PSIR 426/W 11&12 THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM & THE AKP YEARS IN TURKEY

PSIR 426/W 11&12THE RİSE OF POLİTİCAL ISLAM & THE AKP YEARS İN TURKEY

The Rise of Political Islam

The period starting from the mid 1990s witnessed the rise of Political Islam that became manifest in RP’s, and its successor, AKP’s political victory.

RP gained 21.3 per cent of the votes in the 1995 general elections and formed a coalition government with the DYP as the senior partner of the coalition.


RP’s endevaour to satisfy the demands of its conservative constituency led to a ‘post-modern coup d’etat’ on 28th February 1997.

The government had been warned by the NSC and was asked to implement a number of key steps to conform to the secular constitutional order.

The government remained in office until Prime Minister Erbakan’s resignation in June 1997 which would be followed by the closing of the party in January 1998 by the Constitutional Court.


The rise of Political Islam later became manifest in the political victory of the successor of the RP; the AKP.

Islamists have been in heavy retreat in Turkey since the second half of 1997 following the attacks by the established organs of the state on their main organizational sources of political support. AKP was born out of the split of RP’s successor, Fazilet Partisi (FP) .


FP represented a much more moderate position in terms of its leadership and programmatic commitments. However, soon after the internal struggle between the so-called Innovators (Yenilikciler), who believed that state and religion should be separate, and the Conservatives (Gelenekciler) resulted in the split of the party, with the Erbakan faction forming the Saadet Partisi (SP) and the Innovators founding the AKP headed by Tayyip Erdogan.


There is a tendency on the part of some authors to explain the rise of Political Islam in terms of the decline of class politics and the rise of the identity politics.

It is argued that forms of communal belonging that are of a cultural nature and cut across class lines have taken the central stage in the political struggle.


However, this analysis is problematic as it ignores the fact that elements of class politics have been hidden within the agenda of Political Islam.

Despite the cultural colouring of Islamic discourse and the language of recognition politics, political Islam has been promoting the interests of the petty bourgeoisie.


The language of recognition has been used by small and medium business people (mostly of Anatolia), small merchants, artisans and traders within Islamic parties to confront the hegemony of the western-oriented big businesses of the İstanbul bourgeoisie.


The predecessor of RP, the MSP, represented the traditional, small to medium-size business sector in provincial towns against the ISI-based big industrial and other business interests in urban areas.


MUSIAD, in line with the position of the RP, strongly rejected the Customs Union with Europe. MUSİAD’s activities expanded rapidly at a time when the RP’s fortunes also displayed a pronounced upward trend. Yet the disbanding of the RP led to a drastic decline in the fortunes of the entrepreneurial groups closely associated with the party due to special investigations and embargoes on their activities.

In its struggle to survive the onslaught, MUSİAD experienced a serious learning process following the 28th February process and increasingly adopted a pro-European stance in parallel with the changing position of the RP’s successors; the FP and the AKP.


The elements of class politics in Political Islam were not only manifest in the representation of the petty bourgeoisie against the big bourgeoisie.

Political Islam represented in the RP and AKP has found a fertile ground in the decline of traditional working class politics. An important feature of these two parties is their success in gaining the support of the poor and the dispossessed at the expense of the social democratic parties.


Gulalp highlights the way in which Political Islam targeted the peripheral segment of the working class which consisted of recent immigrants to the cities who have mostly been unable to find secure employment and have engaged in marginal activities.

This segment of the working class, unlike the established and organized working class, has been more prone to be swayed by non-mainstream political movements.

However, it is important to underline that political Islam has also won support among the more established working class.


Consequently, ‘Welfare’s [RP] voter base grew fastest in poor neighbourhoods that lie at the periphery of large metropolitan centres—neighbourhoods that were the solid source of support for social democrats in the 1970s.

The RP spoke the language of socio-economic justice and equality in poor urban neighbourhoods.

Local religious organizations and foundations working to help the poor in poor neighbourhoods took over the functions of the defunct welfare state, thereby contributing to the popularity of the Islamist political movement.


Five years after the 28th February intervention, the elections held on November 3rd 2002 brought the AKP to power. The AKP obtained 34.5 per cent of the votes in an 18-party election resulting in an absolute majority in the Parliament.

The three government parties, DSP, MHP and ANAP, and the main opposition party, the DYP, could not clear the ten per cent election barrier and were therefore left out of Parliament.

The AKP formed the government whereas CHP became the sole opposition party.


The AKP came to power in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis which had negative repercussions on all sections of Turkish society, rich and poor, educated and non-educated, urban and rural.

All established political parties paid the price of the crisis in one way or another.

Specifically, the three members of the coalition government (DSP, MHP and ANAP) experienced major setbacks with a dramatic collapse in their electoral support.


The Turkish electorate displayed deep dissatisfaction with established political parties on both the right and the left of the political spectrum. Center-left parties were penalized for failing to protect the interests of the poor and the underprivileged.

Center right parties suffered from their association with widespread corruption.


Hence, the AKP capitalized on the governing parties’ failure to achieve sustained and equitable economic growth, avoid costly financial crises and tackle the problem of unemployment. The party hugely benefited from the strong track record of its predecessors, the RP and the FP, at the level of the municipal governments.


Last but not least, the party has been successful in constituting a cross-class electoral alliance incorporating into its scope both winners and losersfrom the neo-liberal globalization process.

The AKP has been successful in gaining the support among provincial capitalists, the conservative small bourgeoisie, the newly urbanized poor, important factions of the police and much of the liberal, left-leaning intelligentsia.


The predecessors of the AKP mostly gave voice to the losers of the economic policies implemented at the time. For example, the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) (NSP) represented the interests of the small-scale commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the 1970s.

The AKP went beyond appealing to the traditional support base of its predecessors to represent the second generation bourgeoisie, which has flourished under conditions of globalization.


Globalization gives way to flexible forms of capitalist accumulation, marking a significant shift from the previous mode of industrial organization associated with the manufacturing of standardized products on a large scale, with rigid assembly-line technology.

Global trends toward forms of “flexible accumulation” include a rise in smaller-scale manufacturing and self-employment.


The second generation bourgeoisie today includes not only small and medium-scale employers. From the 1990s onwards Islamic capital has also grown, taking advantage of the export orientation of the economy and leading to the foundation of some holding companies that have reached the size and economic power of many units of “core” capital.


It was the rise of the second generation bourgeoisie that gave way to the JDP’s split from its predecessor Welfare Party.

Increasingly, the so-called Just Order of the National Outlook line that highlighted social justice, redistribution, and heavy state intervention alienated the emerging devout bourgeoisie, who became supportive of free market principles rather than the Just Order.


The fact that the AKP incorporated winners and losers also explains why Islamist politics in Turkey has been evolving in a moderate direction, as the newly rising Anatolian bourgeoisie would not benefit from open confrontation with the secular establishment) and thus tempered their activities accordingly.

On the other hand, Turkey’s deepening relations with the EU also contributed to the moderation of Islamic oriented parties as these parties recognized the promotion of relations with the EU would create a convenient environment for the promotion of religious freedoms.


Initially key segments of the domestic business community and international financial circles had an uneasiness about the AKP’s landslide electoral victory. The fear was that the AKP would resort to populist policies and deviate from the IMF programme, thereby bringing the country to the verge of another economic crisis.

However, such fears lacked any serious basis due to the fact ‘the government displayed a strong commitment to the basic principles of fiscal stabilization and structural reforms embodied in the IMF programme’.


In fact, the AKP has displayed its neoliberal position both in its pre-election discourse and its practices after coming to power. The market based approach of the party became manifest in privatization, the creation of incentives for foreign investment and compliance with the criteria determined by the IMF.

To reiterate, the Labour Law adopted by the party in 2003 provided employer flexibility in the workplace in order to encourage foreign and domestic investment.


AKP’s adherence to the market based approach is also evident in its proposals to restructure the sphere of public administration. It is possible to observe a repeated emphasis on an overall transformation in the public administration system via privatization and decentralization in local government within the official documents of the party and in the draft law on public administration reform prepared by AKP.


In its initial stages, the AKP became proactive on the issue of Turkey’s EU membership and displayed great commitment to economic and political reforms necessitated by the EU. For example, the AKP put a lot of effort into tackling the Cyprus issue through diplomatic iniatives right after the November electoral victory.


This move was a risky strategy as it involved the possibility of a serious clash with key factions of the military and foreign policy establishment. However, the proactive stance helped to gather support in both internal and external circles and to overcome the initial reservations concerning the party’s alleged Islamic credentials.


At this stage, especially because of its commitment to political reforms, the AKP has been predominantly perceived as a democratizing force in Turkey and abroad. However, this reputation of the party would not last as it would soon reveal its hawkish standpoint on a number of issues.


During the electoral campaign of 2002, RecepTayyipErdogan raised popular expectations that his party would immediately tackle problems of growing poverty, distorted income distribution, and social inequality; yet the AKP stayed within the neoliberal framework.

In that sense AKP under Erdogan has been a proponent of ‘neoliberalism with a human face’, whereas beyond the party leader’s people-friendly rhetoric a neoliberal agenda remains intact, with the government placing priority on fiscal responsibility via budgetary austerity.


In its rule for more than a decade, AKP engaged in a gradual marketisation of public services, privatisation, and the flexibilisation of labour.

The New Social Insurance and Universal Health Insurance Act that was passed in parliament in 2008 targeted raising the age of retirement, lengthening the contribution period, and reducing retirement, disability, and survivor benefits and pensions.


AKP directed to weaken welfare policies as a public obligation because the state is subcontracting its welfare provision duties to the private sector. Charity groups and philanthropic associations are taking over some state functions.


The neoliberal ideology of the party also became manifest in the so-called ‘urban transformation’ projects where public places, green areas, and historical sites are demolished and poor populations are displaced.

‘All these unwanted spaces (and people) are being replaced by malls, skyscrapers, office spaces, and glossy remakes of historical buildings.’


The economic policies formulated by the AKP since 2002 aimed to reward both the first generation and the second generation bourgeoisie.


On the other hand, the impact of these economic policies on the working class, unemployed and vulnerable sectors such as housewives and the elderly have been hardly positive.

Even though AKP managed to achieve economic growth, this growth – which relied on short-term capital inflows – neither reduced unemployment nor led to an increase in real wages.

According to research conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), Turkey is classified in the category of member countries with the highest income inequality.


Despite these economic policies, opinion polls reveals the supporters of the party:

AKP supporters have lower socio-economic status, identify themselves as right wing and religious, reside in the three big cities İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir and rural regions.


Another poll showed that the majority of the AKP’s votes came from housewives, followed by farmers, blue collar workers working in the private sector and the unemployed.

The AKP also received more than 50% of the vote in suburbs and slums, whereas it is weakest in housing estates (23.8%)

(However what is novel about the party’s success is that it managed to gain the support of not only the organized and marginalized sections of the working class, but the second generation (or Anatolian) bourgeoisie as well).


The AKP also managed to attract the support of various groups holding different political orientations. A poll reveals the profile of the electorate that voted for the AKP in the 2011 elections:

27 % define themselves as conservative, 24.4% as Turkish Nationalist 16.4% pro Atatürk Kemalist (Atatürkçü Kemalist) 7.2% social democrat, 5.9% liberal democrat, 3% nationalist (ulusalcı), and 1.4% Kurdish nationalist


One of the most interesting things about the AKP’s electoral support is the fact that the party gained the support of subordinate classes despite being a proponent of “neoliberalism with a human face”.


Why does the working class (organized and marginalized sections) support the AKP?

AKP’s resorting to populist measures such as social assistance funds and transfers enables the party to respond to the short-term demands of the masses, thereby expanding its party support base.

It is possible to observe a certain increase between 2001 and 2004 in means-tested social expenditures by certain institutions directly involved in poverty alleviation.


There is a significant increase in: social assistance (in kind assistance such

as food, coal). conditional cash transfers in the form of

monthly payments to poor families to send their children to school.


Meanwhile, it can be observed that municipalities assumed greater responsibility in distributing social assistance since 2003.

In this period, municipalities exhibited a people-friendly attitude — organizing soup kitchens for the poor, building giant food tents for iftar meals during the month of Ramadan, and most importantly, in-kind assistance to the poor. Yet very little of the funding for these services actually comes directly from the municipalities, but rather from those who contribute to the “charity funds” of municipalities.

This creates a problem in the sense that funding depending on charity leads to inconsistency and unreliability of assistance programs.


Another development that marks the era is the meteoric rise in the number of charity associations, philanthropic groups and NGOs which aim to fill the social vacuum left by the absence of a functioning welfare state.

The most important problem with community-based philanthropic groups is that there is usually some sort of conditionality attached to getting access to these services. More often than not, community affiliation and loyalty are expected in return for access.


The AKP also aims to gain the consent of the constituency by drawing on conservatism, Islamism and nationalism.


Erdoğan broke his fasts in slums or shanties together with the poor when he was the municipal mayor of

Istanbul. Interestingly, although Erdogan had openly shunned Islamism and adopted neoliberalism, his past involvement as an Islamist, his shared everyday practices with the poor, and his origins in an urban poor neighborhood enabled popular sectors to read nonneoliberal meanings into the party.


This symbolic capital would come to play a key role in constituting the AKP’s hegemony. The class difference between the AKP cadres in power and poor constituency can only be overcome by this emphasis on common religious values.

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PSIR 426/W 11&12 THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM & THE AKP YEARS IN TURKEY