Pub Digest 6

7/30/2019 Pub Digest 6

1/12

Re: Gross violation of the Civil Service Law

Facts:

Respondent was appointed by the Court as SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of

Administrative Services - OAS on July 14, 2008. Anonymous letter[1]reached the OAS reporting the

respondents gross violation of the Civil Service Law on the prohibition against dual employment and double

compensation in the government service. The letter alleged that respondent accepted employment, and thusreceived salaries and other benefits, from the Courtand also from the PNP of which he remained an active

member.

The OAS inquiries on this allegation confirmed that prior to his employment at the Court, respondent was an

active member of the PNP assigned with the Aviation Security Group 2nd Police Center for Aviation Security

at the Manila Domestic Airport in Pasay City, with a permanent status and rank of Police Chief Inspector.While employed in the Court and receiving his regular compensation, he continued to be a bonafide member

of the PNP assigned with the Aviation Security Group with the same status and rank of Police Chief Inspector

until the date when he optionally retired on September 30, 2009.

Respondents explanation: On January 24, 2008, I applied for optional retirement as a member of the Philippine

National Police (PNP). At that time, I was informed that my application would be effective on March 31, 2008, or

a period of three (3) months from its submission date. However, I was advised that, as part of the new policy onoptional retirement, the effectivity of my application would be six (6) months from date of its submission, or on

July 14, 2008.

Pending the approval of my application for optional retirement, I applied with the Honorable Supreme Court for

the position of Chief Security Officer. In the course of my interview, I declared that the Philippine National Police

(PNP) had yet to formally approve my application for optional retirement. Due to the urgent need to fill-in the

said vacant position I was hired by the Honorable Supreme Court as its employee which took effect on July 14,

2008.But, then, as fate had it, my application for optional retirement was not immediately acted upon by thePhilippine National Police (PNP) within the original period of my request. As it is, such application was bypassed

several times, and I was considered optionally retired on September 30, 2009.

Issue: WON respondent is guilty

Held: Yes, SC adopted OAS findings

Ratio:

In its report to the Court dated June 27, 2011, the OAS presented its findings that by respondents own

admission, without offering any justification, his acts have prejudiced the government. His offer of mitigating

circumstance - delay in the processing of his retirement papers - is unacceptable as records of the PNP will

contradict this. The Service Record issued by the PNP in his favor for retirement purposes was dated August

26, 2008.[8]Likewise, his Certificates of Clearances, namely: (a) no pending administrative case was dated

August 13, 2008[9]; (b) no money accountability was dated October 29, 2008 [10]and; (c) property

accountability/responsibility was dated October 31, 2008[11]. These documents clearly show that he only

started processing the requirements for his application for optional retirement when he was already

connected with the Court.

The OAS found respondents claim that he applied for optional retirement as early as January 2008 to bemerely an afterthought. . The OAS further noted that the vacancy for the position of SC Chief Judicial StaffOfficer of the Security Division existed only after April 30, 2008. Such circumstances lead the OAS to conclude

that respondent first made clear to be appointed to the Court prior to filing his application for retirement to

be sure that he transfers to another government agency, at the same time enjoying the fruits of his retirement

from the PNP.

The OAS thus found respondents indirect claim of good faith unavailing. His regular receipt of his salaries

from the PNP despite presumably exclusively working with the Court implies a deliberate intent to give
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn2


2/12

unwarranted benefit to himself and undue prejudice to the government especially so by his regular

submission of monthly/daily time record as a mandatory requirement for inclusion in the payroll.

The OAS also found that respondent became aware of the approval of his application for retirement as early

as September 30, 2009. Notwithstanding such knowledge, he did not immediately refund his overpayment, if

that was indeed the case, and that his act of returning his salaries after the period of 20 months was also a

mere afterthought as he did so only because the Court became aware of it and directed him to explain.

Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory

definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of

design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individuals personal good faith is a concept of his

own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of

intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The

essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior cla im, and

absence of intention to overreach another.[13]

The OAS found respondents actuation even amounts to gross dishonesty. His receipt of salaries from the PNP

despite not rendering any service thereto is a form of deceit. With the undisputed facts of the case, the OAS

considers that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that respondent is liable for gross dishonesty

and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Asilo v People

Facts:

Private respondents mother entered into a contract of lease with the Municipality of Nagcarlan Laguna over a

parcel of land. They built a store there. Private respondent then took over the operation of the store,

obtaining the yearly Mayors permit. Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon

Visitacions request for inspection on 15 May 1986, District Engineer Marcelino B. Gorospe (Engineer

Gorospe) of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways,11Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store

of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the

Municipality of Nagcarlan. The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire.

On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter12

from Mayor Comendador directing her to demolish herstore within five (5) days from notice. Attached to the letter were copies of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No.

156: NOW THEREFORE, be it RESOLVED, as it hereby resolved to authorize Hon. Demetrio T. Comendador to

enforce and order the Coronados to demolish the building constructed on the space previously rented to

them in order to give way for the construction of a new municipal market building.

RESOLVED FURTHER, to authorize Demetrio T. Comendador, Honorable Mayor of Nagcarlan to file an

Unlawful Detainer Case with damages for the expenses incurred due to the delay in the completion of the

project if the Coronados continuously resists the order.

On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution No. 183 authorizing

Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. On 15 October1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156

authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.

On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed with the

Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna a Civil Case19for damages with preliminary injunction against

the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.,and Alberto S.Angeles. Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint21against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and

Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94)23with

Criminal Case No. 23267 pending before the Third Division pursuant to Section 4, Presidential Decree No.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/july2011/2011-04-SC.htm#_ftn14


3/12

1606, which pertinently reads: Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the

criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense

charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by

the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily

carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from

the criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that where the civil action had heretofore been

filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed withthe Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the

appropriate court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,

otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned

During the pendency of the case Angeles died civil and criminal case against him was dismissed. Mayor

Comendador died after and the court was notified. In Criminal Case No. 23267, the court finds accused

Demetrio T. Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of

Republic Act. No. 3019. In Civil Case No. 4064, defendants Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, Demetrio T.

Comendador and Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff P437,900.00 as

actual damages for the destruction of the store

Issue: WON petitioners are guilty

Held: Yes

Ratio:

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 provides: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge

of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross

inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government

corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged

in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of

their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party,

whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,

advantage or preference to the other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifestpartiality, evident bad faithor gross inexcusable negligence.

1. Causing undue injury to any party, including the government, could only mean actual injury or damage

which must be established by evidence.34 In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as

"actual." Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong

or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any

legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil

law.Clearly, the demolition of plaintiffs store was carried out without a court order, and notwithstanding arestraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of official

duties which apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable

negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to

demolish plaintiffs store.

2. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and

dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.36[It]

contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest

or ill will or for ulterior purposes.37 It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials

committed bad faith in performing the demolition.

First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents structure is a public nuisance. The abatement

of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se.38Nuisance per se is that which is

nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location and surroundings.39In this case, the
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt34


4/12

market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out by the Court, the buildings had

not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A.

Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office

Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition. Unlike its predecessor

law,42the present Local Government Code43does not expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance.44And

even assuming that the power to abate nuisance is provided for by the present code, the accused publicofficials were under the facts of this case, still devoid of any power to demolish the store. A closer look at the

contested resolutions reveals that Mayor Comendador was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case

in case of resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal means

Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as represented by the then Mayor Comendador, was

placed in estoppel after it granted yearly business permits45in favor of the Spouses Bombasi. Therepresentation made by the municipality that the Spouses Bombasi had the right to continuously operate its

store binds the municipality. It is utterly unjust for the Municipality to receive the benefits of the store

operation and later on claim the illegality of the business.

3. Survival of civil liability. We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor Comendador during the

pendency of the case extinguished their criminal liabilities. We now hold, as did the Sandiganbayan that the

civil liability of Mayor Comendador survived his death; and that of Angeles could have likewise survived hadit not been for the fact that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death extinguished the civil liability

was not questioned and lapsed into finality. Death of the accused pending appeal of his convictionextinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. Corollarily, the claim forcivil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a

source of obligation other than delict.

Where the civil liability survives, as explained [above], an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but

only by way of filing a separate civil action 47and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator

or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained

above. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action

by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the

private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations onthe civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with

provisions of Article 1155 of the New Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible

privation of right by prescription.

Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil liability if the

same arose directly from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another

source of obligation, the law on human relations.49The pertinent articles follow:

Art. 31 of the Civil Code states: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or

omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings

and regardless of the result of the latter.

And, Art. 32(6) states: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly

obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties ofanother person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the applicability of the law on human relations. First, the

complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint

for damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor Comendadors violation of plaintiffs right to due process.

The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as already shown, justify demolition

of the store without court order. This Court in a number of decisions51held that even if there is already a writ
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt42


5/12

of execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court

before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over the contested

property.52The pertinent provisions are the following: Before the removal of an improvement must take

place, there must be a special order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove.

Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process violations was filed even ahead of

the criminal case, is complemented by the fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by hiswidow, herein petitioner Victoria who specified in her petition that she has "substituted him as petitioner in

the above captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas

is, therefore, not applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct when it maintained the separate docketing

of the civil and criminal cases before it although their consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of

Presidential Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged."

4. Re damages: To seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a

reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable .55In this

case, the Court finds that the only evidence presented to prove the actual damages incurred was the itemized

list of damaged and lost items56prepared by Engineer Cabrega, an engineer commissioned by the Spouses

Bombasi to estimate the costs. Here, Engineer did not testify hearsay.

Though there is no sufficient evidence to award the actual damages claimed, this Court grants temperatedamages for P200,000.00 in view of the loss suffered by the Spouses Bombasi. Temperate damages are

awarded in accordance with Art. 2224 of the New Civil Code when the court finds that some pecuniary loss

has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty. The amount of

temperate or moderated damages is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should be

reasonable, bearing in mind that the temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than

compensatory.63

Javellana v DILG

Facts:

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5,

1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1)

violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 inrelation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No.

6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,"

and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.

Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian

Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law

without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government

On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth

guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials as follows: Section 7 of Republic Act No.

6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), states, in part, that "In

addition to acts and omission of public officials . . . now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the

following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public officials . . . and are hereby declaredto be unlawful: . . . (b) Public Officials . . . during their incumbency shall not: (1) . . . accept employment as

officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,

supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of

their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or

tend to conflict with their official functions: . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated September 4, 1986, the authority to

grant any permission, to accept private employment in any capacity and to exercise profession, to any
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt55http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt55http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt55http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt63http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt63http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt63http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt63http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt55http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/mar2011/gr_159017_2011.html#fnt52


6/12

government official shall be granted by the head of the Ministry (Department) or agency in accordance with

Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules

On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground

mainly that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme

Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. Five months later or on October 10,1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides:Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing

their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief

executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except

during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1)Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or

instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991. Javellana thereupon filed

this petition for certiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of

the new Local Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null void because: (1) they

violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: WON Javellana motion was properly dismissed

Held: Yes

Ratio:

With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent,

Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing the questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and

90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative charge against him.

In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance

of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public

office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer

Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of whichpetitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a

judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting

them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum

Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging

in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular

No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor

the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law.

The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for

public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private

practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to allprovincial and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly

provides that sanggunian members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in

schools expect during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is

because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of

public service.

Wylie v Rarang

Facts:


7/12

Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative officer and commanding officer,

respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the

Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control guard.

Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the Plan of the Day a daily publication that featured

among others, an action line inquiry. On feb.3,1978, an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods

were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certainAuring was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being the only person nam ed Auring in the said

office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang

was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the

inadvertent publication.) She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation

and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and

ridicule.

Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US

Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the

US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties involved. Lower

court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US government, but personal

and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign country cant be sued without its

consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed.

ISSUES

1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are

immune from suit.

2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the

principle of state immunity from suit?

HELD

1. Yes, they are immune.

RatioCiting US v Guinto: Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from

suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official functions. this is part of the second issue)

Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But even without this

affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine is applicable not only to suitsagainst the state but also to complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in

discharge of their official duties.

The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its

consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of

States. As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given byJustice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right

depends."

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to

complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their

duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an

affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damagesawarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally

impleaded. (Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120) In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the

complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.

The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be

embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract it itself

commences litigation. The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the will

of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. (Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470) We have

held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of its non-suability;


8/12

distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136

SCRA 487) As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where the government

is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial

transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State

may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given itsconsent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to

the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is

devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the

government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between

sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).

The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. There is no question, therefore, that

the petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official

functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit,

then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication. It is to be

noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in

publishing a libelous article.

2. No.

Ratio Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the

name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts

claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where

there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-

accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.

Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or

negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing

contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delictand is governed by the provisions of this

Chapter.

Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the

character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the

Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The

petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without

deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a

tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are

liable for the damages they caused the private respondent.

Domingo v Rayala

Facts:

On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed

a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Departmentof Labor and Employment (DOLE).

Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a

presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary

Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose.It foundRayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided

under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months. The following day, Secretary

Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the


9/12

recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance

with AO 250.

Exec Sec: affirmed but dismissed Rayala instead. CA affirmed. On MR, CA reduced the penalty to suspension

Domingo: She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the President

who has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OPs decision was arrived atafter affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely with

the President

Rayala: InvokingAquino v. Acosta,24Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what constitutes

sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a)

demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-

employment, or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against the

employee.

Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails the definition

of the forms of sexual harassment: FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT Section 1. Forms of Sexual

Harassment. Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following forms: a) Overt sexual advances;

b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for

the same purpose;

d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally

annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.27 He posits that these acts alone without corresponding

demand, request, or requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law.

Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or

omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can

proceed independently of the others.43This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.

Issue: WON Rayala is guilty of SH

Held: Yes

Ratio:

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related

sexual harassment in this wise: Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.

Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor,

agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having

authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment,

demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand,

request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued

employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,

promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying

the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities orotherwise adversely affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or

(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.: Sec. 4. Duty of the

Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training Environment. It shall be the duty of the

employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or

deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution,

settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt24


10/12

The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3,

RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual

harassment.44It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the

President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.

Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still beadministratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual

favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a

categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.

Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having

inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of

future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala

resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a

condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondents

acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.45That the acts of

Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common

factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to anofficemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.

Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC,

which, at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program and policy coordination.

Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its coverage because

he is a presidential appointee. We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is

of no real consequence. The events of this case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against

Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case;

that the participation of the DOLE, through the Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating

the investigation process, reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the investigation report, and

recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to Rayala.

If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the Committee in the

orderly conduct of the investigation.

Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He

argues that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done

allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him. We reiterate that what is before

us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime ofsexualharassment is malum in

se or malum prohibitum is immaterial. It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to

disgraceful and immoral conduct.51Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis

of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Re: correct penalty. In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who

would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power,

however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found that

Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettereddiscretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the

imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for

disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly,

it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a

penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

Ferrer Jr. v Sandiganbayan

Facts:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_155831_2008.html#fnt44


11/12

Information: DOMINADOR C. FERRER, JR., being the Administrator of the Intramuros Administration (IA),

Manila, while in the performance of his official and administrative functions as such, and acting with manifest

partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and

criminally give unwarranted benefits to Offshore Construction and Development Company, by causing the

award of the Lease Contracts to said company, involving Baluarte de San Andres, Ravellin de Recolletos, and

Baluarte de San Francisco de Dilao, Intramuros, Manila, without conducting any public bidding as required

under Joint Circular No. 1 dated September 30, 1989 of the Department of Budget and Management,Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Department of Public Works and Highways, and by

allowing the construction of new structures in said leased areas without any building permit or clearance

required under the Intramuros Charter (P.D. 1616) and the National Building Code, to the damage and

prejudice of public interest.

On May 19, 2003, before he can be arraigned, petitioner filed yet another motion with public respondent, this

time a Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause,15invoking the ruling of the Office of the President

(OP), dated February 29, 2000,16which absolved petitioner of administrative liability. The OP reviewed the

administrative case filed against petitioner with the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption

(PCAGC) and held that petitioner acted in good faith and within the scope of his authority.

On July 2, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued herein assailed Resolution denying the Motion for Re-

determination of Probable Cause, stating as follows: The Court resolves to deny the motion for re-determination of probable cause, the argument advanced therein having been passed upon and resolved by

this Court in accused's motion to dismiss as well as motion for reconsideration and where the resolution of

this Court was sustained by the Supreme Court.17

Petitioner insists that the Sandiganbayan should have dismissed the criminal case filed against him, since the

alleged wrongful acts complained of in the case are the same as those alleged in the administrative case

against him which have been dismissed.

Issue: WON the criminal case should be dismissed

Held: No

Ratio:

In Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23

the Court denied a similar petition to dismiss a pending criminal case withtheSandiganbayan on the basis of the dismissal of the administrative case against the accused. The Court

ratiocinated, thus: Petitioners call attention to the fact that the administrative complaint against petitioner

Honrada was dismissed. But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability

for the same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of public documents is in no

way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v. Comelec, the dismissal of an

administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts

which were the subject of the administrative complaint.

The same rule applies even to those cases that have yet to be filed in court. In Tan v. Commission on

Elections,25it was held that an investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal case for falsification and

violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and an inquiry into the administrative charges by the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) are entirely independent proceedings, neither of which results in or

concludes the other. The established rule is that an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to anadministrative prosecution, or vice versa.26The dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar

the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative

complaint.27

Petitioners argue that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the administrative case against them based on the

same subject matter should operate to dismiss the criminal case because the quantum of proof in criminal

cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while that in administrative cases is only substantial evidence. While

that may be true, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal

liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt15


12/12

honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal

prosecution is the punishment of crime.

Moreover, one of the grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against petitioners is the fact that

they were re-elected to office. Indeed, a re-elected local official may not be held administratively accountable

for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the

electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character,including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still re-elects him, then such re-election is

considered a condonation of his past misdeeds. However, the re-election of a public official extinguishes only

the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office

Petitioner cites Larin v. Executive Secretary33to support his arguments. That case, however, is not on all fours

with the present case. In Larin, the accused was first convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of the

National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On the basis of this conviction, an

administrative case was filed against him. On appeal of the criminal conviction to the Supreme Court,

however, he was acquitted upon a finding that the acts he had committed were neither illegal nor irregular.

When the accused sought a similar dismissal of the administrative case, the Supreme Court sustained him and

ruled that since the same acts for which he was administratively charged had been found neither illegal nor

irregular, his acquittal in the criminal case should entail the dismissal of the administrative case.

The present case differs from Larin because here, the administrative case was filed independently of the

criminal case. The administrative case was not filed on the basis of a criminal conviction, as in fact, the

administrative case was dismissed without regard for the results of the criminal case. This is in contrast

with Larin, where the administrative case was dismissed only after its basis, the criminal conviction, was

overturned on appeal. The independent nature of a criminal prosecution dictates that

the Sandiganbayan must determine petitioner's criminal liability without its hands being tied by what

transpired in the administrative case. The court is duty-bound to exercise its independent judgment.35It is

not ousted of its jurisdiction by the ruling in the administrative proceeding. It is axiomatic that when the

court obtains jurisdiction over a case, it continues to retain it until the case is terminated.36
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_161067_2008.html#fnt33

Documents

Pub Digest 6