Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 118978

Facts:Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ ofcertiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee.That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies.She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code.Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is valid?Held: Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure.Thus, an employer is required, as a conditionsine qua nonprior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, ones labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:ART. 136.Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.In the case at bar, it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, that youre fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you. Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the companys policy against marriage (and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right.Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.