PSC 306 The American Presidency - University at Buffalo

Second Half of the Course Professor Campbell

322 Millard Fillmore Academic Complex 6:00 to 8:50pm Wednesdays

PSC 306 The American Presidency

Presidents and Public Policy 1. The Economy

2. Justice and Extending Liberty

3. Defense and Foreign Policy

Table 8. Economic Performance of the Presidents

Strongest Growth Middling Growth Weakest Growth

1. F. Roosevelt 14. Nixon 27. Truman

2. Hayes 15. Carter 27. G.H.W. Bush

3. Fillmore 16. A. Johnson 29. Jefferson

4. McKinley 16. T. Roosevelt 29. Arthur

5. L. Johnson 18. Grant 31. Madison

6. Reagan 19. Washington 32. Wilson

7. Ford 19. Monroe 33. B. Harrison

7. Clinton 19. Taft 34. Pierce

9. Jackson 22. Buchanan 35. J.Q. Adams

10. Coolidge 23. Eisenhower 36. Van Buren

11. Tyler 24. J. Adams 37. Hoover

11. Lincoln 24. Polk

11. Cleveland 26. G.W. Bush

Have Democratic Presidents since WWII had better economic records than Republican Presidents? And if so, Why?

What are the General Lessons about the American Presidency

from Felzenberg’s Analysis of the Personal Qualities of Presidents

and Their Success in Different Policy Areas?

Table. Felzenberg’s Ratings of Presidential Personal Qualities

Personal Qualities

Rating Character Vision Competence

5 17 4 7

4 3 8 7

3 8 10 12

2 7 11 8

1 4 6 5

Mean 3.6 2.8 3.1

Std Dev 1.5 1.2 1.3

The most common of the three qualities: Character A median score of 4 (others were 3) The least common of the three qualities: Vision

2. Are the Three Personal Qualities of the Presidents Often Held (or Not Held) in Common?

Put differently, do we frequently elect presidents who have strong qualities across-the-board and others who are wholly-lacking?

Are the Three Presidential Traits Correlated with one another?

Table. Correlations among Felzenberg’s Presidential Traits

Felzenberg’s TRAIT rating

Character, Trustworthiness

Competence, Pragmatism

Vision, Sense of Direction

.42 .64

Character, Trustworthiness

-- .31

Yes, but not perfectly. Vision and Competence and the most highly correlated. Presidents who are competent and more likely also to have a sense of direction.

3. In Which Policy Areas have Presidents been Most or

Least Successful?

Table. Felzenberg’s Ratings of Presidential Public Policy Success

Policy Success

Rating Economy Liberty Foreign Policy

5 4 3 8

4 7 11 6

3 15 9 19

2 6 8 3

1 7 8 3

Mean 2.9 2.8 3.3

Std Dev 1.2 1.3 1.1

Are Presidential Policy Successes Correlated with one another?

Table. Correlations among Felzenberg’s Presidential Policy Records

Felzenberg’s POLICY rating

Preserving Liberty

Defense and Foreign Policy

The Economy .36 .59

Preserving Liberty -- .04

Surprisingly, Presidents who are successful in dealing with the Economy have also been successful in dealing with Foreign Policy. Presidents unsuccessful in one were more likely to be unsuccessful in the other.

1. Successes in Economic and Foreign Policies are positively correlated

2. Successes in Economic Policy and Preserving Liberty are somewhat positively correlated

3. BUT, Successes in Foreign Policy and Preserving Liberty are UNCORRELATED

REASONS? General Competence for #1 & 2 ? Tension of Security versus Liberty for #3 ?

General Presidential Success

Personal Qualities 1. Character 2. Vision 3. Competence

Public Policy Success 1. Economy 2. Preserving Liberty 3. Foreign Policy

?

? ?

Table . Personal Qualities and Economic Policy Success

Qualities Effect

Vision .40*

Character .00

Competence .24

Constant 1.02

N 39

Adjusted R2 .30

Std. Error of Est. 1.02

ONLY Vision makes a difference to success or failure in Economic Policy.

Table . Personal Qualities and Preserving Liberty Success

Qualities Effect

Vision .47*

Character .19*

Competence -.12

Constant .47

N 39

Adjusted R2 .52

Std. Error of Est. .88

Vision and (to a lesser degree) Character makes a difference to success or failure in Preserving Liberty.

Table . Personal Qualities and Foreign Policy Success

Qualities Effect

Vision .16

Character -.12

Competence .53*

Constant 1.67

N 39

Adjusted R2 .43

Std. Error of Est. .85

ONLY Competence makes a difference to success or failure in Foreign Policy.

Summary Table. Personal Qualities and Policy Success

Personal Qualities

Policy Areas Character Vision Competence

Economy

Preserving Liberty Foreign Policy

Summary Answers to Questions 4, 5, and 6

Table . Policy Area Success and Overall Presidential Evaluations (sign flipped for rating)

Policy Success Effect

Economy -.70

Liberty 4.84*

Foreign Policy 6.01*

Constant 51.83

N 39

Adjusted R2 .55


Preserving Liberty and Foreign Policy Success boost General Presidential Ratings, but Economic Policy Success DOES NOT!!!

Table . Personal Qualities, Policy Achievements and General Presidential Success (C-SPAN) (signs flipped for rating)

Qualities or Achievements Effect

Personal Quality Average 6.27*

Policy Achievements Average 3.32

Constant 49.90

N 39

Adjusted R2 .60


Personal Qualities actually matter more than Policy Achievements in the General Presidential Ratings – largely Competence and Vision

WHY PRESIDENTS FAIL RICHARD M. PIOUS

Chapter 1. Reputation: Eisenhower and the U-2 Flights

Facts: Downing of a U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union and the capture of the pilot, Francis Gary Powers. Nikita Krushchev was enraged. Threatened his position within Soviet Union. Hard-liners would up pressure. Krushchev would need to accommodate them. U.S. lies. Says it was an unarmed weather plane. Then the plane and Powers are brought out… “plausible deniability” for Ike? Oh what a tangled web we weave… to detect “surprise attack” reason for flight. Krushchev demanded as apology and punishment.

Chapter 2. Power Stakes: Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs

The Lesson: Dangers of micromanagement. “There are times when attempting to preserve power stakes leads to failure of the initial operation– and narrows future options rather than expands them. The Bay of Pigs is such a case.” Facts: CIA-planned invasion of Cuba. Botched. Air-strikes cancelled. Exiles under fire. One error cascaded into another. Standard explanations: CIA poor planning and coordination. “Groupthink” among advisors.

Chapter 2. Power Stakes: Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs Why did Kennedy fail? “The fault was more his own than the CIA’s, more a result of his own desire to protect his power stakes and preserve a cover story fashioned to conceal American involvement than because of a lack of information, errors in facts, or even errors in the premises of the plan, though clearly all these factors were present and contributed to the failure. Every decision Kennedy took made matters worse by increasing the operational risks even as they were intended to minimize political and diplomatic risks.”

Chapter 2. Power Stakes: Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs Why did Kennedy fail? (continued) “It failed because of its hard-nosed realism, because of the gamesmanship the president played with the CIA, because of the compromises in the operation Kennedy forced on the Cubans, and above all, because of the president’s approach that placed his own power stakes front and center.”

Chapter 3. Compellence: Johnson and the Vietnam Escalation

Johnson’s goal was to get Hanoi to feel compelled to call off its infiltration of South Vietnam. Escalation was to put the pressure no Hanoi – but “as few troops as possible to prevent high U.S. casualties.” “Why didn’t the compellence game work in Vietnam? Because the Vietnamese had their own game, which was to draw in American forces to reduce the authority and legitimacy of the South Vietnamese regime. [The escalation of American troops] made it an American war [and] guaranteed that no government in Saigon could gain popular support.”

Chapter 3. Compellence: Johnson and the Vietnam Escalation Why did Johnson fail? “By choosing the stalemate option, Johnson overreacted to his risks, and it is this miscalculation of risk that defines his failure.” “Johnson defined his policy according to his miscalculations about his power stakes and the utility of the compellence option against Hanoi. His position was always the middle option from those presented by his advisers, but it was the middle of a muddle of unrealistic military options and projections. The tragic dimension of Vietnam for the nation lay in the dissonance between Johnson’s escalation and the actual stakes for the US in the ‘loss’ of Vietnam and between Johnson’s unrealistic game of compellence and Hanoi’s far more realistic game of exhaustion.”

Chapter 4. Command & Control: Ford and the Mayaguez

Successful in the eyes of the public, President Ford’s approval numbers increased by 12 points,

but a disaster for those involved in the rescue.

GAO study “suggested that the decision to use force rather than seek a diplomatic solution had not been warranted.”

Chapter 5. Rhetoric: Carter and the Malaise Speech

1979: The energy crisis (gas lines and shortages) and a crisis of confidence. Falling approval numbers (into the high 20s) and Teddy Kennedy looming in the wings. Complicated energy policies built on regulations and tax manipulations – windfall profits tax, 55 mph speed limits, gas taxes, price controls, low income subsidies, mass transit, etc. 113 separate provisions in the original proposal. Standby Rationing? Caddell vs Mondale: Public mood vs practical issues

Chapter 6. Prerogative Power: Reagan and the Iran-Contra Affair

Overture to Iran to try to make connections with likely post-Khumani leadership. Iran was holding U.S. hostages. U.S. sold Iran arms for their war with Iraq through “The Enterprise.” Profits from arms sale funneled through The Enterprise to the Nicaraguan Contras (freedom fighters) engaged in a civil war with Communist Sandinistas. This was overseen by Marine Colonel Ollie North. It violated the Boland Amendment that prohibited U.S. aid to the Contras.

Chapter 6. Prerogative Power: Reagan and the Iran-Contra Affair

“Reagan ignored his statutory duty to keep Congress informed of covert operations by violating the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.”

“In the Iran-Contra affair the decision to bypass the framework laws regarding arms sales and intelligence operations resulted in policy fiasco… no sense of restraint… The Enterprise left key aspects of the negotiations outside of any presidential control and accountability.”

Chapter 7. Gamesmanship: Bush 41 and the Budget Summit

Fascinating Contrast in Case Studies of Budget Impasses

1990: G.H.W. Bush vs. Congressional Democrats The Deal was made, the Party Divided, Political Devastation

1994: Bill Clinton vs. Congressional Republicans

The Deal NOT Made, the Party United, Political Revival


The Deficit Crisis of 1990

Fiscal 1991 budget: $100 billion deficit

Weak economy and rising interest rates:

$130 to $160 billion deficit (eventually would come in at $220 billion)

Congressional Democrats played “chicken”

White House: “without a deal, the economy would

topple into a recession”


A Fragile Economy

National Bureau of Economic Research: Recession began July 1990.

Table. Economic Growth Around Time of the Budget Summit

Year and Quarter Real GDP Growth %

1990, Qtr 1 (January-March) 4.4

1990, Qtr 2 (April-June) negotiations 1.6

1990, Qtr 3 (July-September) deal 0.1

1990, Qtr 4 (October-December) - 3.4

1991, Qtr 1 (January-March) - 1.9

1991, Qtr 2 (April-June) 3.1

1991, Qtr 3 (July-September) 1.9

1991, Qtr 4 (October-December) 1.8


“The budget process had evaporated and in its place was more ad hoc summitry” Bush was preoccupied with the Gulf crisis “Republicans entered negotiations in disarray... Poorly served by his negotiating team.”

Chapter 7. Gamesmanship: Bush 41 and the Budget Summit House Republicans balked Gingrich vs Dole Sununu tried to intimate them Summit Budget failed in House and Senate Congress passed a Continuing Resolution to keep Gov. running Pres. Bush vetoed it. Override attempt failed. On the Path to SHUTDOWN

Chapter 7. Gamesmanship: Bush 41 and the Budget Summit Stopgap resolutions averted Shutdown Back to negotiations Resulted in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 Half the previous spending cuts Less revenue increase – but increased income tax rates above $82,000 (31%) plus luxury taxes (recall yacht tax and Maine) Passed Congress despite a majority of Republicans opposing it 47 no to 126 aye among Republicans in the House

Chapter 7. Gamesmanship: Bush 41 and the Budget Summit What happened? Republicans painted themselves into a corner by seeing the issue as a “crisis.” Had to get a deal. “Democrats were able to define the issue in a way that would show up the president, even if he negotiated successfully. The winning issue for Democrats was not the specifics of fiscal policy—it was the valence issues involving fairness, trust, and keeping promises. Bush not only lost on the trust issue: He would be unable to use the credibility issue against {President?} Bill Clinton in the 1992 elections. The worst of it was that Bush divided his own party on the character question.”

Chapter 7. Gamesmanship: Bush 41 and the Budget Summit On top of it all – with the huge political price – it had little economic impact. Spending cuts were tiny. Interest rates stayed high. “After the deal was announced, the economy went into the tank. {Actually, before.}… [but] did spark a recovery in the presidential election year” but too late. {Also it was not so clear at the time that we were in recovery.} “It wasn’t the tax increase per se that hurt Bush, it was how it defined him with a specific group of conservative voters.”

Chapter 9. Parallel Governance: Bush (43) and the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

Parallel Government, Bypasses Congress??? p.238

“Failure to find WMD became a partisan issue. Democrats charged that Bush had deceived Congress and fraudulently gained its

authorization to use force.”

But see the earlier evidence --

Chapter 1. Washington’s Way: “Liberal Allowances, Mutual Forbearances,

and Temporizing Yieldings on All Sides”

A Muscular Moderate Consensus driven The Compromise of 1790: Hamilton’s debt plan and the Capitol carved out of Virginia and Maryland. “Washington spread a gospel of civility and centrism that elevated Americans and the presidency.”

Chapter 1. Washington’s Way: “the nation’s nonpartisan conscience” His “executive compass naturally pointed toward the center.” “scrambled to preserve the social harmony that he craved.” “reminded his squabbling subordinates that they shared a similar vision for the country.” “By retiring after two terms, Washington gave the great gift of sensible centrism to the American people. Washington also taught presidents how to exercise power vigorously but within limits, as he did during the Whiskey Rebellion and throughout his tenure.”

Chapter 2. Compromisers, Zealots, and Ciphers: The Blessing of Parties, the Challenge of Slavery,

and the Failure of Presidents “The misnamed Compromise of 1850 failed to find cmmon ground, the essential element of compromise. This was no Washingtonian vision; it was a prelude to disaster.” “Without a vigorous, forward-looking center seeker leading the country, it seemed more difficult to imagine a middle path.” “American democracy generated great passion without good judgment. Moderates became silent and commonsense could not prevail.”

Chapter 2. Compromisers, Zealots, and Ciphers: The Blessing of Parties, the Challenge of Slavery,

and the Failure of Presidents Zachary Taylor, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan Was the weaving path from compromise to compromise and eventually a bloody Civil War, the result of not having moderate leadership (as Troy argues) or of having too much moderation in leadership. popular sovereignty and limits to slavery expansions were unsustainable middles – there was no stable middle political ground.

Chapter 3. Abraham Lincoln’s Middle Measure: A Cautious Politician’s

“My Policy Is to Have No Policy” Pragmatism “In a nation torn between the politically untenable poles of perpetuating an evil institution and abolishing immediately, Lincoln had done the seemingly impossible: forged a middle path. Step by excruciating step, earning credibility along the way even while frustrating some, Lincoln led the skeptical North from fighting a war just for union to fighting against slavery as well. The president pragmatically focused on day-to-day realities rather than daunting abstractions. Lincoln understood that radical surgery would have shocked the body politic and would not have held.”

Chapter 4. Theodore Roosevelt’s Democratic Two-Step: The Rise of the Romantic, Nationalist Presidency

“Roosevelt’s vision of constrained reform shifted America’s center of gravity without destabilizing the country.” -- TR, constrained??? -- shifted the center ??? What is not moderate to Troy? “A pragmatist, Roosevelt judged government agencies by asking whether they practically improved the lives of ‘the mass of the people’.” “modernized the longstanding democratic impulse favoring muscular moderation.” “daring yet cautious”

Chapter 5. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal: The Radical as Moderate

FDR – as Hoover called him: “the chameleon in plaid” “Dr. New Deal prescribed a wide variety of medicines.” “To create a popular mandate for the substantial changes he advocated, Roosevelt played to all sides.” FDR “cleverly balanced bold leadership with agile, even inconsistent, policy making.” “a fluid mind” “a tinkerer, not an ideologue”


“Believed in dialogue and negotiation.” “neither a reactionary nor a radical. The fundamental governing system survived. Private property remained.” Criticized from both the left and the right. >>>>See summary on p.120 “Roosevelt was always in front by a half-step, with a clear direction, propelling the nation onward.”


“As a centrist, Roosevelt met extremist elements halfway…. Roosevelt wore the mantle of pragmatic liberalism proudly.” >>> See p.121

Chapter 6. Truman, Eisenhower, and America’s Bipartisan Consensus:

Building Political Unity through Cultural Conformity A sort of 2nd Return to Normalcy “The shared traumas fueled Americans’ craving for a tranquil, cohesive culture, which the tidal wave of consumerism happily satisfied.” “Moderate leaders had to nurture a political consensus around containment.”


Building Political Unity through Cultural Conformity Truman – “constructed foreign policy as a bipartisan issue.” but a “dyspeptic pit bull on domestic issues.” “The shrill Left versus Right conflict allowed Truman to forge a vibrant center.” His “quite vigorously muscular moderation clashed with the milquetoast moderation of the Republican nominee, Thomas E. Dewey.” >>> Truman as moderate???


Building Political Unity through Cultural Conformity “Truman built political consensus on a remarkable cultural consensus… (on) an American patriotism based on consumerism, careerism, and community.” Ike – “cultivated a broader cult of consensus in political and popular culture.” – “I Like Ike” “Frustrated by all this center seeking,” Russell Kirk scoffed that Ike was no conservative, “he is a golfer.”


Building Political Unity through Cultural Conformity Ike’s “most dramatic and most centrist action would be passive. By maintaining signature New Deal programs such as Social Security, Eisenhower ratified Roosevelt’s vision and guaranteed that America would maintain its welfare state.” Ike’s “operating vision included the citizens cooperating, the government assisting when necessary, and the president mediating when pressed.”

Chapter 7. John F. Kennedy and Civil Rights: Moderation and the Challenge of Change

Restraint in Cuban Missile Crisis June 1963 Shift from caution to more aggressive leadership on civil rights in 1963. Took a stand as a “muscular moderate on civil rights” (p.163) Then he was assassinated in November

Chapter 8. The Consensus Collapses: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of Moderation

LBJ “Come now, and let us reason together.” A master legislator and coalition-builder in Congress – but almost too good: “Johnson won the legislative battle but lost the national consensus.” >>> see p. 180.

Chapter 9. Learning from Losers: Where Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter Went Wrong

Fed the nation’s “crisis of confidence” Nixon: “Not all politicians who aim for the center find it. Richard Nixon’s policies were centrist, but his politics were immoderate. For all of Nixon’s clever positioning, his kill-or-be-killed approach to politics proved self-destructive.” >>>>immoderate?


Fed the nation’s “crisis of confidence” Carter: “proved that the sum of the modern president’s program is greater than its individual parts. Carter’s discouraging speeches hurt him and his country. Craving a new, affirmative consensus, Americans resented Carter’s defeatist message, laced with his impotent pessimism.” But more substantive -- “Carter’s responses to problems were inadequate.”


“Unfortunately, Jimmy Carter failed to offer such leadership. He squandered goodwill and power with his amateurism, arrogance, and half-measures. He seemed unable to whip inflation, manage the energy crisis, balance the budget, tame the media, or master foreign affairs… Mr. ‘Why Not the Best’ soon embodied American defeatism at its worst.” >>> but he was a moderate as was Nixon.

Chapter 10. Ronald Reagan’s Moderate Revolution: Resurrecting the Center

“Reagan defined a meaningful and muscular middle.” >>> muscular, yes; but middle???? “Ronald Reagan tried leading a revolution from the center; his ideology repudiated the Great Society status quo, but his temperament, leadership techniques, and patriotism tethered him to mainstream public opinion.”


“Ronald Reagan sought to renew the American center by pushing it to the right, back where he believed it belonged.” >>> and this makes him a moderate??? Nationalism, pragmatism, but “Ronald Reagan was in fact a committed conservative, promising a conservative counterrevolution.” Yet, he “governed moderately.”


“Reagan cared less about budget cuts and more about tax cuts, defense increases, and deregulation…. (his) centrism angered core supporters.” His “instinct for moderation yielded its greatest rewards in the arena where zealotry seemed most dangerous: relations with the Soviet Union.”

Chapter 11. Bill Clinton and the Perils of Triangulation: The Need to be Muscular as Well as Moderate

“Bill Clinton was a center seeker by temperment, not just ideology.” >>> did not move to the center until it was forced on him by political events: the 1994 midterm election and a Republican Congress

Chapter 12. George W. Bush: Imprisoned by Conviction?

“the danger of muscle without moderation” “Bush is a conviction politician.” “too muscular” >>> compassionate conservatism seems like a nod to moderation. Then his policies: No Child Left Behind for Education, Prescription Drug Benefit add on to Social Security, No big domestic spending cuts, even tax cuts across the board – seems moderate?

Presidents, Public Opinion and

Representation

Two Big Questions 1.Who Do Presidents Represent?

The General Public or Their Partisan Base?

Are Presidents centrists or partisans? And should Presidents be centrists or partisans?

Two Big Questions Again, the classic tradeoffs. Public Opinion or the Public Interest Public or Political Party Center or Base Politics or Principle Consent or Wisdom

Approval Ratings can be used to see whether those in the Public and the Political Parties think that they are being Represented.

Table . Presidential Approval, 1945-2013

Years President Approval

1961-1963 Kennedy 70.1

1953-1961 Eisenhower 65.0

1989-1993 G.H.W. Bush 60.9

1963-1969 Johnson 55.1

1993-2001 Clinton 55.1

1981-1989 Reagan 52.8

2001-2009 G.W. Bush 49.4

1969-1974 Nixon 49.0

2009- Obama 48.7

1974-1977 Ford 47.2

1977-1981 Carter 45.5

1945-1953 Truman 45.4

Mean 53.7

Some ratings are quite high (60s+) and some are a bit low (mid-40s) But, overall (low-50s) a sense that

much of the public is being represented.



1963-1965 Johnson 74.2

1961-1963 Kennedy 70.1


2001-2005 G.W. Bush 62.2

1989-1993 G.H.W. Bush 60.9

1969-1973 Nixon 55.8

1945-1949 Truman 55.6

1981-1985 Reagan 50.3

1993-1997 Clinton 49.6

2009-2013 Obama 49.2

1974-1977 Ford 47.2

1977-1981 Carter 45.5

Mean 57.5

First Term



1997-2001 Clinton 60.6


1985-1989 Reagan 55.3

1965-1969 Johnson 50.3

2013- Obama 46.7

2005-2009 G.W. Bush 36.5

1949-1953 Truman 36.5

1973-1974 Nixon 34.4

Mean 47.6

2nd Term

Is there a trend to lower approval ratings? No. Slight negative correlation, but not significant.

Are Ratings Lower in Second Terms? Yes. There is a general decline in approval after “the honeymoon” period Qtr 1, mean = 66% Qtr 8, mean (pre-midterm) = 56% Lower, but generally stable in 2nd term

Are Ratings Lower in Second Terms? Yes. 8 Presidents since 1945 have served a 2nd term Approval Ratings were Lower in 6 of the 8 cases Lower by over 15 percentage points in 4 cases Truman, LBJ, Nixon, and G.W. Bush

Are Ratings Lower in Second Terms? Only 2 presidents improved their approval rating in their second term: Reagan +5, from 50.3% to 55.3% Clinton +11, from 49.6% to 60.6%

Representing the Partisan Base President Obama’s Approval Ratings by Political Party Mean (1/09 to 12/13) Democrats 83.5% Independents 44.5% Republicans 13.9% Current (12/13) Democrats 77% Independents 35% Republicans 8%

There is a Significant Difference in Presidential Approval Ratings by Political Party 1. It has been increasing for recent Presidents 2. It tends to get larger over presidential terms 3. It involves more the Decline in Approval among those in the Opposition Party rather than an Increase in Approval in the President’s Party

Table . Partisanship and Presidential Approval

Quarter of Presidency

President’s Party

Opposition Party

Difference

1. Post-Inauguration 82 48 34

8. At First Midterm 79 36 43

15. At Reelection 80 28 52

23. At 2nd Midterm 74 26 48

31. End of 2nd Term 76 22 54

President’s Tend to Represent: To some extent, both the General Public (decent general approval ratings) & their Party’s Base (excellent ratings) But, on balance and in general, they govern more to their Party’s Base

Why Do President’s Govern more to the Party’s Base? Shouldn’t the Median Voter call the shots? Can’t the Party Base be taken for granted? Where are they going to go?

Why Do President’s Govern more to the Party’s Base? Supposedly-- according to Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy Candidates and, once elected, Presidents should move to the political middle of the political spectrum.

_____D_________________M______R______________ __________________D____M______R______________ R should win #1 and D should win #2

The Misinterpretation of Downs That elections are won by attracting the median voter does NOT mean that you can take the base for granted and just appeal to centrist swing voters Median Voter theory (Downs) does not take into account the importance of turnout and the seeming “irrationality” of base voters who may not turn out to vote for a candidate that they are not happy about (even if their party’s candidate is preferable to the opposition, the lesser of two evils).

The Misinterpretation of Downs The decision to turn out is based on psychological gratification and not an instrumental choice. There is not much psychological gratification from voting for the lesser of two evils. In effect, candidates need to be concerned about the enthusiasm and turnout of the base. Every vote lost from the base means that the median voter is further removed from the party’s candidate.

Why Do President’s Govern more to the Party’s Base? There is little incentive to represent of to try to influence the partisans of the opposing party. Part of the public can be quickly dismissed The decision is how much to govern: to the partisan base of ideologically committed and strong partisans OR to potential supporters in the political center, independents, moderates, and X-pressured partisans

Why Do President’s Govern more to the Party’s Base? Presidents pay a great deal of attention to their party’s base because the base is BOTH the BASE of their support in getting Elected (and Reelected) and the BASE of their support in assembling a coalition to Govern (to pass laws, etc. This is more the case for some presidents than others. Some depend more on their party’s base. Others depend a bit more on swing voters.

Why Do President’s Govern more to the Party’s Base?

An Electoral Theory of Presidential Leadership (from chapter in The Obama Legacy)

Or

“You Dance with the One Who Brought You.”

Why Do President’s Govern more to the Party’s Base? Presidents cannot and should not politically take the support of their party’s base for granted. The base is active. The base monitors politics more closely. Once lost, the trust of the base is difficult to regain. You go nowhere – politically or in governing – without the support of the base. And the base will take “a walk” -- amateurism gives them leverage.

Why Do President’s Govern more to the Party’s Base? In modern times – Republicans should be particularly prone to govern to their base. The conservative Republican base is larger than the liberal Democratic base.

Figure 3. The Pre side nt’s Base and Non-Base Vote , 1972-2008

1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Note: Calculated from variables VCF0803 (ideology) and VCF0705 (presidential vote) in the ANES Cumulative Data

File dataset. Weight variable VCF0009A was used. The base vote consists of party identifiers claiming an ideological

perspective consistent with the president’s party (e.g., liberal Democrats for a Democratic president, conservative

Republicans for a Republican president). The non-base vote consists of moderates, don’ t knows, and those with

ideological views opposite of those of the president. Both percentages of all reported voters for the president.

RN2 JC RR1 RR2 GB WC1 WC2 GWB1 GWB2 Obama

Election and President

Base

Non-Base

Percent

of the

President’s

Vote

Figure 3. The Pre side nt’s Base and Non-Base Vote , 1972-2008

1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Note: Calculated from variables VCF0803 (ideology) and VCF0705 (presidential vote) in the ANES Cumulative Data

File dataset. Weight variable VCF0009A was used. The base vote consists of party identifiers claiming an ideological

perspective consistent with the president’s party (e.g., liberal Democrats for a Democratic president, conservative

Republicans for a Republican president). The non-base vote consists of moderates, don’ t knows, and those with

ideological views opposite of those of the president. Both percentages of all reported voters for the president.

RN2 JC RR1 RR2 GB WC1 WC2 GWB1 GWB2 Obama

Election and President

Base

Non-Base

Percent

of the

President’s

Vote

Why Do President’s Govern more to the Party’s Base? Governing appeals should match successful electoral appeals. Support in Governing is likely to come from the same sources as Electoral Support and Opposition is likely to carry over from elections to governing as well. You would not expect those who opposed your election to be allies in governing.

Two Big Questions 2. Are Presidents Able to Sway Public Opinion?

Is the Bully Pulpit Generally Effective?

Is the “bully pulpit” or “going public” generally effective? Seems to fall on “Deaf Ears” Not Much Evidence of Presidential Persuasion. A Minimal Effects Finding “Going Public” does not make a difference in public opinion polls

George Edwards’s On Deaf Ears The Minimal Effects Finding – that is, “going public” usually does not make a difference to public opinion. This conclusion is based on multiple examples of presidential speeches and public opinion measures following those speeches during the Reagan and Clinton presidencies–two presidents commonly thought to be most effective in their communication with the public.

On Clinton: “Despite his impressive political and communication skills, the evidence is clear that the president typically failed to obtain public support.” On Reagan: “ ...when it came time to change public opinion or mobilize it on his behalf, he typically met with failure.”

Why?

Public Support for Clinton’s Health Care Reform

Date Favor Oppose

9/24-26/1993 59 33

10/28-30/93 45 45

11/2-4/93 52 40

11/19-21/93 52 41

1/15-17/1994 56 39

1/28-30/94 57 38

2/26-28/94 46 48

3/28-30/94 44 47

5/20-22/94 46 49

6/11-12/94 42 50

A Few Examples: Example #1. September 1993, President Clinton delivered a national address on health care reform. Public support for the proposal declined.

Public Support of Troops in Bosnia

Date Approve Disapprove

9/19-22/1995 50 44

11/6-8/95 47 49

Speech

11/27/95 46 40

12/15-18/95 41 54

1/5-7/1996 36 58

5/28-29/96 42 51

6/26-29/96 39 53

Example #2. November 27, 1995, President Clinton delivered a national address on deploying troops in Bosnia. Public support for the deployment declined.

Why Does it Appear that Presidents Do Not Sway Public Opinion? 1. The Selection Issue: Presidents Go Public on the

Tough Issues, Issues on which the public has already made up its mind

2. Effects may be cumulative, not one “one shot” (like commercials)

3. Offsetting impact of Opponents

Why Does it Appear that Presidents Do Not Sway Public Opinion? 4. The Minimal Effects Conundrum: Those who hear the speech have strong views that are difficult to change; those who are most changeable are the least likely to hear the speech. 5. Relatively small differences (<10%) may still be important in national politics

6. Sometimes you win and sometimes you lose:

The Bully Pulpit is Not an Automatic Effect

Documents

PSC 306 The American Presidency - University at Buffalo