Psychology and Economics - ocw.mit.edu

Overview Paternalism Save More Tomorrow Market Solutions References

Psychology and Economics 14.13 Lecture 23: Policy with behavioral agents

Frank Schilbach

MIT

May 11, 2020

1 / 38


Plan for today

• Paternalism

• An example of libertarian paternalism: Save More Tomorrow

• Can we rely on market solutions?

2 / 38


End-of-semester festivities

• Cumulative final exam on May 19 (Tuesday) online \. • Same logistics as during mid-term exam • You pick your time window: start any time from 8 am to 9 pm. • Same style as midterm: true/false/uncertain, multiple choice, pset-style questions • We will send you email with precise logistical instructions.

• Entirely optional:

• COVID-19 lecture this Friday (May 15) at 1 pm • Will also complete no-audience version of lecture videos

3 / 38


Reasons for government policy

• Macroeconomic policy (e.g. Federal Reserve, fiscal stimulus)

• Competition policy (e.g. anti-trust laws)

• Redistribution and social insurance (unemployment insurance; Social Security)

• Externalities (e.g. cigarette taxes) and other market failures (e.g. innovation)

• Internalities: consumer does not fully or properly internalize all the costs and/or benefits she imposes on her (future) self.

4 / 38


What is paternalism?

• Merriam-Webster: A system under which an authority undertakes to supply needs or regulate conduct of those under its control in matters affecting them as individuals as well as in their relations to authority and to each other.

• David Laibson: An attempt to influence or control people’s conduct for their own good – in other words, when the motivation for the intervention is not about externalities.

5 / 38


When is paternalism warranted? • Non-standard preferences

• Time preferences • Risk and reference-dependent preferences • Social preferences

• Non-standard beliefs

• Limited attention • Learning failures; over-optimism; projection and attribution bias • Motivated beliefs

• Non-standard decision-making

• Gender discrimination • Defaults, frames, and nudges • Poverty • Happiness and mental health

6 / 38


Hard vs. soft paternalism

• Hard paternalism

• Force choices on people; change prices significantly • Mandate choices or procedures • Outlaw products • Taxes

• Soft paternalism

• Libertarian paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003): policies that constructively influence behavior, while preserving or nearly preserving, freedom of choice

• Asymmetric paternalism (Camerer et al., 2003): policies that help people who make mistakes, while interfering minimally with people who behave optimally

7 / 38


Arguments against paternalism?

• People have better information than the government.

• Might make things worse if misunderstand preferences

• People optimize already anyway. Why intervene?

• Rational people are worse off since their choices are distorted.

• The government is inefficient and wastes money.

• The government does not (always) have consumers’ best interest in mind.

• Fear of regulatory capture

• Freedom of choice matters per se.

• People dislike (hard) paternalism.

• Which paternalistic policy should we choose?

• Practical implementation problems

8 / 38


Arguments in favor of paternalism

• People make mistakes.

• People don’t like to make choices for themselves.

• Rational people can opt out of/are unaffected by soft paternalism regimes.

• Addresses many of the above concerns.

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12/12/2016 imrs.php (480×311)

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Are people making mistakes?

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10 / 38

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Relatively popular paternalism

• Social security (hard paternalism)

• Health program for retirees, like Medicare (hard paternalism)

• Restrict investment menu in 401(k) plans (hard paternalism)

• Consumer safety regulations, e.g. FDA (hard paternalism)

• Mandatory education (hard paternalism)

• Cigarette ‘sin’ taxes (hard paternalism)

• Banning prostitution (hard paternalism)

• Banning polygamy (hard paternalism)

• Mandating face masks (hard paternalism) [in some states!]

• Ban junk food in school vending machines (‘soft’ paternalism)

• Calorie disclosure laws (soft paternalism)

• Default enrollment in 401(k) plans (soft paternalism)

11 / 38


State cigarette taxes (per pack) are extremely high!

• Federal tax is roughly an additional dollar per pack.

Courtesy of Tax Foundation. License: CC BY-NC 12 / 38


Vast variation in state alcohol taxes (per gallon)

• Lowest in CO and MO

• Highest in WA and OR

• Additional federal taxes

Courtesy of Tax Foundation. License: CC BY-NC

13 / 38


Relatively unpopular paternalism

• Helmet laws (hard paternalism)

• Seatbelt laws (hard paternalism)

• Junk food bans (hard paternalism)

• Junk food taxes (hard paternalism)

• Other kinds of ‘sin’ taxes (hard paternalism)

• Alcohol bans (hard paternalism)

• Pornography laws (hard paternalism)

• Gambling laws (hard paternalism)

• Mandating face masks (hard paternalism) [in some states!]

• NYC’s ban on 16+ oz sodas (hard paternalism)

14 / 38


Fasten your seatbelt

Image is in the public domain. CC0 15 / 38


THC (cannabis) legalization across states (as of 2019)

• What is the case for making drugs illegal vs. taxation?

Courtesy of Tax Foundation. License: CC BY-NC

16 / 38


Massive impacts of some nudges: automatic enrollment

© The Wall Street Journal. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see https://ocw.mit.edu/help/faq-fair-use

17 / 38


Paternalism Save More Tomorrow Market Solutions

Massive impacts of some nudges: court appearances

USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES 5Executive Summary

to offend, and so most approaches aim to make crime less worthwhile. But our interventions are built on the view that people who miss their court date do not necessarily make an active choice to skip it. Rather, they may have failed to consider the decision at all due to a number of obstacles. The results indicate that crime policies that focus on behavioral barriers can offer humane approaches to reducenegative consequences for both citizens and the criminal justice system, without resorting to the traditional lever of increasing enforcement.

WITH OLD FORM: 41%

WITH MOST EFFECTIVE TEXT MESSAGES:

Estimates for summons recipients who provide a phone number

Improvements in timely court appearance

FTA Rates

13%DECREASE

36%DECREASE

26%DECREASE

WITH NEW FORM: 36%

26%

Overview References

Courtesy of University of Chicago UrbanLabs and ideas42. Used with permission. 18 / 38


But there are limits!

Effect of Electronic Reminders, Financial Incentives,and Social Support on Outcomes After Myocardial InfarctionThe HeartStrong Randomized Clinical TrialKevin G. Volpp, MD, PhD; Andrea B. Troxel, ScD; Shivan J. Mehta, MD, MBA, MSHP; Laurie Norton, MA; Jingsan Zhu, MS, MBA; Raymond Lim, MA;Wenli Wang, MS; Noora Marcus, MA; Christian Terwiesch, PhD; Kristen Caldarella, MHA; Tova Levin, MBA; Mike Relish, MA; Nathan Negin, MD;Aaron Smith-McLallen, PhD; Richard Snyder, MD; Claire M. Spettell, PhD; Brian Drachman, MD; Daniel Kolansky, MD; David A. Asch, MD, MBA

IMPORTANCE Adherence to medications prescribed after acute myocardial infarction (AMI)is low. Wireless technology and behavioral economic approaches have shown promise inimproving health behaviors.

OBJECTIVE To determine whether a system of medication reminders using financialincentives and social support delays subsequent vascular events in patients following AMIcompared with usual care.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS Two-arm, randomized clinical trial with a 12-monthintervention conducted from 2013 through 2016. Investigators were blinded to study group,but participants were not. Design was a health plan–intermediated intervention for membersof several health plans. We recruited 1509 participants from 7179 contacted AMI survivors(insured with 5 large US insurers nationally or with Medicare fee-for-service at the Universityof Pennsylvania Health System). Patients aged 18 to 80 years were eligible if currentlyprescribed at least 2 of 4 study medications (statin, aspirin, β-blocker, antiplatelet agent), andwere hospital inpatients for 1 to 180 days and discharged home with a principal diagnosisof AMI.

INTERVENTIONS Patients were randomized 2:1 to an intervention using electronic pill bottlescombined with lottery incentives and social support for medication adherence (1003patients), or to usual care (506 patients).

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Primary outcome was time to first vascularrehospitalization or death. Secondary outcomes were time to first all-cause rehospitalization,total number of repeated hospitalizations, medication adherence, and total medical costs.

RESULTS A total of 35.5% of participants were female (n = 536); mean (SD) age was 61.0(10.3) years. There were no statistically significant differences between study arms in time tofirst rehospitalization for a vascular event or death (hazard ratio, 1.04; 95% CI, 0.71 to 1.52;P = .84), time to first all-cause rehospitalization (hazard ratio, 0.89; 95% CI, 0.73 to 1.09;P = .27), or total number of repeated hospitalizations (hazard ratio, 0.94; 95% CI, 0.60 to1.48; P = .79). Mean (SD) medication adherence did not differ between control (0.42 [0.39])and intervention (0.46 [0.39]) (difference, 0.04; 95% CI, −0.01 to 0.09; P = .10). Mean (SD)medical costs in 12 months following enrollment did not differ between control ($29 811[$74 850]) and intervention ($24 038 [$66 915]) (difference, −$5773; 95% CI, −$13 682 to$2137; P = .15).

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE A compound intervention integrating wireless pill bottles,lottery-based incentives, and social support did not significantly improve medicationadherence or vascular readmission outcomes for AMI survivors.

TRIAL REGISTRATION clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT01800201

JAMA Intern Med. 2017;177(8):1093-1101. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2017.2449Published online June 26, 2017.

Author Audio Interview

Supplemental content

Author Affiliations: Authoraffiliations are listed at the end of thisarticle.

Corresponding Author: Kevin G.Volpp, MD, PhD, Perelman School ofMedicine, University of Pennsylvania,1120 Blockley Hall, 423 Guardian Dr,Philadelphia, PA 19104([email protected]).

Research

JAMA Internal Medicine | Original Investigation

(Reprinted) 1093

© 2017 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.

Downloaded From: by a Massachusetts Institute of Technology User on 12/06/2017

Effect of Electronic Reminders, Financial Incentives,and Social Support on Outcomes After Myocardial InfarctionThe HeartStrong Randomized Clinical TrialKevin G. Volpp, MD, PhD; Andrea B. Troxel, ScD; Shivan J. Mehta, MD, MBA, MSHP; Laurie Norton, MA; Jingsan Zhu, MS, MBA; Raymond Lim, MA;Wenli Wang, MS; Noora Marcus, MA; Christian Terwiesch, PhD; Kristen Caldarella, MHA; Tova Levin, MBA; Mike Relish, MA; Nathan Negin, MD;Aaron Smith-McLallen, PhD; Richard Snyder, MD; Claire M. Spettell, PhD; Brian Drachman, MD; Daniel Kolansky, MD; David A. Asch, MD, MBA

IMPORTANCE Adherence to medications prescribed after acute myocardial infarction (AMI)is low. Wireless technology and behavioral economic approaches have shown promise inimproving health behaviors.

OBJECTIVE To determine whether a system of medication reminders using financialincentives and social support delays subsequent vascular events in patients following AMIcompared with usual care.

DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS Two-arm, randomized clinical trial with a 12-monthintervention conducted from 2013 through 2016. Investigators were blinded to study group,but participants were not. Design was a health plan–intermediated intervention for membersof several health plans. We recruited 1509 participants from 7179 contacted AMI survivors(insured with 5 large US insurers nationally or with Medicare fee-for-service at the Universityof Pennsylvania Health System). Patients aged 18 to 80 years were eligible if currentlyprescribed at least 2 of 4 study medications (statin, aspirin, β-blocker, antiplatelet agent), andwere hospital inpatients for 1 to 180 days and discharged home with a principal diagnosisof AMI.

INTERVENTIONS Patients were randomized 2:1 to an intervention using electronic pill bottlescombined with lottery incentives and social support for medication adherence (1003patients), or to usual care (506 patients).

MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Primary outcome was time to first vascularrehospitalization or death. Secondary outcomes were time to first all-cause rehospitalization,total number of repeated hospitalizations, medication adherence, and total medical costs.

RESULTS A total of 35.5% of participants were female (n = 536); mean (SD) age was 61.0(10.3) years. There were no statistically significant differences between study arms in time tofirst rehospitalization for a vascular event or death (hazard ratio, 1.04; 95% CI, 0.71 to 1.52;P = .84), time to first all-cause rehospitalization (hazard ratio, 0.89; 95% CI, 0.73 to 1.09;P = .27), or total number of repeated hospitalizations (hazard ratio, 0.94; 95% CI, 0.60 to1.48; P = .79). Mean (SD) medication adherence did not differ between control (0.42 [0.39])and intervention (0.46 [0.39]) (difference, 0.04; 95% CI, −0.01 to 0.09; P = .10). Mean (SD)medical costs in 12 months following enrollment did not differ between control ($29 811[$74 850]) and intervention ($24 038 [$66 915]) (difference, −$5773; 95% CI, −$13 682 to$2137; P = .15).

CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE A compound intervention integrating wireless pill bottles,lottery-based incentives, and social support did not significantly improve medicationadherence or vascular readmission outcomes for AMI survivors.

TRIAL REGISTRATION clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT01800201

JAMA Intern Med. 2017;177(8):1093-1101. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2017.2449Published online June 26, 2017.

Author Audio Interview

Supplemental content

Author Affiliations: Authoraffiliations are listed at the end of thisarticle.

Corresponding Author: Kevin G.Volpp, MD, PhD, Perelman School ofMedicine, University of Pennsylvania,1120 Blockley Hall, 423 Guardian Dr,Philadelphia, PA 19104([email protected]).

Research

JAMA Internal Medicine | Original Investigation

(Reprinted) 1093

© 2017 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.

Downloaded From: by a Massachusetts Institute of Technology User on 12/06/2017

19 / 38

Overview Paternalism Save More Tomorrow

Caveat: larger treatment effects in academic studies than in nudge units Figure 4: Nudge treatment effects

(a) Academic journals sample

Active decision in 401k enrollment(Carroll et al., 2009)

H&R Block FAFSA experiment(Bettinger et al., 2012) Changing menu order

in buffet line for healthierfood consumption(Wansink & Hanks, 2013)

2030

40 e

ffect

(p.p

.)

Letters enforcing delinquent sewer bill payment

Redesigned webpage encouraging applications to city board

city bills

-20

-10

010

20Tr

eatm

ent e

ffect

(p.p

.)

0 20 40 60 80 100

This figure plots the treatment effect relative to control group take-up for each nudge. Nudges with extreme treatment effectsare labeled for context.

29

Figure 4: Nudge treatment effects

(a) Academic journals sample

Active decision in 401k enrollment(Carroll et al., 2009)

H&R Block FAFSA experiment(Bettinger et al., 2012) Changing menu order

in buffet line for healthierfood consumption(Wansink & Hanks, 2013)

2030

40 e

ffect

(p.p

.)

(b) Nudge units sample

Letters enforcing delinquent sewer bill payment

Redesigned webpage encouraging applications to city board

city bills

-20

-10

010

20Tr

eatm

ent e

ffect

(p.p

.)

0 20 40 60 80 100

Courtesy of Stefano DellaVigna and Elizabeth Linos. Used with permission. 20 / 38


Does everyone want to be nudged?

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No! Some people are willing to pay NOT to be nudged.

Courtesy of Hunt Allcott and Judd B. Kessler. Used with permission.

22 / 38


What form should paternalism take?

• Take 401(k) savings policies. What policy is best?

• Minimum non-zero 401(k) savings rate • Active decision • Default of non-participation • Default of participation (savings rate + asset allocation) • Default + web-based advice • Default + limited menu of easy alternatives • Personal financial planner sits down with you • Other options?

• Note: strict ‘non-paternalism’ is also problematic.

• Is it possible to truly be non-paternalistic? • What does that mean in this context and in general?

23 / 38


A brilliant example of Libertarian Paternalism

• Thaler and Benartzi (2004) design a 401(k) program for company that wanted to increase its employees’ savings.

• The company hired a financial advisor.

• Employees could sit down with the advisor to evaluate their financial situation and make a plan.

• For those who agreed to talk to the financial advisor, he recommended a savings rate. • Some agreed to implement this.

• Benartzi and Thaler got the leftovers—a group selected against the propensity to save!

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The Save More Tomorrow (SMarT) Plan

(1) Employees approached about increasing their contribution rates a considerable time before next scheduled pay increase

(2) Employees join voluntarily, and if they do, their contribution to the plan is increased beginning with the first paycheck after a raise (by an amount less than the raise).

(3) The contribution rate continues to increase on each raise until the contribution rate reaches a preset maximum.

(4) The employee can opt out of the plan at any time (by making a phone call and filling out a form).

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Why is the SMarT plan libertarian paternalism?

• Aspects (2) and (4) make the program libertarian paternalism.

• The plan is entirely voluntary.

• People can leave it if they don’t like it.

• Basically, it’s just increasing people’s options.

26 / 38


Results of the first implementation of SMarT (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004) S174 journal of political economy

TABLE 2Average Saving Rates (%) for the First Implementation of SMarT

ParticipantsWho Did NotContact the

FinancialConsultant

ParticipantsWho Accepted

the Consultant’sRecommended

Saving Rate

ParticipantsWho Joinedthe SMarT

Plan

ParticipantsWho Declined

the SMarTPlan All

Participantsinitiallychoosingeachoption* 29 79 162 45 315

Pre-advice 6.6 4.4 3.5 6.1 4.4First pay raise 6.5 9.1 6.5 6.3 7.1Second pay

raise 6.8 8.9 9.4 6.2 8.6Third pay raise 6.6 8.7 11.6 6.1 9.8Fourth pay

raise 6.2 8.8 13.6 5.9 10.6

* There is attrition from each group over time. The number of employees who remain by the time of the fourthpay raise is 229.

the investment consultant was brought into the company, the overallsavings rate in the plan was 4.4 percent. The employees who did notwant to talk to the consultant were saving more than the average, 6.6percent. The group that accepted the advice of the consultant had beensaving at exactly the overall company average, 4.4 percent, and afterimplementing the advice, they began saving 9.1 percent of their salary.At the end of our data collection period, that rate had slipped slightlyto 8.8 percent. Those who were unwilling to accept the advice were, notsurprisingly, starting from a lower base of 3.5 percent and so would findthe advice harder to adopt. Once they got their first pay raise, however,their saving rate jumped to 6.5 percent, and after three more raises, itwas up 13.6 percent. Those participating in the SMarT plan ended upwith a much higher saving rate than those who accepted the consultant’srecommendation.

Of course, the implementation of the SMarT plan was not conductedas an experiment with random assignment to conditions. Participantsselected themselves into the SMarT plan. In other circumstances, onemight worry that the observed increase in savings rates might be attrib-utable to some unmeasured “taste for saving” in the households thatjoined the SMarT plan; however, this worry seems unwarranted here ontwo counts. First, the SMarT participants had been saving very littlebefore joining the plan, so one would have to believe that their tastefor saving was newly acquired. Second, recall that the SMarT plan wasoffered only to those employees who were unwilling to increase theirsavings rate immediately by 5 percent. So, if anything, the group that

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27 / 38



SMarT combines several behavioral principles.

(1) It puts the increase in the contribution rate into the future.

• Hence, at the moment of joining, it sidesteps people’s short-run inclination not to save (present bias).

(2) It never requires cutting back on consumption, so it doesn’t make employees feel like they’re suffering a loss from saving.

• They still get a little gain from pay raises (addresses reference-dependence).

(3) It makes saving for retirement the default, and creates a small immediate cost of switching out of it.

• It uses default effects and present bias to help them! • Those not subject to default effects/present bias just pay small cost to switch out if

the plan isn’t right for them (anymore).

28 / 38


A market solution?

• Example: self-control problems regarding credit-card spending

• Common economists’ reaction: why do we need a central authority to help people?

• If consumers are sophisticated, they demand ways to change their consumption, i.e. they demand commitment.

• Market participants seeking to earn profit will satisfy demand. • Government intervention won’t be necessary.

• What might be problematic with this line of argument?

29 / 38

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Article: Impulsive and compulsive spendingCompulsive spending is many times an addiction to credit cards. ... Sinceimpulsive and compulsive spending patterns can often be justified orrationalized ...www.crown.org/Library/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=426 - 88k -Cached - Similar pages

The Siren Song of Impulsive SpendingThe Siren Song of Impulsive Spending. Thursday August 14, 2008. Is yourcredit card screaming to be used? Do random items in the mall flag youdown to be ...bipolar.about.com/b/2008/08/14/the-siren-song-of-impulsive-spending.htm -27k - Cached - Similar pages

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The market is part of the problem!

• While one side of the market might help people with self-control problems...

• ...Another side will try to exploit customers.

• Firms try to target naive people (Ru and Schoar, 2017).

• Naive people are most easily exploited and they don’t think they need help!

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30 / 38



Fundamental tension in the market

• Market participants have an incentive not only to provide self-control to consumers, but also to break down any self-control consumers may have.

• Two forces:

(1) If consumers value and demand self-control, a firm can profit from providing it and will want to provide it.

(2) But other firms, or even the same firm, can make money by taking advantage of the person’s short-sightedness, and so will want to undermine any self-control.

• (2) severely limits the market’s ability to provide self-control.

• Can the government limit such market influences? It already does!

• Many forms of advertisements for cigarette smoking, drugs, or gambling are illegal. • Caps on interest rates; other forms of consumer protection (e.g. CFPB)

31 / 38


Nudge, not sludge

• Key goal of nudges: make it easy to make good choices

• Text message reminders, thoughtful defaults, etc.

• But the same techniques for nudging can be used for less benevolent purposes!

• Firms maximize profits rather than buyers • Example: offer rebate to buy product, but then require customers to mail in a form • Because of such sludges, redemption rates for rebates tend to be low • Similar examples from public sector (IRS or voter registration)

• Identifying and eliminating sludges can be highly valuable.

32 / 38


Summary

• Some forms of soft paternalism can unambiguously improve welfare.

• Nudges can make things worse.

• Some people dislike being nudged. We should respect that.

• The market does not solve everything.

• Sometimes reducing sludges can go a long way.

33 / 38


Big picture summary: Now what?

• Psychological considerations are important

• Understand your own biases better and try to improve decision-making

• Short-run considerations: e.g. procrastination, exercise • Long-run considerations: e.g. jobs, friendship, etc.

• Small changes can make big differences

• Introspect, be more mindful in your choices • Experiment, seek advice • But also don’t be too harsh on yourself! • Sometimes it is easier to understand and help your friends than yourself

• Design of teams, incentives, or products

34 / 38


Some books to read

• Kahneman et al. (1982): Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

• Kahneman and Tversky (2000): Choices, Values and Frames

• Kahneman (2011): Thinking, Fast and Slow

• Ross and Nisbett (1991): The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology

• Cialdini (1993): Influence, the Psychology of Persuasion

• Thaler and Sunstein (2008): Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness

• Ariely (2009): Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape our Decisions

• Mullainathan and Shafir (2013): Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means so Much

• Lewis (2017): The Undoing Project: A Friendship That Changed Our Minds

• Thaler (2015): Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics

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The end

• It was a great pleasure teaching this class!

• I learned a lot. I hope you did too.

• If you haven’t done so, please fill out the course evaluations.

• Swing by for office hours if you have questions!

• Thank you!

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References used in this lecture I

Ariely, Dan, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape our Decisions, New York: Harper, 2009.

Camerer, Colin, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin, “Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2003, 151 (3), 407–441.

Cialdini, Robert B., Influence, the Psychology of Persuasion, New York: William Morrow Publishing Company, 1993.

Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

and Amos (eds.) Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames, New York: Russell Sage Foundation: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Mullainathan, Sendhil and Eldar Shafir, Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much, Time Books, Henry Holt and Co. LLC, 2013.

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References used in this lecture II

Ross, Lee and Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.

Ru, Hong and Antoinette Schoar, “Do Credit Card Companies Screen for Behavioral Biases,” mimeo, 2017.

Thaler, Richard H. and Cass R. Sunstein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 2003, 93 (2), 175–179.

and , Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

and Shlomo Benartzi, “Save More TomorrowTM : Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving,” Journal of Political Economy, 2004, 112 (S1), S164–S187.

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