PsyFun - Causation and the Logical Impossibility of a Divine Cause

8/10/2019 PsyFun - Causation and the Logical Impossibility of a Divine Cause

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A great exercise in deep thinking--logical analysis--using the tools of philosophy

[This article was originally published in Philosophical Topics, Volume 2, !umber , "pring##$, pp% $#-#%&

CAUSATION AND THE LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF A DIVINE CAUSE* (1996)

'uentin "mith

(estern )ichigan *ni+ersity

% ntroduction"ome interesting light is thrown on the nature of causation, the origin of the uni+erse, andarguments for atheism if we address the uestion. s it logically possible that the uni+erse has anoriginating di+ine cause/

think that +irtually all contemporary theists, agnostics and atheists belie+e this is logicallypossible% ndeed, the main philosophical tradition from Plato to the present has assumed that thesentence, 01od is the originating cause of the uni+erse0, does not express a logical contradiction,e+en though many philosophers ha+e argued that this sentence either is synthetic and meaninglesse%g%, the logical positi+ists3 or states a synthetic and a priori falsehood e%g%, 4ant and )oore3, orstates a synthetic and a posteriori falsehood e%g%, contemporary defenders of the probabilisticargument from e+il3% belie+e the pre+alence of this assumption is due to the fact that philosophers ha+e notundertaken the reuisite sort of metaphysical in+estigation into the nature of causation% Thisin+estigation is the purpose of this paper5 specifically, shall argue that the thesis that the

uni+erse has an originating di+ine cause is logically inconsistent with all extant definitions ofcausality and with a logical reuirement upon these and all possible +alid definitions or theoriesof causality% will conclude that the cosmological and teleological arguments for a cause of theuni+erse may ha+e some force but that these arguments, traditionally understood as arguments forthe existence of 1od, are in fact arguments for the nonexistence of 1od%2% 6ausal 7efinitions and the !otion of an 8riginating 7i+ine 6ause"omething is a continuing cause of the uni+erse if and only if it causes each state of the uni+erse%"omething is an originating cause of the uni+erse if and only if it causes the earliest state of theuni+erse% f time is continuous, 0the earliest state0 may refer to an instantaneous state or if theuni+erse9s history is half-open in the earlier direction3 to a temporally extended state of some

gi+en length%f big bang cosmology is true, the uni+erse began to exist about : billion years ago with the bigbang% The big bang is the earliest state of the uni+erse5 0the big bang0 may be taken to refer to asingularity that constitutes the first instantaneous state of the uni+erse or if one 0cuts out0 thesingularity3 to an explosion that constitutes the first half-open state of some brief length, e%g% thePlanck length, ;-


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6onsiderations of agent causality are not germane to our discussion5 our topic is the cause of theuni+erse9s beginning to exist, not the cause of 1od9s act of willing that the uni+erse begin to exist%(e are not examining the relation between 1od the agent3 and his act of willing the effect3, butthe relation between his act of willing an e+ent3 and the beginning of the uni+erse anothere+ent3% Thus, definitions of agent causality are irrele+ant to our arguments5 we are interested onlyin definitions of e+ent causality, where the cause and effect are both e+ents%

>*)?9" 7?@!T8! 8@ A 6A*"?The most famous and influential definition of a cause is >ume9s definition5 indeed, mostcontemporary definitions include conditions that are similar in some respect to at least one of thethree conditions included in >ume9s definition.06ontiguity in time and place is therefore a reuisite circumstance to the operation of allcauses%%%Priority in time is%%%another reuisite circumstance in e+ery case%%%%[A& third circumstance[is& that of constant conunction betwixt the cause and the effect% ?+ery obect like the causeproduces always some obect like the effect% Beyond these three circumstances of contiguity,priority, and constant conunction can disco+er nothing in this cause%0[&

>ume9s definition includes three conditions for being a cause. temporal priority, spatio-temporalcontiguity, and a nomological relation 0e+ery obect like the cause produces always some obectlike the effect0%3a3 T?)P8CAD PC8CTEf time began to exist with the uni+erse, the 0temporal priority0 condition of >ume9s definitionimplies that the uni+erse cannot be caused to begin to exist since there is no earlier time at whichthe cause could occur%?+en if there is time before the uni+erse, the 0temporal priority0 condition rules out an originating

di+ine cause if all di+ine acts are timeless%>owe+er, the 0temporal priority0 condition only shows the uni+erse cannot ha+e an originatingdi+ine cause if time began to exist with the uni+erse or if all di+ine acts are timeless% t islogically possible that time preceded the beginning of the uni+erse, e+en if there are no knownlaws of physics according to which the physical +ariable t can take +alues earlier than the time atwhich space and mass-energy began to exist% @urther, it is logically possible that 1od exists intime and that a pre-uni+erse time is occupied by 1od9s mental life, which includes his +olitions%Thus, it is logically possible for a di+ine +olition to meet the 0temporal priority0 condition of>ume9s definition% The intractable problems begin with the other two conditions%b3 "PAT8-T?)P8CAD 68!T1*TE

>ume9s and many other definitions of causality reuire that the causal e+ent is spatially in contactwith, or is spatially near to, the effect% 1od is said to be omnipresent, but this means she isconscious of and stands in a +olitional relation to each physical particular% t does not mean thatdi+ine +olitions, which are non-physical, touch or are in the spatial +icinity of the physicalparticulars that are the obects of these +olitions%


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1od9s act of willing that the big bang occurs is not spatio-temporally contiguous with the bigbang since this act of willing does not ha+e spatial coordinates% c and e are spatio-temporallycontiguous only if the spatial coordinates x, y, F that locate c on a manifold either are identicalwith the spatial coordinates x9, y9 ,F9 of e, or locate c in the neighborhood of e%c3 !8)8D816AD C?DAT?7!?""

The third feature of >ume9s definition, the nomological condition 0e+ery obect like the causeproduces always some obect like the effect03, is also common to many definitions of causality%>ume9s definition belongs to the line of reducti+e definitions that define causes in terms of lawsof nature and a set of non-causal relations such as temporal priority and spatio-temporalcontiguity3 between two particulars c and e%[2& According to these definitions, c is a cause of eonly if there is a law of nature D that enables a statement that e occurs to be deduced from thepremises that c occurs and that the law D obtains% @or example, 6arl >empel writes[=&. 0a 9cause9must be allowed to be a more or less complex set of circumstances or e+ents, which might bedescribed by a set of statements 6, 62, % % % 6k% %%%%Thus the causal explanation implicitly claimsthat there are general laws- -let us say, D, D2, % % % Dk--in +irtue of which the occurrence of thecausal antecedents mentioned in 6, 62, % % % 6k is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the

explanadum e+ent%0 A probabilistic law D may be permitted as well, in which case 0to be deducedfrom0 would be replaced by 0to be inducti+ely supported by0%>owe+er, the nomological condition for being a cause is logically inconsistent with a di+inecause of the big bang, since 1od by definition is a supernatural being and his or her actions arenot go+erned by laws of nature% @urthermore, the fact that 1od9s willing is omnipotent makes 0thebig bang occurs0 deducible from 01od wills that the big bang occur0 alone, without the need ofany supplementary nomological premise, thus +itiating the condition that a nomological premiseis a logically necessary condition for the deri+ation of the conclusion that the effect exists frompremises one of which is that the causal e+ent occurs%At this point, we ha+e already ruled out +irtually e+ery extant definition of causality, since most

e+ery definition includes either the spatio-temporal contiguity condition or the nomologicalcondition% (e are left with non-contiguity and singularist definitions of causality%A non-contiguity definition does not mention spatio-temporal contiguity and does not reuire thecause to be both temporally and spatially contiguous with the effect5 +ariants of non-contiguitydefinitions may allow for timeless di+ine acts andGor temporal di+ine acts that are not spatiallynearby or in contact with the effect% A singularist definition allows an e+ent to cause an effect in asingle case, without the cause and effect needing to instantiate some law% >owe+er, the extantformulations that are singularist andGor noncontiguity definitions are few and far between andpro+e problematic for a defender of the logical possibility of an originating di+ine cause%7*6A""?9" "!1*DAC"T 7?@!T8! 8@ A 6A*"?

The most famous singularist definition of a cause is H% 6% 7ucasse9s% 7ucasse9s conception0defines the cause of a particular e+ent in terms of but a single occurrence of it, and thus in noway in+ol+es the supposition that it, or one like it, e+er has occurred before or e+er will again%The supposition of recurrence is thus wholly irrele+ant to the meaning of cause5 that suppositionis rele+ant only to the meaning of law%0[


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>owe+er, further inspection of 7ucasse9s definition shows it does not apply, since his definitionreuires spatio-temporal contiguity% 7ucasse claims the cause c is a sufficient condition of theeffect e and that c is sufficient for e if i3 c is a change that occurred during a time and throughouta space terminating at an instant i at a surface s of an obect5 ii3 the change e occurred during atime and through a space beginning at the instant i at the surface s5 iii3 no change other than coccurred during the time and through the space of c, and i+3 no change other than e occurred

during the time and through the space of e%[:& Thus, 7ucasse9s account meets the singularistcriterion, but not the non-contiguity criterion% Although 7ucasse calls his account a 0definition0of a cause, it is only a partial definition, since he begins his definition with 0if0, not 0if and onlyif0%3T>? TCA!"@?C?!6? 7?@!T8! 8@ 6A*"?Another possible candidate for a singularist and non-contiguity definition is based on thetransference definition of causation, offered by >ector-!eri 6astaneda, 1alen "trawson, 7a+id@air, Herrold Aronson and others%[$& 6astaneda states that 0the heart of production, or causation,seems, thus, to be transfer or transmission0%[I& n the actual world, what is transferred is energyaccording to 6astaneda3, but he uses the word 0causity0 as a generic term for whate+er may be

transferred% 6an 1od9s +olition transfer causity to the big bang/6astaneda9s full theory implies a definition that includes the nomological condition. c is a causeof e if and only if i3 there is a transfer of causity from an obect 8 to an obect 82 in acircumstance x, with the e+ent c being 89s transmission of causity and the e+ent e being 829sacuisition of causity5 ii3 e+ery e+ent of the same category as c that is in a circumstance of thesame category as x is conoined with an e+ent of the same category as e%6ondition ii3 is intended as a nomological condition and thus rules out supernatural causes% Butmay we isolate i3, 0the heart of causation0, and successfully argue that a singularist, non-contiguity, and transference condition is satisfied by a di+ine +olition/ t appears not, since thereis a problem with causity% The causity cannot be identical with energy 6astaneda9s claim about

the actual identity of causity3, since there is no energy in 1od 1od being nonphysical3% ndeed,the causity cannot be anything physical, since 1od is nonphysical% !or can the causity beanything nonphysical, since the big bang is wholly physical% Thus, there appears to be no +iablecandidate for the causity transferred%68*!T?C@A6T*AD 7?@!T8!" 8@ 6A*"AT8!7a+id Dewis9s definition imports counterfactual conditions into the definition and seems to lenditself to a non-contiguity and singularist conception% According to Dewis, c causes e if and only ifi3 c and e are e+ents and both occur and it is the case that either ii3 if c had not occurred, ewould not ha+e occurred, or iii3 there is a causal chain linking c and e and each link d in thechain is such that if d had not occurred then e would not ha+e occurred% "ince there is no causal

chain between a di+ine +olition and the big bang, condition iii3 is inapplicable and we mayconcentrate on i3 and ii3%Are the di+ine +olition and the big bang both e+ents/ According to H% 4im,[J& an e+ent is asubstance exemplifying an n-adic property at a time% ?+en if there no pre-uni+erse time, this neednot rule out the applicability of 4im9s definition to 1od9s +olition, since we may construe 1od9s+olition as simultaneous with the big bang% (e may also follow Brian Deftow[#& and allow thatthe logical position occupied by 0at the time t0 may be occupied by 0at eternity0 or 0timelessly0%Alternately, we could follow 7a+idson[;& and take an e+ent as a particular that is not further


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definable and allow that the di+ine +olition is an e+ent e+en if timeless% This route, or, following(olterstorff and others[&, taking an e+ent as something9s exemplification of an n-adic propertywithout a time specification3, would allow us to consider the di+ine +olition as an e+ent that iseither timeless, simultaneous with, or earlier than the big bang% n these +arious definitions,0e+ent0 and 0state0 may be taken to be synonyms%3

>owe+er, Dewis9s counterfactual definition is not instantiated by a di+ine willing of the big bang%Det c be the di+ine willing of the big bang and let e be the big bang% f e had not occurred, then cwould not ha+e occurred% But this implies the false proposition that e is the cause of c, since c iscounterfactually dependent on e% n this case to use Dewis9s words about a problem he generallynotes3, 0we ha+e a spurious re+erse causal dependence of c on e, contradicting our suppositionthat e did not cause c0[2&%Dewis sol+es this problem by denying the counterfactual 0if e had not occurred, c would not ha+eoccurred%0 Dewis holds that it is instead true that 0c would ha+e occurred ust as it did but wouldha+e failed to cause e0[=&% But this entails that Dewis9s definition cannot be instantiated by 1od9swilling the big bang, since if c had occurred if 1od had willed the big bang3 then it necessarilycauses e the big bang35 1od is omnipotent and his willing is necessarily effecti+e%

n summary, the abo+e considerations suggest that there are no extant definitions of causality thatare satisfied by 1od9s willing the big bang to occur5 belie+e a sur+ey of further extant definitionswould show that most of them include at least one of the abo+e-mentioned conditions contiguity,a nomological condition, etc%3 that are +iolated by the di+ine +olition% The ones that do notinclude one of the abo+e-mentioned conditions include some other condition that is +iolated bythe di+ine +olition5 for example, H% )ackie9s definition of an !*" condition implies a cause c isneither necessary nor sufficient for its effect e but is instead an insufficient and non-redundantpart of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for e%[


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t may also be said that we need not rely on the assumption that the di+ine +olition must satisfy adefinition of a cause in order to be a cause% t is arguable that causation is a simple relation, aconceptual primiti+e, and thus that there is no definition that could capture its nature%[:&These three responses to my discussion in section K2 are perhaps not unreasonable5 indeed, atleast the first response about section K2 presenting an 0inducti+e argument0 based only on extant

definitions3 contains some truth%>owe+er, all three responses are una+ailing in face of the following crucial fact. there is anentailment relation between 0c is a cause of e0 and 0c is not a logically sufficient condition of e0%t is the case that.3 @or any two particular e+ents or states x and y, if x is a logically sufficient condition of y, thenx is not a cause of y%@or example, a body9s being in motion is a logically sufficient condition of the body occupyingspace, but the body9s being in motion is not the cause of the body9s occupation of space% >owe+er,1od9s willing that the big bang occurs is a logically sufficient condition of the big bang, for the

propositions expressed by 01od wills that the big bang occur0 and 0the big bang does not occur0are logically incompatible% The reason for this is that 1od is omnipotent and thus his willing isalways successful of logical necessity35 if an omnipotent being wills x and x does not occur, thenx is not omnipotent, which is a contradiction% 1od can do e+erything that is logically possible51od cannot create a stone that is too hea+y for him to lift, but creating such a stone is not alogical possibility% 1od would ne+er will something to occur if the occurrence of that somethingwere logically impossible--1od is omniscient and omnibene+olent and would not knowinglyengage in any futile effort%3The +ariables in proposition 3 range o+er particular e+ents or states5 they do not range o+erparticular e+ents taken together with laws of nature or uni+ersal generaliFations under which theparticulars are subsumed% As we ha+e seen, the nomological definitions of deterministic causation

imply that a particular e+ent c, in conunction with a law of nature, logically necessitate the e+ente that is the effect% The sun9s shining on a stone, in conunction with the law that whate+er isshined upon is warmed, logically necessitates that the stone is warmed% Proposition 3, howe+er,implies only that the sun9s shining on the stone does not logically necessitate the stone9s beingwarmed% The sun9s shining on the stone is a non-logically sufficient condition of the stone9s beingwarm it is nomologically sufficient, in that it is logically sufficient for the stone9s being warmonly if it is conoined with some law of nature3%Two obections may be made to my argument that di+ine +olitions are logically sufficientconditions and therefore are not causes%8b% 3 t may be obected that e+ery cause can be described in a way that logically implies theoccurrence of its effect, and therefore that di+ine +olitions are not dissimilar to causes% @or

example, the cause, the explosion that burned down the house, logically necessitates its effect, theburning down of the house, since it is a logical contradiction to assert that 0there is an explosionthat burned down the house and yet there is no e+ent of the house burning down0%But this obection is fallacious since 0the explosion that burned down the house0 does not refermerely to the cause but also to the effect% A definite description that refers merely to the causale+ent can be satisfied consistently with the non-occurrence of the effect5 for example, the definitedescription, 0the explosion that occurred in the house0, can be satisfied consistently with the non-satisfaction of 0the burning down of the house0%


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The fallaciousness of this obection can be explained more precisely in terms of referentiallytransparent and referentially opaue contexts% The definite description, 0the explosion thatresulted in the burning down of the house0, is a referentially transparent context5 this implies that0the burning down of the house0 occupies a position that is open to substitution and uantificationin 0the explosion that resulted in the burning down of the house% A description of the form 0theexplosion that resulted in the @0 permits co-referring expressions to be substituted for 0the @0 and

if a description of this form is satisfied, it follows that there is an @% "ince the description of theeffect, 0the @0, occurs in a referentially transparent context, 0the explosion that resulted in the @0refers to both the cause and the effect%By contrast, the definite description, 0the di+ine willing that the big bang occurs0, is areferentially opaue context and refers merely to the di+ine +olition% This description isreferentially opaue since it a propositional attitude construction, and positions within attitudeconstructions are not open to substitution and uantification%[$& "pecifically, a definitedescription of the form, 0the willing by x that the @ occurs0, does not permit substitutions of co-referring expressions for 0the @0, and 0the @0 is not open to uantification% This implies that if adescription of the form, 0the willing by x that the @ occurs0, is satisfied, it does not follow thatthere is an @% "ince the description of the effect, 0the @0, occurs in an opaue context, 0the willing

by x that the @ occurs0 refers only to the cause%1i+en this distinction, we may say that a definite description 7 of a cause also refers to the effectif and only if 7 includes a term for the effect that is open to substitution and uantification% Adefinite description 79 of a cause does not refer to the effect if and only if 79 either does notcontain a term for the effect or contains a term for the effect in an opaue context%This enables us to state our principle 3 about causes and logically sufficient conditions insemantic terms. the satisfaction of a definite description 7 of a cause logically implies theexistence of the effect if and only if 7 includes a term for the effect in a referentially transparentcontext% "ince the satisfaction of the definite description, 0the di+ine willing that the big bangoccurs0, logically implies that the big bang occurs, despite the fact that 0the big bang0 does not

occur in a referentially transparent context, it follows that this description does not refer to acause%The reason that the satisfaction of the description, 0the di+ine willing that the big bang occurs0,implies there is a big bang is not due to the logical form of the description the form is opaue3,but is due to the content of the description% This content is distincti+e in that it makes the rele+antconditionals about the di+ine +olition and the big bang logical truths% The expression, 0anomnipotent being0, means in part a being whose acts of will necessarily actualiFe what is willed,Thus, the sentence 0if an omnipotent being wills that the big bang is actualiFed, then the big bangis actualiFed0 expresses the same proposition as the sentence, 0if an omnipotent being, whose actsof will necessarily actualiFe what is willed, wills that the big bang is actualiFed, then the big bangis actualiFed0, which is a truth of logic%

Principle 3 about causes and logically sufficient conditions implies that no causal conditional isa logical theorem, where a causal conditional has the form 0if c occurs, then e occurs0 andsubstitutions for 0c0 are expressions that refer to the cause and do not include a term for the effectin a referentially transparent context%These restatements of principle 3 in semantic and logical terms suffice to refute the firstobection to my argument that the di+ine +olition is not a cause, the obection that 0for each causec and effect e, there is some description of c that logically implies the existence of e0%


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8b% 23 The first obection to my argument about causes and logically sufficient conditions wasthat di+ine +olitions are not uniue since e+ery cause can be described in a way that logicallyimplies the effect% A second obection is that there is some description of 1od9s willing the bigbang that does not logically imply that the big bang occurs, and therefore for this differentreason3 di+ine +olitions are not dissimilar to causes% The description, 0the willing that has for its

aim the actualiFation of the big bang0, can be used as a definite description of the rele+ant di+ine+olition and yet 0there occurs the willing that has for its aim the actualiFation of the big bang, butthe big bang is not actualiFed0 is not a logical contradiction% t follows the obection goes3 that1od9s willing need not be regarded as a logically sufficient condition of the big bang% Theobector may argue that the existence of such descriptions implies that whether or not a di+ine+olition logically necessitates the existence of its +olitional obect is not a fact about the di+ine+olition itself, but is relati+e to how the +olition is described%But this obection is in+alid, since the existence of a description of the di+ine +olition that doesnot logically imply that the big bang occurs is consistent with the di+ine +olition necessarilypossessing the relational property of being conoined with the occurrence of the big bang% Thisconsistency is an instance of the more general principle that 0something that necessarily possesses

a certain property @ can be described by a definite description 7 that does not include @ among itsdescripti+e conditions, and 7 will not imply that whate+er satisfies 7 necessarily possesses @0%@or example, the number nine necessarily possesses oddness and is described by 0the number ofplanets0, but since 0the number of planets0 does not include oddness among its descripti+econditions, it does not imply that whate+er satisfies this description necessarily possessesoddness%These responses to the two obections 8b% 3 and 8b% 23 help to ustify my claim that theproposition,3 @or any two particular e+ents or states x and y, if x is a logically sufficient condition of y, thenx is not a cause of y, is both true and precludes di+ine +olitions from being causes%

"8"A9" T>?8CE 8@ 6A*"AT8!7oes e+ery philosopher accept that a particular e+ent c that causes a particular e+ent e cannotlogically necessitate e/ ?rnest "osa has suggested a theory of causality that might appear to beinconsistent with this thesis% "osa distinguishes se+eral types of causation, nomological causation,material causation, conseuentialist causation, and inclusi+e causation% 8f interest to us is "osa9sdefinition of conseuentialist causation, since this definition is instantiated by 1od9s willing thebig bang% n cases of conseuentialist causation, 0the cause does entail the result orconseuence0[I&%"osa list se+eral examples of conseuentialist causation. i3 an apple9s being red causes the apple

to be colored5 ii3 Tom9s being in the room causes the general fact that there is someone in theroom5 iii3 Peter, Paul and )ary are tall and the only people in the room, and this causes thegeneral fact that e+eryone in the room is tall5 i+3 an apple9s being sweet, uicy, etc%, causes theapple to ha+e the +alue of goodness%"osa acknowledges that he has no analysis or definition of conseuentialist causation, but says itin+ol+es a conseuence deri+ing necessarily from a cause 0that is somehow more basic0[J&%


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The immediate reoinder to "osa9s theory is that his cases of conseuentialist causation are notcases of causation but cases of logical deri+ation, or, more exactly, cases where the instantiationof one property @ logically necessitates the instantiation of a second property 1, or whether theobtaining of one fact p logically necessitates the obtaining of a second fact % (hen "osa says thisdoes 0seem to be a genuine form of causation0[#&, he seems to be mistaken% ndeed, the man orwoman in the street, contemporary philosophers and scientists would all emphatically and

correctly assert that these are not genuine cases of causation% But in fairness to "osa, heacknowledges this +ery point, and makes some plausible obser+ations in this connection.0t might be obected that much of the foregoing is a mere terminological maneu+er, that it simplytakes what philosophers ha+e long called causation, relabels it 9nomological causation9, and goeson to classify it with certain wholly other relations that philosophers ha+e not heretofore calledcausal relations% And it might perhaps be that the word 9cause9 and its cognates ha+e been soclosely and so persistently associated with nomological causation by philosophers that they mustbe surrendered% But e+en then the basic point would remain, for nomological causation is arelation between a source and a conseuence or result, and so is material causation e%g%generation3, so is conseuentialist causation e%g% the apple is chromatically colored as a result ofbeing red3 and so is inclusi+e causation% % % These are all source-conseuence relations or result-

yielding relations%0[2;&Thus, we can agree with "osa inasmuch as causation can be classified with other result-yieldingrelations, such as the logical necessitation of a property @ by another property 1, as one type ofresult-yielding relation, but at the same time distinguish causation from these other noncausalresultyielding relations%ow might the defender of di+ine causality answer these arguments/ 8ne answer might be togrant that 1od9s willing is not a 0cause0 of the uni+erse9s beginning, but instead is the 0creator0 or0producer0 of the uni+erse9s beginning% But this change in terminology does not sol+e theproblem5 0c creates e0 and 0c produces e0 each imply 0c causes e0, so the problem is not a+oided%f we wish to stipulate that 0c creates e0 does not imply 0c causes e0, then we depri+e the word0creates0 of any apparent intelligibility% f 0creates0 no longer means what it normally means, thenwe are hard put to say what it means%A similar problem affects an alternati+e solution, namely, that we say that 1od 0wills0 theuni+erse to begin to exist, but does not 0cause0 it to begin to exist% pro+isionally used theterminology of 01od9s willing0 and 0di+ine +olition0 in the preceding sections, but this usagecalls for ree+aluation% 0x wills e and e occurs because of x9s willing0 logically implies 0x9s willing

causes e0% f 1od9s act of willing is not an act of causation, it is difficult to say what the word0willing0 means when applied to 1od% t does not mean what it means in such sentences as 0Hohnmo+ed his broken limb by a sheer act of will0%Perhaps we can say that the words 0willing0 and 0cause0 are used in an analogical ormetaphorical sense when applied to 1od% This means that 1od has some features that areanalogous to the features we normally mean by 0willing0 and 0cause0, and also some features thatare different% The analogy for 0willing0 would be this. f a human wills something, this willing isa mental e+ent that has for its aim bringing another e+ent into existence% Dikewise, we may say of


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1od that he or she experiences a mental e+ent and that this mental e+ent has for its aim bringinganother e+ent into existence% This is the analogy% There is also a difference, in that 1od9s willingis a logically sufficient condition for the existence of the e+ent that is willed, whereas a human9swilling is not logically sufficient for the e+ent that is willed%

>owe+er, this resort to the 0analogical0 use of words threatens to break down the intelligibility of

our talk about 1od9s willing% The explanation of the analogical meaning of these words is in termsof other words that also ha+e an analogical meaning% (e said that 1od9s willing is a mental e+entthat 0has for its aim bringing another e+ent into existence0% >owe+er, the literal meaning of thephrase about aiming for a goal implies that 0it is logically possible that this goal is not achie+ed0%(hen we say that Alice has the aim of writing a book, we mean, in part, that it is logicallypossible that she not succeed in achie+ing her aim% 1i+en the literal meaning of 0aims0, astatement of the form 0x aims to realiFe @ and @ is realiFed0 is neither a logical nor an analytictruth% 6onseuently, the explanation of the analogical meaning of 0di+ine willing0 in terms of0aiming to do something0 cannot in+ol+e a literal use of 0aiming to do something0% But if0aiming0 is used analogically, then our problem of explaining what we mean by our wordsreappears% This problem does not appear to ha+e a solution5 we are embarked on a regress ofexplaining analogically used words in terms of other analogically used words, with no way to end

this regress by an explanation that in+ol+es words in their normal and literal use% This regress is+icious5 in order to understand phrase K, we need to understand phrase K2, but in order tounderstand phrase K2, we need to understand phrase K=, and so on% This suggests we cannotattach any definite meaning to the assertion that 1od causes, wills or aims to bring the uni+erseinto existence%A DT?CAD @8C)*DAT8! 8@ T>? 7V!? C?DAT8! T8 T>? B1 BA!1But this is not to say that we cannot intelligibly talk about 1od and her relation to the big bang% tappears that we can say at least that there is some n-adic property @ exemplified by 1od, suchthat by +irtue of exemplifying this property, 1od stands in relation to the big bang of being alogically sufficient condition of the big bang% Perhaps we can e+en be more precise and say @ issome mental property, where 0mental0 is understood in terms of intentionality in the tradition ofBrentano, >usserl, 6hisholm and "earle3% @urther, we can say this intentional act experienced by1od has a certain property as its intentional obect, the property, being the big bang% The propertybeing the big bang will thereby ha+e a second order property, +iF%, being the intentional obect ofthe di+ine intentional act A, such that being an intentional obect of A is a logically sufficientcondition of being exemplified% Talk of 0intentional act0 may be literal here, since these aretechnical terms in the philosophical literature and 0act0 here has a different meaning than 0act0 in0Hane9s acted uickly to remedy the situation0 or 0the last act of the play was a disappointment0%f it is obected that 0intentional act0 does not ha+e a uni+ocal meaning between 0humans performembodied, non-omniscient and non-omnipotent3 intentional acts0 and 01od performsdisembodied, omniscient and omnipotent3 intentional acts0, then we can resort to a more generalle+el of talk% (e can say that there is a certain relation C in which 1od stands to the property

being the big bang, such that by +irtue of 1od standing in C to being the big bang, it is logicallynecessary that being the big bang is exemplified%n summary, we are safe in saying that 1od does not cause the big bang, but Cs the big bang,where 01od Cs the big bang0 means that 1od stands in a certain relation C to being the big bang,such that by +irtue of standing in this relation to this property, it is logically necessary that thisproperty is exemplified% @or ease of expression, will sometimes talk loosely in the followingsections of 1od standing in C to the big bang, but such talk should be strictly analyFed in the way analyFed 01od Cs the big bang0%3


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:% 8bections to the Arguments that 1od 6annot be a 6ause@C"T 8BH?6T8!t may be obected that the di+ine relation C cannot merely be that of being a logically sufficientcondition of the big bang% 1od9s standing in this logical relation to the big bang is not similar to

the sun9s being orange standing in relation to the sun9s being colored as a logically sufficientcondition% The sun9s exemplification of being orange does not in any sense bring about or producethe sun9s exemplification of being colored% But 1od9s exemplification of C does bring about thebig bang%But this obection is o+ertly uestion-begging% ha+e already argued that 1od9s standing inrelation to the big bang does not satisfy any extant definition of causation section 23 and does notsatisfy a logically necessary condition of being a cause section =3% Thus, to introduce synonymsof 0causes0, such as 0brings about0 or 0produces0, etc%, is simply to beg the uestion at issue%t may be countered by the obector that there is an important disanalogy between the case of therele+ant di+ine e+ent and the case of other logically sufficient conditions, +iF%, that 1od9s standing

in relation to the big bang is an e+ent, a concrete particular, and the big bang is another concreteparticular, whereas the other logical relations are among abstract obects%This countering argument is inaccurate% According to one conception of e+ents or states, an e+entor state is the exemplification of a property by something% 1od9s exemplification of the polyadicproperty C is a state, and so is Hane9s exemplification of running and her exemplification of beingali+e% The concrete state of Hane9s exemplification of running is a logically sufficient condition ofthe concrete state of Hane9s exemplification of being ali+e% Thus, there are two concrete statesstanding in the relation of one being the logically sufficient condition of the other% This situationis similar in this respect to 1od standing to the big bang in the rele+ant relation%!onetheless, the intuition may persist that there is an important ingredient in 1od9s relation to thebig bang of logically necessitating the big bang that is not present in the sun9s orangenesslogically necessitating the sun9s being colored, or Hane9s running necessitating her being ali+e, aningredient that is metaphorically captured by causal language 0produces0, 0brings about0, etc%3%The obector may simply state that it is intuiti+ely ob+ious that there is this difference betweenthe two cases, e+en if this difference cannot be adeuately expressed in words%But this amounts to retreating to an ineffability theory% (e now ha+e the theory. 01od does notliterally cause the big bang, but in some metaphorical sense causes the big bang, e+en though it isimpossible to specify literally the analogy between causation and 1od9s relation to the big bangthat ustifies the metaphor%0 The ineffability theory is that 1od9s C-ing the big bang is a relationwith two properties5 one property of 1od9s C-ing the big bang is that the C-ing is a logicallysufficient condition of the big bang, and the second property is an indescribable property, whichwe may call an Lproperty, such that the L-property is a property of 1od9s C-ing that makes the C-ing analogous in a rele+ant respect to a causal relation%>owe+er, the ineffability theory fails for three reasons%i3 f the L-property makes the C-ing analogous to a causal relation, then the L-property is someproperty shared in common by the causal relation and the C relation% "ince the L-propertybelongs to the causal relation, and we can literally describe the causal relation, we should be ableto literally specify the causal relation9s L-property and say that it is this property that the Crelation has in common with the causal relation% But the ineffability theory fails to do this%


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ii3 The ineffability theory has no ustification for asserting there is this L-property% Theineffability theory mentions no datum that the postulation of the L-property is used to explain,and it introduces no premises from which the presence of the L-property is deduced% The onlyapparent ustification might be that one has had a mystical experience and directly 0beheld0 1odC-ing the big bang and 0beheld0 the L-property of this C-ing, but that in reporting this intuition,one realiFed there are no adeuate and literally used words that could describe this L-property%

>owe+er, if the theory that 1od metaphorically causes the uni+erse amounts to nothing more thandark sayings about what is 0beheld0 in an ineffable mystical experience, then this not a theorybased on natural reason but is a flight into mysticism and the deli+erances of 0supernaturalreason0% t would hold no interest for a philosopher intent on constructing a world-+iew based onnatural reason%iii3 The best explanation of the origins of the 0intuition0 that 1od metaphorically causes the bigbang, and is not merely a logically sufficient condition of the big bang, does not imply thisintuition is true% The origin of this 0intuition0 is the long and per+asi+e tradition in philosophy,religion and 0ordinary language03 of using causal words, 0causes0, 0creates0, 0wills0, etc%, todescribe 1od9s relation to the beginning of the uni+erse% The psychological associations producedby the adoption of this linguistic tradition gi+es rise to the 0intuition0 that there must be an L-

property of 1od9s relation to the big bang that grounds the metaphorical usage of 0causes0%There are differences between for example3 the orangeGcolor relation and the C relation of 1odto the big bang, but none are causal-like% 8range is a kind of color, but 1od9s relation to the bigbang is not a kind of big bang% @urther, the orangeness is a monadic property of the same thing ofwhich being colored is a property, but the C property is polyadic and interconnects differentobects% Thirdly, being orange and being colored are both physical properties, whereas the di+inerelation is a mental property and being the big bang is a physical property%(e can also specify formal features of the C relation. it is asymmetric, transiti+e and irreflexi+e,but many non-causal relations also possess these formal features%

"?68!7 8BH?6T8!The theist, agnostic or atheist who belie+es it is logically intelligible to say that 1od is anoriginating cause of the uni+erse may take the bull by the horns and arrogantly assert that 1od9sbeing a logically sufficient condition of the big bang is a counterexample to the extant definitionsof causation discussed in section 2, and shows these definitions are wrong, and is also a +alidcounterexample to my principle 3 that states causes are not logically sufficient conditions% Theobector proclaims. 0All actual and possible contiguity or nomological definitions of causationare false% The correct definition is a non-contiguity and singularist definition that allows thatsome causal relations are logical relations%0The problem with this 0arrogant obection0 is that there is no apparent ustification for the belief

that there is a correct definition of causation that is non-contiguous, singularist and permitslogical relations apart from 1od9s alleged acts of causation% But these are precisely the e+entswhose causal nature is in dispute% To assume, in face of the arguments ha+e gi+en, that theseacts are casual relations is a uestion-begging response% n order to demonstrate that the rele+antdi+ine relation is a causal relation, we must ha+e a logically independent reason to belie+e there issome correct definition of causation that the di+ine relation C satisfies% But there is no suchreason% 6onsider the argument.


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23 There is a sufficient reason H to belie+e that there is a correct definition of causation that issingularist, non-contiguous and permits logical relations%Therefore,=3 The di+ine relation C is a causal relation%

f the offered reason H is =3, then the argument that the di+ine relation C is a causal relation isuestion-begging%t may be obected that the defender of the 0there cannot be a di+ine cause0 thesis is in a similaruestion-begging situation and thus that there is a 0stand off0% t may be said that the defenderbegs the uestion by assuming that =3 is false or cannot play the role of reason H%This obection fails since the defender of the 0there cannot be a di+ine cause0 thesis has a non-uestion-begging argument for the falsity of =3% The argument is that all cases of causation thatare not in dispute are inconsistent with the hypothesis that there is a correct definition of the sortmentioned in 23% Both parties to the dispute agree that physical e+ents cause other physical

e+ents, and that the mental e+ents of intelligent organisms cause other e+ents assuming anappropriate philosophy of mind3, and this agreement is the common ground between theopponent and defender of the 0there cannot be a di+ine cause0 thesis% But these common groundsare inconsistent with the positi+e thesis, +iF%, that 0there can be a di+ine cause0, if only for thereason that it is a logically necessary property of the agreed upon cases of causation that thecausal e+ent is not a logically sufficient condition of the effect% "ince these causal e+ents arenecessarily not logically sufficient conditions, a definition of a cause that encompassed both thesecausal e+ents and 1od9s relation to the big bang would include the contradiction 0is not alogically sufficient condition and is a logically sufficient condition0% The agreed upon cases mayalso include nomological and contiguity conditions, and conseuently there may be furthercontradictions, e%g%, 0instantiates some law of nature and does not instantiate any law of nature0and 0is spatially contiguous with the effect and is not spatially contiguous with the effect0%

T>C7 8BH?6T8!t may be argued that a disuncti+e definition can sol+e the problem % "uppose we ha+e thisdisuncti+e definition of causation. c is a cause of e if and only if c is either a logically sufficientcondition of e, or c is not a logically sufficient condition of e and instead satisfies say3 the>umean conditions%8ne problem with this disuncti+e definition is that it classifies the sun9s being orange as a causeof the sun9s being colored% "o it does not work for this reason, as well as for the other reasonsmentioned in my discussion of "osa9s account of causation%

?+en if we add a temporal priority condition, this disuncti+e definition will not work% (e maysay. c is a cause of e if and only if ?T>?C c is both a logically sufficient condition of e andtemporally prior to e 8C c is not a logically sufficient condition of e and satisfies say3 the>umean conditions% >owe+er, the first disunct is satisfied by many items that are not causes%Hohn9s being a li+ing organism or Hohn9s being embodied in a mortal body at time t3 is bothtemporally prior to and is a logically sufficient condition of Hohn9s being dead, but Hohn9s being ali+ing organism or Hohn9s being embodied in a mortal body at time t3 is not the cause of hisdeath% >is death is caused, say, by a car hitting him as he crosses the street% The conceptexpressed by 0is a li+ing organism0 analytically includes the concept expressed by 0is mortal0 and


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the rele+ant logical truths e%g%, 0if x is an organism that dies, then x dies03 can be obtained bysubstituting synonyms for synonyms%"uppose we become e+en more specific and say instead. c is a cause of e if and only if ?T>?C cis 1od9s standing in the C relation to e 8C c is not a logically sufficient condition of e andsatisfies say3 the >umean conditions% But this attempt to produce a satisfactory definition fails

for two interrelated reasons.i3 A logically necessary condition of a correct definition of a purely ualitati+e uni+ersal, be it amonadic property or a relation such as causation or intentionality3 is that it not include a disunctthat mentions one particular case that does not meet the general conditions described in the otherdisunct% A purely ualitati+e uni+ersal does not include any particulars as constituents% Anexample of an impurely ualitati+e uni+ersal is being taller than )ount ?+erest% 7efinitions ofpurely ualitati+e uni+ersals mention general conditions and do not include mentions of aparticular case, such as the particular case of 1od standing in an C relation to something%ii3 f this logical condition of correct definitions of purely ualitati+e uni+ersals +iF%, thecondition of not mentioning a particular case in a disunct3 were allowed to be +iolated, then the

procedure of testing definitions by the counterexampling method the standard method of testingthe correctness of definitions3 is no longer usable% Any counterexample to a definition could bemade consistent with the definition by adding to the definition a disunct that mentions thecounterexample% To sa+e the definition 0x is a planet if and only if x is a large body that orbits astar and contains no life0, we can expand it to 0x is a planet if and only if ?T>?C x is a largebody that orbits a star and contains no life 8C x is the ?arth0% The distinction between correctdefinitions and ad hoc definitions would collapse%@8*CT> 8BH?6T8!A final argument is that philosophers from Plato to Plantinga ha+e described 1od9s rele+antmental state as a cause of the uni+erse, and therefore that this is an acceptable notion% There is

both an established philosophical usage for calling 1od9s relation to the uni+erse a 0causalrelation0 and a long and +enerable tradition that held it to be coherent to describe a di+ine mentalstate as a cause%This argument, which is in effect an 0appeal to authority0, is unsuccessful, since if this argumentwere admissable, it could be used to reect any new theory that is inconsistent with traditionallyheld theories% This 0appeal to authority0 at best moti+ates us to examine seriously the notion that1od9s mental states are causes, in deference to the fact that +irtually all philosophers andlaypersons ha+e accepted this notion as logically unproblematic%Perhaps to respond fully to this obection we also need an explanation of why this mistakentradition has pre+ailed for so long and among so many philosophers% think the main reason is

that an in+estigation of the logical connection between what is expressed by 0the uni+erse9sbeginning to exist is the result of a di+ine act0 and what is expressed by 0the natural e+ent e is thecausal result of the natural e+ent e0 has not been systematically undertaken% The main exceptionis the different but illuminating discussions of this connection in the recent writings of Adolf1runbaum[2&%3 )ost philosophers ha+e tacitly presupposed that the thesis that 0di+ine causationis logically possible0 is unproblematic, but once this thesis is examined, the presupposition isseen to be false%


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$% 6onclusion. 6osmological and Teleological Arguments for 1od9s !onexistenceThe argument of this paper might seem at first glance to tell us more about the nature of causationand the nature of 1od than about atheism +ersus theism% 0A di+ine state cannot cause the uni+erseto begin to exist0 does not entail that 1od does not exist or that the big bang is not a logical resultof a di+ine state% t merely entails that we cannot describe a di+ine state as the originating cause

of the uni+erse%!onetheless, there are important and perhaps decisi+e implications for the debate between theismand atheism, namely, that arguments from the necessary truth, a priori truth or empirical truth ofsome causal principle cannot be a rele+ant premise from which to deduce or induce that the bigbang is the logical conseuence of 1od standing in the relation C to the property being the bigbang% 6onsider the following argument.


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Cesearch for this paper was supported by an American 6ouncil of Dearned "ocieties @ellowshipfor ##$, and by a !ational ?ndowment for the >umanities "ummer "tipend for ##:%[&% 7a+id >ume, 0An Abstract of A Treatise of >uman !ature9, in An nuiry 6oncerning>uman *nderstanding !ew Eork. Bobbs-)erril, #::3, pp% J$-I%

[2&% t is worth noting that )ichael Tooley9s theory implies that a cause reuires an underlyinglaw of nature, but that the cause is not specified solely by the law of nature and noncausal facts%Although Tooley9s definition differs from the traditional reducti+e definitions, its inclusion of anomological condition precludes it from being satisfied by a di+ine +olition% "ee his 6ausation. ACealist Approach 8xford. 6larendon Press, #JI3%[=&% 6arl >empel, Aspects of "cientific ?xplanation !ew Eork. The @ree Press, #$:3, pp% =istory and Philosophy of "cience I#I3, pp% =:-=$%[I&% 6astaneda, p% 22%[J&% Haegwon 4im, 0?+ents as Property ?xemplifications0, in Action Theory, eds% )% Brand and

7% (alton 7ordrecht. Ceidel, #I$3%[#&% Brian Deftow, Time and ?ternity thaca. 6ornell *ni+ersity Press, ##=3%[;&% 7onald 7a+idson, 06ausal Celations0, in 6ausation, eds% "osa and Tooley%[&% !icholas (olterstorff, 01od ?+erlasting0 in 1od and the 1ood, ed% 6% 8rlebeke and %"medes 1rand Capids, ). ?erdmans, #I:3 #I#5 'uentin "mith, Danguage and Time !ewEork. 8xford *ni+ersity Press, ##=3%[2&% 7a+id Dewis, Philosophical Papers, Volume !ew Eork. 8xford *ni+ersity Press, #J=3,p% I;%

[=&% Dewis, p% I;%[


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[$&% )ore exactly, a notational occurrence of a term in a position within attitude constructions isnot open to substitution and uantification5 a relational occurrence of a term in this position isopen to substitution and uantification% 0@0 occurs relationally in 0y desires that there is an @0 ifthis is read as 0?x3 @x% y desires that. ?x3 @x%0 By contrast, 0@0 occurs notationally if 0y desiresthat there is an @0 is read as 0y desires that. ?x3 @x%0 "ee 7a+id 4aplan, 08pacity0, in ThePhilosophy of (%V% 'uine, ed% D% >annard and P% "chlipp Da "alle. 8pen 6ourt3% (hen talk

about 0positions with attitude constructions0 ha+e in mind only positions within attitudeconstruction in which terms occur notationally%[I&% ?rnest "osa, 0Varieties of 6ausation0, in 6ausation, eds% "osa and Tooley, p% 2

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PsyFun - Causation and the Logical Impossibility of a Divine Cause