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G.R. No. L-45685 December 22, 1937THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,s.OSE O. VERA, Judge ad interim of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.olicitor-General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.

De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orence and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for the respondent Cu Unjieng.No appearance for respondent Judge.

AUREL, J.: After rendition of the judgment of this court in the above-entitled case, the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, on November 26,937, gave notice of his intention to petition the Supreme Court of the United State for a writ of certiorari for the review of said

udgment and, desiring to stay execution during the pendency of the application for the writ and of the proceedings relative thereton the Supreme Court of the United State, now prays that the corresponding supersedeas bond be fixed, as provided by the rulesf this court. The People of the Philippines and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, petitioners in the above-entitledase, oppose the application of the respondent for the granting of a supersedeas bond.

The original action instituted in this court which resulted in the declaration of unconstitutionality of the Probation Act (No. 4221 )was for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, thru counsel, states that as certiorari and prohibition are civilemedies, it is mandatory upon this court to stay enforcement of its judgment in the above-entitled case. (Sec. 46 [a] infra , Rulef the Supreme Court of the Philippines.) He also calls attention to the principle that probation can not be granted after theefendant has begun the service of his sentence and to the policy of this court to encourage review of its decisions and judgmentsn certiorari by the Federal Supreme Court. In opposition, the petitioners state that the judgment of this court declaring therobation Act unconstitutional and void is self-executing; that there is no judgment in the instant proceedings to be executed and

hat the supersedeas will serve no useful purpose. The petitioner gave answer to the foregoing objections raised by theespondent and reiterated the arguments advanced by him in support of his petition for the fixing of the bond.ection 46 (a) of the rules of this court provides that:

Whenever it is made to appear by notice in writing that any party to a civil case in which final judgment has been renderedby this court intends to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari for the review of the decisionand judgment of his court, and it appears that the case is one which, by reason of the amount involved or the nature of thequestions of law presented, may be removed to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of certiorari , and it furthappears that the party intending to make application for such writ desires to stay the enforcement of the judgment of thiscourt during the pendency of the application for the writ of certiorari and of the proceeding in the Supreme Court of theUnited States, it such is granted, this court shall grant a stay, for a term not to exceed ten days, within which the movingparty may give a supersedeas bond, and shall designate one of its members to determine the sufficiency of such bond.

The foregoing rule requires that in any civil case in which final judgment has been rendered by this court, if any party thereto givesotice in writing of his intention to remove the case to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of certiorari , this court shalrant a stay for the period therein mentioned within which said party may give a supersedeas bond, the sufficiency of which is toe determined by one of the members of this court. It is admitted that certiorari and prohibition are civil remedies but the certior

nd prohibition proceedings originally instituted in this court were, like the proceedings for probation, an incident of the criminalase. Apart from this, it will be noted that the appeal taken is from the judgment of this court declaring the Probation Actnconstitutional and void. That judgment does not command or permit any act to be done. There is nothing there to be activelynforced by execution or otherwise. Because of its negative or prohibitive character, there is nothing to supersede; nothing, asetitioners assert, upon which the stay bond can operate. In reality, the supersedeas is intended to operate on the decision and

udgment in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippines Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng et al." The decision of theCourt of First Instance of Manila in that case, rendered on January 8, 1934 (Criminal Case No. 42649), was affirmed by this courtn March 26, 1935 (G.R. No. 41200), 1. The decision of this court in that criminal case has already become final and the petitionor a writ of certiorari to review said decision was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States in November of last year. Atottom, supersedeas is being sought to stay the execution of the final judgment in said criminal case. Thereby, the petitioner willontinue to be at large and this is the status quo desired to be maintained. We do not think that this should be allowed. (Sec. 46f], Rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippines.) The suspensive effect of supersedeas can only operate in this case on theudgment sought to be reviewed and cannot arrest the execution of the final judgment rendered in the criminal case against the

espondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. (Cyc. of Fed. Proc., Civil and Criminal, Longsdorf, vol. 6, sec. 2869, p. 362.)The public interest and the interest of the speedy administration of justice demand prompt execution of the final sentence ofonviction rendered against the petitioner. Said petitioner has had all the time and opportunity which the law can possibly afford tonyone in self-defense. He had the assistance of able counsel and opportunity to appeal to this court and the Supreme Court ofhe United States, and the least that can be said is that he must abide by this judgment and serve his term. It is further to bebserved that the petition for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has already by the trial court.

There is force in the argument that where the case is appealable under the Constitution and law to the Supreme Court of theUnited States, this court is but an agent of that court and must permit the case to take its due course. In such a case, the appeal is

matter of right. But from this premise it does not follow that a stay must be granted by this court where nothing can be stayed, orhat the final decision in a criminal case which can no longer be appealed from should be superseded. Upon the other hand, the


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wide latitude necessarily possessed by this court in the interpretation of its Rules must be exercised in favor of what is believed toe a matter of public interest in the present case.

As a rule of federal practice in the United States, section 8 cd. of the Act of Congress of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat., 936, 940; 28U.S.C.A., sec. 350), provides that in any case the execution and enforcement of final judgment or degree which is subject toeview by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of certiorari is discretionary with "a judge of the court rendering theudgment or decree or by the Justice of the Supreme Court," and this rule is reiterated in paragraph 6 of Rule 38 of the SupremeCourt of the United States. (Robertson & Kirkham, sec. 413, p. 831 et seq.) In Magnum Import Co. vs. De Spoturno Coty (262U.S., 159,163; 43 S. Ct., 531; 67 Law. ed., 922), the Supreme Court of the United States, though Chief Justice Taft,aid: lawphil.net

The petition should, in the first instance, be made to the circuit court of appeals, which, with its complete knowledge of thecases, may, with full consideration, promptly pass on it. That court is in a position to judge, first, whether the case is onelikely, under our practice, to be taken up by us on certiorari ; and, second, whether the balance of convenience requires asuspension of its decree and a withholding of its mandate. It involves no disrespect to this court for the circuit court ofappeals to refuse to withhold its mandate or to suspend the operation f its judgment or decree pending application forcertiorari to us. If it thinks a question involved should be ruled upon by this court, it may certify it. If it does not certify, itmay still consider that the case is one in which a certiorari may properly issue, and may, in its discretion, facilitate theapplication by witholding the mandate or suspend in its decree. If it refuses, this court requires an extaordinary showingbefore it will grant a stay of the decree below pending the application for a certiorari , and even after it has granted acertiorari , it requires a clear case and decided balance of convenience before it will grant such stay. These remarks, ofcourse, apply also to applications for certiorari to review judgments and decrees of the highest courts of states.

etition for stay of execution and the fixing of a supersedeas bond is denied. So ordered.Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

ootnotes 1 35 Off. Gaz., 738. See also resolutions of December 17, 1935.

EOPLE vs. VERACu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SCemanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he isnnocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office.

The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set forearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is iniolation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide aystem of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it isnly indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because SecArt 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and

his also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of thexecutive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.SSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. Theres undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act inarrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution andhe doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challengedection of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respectiverovincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincialiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation

Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probationwithin their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of theiright to probation.

G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and GRANDY N.TRIESTE, petitioners

s.THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents .CRUZ, J.:p n Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13,990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among theanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditionsaid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even theonfiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree toe imposed by the Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment became final andxecutory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.ubsequently, the following developments transpired:


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n a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged trafficiolation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.

On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who shouldnforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses,nd where they should file their complaints.

Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto, complaining against the confiscationf his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.

This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver'scense by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.till another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who alsorotested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center andhe confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.

Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, ofMandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for trafficiolations.or his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991,rom the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction underertain conditions.

Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office hadever authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance withhe above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Platesnd dated February 28, 1991.at. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not theonfiscation of driver's licenses.

On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach thecense plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in

Metro Manila."On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:

The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No.11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:

Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound . The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thruthe Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impoundattended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic inMetro Manila.

The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under theconditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against the confiscationby police authorities of driver's licenses for alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said

decision, not among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the Court resolved torequire the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit, within ten (10) days from noticehereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.

n its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to theowers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) theesponsibility among others of:

1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordinationor consolidation for the Authority; and2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application , approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, andexercise of its rule-making powers . (Emphasis supplied)

The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to

upplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid inhe absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that therdinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.or his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalidxercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, whichoes not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for trafficiolations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in thebsence of a formal challenge to its validity.

On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of the questioned sancti ons, toemove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which


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lso been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the caset bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6

But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity ofhe exercise of such delegated power.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, thects of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case nowefore us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipalorporations.

According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfairr oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable;nd 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. 7

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion becausehey do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates orhe confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the followingrovisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to imposeuch sanctions:

Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise disciplinedrivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations inMetropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed . For this purpose, thepowers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over suchviolations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When theproper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of public convenience the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revoke such license or certificate. Thesuspended or revoked driver's license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of publicconvenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the casemay be, for their records update.xxx xxx xxxSection 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period,reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 forthe first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver's license for the fifth offense: Provided, That theMetropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of itsordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in MetropolitanManila.

xxx xxx xxxSection 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall beimmediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state theviolation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the

city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or PhilippineVeterans Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket.If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan ManilaCommission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriateproceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver's licenseshall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges.

xxx xxx xxxSection 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules andregulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasissupplied).

n fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed toimpose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed,"

hat is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to bemposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's li censehall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local politicalubdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able toegislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to createheir own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what isalled the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but mustbey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,annot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.


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The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which wasnacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction.n Villacorta vs, Bemardo , 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative ofhe Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:

In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the enactment of thequestioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496,because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineerbefore the same is submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land RegistrationOffice or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the sameordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on aservice fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section3 of the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter lawdoes not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deedsallows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose a penaltyfor its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of theCity of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner additional conditions.

xxx xxx xxxThe Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt thesurreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already intimated above,the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shallimpede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated toa local ordinance.

We affirm.To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating nationallaws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements forthe issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; theexecution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom ofspeech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be uvires .

The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does notllow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.

We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception tohe general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic ruleslsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.

The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of theublic for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of moreeterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may

ttend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, theact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of suchenalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactmentsy virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.t is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directlyhrough a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without suchction, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under theonditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988 of the

Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except

when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic violations within the said area.

O ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.nd Romero, JJ., concur.

Nocon, J., took no part.

Footnotes1 En Banc 187 SCRA 432.2 Constitution, Article VHI, Section 5(5).3 84 Phil. 368.4 R.A. 7160, Title One, Chapter 2, Section 16.5 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569.


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6 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726.7 U.S. v. Abendan, 24 Phil. 165.8 Article X, Section 5.9 143 SCR.A 480.

G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007 THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the MetropolitanManila Development Authority, petitioners,s.

VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.--------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007 HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY andBAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners,s.

MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent.D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J .: The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court:

Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from bad to worse, from tolerable to critical.The number of people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied x x x ,1

ave remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day. Traffic jams continue to clog the streets of Metro Manila, bringingehicles to a standstill at main road arteries during rush hour traffic and sapping peoples energies and pa tience in the process.

The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the MetropolitanManila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los Santos AvenueEDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.pecifically challenged are two Orders issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch6 in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224.

The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005 ,2 which resolved a motion for reconsideration filed by herein respondents, declaredExecutive Order (E.O.) No. 179, hereafter referred to as the E.O., "unconstitutional as it constitutes an unreasonable exercise of

olice power." The second assailed Order of November 23, 20053

deni ed petitioners motion for reconsideration. The following facts are not disputed:

resident Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater ManilaMass Transport System," the pertinent portions of which read:

WHEREAS, Metro Manila continues to be the center of employment opportunities, trade and commerce of theGreater Metro Manila area;WHEREAS, the traffic situation in Metro Manila has affected the adjacent provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna,and Rizal, owing to the continued movement of residents and industries to more affordable and economicallyviable locations in these provinces;WHEREAS, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is tasked to undertake measures to easetraffic congestion in Metro Manila and ensure the convenient and efficient travel of commuters within its

jurisdiction;WHEREAS, a primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the

streets that impedes [sic] the flow of vehicles and commuters due to the inefficient connectivity of the differenttransport modes;WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals nowlocated along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transportsystem to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate theexisting transport modes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitateand ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different transport modes;WHEREAS, the national government must provide the necessary funding requirements to immediately implementand render operational these projects; and extent to MMDA such other assistance as may be warranted to ensuretheir expeditious prosecution.
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NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powersvested in me by law, do hereby order:Section 1. THE PROJECT . The project shall be identified as GREATER MANILA TRANSPORT SYSTEMProject.Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES . In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA, the project aims todevelop four (4) interim intermodal mass transport terminals to integrate the different transport modes, as well asthose that shall hereafter be developed, to serve the commuting public in the northwest, north, east, south, andsouthwest of Metro Manila. Initially, the project shall concentrate on immediately establishing the mass transportterminals for the north and south Metro Manila commuters as hereinafter described.Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY . The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority(MMDA), is hereby designated as the implementing Agency for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is directed toundertake such infrastructure development work as may be necessary and, thereafter, manage the project until itmay be turned-over to more appropriate agencies, if found suitable and convenient. Specifically, MMDA shallhave the following functions and responsibilities:

a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the projects, including the designs and costing;b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties needed for the project with the respective agenciesand/or entities owning them;c) Supervise and manage the construction of the necessary structures and facilities;d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be necessary, with the appropriate governmentagencies, entities, and/or private persons, in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations, tofacilitate the implementation of the project;e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be necessary for the construction and/orimplementation of the projects, in accordance with prevailing accounting and audit polices and practice ingovernment.f) Enlist the assistance of any national government agency, office or department, including localgovernment units, government-owned or controlled corporations, as may be necessary;g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above purposes; andh) Perform such other related functions as may be necessary to enable it to accomplish the objectivesand purposes of this Executive Order .4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numeroususes plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes ;5 and the MMDA had "recommended alan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing morend convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminalacilities "6 which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).

The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.ursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued

Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 7 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the differentransport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus

erminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila .8

On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportationwith a provincial bus operation ,9 filed a petition for declaratory relie f10 before the RTC 11 of Manila.n its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando, waspoised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA andn the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation. "12 This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closuref its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.

Alleging that the MMDAs authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bu serminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of theower of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority,

Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of provincial bus terminals would contravene the Public Service Actnd related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for the privilege of

perating as common carriers .13

Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator, later filed a similar petition for declaratory reliegainst Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman Fernando.

Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners andperators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals.

Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and eliminate all provincial bus terminals alongEDSA and in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their operations to common bus terminals ,15 Mencorp prayed for thessuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the impending closure of its buserminals which it was leasing at the corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at the intersection of Blumentritt, Laonaan and Halcon Streets in Quezon City. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-106224 and was raffled to Branch 47 of

he RTC of Manila.
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Mencorps petition was consolidated on June 19, 2003 with Virons petition which was raff led to Branch 26 of the RTC, Manila.Mencorps prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction was denied as was its application for the issuance of a preliminarynjunction .16 n the Pre-Trial Orde r17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulateraffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established andxisting bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Actnd the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law shouldhey be required to use the common bus terminals.

Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position papers in lieu of hearings.By Decision 18 of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No. 7924,which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manilas basic services including those of transport and traffic management.The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subjectmatter and lawfu l means, hence, Virons and Mencorps property rights must yield to police power. On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court, by Order of September 8, 2005, reversed it sDecision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under

ection (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus termina lnd that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.etitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2005.

Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1) the requisites of declaratory relief are not present, thereeing no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President has the authority to undertaker cause the implementation of the Project .19 etitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O.

mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Viron andMencorp, they argue, failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of anmmediate plan to close down their bus terminals.

And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA ando make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relationreated by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.

The petition fails.t is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the consolidated petitions to meet the requirement ofusticiability was not among the issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial Order of January 12, 2004. It is equally true, however,hat the question was repeatedly raised by petitioners in their Answer to Virons petition ,20 their Comment of April 29, 2003pposing Mencorps prayer for the issuance of a TRO ,21 and their Position Paper of August 23, 2004 .22 n bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the essential requisites for theirespective petitions for declaratory relief ,23 and refuted petitioners contention that a justiciable controversy was lacking .24 Theran be no denying, therefore, that the issue was raised and discussed by the parties before the trial court.

The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) theontroversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal

nterest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination .25

The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds therexist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending theontroversy .26 A question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested .27 n the present cases, respondents resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the E.O. The 4 th Whereas clause of the E.O.ets out in clear strokes the MMDAs plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro

Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through therovision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)ection 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment of common bus terminals for north- and south-boundommuters. For this purpose, Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds of not more than oneundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of the construction of the north and south terminals. And the E.O. was

made effective immediately.The MMDAs resolve to immediatel y implement the Project, its denials to the contrary notwithstanding, is also evident from telltale

ircumstances, foremost of which was the passage by the MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003 expressing its full supportf the immediate implementation of the Project.Notable from the 5 th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to "remove the bus terminals located along majorhoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the different transport modes." The 7 th Whereas clause proceeds to

mention the establishment of the North and South terminals.As alleged in Virons petition, a diagram of the GMA -MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of theerminal is already in progress. The MMDA, in its Answer 28 and Position Paper ,29 in fact affirmed that the government had beguno implement the Project.t thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely conjectural or anticipatory.
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Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the MMDA of an order for the c losure of respondentsus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which, underection 1, Rule 63 30 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.

As for petitioners contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which creates no relation with third persons, it doeot persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for which the concerned government agencies areirected to coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by third persons likeespondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate from the common bus terminals.t cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean,mong other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim aeprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.

Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, orwill sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement. "31 Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of aaw or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has beenatisfied by respondents.

On to the merits of the case.Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of their bus terminals under the E.O. which, theyrgue, is unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that neither is the MMDAlothed with such authority under R.A. No. 7924.etitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the Presidents authority to undertake or to cause the implementati on

he Project. They assert that the authority of the President is derived from E.O. No. 125, "Reorganizing the Ministry ofTransportation and Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes," her residual power and/or E.O.No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also a valid exercise of the police power.E.O. No. 125 ,32 which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of legislative powers, reorganized the then Ministrynow Department) of Transportation and Communications. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 22 of E.O. 125, as amended by E.O. 125-A ,33 ead:

SECTION 4. Mandate. The Ministry shall be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,implementing, regulating and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in thepromotion, development and regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation andcommunication systems as well as in the fast, safe, efficient and reliable postal, transportation andcommunications services.To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the following objectives:

(a) Promote the development of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation andcommunications systems;(b) Guide government and private investment in the development of the countrys intermodaltransportation and communications systems in a most practical, expeditious, and orderly fashion formaximum safety, service, and cost effectiveness; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)x x x x

SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Ministry shall have the following powers

and functions:(a) Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation ofintegrated and comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national, regional andlocal levels;(b) Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation andcommunications , and for this purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or organization, whetherpublic or private, whose development programs include transportation and communications as an integralpart thereof, to participate and assist in the preparation and implementation of such program;(c) Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and communications research and developmentprograms of the government in coordination with other institutions concerned;(d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)x x x x

SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandateof the Ministry and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Minister ofTransportation and Communications , hereinafter referred to as the Minister, who shall have supervision andcontrol over the Ministry and shall be appointed by the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. The Minister shall issue such orders, rules, regulationsand other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of thisExecutive Order . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

t is readily apparent from the abovequoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the President, then possessed of andxercising legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,egulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of
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uthority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportationnd communications.

As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the authority and responsibility to exercise themandate given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations andther issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law.ince, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, it follows that

he President may exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the Project, which admittedly is one forransportation.uch authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all executive departments as well a s the obligation for the faithfuxecution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shallensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38, Chapter 37,Book IV of the same Code defines the Presidents power of supervision and control over the executive dep artments, viz:

SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or inother laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall becategorized and defined as follows:(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever aspecific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate ; direct the performance of duty; restrainthe commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units;determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in thespecific law governing the relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision andcontrol as defined in this paragraph. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the President may act directly or merelyirect the performance of a duty .34

Respecting the Presidents authority to order the implementation of the Project in the exercise of the po lice power of the State,uffice it to stress that the powers vested in the DOTC Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive and integratedrograms for transportation and communications and to issue orders, rules and regulations to implement such mandate (which, asreviously discussed, may also be exercised by the President) have been so delegated for the good and welfare of the people.

Hence, these powers partake of the nature of police power.olice power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws,tatutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people .35 This power to prescribeegulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from theecognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly beingelegated .36 By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards 37 as well asy the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government

Code of 1991 .38

The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as themplementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires , there being no legal basis therefor.t bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorizedo establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized tostablish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC whicy law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks ofransportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authorityonferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires .n another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. No.924.

To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area 39 as a "special development and administrative region" and placedhe administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.

ection 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform "planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and inhe process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services," including transport and trafficmanagement .40 Section 5 of the same law enumerates the powers and functions of the MMDA as follows:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for thedelivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent withnational development objectives and priorities;(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wideservices which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall includethe packaging of projects and presentation to funding institutions;
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(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific servicesunder its jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriateproject management offices;(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identifybottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulatethe implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining toenforcement, engineering and education . Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation,including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kindsof violations of traffic rules and regulations , whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate andsuspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provis ions of RA4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws andregulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, trafficenforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmentalorganizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as theAuthority may impose; and(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking ofdelivery of basic services to the local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordinationwith and consent of the local government unit concerned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and policy-setting body has been settled in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc .41 In that case, the Court stressed:

Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these istransport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards andprojects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares andpromotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and theinstitution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, trafficengineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in MetroManila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized to "to set the policiesconcerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." Inaddition, the MMDA may install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines andpenalties for all traffic violations.It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system andadministration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislativepower. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislativebodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA orits Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the

inhabitants of Metro Manila . The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a development authority . It an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various nationalgovernment agencies, peoples organizations, non -governmental organizations and the private sector forthe efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions areadministrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself , viz:SECTION 2. Crea tion of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . .

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the processexercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services withinMetro Manila , without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely localmatters. 42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

n light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project asnvisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows thathe MMDA can not validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.

ven the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above -quoted ruling inMMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc . and this Courts subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.Garin 43 that the MMDA is not vested with police power.Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the two testsf a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class,equires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and notnduly oppressive upon individuals .44 Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interestnd welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.

As early as Calalang v. Williams ,45 this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. TheCourt therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rulesnd regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.
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ikewise, in Luque v. Villegas ,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designedto relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. "47 As such, measures calculated to promotehe safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject forhe exercise of police power.

Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Indeed,he E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA soetermined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existingransport systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of the E.O. is the interest of the public ineneral.

Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not dulyppressive?

With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to "eliminate[e] the bus terminals now locatedlong major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provid[e] more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commutingublic through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x. "48 Common carriers with terminals along the majorhoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designatedommon parking areas.n Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc .,49 two city ordinances were passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ucena, directing public utility vehicles to unload and load passengers at the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, which was given thexclusive franchise to operate a single common terminal. Declaring that no other terminals shall be situated, constructed,

maintained or established inside or within the city of Lucena, the sanggunian declared as inoperable all temporary terminalsherein.

The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia , the measuresonstituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibitiongainst monopolies.

Citing De la Cruz v. Para s 50 and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals ,51 this Court held that the assailed ordinances were characterizedy overbreadth, as they went beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city. And it found that theompulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal was unduly oppressive because it would subject its users to fees, rentals andharges.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights areexercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societalproblems.From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod hadidentified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buseson the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of busesobstructing traffic on the city streets.Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscriptionagainst the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as

reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened . If terminals lackadequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead ofinside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits tooperate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals isso broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal arebarred from operating at all . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As in Lucena , this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the e xistence of respondents terminals can be considered aeasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents bus termi nalrings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case ofransference from one site to another.ess intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and using thetreets for parking and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing the traffic

ituation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major thoroughfares.As to the alleged confiscatory characte r of the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents certificates of public convenienceonfer no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges .52 As such, these must yield to legislation safeguarding the interest ofhe people.ven then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents terminals not only because nuthority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also because thelimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.inally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act.aragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive Order No. 202, creating the Land

Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now the LTFRB) withx x x jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties x x x."
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Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to " impose such conditions as to construction, equipment,maintenance, service , or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require "53 in approving any franchisr privilege.urther, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Ac t54 provided that the Commission shall have the power, upon proper noticend hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned andaving provisions to the contrary:

(g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service as regards the manner offurnishing the same as well as the maintenance of the necessary material and equipment.(h) To require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension ofits existing facilities , where in the judgment of said Commission, such extension is reasonable and practicableand will furnish sufficient business to justify the construction and maintenance of the same and when the financialcondition of the said public service reasonably warrants the original expenditure required in making and operatingsuch extension.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered aecessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the investments they have poured into thecquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Publicervice Act.

This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering problem ofraffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the abominable traffic situationf our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It needs only to be reiterated thats the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity toromote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications which has the power to establish anddminister a transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar .

No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not authorized to implementannot pass muster.

WHEREFORE , the Petition is, in light

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