Psychology of Political Violence

Social Scientist

Psychology of Political ViolenceAuthor(s): Gopal SinghSource: Social Scientist, Vol. 4, No. 6 (Jan., 1976), pp. 3-13Published by: Social ScientistStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3516257 .

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GOPAL SIJNGH

Psychology of Political Violence

POLITICAL VIOLENCE is episodic in the history of most organized political communities and chronic in many. No country in the world has been free of it even for the span of a generation. The prevalence of violence in the realm of politics particularly poses the cardinal problem: is man violent by nature or do circumstances make him so? Is he inherently aggressive or aggressive only in response to specific social conditions? In the Hobbesian view, the inescapable legacy of human nature is the "life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short". This view has been given credence recently by ethnologists, whose study of animals in their habitats led them to conclude that the aggressive drive in animals is innate, ranking with the instincts of hunger, sex and fear.1

But most psychologists and social scientists do not regard aggression as fundamentally spontaneous or instinctive nor does their evidence support such a view. Rather they regard most aggression, including violence, as sometimes an emotional response to socially induced frustration, and sometimes a dispassionate, learned response evoked by specific situations.2 Nature provides us only with the capacity for violence. It is social circumstance that determines whether and how we exercise that capacity.8 Psychological evidence suggests that men have a capacity but not a need for aggression; other evidence points to the patterns of social circumstances



SOCIAL SCIENTIST

in which men exercise their capacity collectively.' Political violence is. not an ineluctable manifestation of human nature. It is a specific kind of res-

ponse to specific conditions of ocial existence. The capacity, but not need, for violence appears to be biologically inherent in man.5

While the concept of aggression has received extensive elaboration in psychology, the frustration-anger-aggression hypothesis seems to

engage the American theorists most.6 There is a variety of theoretical

writings on the sources of aggression, some of it speculative, some of it based on empirical research. However some psychological theories about the sources of aggressive behaviour can be disregarded at the outset. There is for instance little support for pseudo-psychological assertions that most or all revolutionaries or conspirators are deviants, fools or maladjusted.7 Psychodynamic explanations of the revolutionary personality may be useful for microanalysis of particular events but contribute relatively little to general theories of collective violence.8

Aggressive Impulse Ted Robert Gurr categorizes the psychological assumptions about

the generic sources of human aggression into three:(a)that aggression is

solely instinctive; (b) that it is solely earned and (c) that it is an innate

response activitated by frustration.9 The instinct theories of aggre-ssion represented among others by Freud's qualified attribution of the impulse to distructiveness or a death instinct, and by Lorenz's view of aggression as a survival-enhancing instinct, assume that most or all men have within them an autonomous source of aggressive impulses. Although there is no definitive support for the assumption, its advocates, including Freud and Lorenez, have often applied it to the explanation of collective as well as individual aggression. l?This assumption as we have already stated is evident in Hobbes's characterization of men in the state of nature, and

perhaps implicit in Neiburg's recent concern for the people's capacity for

outraged, uncontrolled, bitter and bloody violence,'1 but plays no significant role in contemporary theories of civil strife.

The second assumption that violence is a learned response, rationally chosen and dispassionately employed, is common to a number of recent theoretical approaches to collective conflict. Among theorists of revola-

tion, Johnson repeatedly speaks of civil violence as purposive, as a form of behaviour intended to disorient the behaviour of others, thereby bringing about the demise of a hated social system.12 Timasheff regards revolution as a residual, even an expedient resorted to when other ways of over-

coming tensions have failed.18 Parsons attempt to fit political violence into the framew9rk of social interaction theory, treating the resort to force as a way of acting chosen by the actors for purposes of deterrence, punish- ment or symbolic demonstration of capacity to act. 4 Schelling represents those conflict theorists who explicitly assume rational behaviour and

interdependence of adversaries' decisions in all types of conflicts. 5

The third and the most important psychological assumption is that

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PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITI CAL VIOLENCE

of response to frustration. The frustration-anger-aggression theory is more

systematically developed and has substantially more empirical support than the other two theories. The most influential formulation of frustra-

tion-anger-aggression theory was proposed by Dollard'6 and his colleagues at Yale in 1939. The basic postulate is that the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and that the existence of frustration leads to some form of aggression. The primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be the

frustration-aggression mechanism. The anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes man to aggression. If frustrations are

sufficiently prolonged or sharply felt, aggression is quite likely to occur.17

So in its most basic and fundamental formulation, the frustration-aggression hypothesis maintains that aggression is the result of frustration. Frustration itself is defined as the thwarting or interference with the attainment of goals, aspirations or expectations, and aggression as behaviour

designed to injure physically or otherwise those toward whom it is directed. The disposition to respond aggressively when frustrated is part of man's

biological make-up; there is a biologically inherent tendency in men and animals to attack the frustrating agent.18

Analogous concepts used by contemporary American theorists are too many to be stated here. We can mention only a few. Lerner des- cribed the gap between what people want and what they get as "frustrat-

ing" and suggests revolutionary consequences. 9 Crozier says that one

element common to all rebels is frustration, defined as "inability to do something one badly wants to do, through circumstances beyond one's control."20 Four analogous concepts however are more important arnd need detailed analysis. Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation is defined by Ted Robert Gurr as "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities."2 Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which

people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the

goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining and maintain-

ing, given the social means available to them. Societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities increase the intensity of discontent. Societal conditions that decrease man's average value positions without decreasing their value

expectations similarly increase deprivation, hence the intensity of discontent.22 The emphasis of the hypothesis is on the perception of deprivation people may be subjectively deprived of, with reference to their expectation even though an objective observer might not judge them to be in want. Similarly the existence of what the observer judges to be abject poverty or "absolute deprivation" is not necessarily thought to be unjust or irremediable by those who experience it.28

Gurr's hypothesis is that the potential for collective violence varies

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strongly with the intensity and the scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity.2' Deprivation-induced discontent is a general spur to action. Psychological theory and group conflict theory both sug- gest that the greater the intensity of discontent, the more likely is violence. The outlines of Gurr's hypothesis can be sketched briefly: the primary causal sequence in political violence is, first, the development of discontent, second, the politicization of that discontent, and finally, its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors. The great majority of acts of collective violence in recent decades have had at least some political objects; the more intense such violent acts are, the more likely they are to be focused primarily or exclusively on the political system. Intense discontent is quite likely to be politicized discontent and is a necessary condition for the resort to violence in politics. But however intense and focused the impetus to violence is, its actualization is strongly influenced by the patterns of coercive control and institutional support in the political community. Political violence is of the greatest magnitude and most likely to take the form of internal war, if regimes and those who oppose them exercise approximately equal degree of coercive control and command similar and relatively high degrees of institutional support in society.a

Alarmist Foreboding and Systematic Frustration Davies attributes revolutionary outbreaks to the frustration which

results from a short-term decline in achievement following a long-term increase that generated expectations about continuing increase.28 Davies in his analysis of several revolutions, concludes that contrary to Marxian

expectations, revolutions do not occur during periods of prolonged abject or worsening situations of social deprivation. Neither does the evidence sustain the insight of de Tocqueville and others, that revolutions are per- petrated during periods of relative prosperity and improvement. Instead Davies postulates a J-curve of socio-economic development, whereby revolution occurs in social systems in which social well-being has been

continually raised for an extended period of time, followed by an abrupt or sharp setback, with the certainty of social expectations being rein- forced during the period of continued socio-economic development. The

sharp reversal in social fortunes creates an intolerable discrepancy between achievement and expectations. It is also possible that the unexpected reversal in attainment creates an alarmist expectation of continued severe decreases in levels of achievement. Such a fear for the future, possibly an

exaggerated fear, motivates present actions. The concept of frustration is often thought more appropriate to

individual than to social circumstances. Feierabands and Nesvold believe that the notion of "systematic frustration" 27 makes the concept applicable to the analysis of aggregate, violent political behaviour within social

systems. They define systematic frustration with reference to three cri- teria: (1) as frustration interfering with the attainment and maintenance

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PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

of social goals, aspirations and values; (2) as frustration simultaneously experienced by members of a social aggregate and hence also complex social systems, and (3) as frustration or strain that is produced within the structures and processes of a social system. Systematic frustration is thus frustration that is exprienced simultaneously and collectively within societies.

Guided by this definition, Feierabands and Nesvold adopt two basic propositions from the frustration-aggression hypothesis and restate them with reference to social systems: (1) violent political behaviour is

instigated by systematic frustration; and (2) systematic frustration may stem, among other circumstances of the social system, from specific characteristics of social change.

Four general hypotheses figure in their theory: (1) systematic frustration at any given time is a function of the discrepancy between

present social aspirations, expectations, on the one hand, and social achievements on the other; (2) In addition, present estimates or expectations of future frustrations or satisfactions are also responsible for levels of

present frustration or satisfaction; (3) Uncertainties in social expectations in themselves increase the sense of systematic frustration. Ambiguity as to whether the future will bring disaster or salvation should be considered a

distressing experience, adding to the present sense of frustration. Only in case of disaster is certainty likely to be judged as more frustrating than

uncertainty; (4) Conflicting aspirations and conflicting expectations provide yet another source of systematic frustration. Conflict is a sys-

tematically frustrating circumstance. Conflict is considered as a specific case of frustration in which an individual's alternative motives, aspirations and

expectations work at cross purposes, blocking one another.

Tensions of Transition The causes of violence and instability in the emerging countries of

Asia, Africa and Latin America, argues Huntington,28 may be found in the lag in the development of viable political institutions on the one hand and social and economic change on the other. Huntington like Feiereband divides societies into three: traditional, transitional and modern. While the first and the last are less prone to political violence and instability, the transitional societies suffer from political violence every now and then. Revolutionary upheavals, military coups, insurrections, guerrilla warfares, and assassinations are a common feature of transitional societies.

Huntington does not agree with the thesis that it is poverty and economic and social backwardness which cause violence in society which even Mc Namara believed, "There is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness... all pervasive poverty under- mines government of any kind. It is a persistent cause of instability which makes democracy well-nigh impossible to practise."29 Huntington argues that it is not poverty and backwardness which cause political violence, rather it is the desire to be rich and modern which breed violence:

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If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor but because they are trying to be rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor and stable... It is precisely the devolution of modernization throughout the world which increases the prevalence of violence around the world...causes of violence lay with the modernization rather than with the backwardness. Wealtheir nations tend to be more stable than those less wealthy but the poorest nations, those at the bottom of the international economic ladder, tend to be less prone to violence and instability than those countries just above them.80

He goes on to say that in modernizing countries, violence, unrest and extremism are more often found in the wealthier parts of the country than in the poorer sections. In analyzing the situation in India, Hunting- ton quotes Houselitz and Weiner who found that

the correlation between political stability and economic development is poor or even negative. Under British rule political violence was most prevalent in the 'economically most highly developed provinces' and after independence violence remained more likely in the indu- strialized and urban centres than in the more backward and under-

developed areas of India. '

Strains of Instability: Gap Hypothesis According to Huntington some measure of economic growth is

necessary to make instability possible: "The simple poverty thesis falls down because people who are really poor are too poor for politics and too poor for protest. They are indifferent, apathetic, and lack exposure to the media and other stimuli which would arouse their aspirations in such manner as to galvanize them into political activity."' 2

"The abjectly poor, too," Eric Hoffer observed, "stand in awe of the world around them and are not hospitable to change... there is thus a conservatism'of the destitute as profound as the conservatism of the privileged, and the former is as much a factor in the perpetuation of a social order as the latter."33 Poverty itselfis a barrier to instability. "Those who are concerned about the immediate goal of the next meal are not apt to worry about the grand transformation of society. Just as social mobilization is necessary to provide the motive for instability, so also some measure of economic development is necessary to provide the means for instability." I

But at another extreme, Huntington says, among other countries which have reached a relatively high level of economic development, a high rate of economic growth is compatible with political stability. Econo- mically developed countries are more stable and have higher rates of growth than economically less developed countries. "Thus, the relationship between the rate of economic growth and political instability varies with the level of economic development. At low levels, a positive relation- hip exists, at medium levels no significant relations and at high levels a

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negative relationship.85 In the end Huntington states what he calls the "Gap Hypothesis",

which is something akin to Feierabands's theory of social change and violence and Ted Robert Gurr's concept of relative discrepancy and

political violence. Social mobilization is much more destabilizing than economic development. The gap between these two forms of change furnished some measure of the impact of modernization on political stability. Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibi- lities of satisfaction. These experiences break the cognitive and attitudinal barriers of the traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations and wants. The ability of a transitional society to satisfy these new aspirations, however, increases much more slowly than the aspirations themselves. Consequently a gap develops between aspiration and expectation, want formation and want satisfaction, or the aspirations function and the level of living function. This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfac- tion. In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index to

political instability. Social frustration leads to demands on government and the expansion of political participation to enforce those demands. Political backwardness of the country in terms of political institutionliza- tion, moreover, makes it difficult if not impossible for the demands upon the government to be expressed through legitimate channels and to be moderated and aggregated within the political system. Hence the sharp increase in political participation gives rise to political instability and violence.

Huntington closes his thesis with his conviction that fully modernized and economically developed countries have little instability and violence: "the sharp difference between the transitional and modern countries demonstrates the thesis that m,dernity means stability and modernization instability."86 And the ideal model of modernity and prosperity in his mind is America.

Collective Bewilderment Closely related to the Huntington hypothesis is the Feierabands-

Nesvold hypothesis87 that with the process of modernization and social

change, political violenee is closely associated. But unlike Huntington they say social changes are of two types. Firstly that which has beneficial and

pacifying social consequences: if social change is perceived as bringing gratification and if it fulfills aspiration there is no reason to expect social crises in its wake. On the contrary, they may have a stabilizing effect on the political order. Secondly change which brings with it social circumstances that breed discontent and strain: the result of the social discontent and strain is protest movements, turmoil and violence. "Given these cont-

radictory insights, the idea of change alone is not sufficient to explain the occurrences of violent political behaviour...The blanket assertion that

change breeds violence is too simplistic."T

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Feierabands and Nesvold state their hypothesis like this: massive

change that moves people physically into new environments exposes their minds to new ideas and casts them in new and unfamiliar roles is very likely to create collective bewilderment. This bewilderment may find

expression in turmoil and social violence.8 And they derive the same conclusion as Huntington:

Political violence is associated with the transitional process... Nations may be classified into three groups-modern, traditional and

modernizing. The latter are passing through the transitional stage from traditional society to modernity. Generally, this period of transition is regarded as one that entails an inordinate amount of strain, tension and crisis.4

The main argument of their hypothesis is that members of transitional societies aspire to the benefits of modernity, yet modern goals may be blocked by the values inherent in traditional society.4 1 Any modicum of m6dernity introduced into traditional society will conflict with its tradi- tions. The farther the process of transition progresses, the more likely and more intense the conflicts between modern and established patterns. The midpoint, of transitional process is the highest intensity of conflict characterized by a high incidence of violent activity. It is because at this midpoint accomplishment of modernity equals those of tradition and the drive towards modernity is offset by the contradictory and equal attrac- tion of traditional ways. This is the stage of the most intense struggle. Diversionist Intent

The American theories of etiology of political violence are faulty and misleading. The flood of literature emanating from the United States on modernization, violence and revolution is meant to divert the attention of the youth of the emerging nations of the "Third World" from the real causes of violence and revolution which are poverty,inequality and exploitation. American social scientists are recruited by the White House, the CIA and various foundations to churn out jargons and theories to confuse the

peoples of the developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America regard- ing the causes of violence and revolution and thereby to weaken all other theories, particularly the Marxist-Leninist theory.42

The frustration-anger-aggression hypotheses may find application in the case of individuals but not in the case of societies. American theorists apply these theses to societies and nowhere do they mention what Marx,Lenin and Mao have said about the causes of violence and revolution. Actually American prophets pose modernization as an alternative to revolution. They think that modernization of political institutions and processes can be independent of economic modernization,48 and that a change in relations of production is not a precondition for modernization. Modernization provides an ideological alternative to the theorists of Ameri- can imperialism and a critique of the revolutionary Marxist world-view.

Marx also accepted modernization as an integral part of the

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revolutionary process. But Marx's concept of modernization fundamentally differs from its western variety. Marx held that in order to be successful, modernization has to be achieved not purely by political or administrative reform but predicated upon a structural change in socio-economic relations.44 The conspicuous aspect of modernization and change is social revolution. It is a change in depth.45 Where there is no change there is no history.' 6 Political modernization is like changing the roof of a building leaving the pillars of the old structure intact. But in Marxian termi- nology "not only the death of the old order but the birth of a new order is needed,"47 because "revolution is a product inevitably of some deep- seated irrationality or incoherence in the existing arrangements of society."'4

The Huntington-Feierabands-Nesvold thesis that violence and instability are at a peak in transitional society and that modern and traditional societies are comparatively free from violence is also open to criticism. If America is a modern polity, why is there greater violence in that country than in India,a transitional polity? Why do more political murders take place in America than in India? Even in the most traditional countries of Africa and Latin America violence is as dominant as in transitional countries. Tribal and feudal violence and military coups are a daily occurrence. The wave of violence which swept the so-called modernized countries of Europe and America (student violence, particularly) between 1968 and 1970 falsifies the Huntington hypothesis that modern societies are free from instability and violence. The student uprising in France during General de Gaulle's time also clearly contradicts this hypothesis. Institutional and Revolutionary Violence

Huntington's hypothesis that the poor are too poor for politics or protest and they protest only when they are taught so-called modern values49 is rather fantastic. It is the poor who are most prone to violence and constitute the most potent revolutionary force as they have "nothing to lose but their chains."What is needed is to convince them that they are poor because they have been exploited by the rich for ages and that their lot can be improved if they take up arms against their exploiters and liquidate them. After all, revolution through violence did take place in comparatively backward and traditional countries like Cuba and China. Once the masses are enlightened and apprised of the real causes of their misery and poverty, they take to arms and fight to the finish. The history of communist movements in Russia, China, Vietnam and Cuba is a clear testimony to this fact.

However, this is not saying that there is no political violence in socialist societies in Russia, China, Cuba and elsewhere. The emphasis is that there is much less violence here than in the bourgeois-democratic states. Till the goal of a classless and stateless society is achieved, violence is bound to operate because the state is, as Marx said, an agency of exploitation of the proletariat in a bourgeois democracy and even after

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the revolution, the "class enemy" dies hard. Most of the causes of exploitation and hence of violence are eliminated but not completely in prole- tarian dictatorship. The state with all its paraphernalia-the military, the

police and the bureaucracy-still exists and hence violence also will continue.

Thus exploitation, poverty and inequality are the primary and root causes of violence in society and politics, and other causes such as

revenge, lust for power, instinct for domination and ambition are only secondary by-products. The more the exploitation, the more intense will be violence. The basic forces behind exploitation are the dominant socio-economic groups in society. The political apparatus is controlled by the dominant groups which in order to realize or maintain their interests use the various instrumentalities at their disposal. Consequently exploitation is perpetuated through the institutionalization of the exploitative apparatus in the form of political structure. It is the institutionalized nature of exploitation that brings forth various forms of organized group and mass violence, to preserve the concretization of dominant interests. Most often the ignorant and exploited masses are themselves used as tools

by the dominant socio-economic groups for the furtherance of their vested interests. If the exploited are made politically conscious of the situation

they can be taught the use of revolutionary violence to be turned against the exploiters.

1 Konard Lorenz, On Aggression, New York 1966; and Robert Andrey, The Territoria Imperative, New York 1966.

2 Leonard Berkowitz, Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis, New York 1962, and

Ashley Montague (ed.), Man and Aggression, New York 1968. This assumption underlies almost all the studies in the volume entitled The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspective, Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, (eds). Washington 1969, and also in Gurr's book Why Men

Rebel, Princeton, 1970. 8 Graham and Gurr, op.cit., p 802. 4 Gurr, op. cit., p ix. 0 Ibid., p317. 6 For an early classic theoretical statement of the frustration-aggression hypothesis,

see John Dollard, Frustration and Aggression, New Haven 1939. 7 Riezler Kurt, "On the Psychology of Modern Revolution", Social Research,

September 1943, pp 320-36; portions of Eric Hoffer's The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, New York 1951, and Donald J Goodspeed, The

Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d' etat, New York 1962. 8 A recent study of this type is E Victor Wolfenstein's The Revolutionary Personality:

Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi, Princeton 1967. 9 Gurr, op. cit., pp 31-33.

10 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, John Riviers (trans.) London 1930; Konard Lorenz, op. cit., ch. 13 and 14. H L Nieburg, "The Threat of Violence and Social Change", American Political

Science Review, vol 61, December 1962, p 870. Also see his Political Violence, the

Behavioural Process,_ New York 1961. 12 Chalmer Johnson, Revolutionary Changes, Boston 1966, pp 12-13. 8 Timasheff, War and Revolution, New York 1965, p 154.

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14 Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War: Problems and Approaches, New York 1964, pp 34-36.

'6 Thomas C Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge 1960. 16 John Dollard op. cit; also see Elton D McNeil, "Psychology and Aggression", Journal

of Conflict Resolution, vol 3, June 1959, pp 195-294. 17 Gurr, op. cit. '8 Ibid.,p 33. 19 Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization: A Set of

Considerations", in Lucian W Pye (ed.), Communication and Political Development, Prin- ceton 1963, pp 327-50.

20 Brian Crozier, The Rebels: A Study of Postwar Insurrections, London 1960, pp 15-16. 21 Gurr, op. cit., p 13. 22 Ibid. 2a Ibid., p 24. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., pp 13-14. 26 James C Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review,

vol 27, February 1962, pp 5-19. Also "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining. Satis- factions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Continued Rebellion", in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, (eds.), op.cit.

27 History of Violence in America, op. cit., ch 18, pp 635-8. 28 Samuel P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven 1968, pp 39-50 29 Speech by Robert S McNamara, Montreal, Quebec, 18 May 1966, New York Times,

19 May 1966, p 11. 80 Huntington, op. cit., p 41.

l Bert F Hoselitz, and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India", Dissent, vol 8, Spring 1961, p 173.

82 Huntington, op. cit., p 52. 88 Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, New York 1951, p 17. 84 Huntington, op. cit., p. 53. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., p 43. 87 History of Violence in America, op. cit., pp 634-77. 88 Ibid., p 634. 89 Ibid. 40 Ibid., p 645. Also Lucian W Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Boston, 1966. 41 David E Apter, The Politics of Modernization, Chicago 1965. 42 Judith C Coburn, "Asian Scholars and Government", in Friedman and Seldon.

(eds.) America's Asia, Pantheon, 1971, throws light on how American social scientists are recruited by the White House, CIA and the Foundations to produce biased literature on Third World countries. The USA to some extent has been successful in its mission in India. See also Noam Chomsky, At War with Asia, Collins, 1971.

48 Huntington, op. cit., This is the theme of the whole book. See also Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, Bombay 1970, pp 232-3.

4 Carr, What is History? Quoted by Randhir Singh, Reason, Revolution and Political Theory, New Delhi 1967, p 134.

45 Friedman and Seldon, (eds.),op. cit., p 139. 46 Randhir Singh, op. cit., p 141. 47 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, quoted by Randhir Singh, ibid., p 143 4 8 Randhir Singh, ibid., p 141. 49 Americans taught modern values to the Vietnamese for about twenty years and what

has been the outcome is obvious to all.

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Psychology of Political Violence