffice. Nowhere does it mention the Chief of Police in the said list of officials. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

2. Notwithstanding both R.A. 557 and the Civil Service Law, it is within the legal competence of Congress to enact R.A2234. Congress has the plenary power to make laws, meaning its power to make any kind of law is, in theory, unlimited.

Quiz: If the municipality of a municipal judge is converted into a city, can the judge continue to serve in the new city?Answer: Yes. A judge is not a municipal official. He does not derive his power or his appointment from a city charter; hederives them from the Constitution and other Laws.

b. 7 Mathay v. CA 320 SCRA 703NOTE: Dont confuse CSU with CSCFacts: During his term, Mayor Brigido Simon appointed 16 people to positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU) of

the local government of Quezon City. Simons authority to appoint was based upon P.D. 51. The Secretary of Justicerendered an Opinion, stating that P.D. 51 was never published in the Gazette, therefore, conformably with the Tanada v.

Tuvera ruling P.D. 51 never became law at all. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) thus ordered the revocation of allappointments in the CSU. However, the effects of such revocation were temporarily cushioned when the city councilissued an ordinance creating the Department of Public Order and Safety (DPOS). All present personnel of the CSU, thesaid ordinance stated are to be absorbed into the DPOS.

However, the regular positions in the DPOS never got filled due to insufficient number of said positions and lackof funds.

Simon and later on his successor, Mayor Ismael Mathay, remedied the situation by offering the CSU personnecontractual appointment. When Mathay refused to renew their appointments, the CSU personnel complained to the CSCThe CSC replied by issuing resolutions ordering the CSU personnel reinstated. Mathay now asserts that the CSC cannotorder him to reinstate the said personnel as it is. In effect, giving the appointing power he possesses, as city Mayor to theCSC.

Held: Mathay is correct. Reasons:1) First of all, the law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old LGC and not the LGC of 1991 since the material events o

the case took place during the time of the old LGC.2) Under B.P. 337, the power to appoint rests in the local chief executive in the case the Mayor. When the city

council issued the ordinance allowing for the absorption of CSU personnel into the DPOS, it specifically made use of thewordings Present Personnel and not positions, thus the city council arrogated upon itself the appointing power bydictating who shall occupy the DPOS positions. Even in the local government level, the separation of powers must berespected.

3) The reasoning in no. 2 also applies to the CSC. The CSC claims that by virtue of the ordinance enacted by thecity council, the CSU personnel became regular employees and such they have gained the protection of the Civil ServiceLaw. Such reasoning is wrong because in the first place the CSU never existed at all, thus they were never part of theCivil Service to begin with. Thus when Simon and later on Mathay offered them contractual appointments, they were atthe mercy of the appointing power of the said mayors, as they have the option not to renew their appointments


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b. 8 Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53Facts: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City. Quezon

City councilor Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to incomeland area and population of Novaliches were not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 85352) a certification attesting to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation oNovaliches city in terms of income, land area and population, was also not presented 3) a copy of the petition ofconcerned barangays calling or the creation of City of Novaliches was not presented to the Quezon City Council, asmandated by the Implementing Rules of the LGC, 1991 and 4) R.A. 8535 failed to specify the seat of government of theproposed City of Novaliches as mandated by Sec. 11 (a) of the LGC, 1991.

Held: Samson is wrong. Reasons:1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case, meaning that Samson has burden o

proof to show that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional. Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were presentedduring the deliberations. And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the representatives of the DOF,NSO, DENR and even Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the deliberations. The official statementsattesting to the income, land area and population of Novaliches could serve the certifications contemplated by law

2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to the creation of the City ofNovaliches, he would be the first representative to do so. But he didnt.

3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City ofNovaliches is not fatal as such petition is meant only to inform the QC council of such creation. With the mass mediapublicizing the creation of the city of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed creation

4. The failure of R.A.8535 to provide a seat of government for Novaliches is not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGCprovides that a government center shall be established by the LGU as far as practicable. Government centers can also

serve as seats of government.5. The fact that the City of Novaliches was not included among the 17 cities and municipalities listed in the

ordinance attached to the 1987 constitution does not mean that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order forNovaliches to become a city. The ordinance attached to the Constitution merely apportions the seat of the House ofRepresentatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall beforever composed of 17 cities and municipalities.

NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite held for that purpose

C. How are existing sub-provinces converted to provinces?

* Sec. 10 LGC: Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration oboundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the voted cast in a plebiscite called for the purposein the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days from the

date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless the law or ordinance fixes another date.

* Sec. 462 LGC: Existing Sub-provinces Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces uponapproval of the voters cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub provinces and the original provinces directly affectedThe plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity othis code.

The new legislative district created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress bythe duly elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new province or districts were created unit theiown representative shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualified

The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to holdoffice until June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resultingfrom expiration of resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case of negative votes in the plebiscite results, shalbe filled by appointment by the President. The appointees shall hold office until their successors shall have been electedin the regular local elections following the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such conversion,the President shall fill up the position of governor of the newly created province through appointment if none has yet beenappointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall also appoint a vice governor and other members of theSanggunian Panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office unit their successors shall have been elected in the nextlocal election and qualified.

All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of theirconversion into regular provinces shall continue in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulation.

C 1. Grino v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672Facts: Pursuant to Sec. 462, LGC, a plebiscite to determine whether the sub-province of Guimaras (its mother

province was Iloilo) wants to become a regular province was held simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. Theparticipants in the said plebiscite were the residents of Iloilo (except Iloilo city) and the 3 municipalities of GuimarasSurprisingly, the ballots issued in the said 3 municipalities did not provided any space for the election of governor, vice


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governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Iloilo. LDP Iloilo governor-candidateSimplicio Grino claims that the COMELEC erred in not allowing the said 3 municipalities to vote for the provincial officialsof Iloilo, since at the time of the plebiscite Guimaras was still a sub-province of Iloilo. Grino says if Guimaras voted forregular provincehood then there would have been no need for them at all to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo. Buwhat if Guimaras votes to remain as a sub-province? Should special election be held for the 3 municipalities so that theycan vote for the provincial official of Iloilo?

Held: Obviously, Grinos petition was rendered moot and academic when Guimaras voted to become regulaprovince. Besides its too late to undo what COMELEC has done. If Guimaras did vote to remain as a sub province,Grinos petition would have been meritorious.

D. Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city and reclassification (implementing Rules anregulations, LGC).

* Art 12 Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized citya) Requisites for conversion. A component city shall not be converted into a highly urbanized city unless the

following requirements are present:1. Income latest annual income of not less than P50M based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city

treasure. The annual income shall included the income accruing to the general fund exclusive of special funds, transfersand non-recurring income and

2. Population, which shall not be less than 200,000 inhabitants as certified by NSO.

b) Procedure for conversion:

1. Resolution. The interested component city shall submit to the office of the President a resolution of itsSanggunian adopted by a majority of all its members in a meeting duly called for the purpose, and approved andendorsed by the city mayor. Said resolution shall be accompanied by certifications as to income and population

2. Declaration of conversion. Within 30 days from receipt of such resolution, the President shall, after verifyingthat the income and population requirements have been met, declare the component city as highly urbanized

3. Plebiscite. Within 120 days from the declaration of the President or as specified in the declaration, theCOMELEC shall conduct a plebiscite in the city proposed to the converted such plebiscite shall be preceded by acomprehensive information campaign to be conducted by the COMELEC with the assistance of national and locagovernment officials, media, NGOs and other interested parties.

c) Effect of conversionThe conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make it independent of the province where i

is geographically located

Reclassification (See cases below and III-e)

d. 1 Ceniza v. COMELEC 95 SCRA 763Facts: on Dec. 22 1979, the interim Batasang Pambansa enacted B.P. Blg. 51 providing for local elections on Jan

30, 1980. Its section 3, the subject of controversy, reads as follows:xxx Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component comes in accordance with standard

established in the LGC as province for in Art XI, Sec 4 (1) of the Constitution. Any city now existing with an annual regulaincome derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less than P40M at the time of the approval of the act shall beclassified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they aregeographically located. xxx The registered voters may be entitled to voter in the election of the official of the province owhich that city is a component. If its charter so provides. However, voters in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabovedefined shall no participate nor vote in the election of the official of the province in which the highly urbanized city isgeographical located.

Robert Ceniza et.al. filed a case as tax payers and registered voters in the cities of Cebu ad Mandaue assailingSec. 3 Specially, they questioned the use of annual income of a given city as basis for classification of whether or not aparticular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may no participate in the election of provincial officials of theprovince in which the city is geographically located. Ceniza and his fellow goons claim Sec.3 regulates the exercise offreedom of suffrage and violates the equal protection of the law. Moreover, they attacked R.A. 5519 the law creating theCity of Mandaue, which went to effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in the plebiscite orreferendum. They particularly cited the charters provision denying Mandaue the right to participate in provincial elections.

Held: Ceniza et. at. is mistaken. Reasons:1. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of LGUs Corollary to independence

however, is the concomitant loss of right to participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective


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provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any government jurisdiction and authority oversaid city.

2. Regular annual income of a given city is substantial distinction for classification. The revenue of a city wouldshow whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent economic, social and politicaunit. Thus, the equal protection of the laws in not violated.

3. Freedom of suffrage is not imperiled since the Constitution does not give the city voter the right to participate inprovincial elections for territorial reasons

4. The city of Mandaue came into existence. In 1969, the constitutional requirement that the creation, alterationetc. of a city, province, etc. is subject to a plebiscite only came into being when the 1973 Constitution was enacted andtherefore cannot be applied retroactively.

d. 2 Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106Facts: Robert Tobias, et. al. invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong City, assailed the

constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, known as An act Converting the City of Mandaluyong into a Highly urbanized cityknown as the City of Mandaluyong. They cited, among others, Art. VIll, Sec. 49 of R.A. 7675, which provides that As ahighly urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to beelected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of SanJuan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at thesame region Said provision Tobias claims is not germane to the title of R.A. 7675 thus being contrary to the one title-onesubject rule since it creates a legislative district whereas the title expressly provides only for the conversion ofMandaluyong into highly urbanized city. Also, Tobias, et. al. contend that the people of san Juan should have been madeto participate in the plebiscite as the same involves a change in their legislative district.

Held: Tobias, et.al. are grossly erroneous Reasons:1. The creation of a new legislative district is a natural logical consequence of its conversion into a highly

urbanized city.2. The contention that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A.

7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district is benefit of merit. The reason is that the principle subjectinvolved I the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate districtrepresentation was only ancillary thereto. Thus the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the saidplebiscite as they have nothing to do with the changed in status of neighboring Mandaluyong. (This argument is rathestrange for me).

d.3 Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603Facts: On May 5, 1994 R.A. 7720 was passed converting the municipality of Santiago, Isabel into an independen

component city. On Feb 14, 1998 R.A. 8528 was passed amending R.A. 7720 on 2 points: 1 Sec. 2 of R.A. 7720 is

hereby amended by deleting the words, an independent so that the municipality of Santiago will be converted into acomponent city only and 2) the voters of Santiago could now vote again for the provincial officials of the province oIsabela. Jose Miranda, the mayor of Santiago and other petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. 8528. He saysthat said law lacks the provision requiring that the plebiscite be held for its ratification. Alexander Aguirre, the ExecutiveSecretary and other respondents on the other hand countered that (1) Miranda et. al. had no standing to file their petition2) the issue is a political question and 3) R.A. 8528 did not created divide, etc or after any boundaries of Santiago imerely reclassified Santiago from an independent component city into a component city.

Held: Aguirre and his cohorts are gravely mistaken. Reasons:1. Miranda had standing, he field the petition in his capacity as mayor of Santiago.2. The issue is justiciable, Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. 8528, since it runs contrary to article X,

Sec 10 of the 1987 Constitution. The court has the power to decide the constitutionality of any law.3. The reclassification will downgrade Santiagos status from an independent component city into a component

city. Far reaching changes will then take place. Its political independence will diminish. The city mayor will be placedunder the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. Ordinance and resolution passed by the city council oSantiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabel. Taxes collected by the city would then be shared withthe province. All these changes merit the need of a plebiscite so that the people at Santiago can air their side on theissue. Moreover, if a plebiscite can be held for the upgrading of an LGU, should not a plebiscite be held for itsdowngrading as well?

NOTE: Mendozas strong dissent was anchored on Art. X Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution. Said section refers toalteration of boundaries of Santiago were substantially altered nor any of its income, population or land area beenradically changes Santiago was neither recreated into another LGU nor abolished, much less its boundaries alter. (Thisgood justice is implying the reclassification was administrative in nature.

E. Classification of provinces, cities and municipalities (Read E.O. 349)


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This act is entitled providing for a new income classification of provinces, cities and other municipalities Pertinentprovisions include:

Sec. 1. Classification of provinces and cities. Provinces and cities except Manila and Quezon City, which shall beconsidered as special class cities, are hereby divided into 6 main classes according to the annual average income theyactually realized during the last 4 calendar years immediately preceding as follows: a) First class P30M or more bSecond class P20M-P30M; c) Third class P15M-P20M; d) Fourth class P10M-15M, e) Fifth class P5M-10-M; f) Sixth classless than P5M

Sec. 2. Classification of Municipalities x x x according to the annual average income they actually realized during thelast 4 calendar years immediately preceding as follows; a) First class, P15M or more b) second class, P10M-15M c) Thirdclass, P5M-10M d) fourth class P3M-P5M e) Fifth class, P1M-3M f) Sixth Class, less than P1M.

Sec. 3. Period of General Reclassification of Province, Cities and Municipalities. Upon the effectivity of this E.O. andfor each period of 4 consecutive calendar years thereafter, the Secretary of Finance shall reclassify the all provinces,cities, except Manila and Quezon City, Which shall remain as special class cities, and municipalities, on the basis of theforegoing schedules of the average annual income of each province, city or municipality derived during the last 4consecutive calendar years immediately such reclassification according to the provisions hereof.

Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. As used this E.O.a. Annual Income revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the

local general and infrastructure funds including the internal revenue and specific tax allotments provided for in PDs 144and 436, both as amended but exclusive of non-recurring receipt, such as other national ads, grants, financial assistance

loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets and similar othersb. Average annual income- sum of the annual income- sum of the Annual Income as herein defined actually

obtained by a province, cities and municipalities.

Sec. 5 Use of income classification of provinces, cities, and municipalities. xxx as basis for: a) Fixing of maximum taxceiling imposable by the local government b) Determination of statutory and administrative aids, Financial grants andother forms of assistance to local government c) Establishment of salary scales and rates of allowances per diems, andother emoluments that local government officials and personnel may be entitled to d) Implementation of personnel policieson promotions, transfers, details or secondment, and related matters at the local government levels e) formulation andexecution of local government budget policies and f) Determination of the financial capability of local government units toundertake development programs and priority projects

NOTE: There are 7 more sections, mainly on salaries and taxes- you know, ways to put more money into thepocket of our bureaucrats

F. Settlement of boundary disputes( Sec. 118, LGC, Sec 15-19, IRR)* Section 118. Judicial Responsibility for settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary dispute between and among

LGUs shall, as much as possible. Be settled amicably. To this end:a. Boundary disputes involving 2 or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for

settlement to the Sangguniang Panlungsod Sangguniang Bayan concerned.b. Boundary disputes involving 2 or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlemen

to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned.c. Boundary dispute involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for

settlement to the Sangguniang of the province concerned.d. Boundary dispute involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the

other or 2 or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective Sangguniang of theparties

e. In the event the Sangguniang fails to present an amicable settlement within 60 days from the date the disputewas referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter the dispute shall be

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Public Corporation Ulep Notes[1]