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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PEOPLES PARTY-OPPOSITION
RELATIONSHIP IN PAKISTAN (1972-1977)
Supervised by
PROF. DR. TAJ MOHARRAM KHAN
Submitted by
ARIF KHAN
Ph.D Scholar
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR
(2016)
2
Acknowledgment
First of all I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to Almighty Allah, for blessing me to
face and complete this challenging task successfully. I am greatly indebted to Professor
Dr. Taj Moharram Khan who, being the head of department and inspite of his very busy
and tedious schedule, gave me sufficient time for guidance and discussion. His guidance
helped reduced many shortcomings in this research work.
I do acknowledge the kindness of staff of different libraries in the University of
Peshawar, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan Study Centre (University of
Karachi), National Assembly (Islamabad), National Documentation Centre (NDC)
Islamabad, Peshawar archives, National Library (Islamabad) for their support and help in
providing concened materials. And yes, I am grateful to the staff of the Department of
Politics library (Royal Holloway University), Department of Political science
library(University of Oxford), Birmingham University Library and Birmingham City
University library and British Library who extended every possible help during my six
months academic visit to UK.
I would like to thank all the worthy faculty members of the Department of Political
Science (University of Peshawar) for not only motivating and guiding me but for also
providing me with a vibrant atmosphere to study. And of course, my special thanks to
Professor Dr Markus (my external supervisor during my 6 months academic visit to
Royal Holloway University of London) who was kind and cooperative to me and from
whose experiences I benefited a lot during the short period.
I am also grateful to my friends particularly, Bakhtiar Khan, Ashfaq-ur-Rehman, Saif-ul-
Islam Lala, Fazal Said (Professor) and Zulqarnain (Lecturer) who generously gave me
their precious time and advise, while providing me some time with additional insight on
3
some important aspects and issues. I would also express my profound love and respect
for my two elder brothers whose love, care and sincere wishes always inspired and
encouraged me.
In the end, I will surely express my thanks and regards to the contemporaries of Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto like Abdul Hafeez Peerzada, Munnawar Hasan, Muhammad Hussain Mehinti,
Professor N. D. Khan, Hafiz Naeem ur Rehman, Syed Usmani, Malik Miraj Muhammad
Khan, Retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Abdul Akbar Khan who gave me time to
interview them. I am also thankful to the two academicians/experts of political
developments in Pakistan, Professor Syed Jaffar Ahmad (Director Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Karachi), and Professor Tauseef Ahmad (ex-HOD, Federal Urdu
University) for useful interaction on the theme of my study.
Arif Khan
PhD Research Scholar
4
Abstract
State of democracy in Pakistan has been one of the burning issues of discussion since
long. Those aware of the nature of Pakistan politics are genuinely apprehensive about the
future of democracy in Pakistan.
This research work is an attempt to find answers to certain key questions pertaining to
democracy in Pakistan with reference to the ruling-opposition relationship, in general,
and during PPP government under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-177), in particular. This
study seeks to explore the role of PPP and opposition parties in that critical time when a
truly elected government came into power as a result of first ever general elections held
in December 1970. Since the state was then under an elected set-up, it was hoped that a
new era in the politics of Pakistan would usher. In fact, there was seen a marked
improvement in the style of politics as was evident from the mutual relations of political
parties particularly during the formation of government and process towards constitution
making. But soon there was seen a patent divergence in attitudes once the 1973
Constitution was put into effect. It appeared as if the ruling PPP and the opposition have
parted ways. The study reveals the way PPP and the opposition parties reacted to certain
situations, how they maneuvered and how they agreed on some occasions and fought
among themselves on others. It also investigates the extent to which the personal
characteristics of party leaders influenced the state of politics during the period. In fact, it
was a deviation from the established principles on both sides that obstructed the growth
of democracy in Pakistan. One of the findings of this study is that democracy has
persistently remained in a state of uncertainty because of the lust for power, clash of egos
and most importantly, the extra-democratic behavior on the part of politicians. The thesis
investigates as to how the PPP and the opposition parties lost the opportunity to transform
Pakistan into a truly democratic polity.
5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AKMC Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference
ANP Awami National Party
BD Basic Democracy/Democracies/Democrats
BLA Baloch Liberation Army
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief
COAS Chief of Army Staff
Con ML Covention Muslim League
Coun ML Council Muslim League
COP Combined Opposition Parties
CWO Commonwealth Organization
DAC Democratic Action Committee
DPR Defense of Pakistan Rules
EBDO Elective Bodies Disqualification Order
ECP Election Commission of Pakistan
EP East Pakistan
FRB Federal Review Board
FSF Federal Security Force
IRSP International Research Support Initiative Program
ISI Inter Services Intelligence
JI Jamaat-i-Islami
JUP Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan
6
JUI Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam
KP Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
KSP Krishak Sramik Party
KT Khaksar Tehrik
LFO Legal Framework Order
NAP National Awami Party
NAP (W) National Awami Party (Wali Khan Group)
NDC National Documentation Centre
NDP National Democratic Party
NDU National Defense University (Islamabad)
NWFP North West Frontier Province
PDM Pakistan Democratic Movement
PDP Pakistan Democratic Party
PM Prime Minister
PMLQ Pakistan Muslim League Qayyum Group
PNA Pakistan National Alliance
PNC Pakistan National Centre
POW Prisoner of War
PPP Pakistan Peoples Party
PRB People‘s Representation Bill
PRODA Public and Representative offices (Disqualification) Act
PSP Pakistan Socialist Party
PTV Pakistan Television
7
QAU Quaid-e-Azam University (Islamabad)
RTC Round Table Conference
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization
TI Tehrik-i-Istiqlal
UDF United Democratic Front
UF United Front
UK United Kingdom
US United States
WP West Pakistan
Z. A. Bhutto Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
8
TABLE OF CONTENTS
S. No Titles Page No
Acknowledgement…………………………………………………. i
Abstract………….…………………………………………………. iii
List of Abbreviations……………………………………………… iv
Chapter: 1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………… 1
1.1. Statement of the Problem……………………………………… 4
1.2. Objectives of the Study………………………………………… 5
1.3. Research Questions……………………………………………... 6
1.4. Literature Review ……………………………………………… 6
1.5. Significance of the Study………………………………………... 13
1.6. Methodology…………………………………………………….. 14
1.7. Data Collection………………………………………………….. 14
1.8. Limitations ……………………………………………………… 16
1.9. Chapter Structure 17
Chapter: 2 FUNCTIONAL DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KEY
COMPONENTS…………………………………………………....
20
2.1. Introduction………………………………………………….. 20
2.2. Elements of Democracy relating to the Study …………….. 22
2.2.1. Respect for Majority Rule and Minority Rights……………… 22
2.2.2. Free, Fair and Impartial Elections…………………………… 23
2.2.3. Rule of Law…………………………………………………. 25
2.2.4. Separation of Powers and Independence of Judiciary……… 26
2.2.5. Independent Media………………………………………….. 26
2.2.6. Conflict and Consensus ……………………………………… 27
2.2.7. Accountability of Government……………………………….. 28
2.3. What is a Political Party……………………………………… 29
2.4. Democracy and Political Parties……………………………… 30
2.5. The Need for Political Parties………………………………….. 32
2.6. Political Conflicts and their Resolution in a Democratic ……… 33
2.7. Importance of Political Parties to Democracies……………….. 34
2.8. Opposition in Democracy……………………………………… 37
2.9. Importance of Opposition in a Democratic system ………….. 38
2.10. Rights and Responsibilities of Opposition …………………… 39
2.11. Role and Obligations of Opposition………………………….. 41
2.11.1. Opposition as the Voice of the Voiceless ……………………. 44
2.11.2. To Offer a Viable Alternative to the Government ………….. 44
2.11.3. Seeking Accountability of Government……………………… 45
2.11.4. To Oppose the Government in Power……………………….. 45
2.11.5. In Case of National Tragedy and National Glory…………… 46
9
Chapter: 3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND………………………………… 48
3.1. Introduction…………………………………………………….. 48
3.2. Political Instability After Independence……………………….. 48
3.3. Political Parties and Democracy in Post Independence Pakistan.. 51
3.4. The Situation during 1954 Elections……………………………. 55
3.5. Lack of Elections in Pakistan…………………………………… 57
3.6. Delayed Framing of Constitution……………………………….. 58
3.7. Bureaucratic and Military Influence in the Politics of Pakistan… 62
3.8. Pak-India Comparative Study…………………………………… 65
3.9. Military Intervention and Decade of Military Rule……………... 66
3.10. 1965 War, Tashkent Declaration and Bhutto‘s Maneuvering…. 75
3.11. The Formation of Pakistan Peoples Party …………………… 77
3.12. Opposition to Ayub Khan…………………………………….. 83
3.13. Transfer of Power from Military Man to his Comrade in Arm .. 87
3.14. 1970 Elections and Yahya Khan………………………………. 90 3.14.1. Competing Political Parties in 1970 Elections……………… 91
3.14.2. Campaign for the Elections and Politicians Maneuvering…… 92
3.14.3. Party-wise Candidates on Territorial Basis………………….. 97
3.14.4. Election Results and Political Maneuvering of Bhutto …….. 100
Chapter: 4 POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: THE PPP STYLE…………………. 107
4.1. Introduction…………………………………………………….. 107
4.2. Failure of Dhaka Negotiation and Responsibility of Political…... 107
4.3. PPP in power…………………………………………………… 111
4.4. 1973 Constitution and Bhutto Maneuvering…………………. 114
4.5. Constitution of 1973 and Provincial Autonomy……………… 122
4.6. Why opposition Accepted the 1973 Constitution the ……… 126
Chapter: 5 THE POST 1973 SCENARIO………………….. 130
5.1. Introduction……………………………………………………. 130
5.2. Tripartite (PPP, NAP and JUI) Accord of March 1972……….. 133
5.3. Politics of Rivalry and Political Maneuvering in NWFP (KP)…. 137
5.4. Political Rivalry in the Province of Balochistan ……………… 138
5.5. Jamotes-Mengals Dispute……………………………………….. 141
5.6. London Conspiracy and Bhutto Maneuvering…………………. 142
5.7. Death of Hayat Muhammad Khan and Ban on NAP………….. 147
5.8. State of PPP‘s Intra-Party Relationship ……………………… 150
5.9. Bhutto‘s Team A & Team B………………………………….. 152
5.10. Constitutional Amendments and their Impact on PPP-………. 153
5.10.1. First Amendment……………………………………………. 156
5.10.2. Second Amendment………………………………………… 157
5.10.3. Third Amendment………………………………………….. 158
5.10.4. Fourth Amendment………………………………………… 160
5.10.5. Fifth Amendment…………………………………………… 162
5.10.6. Sixth Amendment…………………………………………. 162
10
5.10.7. Seventh Amendment……………………………………… 162
5.11. Conclusion…………………………………………………… 164
Chapter: 6 1977 ELECTIONS, PPP’s HANDLING OF PNA MOVEMENT
AND THE DREADFUL OUTCOME……………………………
167
6.1. Introduction……………………………………………………. 167
6.2. Why the 1977 Elections were held Before the End of ………… 167
6.3. Formation of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)……………… 172
6.4. The Issue of Election Symbol…………………………………. 175
6.5. Qayyum Khan‘s PML(Q)……………………………………… 177
6.6. Selections of Candidates for 1977 Elections…………………. 179
6.7. The Campaign for 1977 Elections…………………………….. 180
6.8. The Elections Results………………………………………….. 187
6.9. Aftermath of the Elections…………………………………….. 189
6.10. PPP-PNA Reconciliatory Dialogue…………………………… 197
6.11. Opposition Faults after the 1977 Elections………………….. 205
6.12. Conclusion …………………………………………………… 207
Chapter: 7 BHUTTO’S LEADERSHIP, RULING-OPPOSITION
RELATIONSHIP, STATUS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
DISMISSAL OF PPP: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
(Based on Interviews)
209
7.1. Introduction …………………………………………………… 209
7.2. PPPs Success in 1970 Elections and Aftermath………………. 211
7.3. Ruling Party‘s Relation with the Opposition Provincial ………. 217
7.4. PPP and the Local Government……………………………….. 222
7.5. Freedom of Expression Under Bhutto………………………….. 223
7.6. Bhutto Attitude towards Members of his Party ……………….. 224
7.7. Formation and Use of Federal Security Force…………………. 224
7.8. Constitutional Amendments…………………………………… 226
7.9. Why the Dialogue in the Aftermath of 1977 Elections Failed…. 227
7.10. Military takeover ……………………………………………… 228
7.11. PPP‘s Slogan: ‗Democracy is Our Polity‘……………………. 232
Chapter: 8 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………… 235
8.2. Findings of the study…………………………………………. 242
8.3. Recommendations …………………………………………… 245
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………….. 251
ANNEXURES…………………………………………………… 267
11
Chapter - 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the topic, the objectives, significance of the study and provides
literature review to determine the importance of the study in the light of studies already
conducted on topics closer to the current one.
Democracy is that form of government in which people get themselves governed through
their elected representatives. A democratic form of government is considered to be the
most suitable one for territorial and political integration and for equitable distribution of
the national resources among various sections of the population. Democracy, by virtue of
its mechanics, is considered to be a cementing force binding different and, sometimes,
opposing sections of a society together. Popular sovereignty, participatory governance,
periodic elections, rule of law, independence of judiciary, supremacy of constitution,
freedom of expression, right to set up political and other organizations within the
framework of law, consensus based decisions, the right for dissent and respect for
minority rights are some of the novel principles of democracy.
In democracy, political parties work in two different capacities, i.e., either they form the
government or act as opposition. Democracy places emphasis on an orderly pattern of
relationship between the ruling and opposition parties which is to be characterized by
accommodation and tolerance. Although opposition parties do not have a share in the
exercise of executive power, yet they do exercise a check on the ruling party/coalition. In
democracy, the opposition is free to criticize the government and offer alternative policy
options. The opposition, under the principle of respect for majority rule, is required to
grant recognition to the authority of the government but, at the same time, exercise an
effective check on the rulers. This is because a successful democracy needs an effective
and vigilant opposition. In democratic states, the ruling and opposition parties develop an
environment of tolerance, trust and understanding and resolve their differences
12
peacefully. The rulers in democracies govern the country on the consent of governed. The
opposition parties also recognize the right of the majority party to rule and make
decisions but, at the same time, the ruling party also respects the minority‘s right to
dissent.1
It is true that strong and formidable opposition is necessary for a sound democratic
system. The role of opposition in the strengthening, stability and the successful working
of democracy is now internationally acknowledged. In the absence of such an
environment, the ruling party would tend to get tardy and complacent or become
autocratic. Wherever there is organized opposition capable of bringing to the surface the
wrongs committed by the government and its acts of omission and commission, the
government can hardly be negligent in the performance of its duty towards the people in
particular, and the state, in general. These principles have consistently been followed and
acted upon by countries that are relatively more developed with strong democratic
traditions. They establish a close link between the state and society. They regularly and
consistently allow input from their electorates. All state organs i.e. the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary function within their clearly demarcated sphere of influence.
In Pakistan, the political parties, in general, and their leaders, in particular, demonstrate
enormous enthusiasm for, and commitment to, these principles but on coming to power
they start pursuing personalization of power and authoritarian style of governance. Thus,
they go contrary to the principles which they so loudly speak about.
Till the launching of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in November
1967, there was no political party of a national stature. In the absence of popular,
organized and public-spirited political parties, the country was ruled by the nexus of
bureaucracy and military oligarchy. There was a lack of participation on the part of the
masses with marginal attention given to their welfare.
1. Wondwosen Teshome, (2009). Opposition Parties and the Politics of Opposition in Africa: A Critical
Analyses. International Journel of Human and Social Sciences vol: 4, pp. 287-88.
13
Things started changing with the appearance of Z. A. Bhutto on the political horizon of
Pakistan. He had come to power in response to people‘s grievances against Ayub Khan
regime. Bhutto promised to redress those grievances and, for the purpose, launched
sectoral reforms. He became popular not only because of his attractive personality but
also because of his sensational speeches and slogans such as ‗PPP‘s voice is people‘s
voice‘. The nation trusted him and considered him to be a Messiah who would rid the
nation of all its maladies and would bring a true form of democracy. Ironically, Bhutto
came to symbolize the very vices that he had come to remedy. He went against the
principles of democracy which he would, otherwise, pronounce so proudly.
The spirit of democracy was damaged by the arbitrary amendments that were made to the
1973 Constitution. His reforms were meant for strengthening his personal position and
not of institutions such as parliament and judiciary.2 Political freedom and the
independence of judiciary were both curtailed. He used state authority to muzzle the
recalcitrant segments of the dominant social groups and to reward those who supported
him.3 Bhutto‘s regime had no respect for the principle of dissension and disagreement.
Through Bhutto‘s stay in power, his government remained uncompromising with the
opposition and did not tolerate any dissent. The PPP government soon became the rule of
one man. The central government‘s intervention in provincial affairs was seen as
betraying the democratic tradition. Bhutto was accused of personalizing power, mauling
state institutions and subverting the populist dream.4 Not only did Bhutto stifle and harass
the opposition but also interfered wherever the opposition was in power. He pressurized
and terrorized not only the opposition but his dissidents within the PPP as well. Arbitrary
2. Ayesha Jalal, (1995). Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical
Perspective. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, p. 80. 3. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, (2011). Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy. London:
Routledge, p.195. 4. Ayesha Jalal, (1995). Op. cit., p. 77.
14
jailing, fake criminal charges and physical intimidation were the tactics that were applied
so frequently.5
In fact, Z. A. Bhutto, with a group of rascals prostituted the noble and lofty goal of PPP6
very soon and the autocratic style of PPP leadership also played its part in preventing
democracy from gaining roots. In short, the five and half years of Z. A. Bhutto‘s
abominable rule (1972-1977) was bad for democracy.
A nation that was born with the promise of democracy did not favor dictatorial
inclinations on the part of one who had sought mass support against dictatorship. The
agitational politics in the post 1977 general elections with the active participation of the
opposition parties and all those who had suffered from the arbitrary measures of Bhutto
made the downfall of his government inevitable.
1.1. Statement of the Problem:
The very concept of democracy presupposes the existence of a healthy opposition. The
absence of a vigilant and active opposition encourages the ruling party to pursue
dictatorial tendency. If the opposition parties exhibit negligence in exercising a check
over the ruling party, it is tantamount to betraying the electorates. Likewise, stifling the
voice and restricting the movement of opposition by the ruling party is also an act of
damaging the fundamental principles of democracy. Bhutto era (1972-77) is
characterized with sensational, storming and dramatic political developments. Bhutto
came as the right man at the right time. He had charisma, education, links and a family
that was fully rooted in politics. No one could have anticipated Bhutto‘s fall as such. But,
as the post 1972 developments revealed, the PPP style of politics was quite different from
what it had been projecting ever since 1967. The PPP had no guidelines and was lacking
the collaborative working mechanism. The autocratic style of politics by the regime
5. Philip Oldenburg, (2010). India, Pakistan and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths.
London: Routledge, p. 184. 6. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford
University Press, p. 382.
15
created an environment of gloom and suspicion. The opposition leaders sensed the
undemocratic treatment all the times. Intimidation and incarceration were the tools used
just to protect the person and operations of Bhutto.7 This study focuses on whether the
style of governance during the Bhutto era was consistent with the fundamentals of
democracy. It further also focuses on the role of opposition as to what extent did it
support/promote democratic values and norms, and the kind of treatment that was meted
out to them by the ruling PPP.
1.2. Objectives of the Study:
Following are the objectives of this study:
1. To examine the rationale of democratic principles in the context of relationship
between the ruling and opposition parties and their impact on the smooth
functioning of state institutions;
2. To bring on record the causes as to why politicians in Pakistan have been
demonstrating a marginal interest in their commitment to democracy;
3. To make a critical analysis of the PPP style of governance under Z. A. Bhutto
(1972-1977) and determine its relevance to democracy;
4. To point out the extent to which the ruling PPP adhered to a collaborative
framework with the opposition while managing the state affairs;
5. To highlight the pattern of relationship which the PPP maintained with the
opposition both inside and outside the parliament during 1972-1977.
1.3. Research Questions:
This study seeks answers to the following questions:
7. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development. Colorado: Westview Press,
p. 122.
16
1. By making ‗Democracy is our polity‘ a party motto, did Bhutto mean business or
was it merely a slogan to mobilize public opinion?
2. Did Bhutto‘s government create the sort of political environment where the
opposition could perform its role effectively?
3. Did PPP, under the leadership of Z. A. Bhutto (1972-77), adhere to the principles
of consensus, dissension and dialogue being the cardinal features of democracy?
4. Could the opposition parties fulfill their obligations towards the promotion of
democratic values in Pakistan during the period under review?
5. Cold PPP government‘s arbitrary style of politics be regarded as a major cause of
its downfall in 1977?
1.4. Literature Review:
Ziring (1980) is of the view that it was a noble intention that led to the creation/birth of
Pakistan but unfortunately the early leadership could not provide it with a sound
foundation. The personal, regional and professional rivalries among the politicians
rendered them incapable to run the system smoothly and hence military‘s intervention
was not unexpected. The author provides a deep insight of the country‘s experimentation
with different political and military regimes. The autocratic decision making and eager of
the ruling politicians to satisfy their vested motives rendered democracy a failure/fiasco.
As far as the constitutional history is concerned, the author holds the view that there was
little success in framing a viable constitution. Pakistan proved a laboratory for
constitutional experimentation but none accomplished what the constitutions proclaimed.
The ethnic tension which Pakistan is suffering from the very inception and which has
given birth to many other problems, still plague the country. In the end, the author
discusses the foreign policy of Pakistan, saying that foreign policy is the extension of
17
internal condition and due to the domestic dilemmas, Pakistan‘s foreign policy remains a
source of its weakness. So internal factors intertwined with external factors can play a
significant role in shaping Pakistan‘s future.
Ziring (2003) holds the leadership of various political parties responsible for the failure
of political system of Pakistan. He has pointed to the lack of interest on the part of
country leadership in the growth of the political system that led to the absence of
involvement of the common people into the system of the country. The political process,
in place of the political parties is mostly carried out by the bureaucracy (civil and
military). This led to the incapability of parties for providing disciplined expressions of
public aspirations. He also holds that politicians from Punjab province dominated the
administration, the economic structure, the general decision making power and political
reforms process.
Jalal (1995) has expressed her views on the success of democracy in India and its failure
in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The author questions as to why a common British colonial
legacy led to divergent political development after independence in 1947. The author has
discussed the similarities between the populist experiments of both India and Pakistan.
The popular leaders in both the countries have been accused of personalizing power,
mauling the institutions of the state and subverting the populist dream. Both the countries
were ruled by leaders having strong roots in the old structure of power. After the
disintegration, the anti bureaucratic sentiment and the army humiliation afforded the
popularly elected leaders of Pakistan an opportunity to tilt the institutional balance in
favour of popularly elected institutions against the non elected institutions of the state.
But the legacies of military rule had greatly reduced such prospects. The populist
experience of Bangladesh was different from that of India and Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib-ur-
Rahman concentrated on the Awami League‘s political networks instead of the non-
elected institutions of the state. Steps were taken to establish and build the Awami
League‘s organizational machinery down to the district level and to ensure political
18
control over the administrative arms of the state. Yet Mujib failed because the Awami
League reflected the broader ideological divisions in Bangladeshi society. The Indian
populism met with the same fate as those of Pakistan and Bangladesh and proved to be a
mirage and nothing more than reassertion of authoritarian tendencies.
Talbot (1998) recounts the problems that Pakistan faced since its inception. To develop a
perspective, he goes back a couple of decades back when Pakistan was in the process of
making. Pakistan‘s present problems are predicated on the colonial rule, incompatible
regional and cultural interests of the groups inhabiting the subcontinent before partition.
Furthermore, the author inquires into the separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Z. A.
Bhutto‘s decline, Zia‘s rule, Benazir Bhutto‘s failure to establish an enduring democratic
government and Nawaz Sharif‘s rise to power. Finally, the impact that these rulers had on
Pakistan and the issues which plagued Pakistan are vividly brought into focus.
Mazari (2006) gives a historical description of Pakistan. Sherbaz Khan Mazari entered
into the politics of Pakistan by joining an alliance of five opposition political parties
called Combined Opposition Parties (COP) which jointly nominated Fatima Jinnah for
presidential elections of 1965. Ayub Khan‘s era is critically discussed. This is followed
by an indepth analysis of Z. A. Bhutto and Zia periods. Bhutto‘s autocratic and inhuman
attitudes towards opposition, his use of military in Balochistan, personalization trends in
politics and subsequently his downfall are important contents of the book. The author
also evaluates Zia‘s rule and his relations with the opposition. Besides, the leading
political figures and important political events are also focused fascinatingly.
Raza (1997) traces the formation of PPP in 1967 to the fall of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
government. The author evaluates the political career of Zuilfiqar Ali Bbhutto who was
the first elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. The author discusses in detail the first
general elections of 1970, campaign strategy of Zuilfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970 elections
and the electoral performances of national level parties i.e. PPP and Awami League in the
West and East Pakistan respectively. He further holds that the victory of Awami League
19
in Eastern Pakistan and PPP in Western Pakistan set the scene for and led to the
dismemberment of Pakistan. The author analyzes PPP leadership (Bhutto) dealings with
the Muslim countries including Bangladesh. He also throws light on Pak-US relations
during Bhutto rule. The author is of the view that on national front Bhutto had to face and
deal with some serious issues and problems like provincial autonomy, nationalization, the
Qadiani issue, and the clash between fundamental Islam and the liberals. In the end the
1977 general elections, unopposed election of some of the PPP members and the dreadful
aftermath culminating in the promulgation of Martial Law led by Zia ul Haq are
analyzed.
Yousuf (1999) examines and scrutinizes the role of different political parties. He
discusses the history and evolution of political parties and incumbent government clashes
with the opponents during the period of study.
Aman (1974) holds the politicians and political parties responsible for political instability
in Pakistan. The author is of the view that democracy could not get roots in Pakistan and
the democratic process remained stuck due to the unfair and authoritative attitude and
behavior of political leaders. The political parties have a loose democratic base and lack
roots in the masses. Revolving around persons of influence, these parties serve their
leader‘s vested interests. Due to their lack of proper organization and committed
leadership, no party is up to the mark. Most of the parties national and regional are under
the control of a particular group or family. He also condemns those demoguage
politicians who show strong commitment for democracy, but do little when voted to
power.
Hussain (1979) discusses the political system of Pakistan. The author holds that different
groups of elites i.e. the landlords, political, religious, industrial, professional, and military
elites all are active competitors for gaining power. Military has used both feudals and
bureaucrats for establishing its hegemony over the political system of Pakistan. The
author is of the view that the initial problem of Pakistan was more administrative than
20
political. He has focused on the role of military and is of the view that military ruined the
political system. It is very sad that the political parties were excluded from the process of
forming the government and this caused irreparable damage to the political system of our
country. The author holds both the civil and military elites responsible for the destruction
of the system.
Syed (1992) evaluates the political career of Z. A. Bhutto. He was, no doubt, the most
controversial prime minister in the history of Pakistan. He ruled the country first as
president till 1973 Constitution and then till the end of his rule i.e. July 1977 as a prime
minister. The author throws light on how Bhutto successfully mobilized the masses and
campaigned for the first general elections of 1970. The author also discusses the causes
of the disintegration of Pakistan, Bhutto‘s attitude towards and style of managing internal
issues and crises and his dealing with the issues of peace and war between Pakistan and
the rival India. The author also focuses on the unending search for personal power on the
part of Bhutto, where he ignored the institutions of the state where power out to be
stored/housed. In the end, the author gives his view that Bhutto‘s efforts for making the
masses politically conscious and his concern for the neglected section (poor) of the
people much more than his operational style as a ruler are his legacy for Pakistan which
are likely to last for a long time.
Mahmood (2000) has given a detailed account of the political history of Pakistan. He
explores the process of constitutional development and pinpoints the factors responsible
for its failure. The author also evaluates the military governments of Ayub Khan, Yahya
Khan and Ziaul Haq and, in the same pattern, examines the functioning of the civilian
governments. The political parties, their working, their achievements and their leadership
is also part of the discussion. The author gives his views on the poor performance of
elected governments in the past.
Kumari in her essay holds that opposition is an integral part of the democratic process.
Being the representatives of the masses, the opposition leaders protect their interests.
21
When the ruling party derails from the track, it is the opposition that puts her back on the
track either by raising the issue in the parliament or questioning the matter in the public.
It also educates the masses about issues of national importance and raises their level of
political consciousness. If a government acquires autocratic style and starts serving its
partisan interests instead of those of the masses, the opposition reacts and stirs the masses
for agitation and thus brings the government to her sense.
Rais (2009) says that family-based politics is the dominant feature of political system of
Pakistan and also one of the factors that has caused political crises. The absence of
democratic values within the parties has damaged the politics of Pakistan. The author has
expressed the fear that the current despotic attitude of politicians and growing trend of
manipulating the politics for personal and partisan ends will perpetuate confrontational
politics in Pakistan.
Johnson (2013) centers his attention on the political opposition in Japan and its
contributions. He gives charming details about the role of opposition and stresses on the
central role of opposition. Due to its importance for the system, the opposition should not
be neglected.
In a study published by the Commonwealth Organization (CWO), the role of opposition
as an essential part of legislative framework has been thoroughly analyzed. It also focuses
on various problems faced by the opposition parties.
Hasan (2000) gives an in-depth account of the rise and fall of the first elected but
controversial prime minister, Bhutto. He was fascinating and interesting personality
coupled with Machiavellian qualities. The author holds that a popular protest ousted
Bhutto from power. Bhutto was ultimately executed by the order of the Highest Court of
Pakistan for his alleged role in the murder of a political opponent. The author was not
only a political supporter but also a close friend of Bhutto, therefore he presents and
shares useful information about Z. A. Bhutto rule.
22
Rizvi (2000) focuses on and discusses in detail the weak political structure of the country
and holds the weak and vulnerable political parties responsible for the failure of the
political system and development of military. Most of the time these political parties
ignoring the standards of political system engaged in regional, biased and factional issues
damaging the political system of the country. These less-organized and less-integrated
political parties provided an opportunity to the already dominant Punjab-based civil and
military bureaucracies to prevail.
Jahan (1972) has discussed Pakistan‗s failure in national integration. The author argues
that the situation of imbalance between the East and West Pakistan‗s political parties led
to the disintegration of Pakistan. She holds that the problem of regionalism was a basic
one that restricted the process of national integration. The struggle between the political
leaders of East and West Pakistan resulted in the creation of different interest-based
political parties, which ruined the party politics and the political system of Pakistan.
Therefore, the political leaders could neither develop nor fortify the existing political
institutions during the formative phase from 1947 to 1958.
Saeed (1967) deeply observes the politics in Pakistan. His investigation reveals that
Pakistani politics was based wholly on clashes which hindered the growth of the political
system. Mostly, these conflicts were between the civil and military bureaucracies on one
hand and political leaders on the other which significantly harmed the political system of
the country. This resulted into regionalism among the political parties in both parts of the
country i.e. Eastern and Western Pakistan. Each party only paid attention towards its
regional interests, deserting the rest of the populace.
Callard (1968) projected that Pakistanis had until the end of time idealized democracy
but did not know how to put it into practice. He is of the view that the initial phase of the
country‗s history was a period of change and vagueness. To him, though political parties
in Pakistan are greater than before in number but have declined and they have also
23
experienced a number of interruptions. The author further describes and holds military
and civil bureaucracy responsible for the powerlessness of the religious leaders of
Pakistan to get better the political system.
1.5. Significance of the Study
It is an important research work on the theme as it brings on record the factors
responsible for derailing democracy and, at the same time, strengthening the hands of
anti-democratic forces. The success of democracy demands fairplay, recognizing the
rights of opposition and establishing relationship with them in accordance with the spirit
of constitution. Ironically, all these pre-requisites were blatantly violated. Enormous
literature is available on the subject but the particular area that the researcher has chosen,
has not received adequate attention. This research work examines the democratization
process in Pakistan from 1972 to 1977. The PPP was a new addition to the existing
political parties in Pakistan and its landslide victory in the firstever general elections of
1970 afforded to the party an opportunity to make a new beginning. A change in attitude
of the party leadership, however, did not allow the ship of the nation to sail smoothly.
This study brings to the surface those facts which not only caused insurmountable
damage to the future of democracy but also paved the way for military to enter once
again into the political arena of Pakistan. The findings of this study will surely make
significant contribution to the existing body of knowledge. It will also facilitate the task
of new researchers to investigate other related aspects of the politics of the era.
1.6. Methodology:
This is an exploratory research work and the techniques adopted by the researcher for
data collection include a detailed survey of the available literature covering different
aspects of the PPP government (1972-1977). Both primary and secondary sources have
been used such as books, newspapers, journals, unpublished dissertations, research
articles, related research work, government documents, reform reports etc. Facts were
24
also collected by conducting interviews with politicians, political analysts, academicians
and the contemporaries of Z.A. Bhutto known for their candid views on the politics of
Pakistan. Fifteen respondents representing different segments of the society were
interviewed for the purpose. The gathered facts have been analyzed for drawing
conclusions.
1.7. Data Collection
Data collection is a method to obtain and collect materials (data) for research study. The
sources which provide data may either be primary or secondary. First hand information
that the researcher collected was through methods such as observation, interviewing, post
or e-mailing etc. Data collected through secondary sources included journals, reports,
articles, important statements and surveys conducted by different organizations.
In this qualitative research study, the researcher has extensively relied upon secondary
data. Data was also collected through interviews with the contemporaries of ZAB and
thus made use of primary source. As far as secondary source is concerned, it has many
advantages as compared to the primary source such as the easy availability of materials,
low/negligible cost, and it can also be easily saved. The reliability and authenticity of
data is considered during data collection process. The researcher has tried to go through
books written by authors of standing. The researcher also selected national newspapers
and benefitted from the writings of columnists known for their balanced analysis. The
researcher interviewed the contemporaries of Zulfiqar Ali Bbhutto both from ruling and
opposition parties, an exercise that was found very insightful.
For giving weight to this study, the researcher searched both print and electronic media
for covering different aspects and also found answers to the questions raised in this study.
The researcher also benefitted from the relevant articles published in journals of repute.
Under the key words, there were many articles and literature available which the
researcher benefitted from. It was through the study of these materials that the researcher
got an insight into the manner in which both the PPP under ZAB and different opposition
25
parties worked to strengthen or hamper democracy in Pakistan. Initially, the researcher
selected data that showed how ZAB parted ways with his mentor Ayub Khan and formed
his own Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and joined the opposition camp, and how he
injected political awareness among the masses and brought them to streets against his
mentor. The researcher also benefitted from the vast literature for covering the first
general elections in Pakistan which, of course, was a new development being based on
the principle of universal adult franchise. The researcher searched internet for 1970
elections with different key words. Here the researcher analyzed the role of different
political parties especially PPP from West Pakistan and Awami League from East
Pakistan and drew conclusion as to how much democratic loving these parties were. The
factors that played their part in derailing the process of democracy in its very beginning
have also been examined.
To have an understanding of the main political parties, their role in the mirror of
democratic norms, the researcher studied available literature particularly written by
Bhutto‘s contemporaries and by scholars of national and international repute. For
collecting data, the researcher visited various seminar libraries of the University of
Peshawar, libraries of other universities such as Quaid-e-Azam University (Islamabad),
University of Karachi (Karachi) and the National Defense University (Islamabad). The
researcher spent a lot of time in Peshawar Archieves and the National Library in
Islamabad. The researcher also won the reward from IRSP for a six months academic
visit to the Royal Holloway, University of London. The visit provided me with an
opportunity to collect data for my research work from different libraries of the United
Kingdom. The most recognized libraries of UK which the researcher visited were British
Library, SOAS Library, Library of Political Science in the University of Oxford,
Birmingham University Library and Birmingham City University Library. The researcher
made a valuable use of internet for getting information which is comparatively easy and
economical. While collecting information from internet, the researcher also saved links
26
with captions. In all this process, the researcher tried his best to rely on those books,
journals, articles etc having greater relevance with the topic chosen by the researcher.
1.8. Limitations
One limitation for the researcher in collecting data to be ever remembered was that when
the researcher visited Royal Holloway University of London, he could not get access to
the online materials of different Libraries thought it was reliably learnt that the visiting
students are allowed access to the online materials. Along with all the available literature,
the plan was to conduct interviews with prominent politicians especially the
contemporaries of Zuilfiqar Ali Bbhutto, military personnel and academicians with sound
knowledge and interests in the politics of Pakistan to obtain their views on the politics of
Pakistan during the period under review but there were many hurdles to have an access to
these targeted persons and getting an appointment with them. The researcher could not
get an appointment with an army officer because of his tight schedule. Similarly, the
politicians in Pakistan tend to be very busy and it is not an easy task to get an
appointment with them. In certain cases, however, the researcher was fortunate to have
sitting with high profile persons whose views enlightened the researcher tremendously.
Similarly, as the target was contemporaries of Zuilfiqar Ali Bbhutto, many of them had
either passed away like Professor Ghafoor Ahmad or were in a weak/ill stage of health
like Sardar Sherzbaz Khan Mazari whom the researcher visited twice to interview but
found him unable to discuss anything. Similarly, the researcher found some of the
respondents out of Pakistan. Cost of travelling also limited my visits to some very
important places. Also some of the interviewees gave little time.
1.9. Chapter Structure:
The dissertation consists of the following chapters:
Chapter 1: Introduction
27
The first chapter of this research work introduces the topic, the objectives and justifies
the significance of the study and also provides a literature review to identify the work
already done on issues related to the subject so far.
28
Chapter 2: Functional Democracy: An Analysis of the Key Components
This chapter debates democracy and the key elements of a democratic system. It also
discusses the political parties, their role and importance in democracy. The last section
comprises the role of opposition in a democratic system. For this purpose, some of the
internationally reputed authors and experts have been quoted.
Chapter 3: Historical Background
This chapter consists of a detailed account of the political instability in Pakistan, the
centralization of governmental authority, constitutional dilemma, the undemocratic
attitude of political parties and leadership. It further discusses the role of bureaucracy and
military in the politics of the country and the military intervention into the politics. The
Ayub Khan era is also discussed in detail. The chapter also highlights the formation of
Pakistan Peoples Party by Z. A. Bhutto, the first ever general elections of 1970 and its
aftermath as a background study.
Chapter 4: Politics in Pakistan: The PPP Style
This chapter examines the Tri-Partite Talks after the 1970 general elections, finds out that
why a peaceful transition could not take place and who were responsible for the failure of
the talks. The chapter also discusses the contributions of ruling as well as opposition
parties towards the framing of the 1973 Constitution. The focus is on assessing the
governing authority of PPP under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto till the
promulgation of the Constitution in 1973.
Chapter 5: The Post 1973 Scenario
This chapter evaluates the performance of PPP government in the aftermath of 1973
Constitution i.e., 1973 to 1977 when the party was in full control of the affairs in Pakistan
and had acquired an autocratic style. Reference in this connection has been made to the
termination of two provincial governments under the 2-party opposition alliance and the
arbitrary handling of the constitutional amendments. The purpose is to determine whether
29
the relationship between PPP and opposition parties was in line with the spirit of the
constitution and in accordance with the established principles of democracy.
Chapter 6: 1977 Elections, PPP’s handling of PNA Movement and the Dreadful
Outcome.
This chapter discusses the emergence of PNA and the 1977 general elections in Pakistan.
It focuses on whether the elections were fair and free and the incumbent government
sincerely contested the elections. It also makes an evaluation of the PNA‘s allegations of
rigging in the elections and the launching of a movement against the PPP government
leading to the downfall of the latter in July 1977.
Chapter 7: Bhutto’s Leadership, Ruling-Opposition Relationship, Status of
Democracy and the Dismissal of PPP: A Qualitative Analysis
This chapter consists of an evaluation of the views of experts gathered through interviews
or questionnaires. Their views have been subjected to analysis with the aim to determine
how sincere the party was to the establishment of a truly democratic set-up in Pakistan.
The genuineness of the charges leveled against the government of Z. A. Bhutto
culminating in the termination of his government, has also been examined.
Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter draws the conclusion based on the analysis of data gathered for this study.
Recommendations are given based on the findings of the study.
30
CHAPTER - 2
FUNCTIONAL DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KEY
COMPONENTS
2.1. Introduction
This chapter debates democracy and the key elements of a democratic system. It also
discusses the political parties, their role and importance in democracy. The last section
comprises the role of opposition in a democratic system. For this purpose, some of the
internationally reputed authors and experts have been quoted.
According to Rustow democracy is a competitive and challenging process and this
competition gives an edge to those who can rationalize their commitment to it and an yet
better edge to those who genuinely believe in it.8 A democratic system is one where
people choose their representatives by voting in free, fair and impartial elections. In
democracy, people are afforded with a choice among different parties and their
candidates who desire access to power. In a democratic system, government is based on
the will of the people and it can hope to stay as long as it enjoys the support of the
masses. If the elected representatives fail to serve the public interests, the latter have the
right to criticize and replace them. The elected representatives are bound to fulfill the
needs and aspirations of the citizens.9 In the western concept of democracy, sovereignty
belongs to the masses which is to be exercised through their elected representatives.
Hence according to Schmitter and Karl (1991), modern democracy is ―a system of
governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm
acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of the elected
representatives.‖10 According to Dahl (1971), ―it is the responsiveness of government to the
preferences of its citizens (who are, in theory, ―political equals‖ of the rulers), that is the key characteristic
8. Dankwart A. Rustow, (1970). Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative
politics, 2(3), 337-363. 9. https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/DemocracyEducation0204.htm. 10. Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karal, (1991). What Democracy is... and is Not." Journal of
Democracy, 2(3), pp. 75-88.
31
of democracy.‖11 Such responsiveness necessitates that general public have the right to
formulate their preferences, articulate them and have them considered by those at the
helm of affairs. According to Churchill, ―No one pretends that democracy is perfect or
all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except
all other forms that have been tried from time to time.‖12 In the above famous quote, the
former British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill focuses on the weak side of
democracy. Of course, there is no perfect form of government in the world anywhere. But
all other forms of government produce less desired results than democracy. It is the
democratic system that can regulate public affairs in a better way.13 In simple words, a
democratic system is one in which everyone is treated equally and has equal rights. When
people have a voice in the government, they have more trust in it.14
Democracy is a suitable form of government particularly for a multi-ethnic society like
Pakistan. The legitimacy of democracy is accepted throughout the world. Most countries
of the world are moving towards the adoption of this system. Some are more developed,
some are in the process of making but if internal conditions are not favorable,
snowballing alone is unlikely to promote democracy in a particular country. For example,
the democratization of India, UK and Turkey does not mean that there will be democracy
in Pakistan unless the conditions that promote democracy are met in Pakistan. The
ongoing process of democratization worldwide will certainly create an environment for
those regions that are lagging behind to come up to a required level of acceptability.15 In a
non-democratic state, a single party holds power that violates the human rights by
misusing authority that results in a negative reaction leading to disturbance and anarchy
11. Robert A. Dahl, (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, p.
1. 12. http://www.democracy-building.info/definition-democracy.html. 13. Ibid. 14. Samuel P. Huntington, (1991). Democracy's Third Wave. Journal of democracy, 2(2), 12-34. 15. Ibid.
32
in the country. Strikes, violence, and disorders of all sorts become routine affairs in such
a polity.
A Resolution (A/RES/59/201)16 adopted the UN General Assembly in 2004, provided for
certain ‗essential elements of a democracy‘.17 A state that guarantees the observance of all
or many of these elements/principles deserves to be called democratic.
According to Prothro and Cregg, some basic principles for successful democracy demand that
public officials should be chosen by majority vote, citizens should have equal opportunity
and chance to affect the government, the minority should have the right to criticize
majority decisions provided that are inconsistent with the state laws, the opposition
political parties should be free to mobilize public opinion in support of their programs,
respect for majority rule and protection of minority rights (freedom to dissent).18
2.2. Elements of Democracy relating to the Study
Some of the key elements of democracy which relate to this study are discussed below:
2.2.1. Respect for Majority Rule and Minority Rights
Majority rule is a way for any government to stay organized. Majority rule allows people
to vote for or against an issue.19 Minorities should not be deprived of their rights. They
16. Adopted 20 December 2004, the resolution was officially published in 2005. See:
http://www.undemocracy.com/A-RES-59-201.pdf. also available at: International
Consensus: Essential Elements of Democracy, Democracy Reporting International (DRI), October
2011. P. 06. 17. Paragraph 1 of the said resolution emphasizes on the, ―respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, inter alia, freedom of association and peaceful assembly and of expression and opinion,
to vote and to be elected at free, fair and timely elections by universal adult suffrage and by secret
vote ensuring the free expression of the will of the people, as well as a pluralistic system of
political parties and organizations, and the right of participation in the conduct of public affairs
either directly or through the elected representatives, accountability in public administration,
separation of powers between different branches of government, respect for the rule of law, the
independence of judiciary and lastly free and independent media.‖ 18. James W. Prothro and Charles M. Cregg, (1960). Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of
Agreement and Disagreement, The Journal of Politics, 22(2), 276-294. 19. For example, an eighth grade class is faced with making a choice for a class trip. The choices are
Hershey Park or Knoebels. The class holds a vote and 51% of the class votes for Hershey Park and
only 49% votes for Knoebels. Majority rule in this case shows that Hershey Park will be the class
trip. Minority rights are when the group that does not have the majority rule will not be
discriminated against. Their basic rights cannot be taken away from them, and they will still be
represented. As in the example of the class trip, the group that did not vote in favor of Hershey
Park still has the right to go to Hershey Park.
33
should be treated in a fair way. Minorities will feel comfortable when they are treated
fairly with no discrimination. They hold strong onto their basic rights and represent them.
Though the government is of majority, the minority avails the same rights and benefits as
availed by the majority. The minority rights can be well protected if they are given
opportunities of participation on equal footings.20
2.2.2. Free, Fair and Impartial Elections
According to Katz, ―Elections‖ ―are the defining institutions of modern democracy.‖21 All
citizens use their right to vote in electing representatives of their choice who then take
decisions for the betterment of their voters. Periodic elections are the sign of a healthy
political system where the chosen representatives run the system and take initiatives for
the general welfare of citizens.22 Election is a formal and organized process enabling a
person to have access to a public office. It empowers the citizens to exercise their right of
choosing those who would hold authority. Democracy manifests itself through the
electoral process; continous process of free and fair elections and peaceful and orderly
transfer of power.23
One of the basic criteria for democracy is ensuring an equitable and open
competition/choice to the electorates allowing them to choose from among different
political parties without interference. Democracy gains strength when citizens are free to
raise voice for their rights, when there is equality, media is free and when equitable
conditions for electoral competition are ensured. In a country where a party or personality
dominates the system, the playing field will be tilted in favor of the incumbent
government.24 Free and fair elections lead towards a sustainable democracy. It is also a
mechanism of political education. The stability and growth of political institutions of a
20. http://ronstadt.proboards.com/thread/3544/springsteen-cancels-concert-carolina-bigoted 21. Richard S. Katz, (1997). Democracy and Elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 1. 22. Riccardo Pelizzo, (2006). Free and Fair Elections. Singapore Management University, p.1. 23. Touqir Hussain, (2011). Democracy vs Democracy, Published in The Express Tribune, June 25 th,
2011. 24. Samuel P. Huntington, (1991). Op. cit., pp. 12-34.
34
country is linked with free and fair elections. So, for a country to be democratic there
would be an open competition and electorates should be given a free hand to elect
candidates of their own choice.25
For political scientists, democracy is a system where the power rests with the people and
where all citizens are equally entitled to influence the politics of the state. To Dahl,
however, this basic democratic principle is violated:
1. If citizens are not permitted to devise their political preferences;
2. If citizens are not permitted to express – through individual or collective action, their
political preferences to their fellow citizens and to the government; and
3. If the government does not respect the citizens‘ preferences.26
The above conditions will stand fulfilled if certain rights are guaranteed under the
constitution. The Constitution must protect citizens‘ right to associations, citizen‘s right
to freedom of expression, right to vote, right of all eligible citizens to compete for public
offices, the right to information, free and fair elections and institutional arrangements for
ensuring that government‘s policies and actions are meant for public welfare.27
The above mentioned rights and freedoms cover not only pre-election phase but the post
also. It is to keep the government accountable for all of its actions.28 For the stability and
consolidation of a democratic system, both free and fair elections and government
accountability is necessary. Accountability is inherently connected with electoral
competition and it creates a competitive environment for the representatives.29 Sartori, for
example, argued that ―representation intrinsically consists of two ingredients:
25. Farhatullah Babar (n.d). Democracy and Elections: How Elections are Rigged in Pakistan (Peshawar:
Peoples Institute of Democracy), p. 6. 26. Robert A. Dahl, (1971). Op. cit., p. 2. 27. Ibid., p. 3. 28. Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl identify these eight conditions that make democracy possible,
see, Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, (1991). Op. cit., pp. 75-88. 29. Riccardo Pelizzo, (2006). Op.cit., p. 5.
35
responsiveness and independent responsibility.‖30 Sartori states that free and fair election
is by itself an instrument which ensures accountability of government.
The citizens do have the right to vote for the political parties and politicians in power but
they also have the power to vote them out. The parties have to remain sensitive to voter‘s
demands and work for the interests of the citizens because their future depends on public
support. If they do not remain responsive and fail in fulfilling the demands of their voters,
the latter will not support them in future. Thus the electorate may vote them out by
supporting their rivals. The opposition political parties, too, have to be sensitive to voters‘
demands. It is because of this behavior of opposition that justifies their claim to be a good
alternate to the incumbent government whenever the incumbent fails to do its duty. But
elections can seek accountability of government only if they are free and fair.31
2.2.3. Rule of Law
Democracy stands for the rule of law. A democratic set up facilitates fair and equal
application of law and procedures without any discrimination on the basis of caste, creed
or religion. Everyone is treated equally. The rule of law guarantees protection of the
rights of all by putting limits on the power of government. It maintains order and protects
the country from anarchy and all sorts of disturbances. No one is arrested and punished
arbitrarily. All are equally treated, so as to enjoy their rights and freedom. Law is for all
either head of the state or a common man. Courts are free bodies and they implement the
laws in their letter and spirit.32 Similarly, in a democratic set up, if someone is accused of
some crime they have the right to a fair, speedy and open trial because of the fact that
they are entitled to the equal protection of law. They are innocent unless proven guilty by
the court during the trail. The accused has full right to know about the charges against
30. Giovanni Sartori, (1987). The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Chatam: Chatam House Publisher, p.
170. 31. Riccardo Pelizzo, (2006). Op. cit., p. 5. 32. https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/DemocracyEducation0204.htm
36
him, to remain silent and to be defensive. The same charges are not to be applied against
him twice. Torture and torment is not allowed even though seizing his property.33
2.2.4. Separation of Powers and Independence of Judiciary
In any political system if political power is to be restricted and accountable, the
independence of judiciary from executive control must be ensured. In a democracy, the
exercise of political power by the elected representatives of the people must respect the
law, the constitution and the will of the people. This requires that power be separated
with clearly defined span of control so that the cabinet ministers could not interfere and
hinder in court cases. In a democratic system, it is the responsibility of the executive to
put into practice programs and policies, administers budget and deal with state
affairs. The executive ay have the right to propose laws, however, only the elected
members in the parliament who represent the people have the power of enactment. Only
the courts have the power to decide the guiltiness or innocence of persons charged with a
crime and only the higher courts can determine whether a law or a government
action/policy is in line with the constitution.34
2.2.5. Independent Media
Media freedom is inevitable in a democratic set up. It not only helps in creating plural
and open societies, accountable and transparent system of government but also protects
human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is the free and independent media that
guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of information which are the two
essentials facilitating active participation of citizens in governmental business.35 The
press plays an important role in public awareness about government policy and other
matters of importance and thus promotes a democratic culture. Those responsible are
33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Michael Meyer-Resende, (2011). International Consensus, Essential Elements of Democracy.
democracy reporting international, p. 14.
37
brought to the limelight and also ensure means for mutual interaction.36 To perform these
functions, the press must not only be independent but it must also have both material and
human resources to deal with all the important problems of a society.37
2.2.6. Conflict and Consensus
Conflict and consensus occupy a central position in democracy which manifests in
numerous forms. Conflicts do arise in any democratic set up but are managed amicably.
All have to search for compromises, give and take, consensus or other agreements that
would be acceptable to all. It should, then, discover means to alleviate disagreement and
cleavage with consensus.38
Consensus is more than the sum total of ideas of the persons in a group.39 Consensus
strives to consider each disagreement and come to a decision earlier than a judgment is
made. More significantly, this course encourages a setting where one and all are valued
and all contributions are appreciated.40 For any democratic set up to sustain, all persons
and groups should be prepared to stomach each other‘s differences. They should admit
that the competitor has a convincing right and a genuine opinion.
2.2.7. Accountability of Government
36. David Beetham and Kevin Boyle, (2009). Introducing Democracy: 80 Questions and Answers.
UNESCO. 37. M Cherif Bassiouni, (1998). Democracy: its Principles and Achievement. Vol. 1021. Inter-Parliamentary
Union. P. 45. 38. L. Diamond & M. Plattner, (1999). Democratization in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, p. xiii. 39. Through deliberations, more ideas come to the front producing fresh ideas and as a result the most
excellent decision comes out. This lively activity is called the innovative interaction of ideas. It is
creativity that plays a key role in finding out what is best for the public and when more populace
are drawn in this accommodating endeavor as a result more ideas and possibilities are generated.
In this respect, the relentless, indiscriminate and rigid use of parliamentary majority is essentially
offensive and not consensual. The purpose has repeatedly been capturing the vote, in spite of
another option that might be in the interest of the entire group; it resorts to the power of
domination as an alternative of persuasion. When the will of the majority supersedes the concerns
of minority, it is intrinsically conflictual. 40. http://www.consensus.net/occac1.html.
38
In democracy political parties take part in elections, make efforts to win the elections for
capturing political offices and managing governmental affairs.41 In a democracy, elections
are held and the contending candidates represent their parties and the people are free to
vote to power candidates of their own choice. The political party that wins the majority of
seats, forms government and exercises control over the administration.42 Occasionally, if
no party gets the required majority to form government, two or more parties join hands
for a coalition government. In a democracy, political parties build a balance between
demands and support such as interest expression and aggregation. It is the political parties
that connect a government to the people.43 The party or parties which form government
and acquire control of administration are responsible for every action of the government.
The government can only be popular and effective when it seeks public good, protects
their rights, their lives and their possessions.44
Accountability is a virtue without which free, popular and powerful/strong government
cannot endure long. Political parties must be provided with the means of accountability
that they could make a stable and functional government. The Social Contract Theory
stresses upon the need for accountability. People must have the right to replace the
government if it fails in fulfilling its responsibilities.45 This provides a means for public
accountability of government for its deeds. The masses keep in mind the previous record
while electing their representatives. This fear keeps the government vigilant and
responsive to public demands. If the government is accountable, the elected
representative would not violate the citizens‘ rights and would not abuse power. An
unaccountable government is always corrupt and irresponsible. It cannot function well
because it is not afraid of doing wrongs. So, in short, accountability is an essential and
41. Ivan Doherty, (2001). Democracy out of balance. Policy Review, (106), 25, p. 32. 42. V. Randall & L. Svåsand, (2002). Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and
Democratic Consolidation, Democratization, p. 7. 43. David Mckay, (2001). Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience. OUP
Catalogue, p. 82. 44. Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/254975/democracy--the-only-road-to-be-on/> 45. David Mckay, (2001). Op. cit., p. 82.
39
central pillar of a successful system. It maintains a liaison between the rulers and the
ruled.46
2.3. What is a Political Party
According to T. Luta Maliyamkono & Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo, a political party is
systematic group of those individuals who work collectively to struggle and compete for
political office and advance their agreed-upon policies.47 Downs is of the view that a
political party is a group of people who hunt for controlling the governing machinery by
gaining office in a duly constituted election.48 The organization of a political party is
based on certain basic principles and interests and it is not a loosely knitted organization
of a few individuals. A close and intimate relationship among party members is
inevitable. Party leadership should ever try to expand its support base. It will lead to
legitimize the circle of decision makers. Another important aspect of a democratic party
is the adoption of constitutional means for capturing power. It will enable party
leadership to implement its programs or to protect and promote its specific interests.49
No one can deny the importance of political parties for the successful working of a
democratic system. Political parties are the only source to present the needs, interests and
grievances of the masses to the elected assemblies.50
Different authors consider political
party as a bridge between the citizens and government.51
46. Nadeem Akhtar, (2013). Role of Political Parties in the Democratic System of Pakistan (Master Thesis),
School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, p. 29. 47. T. Luta Maliyamkono & Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo, (2003). When political Parties Clash. Tema Pub
Limited, P.41. 48. Anthony Downs, (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers, P. 25. 49. Saddique Muhammad Abdullah, (1999). Comparative and development politics, pp. 292-293. 50. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/01/political-parties-act.html. 51. According to Randall and Svåsand, ―parties connect the people with the government and serve as an
intermediary between the government and civil society organizations.‖ Vicky Randall & Lars
Svåsand, (2002). Party Institutionalization in New Democracies. Party Politics 8(1), pp. 5-29.
Sartori is of the view that ―parties are best conceived as a ―means of communication‖ between the
government and the civil society groups.‖ Giovanni Sartori, (1976); reprint 2005. Parties and Party
Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. P.28. While
Lipset claims that ―political parties not only connect the government with civil society groups but
they also stimulate other associational activities.‖ Seymour Martin Lipset, (2000). The
Indispensability of Political Parties. Journal of Democracy, 11(1), pp. 48-55.
40
Political parties are inevitable in a democratic set up because during the elections they
perform an important function of creating consciousness among the electorates. Political
parties enable the citizens to take interest in the political affairs of the state and thus keep
the nation politically alive. Once the voters take interest in political affairs, they get
attracted towards key issues and problems of the state. To serve this purpose, political
parties not only deliver lectures from time to time but also distribute literature.52
2.4. Democracy and Political Parties
Political parties are essential for a democratic system. Democracy cannot exist or flourish
without political parties. Lipset argues that through parties people choose amongst the
contestants so as to change government officials and bring about a change in political
office.53 Despite all the weaknesses of parties and in spite of all the challenges that parties
face, one thing remains certain: without parties, democracy cannot function.54 According
to Encyclopedia Encarta (2009), political parties mobilize the masses on the basis of a
common set of interests, needs and objectives. Political parties are not restricted just to
formulate political and policy agendas but also have some other important tasks like to
select suitable candidates, to arrange campaigns for elections and to regularly monitor the
work of their elected representatives. Also, political parties have to make connections
between the citizens and the government and ensuring that masses interference in
governmental affairs.55 No one can think of democracy without political parties. It is the
political party or group of political parties that form the government or opposition. The
political party/parties that get the majority of seats form the government while other
political parties sit on the opposition benches and attempt to check and control the abuses
52. K. Kabir (n.d.). Essay on the Importance of Political Parties in Democracy. Available at:
http://www.publishyourarticles.net/knowledge-hub/essay/essay-on-the-importance-of-political-parties-in-democracy/6006/
53. Seymour Martin Lipset, (2000). Op. cit., pp. 48-55. 54. Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, (2011). Political Parties, Functions and Organization in
Democratic Societies. Singapore :Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 91 55. Encyclopedia Encarta (2009), Available
at: < http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/200sbd.pdf > p4)
41
of authority by the ruling party. Political parties play the role of a bridge between the
citizens and the government. It is the political parties that inform the government of
public demands, needs and other problems. Political parties educate the people about
their policies and through their policies they spread awareness among the citizens.
Political parties, whether ruling or opposition, also offer different policy options to the
masses. It is political parties that educate the people to defend their rights and it is the
support of masses that strengthens political parties. It is one of the important
responsibilities of political parties to develop democratic norms and values and promote
democratic roots in the society. Political development is impossible without political
parties.56 If a political party has democratic structure, respect democratic values and
norms, it gets popular support and its leadership wins the trust of masses. On the other
hand, if a political party has undemocratic structure and lacks democratic values and
practices, it becomes unpopular and its leadership also loses trust of the people. A well
organized political party ensures a responsible and accountable form of government that
strengthens state institutions and also promotes public participation in state affairs
especially in decision-making process.57
In the 21th century, political scientists agree that political parties have not only promoted
democracy in the West but are also serving vital functions in modern day states. But it is
also a fact to which most of the political scientists agree that the emergence and
continuance of regular party competition is possible in a country whose citizens have
acquired a measure of political sophistication. A country with flourishing political parties
is one where there is a resort to the rules of game, tolerance towards dissent and respect
for the rights of opposition etc. On the other hand, a country with inchoate/ languishing
56. Ishrat Husain, (2009). The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy. Journal of International Affairs,
63(1), 1. p. 1-18 57. Ishrat Husain, (2009). Op. cit., pp. 1-18
42
parties is considered as underdeveloped or perverse. Development of political party is
essential for democratization and both are signs of political development.58
2.5. The Need for Political Parties
Hofmeister and Grabow hold the view that every society has different needs, opinions,
expectations and views on common matters. On the contrary, in every society there are
opposing interests that often have a collision with one another. For the peaceful
resolution of clashes and conflicts there must be a process of debate and discussion
among those have differences of opinions. There should be some common conviction and
sincerity. Each and every citizen has the right to represent his view and conviction in a
peaceful exchange of views. This assumption of conflicting interests within every society
which are lawful is called pluralism and is a substance of ―Competition Theory‖ of
democracy.59
As ―tyranny of the majority‖ upset rules of democracy and abuses
undeniable individual rights so it must not be there. Yet majority decision may involve
deficiency or even unfairness. For that reason, on the one hand, minorities must be
provided protection with constitutionally guarantee and on the other the losing side
should recognize it electoral defeat which serves as a constitutive element of democracy.
In fact, once the divergent interests are clearly and explicitly expressed and all the parties
tolerate and accept and allow other parties to stand for their particular interests and also
all the parties accept the principles of the political game (for example parties agree on
constitution) then it is likely to decide and resolve conflicts peacefully and form political
compromises in a proper way.60
Bryce holds the view that political parties are
unavoidable part of democracy. There is not a single democracy in the world which exists
58. Kenneth Kolson, (1978). Party, Opposition, and Political Development. The Review of Politics 40(2),
163-182. 59. The theory holds that the formation of political opinion in the pluralistic society is attained through a
process of competition between varied interests. Owing to the diversity of opinions and social
conflicts, the way out to the problems is that decisions have to be reached with the support and
approval of a majority of the people. 60. Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, (2011). Political Parties, Functions and Organization in
Democratic Societies. Singapore :Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 14.
43
without political parties. One cannot imagine a representative government without
political parties. It is the parties that bring order out of the chaos and confusion of a
multitude of voters.61
2.6. Political Conflicts and their Resolution in a Democratic System
According to Hofmeister and Grabow, conflicts may arise within political parties. This
may arise either due to varying perceptions on different political issues or due to rivalries
among party members for different positions. These conflicts are inevitable in any
democratic set-up but need a mindset to be resolved in a correct manner. The conflicts
among party members must be resolved under a laid down procedure. All party members
including those involved in the conflict should respect the party decisions taken in a
democratic manner. In some countries, politicians who enjoy a strong support of voters or
who occupy a high public office often do not respect party decisions and leave their
parties, if conflicts are not resolved in their favor. This is a negative approach which
harms the image of concerned member. In a nutshell, democracy means respect for
majority even if one‘s personal position is ―only‖ the opinion of a minority.62 Party
conventions and meetings are the two useful tools where intra-party conflicts and
disputes are discussed, debated and resolved in a democratic way.63 The ruling party in a
democratic set-up takes care of the needs, interests and preferences of the electorates.
Dahl is of the view that the government should be responsiveness to the preferences of
citizens and this is the essential feature of democracy.‖64 Consensus building is inevitable
part of democracy and it requires compromise and tolerance.65
2.7. Importance of Political Parties to Democracies
61. K. Kabir (n.d.). Op. cit., 62. Wilhelm Hofmeister & Karsten Grabow, (2011). Op-cit., p. 51. 63. Ibid.,, p. 52. 64. Robert A. Dhal, (1971). Op. cit., p. 1. 65. UNDP [United Nations Development Program], 2002: Human Development Report 2002: Deepening
Democracy in a Fragmented World. New York: Oxford University Press.
44
Political parties are important in a democratic set up for various reasons. Ezrow is of the
view that political parties not only ensure accountability of government for all of its
actions but also check the rise of anti-party elements. It also educate the people to the
values and norms of democracy.66
One of the functions of political parties is that they educate voters and help them to
identify and remove unpopular leadership. Parties not only inform the masses about
different issues that different candidates support67 but also enable the electorates to
evaluate and judge the past performance of the leaders.68
Political parties also ensure horizontal accountability69 or accountability of the various
branches of government. Parties prevent the blending of the executive power with
legislature and put a check on the executive branch. Parties in the legislature regularly
inquire and oversee the executive and prevent any exploitation by the executive. For
example, the parties prevent the executive from appointing or promoting biased judges
who might serve the executive. By doing so, parties not only protect and promote the
integrity of judiciary but also ensure the fairness and transparency of electoral process.70
Parties also make the government accountable by overseeing the implementation of
policies.71 In a democratic system, political parties perform a number of important
functions and in their absence or when parties are weak, the two non-elected institutions
i.e., military and civil bureaucracy encroach upon the domain of politicians. A more
powerful leader may also take the advantage and once the personalities become more
important than political parties, democratic accountability becomes weaker.72
66. Natasha Ezrow, (2011). The Importance of Parties and Party System Institutionalization in New
Democracies. Institute for Democracy & Conflict Resolution- Briefing Paper (IDCR-BP-06/11).
Part of the University of Essex Knowledge Gateway, p. 3. 67. Anthony Downs, (1957). Op. cit., 135-150. 68. Vicky Randall & Lars Svåsand, (2002). Op. cit., pp. 5-29. 69. Guillermo A. O‗Donnell, (1998). Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, Journal of Democracy
9(3), pp. 112-126. 70. Steven Levitsky & Maxwell A. Cameron, (2003). Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and
Regime Change in Fujimori‗s Peru, Latin American Politics and Society 45(3), pp. 1-33. 71. Natasha Ezrow, (2011). Op. cit., p. 3. 72. Ibid., p. 4.
45
It is the political parties that block the way for any politician to promote his own interests
rather than those of the people. In established democracies, there is little chance for such
a politician to succeed. While in a fragile democracy where parties are not well
organized, there are more chances for anti-party candidates to be more successful because
in the absence of organized parties, the electorates vote on the basis of personal
characteristics of the candidates and their personal links with the citizens rather on the
basis of some ideology or programe.73
Political parties habituate the masses to democratic values, norms and practices.74 In
democracy, no doubt, conflicts occur between the incumbent government and the
opposition parties but the manner in which these conflicts are resolved lead to further
strength of democratic values and procedures.75 The debate, discussion and other sorts of
interactions among various political parties promote the spirit of tolerance among
politicians.76 Parties also habituate the public to democratic norms and practices by
educating, mobilizing and motivating them to cast their votes. Parties inspire the masses
to come forward and take interest and participate in the political process of the country.77
Political parties are the source of articulating and aggregating interests.78 Often different
groups come together and compromise on different issues and policies and join hands to
form political party.79 It is difficult for independent politicians and they do not
compromise on policies that do not match with their own individual preferences. But the
hope of winning a larger support base, a political party easily comes to compromise.80
Political parties are also important for a democratic system as they nominate, recruit and
socialize political leadership. Parties make search and find the best politicians to lead by
73. Steven Levitsky &Maxwell A. Cameron, (2003). Op. cit., pp. 1-33. 74. Vicky Randall & Lars Svåsand, (2002). Op. cit., pp. 5-29. 75. Seymour Martin Lipset, (2000). Op. cit., pp. 48-55. 76. Ibid., 77. Larry Diamond & Richard Gunther, (2001). Op. cit., pp.7-8. 78. Vicky Randall & Lars Svåsand, (2002). Op. cit., pp. 5-29. 79. Gilat Levy, (2004). A Model of Political Parties. Journal of Economic Theory, 115(2), pp. 250-277. 80. Ibid.,
46
recruiting zealous and committed candidates. The leadership is selected through
established procedures and thus rare chances for leaders to subordinate the party. Parties
allow politicians from all backgrounds to come and rise to power. Parties socialize
politicians about different democratic values and practices like negotiation, compromise,
coordination and consensus building. All this enables politicians to preserve and promote
democratic institutions.81
In a democracy where there is parliamentary set up, political parties form and sustain
governments. It is done not only through coalition negotiations but also through the
allotment of various ministries and offices. Parties also establish rules of procedures in
parliament to organize different legislative committees and prepare legislative agendas.
Parties also prevent confusion and chaos by educating politicians in discipline and thus
bring order and stability to the system.82
2.8. Opposition in Democracy
Opposition is an unavoidable part of democracy. In a parliamentary system, the political
party voted to power, forms the government and remains in office for the mandated term.
The house is usually a two wings house. On the right side of the speaker, the ruling party
members are seated whereas the left side is the opposition‘s abode.83 According to
Schapiro, opposition is ―an organized political group which the aims to oust the
government in power and to replace it by one of its own choosing.‖84
In an open
democracy, there is always room for choice all the way up to the selection of
government. This means that divergent opinions are provided an opportunity to be heard
in the legislature. It also refers to the views of those parliamentarians who are not part of
government and are opposed to the policies of incumbent government. Simply, the
81. Natasha Ezrow, (2011). Op. cit., p. 5. 82. Ibid. 83. Hon. Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). The Role, Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition, p. 2 available
at: http://stephendieseruvwe.com/2015/05/27/the-role-rights-and-responsibilities-of-the-
opposition-by-hon-alban-s-k-bagbin/ 84. L. Schapiro, (1967). ―Putting the lid on Leninism: Opposition and Dissent in the Communist One-Party
States.‖ Government and Opposition vol.2, n°2, 1967.
47
elected representatives of the people, either belonging to the government or opposition
must be provided opportunity to express their opinion, present alternative policy options
and take part in parliamentary discussion and debates. Such a faction in the parliament
that does not belong to government is called opposition.85
The political parties with less number of seats sit in the assembly as opposition and
present their own view, give suggestions to the government and sometime challenge the
government policies if they are against the interest of the common people. In a
democracy, the opposition parties are free to work and draw the attention and support of
the masses and convey a signal to the incumbent government and present itself as the
second choice to replace the incumbent party/parties.86
The opposition may be of different types according to the nature of political system.
Simply, opposition means the political party or parties that do not have majority in the
parliament and always ready to disagree with and criticize government actions and
policies that are not seeking common interests.87 The term opposition refers to those
political parties whose members seek support of citizens not as individual candidates but
as an organized and disciplined political party and as an alternative government.88
Parliament is the place of debate and transaction of the people‘s business by their elected
representatives. Thus opposition in democracy is necessary for representing people and
for settling differences with the government. Discussions and dissent is the part of
democracy and opposition becomes inevitable for the system. Strong and effective
democracy needs an equally strong and effective opposition. The strength of opposition
85. siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/commonwealthunit7.pdf 86. Nadeem Akhtar, (2013). Role of Political Parties in the Democratic System of Pakistan, p. 30. 87. European conference of presidents of parliaments, Oslo, Norway, 11-12 September 2014, p. 2 88. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference, Role, rights and responsibilities of the opposition, New
Delhi, India, 27 September 2007, The Parliamentarian 2007/Issue Four 307.
48
in a parliament shows the quality of democracy.89
In fact, opposition is an inevitable
component of a democratic system.90
2.9. Importance of Opposition in a Democratic system
It is a fact that for a successful democracy, multi party system or, at least, bi-party system
is a must. If in a country there is single party system and there is no vigilant and effective
opposition, there will be every possibility of government to become autocratic. One party
system degenerates into dictatorship. Where there is one party system, the opposition is
muzzled and crushed and the dictatorship of the single party is established. Germany
during Hitler‘s rule and Italy during Mussoloni rule are the cases in point.91
One cannot think of a democratic set up without a healthy and vigilant opposition. For the
success of any parliamentary democracy, an effective opposition is must to perform its
functions fearlessly and effectively. The opposition basically works for the rights of the
people. History teaches us that freedom dies when criticism ends. It is the opposition that
checks the incumbent party‘s despotism. Where there are elements in the form of
informed critics for good means, a healthy criticism which can hold the government
responsible and answerable for its actions then the government is attentive to its duties.
The continuous situation at loggerhead with the opposition keeps the government in
action all the time around as it cannot afford to be lacking and careless. Excellence could
only be achieved in strict checks and watchful eyes of opposition. Mutual consensus
allows a bill to become law and it is sanctioned from opposition too. The opposition
89. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference, Op. cit., 90. According to Democratic Theory ―the principle of legitimate political opposition is one of the most
fundamental components of liberal democracy. As Hon. Alban quoted, Ian Shapiro, ―democracy is
an ideology of opposition as much as it is one of government.‖ Hon Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015).
Op. cit., p. 1. Helms is of the view that ‗there can be no real democracy without opposition.
Helms Ludger, (2008). Studying Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies: Issues
and Perspectives‘, the Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 14, nos. 1/2, March/June 2008,
6-19, p. 6. 91. K. Kabir. Essay on the Importance of Political Parties in Democracy, available at:
http://www.publishyourarticles.net/knowledge-hub/essay/essay-on-the-importance-of-political-parties-in-democracy/6006/.
49
combs through the bill for any discrepancies and its after effects in the long run. If
opposition is absent then the ruling party can act despotically.92
2.10. Rights and Responsibilities of Opposition
The opposition in any democratic set-up enjoys the right to operate freely and promote
democratic values. Laws or actions that hinder or put fetters on opposition are not only
harmful for opposition but also have adverse effects on the promotion of democracy.
Some of the guidelines mentioned in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly
Resolution 1601 (2008),93 (For details see annexure 2) are enumerated below:
Opposition members must have freedom of expression, freedom of opinion and to freely
express their views on matters under discussion in the house.
Members of the opposition in parliament shall enjoy the right to information. They must
have free and equal access to information in the same manner like the ruling party
members.
Opposition members have the right to inform the citizens. They also have the right of
access to different sources of information such as television channels, internet sites etc.
The opposition members shall be privileged to debate, discuss and scrutinize the policies,
decisions and actions of the government. Right to ask oral or written questions from the
members of the government. In the same manner they have the right to receive replies to
their questions. They have the right to open question time and members of the opposition
shall be privileged to ask more questions than members of the government. The
opposition can hold the incumbent government accountable by tabling a motion of
censure or no confidence. The right to ask for a discussion and debate regarding an urgent
and important issue and it should be granted if the required number of members demand
92. http://www.preservearticles.com/201103254718/role-of-an-effective-opposition-in-a-democracy.html
24-10-2013. 93. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. Resolution 1601 (2008). Procedural Guidelines on the
Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament.
Available at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-
ViewPDF.asp?FileID=17626&lang=en
50
so. The right to request for setting up a committee of inquiry, a fact-finding mission or
parliamentary mission of information. The right to ask for a special session of parliament
to discuss some matter of urgency. It should be granted if the required number of
parliamentarians so demand. Opposition shall be allotted sufficient speaking time. Under
certain circumstances, equal speaking time to government and opposition members
should also be ensured.
The right to take part in the management of parliamentary work. The right of access to
different posts likes vice-president and other posts of responsibility. The composition of
any governing body in parliament shall respect the principle of proportional
representation and opposition shall be given its due share.
It includes the right to initiate legislation and table bills and motion on various legislative
matters, the right to propose and present amendments in laws, the right to speak in all
legislative debates. Similarly, they have the right to vote, the right to present procedural
motions for change in the adopted agenda and the right to refer a report back to the
concerned House Committee.
The chairmanship of various permanent and standing committees inside the parliament
shall be allotted to the parliamentary parties on the basis of proportional representation.
Opposition be allowed to head at least one permanent committee. Chairmanship of the
main monitoring and oversight committees94
should be allowed to a member from the
opposition. All the committees, permanent or standing shall be composed of various
political parties in accordance with their strength in the parliament. In the committees, the
members of opposition shall have the right to speak and right to vote. The right to be
designated as a rapporteur on the basis of proportional representation.
94. Such as the committee on finance, committee supervising security and intelligence services or the
committee on audit.
51
The right to ask for reviewing the constitutionality of the adopted laws and refer the
matter to constitutional court or other legal body prior to their adoption. The right of
access to Audit Court and asking for its opinion on financial matters.
Along with all the above mentioned rights, the opposition shall participate in political
decisions. Opposition shall also be consulted before any decision to dissolve the
parliament.
2.11. Role and Obligations of Opposition
Both ruling and opposition parties are central to the working of democracy. That is why
both ruling and opposition parties share the basic democratic values such as the freedom
of speech, rule of law and equal protection under the law. In fact, the opposition is,
―government-in the-waiting.‖ The opposition should have the right to express their views,
to dissent or criticize the incumbent government, if democracy has to be promoted.
Besides, the opposition parties need to have confidence that they have a chance to
campaign and present themselves before the electorates for seeking their votes through
free, fair and regular elections.95 Shortly, if democracy is to be promoted the principle of
‗majority rule, must be accompanied by minority right i.e., accommodation of dissenting
views.
Political pluralism and democracy cannot be separated. Government‘s acceptance of
opposition, protest and the existence of an institutional representation for the political
opposition are the pre conditions for the effective working of democratic institutions.
French philosopher and political scientist Raymond Aron, holds the view that democracy
is a system ―in which a peaceful rivalry for the acquisition of power exists
constitutionally.‖96 The role of opposition in the proper functioning of liberal democracy
is universally acknowledged.97
95. Julius Kiiza & Hotel A. Impala, (2005). The Role of Opposition Parties in a Democracy. In Regional
Conference on Political Parties and Democratization in East Africa, Tanzania. 96. European conference of presidents of parliaments, Oslo, Norway, 11-12 September 2014, p. 2. 97. Hon Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 1
52
Democracy places emphasis on an orderly pattern of relationship between the ruling and
opposition parties which is to be characterized by consensus and participation. Although
the opposition parties do not hold executive positions, yet they do exercise a check on the
ruling party/coalition. Democracy allows the opposition to criticize the government and
put forward alternative policy options. On the one hand if opposition is required to grant
recognition to the authority of government, on the other hand, it is also expected to
exercise a check on the government. This is because a flourishing democracy always
needs an active and effective opposition. In a democratic system, all the political parties
whether from ruling or opposition side develop an atmosphere of trust, tolerance and
understanding and resolve their difference peacefully. The rulers govern the country on
the consent of governed. The opposition parties also recognize the right of the majority
party to rule and make decisions but, at the same time, the ruling party also respects the
opposition‘s right to dissent.98
For determining effectiveness of democracy in its real sense, it is important to examine
the role of opposition as a yardstick. Not only the ruling party but the opposition parties
too have an important role to play. The role of opposition parties should not be critical
only but it should also be constructive.99 The effective role of opposition is more
important in parliamentary system because there is every possibility of combining the
executive and legislative powers which may enable the executive to acquire
preponderance over all other state institutions. In such a situation, the presence of an
active and vigilant opposition and regular alteration of government are important for
having a check on the executive branch of government.
The opposition parties struggle for safeguarding the rights and the interests of the people.
With this view, they criticize the government in case the latter ignores them. They resort
to protestation in the House and at the public level. It counts very much for raising the
98. Wondwosen Teshome, (2009). Opposition Parties and the Politics of Opposition in Africa: A Critical
Analyses. International Journel of Human and Social Sciences vol: 4, pp. 287-88. 99. Nadeem Akhtar, (2013). Op. cit., P. 45.
53
level of political consciousness among the people. However, sometime just for the sake
of opposition, the opposition criticizes the right policy of the government which is
harmful for democracy.100
Members of the opposition parties are also included in various committees connected to
the respective ministries. All procedures and dealings of the government associated with
the respective ministries are talked about and settled by them. The opposition plays a
considerable role in it through making recommendations.101
The responsible opposition parties play an important role in the promotion of democracy
as is evident from the following headings:
2.11.1. Opposition as the Voice of the Voiceless
The opposition in a democratic set up monitors the day to day activities and performance
of the incumbent government and keeps the citizens informed. Both the party in power
and the one in opposition are the agents of citizens. 102 The opposition plays a special role
both inside and outside the Parliament by voicing concern over the grievances of various
groups and other interests that are not represented in the parliament.103 It makes certain
that the opinions of the opposition are given full coverage, particularly when the issue at
hand is of immense national importance. Thus, the opposition becomes the voice of the
voiceless section of society. By doing so, they build the confidence of the public and
assures them that their concerns and interests are competently expressed and protected.104
2.11.2. To Offer a Viable Alternative to the Government
100. Sheetal Kumari. An essay, What is the Role of the Opposition in a Democracy. Available at:
http://www.publishyourarticles.net/knowledge-hub/essay/what-is-the-role-of-opposition-in-
democracy/5092/. 101. Ibid., 102. Adam Przeworski &Susan C. Stokes, (1999). Democracy, Accountability and Representation.
CambridgeUniversity Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom, P. 48. 103. Hon Alban S K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 3. 104. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference, Op. cit.
54
The opposition also develops alternative policies and programs and presents itself as a
viable alternative to the incumbent government.105
In a democratic set up, there is a
constant reminder to the voters that there is a credible alternative to the government of
the day. An alternative that has the potential to improve the quality of life of the people,
serve their interests and let them realize their aspirations. The opposition presents a viable
alternative ideological program and shows that it is more competent, to rule, than the
ruling party.106 To attain democratization, only advocating democratization is not enough
rather the opposition should serve as a credible alternative to the serving government as it
is not possible to achieve and sustain democracy in the absence of alternative power.
Stronger the opposition, brighter would be the future of democracy.107
2.11.3. Seeking Accountability of Government
It is the opposition that scrutinizes activities of the government by making the latter to
justify its move. The opposition always remains active and vigilant and serves as a
watchdog. It keeps the government within the prescribed limits of law by pointing out her
shortcomings. It does not loose sight of its aims and objectives which is to keep the
government on the track. Thus opposition ensures transparency in state affairs.108 The
opposition also keeps check on the activities of the incumbent government by asking
questions in the parliament and in different committees. Opposition members who are
also members of different parliamentary committees usually call on and ask the
government to account for the performance of its duties. Thus, the opposition has the
opportunity not only to highlight but expose those aspects of the government that do not
serve common/national interests. Resultantly, the government of the day is induced to
105. Ibid., 106. Hon Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 4. 107. E. Y. Wing‐yat, & N. C. Ka‐man, (2012). The Political Opposition and Democracy In Macao:
Revolutionaries or Loyalists? Government and opposition, 47(1), 97-116. 108. Commentary: The Role of the Opposition in a Democracy: available at
http://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/features/commentary/commentary-the-role-of-the-opposition-in-a-democracy/
55
rethink and bring modifications in its policies and programs by bringing them in harmony
with the common good.109
2.11.4. To Oppose the Government in Power
Opposition derives its status from the role of being opposing all the time. This role of the
opposition to oppose the government is both vague and beneficial at the same time. Their
ultimate goal is to convince the people to throw away the incompetent government and
allow or facilitate the opposition to come into power and serve the masses in a better
way. To achieve the purpose, the opposition parties highlights and exposes those aspects
of the serving government which, it believes, are contrary to the national interests. The
opposition exposes the dark side other side110 which the government attempts to put out of
public sight i.e. unconstructive aspect. This is a fundamental responsibility of opposition
to shield and protect the masses and society from the undemocratic acts and policies of
the government in office. Performing this responsibility is not easy, because it attempts to
confront and challenge each and every misuse of executive authority, violation of
individual rights, waste of public money, and exposes all these for control. This is really a
watchdog job and serves as a check over the unrestrained exercise of authority by the
executive. It is through the performance of this role that the negative perception of the
opposition arises.111 The opposition has the right to criticize the policies of the
government but it has to be fair in its criticism. The opposition should put forward
alternative proposals with supportive arguments.112 It is essential for the opposition to be
cautious while criticizing the incumbent party as it may be in government in coming time
and yet fail to put into practice what it was criticizing the government for.113
2.11.5. In Case of National Tragedy and National Glory
109. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference. Op. cit. 110. Hon. Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 4. 111. Ibid., p. 5. 112. Ibid., p. 8. 113. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference. Op-cit.
56
It is the primary responsibility of not only the incumbent government but of the
opposition as well to uphold and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
state. Both must make every possible effort to ensure stability of the country and avoid
such activities that are detrimental to the unity of the state.114 In the same way, if there
occurs some national tragedy or mishap, they have to ignore and to put aside all their
differences with each other and make collectively efforts to deal with the tragedy.
Likewise they also have to celebrate jointly when it is a matter of national pride and
glory.115 It is in the interest of not only the democratic practice but also in the interest of
the nation that both the incumbent and the opposition parties are loyal to the nation and
uphold the rule of law regardless of the fact that they are critical of each other.116
In a true democratic set-up, opposition is as important as the government and it has to
perform its role fearlessly and effectively. For performing such a role, the opposition has
to be recognized, it should be accorded rights and it should also be provided to act
responsibly.117 In case of extreme confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties,
if the incumbent government is all powerful and wants to muzzle the opposition then
opposition has to go for mass movement and agitation. This is then the only option
available to opposition to save the democracy. The great Greek philosopher Plato has
rightly put when he said that, ―the punishment of wise man who refuses to take part in the
affairs of the government, is to live under the government of unwise men.‖118 It is for the
incumbent government to allow the opposition to fulfill these functions which indicate a
sign of democratic maturity on the part of the government. The opposition has to focus on
its democratic functions and if it fails to do so, it will be a sign of dysfunctional
democracy.
114. Hon. Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 8. 115. Ibid., p. 9. 116. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference. Op. cit. 117. Ibid., 118. Sheetal Kumari. Op. cit.
57
CHAPTER - 3
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
3.1. Introduction
This chapter consists of a detailed account of the causes of political instability in
Pakistan, the centralization of governmental authority, constitutional dilemma, the
undemocratic attitude of political parties and leadership. It further discusses the role of
bureaucracy and military in politics and the military intervention into the politics. The
Ayub Khan‘s era is also discussed in detail. In the end, the 1965 war, Tashkent
Declaration and Bhutto‘s maneuvering is also discussed. This chapter further examines
the initial style of PPP politics i.e. from November 1967 to 1970 general election‘s result.
During this period, the party acted in dual capacities i.e., as a new platform opposing
Ayub Khan‘s stay in power; and then as a majority party in the Western Pakistan
maneuvering for getting into power. The focus here is as to why Pakistan Peoples Party
was formed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when already there was an established political party
(Muslim League) and he himself was a strong supporter of Ayub Khan. Opposition to
Ayub Khan not only by Bhutto but by other politicians from both parts of the country is
also discussed in detail. Next, the chapter focuses on the 1970 elections and its aftermath.
3.2. Political Instability After Independence
Well organized and well entrenched political parties are vital for any political system to
function efficiently. Regrettably, Pakistani political parties are unsuccessful to develop
into strong vehicles of national political will.119
Since from its very birth, Pakistani leadership is struggling for a better form of
government. Though they have agreed to adopt democracy as a system of government but
119. Hamid Khan, (2001). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University
Press, p. 352.
58
could not sustain it for a number of reasons democracy including military interference
into politics of the country.120
Initially Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act 1935 with certain amendments as
its interim constitution. A parliamentary form of government, as provided by the Act, was
agreed to put in practice. But, as on one hand, the Governor General exercised more
powers, likewise, the central government overpowered the provinces.121
It is true that
Jinnah as the first Governor General acquired a powerful position because of a number of
factors such as the lack of experienced politicians, lack of professional experts, serious
administrative and management problems faced by the newly born country, fear of the
survival of the state122
in the wake of Indian threat and many other domestic issues that
needed special attention. In such a grave situation, it became inevitable for the leadership
to assert central authority. Jinnah was a man of great insight and his towering personality
dominated early political conditions of the country. All his actions were necessitated by
the exigency of time. He always concentrated on executive decision making and crisis
management and had these not been done, the country position would have been more
perilous.123
In the early days of the independence, it was the need of the time for the
central leadership to adopt a dominant role. Under the system, the Governor General was
given more powers as compared to the prime minister.124
A few people condemn that
Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah‘s wielded more authority to himself and became a
strong and powerful Governor General. They argue this as a first blow to parliamentary
democracy in Pakistan. But this decision has to be examined and appreciated both in the
light of the constitutional arrangement in place under 1935 Act, the Indian Independence
120. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2011). Democracy in Pakistan. Project on the State of Democracy in South Asia
as part of the Qualitative Assessment of Democracy, Lokniti (Programme of Comparative
Democracy), Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, p. 3. 121. Ibid. 122. Lawrence Ziring, (2000). Pakistan in the Twentieth Centuary: A Political History. (The Jubilee Series),
p.100. 123. Ibid. 124. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Pakistan Under Bhutto's Leadership. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing
House, pp. 39-40.
59
Act, as adopted by Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order 1947, and the political
situation under which the founder of the Nation had to exercise his constitutional
authority, for nurturing the newly born country.125
It was unfortunate that Quaid‘s
successors did not posses any of his great qualities nor did they command the obedience
that had been enjoyed by him Thus, Pakistan‘s democracy soon fell perpetually victim to
factionalism and dictatorship. Among his followers, those who tried to imitate Jinnah
made a shamble of the high office and pushed the country into deeper difficulties.126
After the demise of Jinnah, there was disappointment over the appointment of Khawaja
Nazimuddin from all sections of society, which proved an unmitigated disaster. Liaqat
Ali Khan had passed a long time in Jinnah‘s company and was eager to assert his own
position and did not want a leader who could disturb him. So Nazimuddin was a perfect
choice for Prime Minister.127 On various occasions, heads at the centre and also in
provinces turned to adopt arbitrary attitudes and did not show any respect for the norms
of parliamentary government.128 But unfortunately no party had a leader bold enough to
come forward and protect the system. It is not because of the lack of competent
leadership but because of the lack of commitment to democratic principles. The leaders
were always at squabbles with each other for their vested interests, for their families and
for their regional/provincial groups. There was a continuous struggle for power all the
125. A specific provision as was available in British North America Act and other Dominion constitutions
binding the Governor General to the advice of the Cabinet or Council was not available in the
Provisional Constitution Order for Pakistan. Therefore Governor General of Pakistan was
constitutionally a more empowered Governor General, in the Vice Royal mould.In addition, there
were other reasons also as to why Pakistan was not a fully functioning democracy, at its birth. It
mainly comprised regulated provinces and areas of British India, with features like: executive was
excessively strong, elected institutions were weak, undeveloped middle class, and feudal
aristocracy. The above geo-polity needed a strong Governor General. Shahzado Shaikh Quaid-e-
Azam‘s Vision: A Democratic Pakistan. Available at:
http://www.hamariweb.com/articles/article.aspx?id=41771. 126. Lawrence Ziring, (2000). Op. cit., p. 100. 127. Lawrence Ziring, (2000). Ibid., pp. 100-101. 128. Khalid Bin Saeed, (1959). Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan. The Middle East Journal,
389-406.
60
time. Like Hobbe‘s state of nature, every political group was at war with every other
group.129 The cure for this trouble emerged in the shape of martial law in October, 1958.
3.3. Political Parties and Democracy in Post Independence Pakistan
Political parties are the integral part of democratic system. In the absence of political
parties, it is difficult for democracy to see light of the day. The mere presence of political
parties is not enough, there must be dynamic leadership and the parties must concentrate
on their basic functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, participation in
election and governance within the prescribed democratic limit, otherwise it will
adversely affect governance and the whole political setup.130
Political parties connect the state and society together and that is why they perform a vital
role in the institutionalization of democracy. But unfortunately, political parties remained
underdeveloped in Pakistan due to a number of reasons i.e., low level of development of
Pakistani society, the authoritarian and intolerant attitude of the early leaders which has
been embraced by the latecomers and the imbalance of power between state and political
institutions, which invited time and again the non elected institution i.e. military to the
corridor of power, consequently democracy could not gain ground in Pakistani
environment.131 It is not because there is lack of political parties, but they have not
worked well. The parties have been ineffective in the performance of their fundamental
functions such as interest articulation, interest aggregation and policy making. Thus the
two non-political institutions of the state i.e. Bureaucracy and Military assumed the
responsibility of policy formulation.132 Most of the political parties in Pakistan lack
organized membership. Even the party members are often not well informed about the
party program. With the exception of few political parties, others lacked organized
structure. A majority of political parties remain dormant most of the time and become
129. Khalid Bin Saeed, (1959). Op. cit., p. 389-406. 130. Inayatullah, (1997). State and Democracy in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard, p. 39. 131. Ibid., p. 39. 132. Craig Baxter, et.al,(1998). Government and Politics in South Asia. Lahore: Vanguard books, p. 188.
61
active only on the occasion of elections. Very few of the parties in Pakistan practice
internal democracy and educate their members adequately. They do not bother about
developing a sound foundation for the strengthening of democracy and creating a sense
of nationhood among the masses.133 There are mainly four explanations for the
ineffectiveness of political parties in Pakistan. Firstly, personalism, most of the political
parties are amorphous grouping attached to a few individuals. And as the
leader/individual disappears, the party automatically disperses into various warring
factions e.g. Muslim League after the death of the founder of Pakistan (Muhammad Ali
Jinnah) in 1948 and then after the assassination of Pakistan first Prime Minister Liaqat
Ali Khan in 1951. Secondly, regionalism has always played its negative role. The
majority of the post-Jinnah political leaders regionalized and localized politics as they did
not have a nationwide appeal and had regional and local stature.134 This is very much clear
from the results of first ever general elections of 1970 in Pakistan. In the said elections,
political parties gained strength from the regional constituencies. Thirdly, factionalism is
not less effective in the ineffectiveness of political parties. In Pakistan, political leaders
are members of prominent families. Loyalty to such leaders is neither doctrinal nor
ideological allegiance to a party program but rather by the individuals association with
the party. Last but not the least, is the repression which is the rule and not the exception
of Pakistani political culture.135 It is the cultural and material development of a society in
which citizens are free to form groups and associations so as to articulate their interests
and demands that leads to the emergence of political parties. But the lack of such
development and absence of freedom in Pakistani society particularly during the first
decade constrained the development of political parties. But later on during 1960s, the
industrial development accompanied by certain other social changes led to the emergence
133. Inayatullah, (1997). Op. cit., p. 39. 134. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2011). Op. cit., p. 3. 135. Craig Baxter (1998). Op. cit., p. 188-190.
62
of new political parties such as Pakistan Peoples Party and old parties like Awami League
also gained strength.136
Well-organized and well-entrenched political parties are very much essential for a sound
and effective political and constitutional system.137 It is the primary responsibility of
political parties to safeguard democratic values in a country, but unfortunately, political
parties in Pakistan have failed in fulfilling this responsibility. The political parties could
not carry the representative system of governance forward. The All-India Muslim
League which had launched the struggle for independent Pakistan from 1940 to 1947,
was not a well organized political party.138 Keith Callard has beautifully portrayed the
scenario.139
It was the negative attitude of Pakistan Muslim League towards rival parties that badly
affected the development of other parties.140
It did not extend recognition and respect to
the legitimate opposition and often labeled other parties as traitors. The Muslim League
never hesitated in initiating repressive measures against opposition. This political culture
of Muslim League was later on adopted by other political parties particularly Pakistan
Peoples Party.141 Soon after independence, the ruling Muslim League‘s lack of democratic
experience forced important political figures to form opposition. On the one hand, the
Muslim League could not satisfy masses and, on the other, it sidelined those key
personalities who were opposing its policies which cost her heavily. The result was that
some capable and influential leaders along with their supporters parted ways with the
136. Inayatullah, (1997). Op. cit., p. 39-40. 137. Noor ul Haq, (2010). Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects,
IPRI journal x, no.1, 7, p.8. 138. Ibid., p. 8. 139. The system of political parties in Pakistan bears little resemblance to that of the other democratic
countries. Politics has begun at the top. Pakistan has neither a two party system in which struggle
is waged between fairly stable groups, one of which is in office and the other in opposition; nor a
multi-party system, in which clear differences of program or ideology separate a variety of
opponents. In Pakistan, politics is made up of a large number of leading persons who, with their
political dependents, form loose agreements to achieve power and to maintain it. Keith. B.
Callard, (1957). A Political Study. London: Allen and Unwin. p. 67. 140. Inayatullah, (1997). Op. cit., p. 40. 141. Ibid., p. 40.
63
Muslim League. Suhrawardi was one such disgruntled leaders who felt that the ruling
clique was unable to accommodate the political aspirants to play their part in politics. In a
very short time, he became a leader of opposition in both parts of the country. Some other
important political figures also joined Suhrawardi and thus they formed their own
political party known as All Pakistan Awami Muslim League.142
In fact, the ruling party showed indifference even to its own members and made no
efforts to persuade the dissatisfied workers to remain affiliated with the Muslim League.
Thus, those members and workers had no other option but to join opposition. As the
League identified itself with the state, every sort of opposition to Muslim League was
treated badly and was labeled as anti-state or anti Pakistan.143 The elections for the East
Bengal Provincial Assembly was announced in March 1954. Here it is to be noted that
there were demands for fresh elections because the members of the assembly who were
elected in 1946 had lost popular support and ceased to reflect public opinion.144 The
ruling Muslim League was biased towards Awami League and did not provide a level
playing field during Provincial Legislative Assemblies elections to its members including
Suhrawardy who was the leader of the party. No member of the Awami League was
allowed to campaign freely for the party. Due to the negative attitude of the ruling clique,
the Awami League could not produce the desired results and got a negligible
representation in the western province. Suhrawardy, after experiencing such sort of
situation in West Pakistan, decided to challenge Muslim League in the Eastern province.
The Bengali grievances against central government were on the peak which provided
Suhrawardy a chance to exploit and advance his party agenda.
Most of the influential leaders from East Bengal who were not satisfied with the Muslim
League rule joined Awami League while some others decided to establish their own
142. Ghulam Mustafa, (2010). Alliances Politics in Pakistan: A study of the United Front, Pakistan Journal
of History and Culture, Vol.XXXI, No.1, p. 103-129, p. 106. 143. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Politics of Alliances in Pakistan 1954-1999 (PhD Thesis), Quaid-i-Azam
University Islamabad, p. 1. 144. Ibid., p. 2.
64
political parties. Thus, gradually new opposition parties started to emerge on the scene.
Some prominent figures from these opposition political parties, sensing the dominant
position of Muslim League, decided to form a United Front against it in the 1954
elections.145
3.4. The Situation during 1954 Elections
All the opposition parties antagonized against the Muslim League, realized that fighting
among themselves would bring no positive change but further strengthen the Muslim
League. Most of the opposition parties in East Bengal welcomed the idea of a United
Front. The parties that constituted the United Front were: Awami League, Krishak
Saramic Party (peasants and workers party), Maulana Ataha Ali‘s Nizam-i-Islami (NI)
Party and Ganatantri Dal (GD), a party of the left including the communists and led by a
leader of the Tebhaga Peasant Movement.146 Although some other small parties like
Khilafat-i- Rabbani and East Pakistan Communist Party did not form part of the United
Front, yet they had a secret understanding to support it in the provincial elections against
the ruling Muslim League.147 The constituent political parties of the United Front jointly
adopted a 21-point programme.148 This programme was actually meant to accommodate
the agendas of all the political parties forming the United Front. In the strict sense, the
programme differed in some respects from the declared party agendas of the constituent
parties of the United Front.149 The 21-point programme of the United Front incorporated
different demands such as the adoption of Bengali as one of Pakistan‘s national
languages along with its adoption as a source of education, guaranteeing economic
improvements, nationalization of jute trade and ensuring fair prices.150
The said
programme also insisted that only defense, foreign affairs and currency should remain
145. Ghulam Mustafa, (2010). Op. cit., p. 107. 146. Christophe Jaffrelot, (Ed.). (2004), A History of Pakistan and its Origins. Anthem Press, p. 48. 147. Akhtar Hussain, (2008).Op. cit., p. 6. 148. Christophe Jaffrelot, (Ed.). (2004). Op. cit., p. 48. 149. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Op. cit., p. 7 150. Christophe Jaffrelot, (Ed.). (2004). Op. cit., p.48.
65
with the central government while rest of the subjects should be left to the provinces. In a
nutshell, the United Front incorporated in its twenty one point manifesto something for
everyone in East Bengal.151 The Muslim League started its election campaign in January
1954. It called upon the masses to vote for Muslim League as it would ensure the ―very
existence of Pakistan‖. In Dhaka, on twenty first January 1954, the Chief Minister Nurul
Amin, while addressing a conference of the All East Pakistan Muslim Students League
said that general elections would be a ―sort of referendum to decide if East Pakistan
would remain a part of Pakistan or join India‖.152 The Chief Minister accused that all the
units of United Front were against Pakistan and the Muslim League. The opposition
parties were alleged as a group combined together to destroy Pakistan and dismantle the
founder organization. The Chief Minister also severely criticized the two prominent
leaders of United Front namely A. K. Fazlul Haq and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy.153
The League leaders emphasized that only Muslim League could bring harmony and
understanding between the two wings of Pakistan. They claimed that the solidarity of
Pakistan was in the victory of Muslim League. They also made scathing attacks against
the United Front for the inherent disunity among its constituent units. They described that
United Front had only one thing in common that was their prejudice and hatred against
the Muslim League. They also alleged the United Front that ―it received a donation of
Rupees one crore from India and that if succeeded in the elections, the Front would be
controlled by the Indians.154
It was the first general elections on the basis of adult franchise. The people of East
Pakistan gave their verdict against the Muslim League and against the central
government. The United Front emerged victorious by securing 229 seats out of the total
309. The Muslim League won only nine seats and met its waterloo at the hands of United
151. Ibid., p. 48. 152. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Op. cit., p. 8. 153. Ibid., p. 8 154. Ibid., pp. 8-9
66
Front. The party was never given a hearing in the province again.155 The chief minister
and the president of East Pakistan Muslim League Nurul Amin was defeated by a law
graduate Khaliq Nawaz.156
3.5. Lack of Elections in Pakistan
The general elections at national level were held in Pakistan after a lapse of 23 years of
its birth. However, in the provincial elections people went to the polls in 1951 in Punjab
and N.W.F.P (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and a little later in Sindh and East Pakistan.
Unfortunately, these elections did not contribute to either promote political institutions or
democracy in Pakistan. 157
These provincial elections particularly in West Pakistan were a mockery and fraud with
the masses. The ruling party (Muslim League) used all sorts of means for maintaining its
hold over the three provinces of West Pakistan. However, in East Bengal, despite the firm
support of central government for Muslim League, the United Front swept the polls and
routed the Muslim League out from East Pakistan.158 As put by Kamran,Yunas Samad
confirms it by arguing that the central government ceased to be neutral and non-partisan
in the elections held in the Punjab, NWFP and Sindh. It was confirmed that some of the
state functionaries at the call of the central government interfered and disturbed the free
exercise of ballot. In some cases, the nomination papers of the opposition candidates
were rejected on baseless and flimsy grounds and in other cases, they were thrown into
prison on the charges of their being a threat to the state.159
The Muslim League, unlike Congress, had no post independence planned political
program. It lacked grassroots support, powerful factional leaders and had weak
organizational structure. After independence, the Muslim League consisted of mostly big
landowners whose interests were in conflict with democratic dispensation. It was also a
155. Christophe Jaffrelot, (Ed.). (2004). Op. cit., p.48. 156. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Op. cit., p. 12. 157. Tahir Kamran. Electoral Politics in Pakistan (1955-1969), Pakistan Vision, 10(1), p. 82. 158. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 159. Ibid.
67
fact that a few of the Muslim Leaguers had roots in Pakistan.160 Their ineffectiveness and
mutual rivalries for power and position had played its role for delaying the constitution
making. Instead of consensus, cooperation and mutual understanding, they were busy
most of the time in ceaseless infighting. The imposition of mini Martial Law in 1953 was
the result of a conflict between the central and provincial leadership.161
3.6. Delayed Framing of Constitution
According to the proposals of Cabinet Mission Plan, a constituent assembly was
indirectly elected by the provincial legislatures, which was charged with the task of
framing the constitution for united India.162 But with the partition of India, the constituent
assembly got divided. Initially, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was consisted of 69
members who were later on increased. The Assembly was given the dual responsibility
i.e. in addition to framing of the constitution it had to shoulder the responsibility of acting
as a legislature.163 The most urgent and pressing task was structuring of a constitution.
The constitution was supposed to lay down that which form of government to be adopted,
what will be the role and responsibilities of judiciary, military, and bureaucracy.
Additionally, religion and the state, provincial autonomy, joint or separate electorate,
fundamental rights and civil liberties and minorities and women representation were
other important issues that the Constitution had to decide. The representation of both the
wings and religion versus secularism were the main hindrances in the framing of the
constitution.164
The members of the assembly belonged to two parties i.e. the Muslim League and the
Congress. All of the League members except one or two represented the Muslims, while
Congress party was representing Hindus mostly from East Pakistan. The strength of
160. Noor ul Haq, (2010). Op. cit., p.8. 161. Ibid. 162. Hamid Yousaf, (1998). Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments, 1947-97. Lahore: Pakistan
Academy of Administrative and Social Science, p.47. 163. Ibid. 164. Noor ul Haq, (2010). Op. cit., p.7.
68
Muslim League was 59 mostly from landlords while members of the Congress came from
the middle class. The opposition that Muslim League had to face in the Constituent
Assembly came from within, in the form of various groups.165
The Objectives Resolution passed in March 1949 was a landmark development in the
constitution making process. It stated the fundamental principles and basic objectives on
which the future constitution was to be based. The minority leaders opposed the
Objectives Resolution on its religious accent.166 The Pakistan National Congress was the
main opposing party. Its argument was that the Objectives Resolution has mixed religion
with politics and it will reduce the minorities to the status of serfs.167 On the other side,
the religious leaders also opposed the resolution on its secular implications.168 However,
the real problem was how to give these principles/objectives a practical shape in the form
of future constitution.
East Bengal which was about 1/6th the size of the western wing had more population
than Western part, demanded for democratic rights and better economic conditions, while
the western part having larger area, had better strategic situation and natural resources. It
was also in a dominant position as far as the administrative and army services were
concerned. The West Pakistan was apprehensive of the predominant position of Bengal
that might pose a threat to the feudal interests. Another complicating feature was that a
significant percentage of the population in the Eastern wing belonged to Hindu minority.
So in such a strain situation, it was very difficult to devise a constitutional arrangement
acceptable to both parts of the country.169
Thus the constitution making process was delayed for about a decade due to the harsh
and adverse attitudes of elites both from West and East Pakistan. The central point of
165. Hamid Yousaf.,(1998). Op. cit., p.47. 166. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Pakistan: Political Roots and Development, 1947-1999. Karachi: Oxford
University Press, p. 36. 167. Ibid. 168. Mushtaq Ahmad, (1971). Politics Without Social Change. Space Publishers, p. 28. 169. Hamid Yousaf, (1998). Op. cit., p. 48.
69
conflict was the distribution of powers between the centre and the provinces
governments. West Pakistan stood for a strong centre while East Pakistan demanded
maximum provincial autonomy. The second issue that played its part in complicating the
process of constitution making was that of representation. As the East Bengalis
constituted 54% of the total population, they demanded for representation proportionate
to their numbers.170 But the West wing elite were not ready to accept this demand.171 They
considered themselves more important and more leading so they made every possible
attempt to put an end to every such development that might give the Bengalis a sway in
the decision making process. In a nutshell both East and West Pakistan feared of each
other‘s domination. None of the two sides were ready to create an atmosphere of
harmony and understanding. The deadlock/controversy lasted for a long time which gave
birth to regionalism and negative feelings against each other that rose to the surface in
1971.172 Thus, the mutual rivalry between the two wings of Pakistan led to a bloody
conflict which, at last, resulted into the separation of East Pakistan and her emergence as
Bangladesh.
In October 1954, when the Governor General Ghulam Muhammd dissolved the first
Constitutional Assembly, the Supreme Court mandated a second Constituent
Assembly.173 The second Constituent Assembly met in 1955 and in a very short time
amalgamated the three provinces (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and
the commissioner province of Balochistan of the West Pakistan into One Unit. The One
Unit was supposed to give the Punjabis control over the other three units of West
Pakistan and it was also to balance the influence of Eastern Wing. Thus the first
constitution was framed by the second Constituent Assembly in 1956 and was officially
170. Hamid Khan, (2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University
Press, p. 78. 171. Muhammad Hassan, (2011). Causes of Military Intervention in Pakistan: A Revisionist Discourse.
Pakistan Vision, 12(2), 66-100. 172. Lawrence Ziring. (1977). Pakistan: The Vision and the Reality, Asian Affairs: An American Review,
4(6), 385-407, p. 394. 173. Ibid.
70
promulgated in March of the same year.174 The constitution contained a parity formula
wherein both East and West Pakistan had equal representation in the central legislature.
East Pakistan gave to the constitution only a token support because they were at
disadvantage.175
After a long period of nearly a decade, constitution was enforced in the country. Of
course, it was a moment of great happiness and celebrations but unfortunately it lasted for
little more than two and a half years. The politics of the country had already degenerated.
The promise of general elections remained unfulfilled.176 Had the general elections held at
proper intervals, the situation would have been better. After the integration of West
Pakistan, the Republican Party under Dr Khan Sahib got majority in the West Pakistan
Assembly.177 It did not have roots in masses but political manueures added with patronage
helped it to form the government. While at the centre, a coalition government was the
only option which tended to be a weak government. The Muslim League proved to be in
a weak position. It remained in power till September 1956. The Muslim League was
succeeded by Awami League and Republican Party.178 But as the political instability was
at peak at that point of time which did not allow this coalition ministry to stay in power
for long. Political loyalties and floor crossing became so frequent that there was no
chance for any political party to stay in power for a reasonable length of time.
Demonstrations in favor of provincial autonomy and also against One Unit scheme
further degenerated the political atmosphere. Finally, the lack of popular leadership with
national stature and high caliber led to the imposition of martial law in October 1958.179
3.7. Bureaucratic and Military Influence in the Politics of Pakistan
174. Ibid. 175. Ibid. 176. Safdar Mahmood. (2000). Op. cit., p. 53. 177. Ibid., p. 53. 178. Ibid. 179. Ibid., p. 54.
71
From the very beginning it was Jinnah‘s personality cult and preference for viceregal
system that gave bureaucracy a dominant position in the politics of Pakistan. Jinnah had
more trust on civil bureaucracy, therefore, he preferred them over politicians. Under the
inherited viceregal system, the Governor General was more powerful than the Prime
Minister. The parliamentary norms were violated in the appointment of the first prime
minister because there was no respect for the consent of parliament as far as the
appointment of Liaqat Ali Khan as prime minister was concerned.180After the demise of
Jinnah, the second Governor General Khawaja Nazimuddin strictly followed his
predecessor in matters of exercising discretionary powers. PRODA, Public and
Representatives Offices (Disqualification) Act of 1949 further enhanced the discretionary
powers of the head of the state. For example, in 1948 Pir Ilahi Baksh‘s ministry and in
1949 Daulatana‘s ministry were dismissed.181
With the passing away of the first prime minister in October 1951, the second Governor
General took the office of prime minister while a Punjab based bureaucrat Ghulam
Muhammad replaced the Governor General. He left no stone unturned in making the civil
and military bureaucracy part of decision making in Pakistan. Ghulam Muhammad
followed Muhammad Ali Jinnah and continued the trend that had begun in the era of the
founder of the nation consolidating powers in the hands of two non-political institutions
of the country. In 1951, General Ayub Khan became the Commander-in-Chief of
Pakistan Army and the then Defence Secretary Major General Iskandar Mirza, a
prominent man in the establishment played a key role in pushing Ayub Khan to the post
of Commander-in-Chief of Army. Thus, the closed links between the two non-political
institutions got consolidated after Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan.182After Jinaah and Liaqat
Ali Khan, the bureaucratic elite did not spare any opportunity to convert the office of
180. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., p.33. 181. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, (1967). The Emergence of Pakistan. New York: Columbia University press,
pp. 367-368. 182. Surendra Nath Kaushik. (1985). Op. cit., p.34
72
Governor General into an instrument of bureaucratic intervention into politics.
Bureaucratic intervention was seen, from time to time in the provinces in the shape of
Governor‘s rule. The chief ministers were thrown out of their offices by violating
parliamentary norms.183
After their induction into politics, the bureaucrats became addicted to it. Bureaucrats
considered themselves not only more competent but also more patriot than the politicians.
The politicians also stifled the democratic impulses and provided an opportunity to the
civil servants to usurp power. Gradually, the two unelected institutions assumed
responsibility for dealing with Pakistan‘s internal and external affairs.184 Very soon they
turned politicians and dominated the politics of the country. The bureaucracy
consolidated its position as a real and permanent pillar of power. They turned masters of
the ministers.185
In a democratic set up, the military is subordinate to the elected government and it cannot
act unilaterally. But the lack of regard for such a rule in Pakistan harmed the image of the
country and that of military as well. Civil supremacy and control over the military has
been weak in Pakistan. Under the cover of national security, the military usually escapes
not only from political scrutiny but also from debate in the parliament. Actually, the weak
and inefficient democratic set up and well organized military along with extended tenures
for military chiefs made them headstrong.186 It was the fragile and corrupt political
system and the lack of political leadership in Pakistan that provided the military with an
opportunity to enter into the corridors of power.187 Thus the two non-political institutions
i.e. civil bureaucracy and the military were in dominant position because of their better
organization. As they were used to protect and promote the colonial interests with a stress
183. Muhammad Hassan, (2011). Causes of Military Intervention in Pakistan: A Revisionist Discourse.
Pakistan Vision, 12(2), 66-100. 184. Lawrence Ziring. ( 1977). Op. cit., 385-407. 185. Khalid Mahmood Arif. (1995). Working with Zia: Pakistan‘s Power Politics 1977-1988. Oxford
University Press. pp. 14-15. 186. Khalid Mahmood Arif, (1995). Op. cit., p. 16. 187. Ibid., p. 16-17.
73
on obeying the orders of their superiors, so they had no commitment to democracy.
Besides, the third most powerful group was the feudal class. Its source of power was
access to bureaucracy, control over political leadership and legislative institutions. As
following/adopting of democratic norms came in conflict with their vested interests so
they never tried it.188
Feudalism became dominant in the politics of Pakistan from the early days of
independence. Feudalism played a great role in damaging political parties. As this feudal
class was not capable of dealing with the complicated problems faced by the country,
they were always in need of help from the civil-military bureaucracy. There was a lack of
competent head of the state from amongst the political leadership that is why most of the
time this position was assumed either by a bureaucrat or by a military man. Both these
institutions often took decisions without consulting political leaders.189
This adversely
affected the image of political leadership and resultantly handicapped democracy in
Pakistan.
In short, from the very early time those who had power, lacked commitment to
democracy because of the fear of losing their power. While those who were potential
beneficiaries of democracy such as writers, lawyers and journalists lacked power to
enforce it.
3.8. Pak-India Comparative Study
It is rare in the world history that two countries with so much similarities as Pakistan and
India have such a contrasting political history. Both got independence from the same
Colonial era at the same time. Both served as host to multireligions, multi languages with
extreme poverty and inequality. All these factors militated against democracy as it
usually happens. In fact democracy failed in Pakistan from its inception. It experienced a
façade of military- bureaucratic rule. India also experienced an authoritarian rule but just
188. Inayatullah. (1997). Op. cit., p.52. 189. Noor ul Haq. (2010). Op. cit., p.10.
74
for a brief period i.e. 1975-77. After 1977 elections, democracy was put on the track in
India.190
Both Pakistan and India inherited the same legal system, same bureaucratic system and
same constitutional structure. In Pakistan, the fragile political system both at the centre
and provinces provided an opportunity to the higher bureaucracy to take the
responsibilities of the day to day administration. So in Pakistan, the independence
brought little change. Before 1947, the bureaucrats were without local bosses to control
them while after the death of Qaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan,
there was no competent leadership of exercising such a control.191 On the other side of the
boarder, India presented a different picture. The political maturity of the Congress Party
coupled with great insight and effective leadership of Nehru rationalized the position of
Indian Administrative Service vis-à-vis the emerging political structure.
In a nutshell, the post independence period witnessed the weakness of Muslim League in
Pakistan and the strength of Congress in India. Even in the presence of Jinnah and Liaqat
Ali Khan, the bureaucracy in Pakistan assumed a dominant position as compared to the
Indian bureaucracy.192
3.9. Military Intervention and Decade of Military Rule
When General Ayub Khan took control of power, he assumed supreme power. After the
imposition of martial law, some drastic steps were taken i. e. abrogation of 1956
Constitution, dismissal of cabinets both central and provincial, dissolution of the national
parliament and the provincial assemblies, and banning of all political parties. His
authority heavily relied on the support of army while for running the administration of the
country, Ayub Khan needed bureaucratic support which he got. He had no respect for
politicians. They were lumped with smugglers and black marketers. He warned
190. Philip, Oldenburg. (2010). India., Pakistan and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths.
Routledge. p.1. 191. Ibid., p. 45. 192. Ibid.
75
politicians to behave, otherwise, they will face retribution.193 Ayub Khan was of the
view194 that politicians have brought the nation to the verge of disintegration.195
193. Sherbaz Khan Mazari. (1999). A Journey to Disillusionment. USA: Oxford University Press, p. 94 194. Ever since the death of Quaid-i- Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan, politicians have started a free-for-all type
fighting in which no holds were barred. They waged a ceaseless and bitter war against each other regardless
of the ill effects on the country, just to stimulate their appetite and satisfy their personal motives. There has
been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation. Having nothing constructive
to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian, religious and racial differences to set a Pakistani against a
Pakistani. In this mad rush for power and acquisition of dominant position, the country and people could go
to the dogs as far as they were concerned. 195. Ayub Khan, speeches and statements. 1958-64.
76
Ayub Khan distrusted politicians. He introduced Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order
(EBDO) in August 1959 to ban corrupt politicians from elective offices.196 Article five197
of the EBDO was used against political opponents and about 75 politicians and
individuals were disqualified until December 1966.198 Some people including Suhrawardy
who were arrested, fought prosecution. Muhammd Waseem quoting Ian Talbot holds that
EBDO was one of the strongest arms in the hand of Ayub regime through which he
stifled the opposition.199
Restriction on press further damaged the opposition. Ayub Khan not only used the Public
Safety Ordinances (PSO) already on the statute book to control news items, but in 1963
promulgated the Press and Publications Ordinance to make the press conform to standard
principles of journalism and patriotism.200 Apparently, an independent National Press
Trust was established in 1964. It acquired ownership of earlier radical newspapers such
as ―Pakistan Times‖ and shortly changed them into government puppets. Sycophancy and
servility substituted a true patriotism born of candid reporting.201 Altaf Gauhar as a
Central Information Seceretary was the virtual Editor-in-Chief of more than fifteen
hundred publications.202 Such acts of Ayub Khan, on the one hand, if weakened struggle
against his despotic ruling, on the other, also spoiled the long-term progress of civil
society.
196. The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) authorized special tribunals to try former
politicians for "misconduct," an infraction not clearly defined. Prosecution could be avoided if the
accused agreed not to be a candidate for any elective body for a period of seven years. Available
at: http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/18.htm. 197. Under Article 5 of EBDO:a) public servants who had been removed from service on any charge other
than inefficiency; (b) persons who had ever been served with an order underr the Secuity of
Pakistan Act or a similar law relating to an act prejudicial to the defence, external affairs, or the
security of Pakistan;(c) persons found guilty by the Federal Court or High Court or a tribunal
under PRODA; and(d) persons convicted of any offence, and sentenced to more than two year
imprisonment stood debarred from being candidates or members of an elective body, until 31
December 1966. 198. https://lubpak.com/archives/3591 199. Ian Talbot. (2012). Pakistan: A New History. Hurst, p. 77. 200. Ibid. 201. Ibid. 202. Iftikhar H. Malik, (1997). State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Idealogy and
Ethnicity. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 135.
77
Ayub Khan banned the activities of political parties. Although Ayub regime took several
steps in economic and social areas, yet the concept of freely and directly elected
legislatures to make laws at national and provincial levels was not in the thoughts of
Ayub. Instead he preferred Basic Democrats who were elected directly. They also served
as members of the Electoral College not only for the election of the president but for
national and provincial assemblies as well. For the civilianization of his rule, Ayub
conducted indirect elections in 1962 for the national and provincial assemblies which
were held on non party basis. This further empowered the landlords and biraderi heads
that were already unfriendly to the development of political organization at the grassroots
level.203
Later on, political parties were allowed through the Political Parties Act 1962
and when the Convention Muslim League emerged as a majority party, Ayub Khan
became its president a year later.
Ayub Khan put the blame on politicians for all the ills and overlooked the fact that he
himself was the most powerful chief of the most powerful institution i.e. army and all the
major political decisions taken at the centre had his tacit approval. In fact, Ayub Khan
had remained very close to the centre of power since 1951. He abetted Ghulam
Muhammad in two crucial acts i.e. the dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin which
abolished the parliamentary norm of cabinet‘s responsibility to the parliament and the
dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in October 1954 which was an
unconstitutional act. In reality, it was bureaucracy that ruled Pakistan during the
Country‘s first attempt at a democratic system. The army abetted the bureaucratic rule by
and large. At the end, the man in uniform had gained upper hand but at the expense of
bureaucrats.204
Initially, there was a popular support for Ayub Khan when he seized power from
politicians. One of those who hailed Mirza‘s exit and Ayub Khan‘s ascension to power
203. Sherbaz Khan Mazari. (1999). Op. cit., p. 94 204. Ibid.
78
was Miss Fatima Jinnah who, after some time, became a serious and strong contender for
the presidency against Ayub Khan.205 Once she praised206 Ayub Khan. But after some
time when it was an open secret that the General had no intention to make a shift of
power from military to civilian rule, opposition to his rule strengthened. It also came to
surface that the so called Basic Democracy System was serving the elite group instead of
the masses.
In 1958, Ayub Khan had promised a return to constitutional government as early as
possible. A Constitution Commission was established in February 1960. The Commission
consisted of eleven members. The Commission brought its recommendations but Ayub
Khan was not happy with several of the recommendations and found these repugnant
towards his plan of government. The Commission‘s recommendations with which Ayub
Khan disagreed are direct elections, free political parties, strong legislative and judicial
organs and defined limitations on presidential authority. Ayub Khan considered these
recommendations against his planned government, so he constituted different committees
to make changes in the recommendations.207
Ayub Khan wanted to retain as much power
as possible so he tried to retain certain aspects of his dominant authority in the 1962
Constitution which brought an end to martial law. The Constitution provided for a
presidential system in which the powers of the chief executive were increased. The chief
executive was provided the power to control the legislature, the power to issue
ordinances, the right of appeal to referendum, control over the budget, and protection
from impeachment. The chief executive was also given emergency powers, by which he
could suspend civil rights. The 1965 presidential elections proved that those who equated
205. Sharif Al Mujahid. (1965). Pakistan‘s First Presidential Election. Asian Survey, 280-294. 206. A new era has begun under General Ayub Khan and the Armed Forces have undertaken to root out the
administrative malaise and the anti social practices, to create a sense of confidence, security and
stability and eventually to bring the country back to a state of normalcy. I hope and pray that God
may give them wisdom and strength to achieve their objective. With Faith, Unity and Discipline,
let us march forward as one nation. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Pakistan: The Enigma of Political
Development. Folkestone, Kent: Dawson; Boulder, Colo: Westview, p. 86. 207. Ayub Khan. Available at: http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/18.htm 12-12-2013.
79
constitutional government with parliamentary democracy, opposed the presidential
system of government.208
The 1962 Constitution which is also known as ―One Man Constitution‖ was an attempt to
give a legal cover to the non elective group of civil and military bureaucracy and to
curtail the influence of politicians who were supporting the parliamentary set up.209 This
received great condemnation. Ayub was against parliamentary system for Pakistan
therefore parliamentary set up was replaced with a centralized presidential system. The
constitution was aimed to concentrate power in the president‘s hands. Some of the
features of 1956 constitution were incorporated i.e. the division of the country into East
and West provinces, parity of representation in National Assembly. Power was
distributed between the centre and provinces so as to give it a federal appearance but
practically it was unitary. The president concentrated all the executive powers in his own
hands and was not responsible to parliament. The cabinet ministers were his handpicked
men who served as his advisors and president could accept or reject their advice.210 The
1962 Constitution promulgated by Ayub Khan shifted the executive authority from
legislature to the office of the president. This move was aimed to secure president for a
fixed term of five years in the office and the president was not to depend on majority
support in National Assembly like prime minister in a parliamentary setup. This
arrangement made the president indifferent towards the demands of both opposition and
the provinces. The same pattern was applied to the provinces where governors were not
elected but they were nominees of the president. Thus, it became very difficult for
political parties to enter into the Ayub Khan system at both federal and provincial
208. Ibid. 209. Robert La Porte, (1976). Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan. New Dehli:
Vikas publications House, p. 57. 210. Muhammad Hassan Shaikh, (1987). Role of Political Parties in Pakistan 1969-1977 (Doctoral
dissertation, University of Sindh, Jamshoro). p. 81.
80
level.211
Ayub regime used stern measures and preventive laws for silencing his political
dissidents. Every effort was made to popularize the regime and to muzzle the opposition.
There was a sort of disappointment among the political parties and they felt suffocated.
No doubt, political parties were allowed to operate but the indirect elections through BD
System minimized the role of political parties and reinforced the bureaucrats. Stifling the
voice of politicians led them to agitate but that was of no use without popular
backing/support. It was in 1965 that war with India and later on the Tashkent Agreement
provided a chance for political opponents of Ayub Khan to exploit.212
The changes that were made to the Constitution of 1962 through First Amendment Act of
1963 created an impression that Ayub could change the constitution if it didn‘t serve his
interests. Ayub‘s term as president of Pakistan was due to expire in 1965, he, therefore,
managed to hold presidential elections in January 1965.213 His plan actually was to use the
same BDs who had participated in the referendum held in February 1960, for presidential
elections. To give a practical shape to his plan, the Second Amendment Bill was passed
in the National Assembly in June 1964 which brought the presidential elections five
months earlier before the fixed time. The opposition proclaimed this tactic of Ayub
regime as a cynical manipulation of the constitution just to serve the interests of ruling
party.214
In 1964, with the efforts of Khawaja Nazimmuddin, a pre- poll alliance of five opposition
parties .i .e Combined Opposition Parties (COP) was formed. The Combined Opposition
Parties adopted nine point programme as its manifesto and decided to put Miss Fatima
211. Mohammad Waseem, (2002). "Causes of Democratic Downslide." Economic and Political Weekly, 37,
(
(44/45), 4532-4538. 212. Lawrence Ziring, (1977). Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm. Asian Survey, University of
California press, 581-598. 213. Hamid Khan, (2004).Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University
Press, p. 237. 214. Altaf Gauhar. (1985). Pakistan: Ayub Khan‘s Abdiction. Thirld World Quarterly, 7(1), 102-131.
81
Jinnah as their presidential candidate. The ruling party reacted to this development quite
bitterly and somewhat maliciously. The COP was referred to as an association of
heterogeneous parties which consisted of discredited and disgraced leaders with no aim
but to seize power. The members of COP were also taunted with the lack of a head/leader
of national stature215
and that opposition was not in a position to agree on a candidate to
oppose Ayub in the upcoming elections.
The opposition parties were in search of such a leader whose patriotism, honesty,
sincerity and integrity were above question. The COP actually needed a leader who
commanded the respect and devotion of a large section of the population. Finally, the
name of Miss Fatima Jinnah was proposed and accepted unanimously for the exalted
office of presidency. The ruling party got astonished with the name of Fatima Jinnah as
COP‘s sole candidate in the presidential contest. Elderly Fatima Jinnah was a venerable
lady, had great respect throughout the country. She was the only hope for both masses
and opposition political parties who could bring down the authoritarian rule of Ayub
Khan and restore democratic rights of the people. As Miss Fatima Jinnah had held no
office in the past and, therefore, she could not be blamed for inefficiency and charges of
corruption or maladministration which were leveled against most of the opposition
leaders. Fatima Jinnah‘s personality attracted mammoth crowds of masses but upset all
the calculations of Ayub regime and also sent shocking news through the administration
and Basic Democrats. As Fatima Jinnah was committed to direct elections, her coming
into power was not a good sign for Basic Democrats. Ayub Khan responded to Miss
Jinnah‘s decision to fight Ayub in the presidential elections in these words: ―I didn‘t
know the reason that compelled her to be the presidential candidate. She was living a life
of seclusion and didn‘t participate in politics except giving statement to press on national
days. After the death of Quaid-i-Azam, she made it a habit to criticize every coming
government. She was an opposition party in the period of Liaqat Ali Khan. She never
215. Sharif Al Mujahid. (1965). Op. cit., 280-294.
82
missed any occasion to make people disappointed and depressed. When Martial Law was
imposed, she welcomed it but soon adopted her old routine.‖216
Ayub Khan declared the manifesto of the Combined Opposition Parties as a ―bundle of
lies,‖ a string of ―catchy slogans based on sentiments of parochialism, regionalism and
petty issues.‖ On the other hand, the Combined Opposition Parties featured Ayub Khan‘s
program as an ―election bluff‖. His pragmatic approach to democracy, the opposition
claimed, meant nothing but ―a superimposed constitution or an ordinance issued as
fundamental law.‖ He had already practiced his pragmatism by rejecting the reports of
the Constitution and Franchise Commissions.‖217 Fatima Jinnah accused Ayub of ―lack of
faith in the people‖ and called him ―a dictator‖ who was now trying to wear the garb of a
democrat.‖218
The opposition‘s approach was aimed to exploit the aggrieved and dissatisfied masses of
the country. They chanted slogans like ―democracy versus dictatorship‖, give me votes
and I will give you democracy.‖ These slogans were meant to make the people believe
that the Combined Opposition Parties wanted to bring democracy and the president for
autocracy. On the other hand, the incumbent party not only characterized the Ayub‘s
Basic Democracies System as the most suited form of democracy for Pakistan but also
tried to deflect the election campaign into side issues which were aimed to hurt the
opposition causes.219
As far as the role of Ulema in the presidential elections of 1965 is
concerned, Shah is of the view220 that they supported Ayub Khan.221
216. Akhtar Hussain. (2008). Op. cit., p. 35. 217. Sharif Al Mujahid. (1965). Op. cit., p.280-294. 218. Ibid., pp. 280-294. 219. Ibid. 220. A faction of the ulema and pirs supported Ayub Khan and held Fatima Jinnah‘s candidature in
contravention of the injunction of the Shariah. The Pir of Dewal Sharif claimed that ―God has
communicated to him His displeasure with the Combined Opposition Parties.‖ Some traditionalist
ulema like Abdul Hamid Badayuni not only issued fatwas in favour of Ayub and against the COP,
but also criticized Maududi for opposition to the creation of Pakistan. 221. Shah, Hussian, Syed. Mujawar, (1996). Religion and Politics in Pakistan. Islamabad: Quiad-i-Azam
Chair. NIPS, Quid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, p.70
83
The vote in the elections was limited to the 80,000 members of Electoral College. When
the election results were declared, Ayub Khan won by securing 64% votes as against
35% for Fatima Jinnah.222 Many causes can be attributed to the defeat of Fatima Jinnah
and one of the causes was that Islamic teaching forbids a female to become the head of
the state which Ayub Khan exploited and was triumphant to get the sympathy and
support of religious section. Miss Jinnah‘s intent to scrape the Basic Democracies System
too worked against her as the Basic Democrats for the sake of their own survival voted
Ayub Khan to power against Fatima Jinnah.223 Ayub Khan won the elections but with the
help and support of governmental apparatus. Most of the observers agree that despite the
difficulties of indirect elections and clear advantages for Ayub in his self created system
of Basic Democracies, Fatima Jinnah would have won the elections had they been free
and fair. Of course, she would have won with a huge margin in East Pakistan and would
have also had a good contest in West Pakistan. The elections were rigged not only
through officials‘ interferences but also the basic democrats from opposition parties were
either forced or bribed to vote for Ayub Khan. Thus a very good opportunity to involve
the people of both the wings in governance of the country and restore democracy in the
country was lost.224 He also imposed restrictions on the press, political activities and
freedom of expression. Fundamental rights were denied to the people. His own made
constitution made Ayub Khan virtually a dictator. The democratic principles were
violated by not putting the constitution to referendum. Thus no hope was left for the
democratic institutions to grow.225 This maneuvering of the system by the ruling party for
Ayub Khan further weakened public faith in his system and the masses decided that a
system in which they are unable to elect a person of their own choice then they have only
one option i.e., to change the system.
222. Altaf Gauhar, (1985). Pakistan: Ayub Khan‘s Abdication. Thirld world quarterly, 7(1), 102-131. 223. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Op. cit., p. 62. 224. Hamid Khan, (2001). Op. cit., pp. 237- 238. 225. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Op. cit., pp. 363-364.
84
3.10. 1965 War, Tashkent Declaration and Bhutto’s Maneuvering
On bad advice of some of his ministers, Ayub Khan ordered Pakistan Army to cross the
ceasefire line in Kashmir. This led to the commencement of an all out war with India on
September 6, 1965 which ended in a stalemate on September 23, 1965.226 Some of the
observers in Pakistan believe that Bhutto was the man responsible for initiating the
conflict with India which soon escalated into a full fledged war.227 It became visible that
as early as Spring of 1965, Bhutto had intimated with a few men of which Bhutto had the
principal role. The group made plans for commencing a conflict that might compel the
Indian government to start talks with Pakistan on the basis of more suitable conditions.228
Bhutto believed that if his strategy wins in Kashmir, he will be appreciated more than
Ayub Khan. But if it was lost, Ayub Khan and the army will be dishonored while he will
emerge as the next man.229 Ayub Khan once expressed his opinion to a political analyst
(G. W. Choudhury) that his decision to start war with India in 1965 was a serious and
fatal mistake and he also blamed Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad (then Foreign Secretary) for
having misled him.230
On September 17, China turned its protest against the successive
violations of China‘s territory and sovereignty by the Indian troops into a three days
ultimatum, demanding the dismantling of Indian military structures on the Chinese side
of China-Sikkim border. Though India took China‘s ultimatum as a ploy but the U.S and
Soviet Union took it serious and invigorated their efforts to get a standstill cease-fire
resolution in the Security Council.231 After the termination of 1965 War and before the
notorious Tashkent Agreement, there was a clear display of unity among different
226. Hamid Khan, (2001). Op. cit., p. 238. 227. Anwar Hussain Syed, (1992). The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Macmillam, p. 48. 228. Ibid., p. 49. 229. Philip E. Jones, (2003 ). Pakistan People‘s Party Rise to Power. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.
84. 230. Golam W. Choudhury, (1974). The Last Days of United Pakistan. Karachi: p. 20. 231. Philip E. Jones, (2003). Op. cit., p. 82.
85
segments of the Pakistani population. The feelings of unity among the public can be
summed up in a few lines.232
On September 23, 1965 both India and Pakistan agreed and accepted the Security Council
Resolution bringing an end to the war.233
The Russian Prime Minister Alexi Kosygin,
playing a mediating role, invited Ayub Khan and the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur
Shastri to Tashkent. Kosygin urged them to negotiate their issues and problems and reach
an understanding. He also took part in a week long negotiations. At last an agreement
known as Tashkent Declaration was signed.234
The Tashkent Agreement became possible
because of Soviet Union aegis. But there was also pressure from the United States,
Britain and United Nations asking the two countries to reach a solution.235
Common people in Pakistan started pronouncing that Pakistan had prevailed in the war in
the battlefield, however, lost it on the negotiating table. In fact, the Tashkent Agreement,
to a great extent, damaged Ayub Khan‘s personality and it turned out to be one of the
central causes of his demise. The said Declaration annoyed Pakistani people who had
quite different expectations. The situation further worsened at Ayub‘s denial to comment.
He went into seclusion instead of taking people into confidence for signing the
Declaration. Resultantly, demonstrations started at different places which slowly spread
throughout Pakistan.236
The post Tashkent Declaration saw severe ramifications in
Pakistan. Once Pakistani delegation came back home, the then foreign minister started to
throw hints of a secret clause in the Declaration. No doubt it was a lie, but he was playing
to the gallery. That was his own way of getting support for himself after a war that was 232. ―No government in Pakistan ever had such a healthy climate and opportunity to mould Pakistani people
into a nation of which not only posterity will feel proud, but which would command the respect
and admiration of the world at large. Such moments and opportunities in the life of nations are
rarely witnessed. It is a moment whose significance should be fully realized. It is a moment which
should not be allowed to go unheeded. It is a moment of destiny for Pakistan.‖ Lawrence Ziring,
(1971). The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969. Syracuse University Pr, p. 67. 233. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (1999). The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997. Lahore: Sang-E-Meel
Publication, p. 127. 234. Ibid. 235. Syed Badrul Ahsan, Tashkent 1966 and its ramifications, published in The Daily Star, January 10,
2016. 236. See details on: www.mapsofindia.com. Retrieved on 23.09.2015.
86
started on his wrong advice.237
Ayub, fed up with Bhutto‘s grumbling, asked him either
to resign or go on leave. Bhutto opted for the second option but after a month, under
pressure from his former boss, he resigned and Sharifuddin Pirzada the then Attorney
General replaced him.238
After Tashkent Agreement, Bhutto parted ways with Ayub Khan, and thereafter
differences increased between the two. When Bhutto was foreign minister in Ayub
Khan‘s Cabinet, he had the information about powerful organizations.239 He met and
sought the support of labor organizations, farmer/kisan organizations, and the
associations of advocates. Thus he met with all the downtrodden sections of the society.
He emerged as the first political leader of the downtrodden and suppressed people.
3.11. The Formation of Pakistan Peoples Party
Why was PPP formed? The Muslim League as an established and founder party was
already there. The founder of PPP was a strong supporter of Ayub Khan‘s regime. In fact,
the new system of Basic Democracies established by Ayub Khan proved a first step
towards weakening his rule. The system of Basic Democracies through which Ayub
Khan ruled the country was aimed for stabilizing and strengthening his position.240 Ayub
Khan introduced the system of Basic Democracies and took 80,000 basic democrats, the
number of which was increased to 120 thousand, later on. He got himself elected through
basic democrats. He also introduced 1962 Constitution which is also known as a ―one
man constitution‖. Then the presidential elections were held in 1965 in which Ayub Khan
was opposed by Fatima Jinnah (Mother-e- Millat). And he once again got elected as
president of Pakistan. Thus he got the mandate from basic democrats to run the system of
the country. The said system though had many good points but due to its faulty system of
237. Syed Badrul Ahsan, Tashkent 1966 and its Ramifications, published in The Daily Star, January 10,
2016. 238. Ibid. 239. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Bhutto and senior member of PPP) on 30-07-
2015. 240. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Bhutto and senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015.
87
electing Assembly members and president, invited severe criticism from the masses, in
general, and from politicians, in particular. All this was an effort towards a presidential,
better to say, a dictatorial system. The people were disappointed with the said
dictatorship. Although Ayub Khan‘s rule had some very good points yet as a whole not
only politicians but masses too were annoyed. In that scenario, the opposition against
Ayub Khan was divided into two groups. The most important opposition leaders from
East Pakistan were Hussain Shaheed Suhurwardi, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Maulana A.K.
Fazal-ul- Haq and a few others who had adopted more democratic attitude than their
counterpart in Western part of the country.241
The main opposition leaders from West
Pakistan were Choudhury Muhammad Ali, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daualtana,
Abdul Qayyum Khan, Maulana Maudoodi etc.242 They all were against Ayub‘s Martial
Law, Basic Democracies and also 1962 Constitution. In this whole situation, Z. A.
Bhutto was a strong supporter of Ayub Khan. He also remained as a chief polling agent
of Ayub Khan in the presidential elections of 1965.243
Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardi made an effort to form a United Front in East Pakistan
against the dictatorial rule of Ayub and, thus, the three most important parties of East
wing i.e. Awami League, Krishik Siramic Party and Nizam-i-Islami got united.244
Maulana Maudoodi sent a message to Suhrawardi that it is high time to form the United
Front from both wings of the country. Suhrawardi agreed to Maulana Maudoodi‘s
proposal and, in a meeting held at Suhrawardi House in which 24 leaders from different
opposition parties participated, it was decided to form United Democratic Front (UDF).245
Soon after the formation of UDF, Ayub Khan started a treason based trial of Nawabzada
Nasrullah, Attullah Mengal, Choudhury Ghulam Muhammad of JI and Muhammad-ul-
Haq Usmani of NAP and few others. This was aimed to suppress the opposition, although
241. Ibid. 242. Ibid. 243. Ibid. 244. Ibid. 245. Ibid.
88
the case was later on withdrawn. In that scenario, the shrewd Z.A. Bhutto was noticing
everything. Sensing the political disturbances, Z.A. Bhutto started his politics with
greater enthusiasm.
As his relations with Ayub had deteriorated after the 1965 elections. Though Ayub Khan
had won the election, the uneasiness had increased among the masses throughout the
country. When Fatima Jinnah announced to contest the 1965 presidential elections, Ayub
Khan got annoyed and called on Bhutto where he expressed his extreme sadness and told
Bhutto that ― thoo ne tho muje batya nahi,Ye Teri Maa Khaha Se Agaee‖ (where this
mother of you came from, you did not tell me).246
After the 1965 war, US withdrew itself
from supporting Pakistan but Russia kept supporting India. Russia had also vetoed
Kashmir issue at the United Nations. Some people say that a big defense agreement was
also made between the two.247
There was disappointment and hatred especially among
political circles against US. Being members of SEATO and CENTO, US did not extend
its support to Pakistan. Kosygin made efforts to bring both Pakistan and India on table
and got an agreement signed between the two rival states known as Tashkent Agreement.
The Agreement prompted mixed reactions. Some criticizing it while others appreciating it
in view of its promoting Pak-India relationship, to some extent. As the relations between
Ayub and Bhutto had turned worse when the latter used the said agreement as a
launching pad.248 When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto left Ayub‘s cabinet, he kept his political
prospects afloat, to weigh the plan of an increasingly antagonistic government, to know
the directions of the public opinion, and to know and test the strengths and weaknesses of
various opposition political parties and their leaders. During this period, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto was going through the process of sifting among different options. He wished and
was in search of credible central role in the national politics for which he had three
options. He was struggling to build a political base outside the Ayub regime by
246. Ibid. 247. Ibid. 248. Ibid.
89
consolidating the anti Tashkent constituency and employing it either (1) to create a block
of opposition parties led by pre-Ayub elites, (2) to bargain for entry into the leadership
echelon of an established opposition party, or (3) to organize his own political party and
seek power through socialist politics.249
After Z. A. Bhutto exit from Ayub cabinet, he spent most of his time (particularly from
1966 to 1970) in building his political position. After parting ways with Ayub, Bhutto
had met all the major opposition leaders. Choudhury Ghulam Muhammad of JI was of
the view that Bhutto contacted us but because of the part of Ayub Khan‘s government,
we could not accommodate him.250
Then socialists who need a leader for pushing forward
their agenda found Bhutto most suitable. Bhutto belonged to a landlord family of Sindh
and got political training under Ayub Khan‘s one party rule. He was never found to be
such a strong supporter of democracy earlier. In West Pakistan, the leftists supported
Bhutto against Ayub Khan. Those were the days when a layer of hatred had started
against US. Bhutto took advantage of both and decided to establish a party of his own.251
PPP was founded at a ground adjacent to Dr Mubashar Hassan‘s house in Gulburg,
Lahore on November 30 and December 1 1967. It took four sessions to finalize the party
formation. It was launched at a convention that was announced almost a month earlier
and attended by, at least, 300 delegates from West Pakistan, the majority of whom were
from Punjab.252
Initially three names253
were proposed and in the end, the delegates
approved Pakistan Peoples Party as the name. They also approved a tri-colour flag for the
249. Philip E. Jones. (2003). Op. cit., p. 99. 250. Interview with Syed Usmani, Op. cit. 251. Ibid. 252. Other important delegates who attended were Malik Sharif, Hakim Abdul Latif, Mian Mohammad
Aslam, Mohammad Safdar, Aftab Rabbani, A.W. Katpar, Shaukat Ali Lodhi, Mir Rasul Bakhsh
Talpur, Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Begum Abad Ahmad, Khurshid Hasan Meer, Hayat
Mohammad Khan Sherpao, Chakar Ali Junejo, Mujtaba Khar, Haq Nawaz Gandapur, Jehangir
Khan, Imdad Hussain Jamali, Ahmad Dehlvi, Sardar Pir Bakhsh Bhutto, Mir Hamid Hussain,
Mian Mohammad Aslam, Malik Naved Ahmad and Abdul Razak Soomro. 253. (1) People‘s Progressive Party (2) People‘s Party (3) Socialist Party of Pakistan.
90
party. They also approved ‗chairman‘ as the designation of the party chief.254
The two
renowned persons i.e., J. A. Rahim (a diplomat) and Mubashir Hasan (an engineer by
profession) were the ideologues of the party. Stanely is of the view that Bhutto had
shared his intention and had informed J.A. Rahim about his plan for establishing a new
party. Bhutto revealed his plan to J. A. Rahim in Paris in 1966. At that time Rahim was
serving as Pakistan‘s ambassador to France. Bhutto often used to praise him.255
When
Pakistan Peoples Party was founded, the socialists provided Bhutto with the 3 basic
slogans.256
Bhutto focused on all the important sections of the country i.e., starving and shelterless
poor masses, trade unionists, workers, students, mullahs etc. Bhutto‘s slogan of Roti,
Kapra, Makaan (food, clothes and shelter) was for attracting the sympathies of poor. In
fact, the slogan of food, clothing and shelter (roti, kapra aur makan) was borrowed from
East Pakistan. The East Pakistan peasant leader Maulana Bhashani had already stated in
1969 during his speeches that food, clothing and shelter as the fundamental demands of
workers. PPP‘s chairman cleverly used the slogan to his full advantage.257
Socialism is
our Economy, was directed towards trade unions, workers, students and a section of
intelligentsia. While for religious people (mullahs) he raised the slogan of ‗Islam is our
faith. Bhutto‘s slogan of a thousand years war attracted hawks in the army and most of
the Punjabi and Sindhi population.258
Bhutto‘s decision to form his own political party was criticized by some circles, for
example, the then Provincial Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Begum Zahida
254. Abdul Razak Soomro (Founder Member of PPP Karachi). The PPP‘s Founding published in Dawn on
1st June 2013. 255. He once said, ―Above all he more than anyone else made me to decide for launching a new party.
Actually he and I founded it in Paris in 1966. He worked hard on the Foundation Papers‖. Stanely
Wolpert, (1993). Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times. New York: Oxford Unversity
Press, p. 110. 256. Golam W. Choudhury. (1974).Op. cit., P. 22 257. Dawn, March 23, 1969. 258. Samuel Baid, (2011). Pakistan: Crisis is Inherent. Strategic Analysis, 35(2), 342-371.
91
Khaliquzzaman, criticized Bhutto for his contradictory attitude.259 When the PPP raised
socialist agenda, the religious parties took it something against the ideology of Pakistan.
The ulema were not united at that point of time. Maulana Maudoodi strongly reacted
against socialism and said: ―ye mulk Islam k leye bana hay aur yahan koi naya nizam
hamari gardano ko kat kar hi laya jaya ga (this country was founded in the name of Islam
and any other new system would not be tolerated).‖260 Most of the religious leaders tried
to start a united struggle against socialism. So all these things including PPP‘s slogan for
unity and integrity of the country, socialism and socialist support led to the formation of
Pakistan Peoples Party.
3.12. Opposition to Ayub Khan
When Bhutto established his own political party, soon it was joined by a great number of
sympathizers like students groups, urban intellectuals, zamindars etc. Thus soon he got
many in PPP. The party motto was summed up in four points. The socio political and
economic problems during Ayub Khan‘s regime provided an opportunity to the PPP to
emerge and got strengthened. Bhutto took advantage of the opportunity and announced
PPP‘s below mentioned four point manifesto. 261
Democracy is our polity
Socialism is our economy
Islam is our religion
259. She alleged that the formation of PPP is Just a ruse to hoodwink the masses and gain his personal
political ends.‖ In a press statement, she disclosed that ―ever changing and vacillating attitude of
the former foreign minister was baffling and could convince not even a layman. It was strange that
the erstwhile supporter of the Ayub Constitution was now disowning it and flirting with the
opposition leaders some of whom were inherently opposed to the very creation of Pakistan.‖
Referring to the support given by Bhutto to the Six-point programme of Sheikh Mujib, Begum
Zahida remarked that ―it was an enigmatic somersault which politicians of his status should not
have ventured to make. Dawn, November 1, 1967. 260. Interview with Syed Usmani (senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 261. Craig Baxter. (1971). Pakistan Votes--1970. Asian Survey, 11(3), 197-218.
92
All power to the people262
Bhutto had close links in military, bureaucracy and the ruling party. He was informed
about the struggle for succession within the regime. He had established close contact with
Major-General S. G. M. M. Peerzada, a man of inordinate ambitions and a trusted friend
of Yahya Khan.263 Both Bhutto and Peerzada had established friendship because both had
grievances against Ayub khan, as they were pushed out of the close circle of Ayub Khan.
A deal was struck between Bhutto and Peerzada that initiated a movement against Ayub.
Peerzada assured Zulfiqar Ali Bhutt that army support for Ayub Khan would be lacking
in a mass confrontation and Bhutto was ready to start the movement on the popular theme
of Ayub‘s alleged sacrifice of ‗national honor‘ preserved at the cost of the brave jawans
(soldiers), at the conference table in Tashkent‖264
Bhutto, having superb oratory skill, presented himself as the champion of democracy and
the masses stood behind him against Ayub Khan‘s dictatorial rule. The factory workers,
labourers, peasants and students, all rallied behind Bhutto to overthrow the illegitimate
and anti-people government of Ayub. In its efforts to emerge as a progressive party, PPP
leadership focused on three objectives i.e. to oppose Ayub Khan‘s dictatorial and
undemocratic regime, to establish democracy in Pakistan and to transform Pakistan into a
Socialist polity. Bhutto‘s glamour call attracted the masses and they took him as their
savior.265 PPP chairman believed that Ayub Khan rule was unbearable sowing the seeds of
confrontation, agitation, discontentment and deprivation amongst the masses. He started
struggle for the rule of people. Pakistan Peoples Party, in a very short time, became the
most popular party in the Western Pakistan. He believed in the power of common masses
and focused on the issues pertaining to common man and also offered tangible solutions
to their problems. His slogan ―Roti, Kapra aur Makan‖ (food, clothing and shelter) for
262. Golam W. Choudhury. (1974). Op. cit., p. 22 263. Ibid. 264. Philip. E. Jone, (2003). Op. cit., p. 150. 265. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit, pp. 65-66.
93
every one also attracted millions of masses.266
When Bhutto started his campaign against the military regime of Ayub Khan, he was a
strong advocate of human rights. In one of the pamphlets produced by Pakistan Peoples
Party Bhutto had argued:
―Civil liberties hold key to our future happiness…All fundamental rights are important
and stand or fall together. Genuine freedom of speech cannot function genuinely without
freedom of press or without a proper opportunity for free association.‘ In a ferocious
literary onslaught, Bhutto had compared Pakistan in 1968 to the Kuomintang regime in
pre-revolutionary China, and insisted that ‗the present conditions must give way to a
democratic dispensation in which the entire population participates… All power must
pass to the people. This can only be done by democracy.‘267
It was this combination of democratic demands and socialist promises that made most of
the West Pakistan‘s population to support Bhutto in the 1970 general elections
In a very short span of time, various annoyed politicians from both wings of the country
brought the masses to streets aimed to force Ayub Khan to step down and a total
demolition of his centrist political system. Asghar Khan, a well known figure and former
air chief, also joined Bhutto. Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman of East Pakistan and also leader of
the Awami League was an active critic of the General‘s rule and his imprisonment by
Ayub Khan‘s regime on the allegations of conspiring with India made Mujib more
popular. Through his six points program, Mujib demanded for more political and
economic autonomy for his province. So, the political environment in both the wings was
against Ayub Khan and he was unable to curb the discontent.268 In 1968, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto was busy by bringing together, students, peasants, workers, lawyers and various
other sections of society especially in West Pakistan to form a united opposition against
Ayub regime. He knew who were politically important in towns, big cities and even in
266. Z A Bhutto - Symbol of Democracy by A. Z. Kalhora published in The Daily Times, January 5, 2012. 267. Tariq Ali, (1983). Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State. Penguin Books, p.107. 268. Iftikhar Haider Malik, (2008). The History of Pakistan. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp.150-151
94
rural areas. He also got himself informed about their associations and rivalries. He met
these people and talked politics to them. It is right to say that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto not
alone was responsible for ending the Ayub Khan‘s autocratic regime but he did prepare a
ground for a violent movement against the regime.269 By 1968, the fires of resentment had
grown into a national movement against Ayub and his autocratic regime, absorbing
various interest groups, leading by students and labors. The resentment against the
undemocratic rule of General Ayub reached to a point of no return. The people belonging
to various fields of life came out on the streets and a mass movement was launched
against the government. Having no other option, Ayub Khan offered some political
concessions to reach an understanding. He pledged not to seek re-election, restore
parliamentary system in the country and to hold direct elections. But it was too late to
make the political forces accept anything. They wanted nothing less than Ayub Khan‘s
resignation. Although he made an attempt to contain public pressure by the use of state
apparatus but that backfired.270
From the very start of 1969, anti Ayub rioting grew day
by day and there was almost a collapse of law and order situation.271 Opposition in the
shape of Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) resorted to countrywide perilous
demonstrations against Ayub regime.272 The said PDM was formed in May 1967 by
Awami League, Council Muslim League, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Nizam-i-Islami
Party. The movement was formed for the reintroduction of parliamentary system, direct
elections to both federal and provincial assemblies and the establishing of a federal
structure. The PDM also accommodated the Bengali‘s grievances against West Pakistan‘s
political and economic dominance. The movement won a great deal of sympathy from
Eastern Wing (East Pakistan) of the country. In December 1968, when the movement
269. Hamid Khan, (1992). The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. London: The Macmillan press,
P. 64 270. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Op. cit., p. 364. 271 Meenakshi Gopinath, (1975). Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and Rise to Power of
Pakistan People's Party. Delhi: Manohar Book Service, p. 18. 272. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Phir Marshal Law Aagaya (Then Martial Law Came), Lahore: Jang
Publishers, p. 16.
95
against Ayub Khan rule got strengthened, the PDM joined hands with other political
organizations and formed a more viable organization.273
In early 1969, several opposition parties grouped together in the form of Democratic
Action Committee (DAC) and decided to restore democracy in the country through mass
movement. Ayub Khan used both conciliatory and repressive measures, but disorder
spread. The army moved into different cities to restore order. In February, sensing the
situation Ayub Khan invited a Round Table Conference (RTC) in Rawalpindi to find a
solution but in vain as the General was averse to concede to the demands of universal
empowerment, direct elections and provincial autonomy. Eventually, the old Ayub Khan
confined to a small group of advisors, on 25 March 1969 abdicated in favor of Yahya
Khan instead of speaker of the National Assembly.274 The 1962 Constitution made by
Ayub Khan, could not save his power and position. According to the Chief Justice of
Pakistan Justice Yaqub Ali Khan, Ayub khan had established a council which was the
real authoritative body to govern the country.275 General Yahya Khan, General Sayed
Peerzada and General Sayed Fida Hussain were also its members. So the fault was not
that of law but of those who executed it. It was unconstitutional to hand over power to
Yahya Khan. According to the 1962 Constitution, Ayub Khan had to hand over power to
the Speaker of the National Assembly.276 Thus Second Martial Law was imposed on
March 25, 1969. The major cause for Ayub Khan‘s downfall was lack of respect for
democratic norms and democratic principles. During his rule, there was almost absence
of participatory opportunity on the part of common man in governmental affairs. The
people had realized that they had been deprived of their political rights. At that point of
273. Pakistan Democratic Movement. Available at: www.kppsc.com.pk. 274. Iftikhar Haider Malik, (2008). The History of Pakistan. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 151. 275. Aslam Pervez Mamon. Wafak-i-Pakistan aor Qumi Yakjehti, 1947 se 1971 ka Seyasi Jaiza (Federation
of Pakistan and National Integration from 1947 to 1971: A Political Analysis) (PhD Thesis),
p.185. 276. Ibid.
96
time, the people had lost trust in Ayub Khan and his government and they had no hope
for the restoration of parliamentary system under his rule.277
3.13. Transfer of Power from Military Man to his Comrade in Arm
Yahya Khan occupied the office of the president in the midst of the period of that forced
his guru Ayub Khan to resign the office. The collapse of Ayub regime was a burden
which Yahya had to shoulder as his soldier‘s code of duty. This was a great test for
Yahya Khan and he had to go through personal embarrassment.278
It is the innate weak
point of our military headship who desires to turn into political leaders. As civil-military
bureaucracy assumed a central position in the political affairs of the country from the
very start and particularly in the post 1958 period, politicians were powerless to play any
dynamic role. It was this shrunken political state of affairs that hard-pressed a military
man for the second time into the corridor of power.279
Since 1968-69, the Ayub regime was faced with political crisis in the country when the
military decided to dissociate itself from the president. The main opposition from military
to Ayub Khan‘s regime emerged with the emergence of Air Marshal Asghar Khan and
some other retired Generals who vocally and openly opposed his regime. The military
was also unhappy with him because of his decision to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy
Case.280 The accused were in the custody of the military and most of the evidence of the
case was collected by the military intelligence. Its withdrawal put the military in an
277. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Op. cit., p. 364. 278. Lawrence Ziring, (1974). Militarism in Pakistan: The Yahya Khan Interregnum. Asian Affairs: An
American Review, 1(6), 402-420. 279. Ibid. 280. Agartala Conspiracy Case was a case framed by the Pakistan Government in 1968 during the Ayub
regime against Awami League chief Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, some in-service and ex-service
army personnel and high government officials. They were accused of involvement in a conspiracy
to secede the East wing from Pakistan with the help of the government of India. The petitis
principii in the petition was that the conspiracy was concocted between the Indian party and the
accused persons at Agartala city of Tripura in India. The case was thus called Agartala Conspiracy
Case. However, the Pakistan government was compelled to withdraw the case in the face of a
mass movement in East Pakistan. See:
http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Agartala_Conspiracy_Case.
97
embarrassing position.281 Ayub Khan had made every possible efforts to keep the
dignified office of the president but the political anxiety together with his poor health
compelled him to hand over the role and responsibilities of the office to one of his
followers.282
As soon as Yahya Khan assumed office, he promised to restore democratic process and
creating a conducive environment for the establishment of a constitutional and
democratic government. He also pledged to hand over power to the freely and impartially
elected representatives of the people soon. Through an Ordinance, Yahya Khan presented
a Legal Framework Order (LFO).283 It was intended to serve as a modus operandi for the
approaching elections. The Legal Framework Order (For details see annexure 3) provided
that the elections would be held on the basis of one man one vote. Thus East Pakistan got
169 seats in contemplated National Assembly of 313. The newly elected assembly would
provide the country with a constitution within hundred and twenty days and the
constitution would be drafted in the light of the principles of LFO.284 The Legal
Framwork Order promulgated in March 1970, declared that the future constitution would
preserve five fundamental principles i.e. an Islamic idealogy, territorial integrity, free
elections plus independence of judiciary, a federation securing and ensuring provincial
autonomy as well adequate administrative, legislative and financial powers for the federal
government285
and full opportunities and chances should be given to all the people to
participate in national affairs. It was also clear that the final authority rested with the
281. Anas Malik. (2010). Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology. London and New York:
Routledge, pp. 82-83. 282. Lawrence Ziring. (1974), Op. cit., pp. 402-420. 283. The Legal Framework Order, 1970 (LFO) was a decree issued by then President of Pakistan Gen. Agha
Muhammad Yahya Khan that laid down the political principles and laws governing the 1970
general election, which were the first direct elections in the history of Pakistan. The LFO also
dissolved the "One Unit" scheme of West Pakistan, re-establishing the four provinces of Punjab,
Sindh, Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. See:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_Framework_Order,_1970. 284. Meenakshi Gopinath, (1975). Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and Rise to Power of
Pakistan People's Party. Delhi: Manohar Book Service, p.18. 285. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 64.
98
president of the country to approve or reject the constitution drafted by the assembly.286
Yahya Khan announced the breakup of One Unit in July 1970 and thus he demonstrated
his respect for the sentiments of the people of Pakistan. The nature of federation was,
however, to be studied and finalized by the newly elected national assembly. The stage
was ready for the first ever general elections of 1970.287
3.14. 1970 Elections and Yahya Khan
Thus Ayub Khan departure from office did not ensure a return to civilian rule. In the
absence of a broad based and responsible national political organization, Ayub had to
surrender in favor of his comrades in arms. The administrative system was semi
militarized and army and air force officers took control of decision making process while
civil administrators were made accountable to these officers. The administrators who held
key positions in Ayub Khan‘s government were reduced in stature. The Basic
Democracies system was no longer in practice, constitution was abrogated and efforts
were made to get the support of intelligentsia and political leadership.288
Yahya Khan
treated politicians with great care. He promised to return the country to civilian rule and
also restore the activities of political parties. The new military leader insisted that military
will be sent back to barracks but first to ensure that politicians have produced a suitable
Constitution and that they work to serve national interests.289
Yahya Khan announced to
dissolve One Unit scheme, to reestablish parliamentary system and to draft a new
constitution. Initially, unlike his predecessors, Yahya Khan seemed to hand over power to
civilian leaders as early as possible and was not interested to prolong his rule. Soon after
taking reign of the country, Yahya was looking for chances to hand over power to the
popularly elected representatives. Unlike Ayub Khan, Yahya recognized the necessity of
both political parties and politicians and started conciliatory policies towards political
286. Gopinath Meenakshi, (1975). Op. cit., p. 19. 287. Ibid. 288. Lawrence Ziring, (1980), Op. cit., pp. 97-98. 289. Lawrence Ziring, (1974), Op. cit., pp. 402-420.
99
parties and politicians. Yahya Khan was a ray of hope for the aggrieved common man as
he could not ignore the aspirations of the masses and promised an early return to
democratic rule. Unlike his predecessor, Yahya Khan did not muzzle politicians nor
opted for measure such as Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) of Ayub and
pledged to play a role of referee among the various competing political groups.290 The
credit goes to Yahya Khan for holding the first ever general elections in Pakistan. But
actually, the military junta appeared to have assumed that 1970 elections would bring a
factionalized parliament and the dominant position of the civil-military bureaucracy
would continue where the military would have a chance to hold the de facto balance of
power. Contrary to the military supposition, the elections did not bring the parliament as
desired by Yahya and his comrades291 and all the hopes of military junta shattered when
the results were announced.
3.14.1. Competing Political Parties in 1970 Elections
Despite strong misgiving against Legal Framework Order (LFO), the political parties
decided to participate in the elections and issued their manifestos. The political activities
began in January, 1970.292 About twenty political parties took part in the 1970 elections.
The most important were the following.
1. Pakistan Muslim League (Council)
2. Pakistan Muslim League (Conventiona)
3. Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)
4. Pakistan Peoples Party
5. Awami League
6. National Awami Party (Wali Khan Group)
7. Jamiat Ulma e Islam
290. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit, p. 57. 291. Katharine, Adeney, (2009)."The Limitations of Non-consociational Federalism: The Example of
Pakistan." Ethnopolitics 8.1 (2009): 87-106. 292. Syed Fakharuddin Shah, and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth
of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s,Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research 12.7.
100
8. Jamaat-e-Islami
9. Jamiat Ulma e Pakistan
10. Nizam e Islam Party
11. Pakistan Democratic Party.293
In East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman‘s Awami League was the main political party
which led election campaign. In West Pakistan, among the various political parties
campaigning for the election Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by Z. A. Bhutto was the
leading party. National Awami Party (NAP) led by Wali Khan, Pakistan Democratic
Party (PDP), Council Muslim League, Convention Muslim League, Qayyum Muslim
League, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan also took
part in the elections from Western Pakistan.294 Certainly, the six points program of
Awami League was the most controversial issue in the elections compaign. The military
junta considered it a form of secession while Mujib-ur-Rehman consistently used six
points in his electoral campaign.295
3.14.2. Campaign for the Elections and Politicians Maneuvering
The 1970 elections were held not in normal but in critical conditions. The country was
ruled by Martial Law regime and the elections were held under Martial Law regulations.
The elections were meant for resolving certain issues which were heat generating, of
constitutional nature which revolved around the division of the country into two wings.
That was first experience of general elections on the basis of adult franchise. The
confrontation with India was at peak. The most important issue during the time was
socio-economic one. The people struggled for economic security. PPP leadership caught
masses‘s imaginations by raising the slogan of Roti, Kapra and Makan. The campaign for
the 1970 elections went for one whole year.296
293. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Op. cit., pp. 17-18. 294. Hasan Askari Rizvi. The first 10 general elections of Pakistan, p.11. 295. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p. 100. 296. Abdullah Malik. What will be the Bhutto Strategy? Published in Viewpoint on February 4, 1977.
101
The election campaign started on first January 1970 when Yahya Khan allowed political
activities which were restricted earlier. Politicians started their political activities but
there was no match for Bhutto‘s charisma and mass appeal. Previously drawing room
negotiations and bargaining were the part of electoral politics in Pakistan. People were
approached usually through intermediaries such as revenue officials, police men, and
important persons in villages and also through caste and clan elders. But this time the
modes of contacting the masses were different because of the political strategy and style
of PPP leadership. The yearlong election campaign was dominated by public meetings,
processions, rallies, slogan chanting teams with fitted loudspeakers in vehicles, posters
and handbills. Politicians from all political parties visited cities and towns and delivered
emotional speeches; some like Bhutto also approached peasants and addressed them. This
was, of course, a different scenario where people participated enthusiastically.297 People
also flew flags on the top of their houses and shops were made attractive with portraits of
their favored politicians. The common and illiterate masses became so involved in
political activities that formal education appeared irrelevant to political participation.
People everywhere (In coffee houses, intellectual forums, the press, in homes, barber
shops, and the workplaces) started discussing political issues. Sometime members of the
same family supported opposite sides.298 Tensions built up, and political polarization was
everywhere. The political environment was full of intolerance and violence. Supporters
of all political parties tried to eliminate the viewpoint of others. This situation was
created by some elements that were close to Martial Law Administrator. This group had
made Yahya Khan‘s mind to fish in the troubled water of politics for his survival. And
that is why he kept hobnobbing most of the time with different party‘s leadership and
even some were supported with money. Yahya Khan and his group were convinced that
in the tense and polarized environment, no single party would be able to emerge as a
297. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., pp. 68-69. 298. Iftikhar Ahmad, (1976). Pakistan General Elections, 1970. South Asian Institute, Punjab University.
102
strong party, and challenge his authority. So, he would be able to play one against the
other and himself occupy a dominant position.299
Bhutto welcomed support from each and every side before elections. Print media gave a
cordial and favorable coverage to Pakistan Peoples Party. Except a few pro-Islam papers,
the whole press extended its support to PPP campaign. The Nusrat (ed. Hanif Ramay) and
the Shahab (ed. Kausar Niazi) two independent weeklies were almost converted into
Peoples Party papers. On the political platform, there was no match for Bhutto to
compete in oratorical tactics. He would address a dozen of meetings in a day. Besides,
Bhutto also activated his strong networking that he had established earlier when he was a
part of Ayub Khan‘s government, to promote his party influence. He had closed friends
among the military leadership and also some of the civil servants who subscribed to his
views on different issues extended their help to Bhutto and his party. These contacts also
kept Bhutto informed of the government policies and thinking which helped him to plan
for the upcoming elections. Many, suspected of working against Bhutto, were threatened.
Bhutto himself criticized his opponents and used abusive and objectionable words against
them but government turned a deaf ear and took no notice.300
PPP leadership succeeded in mobilizing the masses against the dictatorial regime of Ayub
Khan. The people became more involved in politics because of PPP‘s progressive and
secular calls. Neither Yahya Khan nor Ayub Khan could damage the PPP‘s reputation
and growing popularity. PPP was the first opposition party which succeeded in
persuading the military leadership to hold general elections in the country and give the
reins of government in civilian hands, later on. The PPP manifesto for the first general
elections in Pakistan reflected radical and revolutionary postures, which annoyed the
orthodox and conservative segments of society. In both wings of the country, the Ulema
(Sunni and Shia) violently attacked PPP‘s radical program and declared it disgusting and
299. Viewpoint. Abdullah Malik, (February 4, 1977). What will be the Bhutto Strategy? 300. M. Rafique Afzal, (1998). Political Parties in Pakistan: 1969-1971.
103
repugnant to the principles of Islam.301 In February 1970, socialism was declared as the
greatest of all the dangers to the security and well being of the country by 113 Ulema.
The Ulema also urged all Muslims to rise against this ―accursed‖ ideology.302 They
strongly criticized and opposed Bhutto‘s socialism and perceived Bhutto as kafir (infidel)
and his socialist program anti religious.303 The Ulema declared that those who practiced
socialism were rebels against Allah and His Book, and it would be morally wrong and
wicked for all those who support or vote for them.304 The Islamic parties and the Muslim
League presented the election as a competition/contest between Islam and its enemies.
They condemned Bhutto‘s association with Ayub Khan‘s regime and called him a drinker
and a womanizer.305 The Fatwa of about 113 Ulema, initiated by Deobandi ulema
appeared in the press against Bhutto‘s socialism306 but it could not stop or even prevented
the attractiveness of Bhutto. Shah had discussed the situation in a few lines.307
All these accusations were of no effect as the results of the elections showed it later. All
the three Islamic parties raised the slogan ―Socialism Kufr Hai‖ (Socialism is unislamic)
while campaigning for the elections. Sensing the growing criticism among Islam Pasand
and right wing political parties, Bhutto shrewdly introduced modifications in PPP‘s
manifesto. Bhutto, in order to gain mass support, modified PPP‘s election manifesto and
301. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1984). Politics in Pakistan: With Special Refrence to Rise and Fall of Bhutto.
Reproduced by Sani Hussain Panhwar, p. 66. 302. Anwar H. Syed, (1992), Op. cit., p. 69 303. Shafqat, Saeed, (1988). Public Policy and Reform in Pakistan 1971-77: An Analysis of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto's Socio-Economic Policies. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 11(3), 37,
p. 39. 304. Rana Rehman Zafar, (1973). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Azeem Siyasi Rahnuma ( Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Great
Political Leader). Lahore: Khyber Publishers, pp. 260-61. 305. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 69. 306. Mughees Ahmed, (2009). Relationship Between Political Parties and Non-Political Powers: An
Analysis with Reference to Pakistan. Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) Vol. 29, No. 1, 107-115. 307. The Fatwa declared socialism as the greatest of all dangers to the security and well-being of Pakistan
and called upon all Muslims to rise against this ―accursed‖ ideology. The ulema declared that
individuals and groups who preached socialism were rebels against God and His Book, and that it
would be gravely sinful for any Muslim to aid, or vote for them. In fact, they claimed that ―Islamic
Socialism‖ was a distorted exploitation and abuse of Islam by shrewd and power-hungry politician
who was a non-practicing Muslim and who had never cared to study Islam carefully. More
important was the fact that there exited no unity among religious or Islam pasand Parties. Shah
Hussian Syed Mujawar, (1996). Religion and Politics in Pakistan. Islamabad: National Institute of
Pakistan Studies, p. 101.
104
Socialism was portrayed as Islamic socialism.308 He also pledged to base Pakistan‘s
society on egalitarianism as mentioned in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of Prophet
Muhammd (s.a.w). Masawat-e-Muhammadi was also added to the PPP program.309 The
PPP members and supporters ran a folksy and colorful campaign for the elections.
Portraits of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto were displayed everywhere in meetings and processions.
Catching slogans310 were shouted in rallies and processions.311
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto symbolized himself as a civil, open-minded, moderate politician, as a
Pakistani loyalist, and as one devoted to democracy. He would make certain that
democracy should in no way be endangered again in Pakistan, for a dictatorship was no
alternate for democratic rule. He did not trust in animosity, he was of the view and would
not let his personal emotion to manipulate his political decisions. He was not intolerant or
conceited and did not desire to become a dictator. He told that ―some of his opponents
had alleged that he was an Indian, some that he was a communist, and others that he was
a fascist. But ―I swear by God, I am nothing but a Pakistani.‖ And, again, this is your
country, and my country, and this is where we have to live and die.‖312
In fact, it was Bhutto‘s big-name in Sindh that greatly enhanced his resulting success at
the polls in the southern province. For the world, his populasim was not a miracle,
however, for the West Pakistan it was a great development. Before that the approach of
West Pakistan‘s politicians towards politics was very low/different. They preferred to
negotiations and discussions among themselves rather than to use public support to chase
308. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1984). Op. cit., p. 66. 309. Dilip Mukherjee, (1972). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Quest For Power, pp. 179-180. 310. For example: ―Bhutto Sada Sher Hai, Baqi Hayr Pher Hai‖ (Our Bhutto is truly a lion while the rest
are merely devious); ―Valika Tha, Amrika Tha, Bhutto Wah, Wah, Wah‖ (Valika, the
industrialist, is down, America is down, cheers for Bhutto); ―Sada Bhutto Awe-i-Awe‖ (Our
Bhutto is bound to come to power); ―Bhutto Jiye Hazar Sal‖ (May Bhutto live a thousand
years).‖ 311. Yunas Adeeb, (1972). Quaid-e-Awam (Leader of the Masses). Urdu (Lahore: Maktaba-e-Pakistan,
pp.203-204. 312. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, (1971). Marching Towards Democracy: A Collection of Articles, Statements and
Speeches: 1970-1971. Pakistan Publications, pp. 39,44,148.
105
their dreams, ambitions and aims.313 Pakistan Peoples Party stood for a republican form of
government, civil liberties, adult franchise, minimum wages and health facilities for the
workers, and independence of judiciary, elimination of illiteracy, equal rights for women
and separation of judiciary from the executive etc. PPP leader did not show any interest
in East Pakistan and focused on West Pakistan. They concentrated on the economic
exploitation of the capitalists in West Pakistan.314 Thus Bhutto successfully campaigned
for the election and gained massive popular support.
3.14.3. Party-wise Candidates on Territorial Basis
In West Pakistan, almost all the political parties decided to participate in the first general
elections. In East Pakistan, the situation was different. The Awami League had a fairly
sound base in East Pakistan at the advent of elections. Maulana Bhashani, the National
Progressive League and Krishak Saramik Party in East Pakistan boycotted the elections
which favored the Awami League of Sheikh Mujib to sweep the elections, as it was left
virtually alone in the field.315 When the National Assembly received the nominations, it
became clear that no party would secure an overall majority in the house. A total of 1957
candidates participated for 300 seats of National Assembly. However, some candidates
were rejected and 1579 were left in the field. Out of the 1579 candidates, 319 were
independent. Similarly, 1850 candidates were from East Pakistan‘s Provincial Assembly
and 1385 were participating in the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly. They all had
conflicting ideologies.
Party-wise Candidates on Territorial Basis were as under
Party Candidates in East Pakistan Candidates in West
Pakistan
Awami League
162 4
313. Shahid Javid Burki, (1991). Pakistan: the Continuing Search for Nationhood. Boulder: Westview Pr, p.
59. 314. Safdar Mahmood, (1984). Pakistan Divided. Lahore: Ferozesons Ltd, p. 78. 315. Muhammad Rizwan, (2014). The Elections 1970: From Ballot to Nowhere. Asian journal of social
sciences and humanities, vol. 3(4), pp. 28-36.
106
Jamaat-i-Islami
69 79
Muslim League (Convention) 93
31
Muslim League (Qaiyum)
65 67
Pakistan Peoples Party
…….. 119
Muslim League (Council)
50 69
Pakistan Democratic Party
81 27
Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan
13 90
National Awami Party
(Wali Khan Group)
36 25
National Awami Party
(Bashani Group)
15 5316
Pakistan Peoples Party put up its candidates for the National and Provincial assemblies in
the following order:
Peoples Party Candidates for National Assembly
S.No. Description Number of Candidates
National Assembly (West Pakistan)
1 Punjab 78
2 Sindh 25
3. NWFP (KP) 16
4 Balochistan 01
National Assembly (East Pakistan)
316. Herbert Feldman, (1972). The End and the Beginning: Pakistan, 1969-1972. London: Oxford
University Press, pp. 72-73.
107
1 East Pakistan 0
Peoples Party Candidates for Provincial Assemblies
S.No. Description Number of Candidates
1 Punjab Assembly 166
2 Sindh 49
3 NWFP (KP) 37
4. Balochistan 0
4 East Pakistan 3317
In East Pakistan, Awami League under Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman dominated the election
campaign where the provincial autonomy was a vital issue. Awami League had
associations of students, labourers and peasants to support its aims. Nonetheless, it was
Mujib-ur-Rehman‘s leadership that raised the League as the dominant party in that part of
Pakistan. As Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy passed away in 1963, he left the National
Democratic Front and revitalized the Awami League in January 1964. On one hand, if
Mujib the Awami League leader attracted the masses through his superb speaking power,
on the other, the depressing role of West Pakistani establishment also added to his fame
and ultimately to Awami League victory. The populace of East Pakistan was
disappointed, when 3 Prime Ministers318 belonging to East Pakistan were brutally sacked
because of intrigues devised by West Pakistani coterie holding power at the Centre.
Furthermore, inability of the central government to respond positively to the three vital
issues and demands319 of Bengali genuinely offended people of East Pakistan.320
317 M. Rafique Afzal, (1998). Political Parties in Pakistan: 1969-1971, p. 133. 318. Khawaja Nazimuddin, Muhammad Ali Bogra and H.S. Suhrawardy
319. To introduce Bengali language, the unfair provision of public resources to East Pakistan and
little representation of Bengalis in the central services, mainly in superior positions.
108
The Awami League‘s campaign soon turned itself into a movement of Bengali revival
and devoid of any doubt the most contentious question in the campaign was the use of
Six Point Programme. As a result, Yahya Khan‘s Government did not disallow Sheikh
Mujib of using the Six Point Programme from his party platform. To create affront
against dominant Punjab Awami League leaders visited West Pakistan. Hyder Bakhsh
Jatoi and Abdus Samad Achakzai and G. M. Syed, were Mujib‘s colleagues in the
Western Wing 321 Despite these relations, Mujib asserted that West Pakistan had been
urbanized by East Pakistan‘s capital and described the 6 Point Formula as ―Magna Carta‖
for the Bengalis which would turn East Pakistan into ‗Sonar Bangla‘ (golden Bengal).322
3.14.4. Election Results and Political Maneuvering of Bhutto
The following three different centers of power emerged after election results were
announced: Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman‘s Awami league (AL) in East Pakistan, the Pakistan
Peoples Party in Sindh and the Punjab, National Awami Party and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
(JUI) in NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan.323
In the Eastern Pakistan, the
Awami League got all but two seats and secured overall majority in the National
Assembly. The Awami League gained a massive victory winning 167, out of 169 seats
allocated for that province but it could not win a single seat from Western Pakistan. In the
West Pakistan, it was the recently established Pakistan Peoples Party under Z. A. Bhutto
leadership which gained a sweeping victory by capturing 81 seats out of total 144 seats
allocated for West Pakistan.324
The performance of the rightist parties was
disappointing.325
Similarly the performance of the leftists was even more
320. Muhammad Rumzan, (1985). The Role of Religio Political Parties in Elections of 1970. M.Phil
Dissertation, Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, p. 90. 321. Ibid. 322. Muhammad Afzal Rafiq, (2001). Pakistan History and Politics, 1947-1971, Karachi: Oxford University
Press, p. 392. 323. Syed Fakharuddin Shah, and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth
of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s,Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research 12.7. 324. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p.101. 325. The rightist parties could not perform well and these parties were badly uprooted as they could get only
37 out of 300 seats for the National Assembly. The Muslim League Qayyum (PMLQ) secured
109
unsatisfactory.326
The Awami League performed tremendously well in the elections. No one expected it to
be in such a powerful position. The common prospect was of a factionalized parliament
but such sort of state of affairs created a stalemate. Z. A. Bhutto whose party swept the
polls in the West Pakistan demanded a share in the government and was not ready to let
Awami League form a majority government. On the other hand, Awami League
leadership was reluctant to allow Bhutto such a role.327 The Awami League secured an
overall majority in the National Assembly but it was not given a chance to form the
government. The military junta hesitated to call upon Mujib as his party had no
representation in the western wing. There was a need for a mutual understanding between
Bhutto and Mujib which sadly didn‘t take place. As Bhutto sensed/realized that Awami
League leadership was in the bad books of the military leadership, he turned down to
discuss terms and reach an agreement with Sheikh Mujib unless he could agree, at least,
to dilute if not publically renounce his six points program. On the other hand, Mujib and
his colleagues in the Awami League were firm that the six points must form the basis of
the future constitution. Of course, this was a difficult situation for Yahya but an
opportunity for PPP leadership.328
The 1970 elections were the first ever general elections after independence and it was the
start of a democratic process. Free, fair and timely elections are very important for the
growth and development of democracy. The right to vote is undeniable right of every
citizen. But unfortunately, in 1970 when this right was given to Pakistanis, a large
number of citizens did not cast their votes. Of all the registered voters, only 58 % used
only 9 seats, Council Muslim League 2, Convention Muslim League and JUI 7 each, MJUI 7, JIP
4 and PDP 1 seat. Craig Baxter, (1971). Op. cit., pp. 197-218. 326. National Awami Party (Wali Group) which was a pro-Russian party and which like the Awami League
stood for secularism, socialism, full autonomy for East Bengal and pleasant relations with India,
secured only 7 seats, 3 in each province of NWFP (KPK) and Balochistan and 1 indirectly elected
women‘s seat. Muhammad Rizwan, (2014). The Elections 1970: From Ballot to Nowhere. Asian
journal of social sciences and humanities, vol. 3(4), pp. 28-36. 327. Katharine Adeney, (2007). 5. Democracy and Federalism in Pakistan. Federalism in Asia, 101, p.113. 328. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p.102.
110
their right to vote while 42 % refrained. It was the combined responsibility of both the
Awami League and PPP to get rid of Martial Law and put the country on the road to
democracy by ensuring a peaceful transfer of power to the civilian hands.329 The Awami
League and PPP had promised the masses of a better future. The official name of the
party was Pakistan Awami League but the party was concentrating on East Pakistan only
and got overwhelming victory in the province.330 Eight of Awami League members were
also contesting elections from the West Pakistan but it was just to give a posture of
national level.331 Similarly, the PPP also fielded all of its 120 candidates in West Pakistan.
There was not a single candidate from PPP contesting the elections from East Pakistan,
despite its election manifesto wherein it is mentioned that if a party which seek to be a
parliamentary party has to get, at least, five percent of the total votes cast in both parts of
the country, so that it could be rightly called a national party.332 Thus the Awami League
emerged as a representative party of East Pakistan and PPP as a representative of the
West Pakistan only.333 Once the election results were announced, the League‘s leadership
declined any option of making any amendment in the six point formula. Sheikh Mujib-ur-
Rahman declared that the people of East Pakistan have voted for six points formula in the
elections and it is now the property of the people and he or his party has no authority to
amend the said formula. Mujib stated further that ―none would be able to stop us from
framing a constitution on the basis of six point program.‖334 Bhutto threatened to stay
away from the National Assembly if Mujib didn‘t yield. Thus he included himself in the
ruling body. Sheikh Mujib observed the alliance between Bhutto and military junta and
claimed that his party has been given a popular mandate to take the reins of government.
329. Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya (Then Came the Martial Law). Lahore: Jung
Publishers, p.18. 330. Ibid. 331. Ibid., p. 20. 332. Ibid. 333. Ibid. 334.The Pakistan Observer, 4th January 1971.
111
He reiterated that the masses had opted for Awami League and therefore the only
justifiable government would be the one formed by it.335
Initially, when the talks failed, the PPP‘s leadership adopted a strict attitude to counter
the Awami Leagues‘s presuure and to force its leadership for some concessions in the six
point formula. In February 1971, the PPP‘s leadership informed the press of its decision
of not attending the National Assembly session which was due on March 3, 1971, unless
and until he was satisfied that PPP‘s fairly good suggestions and demands were
accommodated.336
Bhutto also issued threat of starting a great movement if the session of
the assembly was held without PPP‘s participation.337 He stated, ―I cannot put my party
men in a position of double jeopardy (by sending them to Dhaka),‘ he said and threatened ‗a
revolution from Khyber to Karachi,‘ if the Peoples Party was left out.‖338
He also started issuing threats and warning to the western wing politicians not to attend
the National Assembly session. He further said: ―The PPP expected the people to take
revenge from the people, who had chosen to attend the assembly session, if the people
failed to take the revenge, the PPP itself would take action against them. If any member
of his party attends the session, the party workers would liquidate him.‖339 He threatened
the politicians from West Pakistan of dire consequences if they tried to attend the
session.340 The undemocratic and defiant attitude of PPP leadership caused Yahya Khan
to announce the postponement of the National Assembly session scheduled for 3rd
March
1971 on the pretext that the largest political party from West Pakistan was not attending
the session.341
335. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p. 102. 336. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (1986). The Military 1947-86 and Politics in Pakistan. Lahore: Progressive
Publishers, pp. 183-184. 337. Dawn, 1st March, 1971. 338. Ahmad S. S., (2004). History of Pakistan and Role of the Army. Karachi: Royal Book Company, p. 369. 339. Dawn 1st March, 1971. 340. Ayesha Siddiqa, (2007). Military Inc. Inside Pakistan‘s Military Economy. Karachi: Oxford University
Press, p. 77. 341. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (1986). Op. cit., p.184.
112
Such sort of situation led the military leadership denied to hand over power to Mujibur
Rahman without revision of Awami League‘s six point program. He later announced to
hold the National Assembly session on 25th March. Sheikh Mujib considered this act
against the autonomy of the Bengali and reacted brutally and challenged the decision of
the postponement of the National Assembly session and started street protests.
Meanwhile Yahya Khan asked both parties to meet him and sort out a solution. Yahya
and some other political figures from West Pakistan visited Dhaka and met Mujib.
Bhutto, however, refused to do so. It was, of course, a time of grave national crisis and
mutual understanding was inevitable. Yahya and Mujib met for six days and discussed
the matter and it appeared that Yahya agreed to most of the Bengali demands. A draft
declaration called for the end of the martial law in both wings and also for the division of
the National Assembly into two committees, one representing the East Pakistan and the
other the West Pakistan. The future constitution was to be based on the integrated
recommendations of both committees. Autonomy for East Pakistan as demanded in
Mujib‘s six points program was assured.342
Yahya once again asked PPP leadership to join the talks. This time Bhutto agreed and
went to Dhaka, where Yahya informed him that only Pakistan Peoples Party‘s acceptance
of the draft declaration was needed for the settlement.343 All this proved fruitless because,
on the one hand, the Awami League leadership was unwilling to accept any amendment
in the six point formula while; on the other hand, PPP‘s leadership was not ready to
accept all the six points.344 Bhutto discussed the documents with his advisors and refused
to support the draft declaration because, in his judgment, it would lead to the
dismemberment of the country. In fact, Bhutto and his high command had prepared a
342. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., pp. 102-103. 343. Ibid., p. 103. 344. Zulfikar Ali. Bhutto, (1971). The Great Tragedy. Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, pp. 21-26.
113
formula for a compromise settlement which was very close to the one agreed to by Yahya
and Mujib but Bhutto vetoed that one as well.345
Neither Bhutto nor the military junta could deny Mujib‘s firm and strong claim but they
were not ready to transfer power to Mujib. Bhutto‘s negative response to attend the
National Assembly meeting scheduled in Dhaka meant not accepting the mandate of the
winning party which was very much against the fundamentals of democracy, while the
Awami League leadership grew more unbending after securing an overwhelming
majority in the elections.346 Not accepting the mandate of the Awami League and using
undemocratic language to warn or coercive the politicians on the part of a national leader,
shows his commitment to seat of power and disrespect for democratic norms and values.
This was something against the norms of democracy which Bhutto so loudly spoke about
during his election campaign. The strict and rigid stance of Mujib on the six points
formula too was undemocratic.
The above discussion makes it clear that Bhutto‘s point of view was utterly against
democratic norms and values. One of the reasons for Bhutto‘s undemocratic and
unyielding stand was, undoubtedly, his support from military, bureaucracy and feudal
class in the West Pakistan. Although Yahya Khan drawn in Awami League headship in
the discussion but in reality that was a plan just to hunt for legitimacy for him. It was a
dual endeavor of the military leadership and Bhutto to prevent Mujib-ur-Rehman from
coming into power.347 The military junta sided with Bhutto who, according to Haqqani
and Siddiqa, supported military‘s anti- India agenda.348
345. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p. 103. 346. Waseem-ur-Rehman, Governance Crisis and Pakistan, published in Jahangir‘s World Times in April
2011, p. 31. 347. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 69. 348. Ayesha Siddiqa, (2007). Op. cit., p. 78.
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CHAPTER - 4
POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: THE PPP STYLE
4.1. Introduction
This chapter examines the Tri-Partite Talks after the first general elections, finds out that
why a peaceful transition could take place and who were responsible for the failure of the
talks. The chapter also discusses the roles and contributions of ruling as well as
opposition parties towards the framing of the 1973 Constitution. The focus is on
assessing the governing authority by PPP under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto till
the promulgation of the Constitution.
4.2. Failure of Dhaka Negotiation and Responsibility of Political Leadership
Bhutto had to talk and negotiate with one of the two power centers. Although there were
possibilities of risks in both cases, his first priority was to reach a settlement with the
Awami League's leadership on the basis of a sdemocratic alternative to military rule.
Bhutto approached to Mujib from a position of strength rather than weakness; he
portrayed himself as a leader of the Western part of the country, and ruled out any
possibility of either framing of the constitution or forming government at the centre
without the cooperation of his party. On December 20, 1970, in his speech to the Punjab
Assembly members, Bhutto stated it clearly not to occupy the opposition benches in the
National Assembly. PPP's leadership was not ready to occupy opposition benches and
wait for another five years. It wanted to get into power for the realization of its pledges to
the masses.349 He stressed that his party had won the elections in two provinces of Punjab
and Sindh where the real power existed, so there was no possibility of forming a
government at the centre keeping it out.350 The very next day after Bhutto speech in the
Punjab Assembly i.e. 21 December 1970, he told in a news conference and rejected the
349. Philip E. Jones. (2003). The Pakistan People's Party: Rise to Power. Karachi: Oxford University Press,
pp. 429-430. 350. The Pakistan Times, 21 December 1970.
115
idea to decide issue of autonomy for East Pakistan by the force of majority in the
National Assembly, arguing that because in that case the House would not be able to
form a constitution for both wings of the country. Pointing to the bifurcation of the
country, along party lines, Bhutto suggested and called for a grand coalition of the PPP
and Awami League at the National Assembly so that both the parties would be able to
fulfill their promises to their people.351
In the early post election days, Bhutto had
emphasized his programme of economic and social reform, openly condemned industrial
and business sectors for inflation of prices. He also promised oppressive feudal lords that
the day would come soon when they would have to answer to his party.352 Thus, his first
post election strategy was to make way for transfer of power from military to a PPP-AL
coalition at the central level. It is clear that Bhutto's demand for share of power and
framing of a constitution with mutual settlement was not only aimed to safeguard the
interests of West Pakistan but of Pakistan as a whole. So some concessions from the
Awami League's side on the six points formula was extremely important for the grand
coalition strategy.353 About this period, Bhutto writes in his books ‗The Graet Strategy‘.354
Many blamed PPP‘s leadership for the fall of Dhaka. Almost all political parties except
PPP were of the view that Bhutto did play a major role in the failure of tripartite (Yahya,
Mujib and Bhutto) dialogue.355
Yahya had also sensed the discontent in the military high ranks and he, therefore, sided
with his colleagues and Bhutto. As the writ of the government became ineffective in most
of the Eastern Pakistan, the military regime of Yahya Khan launched a major security
351. The Pakistan Times, 22 December 1970. 352. Philip E. Jones, (2003). Op. cit., p. 430. 353. Ibid. 354. "whether to surrender to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's six points demand which would have led to
constitutional session within a few months, or to resist the demand, which would endanger the
return to democracy and civilian rule, and carry with it the possibility of a violent parting of the
ways. It was, therefore essential to make every endeavor to find a political compromise on six
points so that democracy could be restored and Pakistan saved from disintegration." Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, (1971). The Great Tragedy. Karachi: Vision Publications Ltd, p. 27. 355. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015.
116
operation and unleash forces to contain the uprising led by Awami League under the
command of Tikka Khan who was infamous for mercilessness.356
In his interview with
Fallaci, Bhutto stated that he was not involved in the campaign of Yhaya Khan against
Bengalis. He condemned357
the way the operation was carried out.
Sensing the failure of the Mukti Bahini358 to achieve the objective, India hurriedly
attacked Eastern province and a full-fledged war started on November 22, 1971. On
December 16, 1971 military leadership admitted defeat and Pakistani forces surrendered.
Two days later, fierce protests started throughout West Pakistan. On December 19,
military officers in GHQ, Rawalpindi also resorted to vocal revolt which compelled
Yahya Khan to resign. Thus Bhutto got the opportunity to be sworn in as the president of
the country on December 20, 1971.359 The general elections of 1970 proved the shortest
way for Bhutto to gain political power. Bhutto too was ambivalent about democracy.
During his good days in the Ayub Cabinet, he was a pro-Ayub and anti-democracy. Out
of power, he became anti-Ayub and pro-democracy. Bhutto‘s attachment to democracy
depended on his position in the power structure.360
The responsibility for December 1971 debacle has to be ascribed to political leadership
and Gen Yahya Khan‘s junta as well. As noted by Askari, Prof Wayne Wilcox of the
Southern Asian Institute of Columbia University was of the view that the three parties
engaged in the last-minute negotiations in Dhaka in March 1971 were all negotiating
from a position of weakness and none of the three leaders, Yahya Khan, Mujib and
Bhutto could accept what would have had to be a ―major, visible compromise without 356. Lawrence Ziring. (1980). The Enigma of Political Development in Pakistan. Folkstone: Dawson, p.
103. 357. There are circumstances where a bloody suppression is justifiable and justified. In March, the unity of
Pakistan depended on the suppression of the secessionists. But to carry it out with such brutality
on the people instead of those responsible wasn‘t necessary. Oriana Fallaci, (1976). Interview
with History. New York: Liveright. p. 7. 358. Mukti Bahini is a popular Bengali term which refers to the guerrilla movement formed by the
Bangladeshi military, paramilitary and civilian during the War of Liberation that transformed
EP into Bangladesh in 1971. 359. Waseem-ur-Rehman, (2011). Governance Crisis and Pakistan. Published in Jahangir‘s World Times-
April, p. 31. 360. Ashok Kapur, (2002). Pakistan in Crisis. London: Routledge, p.109.
117
being rejected by their followers‖. Wilcox says, ―Mujib-ur-Rehman was left with the
position of ‗national hegemony or provincial secession‘, Bhutto, with the position of
‗shared national power or West Pakistan secession‘, and the army with ‗adequate support
for national unity and defense or civil war‘. And as a result, each group made its
irreconcilable demand and committed all of its resources in the hope that they would be
enough.‖361
In fact, the military leadership and politicians from the Western Pakistan did not show any
respect for the election results. Their undemocratic attitude and the unfriendly reaction
from Eastern Pakistan and particularly the adamant stand of Sheikh Mubijur Rehman on
six points program, led to a stalemate. The political intolerance and short sightedness of
the political leadership resulted into the disintegration of the country.362
Yahya could not
deal the situation rightfully. Yahya wanted to become the president of the country. Mujib
stressed on the implementation of six points and Bhutto was not ready to accept the
points. Thus the mismanagement of the army and misktakes on the part of political
leadership did play its role in the fall of Dakha.363
Both Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and
Bhutto could not sort out the solution which resulted in the disintegration of the country.
One cannot say that Sheikh Mujib wanted to keep the country united and Bhutto was
wholly responsible for disintegration. Actually politicians had their own priorities, but
adjustment is very much essential. This is very clear that Sheikh Mujib should have been
allowed to form the government. If the 1973 Constitution was formed by the National
Assembly‘s elected members under 1970 elections, then why Mujib was not allowed to
form the government, whose party had won majority of seats and majority of votes in the
same elections? PPP‘s leader was going to be opposition leader and had also chances of
becoming a deputy Prime Minister. It was a matter of bargaining. He then formed his
361. Dawn, 18th December 1990. M. H. Askari. The Stark Lessons of 1971. 362. Ayesha Siddiqa, (2007). Military Inc Inside Pakistan‘s Military Economy. Karachi: Oxford University
Press, p. 77. 363. Interview with Prof. N. D. Khan (Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07-2015.
118
government on the basis of PPP majority and with support of other groups. Why Awami
League was not allowed to form the government?
Pakistan Peoples Party came to power and took most of the praise for overthrowing both
Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. It took over the reins of power after the breakup of
Pakistan when Dhaka had fallen to Indian troops. Zulfiqar ali Bhutto drew strength from
the humiliation and demoralization of the nation. He assumed the office of president of
the country but continued with martial law in operation. The embarrassment of Pakistan
army and the disorder in its ranks also provided Bhutto a chance to become chief martial
law administrator. The dual roles and their interrelationship gave him total power
required/wished by Bhutto. Thus Z. A. Bhutto became the undeniable and total leader of
the new Pakistan after the dismemberment.364
4.3. PPP in Power
After the disintegration of the country in 1971, the new Pakistan (West Pakistan) was
faced with the problem of succession, authority and legitimacy. The military leadership
was not on the same page and stood clearly divided. Gen. Yahya Khan with some of his
associates made every possible effort for retaining power but Lieutenant General Gul
Hasan Khan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan (Then Chief of Pakistan Air Force) with a few
others sided with the civilian leaders and persuaded Yahya Khan and other senior officers
to hand over power to the civilian leadership.365In this context, one observer aptly
remarked, ―Bhutto was an obvious choice for the military high command which, one
364. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Pakistan in Twentieth Centuary: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford
University Press. p. 375. 365. Veena, Kukreja, (2003). Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises. New Dehli:
Sage Publications, p. 33. Also see Muqeem Khan, Fazal. (1973). Pakistan‘s Crisis of
Leadership. Islamabad: National Book Foundation, pp. 129-30. Lieutenant General Gul Hassan
Khan, (1993). Memories of Lt Gen. Gul Hassan Khan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. xi-
xii, 346-50.
119
saner counsel prevailed, accepted that vacating the political arena willingly would leave
the door open until the time was ripe to capture it again.‖366
There was lack of such a constitutional arrangement which could help Bhutto to become
prime minister of the country; he therefore, became head of Civilian Martial Law regime.
As quoted by Sartaj Aziz, Raza noted in his book, Yahya Khan made an effort to develop
a mutual understanding with Bhutto and suggested to him that he should become
president of the country while Bhutto as prime minister. Bhutto wanted full authority and
effective control as president and as civilian martial law administrator. He therefore,
rejected the proposal. He also turned down Yahya Khan‘s second offer that he should be
allowed to continue as Chief Martial Law Administrator and Commander in Chief of the
army while Bhutto should become president of the country. As far as the withdrawal of
martial law was concerned, Bhutto refused to do so as long as there was a constitutional
arrangement approved by the assembly.367
In December 1971, Bhutto assumed the dual offices of the president and Chief Martial
Law Administrator amidst serious national and regional problems. After a few hours
when Bhutto was sworn in as president and Chief Martial Law Administrator,368
he
addressed the nation on radio and television and removed ban on the National Awami
Party.369 Bhutto said that there was indeed a ―thin line‖ between autonomy and
secession.370
366. Ayesha Jalal, (1990). The State of Martial Rule: The Origin of Pakistan Political Economy of Defence.
Cambridge University Press, p. 313. 367. Sartaj Aziz, (2009). Between Dreams and Realities. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 47. 368. Anwar H. Syed, (1992).The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. London: The Macmillan
Press, p.117. 369. ―I will start with a clean state. I am assuming that we are all patriots and that we all want to serve
Pakistan. So I am withdrawing the ban on the National Awami Party and I am going to request
the leaders of NAP to meet me very soon. In this connection, I am also going to ask leaders of
other political parties to meet me.‖ Government of Pakistan (1974). White Paper on
Balochistan, Islamabad, p. 6. 370. Tahir Amin, (1993). Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors,
Islamabad:Institute of Policy Studies, 1988, Rept. p.123.
120
It is very much clear that Z. A. Bhutto came to power with the support of military but
once in power, he emphasized that he was a duly elected leader.371
Despite PPP‘s
majority, Bhutto needed the support of both civil and military bureaucracy. One was
needed for his ambitious reform agenda and the other was vital for the survival of his
government. Pakistan might have entered the era of mass participation but the structure of
the state had not as yet been brought into conformity with an emergent social reality.
According to Ayesha Jalal, ―Extending his control over the mandarins and Praetorian
Guard, jealously watching his impregnable hold over the unprivileged social groups and
also placating the dominant interests groups, petrified by his populistic rhetoric, without
toning down his party‘s promises, required more canning and tact than is possible in a
single life time.‖372
Bhutto wished to consolidate his position and he, therefore, persisted
with the martial law so that to deter his political opponents.373
Bhutto wished to extend his power and consolidate PPP‘s influence therefore during the
transition phase he concentrated on consolidating these objectives. He exercised
unlimited powers as the Chief Martial Law Administrator even when he did not belong to
the armed forces. Subsequently, on assuming the office of the President of Pakistan under
the interim constitution, his powers further enhanced. He did not permit the
democratically elected National Awami Party,-Jamiat Ulama-e-lslam coalition to form
provincial governments in the NWFP (KPK) and Balochistan till mid-April, 1972. Both
the parties were allowed to form provincial governments after persistent pressures by the
opposition political parties.374 Bhutto realized that although in a House of 144, he had the
support of 88 members, the opposition, comprising the remaining 56 members, could
create enough trouble for him. Bhutto also delayed convening the National Assembly,
371. Z. A. Bhutto, ( President of Pakistan). Speeches and Statements: 2O December 1971- 31 March 1972.
(Karachi: The Department of Films and Publications, 1972, p. 3. 372. Ayesha, Jalal, (1990). Op. cit., p.314. 373. Surendranath Kaushik, (1985). Pakistan Under Bhutto's Leadership. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing
House, p.77. 374. Ibid., p. 81.
121
with a view to defer issues which needed urgent attention as those of framing a
permanent constitution.375
Thus election results compelled PPP leadership to form coalition government at the
centre and in two of the four provinces of the remaining Pakistan. To form central and
provincial governments Bhutto made an understanding with different parliamentary
parties. Muslim League headed by Abdul Qayum Khan became PPP partner in the centre.
An understanding was reached with National Awami Party and JUI in forming provincial
governments in NWFP (KP) and Balochistan..376 It was hoped that these coalitions would
heal the polarization caused by the divisive nature of the elections but it did not as the
succeeding events proved later on. About 60% of the adult population gave their verdict
but unfortunately it led to a highly divided parliament. LackIing of legitimacy for popular
politics and the vulnerable law and order situation led Pakistan to muddle for five and
half years, vacillating between aspirations for a true democracy and an authoritarian
desire to ensure order and bring prosperity to the country.377
4.4. 1973 Constitution and Bhutto’s Maneuvering
Bhutto was not sincere in bringing democracy to the country he was actually maintaining
a facade of democracy and was trying to concentrate and acquire absolute power. The
popular resentment was seen everywhere against Bhutto‘s undemocratic attitude. The
country was moving fast towards a severe domestic crisis. The opposition political parties
stuck to adamant stand for the introduction of federal-parliamentary form of government
in line with Pakistan Peoples Party manifesto for the 1970 elections. Inter-party
differences arose which adversely affected PPP‘s discipline and harmony.378
375. Ibid., p.77. 376. Hasan Askari Rizvi. (2013). The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan‘s
Transition from Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy Under Rule of Law: 1970-2013,
p. 48. 377. Ibid. 378. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Politics in Pakistan. With Special Reference to Rise and Fall of Bhutto.
Reproduced by Sani Hussain Panhwar, p. 13.
122
Bhutto wanted extension in the period of martial law for securing and strengthening his
power and position. But he had to yield to strong clamor from the opposition parties and
also from some of his own party men for the lifting of martial law. The press and the
general public demanded the same. The deteriorating law and order situation brought the
law enforcing agencies, on the verge of collapse. The industrial unrest was at peak, police
strikes were observed in certain cities and frequent clashes erupted between the Pakistan
Peoples Party and the opponents. The aforesaid scenario pushed/compelled Bhutto to
focus on constitution making and parliament. At the end of National Assembly session on
its very first day, Bhutto announced that he would repeal martial law on April 21, 1972.
By this master stroke, Bhutto retained the power and popularity for which he was not
ready to end martial law earlier.379
He had got under his belt the support of more members in the parliament but was
cautious about the opposition members. Delaying tactics in convening of assembly
session were adopted by Bhutto. During the constitution making process, Bhutto threw to
the wind established constitutional norms and exercised unlimited authority as President.
He reneged on the promise made with the opposition in the Constitutional Accord of
1972. The opposition wanted him to shed some measures which were detrimental to the
growth and development of democracy. The Political Parties Act of 1962380
and the
provision of two third majority for a no confidence vote were some of those measures.
Out of the controversy between the opposition and the government, Bhutto got the better
of it in the end. He was successful in securing enough support for the approval of
379. Hussain Mahboob, (2013). Parliament in Pakistan 1971-77 and Chief Executive: An Analysis of
Institutional Autonomy. Journal of Political Studies, 20(1), 83-95. 380. Political parties were banned and not allowed to function in June 1962 when Ayub Khan regime
enforced the 1962 constitution. The national and provincial assemblies elections in April and
May 1962 were party less elections. It was felt necessary that once the National Assembly start
functioning Pakistan must have political parties. Therefore, political party‘s act was passed in
1962. The said act provided for working of the political parties and after the passing of the act
the political parties began to function in the country.
123
constitution of 1973.381 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and even the founding members of Pakistan
Peoples Party were never truly compatible; the former was all in all while the latter were
powerless without the leader. J. A. Rahim, Mubashar Hasan, Mehmud Ali Kasuri, Miraj
Khalid and Rana wanted a parliamentary constitution. They believed that it would elevate
their social objectives and would also act as a check on the freewheeling powers of PPP
leadership.382
Through this dramatic change in his attitude, Bhutto not only silenced his vociferous
opposition but also remained as powerful as ever. Securing unanimous vote of confidence
enhanced Bhutto respect and there was no but minimal opposition to the interim
constitution. During his term of office as Chief Martial Law Administrator and president
of the country, Bhutto seized as much authority as possible and played a vital role in the
formation of the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution was promulgated in the backdrop of
which opposition was coerced and skillfully persuaded to endorse it.383
To begin with, the National Assembly agreed over an interim constitution which
substituted martial law on 21 April 1972. Within a short period one year, a new
constitution was unanimously approved by the National Assembly which became
operational from 14 August 1973.
Members of the PPP and those who joined Bhutto camp were willing to follow him.
Bhutto‘s PPP had enough majority i.e., 110 in a house of 144 at that time (138 General
seats plus 6 for Women) to pass the constitution with ease.384
But he was not content with
only PPP‘s support and wished to get the support of all political parties. In early 1971,
during his controversy with East Pakistan leadership, he had argued that a constitution
should be the one acceptable to all the provinces and it should not be imposed by the
381. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 73. 382. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Pakistan in Twentieth Centaury: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford
University Press, p. 397. 383. Hussain Mahboob, (2013). Op. cit., 83-95. 384. Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya (Then Came the Martial Law). Lahore: Jung
Publishers, p. 34.
124
brute majority of one province. As PPP had lost elections of 1970 in the two provinces of
NWFP (now KPK) and Balochistan, and both the provinces were strong supporters of the
demand of provincial autonomy, a constitution rejected by these provinces would not be a
satisfactory one for Bhutto.385
For preparing the draft of 1973 Constitution, the National Assembly formed a committee
consisting of twenty five members from both the ruling and opposition parties. The
Federal Minister for Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Mahmood Ali Qasuri was the
chairman of the committee. Other members of the committee included Ghaus Bakhsh
Bizinjo, who served Balochistan in the capacity of governor from March 1972 to
February 1973, Council Muslim League‘s leader Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan
Daultana was a member of the committee. Mian Mahmmod Ali Qasuri as chairman of the
committee approved the Interim Constitution and the draft was presented to the National
Assembly. For approving the Constitution, it was must that there should be a president of
the country. So, that is why on April 14, the National Assembly had elected Bhutto
unanimously as president of the country. The Assembly then approved the Interim
Constitution on April 17, 1972. On the same day Mahmood Ali Qasuri declared that the
new constitution would be prepared unto October 1972, and if the Assembly failed to do
till 1973, the Interim Constitution would become the permanent constitution. Bhutto took
oath of the office of the president on April 12, 1972.386 After this the process of
constitution making got accelerated. There were differences not only between the ruling
and opposition on different points but Qasuri too had reservations and resigned. Abdul
Hafeez Pirzada replaced Kasuri and soon they reached an agreement on October 20,
1972.387
385. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 173. 386. Aslam Pervez Mamon. (n.d). Wafak-i-Pakistan aor Qumi Yakjehti, 1947 se 1971 Ka Seyasi Jaiza
(Federation of Pakistan and National Integration From 1947 to 1971: A political Analysis (PhD
Thesis). University of Sindh (Jamshoro), p. 213. 387. Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Op. cit., p. 32.
125
After the overthrow of Ayub Khan along with his Constitution of 1962, there was seen a
national consensus for establishing a parliamentary system, universal adult franchise and
direct elections. Almost all the politicians from West Pakistan were in favor of sufficient
autonomy for provinces. The issue of Islam had assumed an important place and was in
need of a debate at length. All the Islamic parties and those who held similar opinions
about Islam were pressing that Pakistan should become an Islamic state. Thus the three
important issues which the future parliament of Pakistan was to address while framing
the constitution included: Provincial Autonomy, the place of Islam and the promotion of
democracy.388 Earlier Bhutto had promised to restore democracy, but once came to power,
he felt it necessary for the government to have enough power to restrain and contain
opponent‘s pressure. Bhutto was a Muslim, but once in power, he was not willing to
allow the Ulema to play a role in state affairs. He would, if he could, allow the
individuals to practice Islam according to their own lights and as the spirit moved them.389
He was against the concentration of authority in the central government and advocated
provincial autonomy time and again, before coming to power. But when he assumed the
headship of central government, Bhutto indulged in increasing rather than diminishing his
authority.
The important opposition groups to the PPP regime in the National Assembly were the
two Muslim League factions (Muslim League Council and Muslim League
Conventional), the three Islamic parties and most importantly, the NAP. As for as
Muslim League was concerned, it had always favored a strong centre and was seemed
comfortable with limited concessions to Islamic sentiment. The Islamic parties advocated
an Islamic state but at the same time also wanted an energetic central government to
implement its goal. The secular NAP had always been advocating decentralization and
provincial autonomy. These differences of orientation and emphasis within opposition
388. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 172. 389. Ibid.
126
ranks provided PPP leadership an opportunity to get the Constitution approved that
accommodated most of Bhutto‘s preferences.390
In the beginning, the PPP‘s government
faced severe criticism during the process of drafting the constitution from the Provincial
Assemblies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP) and Balochistan. The leader of the National
Awami Party (NAP), Abdul Wali Khan warned the government not to deprive the
Pakhtuns and Balochs of their democratic rights; otherwise it would become difficult to
stop them from protesting and retaliation in the same manner.391 Also there were
differences between Peoples Party and the opposition over the Central-Provincial
relationship and power of the Prime Minister (Head of the Government). This debate
between the incumbent party and opposition political parties created bitter feelings and
retarded the process of framing a permanent constitution. During the haggling for the
constitution, the opposition parties threatened government of walk-outs and boycotts of
the National Assembly session, but it was Bhutto‘s cleverness that opposition parties
came to heal and all the controversies in the formation of the constitution ended.392
Also
the two most vocal opposition parties of NAP and JUI withdrew from some of their
demands in the larger interest of the country and also constitution and the religious
parties particularly Jamaat-i-Islami showed a spirit of accommodation.393
The promulgation of 1973 Constitution raised Bhutto‘s confidence as well as his stature
in the politics of the country. In the process of constitution making, the opposition was
committed to make the office of the prime minister answerable to the parliament. Also,
some of the PPP members showed their desire for an effective legislature where every
member could have a say in the affairs of the state. On the other hand, Bhutto wanted to
become a more powerful executive. The draft constitution provided executive (Prime
Minister) with almost dictatorial powers. Thus in spite of the strong opposition, Bhutto
390. Ibid., p. 173. 391. Dawn, April 20, 1972. 392. Hussain Mahboob, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 83-95. 393 Hamid Yusuf, (1999). Pakistan : A study of Political Developments 1947-97. Sang-e-Meel Publications,
P. 152.
127
managed to add more powers in the P.M office.394 Initially, Bhutto preferred presidential
system but ultimately he agreed to a modified parliamentary system where P.M would be
a strong person. Bhutto‘s acceptance to become prime minister of the country (despite his
inclination for presidential system) was because; under the 1973 Constitution, the prime
minister would be a powerful chief executive.395
It was unfortunate that Bhutto did not
respect the rules of the game. Almost all the executive powers were concentrated into the
prime minister office. This fulfilled the desire of Bhutto to become a powerful chief
executive so that he might be able to overrule all the institutions and those who dared to
oppose him.396
At the outset, both NAP and JUI boycotted the National Assembly session because of the
arbitrary sacking of the NAP-JUI coalition government in Balochistan and the resignation
of NAP-JUI government in the province of NWFP (KPP). But later on, the boycott was
ended and the assembly adopted the constitution without dissent.397
The opportunity was
never stronger to give the country a truly democratic constitution. The army was
humiliated by the defeat and the dismemberment of the country, so it was not in a
position to challenge/oppose the leadership of Pakistan Peoples Party. However, the
emergency provisions remained as part of the constitution. Bhutto was as much
charismatic politician in Pakistan as was Sheikh Mujib in Bangladesh and Indira Gandhi
in India. Centralization is certainly compatible with democratic form of government but
all the three operated in such an autocratic ways that hampered democracy in their
respective countries.398
394. Mahboob Hussain, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 83-95. 395. Under article 48 of the original 1973 constitution the president of the country was bound by the advice
of the prime minister, and it was mandatory that every order issued by the president must be
countersigned by the prime minister and unless the prime minister had signed it, no order or
decision of the president would have any legal sanction. What he wanted was absolute power
and the 1973 constitution does not obscure Bhutto's efforts in forming a totalitarian system,
something his predecessors considered but rejected as unsound. Lawrence Ziring, (1980).
Pakistan: Enigma of Political Development. Folkstone: Dawson, p.104. 396. Mahboob Hussain, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 83-95. 397. Hamid Yusuf, (1999). Op. cit., P. 151. 398. Katharine Adeney, (2007). Democracy and Federalism in Pakistan. Federalism in Asia, 101, p. 113.
128
The Constitution of 1973 came into force on August 14, 1973. Addressing the nation, Z.
A. Bhutto emphasized on harmony, cooperation, national unity and democratic practice.
However, he signed an order just after that in which the Balochistan Governor was
directed to take into custody the provincial opposition leaders.399
The Constitution of 1973 introduced federal parliamentary system and promised the basic
and fundamental rights. It also gave independence to the judiciary. It gave power to the
provinces (provincial autonomy) and created a framework for participatory governance.
It was hoped that the framing of the constitution would strengthen democratic
institutions, traditions and values.400 The framing of the Constitution which was in fact
the comeback of Pakistan to democratic rule created much hope that it would shortly beat
its problems and build a workable and democratic system. These were the assumptions.
Unfortunately, the Constitution failed to work in its true spirit.401
PPP‘s leadership soon
―began honoring the 1973 Constitution more in the breach than in the observance.‖402 It
was ignored by the leadership and the party that was chiefly responsible for piloting it in
the National Assembly. The constitution‘s democratic character was compromised by
introducing amendments particularly (fourth, fifth, and sixth) which constrained political
freedom and independence of judiciary. In addition, the government adopted a biased
attitude towards dissent and the opposition was attacked by the government and their
leaders were arrested for different nominal reasons. The press and media were also
restricted. In short, it stopped the growth of political institutions and democratic
traditions.403 Accordingly, the PPP government turned into a personalized
authoritarianism which resorted to undemocratic practices repeatedly.
399. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Op. cit., pp. 396.397. 400. Tanvir Ahmad Tahir, (2010). Political Dynamics of Sindh, 1947-1977. Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Karachi, p. 635. 401. Mushtaq Ahmad, (1959). Government and Politics in Pakistan. Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, p.
126. 402. Jalal 1999, 317. 403. Mushtaq Ahmad, (1959). p. 126.
129
4.5. The Constitution of 1973 and Provincial Autonomy
The Constitution of 1973 was a great achievement and the credit goes to Bhutto for
securing consensus of different political parties. Bhutto took on board all the political
parties of the country and was able to get an all agreed constitution in 1973. The said
constitution proved to be a permanent constitution in reality, not only during Bhutto‘s
rule but for all the time till today. Even dictators like Zia and Musharraf could not dare to
abolish it because it had the unanimous approval of all the parties.404
If truth be told, PPP‘s leadership and opposition leadership sharply differed on the issue
of provincial autonomy. NAP leader Abdul Wali Khan and other political figures from
opposition parties thought that devolution of power to the provinces was the only way to
safeguard the interests of different provinces. But Bhutto thought that only a strong
centralized government could protect national unity. In reality the Constitution of 1973
was the most centralized constitution.405
The division between the federation and the four provinces over legislative subjects was
settled by the 20th
October Accord. The table given below shows the extensive list of
subjects over which the Central government continued to enjoy exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction.
Comparative Table
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
List of 1935 1956 1962 1973
Subjects Act Constitution Constitution Constitution
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal 61 30 94 Part one-59
(One List only) Part two-8
404. Interview, with Abdul Akbar Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, senior PPP member and Ex Deputy
Speaker of KPK Assembly) on 18-11-2015. 405. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Working Relationship between Central and Provincial Governments in
Pakistan, (1971-77). International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3 No. 17, p.
196-204.
130
Provincial 55 94
Concurrent 19 47
Residuary With Provinces Provinces With Provinces
(with overriding
provision regarding
national interests)
________________________________________________________________________
Source: Rafi Raza, (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press,
p.181.
The representatives of the smaller provinces, particularly NAP, showed a surprising
degree of accommodation in agreeing to such wide-ranging federal legislative powers in
order to achieve consensus in October. Bhutto indicated to them that the concurrent list of
subjects could be reviewed in ten years time406
but that did not happen.
In addition to that, a further innovation was Part two of the Federal List.407
On the
Administrative side, Article 153 established a Council of Common Interests to formulate
and regulate policies for these matters. Composed of equal numbers from provinces and
the Centre, with the four Provincial Chief Ministers and four Federal Ministers including
the Prime Minister. The CCI was responsible only to parliament in joint setting.408
It was
to redress the provincial grievances. CCI was an important constitutional institution
aimed to iron out differences, issues and problems not only between different provinces
but also between provinces and centre.409
The basic demands for provincial autonomy were met subject to Articles 232 and 234
relating to Emergency, whereby the Federal Government could assume powers in the
406. Rafi Raza, (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press,
p.180. 407. Covering railways, oil and gas, the development of major industries and water and power which were
subjects of inter-provincial concern. 408. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p.181. 409. Amin Ahmad, Ministry of Production, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, PLD, 1996, Karachi, 27.
131
provinces.410 Such provisions are normal in a federation and can be salutary if used
properly. In Pakistan, they have throughout been weapons in the hands of federal
governments to be used against the provinces, particularly those provinces where
opposition parties govern.
Only one formal meeting of CCI was held, at the end of 1976. Instead the ministry for
Provincial Coordination, which was established to iron out routine differences between
the provinces, functioned as a mini-Council and the constitutional issues of concern to the
Council were left largely unattended. In fact, the Council had been given vast powers but
in reality power remained centralized in Bhutto and was not exercised through the
Council.411
In fact, the 1973 Constitution provided less room for provincial autonomy but as it was
the result of the consensus of all major political parties in the country thus, capable to
facilitate cooperative center-provincial relations. Unfortunately, it did not so happen,412 as
the provincial government of Balochistan under the leadership of Atta Ullah Mengal was
dismissed and NWFP (now KPK) provincial government under Mufti Mahmood was
forced to resign very soon after the promulgation of the 1973 constitution. This shows a
clear disrespect for mandatory and crucial constitutional obligations. Central government
on April 27, 1973 appointed Ghulam Qadir Baloch from Balochistan who belonged to
ML(Qayyaum) as Chief Minister. It was a constitutional requirement that before
becoming a chief minister he had to prove his majority in the Balochistan Assembly and
Ghulam Qadir claimed that he had the requisite majority. But on the very same day NAP
demonstrated in Quetta (Baluchistan) and presented to the audience its 11 out of the total
21 members of the Balochistan Assembly. Although Central Government‘s claim was
410. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p.181. 411. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 182. 412. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 196-204.
132
proved false but undeterred by the exposure of its false clamis, on April 29, 1973
Inayatullah Khan Gandapur was sworn in as the Chief Minister of NWFP (KPK).413
In fact, 1973 provided for a federal state but with more executive powers and centralized
government. This displeased the NAP which was strong advocate of provincial
autonomy. Provincial autonomy was the main issue raised by NAP during constitution
drafting process. Even once Abdul Wali Khan stated,‖When we wanted our rights in the
past we were dubbed as traitors, but now the situation has changed. Now we shall take
our rights and not beg for them. And if anyone tries to oust us from Pakistan then he
should remember that we are not Bengalis who separated.‖414 In fact, from the very early
days the relationship between PPP and NAP-JUI coalition was not cordial and PPP‘s
government faced politico-constitutional tension with the two coalition provincial
governments. The coalition partners were not happy with the governmental structure
provided by the 1973 constitution. Though all the political parties approved the
constitution but the differences between PPP and the two provincial governments of
Balochistan and NWFP (now KPK) were extreme. Also, Bhutto had fear that these
differences might threaten his plan that was to rule Pakistan for a long time. The central
government differences with the provincial governments can be settled by giving space
and by allowing more administrative and financial autonomy but the centralized intention
on the part of PPP‘s leadership ousted the duly mandated provincial leaders and was
committed to settle the issue by force and not in the parliament.415 The centre-provinces
relationship is discussed in detail in chapter five.
4.6. Why Opposition Accepted the 1973 Constitution
Obviously, the 1973 Constitution was a great and brilliant achievement of the PPP
government under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto leadership. After Bhutto‘s ousting from power by
413. Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, (1995). The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford
University Press, p. 248. 414. Dawn 20 April 1972. ―No Denying Rights to Phatoonistan, Baluchis,‘‘. 415. Lawrence Ziring, (1999). Pakistan: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.396.
133
General Zia, some of those who often opposed him, desired the restoration of 1973
constitution. They had a great respect for this sacred document and considered it a
national asset because it was a constitution that represented a broad national consensus.416
But opposition too played a commendable role on its part. Bhutto‘s maneuvering and
bargaining tactics did play a major role in making the opposition political parties to agree
and approve the constitution but opposition also showed responsibility by withdrawing
some of its demands. Even those who had a close look at developments during
constitution making process wondered that how the opposition which had severe
objections, agreed to such a document which was far short of their demands.417
It would
be fair to say that the opposition political parties particularly NAP, JUI and JI leadership
realized the importance of the constitution in that critical time. The NAP and JUI
members who were right to oppose Bhutto particularly after the then developments418
in
Balochistan and N.W.F.P showed high-mindedness. The JI which led the Islamic parties
too displayed a considerable accommodation in the national interest. It is true that the
entire country wanted a permanent constitution and both the ruling and opposition
parties, by demonstrating an attitude of accommodation for reaching a consensus, did not
disappoint the people.419
However, there were some other factors that forced the opposition leaders to yield to a
constitution which could not include most of their demands. The October 1972 Accord
and the 1973 Constitution did not fulfill much of the opposition demands, then why did
the opposition parties assented to the constitution. It was because the opposition was in a
state of disarray and there was a lack of trust on each other. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo was
suspicious about some of the rightist elements in Jamat-e-Islami and cautioned his NAP‘s
416. Syed Hasan Mahmood, (1988). Mera Siyasi Sfar (My Political Journey).Urdu (Lahore: Jung
Publishers), p. 283. 417. Particularly the demand for Provincial Autonomy was withdrawn by NAP and JUI. 418. The dismissal of NAP-JUI government in Balochistan, the change of NAP Governors in the two
provinces, and the resignation of the NAP-JUI Government in NWFP. 419. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 179.
134
colleagues that they would stab us in the back at some time. He was also of the view that
NAP had more in common with the ruling party than other opposition parties.420
Similarly, another Muslim League leader, Mir Mardan Khan Jamali from Balochistan
believed that the NAP was more evil than the PPP. Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, a
leader of JUI was a pro PPP and a critical of both the NAP and JI. Also, some of the
opposition leaders like Maulana Abdul Haq (JUI) and Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari had
separate negotiations with the ruling PPP before the approval of the constitution. Some of
the Jamiat-ai-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) leaders were against the opposition boycott of the
Assembly.421
But the most compelling was the opposition strength of only 36 votes as
against the government‘s 110 in the Assembly.422
In the elections of 1970s PPP initially
secured 81 seats. But unfair means were used by PPP leadership and members of other
political parties were compelled to change their loyalties. Thus, in a house of 146 PPP‘s
membership raised to 110.423
NAP and JUI coalition partners were on the driving seats in both NWFP (KPK) and
Balochistan when the Constitutional Accord of October 1972 was agreed upon. This was
the first experience for both NAP and JUI leaders to be in government and they did not
want to be out. Abdul Wali Khan, who never trusted Bhutto and was always a vocal critic
of PPP‘s leadership, was in London when the Accord was signed. Bizenjo, who deputized
for him, was of the view that it is better for NAP to remain in power to be able to expand
its support base.424 JUI first accepted the Constitutional Accord and also agreed to the
1973 Constitution which accommodated some of its demands while, reserving the right to
make other demands at some other opportune time. JUI did not stress on provincial
autonomy and was happy with the proposed Islamic provisions. NAP, the most vocal of
all opposition parties, was not willing to challenge Bhutto regime alone. Also, Bhutto had
420. Anwar H. Syed. (1992). Op. cit., p. 178. 421. Mukhtar Hasan, (1973). A Report published in Zindagi, March 11, 1973, pp. 5-7. 422. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 178. 423. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Op. cit., p. 34. 424. Anwar H. Syed. (1992). Op. cit., p. 179.
135
caused the impression that NAP-JUI government in both provinces NWFP (now KPK)
and Balochistan would be restored, so NAP leadership did not want to lose the
opportunity.425 Thus each of the main opposition parties and their leaders were ready to
have a settlement with the ruling party. The PPP leadership, on the other hand, was
content more with concessions to the Islamic parties, which he thought cost him little in
terms of his authority than concessions to the provincial autonomists.426
425. Mukhtar Hasan, (1973). Op. cit., pp. 5-7 426. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 179.
136
CHAPTER - 5
THE POST 1973 SCENARIO
1.1.Introduction
This chapter evaluates the performance of PPP government in the aftermath of 1973
Constitution i.e., 1973 to 1977 when the party was in power and had acquired a dominant
position. Reference in this connection may be made to the termination of two provincial
governments under the 2-party opposition alliance and the arbitrary handling of the
constitutional amendments. The purpose would be to determine whether the relationship
between the PPP and opposition parties was in line with the spirit of the constitution and
in accordance with the established principles of democracy.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto the chief executive of Pakistan, from 19th
December 1971 to 13th
August 1973 was president and after the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution from 14
August 1973 to 5th
July 1977 as prime minister.427
On National Day i.e. on 14 August
1973, Bhutto designation changed from President to prime minister and the same day he
addressed to the nation over radio and television.428
Bhutto was leading the first elected parliament of the country. Undoubtedly, he was a
strong personality and also his image as popular leader of the masses was superior. On
the political stage, Bhutto was a prevailing personality and violently attacked his
427. Mahboob Hussain, (2013). Parliament in Pakistan 1971-77 and Chief Executive: An Analysis of
Institutional Autonomy, Journal of Political Studies, voi.20, Issue-, pp. 83-95. 428. "Today, we bid good-bye," he said with cheerfulness and hopefulness, "finally and for all time, to the
palace revolutions and military coups which plagued Pakistan for nearly two decades." He
encouraged all voices to be "raised in defense of all view-points" but cautioned against
"pandemonium." Democracy could work only if there was "discipline." He warned against
"separatist tendencies," and advised the opposition to rest "content" and "wait until future
elections." He reminded his listeners that "we have pledged to Allah" to permit no "intrigues
subversive of government." He spoke at some length about Pakistan's external relations, and
sounded very much like Nixon discussing Watergate when he said, "Let me make it clear that,
when I talk of the Opposition, I am mindful of the fact that the Pakistan Peoples Party may itself
be in opposition some day. ... ―I am no Great Khan that I should entertain dreams of ruling
Pakistan in perpetuity." He had as he spoke already ordered Governor Bugti to arrest former
Governor Bizenjo, former Chief Minister Mengal, and Sardar Marri, but made no mention of
those "insurgents." Stanley Wolpert, (1993). Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times. New
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 236-237.
137
opponents, capitalists and the landlords who were in a vulnerable position. He was the
only dominant actor on the political scene of the country and there was no one who could
challenge his authority not even those who had been expressing their disappointment in
Bhutto. He was the supreme power both inside and outside the parliament. Others might
have desired but not determination and cleverness. Bhutto believed in the concentration
of power in his hands. According to Asghar Khan (an opposition leader), Bhutto was not
a democrat by temperament or conviction. As a political leader of the country, he acted
like an autocrat rather than a democratic political leader. He became authoritarian with
the every passing day. He used martial law powers to suppress his opponents. His critics
viewed Bhutto as a strong civilian political leader who had no respect for parliamentary
democracy. Before the promulgation of 1973 Constitution, there were neither
constitutional restrictions nor any interruptions from the institutions which came into
being under the provisions of the constitutions. Bhutto struggled hard to concentrate
powers in his own hands and ensure his continuity in office. The delayed lifting of
martial law was a tactic aimed to secure his desires. It was apparent from the very early
days of Bhutto rule that hopes of parliamentary government would not materialize.
Bhutto looked quite comfortable with his dictatorial powers and was in no hurry to get rid
of the same.429
Bhutto was not ready to accept his vocal opponents with calmness. He wanted to guide
and lead all of Pakistan and thought it his destiny. He thought about himself; as he was
born for and well educated to assume a leading role. He wished every Pakistani to adore
and support him in that task. It was an insult to his Izzat, his personal feudal "honor," to
be challenged, distrusted, and explicitly attacked either in provincial assemblies or at
press conferences.430 In no instance has the power of the government been used so
relentlessly as against retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan, a former commander-in- chief of
429. Mahboob Hussain, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 83-95. 430. Stanley Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., pp. 254-255.
138
the Pakistan Air Force who, during Bhutto rule, headed a moderate opposition party. His
house was set on fire, his lands confiscated, and his family and friends persecuted.431
The story of Bhutto, and for that matter, of any other ruler who makes tall but
unsustainable claims and the subsequent disappointment of those they rule is not a new
phenomenon in the realm of politics. The Bhutto that we saw post-elections when he
came to power was a far cry from the Bhutto whom we saw campaigning before
elections. Many of the promises that Bhutto had made, he could hardly deliver on few of
them. He became, unfortunately, so intoxicated by his new found power that all the
established conventions of a democratic rule were thrown out of the window. His
vengeance, intolerance and cynicism towards the opposition, in general, and the NAP, in
particular, was beyond forgiveness. The NAP ministries in Balochistan came under
particular wrath from the centre. The bureaucratic cadre was loaded with personnel from
Punjab.432
The job security and career promotion that those employees enjoyed was owed
to the goodwill of the PPP. The provincial government in Balochistan was obstructed in
its governance by the same civil service personnel. Unlike before when there was a
healthy balance between the bureaucracy and government, the Bhutto government tilted
that balance in his favor. The civil servants in Balochistan were repeatedly reminded of
their status as the hirelings of the federal government and instructed that they had better
be loyal to PPP if they held their career dearer.433
5.2. Tripartite (PPP, NAP and JUI) Accord of March 1972
NAP leader Abdul Wali Khan pressed the government by lifting of martial law. He
warned the government of launching a mass movement if martial law was not lifted and
431. Newsweek, July 16, 1973. Pakistan: Life with Bhutto, p. 13. 432. People's Front. London. Vol. 2 No. 6-7. 1975. p. 5. 433. Ibid.
139
democracy was not restored in the country.434
Bhutto knew that consensus of different
political parties was not possible in that point of time. He therefore, concentrated on an
interim constitution.435
Amidst political crisis, Bhutto needed to bring different political forces on board so as to
reach an understanding for making a constitution. In this regard, he first removed the ban
on National Awami Party (NAP) imposed by previous military regime. The opposition
political figure Abdul Wali Khan and other regionalists came to heal and behaved like
establishment groups.436 Once Maulana Mufti Mahmud said, ―The president realizing the
gravity of the situation has joined hands with other political parties to evolve a common
formula which has saved Pakistan.‖437 It was difficult for Bhutto to form provincial
governments in the two provinces of NWFP (KPK) and Balochistan, though not
impossible. He could seek support from other political parties and independents to prevent
NAP-JUI alliance from establishing a majority in the two provincial assemblies. He
wanted support from all political parties so as to create national unity before going to
Shimla Conference.438 He started negotiations with the main opposition parties such as
NAP and JUI and reached an agreement on March 6, 1972, known as PPP-NAP-JUI
Tripartite Accord.439 PPP negotiating team comprised of Hayat Muhammad Khan
Sherpao, Ghulam Mustafa jatoi, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Rafi
Raza. Bhutto and Rafi Raza were the most important players.440 Four representatives,
Abdul Wali Khan, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizanjo, Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil and Khair
434. Dawn, 7 February 1972. 435. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Working Relationship Between Central and Provincial Governments in
Pakistan(1971-77). International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3 No. 17, pp.
196-204. 436. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth
of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s. Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research, 12(7),
pp.1-9. 437. Hasan Mehdi, (1977). Pakistan ki Siasi Jamatian (Pakistan Political Parties). Lahore: Feroz Sons, p.
190. 438. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Macmillan, p. 181. 439. Government of Pakistan (1972), PPP-NAP-JUI Accord, March 6, 1972, Islamabad. 440. Mubashir Hasan, (2000). The Mirage of Power: An Inquiry into the Bhutto Years 1971-1977. Karachi:
Oxford University Press, p. 87.
140
Bakhsh Marri from NAP and Mufti Mahmood and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi
represesnted JUI.441 PPP‘s leaders had his own vision and target before him. In the
interim period between the lifting of martial law and the framing of a permanent
constitution, he wanted to retain as much power with him as he could. He was not happy
to share authority with a prime minister if he was the president or with a president if he
was to be a prime minister.442 So, he went for the said agreement with great skill. The
NAP presented the names of their nominees (Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Arbab Sikander
Khan Khalil) as governors of Balochistan and NWFP (now KPK) respectively and Bhutto
agreed to appoint. This tripartite agreement allowed NAP-JUI to form coalition
governments in these two provinces. Bhutto also agreed to call the Natinonal Assembly
session on April 14 and not to interfere in provincial affairs. In return, both NAP and JUI
were to support the continuance of martial law until August 14, 1972 and would also vote
in favor of a motion of confidence in President Bhutto.443 In another agreement, they also
agreed not to oppose the federal government‘s emergency powers.444 Thus the three parties
agreed to accept the rule of the PPP at the center and in the two provinces of Punjab and
Sindh, the NAP-JUI coalition rule in NWFP and Balochistan.445 Thus PPP leadership was
successful to sign an agreement with representatives of the main opposition parties on 6th March,
1972.446 It was also agreed upon that there would be presidential system at the centre
while a parliamentary form of government in all the four provinces. The agreement was,
of course, a great achievement and it was the result of the spirit of accommodation from
both sides.447 (For details of 6th
March Agreement see Annexure 4)
The said agreement was a marriage of political expediency rather than ideological affinity
between the three political parties. Bhutto, the shrewd, considered both NAP and JUI
441. Ibid. 442. Ibid. 443. Jang (international edition), March 29, 1972. 444. Jang, May 9, 1972. 445. Dawn, Karachi, 7 March 1972. 446. Dawn, 7 March1972. 447. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 196-204.
141
most suitable to be allied with because he had feared that other parties might pose a
greater threat to his rule. The NAP and JUI, on the other hand, took it as a chance to
wield power.448 PPP-NAP-JUI Tripartite Accord, no doubt, saved the country from
political quagmire for the time being but in the long run, it failed to put an end to the
confrontational politics.449
Unfortunately, the Agreement ran into trouble within days of its conclusion. Bhutto
wanted to do things without NAP and JUI because he feared the radical elements might
pose a threat to the interests of PPP. Also, a faction of PPP under the leadership of
Ahmad Raza Qasuri, which had parted ways with the parent party, had decided to rejoin
it as Qasuri held the view that the political troubles and other problems gripping the
country and India‘s threatening attitude on Pakistan‘s borders had made it imperative for
everyone to extend support to President Bhutto.‖450 Besides, Bhutto had also got the
assurance from some independent MNAs of their support, so the need of NAP and JUI
support in the National Assembly was not felt necessary.451 There was also an element of
distrust between the signatories of the said agreement. Bhutto government used martial
law and dismissed many of the provincial civil servants. They were also not allowed an
access to court. In March 1972, about 1300 federal and provincial civil servants were
removed under the cover of martial law on the alleged charges of corruption,
incompetence and bad management.452Since many of the dismissed officials belonged to
the provincial governments, Bhutto‘s move was termed as an invasion on provincial
autonomy. This action of PPP‘s leadership distressed the NAP leaders and created serious
misgivings about PPP government. They took it as an attack on provincial autonomy and
448. Muhammad Hassan Shaikh, (1987). Role of Political Parties in Pakistan 1969-1977 (PhD Thesis),
University of Sindh, Jamshoro, p. 364-365. 449. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 196-204. 450. Hasan Mehdi, (1977). Op. cit., p. 195. 451. Muhammad Hassan Shaikh, (1987). Op. cit., p.366. 452. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2003). Military, State and Society in Pakistan. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications,
p. 153.
142
threatened to withhold support for the continuation of martial law.453 Bhutto replied in the
same coin and refused to appoint NAP-JUI nominees as governors of Balochistan and
NWFP (now KPK) But after several rounds of talks Bhutto agreed and made a
declaration of lifting martial law on April 14, 1972 at the National Assembly session. In
return, Bhutto received the National Assembly approval for provisional constitution and
also a unanimous vote of confidence in his government.454 On April 21, 1972 martial law
came to an end and the Interim Constitution was promulgated. On the same day, Bhutto
was sworn as President under the Interim Constitution of 1972. As agreed upon in the
tripartite agreement, the nominees of NAP-JUI455 were appointed Governors on 28 April
1972.456 Consequently, the NAP-JUI governments were sworn in on May 1, 1972.457 Thus
coalition governments of NAP-JUI were formed in April 1972, lasted till February 1973.
Chief Ministership of NWFP (KP) Provincial Assembly was given to Maulana Mufti
Mahmood while Ataullah Khan Mengal became leader of the house in the Provincial
Assembly of Balochistan. It was the beginning of a new chapter in the relationship
between the center (PPP) and the two provinces (NAP-JUI). However, under the Interim
Constitution, Bhutto as President of Pakistan had the power that he could use to harass
the NAP-JUI coalition governments which would be a patent violation of his pre-election
pledges.458
5.3. Politics of Rivalry and Political Maneuvering in NWFP (KP)
In NWFP, Bhutto appointed NAP‘s Sikandar Khan Khalil as governor and allowed Mufti
Mahmood to become chief minister. Thus, Mufti Mahmood was the first among
maddrasa graduates in the Indo-Pak Sub- Continent who became chief minister. In both
453. Anwar H. Syed. (1992). Op. cit., p. 182. 454. Ibid. 455. Namely Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, in Balochistan and Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil, in NWFP
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). 456. Jang, April 29, 1972. 457. Jang, May 2, 1972. 458. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 196-204.
143
the provinces of Balochistan and NWFP (KPK) he gave the impression to be supporting
the provincial governments and struggling for the rights of the provinces. In fact, Bhutto
wanted to create a rift between JUI and NAP. Bhutto thought that Mufti Mahmood would
not be able to run the government smoothly with NAP a secular-nationalist platform.
PPP‘s leadership gave the impression that it had accommodated different opposition
parties but actually, he wanted to create a rift between NAP and JUI.459 But Mufti
Mahmood made some very important decisions which were accepted by NAP leadership.
For example, JUI leadership passed s resolution and adopted Urdu as provincial
language.460
NAP could demand for Pashto to be adopted as provincial language. It was
the consciousness of NAP leaders who willingly accommodated Urdu language and did
not protest. Certainly this was a positive message for all to focus on common and not
personal interests.
Bhutto wanted to get rid of annoying and defiant provincial government members. To
achieve this purpose, Bhutto encouraged rival political forces in NWFP (Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan. PPP made an alliance with Qyyum Khan‘s Muslim
League. It was agreed upon that the Muslim League(Qayyum) would support PPP in the
National Assembly and also in the provincial assembly of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
and, in return, Qayyum Khan was to be appointed as interior minister. In reality Bhutto
did not need the support of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan but the latter was, a foe of NAP
leaders, could be relied upon to harass and disrupt the NAP-JUI governments in the two
provinces.461 Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao was given the portfolio of Ministry of
Water and Power in the federal government, who also became the leader of the
opposition in the Provincial Assembly of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). As a federal
minister, if, Hayat Muhammad Khan, a rival political figure in NWFP, on the one hand,
could deny cooperation and delay the release of province funds then on the other hand, as
459. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 460.Ibid. 461. Askar Ali Shah, (1972). The Story Behind the Hurry. Outlook, April 22, 1972, p. 5.
144
leader of the opposition in the Provincial Assembly, he could denounce the opposition
government of NAP-JUI coalition for its failure or tardiness in solving the people‘s
problems and grievances.462
While the some socialist elements in PPP were finding an
opportunity to create troubles for both the provincial governments and extended every
possible support to Qayyum Khan to destabilize these governments.463 From the very
outset, Bhutto was not happy with the growing popularity of NAP. The victory of NAP in
1970 general elections in the two provinces added strength to the provincial autonomy
movement. Therefore, in order to counter and suppress the NAP, Bhutto cultivated rival
political forces to make his task easy. All these political maneuverings and tactics of PPP
leadership worked in a manner that turmoiled the center-province relationship.
5.4. Political Rivalry in the Province of Balochistan
Baluchistan got the status of a full-fledged province for the first time during Bhutto
regime. The province had its own governor and provincial government. Earlier, it was a
Commissioner‘s Province and was ruled by an agent of the central government (governor
general/president). Bhutto, as President of Pakistan showed a gesture of political
accommodation by allowing the NAP-JUI opposition to form governments in Balochistan
and NWFP. PPP government also yielded to the NAP insistence for the governorships of
the two provinces.464
Bhutto was ruling Pakistan with 81 members in the National Assembly. PPP had secured
majority in Punjab and Sindh. In Sindh, PPP‘s position was not that much strong but it
included many independents in its fold. After the 1970 elections there were very heated
discussions and negotiations between PPP and NAP-JUI. It was not easy for Bhutto to
form government in the other two provinces. He also had a fear that NAP, Mufti
Mahmood and some other independents might form anti opposition provincial
462. Askar ALI Shah, (1972). The Coalition Anixiety. Outlook, August 19, 1972, p. 5. See also:Hamid Khan,
(2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p. 260 463. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 182. 464. The Pakistan Times, December 1, 1974. Baluchistan: Retrospect and Prospect.
145
government and there would be direct confrontation. So, he wisely appointed Mir Ghos
Bakhsh Bizinjo (a nominee of NAP-JUI) as governor of Baluchistan and Attaullah
Mengal became chief minister on 1 May 1972. Mir Ghos Bakhsh Bizinjo was appointed
because Bhutto had the information about his tense relations with Attaullah Mengal and
some other Baloch leaders. Both of these Baloch leaders were against Bhutto and both
belonged to NAP but due to certain reasons like Baloch-Pashtun rift which had started
after Ayub Khan regime, their internal relationship was disturbed.465
Bhutto knew that
both Baloch leaders were not on the same page. So, he made use of this tense relation
between the two Baloch leaders. Yet again, the Bizinjo‘s entrance into NAP is something
very strange because he was a communist nationalist and had been struggling against the
Baloch sardars, then how he joined NAP, where sardars like Bugti and Mengal were its
members.466
Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sardar Khair Baksh Marri and Sardar Ataullah Mengal were
dominant political figures belonging to NAP. The NAP came into the government for the
first time in its history. The Centre-province relations grew sour from the very outset. The
province wanted a share in the provincial services and the relocation of the Punjabi civil
servants to their respective areas. The Baloch felt dispossessed and disempowered. The
coalition government headed by Attaullah Mengal sought to pursue the central
government to delegate provincial autonomy to Balochistan. Several measures were
taken in this regard but Bhutto accused him of confronting the federal government. But
NAP-JUI government countered these accusations by claiming that it had been working
for fostering democratic norms and values in Balochistan. Enacting land reforms,
allowing freedom to the media men, withdrawing section 144 in Quetta were cited as
examples. The federal government was bent on suppressing the traditional values and
465. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 466. Ibid.
146
culture of the Baloch and ordered the governor to do the same.467 The Balochistan
government was bound to its electorate for fulfilling promises made during the election
campaigns. As a first step, the Baloch government started cleaning the provincial
bureaucracy of the non Baloch officials. The provincial government further wanted to
take control of the police and law enforcement agencies in the province. But the PPP
government termed these steps as incompatible with the constitution. The provincial
government was further strengthened and encouraged to stand its ground against the
Centre because of the growing Baloch resentment and frustration over the domination of
the provincial bureaucracy by the non Baloch and the ruthless competition for limited
land resources. The provincial government was willing and suggested it to the Centre to
nationalize the land and distribute it among those who deserved it i.e. the tillers. The
Centre, despite its reputation as a socialist and poor friendly government, brushed aside
the said suggestion.468 The provincial government of Mengal was frustrated to such an
extent by the intransigence of Centre that he ordered a new force to be recruited by the
name of Dehi Muhafiz. The federal government took it as a bluff to its absolute authority
and set itself on the course of eliminating it altogether. Although the same force was
formed with the consent and approval of the Governor‘s conference, yet the Centre
labeled it as a private army of the NAP.469 Ironically, it was the same force that the PPP
itself maintained by changing its label to Balochistan Reserve Police (BRP).470
5.5. Jamotes-Mengals Dispute
The situation was, literally a tug of war between the Centre and the province with no win
in sight for either side, the federal government adopted extreme measures and willfully
467. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth
of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s, Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research, 12(7),
pp. 1-9. 468. The Herald. (1986), Karachi. July 1986, P. 59. 469. People's Front. London. Vol. 2 No. 6-7, 1975, p. 5. 470. Muhammad Breseeg, (2004). Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development, Karachi: Royal Book
Company, p. 325.
147
created law and order situation in Pat Feeder and Las Bela districts471 to destabilize the
provincial government. The PPP‘s government at the centre alleged the Balochistan
government for arresting some of the Jamote tribe leaders in Lasbela who were anti-NAP
and pro-PPP.472
The Dehi Muhafiz and other supporters of the NAP came forward to
meet miscreants, sent and supported by the federal government.473 The centre was
alarmed by the combined prowess of the Dehi Muhafiz and supporters of the NAP.
Armed forces were sent to face the challenge which was created by the centre itself. The
provincial government reported it to the federal government but the centre denied any
such involvement.474 Instead, the central government tried to convince the Balochistan
government for stopping action against the Jamote tribe but in vain. The central
government sent army contingents to Lasbela to halt the lashkar‘s activities.475 When the
central government sent troops to Lasbela, Mengal instructed the civil armed forces not to
take orders from the army.476
The armed forces from the centre made their way to the
hotspot stealthily. News of the armed forces in the provincial government infiltrating into
and fighting its own people spread like wildfire. Yet, the federal government denied it
and provided the false news to the media men that the operation was conducted on the
request and on behalf of the provincial government to restore law and order situation over
there. The Mengal government was alleged to have tried causing the civil war in the
province.477 The centre came out triumphant in this tug of war at the end. The provincial
government was dissolved and most of the provincial assembly members were arrested on
trumped up charges of one kind or another.478 The NAP-JUI government headed by
471. Janmahmad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 301-302. 472. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Op. cit., pp. 1-9. 473. People's Front. London, Vol. 2 No. 6-7, 1975, p. 3. 474. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 475. Hamid Khan. (2005). Constitutionaland Political History of Pakistan. USA: Oxford University Press,
p. 260. 476. The Pakistan Times, December 1, 1974. 477. S. Mahmud Ali, (1993). The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia. London, pp.
145-146. 478. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Op. cit., pp. 1-9.
148
Attaullah Mengal opposed the central government‘s interference and alleged that Bhutto‘s
regime had caused the Jamotes unrest for political cause to send away the provincial
government.479
5.6. London Conspiracy and Bhutto Maneuvering
Z. A. Bhutto, in fact was not comfortable with the opposition coalition governments in
the two provinces. His regime, therefore, unleashed a serious campaign against the NAP-
JUI coalition government. After having come back from Shimla where he successfully
concluded the issue of prisoner of war, Bhutto approved a publicity campaign about the
‗London Plan‘.480
This campaign was started against Bhutto opponents.481
The NAP
leaders denied the existence of such a plan in the strongest terms. Abdul Wali Khan called
London Plan a false and baseless and an attempt of the federal government to malign and
degrade the NAP provincial government.482
The provincial Governor Mir Ghous Bakhsh
Bizenjo described London Plan as a ‗figment of imagination‘.483
Nawab Akbar Bugti
supported the NAP against Bhutto‘s PPP in the elections of 1970. But differences
developed between Bugti and NAP leaders. Nawab Akbar Bugti expected NAP support
for his women candidate for Senate which NAP refused to extend. Thus differences
developed and Bugti agreed with the government allegation of London Plan against NAP
leaders. He also claimed that he too, was a party to the secessionist conspiracy and later
abandoned it.484
Bugti‘s acknowledgement of the Plan provided a support to the Central
government in overthrowing the NAP-JUI coalition government in Balochistan. It is
believed that he portfolio of Governorship of Balochistan was awarded to Nawab Akbar
479. The Pakistan Times, December, 1974. 480. Rafi Raza. (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. New York: Oxford University Press, p.
267. 481. This alleged conspirational ‗London Plan‘ was given wide publicity for degrading the opposition
government. The pro-Bhutto‘s regime media accused the Balochistan Chief Minister, Attaullah
Mengal and NAP leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan for conspiracy against the integrity of Pakistan
during their stay in London. The Pakistan Times, September 10, 1972. 482. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Op. cit., pp. 1-9. 483. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Pakistan Under Bhutto‘s Leadership. New Dehli: Uppal Publishing
House, p. 169. 484. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 186.
149
Bugti.485
In fact, Nawab Akbar Bugti and NAP leaders had become opponents for tribal
reasons and the vigilant Bhutto took advantage of their rivalry.486
Once, Bhutto himself
admitted it.487
As if Bhutto had prayed for it, a cache of arms was found in Iraqi Embassy at Islamabad.
The ISI which had knowledge of the arrival in existence of such arms in the said embassy
had duly informed Bhutto about it. Although the likely destination of those weapons, was
Iran, where Iraq was eager to ignite insurgency. Bhutto hypothesized that the same
weapons were being imported into Pakistan for the NAP leaders. The Baloch NAP
leaders were accused without an iota of evidence of plotting to provide insurgents in
Baluchistan with those weapons.488 The state owned media, following dictates from the
central government, went on rampaging the reputation of local leadership in Baluchistan.
The governors of NWFP and Baluchistan were scraped on Feb 17, 1973.489 Presidential
rule of thirty days was imposed in Baluchistan. The governments of NWFP (KPK)
resigned in protest. The Balochi leaders were severely criticized and sent behind the bars.
About 100,000 soldiers were used to fight and muzzle the Balochis.490 Akbar Khan Bugti
who was earlier a member of NAP was appointed governor of Baluchistan and
Muhammad Aslam Khattak was appointed governor of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).
As PPP had the majority in Punjab and Sindh Assemblies, it was entitled to form
provincial governments there, similarly, in Balochistan and NWFP (Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa), NAP-JUI coalition had the same right but Bhutto dismissed Balochistan
government. This shows the controversial face of PPP‘s leadership due to which Bhutto
cannot be termed as a true democrat. Democracy was not as democracy during Bhutto
485. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Op. cit., pp. 1-9. 486. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 261. 487. He stated that he knew Bugti and the NAP leaders had been ―birds of the same feather,‖ that they had
become opponents for tribal reasons and that he had taken advantage of their recent rivalry. Pakistan Times, December 17, 1974.
488. Sherbaz Khan Mazari , (1999). A Journey to Disillusionment. New York: Oxford University Press, p.
292. 489. Ibid. 490. Shahid Javed Burki, Op. cit., pp. 71–72.
150
rule but rather democracy as hypocrisy remained dominant.491
This action of the PPP
leadership revealed his true picture of militarism and his willingness to settle political
issues not by peaceful negotiation and debates in the assembly but by military means.
This operation shows Bhutto‘s mental attitude and his character.492
Mubashir Hasan who was the founding member of PPP says that the Centre- Province
confrontation in Baluchistan ―was partly due to the Baloch leaders inexperience of formal
government, though they were natural administrators. More important, however, was
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto‘s failure to accept Sardars dominated government of NAP with their
traditions, who rejected his assumption of superior wisdom and leadership.‖493
Within a short period of only two months, when presidential rule was introduced in
N.W.F.P (KPK), Bhuttto maneuvering made it possible to form a coalition government
led by Inayatullah Khan Gandpur. The new coalition government had the support of
twenty two members out of forty two members of the assembly. The coalition
government consisted of PPP, United Front of Aslam Khattak and Qayyum Muslim
League, where PPP had only four members.494 Actually the government was formed on
15 April 1973 i.e. within days, once the permanent constitution was signed. The NAP and
JUI had agreed to 6 March Agreement, to the Constitutional Accord of 20 October and
lastly to the constitution in the hope that the PPP leadership would reinstate NAP-JUI
government. But they got disappointed and considered it a poor return for their
cooperation.495 The opposition, particularly the NAP stepped up its activities against the
federal government and also against the provincial government of NWFP (KP). Abdul
491. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 492. Shahid Javed Burki. Op. cit., pp. 71–72. 493. Mubashir Hasan, (2000). The Mirage of Power: An Inquiry Into the Bhutto Years 1971-1977. Karachi:
Oxford University Press, p. 169. 494. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 275. 495. Ibid.
151
Wali Khan, stated in a public meeting near Charsadda that ―the time of appeals had
passed and they would now ‗meet force with force‘ to realize their rights.‖496
On the one hand, if Bhutto was not happy with NAP-JUI coalition provincial
governments and was bent upon to create problems and consequently ousted these
governments, on the other, the opposition leaders particularly Baloch leaders too adopted
rigid attitude. The dismissal of NAP-JUI coalition government in Balochistan, was an
overreaction. Some disgruntled Baloch politicians could not understand the vulnerability
of the situation. After establishing provincial government, they thought that they could do
whatever, which is done after a revolution. At that point of time, there was need of
dialogue and negotiations but the NAP leadership particularly the youngsters showed no
sign of patience. They did not realize the seriousness of the situation and did not play a
responsible role. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, was the only opposition leader who adopted a
reasonable attitude and was not in favor of a direct clash and conflict with the centre. He
believed in democracy and considered differences of opinion as inevitable part of any
democratic system. He wanted solution of all the problems within the democratic norms.
On the one hand, if some elements among the opposition did want a direct clash with the
centre, on the other hand, the presence of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan as a interior
minister and in Balochistan Akbar Khan Bugti who wanted to oust NAP from power,
made the task easy for Bhutto to scrape the provincial government. Neither Bhutto nor
the opposition from Balochistan showed any respect for the rules of the game, which
resulted in the derailing of the democratic process in its very early years.497
It is a common practice in Pakistan that elites occupying the federal government always
desired and insisted that provincial governments be subservient to their will and dictation,
and Zulfiqar Ali Bbhutto was not an exception. Even without Iraqi arms incident which
was never directly linked to NAP in Balochistan or NWFP, Bhutto had planned to
496. Dawn, Karachi, 16 July 1974. 497. Interview with Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) on 31-07-
2015.
152
anyhow dismiss the Balochistan government.498 If the NAP-JUI governments in the two
provinces had agreed to accept Bhutto‘s junior partner role and comply without protest,
he would have not forced them out of power. He kept contacting NAP-JUI leadership
even after their ousting of power. He actually wanted to see if they would bend after
being rebuked. Most likely Bhutto could have reinstated the NAP-JUI government, had
their leaders agreed to join his cabinet at the centre and formed coalition governments
with PPP in the two provinces of NWFP and Balochistan. But joining the central cabinet
would have meant a role of Bhutto‘s junior partner which NAP leadership was not ready
to accept. Because, firstly, they did not need the support of PPP to form governments in
the said two provinces and secondly, they had no trust on PPP‘s leadership and worried
that PPP ministers would disrupt more than strengthen their governments. Actually, the
political conflict between PPP‘s central government and the two (NAP-JUI coalition)
provincial governments was not a contest between the state of Pakistan and the
secessionist forces but more like a clash of rival political wills and interests, initiated by
Bhutto‘s repression of the Baloch politicians.499
5.7. Death of Hayat Muhammad Khan and Ban on NAP
A bomb blast on 8th
February 1975 in a public meeting at the University of Peshawar
took the life of Hayat Mohammed Khan Sherpao. PPP leadership raised finger at NAP
leadership and held them responsible for the great tragedy. There are several views as to
who arranged Sherpao assassination.500
498. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 269. 499. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., pp. 189-190. 500. One view that cannot easily be dismissed was that it had been carried out on the direct instructions of
Sherpao‘s own leader Bhutto himself. It is a known fact that before his death Sherpao had become
very disappointed with the leader he had once hero-worshipped. Bhutto had perceived Sherpao‘s
growing popularity and had come to rail against it and had begun politically marginalizing him at
every available opportunity. Even one of their close PPP colleagues commented: ―A few months
before his death, Sherpao seriously considered leaving the party altogether. He only changed his
mind on the persuasion of Rafi Raza and a few other friends from the NWFP. Among all the
colleagues of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Hayat Khan Sherpao‘s personal devotion had been at the peak,
and his later disappointment was, accordingly, the most intense. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 300.
153
Having alienated Sherpao, Bhutto had most likely little use left for him. When a
campaign of bomb blasts began in the NWFP (KPK) Bhutto even sent Rafi Raza to
Peshawar to accuse senior ministers of masterminding the bombings. It is ironical that the
very next day Sherpao met his end in a bomb explosion.501
Bhutto came back from a
foreign tour. NAP was alleged for ―operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty
or integrity of Pakistan," and NAP was banned.502 Bhutto also called an emergency
session of the National Assembly and in an affecting speech, said the country was
passing through another serious crisis. He condemned the "politics of violence," and
stated that he was duty bound to liquidate "all anti-national elements and anti-national
forces." Pakistan had to be saved from "the scourge of secession."503
In addition to that,
the Political Parties Act of 1962 was amended to authorize the government to declare any
foreign aided political party as an unlawful organization. The ban was referred to the
Supreme Court which endorsed the action of the government. Beside the ban, a well
thought-out propaganda movement was started against the NAP and its leadership, and
the official media was also used for to serve the purpose. Top NAP leaders including
Abdul Wali Khan with fifty two others were charged with high treason and arrested.
They were tried by a tribunal specifically constituted for this purpose known as
Hyderabad Tribunal504
also known as ―Hyderabad Conspiracy Case‖505
Finally, the son
501. Ibid., p. 275. 502. Richard S. Wheeler, (1976). Pakistan in 1975: The Hydra of Opposition. Asian Survey, 16(2), pp. 111-
118. 503. Dawn, February 11, 1975. 504. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Pakistan Political Roots and Development (1947-1999). Karachi; Oxford
University Press, p.150. 505. The Hyderabad tribunal (1975–1979), also known as Hyderabad conspiracy case, is the name of a
former judicial tribunal used in Pakistan to prosecute opposition politicians of the National
Awami Party on the charges of treason and acting against the ideology of Pakistan.The tribunal
was set up on the orders of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.The National Awami
Party, which the government banned on 10 February 1975. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, on
30 October 1975, held that the party was working for an independent Pakhtunistan and
greater Balochistan at the cost of Pakistan‘s territorial integrity. It was ultimately wound up
after General Zia-ul Haq overthrew Bhutto in 1977. A total of 52 people were arrested. Those
arrested from the National Awami Party leadership included Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Khan
Amirzadah Khan, Syed Muhammad Kaswar Gardezi, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Nawab Khair
Bakhsh Marri, Mir Gul Khan Nasir, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Habib Jalib, Barrister Azizullah
154
of Abdul Wali Khan Asfandyar Wali and two other students were found guilty of Hayat
Khan‘s murder and they were imprisoned for 10 years.506
An ordinance was passed in the
assembly which allowed for detaining of Members of National Assembly (MNAs) even if
the assembly was in session. Earlier, it was not allowed to arrest MNA‘s for the period of
a session, nor for the duration of a ten day period prior to and following a session. A few
days later, the NWFP governor Aslam Khattak and the Gandapur government were also
dismissed and the federal government imposed its direct rule in the province.507 Bhutto
took advantage of the Hayat Khan‘s murder by exploiting it for attacking his political
opposition. The Supreme Court also upheld the decision of the special tribunal
On June 19, 1975 Abdul Wali Khan appeared before the Supreme Court to speak but he
was forbidden except through his counsel. He insisted to appear in person but objected to
the presence of Justices Muhammad Gul and Muhammad Afzal Cheema because these
judges had served as federal law secretaries at different points in time and there was
suspicion that they had dealt with the file of NAP and its leaders in such capacity which,
of course, they did being part of the executive at that time.508
Due to Abdul Wali Khan
refusal to take part in court proceedings, the court gave its decision509
based on the ex-
parte submissions of the government.510
Shaikh, Aslam Baluch (Shaysani), Aslam Kurd, Saleem Kurd, Sher Mohammad Marri (General
Sherof), Najam Sethi, Saleem Pervez, Majid Gichki, Mir Abdul Wahid Kurd (read article) and
Karnel Sultan Mengal. In addition, several members of the Muslim League and even prominent
critics of Bhutto within his own Pakistan Peoples Party were also arrested. 506. Richard S. Wheeler, (1976). Op. cit., pp. 111-118. 507. Sherbaz Khan Mazari . (1999). Op. cit., p. 372. 508. Hamid Khan. (2005).Op. cit., p. 295. 509. ―We find on the material produced before us no difficulty in holding that the NAP and its leaders are
not reconciled to Pakistan's existence, integrity and sovereignty, that they have consistently been
attempting to create doubts about (sic) people's belief in the ideology of Pakistan with a view to
destroying the very concept which formed the basis of the creation of this country that they have
always been preaching the doctrine of four nationalities/nations to prepare the ground for the
ultimate secession of NWFP and Balochistan on the pretext of demanding the right of self-
determination for different nationalities/nations inhabiting these provinces and advocating a policy
of subversion of the Constitution, rule of law and democratic institutions in the country.‖ 510. Richard S. Wheeler, (1976). Op. cit., pp. 111-118. See also: Dawn Overseas Weekly, November 9,
1975.
155
The court thus declared that by organizing insurgency in Balochistan and using threats
against federal government and also against masses, NAP has made itself liable to
government strict action.
It was expected that the PPP government, under the leadership of Quaid-e-Awam would
focus on Balochistan and would work in collaboration with the provincial government for
the betterment of the province and alleviate the poverty and would promote democratic
norms. But as expected, the central government created troubles for the Balochistan
government with the intention to remove the duly mandated NAP-JUI coalition provincial
government and establish PPP government511 although it had not won any seat in the
general elections of 1970.512
Bhutto was an opportunist democrat. Whenever he needed the support of opposition or to
protect his slogan i.e. democracy is our polity, he took the path of dialogue and preferred
consensus which is the part of democracy. So, if his personal interests or that of PPP
demanded he was a democrat. And once his interests were served, he cared but little for
the rules of game.
5.8. State of PPP’s Intra-party Relationship
The desire for absolute authority entails the elimination of each and every thing/every
one which might come in one‘s way. There was a stark dichotomy between what Bhutto
actually was doing and what he had idealized. Not only was Bhutto recklessly impatient
and intolerant towards the opposition but he also was maintaining a tight hold on his own
party men. No digression from Bhutto‘s hidebound and self styled standard of loyalty
was countenanced. According to one of his ministers, Bhutto believed that it was he
himself from whom authority and loyalty flowed513 and should anyone of his party
511. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Phir Marshal La A Gaya (Then Martial Law Came) Lahore: Jang
Publisher‘s Press, p. 57. 512. Ian Talbot, (1999). Pakistan: A Modern History. Lahore: Vanguard Books, p. 200. 513. Rafi Raza, (1997).Op. cit., p. 301.
156
member threaten Bhutto‘s inherent sense of insecurity by brandishing the slightest of
independence in thinking, he would be mercilessly punished.
In fact, Bhutto was suspicious, of not only his political opposition but those who had
supported him in attaining the highest position of authority. Once he assumed the office
of power and having enjoyed it for a few years, Bhutto thought that he no longer needs
their advice. The stalwarts of PPP like J. A. Rahim, Mubashir Hasan, Mairaj Mohammad
Khan, Mukhtar Rana, Ahmad Raza Kasuri, all were men of integrity and learning. All of
these Bhutto‘s colleagues catered to basic needs of masses and gave importance to the
social improvement of all. None of these refuted men wished personal power. They
jointly decided Bhutto as their leader because he was not only well known/famous leader
but had also sound education plus good oratory skills. They all thought that there will be
collective decision making process under Bhutto‘s leadership, but these proved to be
wrong.514
The dismissal of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto as chief minister of Sindh and his replacement by
his rival Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi515 exemplified the point. Another example was one of
Bhutto‘s disciples Ghulam Mustafa Khar who asserted himself in the province of Punjab
was met with the same fate of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto.516
When Mahmud Ali Kasuri, vice
chairman of PPP quit government as Minister of Law in protest against its disregard for
civil liberties, he promptly found himself and his two sons implicated in a murder charge.
When the charge failed to stick, the government launched a tax audit against all members
of the Kasuri family.517
Bhutto was fearful about his own security and invincibility that
he was unsparing towards none. He would not spare even some of his diehard loyalists
514. Lawrence Ziring, (2004). Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History. Lahore: Vanguards, p. 146. 515. Sherbaz Khan Mazari, (1999). Op. cit., p. 335. 516. Ibid. 517. Newsweek, July 16, 1973. Pakistan: Life with Bhutto, p. 13.
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who had done him invaluable services. J. A. Rahim and Mubashar Hassan illustrated this
particular point.518
In the first three years of PPP government, its leadership provided an opportunity to the
politicians of all shades to join PPP, while honest and committed workers got annoyed and
there was internal disturbance in the PPP.519 By October 1974, for all practical purposes,
the stronger and committed colleagues from Bhutto‘s old team520 were out. Mumtaz Ali
Bhutto had been sidelined to a non political portfolio, Hayat Khan Sherpao was
assassinated in February 1975, and Rafi Raza was no longer holding the position of
Special Assistant to the prime minister. Hanif Ramay had been removed from the Punjab.
These people had been replaced by new faces.521 Under Bhutto‘s deft guidance, the power
of the new team increased and by the end of 1974, tables had been completely turned on
the old team or what remained of it. Still, later, when Ghulam Mustafa Khar enquired
from Bhutto as to why he had opted for the team comprising of civil and military
bureaucrats, his reply was frank and straightforward. Bhutto said that ―to come into power
one needed a special team, but to retain power one needed another kind of team.‖522
5.9. Bhutto’s Team A & Team B
Khurshid Hasan Mir, Mukhtar Rana, J.A. Rahim, Khurshid Ali Qasuri, Mahmood Ali
Qasuri, Rasul Bakhsh Khan Talpur and Miraj Muhammad Khan were the members of
team A of Bhutto. These people played a key role in establishing Bhutto‘s relations with
the masses and they used to bring out the people on roads when such a need arose. But
Bhutto expelled them all. Some were ousted from the party without any explanation,
charge sheet and others were arrested. That was the reason when Bhutto was hanged, no
518. Sherbaz Khan Mazari, (1999). Op. cit., p. 335. 519. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Op. cit., p. 59. 520. J. A. Rahim, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Khurshedd Hasan Meer and Mubashir Hasan 521. Aziz Ahmad, Vaqar Ahmad, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Ghulam Jilani Khan, Saeed Ahmad, Masud Mahmud,
Yahya Bakhtiar, and Kausar Niazi. 522. Mubashir Hasan, (2000). Op. cit., p. 277.
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one protested in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Faislabad and Karachi.523
Tamman,
Tawana, Dawlatana, Buchcha, Sadiq Hussain Qureshi and Jam Sadiq Ali were members
of team B of Bhutto. Some notorious police personnel like Masood Mahmood were also
included in team B. Why did Bhutto include these guys at the cost of his colleagues who
had made many sacrificies? These were the enemies of the party but Bhutto allowed
them.524 Many of those initially opposed PPP and its leadership were facilitated and
rewarded. Sadiq Hussain Qureshi ( Father of Shah Mehmood Qureshi) who was opposed
to PPP was awarded governorship. The Khan of Kalat and the Nawab of Bahawalpur
were also rewarded with governorships.525
PPP had very good slogans like Islam is our religion, Democracy is our polity Socialism
is our economy, All power to the people526
but Maulana Kausar Niazi was a man
supported by military establishment when entered into PPP, destroyed the ideological
foundation of PPP. He never did or uttered something against PPP, but made PPP‘s
program controversial. On the one hand, he told that by socialism we mean to bring
―Masawat e Muhammadi‖ but on the other hand, he told that we considered different
sects of Muslims such as Shia, Sunni and Wahabi as one and equal. Thus, Kausar Niazi
destroyed this by his controversial views.527
5.10. Constitutional Amendments and their Impacts on Ruling-Opposition
Relationship
The political mindset in the post 1973 Constitution illustrates the disloyalty by Bhutto of
the trust that not only common people but the political opponents also had reposed in him
during the thorniest period of his government by supporting him and ensuring its full
collaboration in framing of the constitution. The opposition was not happy and, initially,
523. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Founder member of PPP)
on 30-07-2015. 524. Ibid. 525. Ibid. 526. Ibid. 527. Ibid.
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it disagreed with some of the provisions of the constitution bill, such as the process for a
vote of censure against the prime minister; but looking at Pakistan‘s critical situation at
that time, it did not push the objections. The country lay traumatized and the downhearted
nation had not yet come out from the painful occurrence of disintegration. Almost a one
lac Pakistani armed forces and civilians were still in prisoners camps in India. Serious
negotiation had to be made with India and Bangladesh, two immediate neighbors.
National harmony and integrity was very important. So, the opposition leaders extended
its cooperation to PPP‘s leadership plea and combine its efforts with him in providing to
the country a permanent and viable constitution. How the government had repaid them
for their positive and productive mindset was well known.528
Most of the amendments incorporated into the constitution during this period were
unilateral. The opposition was mostly ignored. Opposition had no role in these
amendments but to oppose. Though, the amendments were passed from the National
Assembly but unilaterally. This act disappointed not only opposition but also the
common man. Democracy has its rules of the game. There are rules for elections,
agitation, dealing with opposition, respect for traditions and most importantly for law
and amendments to constitution but PPP‘s leadership violated these norms and values of
democracy time and again. 529
Any constitution does not mean a final and everlasting thing but amendments are made in
extreme emergency cases and normally a cumbersome procedure is adopted and not an
ordinary process. Amendments in a constitution are made everywhere but in most of the
world constitutions are amended with a slow pace. Constitutions are not treated as
ordinary laws. In Pakistan, the first two Constitutions of 1956 and that of 1962 were
abrogated arbitrarily. The 3rd
Constitution of 1973 was drafted as a result of consensus of
528. Viewpoint, February 4, 1977. NDP has its own Identity. 529. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Ex. Chairman and senior member
of JI) on 29-07-2015.
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almost all political parties but with a lot of amendments. The PPP government under the
leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto amended the constitution seven times between May
1974 and May 1977. Although some of the amendments were need of the time and were
appreciated but most of these amendments undermined the rights of individuals and the
judiciary.
Out of the said amendments to the 1973 Constitution, only the second amendment which
declared Qadianis non-muslims was supported if not encouraged by the opposition.530
Prime Minister Bhutto thought that the way he was ruling would not be acceptable to
judiciary that is why he aggressively curtailed the judiciary powers through
amendment.531
First, Bhutto used to solve many issues through ordinances. Although there was not a
strong opposition, yet he was not ready to tolerate it and often tried to bypass National
Assembly through ordinances. This was something undemocratic on the part of a leader
whose party was committed to promote democracy. Within two to three days of the
approval of 1973 constitution, Bhutto amended it unilaterally which opposition strongly
protested. These amendments are not on the record i.e. the right to access to courts and
right of expression which constitution guaranteed were scraped through an ordinance
within 48 to 72 hours of its approval.532 Some of the amendments made by Bhutto were
dismissed/ declared null and void by Bhutto himself due to opposition pressure.533
The ruling party had stultified the constitution that it had itself made and enforced with
the cooperation of the opposition parties in the parliament. In the face of their concerted
resistance, the government had subjected the constitution to a series of amendments
530. Raza, Rafi,(1997). Op. cit., p. 185. 531. Interview with Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) on 31-07-
2015. 532. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and senior member of JI) on 16-7-2015. 533. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Founder member of PPP)
on 30-7-2015.
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clearly repugnant to its spirit.534 In fact, the amendments were meant for ensuring
Bhutto‘s continuity in office and enhancing the power of executive branch of the
government. To bring in an amendment in the Constitution 2/3rd majority of the National
Assembly was needed to and with the unconditional support of party members it was
easy to for PPP‘s Chairman to ensure the passage of amendments. Interestingly, out of a
total of first six constitutional amendments carried out up to 1976, four extended the
range of executive powers. In addition, the third, fourth, fifth and sixth amendments
further strengthened the grip of ruling PPP.535 (For the details of first seven amendments
see annexure 5)
5.10.1. First Amendment
Consequent to the recognition of Bangladesh in 1974, the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act 1974 was passed on 8 May 1974. Through the Act Clause (2) from
Article 1 was removed. The Clause provided for representation of East Pakistan in the
federation of Pakistan.536 It is commonly believed that the first Amendment to the 1973
Constitution was made to recognize Bangladesh. In fact, Bangladesh had already been
recognized as an independent country to ensure Mujibur Rahman‘s participation in the
Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore in February 1974; by amending Article 1 of the
Constitution in April 1974, the mention of East Pakistan was deleted. But there were
other aspects of the First Amendment that showed as to what Bhutto actually wanted.537
The more serious and violent changes made to Article 17 of the constitution through first
amendment paved the way for limiting the freedom of association. The amendment
placed reasonable restrictions on the right to associations, imposed by law in the interest
of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan. Accordingly, the Political Parties Act of 1962
was also revised. It gave power to the central government to declare any political party
534. Viewpoint, February 4, 1977. NDP has Its own identity. 535. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 83. 536. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 290. 537. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Early Mutilations in the Constitution. Published in ―The News‖ 18
October 2015.
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accused of working against the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan; the accused party
would stand dissolved and all its properties and funds would be forfeited to the federal
government.538 The Supreme Court was also involved.539 Certainly, the apex court could
declare the government‘s decision null and void but as the judiciary too was willing to
obey the federal government, it never happened.540 It was under this provision of the
amended constitution that NAP was later dissolved in 1975 and the matter was referred to
the Supreme Court.541 There were two main reasons that pushed PPP‘s leadership to bring
in such changes to the constitution:
One, if he wanted to crush the most vocal opposition political party, NAP, he had the fear
that some of the annoyed members within PPP such as Ghulam Mustafa Khar and J. A.
Rahim might wish and decide to establish a new political party, which, of course, would
oppose Bhutto, so he wanted to keep the sword in his hands.542
It was a move towards
Bhutto‘s ultimate aim. He wanted to establish a single party state where he would control
everything.543 This shows Bhutto‘s trend towards authoritarianism and away from
democratic norms which Bhutto had promised so loudly. In addition to that, the first
amendment also reduced the maximum period intervening the two consecutive sessions
of the Senate, the National Assembly, and the Provincial Assemblies, from 130 days to
90 days.544
5.10.2. Second Amendment
The 2nd
amendment chiefly dealt with the Qadiani problem nevertheless it had other
repercussions on the politics of Pakistan. Unmatched in the world history, an elected
538. Ibid. 539. It was also provided in the law that where the federal government declared that any political party had
been formed or was operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan,
the federal government shall, within fifteen days of such declaration, refer the matter to the
Supreme Court whose decision on such reference would be final. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit.,
p. 290. 540. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Op. cit. 541. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 290 542. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Op. cit. 543. Shahid Javed Burki, (1986). Pakistan: A Nation in the Making. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 71-72. 544. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 290.
163
parliament took it upon itself to make a decision about the fate of a religious
denomination by passing ruling on the limits of a faith. An issue that even Justice Munir
Report had left open for debate was now closed and sealed to the happiness of some of
the most veteran politicians of the country. A process of declaring other minority sects as
infidels were initiated that would in due course tear asunder the very fabric of this
society.545
5.10.3. Third Amendment
As said earlier, Bhutto government was intolerant and was bent upon restricting people‘s
freedom and fundamental rights. He adopted extremely repressive measures towards
those who opposed PPP government. Some were arrested and detained. The political
opponents had to seek judiciary help which was not up to the mark. The court‘s decision
often favored government and extended very limited relief to the political opponents of
Bhutto‘s government. Bhutto and his comrades were not happy with such relief for
opposition and the judiciary interference in PPP leadership‘s dealing with the opposition
was seen as against PPP government. Bhutto government decided to limit the powers and
jurisdiction of the courts. An arrangement was made and adopted to demoralize the
judiciary for keeping it away from interfering in such matters.
The Code of Criminal Procedure was amended through the 3rd
Constitutional
Amendment which prohibited the courts from granting bail before arrest (BBA) to a
person except a case was registered against him.546 It also provided that no bail would be
effective if case is not registered.547 Such bails before arrest were a safeguard for political
workers to save themselves from victimization and a court could approve such bails even
if there was no case registered but a victim anticipated that a case would be filed and he
would be arrested before approaching the court.548 Until that time, the courts had
545. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Op. cit. 546. Ibid. 547. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 293. 548. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Op. cit.
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permitted blanket bail before arrest to political opponents in cases registered and to be
registered as part of the process of such ill-treatment.549
But this right was snatched
through the 3rd
Amendment and Article 10 of the Constitution, which provided for certain
safeguards against preventive detention, were amended in February 1975.550 It was a
move aimed against all those who opposed PPP leadership.
The Third Amendment, on the one hand, limited the rights of political detenus and on the
other hand, enhanced the powers of the central government. It allowed the federal
government to put under detention a political opponent for an unlimited period of time, if
accused of indulging in anti-state activities. Interestingly, by the time the Third
Amendment was passed; action against the more vocal opposition political party i.e.,
NAP had already been taken.551
In particular, the 3rd Constitutional Amendment also
gave power to the executive (Prime Minister) to use direct authority to prolong the
duration of emergency with no earlier endorsement of the legislature.552 In the National
Assembly, Bhutto defended the introduction of the said Amendment and stated that the
amendment was aimed to restrain the nondemocratic manner of the opponents. Bhutto
further maintained and held opposition responsible for maintaining emergency. He said
that opposition has embarked on the path of violence. They themselves ruined the
atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation.553 The Third Amendment simply was meant for
enhancing the power of PPP government to firmly deal with its political opponents and
put their leadership under indefinite detention. The purpose of the said amendment was
very clear i.e. NAP was the target. Abdul Wali Khan along with the topmost leadership
was put behind the bars. This was a severe blow to the prospects of democracy in
Pakistan.
549. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 293. 550. Ibid. 551. Ibid. 552. Surendra Nath, Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., p.83. 553. For details see National Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates, February 12, 1975, Vol. II, No.
16, pp. 282-283.
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5.10.4. Fourth Amendment
PPP leadership was all the time intolerant to any criticism against its program and
policies. It was never willing to hear the opposition viewpoint. Bhutto wanted to take a
firm action against those who were unwilling to follow his instructions. The opposition
complained against repressive measures. The Peoples Party government, for muzzling
and suppressing the opposition, resorted to another arbitrary amendment.
In November 1975 the Fourth Constitutional Amendment was passed. The said
amendment specified the jurisdiction of the executive regarding the issuance of orders for
preventive detention.554
Through this Amendment the government plan to limit the
jurisdiction of courts was materialized.555 The aim was to prevent the courts from granting
relief to PPP opponents. This was actually limiting the power and jurisdiction of the High
Courts and preventing them to come to aid and help the political victims or to allow such
persons bail when they were detained.556
The said amendment was passed in haste. Various opposition members wished to have a
debate over the 4th
Amendment Bill because the Bill was to curtail the powers of the
courts, they were not only denied their due right but most of the opposition members557
were thrown out of the assembly by force.558 And voting on the Bill was held in the
absence of the PPP opponents.559 The speaker justified pushing out of the opposition
leaders by saying that he had to ensure order of the assembly. Maulana Mufti Mahmood
and Ahmad Raza Kasuri made every possible effort to stop the passage of the Bill but in
vain. Other opposition leaders also tried their best but without any success. Thus the said
Amendment Bill was passed by the assembly on Nov 14, 1975. The Amendment Bill was
554. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 84. 555. The High Courts were forbidden from prohibiting the making of an order for preventive detention of a
person or to grant bail to anyone so detained. 556. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 294. 557. Like Mahmood Ali Kasuri, Chaudhury Zahur Ilahi, Malik Suleman, Ahmad Raza Kasuri, Dr Ghulam
Husain and Zulfiqar Ali Bajwa. 558. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 294. 559. Dawn, 15 November 1975.
166
passed with one hundred and two votes in its favor and none against.560 The PPP
government, on account of its numerical majority in the Assembly, was able to pass the
Amendment Bill through the Assembly. Also, Bhutto had well disciplined party members
and there were little chances that the PPP members would vote against the will of party
leadership. So, there was no need to silence the opposition but such maltreatment towards
the opposition showed his disrespect not only to his political opponents‘ but democratic
norms and traditions as well.
The government point of view in defense of the Bill was that the opposition had to
establish a peaceful relationship and avoid conflict with government. Also, the
Amendment was aimed to empower the government to deal with the uneasy situation
created by the opposition.561
Bhutto‘s defense for the 4th Amendment was that it had no impact on the fundamental
structure of the constitution. He was of the opinion that amendments, relating to the laws
of detention, would not bring judiciary and parliament face to face. Instead, the Supreme
Court had already declared the NAP as a party having some members working against
Pakistan. The fact, according to Bhutto, was that the opposition had not understood its
role as an opposition and was negating the constitution by imposing its will on the
majority party. This is a negation of democracy.‘562
In fact, the 4th
Amendment was devoid of any national interest, it was meant for further
strengthening PPP‘s position to handle the opposition by reducing the powers of the
courts and narrowing down freedom of expression and fundamental rights. Through this
amendment Bhutto signaled to his political opponents that they could not seek a
constitutional remedy.
560.The Pakistan Times, 15 November 1975. 561. Farhat Imrana Aslam, (1988). Constitutional Development in Pakistan-1972 to 1985, (PhD Thesis),
University of the Punjab, Lahore, pp.102. 562. National Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates, Vol. VII, No. 12, November, 1975, pp. 77-79.
167
5.10.5. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Constitutional Amendment was made in September 1976. It was aimed to
further clip the wing of courts vis-as-vis parliament. The 5th Amendment was intended at
restricting the discretionary powers of judges. Bhutto himself defended the amendment in
the National Assembly on September 3, 1976.563 The reality was that the amendment did
empower the parliament to legislate freely in matters of emergency regulations and
fundamental rights at the expense of judiciary powers.564 The same amendment also set
the term for the judges of Supreme Court and High Court as five and four years
respectively. By extending the term of office even after retirement for the judges of
Supreme Court and High Courts565 who were in his good books signified his favoritism
and duplicity vis-à-vis his struggle for democracy.
5.10.6. Sixth Amendment
The 6th Amendment, brought in December 1976, excluded some important office
holders566 from civil service rules in order to enable them to contest elections.567
In
essence, the said Amendment was introduced with the intention of facilitating the
followers of the PPP to take part and contest the upcoming elections. This amendment
was meant for enabling the Government‘s advisors and Special Assistants to participate
in elections immediately after their retirement. Bhutto sought to politicize the career of
his advisers and assistants568 and thus he politicized these institutions on the part of PPP.
5.10.7. Seventh Amendment
Bhutto acknowledged that since he had been made the central figure of opposition‘s
campaign in 1977, he had decided to put the issue in the hands of the people through a
563. ―the Fifth Constitutional Amendment shall, in no way, affect the basic features of the Constitution and
that the parliament had the legal right to bring amendments in. Dawn, September 4, 1976. 564. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 84. 565 . http://historypak.com/constitutional-amendments/ 566. Special assistants of the PM, the Chief Ministers, the members of Law Commission and the members of
the Council of Islamic Ideology. 567. Ibid. 568. Dawn, December 23, 1976.
168
referendum.569 He proposed that a joint sitting of parliament would pass a temporary
amendment to the constitution to provide for a referendum. Accordingly, the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution was passed and which became effective on 16 May 1977.
The said amendment was meant for holding a referendum where the voters had to
demonstrate their confidence in the prime minister.570 The Seventh Amendment was not
only a novel but a strange constitutional provision and was essentially repugnant571 to the
parliamentary system.
In fact, PPP‘s Chairman had secured a popular majority in Western Pakistan and had also
become a strong prime minister but yet he was not satisfied. Though, the 1973
constitution had already provided prime minister with enormous powers not only in the
decision making in central government but also in matters vis-as-vis provincial
governments. It is believed that Bhutto wanted to continue himself in office and to
establish one-party supremacy in politics of the country. It was for that reason that he
pretty like his forerunners, brought in constitutional amendments.572
Bhutto‘s amendments in the constitution for making the prime minister stronger illustrate
his concern for seeking legitimacy to his authoritarian rule for which, he even ignored
constitutional values, traditions and practices. Bhutto‘s pursuit for authoritarian rule was
based on important factors. The first one was that he was Sindhi and could not fully trust
the dominant Punjabi segments and could not take their long support for granted.573
Secondly, he wanted to ensure his continuity in office i.e., rule Pakistan for long time.
And in that pursuit, it is remarkable to note, despite the fact that Bhutto severely
569. Dawn, 14 May 1977. 570. Hamid Khan. (2005). Op. cit., pp. 313-314. 571. Because a vote of no confidence was to be obtained from the parliament and not through a referendum.
If a prime minister was obliged to go to the people for a vote of confidence, then he owed
nothing to the parliament and should not be answerable to it. It is indistinguishable to a
presidential system and the prime minister factually assumes the characteristics of a president
after having won any such referendum since referendum is, conceptionally, part of the
presidential system. Ibid., p. 314. 572. Khalid Bin Sayeed, (1980). Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change. New York:
Praeger Publisher, pp. 104-105. 573. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., pp. 84-85.
169
criticized Ayub Khan but in getting and sustaining power in absolute manners, in reality
the former was, by no means, different from the latter. Both made use of constitutional
autocracy.574 The amendments show the political pressure which the Bhutto government
had faced with. The most crucial point of the whole maneuver is that constitution was put
in service of the government to prevail over its troubles. Yet while amending the
Constitution the usual line was not taken up and some of the important amendments were
made without taking the opposition into confidence575 which is so much against
democratic norms and values. Bhutto had strong partiality for concentrating all the levers
of power in himself. That is why he had made every possible effort to establish
presidential system of government. He was, however, curbed by people from both within
his own party and the opposition not to do so keeping in view the elections manifestos
(parliamentary democracy) PPP had put forward to the public. Later on the half a dozen
amendments that were added to the Constitution of 1973 were aimed exactly at realizing
his hidden and biased motives.
5.11. Conclusion
Before coming to power and during struggle for power (1966-1971) Bhutto stressed for
civil liberties. He cried for the right of opposition parties to disagree with the ruling party
(right to dissent) and criticize its policies and programs. Bhutto severely criticized his
former patron for intimidating and suppressing the opposition. He stressed that political
participation and distributive justice are inevitable for national solidarity. He was of the
view that the denial of democratic rights and freedoms to the citizens would provide an
opportunity to the foreign forces to make their influence and break up the country.576 But
once he came to power, he did not act upon what he preached. In fact, Bhutto had never
accepted provincial autonomy as a mindset. He did not want any other party to share
574. Khalid Bin Sayeed, (1980). Op. cit., p. 104. 575. Farhat Imrana Aslam, (1987). Op. cit., p. 120. 576. Anwar H. Syed , (1980). The Idea of Pakistan Nationhood. Polity, p. 575-597.
170
power.577
In his relationship with opposition, Bhutto did not adopt a democratic attitude.
He used FSF for the suppression and cajoling of those who opposed. He treated those
badly who criticized him. Here, first comes the name of Dr Nazir. The public meetings
and gatherings of opposite groups were dispersed by using a para-military reserve force
called Federal Security Force (FSF). The White Paper published by Zia, in the statements
of Masaod Mahmood and also in Bhutto‘s trail these facts had come to the limelight.
During Bhutto rule, the masses could not fully enjoy the fundamental rights which they
deserved. The freedom of expression was restricted. Many newspapers and journals were
either banned or censored. Hussain Naqvi‘s journal, who was a friend of Bhutto, was
banned and he was arrested.578
PPP meetings with NAP and JUI leadership after the 1970 elections, the Tripartite
Agreement, the appointment of NAP governors in NWFP and Balochistan where it got
majority of seats, signing of the Constitutional Accord on 20 October, 1972, producing a
consensus based permanent constitution and inclusion of opposition members in Simla
delegation highlighted healthy signs of interaction between PPP leadership and the
opposition parties that had put the country on a democratic path. But the real story behind
the scene was quite different. Bhutto actually had some objectives in mind for the sake of
which he adopted the process of negotiation and accommodation. These objectives were:
seeking an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank, settling with India the issue of
prisoners of war and, most importantly, a permanent constitution for the country.579 Once
these objectives were achieved, PPP‘s leadership attitude towards NAP-JUI changed
altogether.
577. Interview with Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Ex Chairman of Mass Communication Department Federal
Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST) Karachi, on 16-07-2015. 578. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 579. Both NAP as well as JUI were kept involved in all the three issues. NAP-JUI governors were appointed
in time to make them participate in formal meetings on devaluation which was required for
making an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. N.W. F. P. governor Arbab Sikander
171
Successful leaders build each other up and they motivate, inspire, and push each other.
Unsuccessful leaders just hate, blame and complain. Although, both PPP as a ruling party
and the opposition had taken some very commendable and healthy steps but as a whole
democratic norms and values could not gain grounds during the seventies because of the
undemocratic attitudes from both sides, most of the time.
Khan Khalil and others were the members to the delegation to Simla. Also, NAP-JUI were
parties to 6th March and 20th October accords preceding first interim constitution and finally the
permanent Constitution of 1973. Rafi, Raza, (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-
1977. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 273.
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CHAPTER - 6
1977 ELECTIONS, PPP’S HANDLING OF PNA MOVEMENT AND
THE DREADFUL OUTCOME
6.1. Introduction
This chapter of my research study discusses as to why the 1977 elections took place
before the mandated period, how did the PNA emerge out of the variant political
ideologies of different political parties which were previously not so close in their
relationship. It further dwells on the issue of election symbol. The campaign for 1977
elections by the ruling PPP and PNA is also part of the discussion. Having studied the
state affairs before the 1977 elections this chapter discusses the election results and the
plethora of allegations about rigging that ensued after the election results were declared.
The focus is on whether the elections were fair and free and the incumbent government
sincerely contested the elections. The chapter also makes an evaluation of PNA‘s
allegations of rigging against Pakistan Peoples Party and finally the downfall of Bhutto
leadership and the imposition of Martial Law. The movement launched by the PNA
against the rigging in elections and the ruling PPP‘s handling of the situation is a part of
the discussion in this chapter. At the end, light is shed on the way negotiations were held
and the settlement which the PPP and the PNA was about to reach but failed.
6.2. Why the 1977 Elections were held Before the End of the Mandated Term
Bhutto already had the fear in mind that his proposed constitutional changes will be
opposed by the middle class. But from the very start of 1977, he was sure to overcome
such sort of opposition to his scheme by appealing directly to those sections of the
society who got benefited from different reforms introduced by the PPP government and
to those who were influenced by personal charisma of Bhutto.580 PPP came into power in
December 1971 and in that case the five years term was to end in December 1976 but the
580. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Pakistan under Bhutto 1971-1977. Macmillon, p. 184
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five years constitutional term of the National Assembly had started from August 14,
1973, which was to expire on August 13, 1978. But PPP‘s leadership deemed it favorable
time for elections to secure a fresh mandate from the masses.581 Z. A. Bhutto decided to
hold general elections and seek a fresh mandate one and a half years earlier than the
mandated time. Article 271(1) of the Constitution provides that the first National
Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue until 14th
of August 1978. It was only
under the proclamation of emergency that Article 234(6) provides that parliament may by
law, extend the term of the National Assembly for a period not exceeding one year.582
On
January 7, 1977 Bhutto addressed the National Assembly, in which he discussed the
achievements of his government during the last five years, in rebuilding the country,
contribution to Islam, and particularly the 1973 constitution. Then he announced that the
general elections would be held on 7 March followed by elections for the provincial
assemblies on March 10, 1977. The retiring Chief Election Commission was given a 3-
year extension in service and was asked to continue working for the sake of free, fair and
impartial elections.583
Bhutto wanted to get two third majority that would enable him to change the 1973
constitution. He had given the responsibility of preparing a new presidential constitution
to an academic expert of London School of Economics and Political Science. He was, to
draft a document that would be composed of such ―secret codes‖ and ―deceptive use of
appendices‖ that no one could read or understand until it was imposed.584
Bhutto was against parliamentary set up and was of the view that the system has
sacrificed the rights of many for protecting the privileges of few. In fact, Bhutto was not
satisfied with the Constitution of 1973 for the little constraints that it had imposed on his
581.The Pakistan Times, January 11, 1977. 582. Rafi Raza, (1997). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.
320. 583. Ibid. 584. Stanely Wolpert, (1993). Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times. New York: Oxford University
Press, p. 267.
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authority. He condemned the opposition for using different provisions of the constitution
and bringing the social and economic downfall of the country. Throughout 1976, Bhutto
visited different constituencies and made speeches to catch people attention for his own
ideas. In fact, PPP‘s leadership was going to face the masses and he wanted a heavy
mandate that would give him the power to change the political and constitutional set up
of the country.585
Bhutto, in February 1975, had banned the NAP and for disqualifying the members of
different opposition parties from national assembly and provincial assemblies passed
some special ordinances. The said ordinances also disqualified some from contesting the
elections. These moves of PPP‘s regime made the opposition skeptical about his
intentions. Though Bhutto announced in the beginning of 1976 to hold general elections
before the expiry of the national assembly term but deferred the elections by recalling
that complete freedom during the 1970s elections created such a situation which
ultimately led to the disintegration of the country and the provincial elections held during
Liaqat Ali Khan, gave birth to provincialism, sectarianism and parochialism.586 Anyhow
Bhutto deferred the elections till he was sure of PPP‘s victory. In the early 1977, all the
activities were in control of the ruling party. The disturbances in both the provinces of
NWFP and Balochistan were calmed to a great extent. Army was already there in
Balochistan to muzzle the hostile elements and not allow these to reemerge. The main
opposition party NAP was banned in the first quarter of 1975 while Abdul Wali Khan
and other topmost leaders of the NAP were sent behind the bars. The other opposition
parties in the parliament were also in a weak position because none of these had more
than three members. The political discussion and meeting were banned by applying
Section 144 and other measures. The opposition was not in a position to convey its views
585. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., pp. 182-183. 586. Dawn, January 2, 1976.
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to the public. It was very rare that media reported critical speeches of the opposition
leaders in the National Assembly.587
Although Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was himself a product of popular support in 1970, first as a
president and then as a prime minister, yet he thought that elections in Pakistan always
resulted in ill fortune. Previously, the elections resulted in a landslide victory for one
party or group of parties, which produced confusion and disorder followed by some
corrective action.588 He was of the view that elections damaged authority with little or no
matching benefit. The country had passed through such experiences in 1954 in East
Pakistan. Similarly, in 1965 the presidential elections brought disrepute for the then
president Ayub Khan and the 1970 elections also led to the disintegration of the country.
He, however, felt that a fresh mandate from the masses was overdue and necessary to
tackle important problems facing the country. In addition, an early election will also
make it difficult for the opposition to get united and gain momentum.589 Thus having no
fear of the opposition, he willingly decided to go for general elections. He not only
expected a bland victory but also wished to get such a mandate that would enable him to
restaff his party from those whom he thought to be more loyal to him and to get rid of the
undesirable members. The establishing of such a new National Assembly composed of
Bhutto‘s loyalists would surely facilitate PPP‘s leadership to act according to his own
whims and wishes and to begin with even more innovative policies at domestic as well as
at international front.590
During both phases i.e. 1972-74 when the decision making power rested with the left, and
1976-77 when Bhutto took command of policy making, the economic and political
decisions taken were not aimed at helping and supporting the essential part of Bhutto‘s
middle class constituency. Also, the Pakistan of 1977 did not reflect the Pakistan that
587. Marvin G. Weinbaum, (1977). The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost. Asian
Survey, 17(7), 599-618.
588. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., pp. 318-319. 589. Ibid., p. 319. 590. Lawrence Ziring, (1977). Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm. Asian Survey, 17(7), 581-598.
176
politically important middle class wanted to shape. By March, 1977 when Bhutto decided
to go to polls, the Pakistani middle class composed of different social, economic and
political groups had already abandoned him.591
On the one hand, if Bhutto was convinced that he was the sole asset and vote catcher of
the party, a view with which the party officials around him eagerly concurred. On the
other hand, it is also a fact that by the time of the elections, Bhutto had lost his old and
committed colleagues and PPP‘s original identity and vitality had died. Also the Federal
Security Force (FSF), which had been created as a substitute for army to deal with civil
disturbances had become unpopular and was ineffective except pressurizing and
terrorizing the opposition. So, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto entered the election year, with a
disillusioned PPP and questionable support from the bureaucracy, on which he relied.592
Also, the decision of the nine different opposition parties to form a coalition called
―Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)‖ badly hit Bhutto‘s perception.
6.3. Formation of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)
Afraid of Bhutto‘s dictatorial tendencies, the opposition tried to close its ranks and stand
as one against the PPP. The alliance which different opposition parties formed was
named PNA.593
The formation of PNA not only surprised but also shocked PPP
leadership. In point of fact, Bhutto‘s planned strategy was based on the assumption that
the various opposition political parties would not be able to unite because of their
differences. However, if they get united, there would be only small adjustments for
different seats. The vast intelligence network had not made any indication of such a
possibility. Even the political journalists of the government press, could not predict this
591. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988).Op. cit., p. 189. 592. Rafi Raza, (1997).Op. cit., 308-309. 593. Lawrence Ziring, (2005). Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History. Manas Publications, p. 156.
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possibility.594 The PNA was composed of those different social and economic groups
which had suffered at the hands of oppressive policies of PPP leadership in one way or
the other. These groups constituted the middle class which was hurt by the social,
economic and administrative reforms of Peoples Party.595 Not only Bhutto was confident
of this support but he was also sure that the various opposition political parties would not
be able to get together and form a platform against PPP. But once the opposition alliance
came true in the form of Pakistan National Alliance, Bhutto called it, ‗a cat with nine
tails‘.596 PNA also decided to have one flag and one manifesto.
The PNA was a cluster597 which incorporated groups from both the right and left
wing.598 The said alliance of opposition political parties included all of the older United
Democratic Front, this time more strengthened by coming into the row Asghar Khan's
Tehrik-i-Istiqlal. Chief of JUI Maulana Mufti Mahmood was unanimously elected
president of the alliance.599 Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was appointed as vice president
and Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa of JUP‘s as Secretary General, while Pir of Pagaro was
accommodated as head of the Central Parliamentary Board.
PNA anxiously challenged and gave a tough time to PPP which was out of question at the
time of its rule and put Bhutto and his party on defensive. The nervousness of PPP‘s
leadership was obvious from Abdul Hafeez Peerzada‘s decision to challenge the allotting
of a single election symbol to PNA. This, at least, set the precedent that the ruling party
594. Abdullah Malik,(1977). What will be the Bhutto Strategy? Published in Viewpoint, February 4, 1077,
p. 15. 595. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 184. 596. Ibid 597. The three Islamic parties i.e. Maulana Mufti Mahmud‘s Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam, Mian Tufail
Muhammad‘s Jamaat-i-Islami, and Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani‘s Jamiatul-Ulema-i-Pakistan
were representing different points of view about the conduct of the affairs of the state on Islamic
lines. Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan‘s Tehrik-i-Isteqlal, Pir Pagara's Muslim League, Nawabzada
Nasrullah Khan‘s Pakistan Democratic Party and Sardar Abdul Qayyum‘s Azad Kashmir Muslim
Conference were fundamentally parties of the centre, stressing for and advocating return to the
parliamentary democracy and private enterprise. Sardar Sherbaz Mazari‘s National Democratic
Party and Khan Muhammad Ashraf Khan‘s Tehrik were parties of the left believing in some kind
of state ownership of capital and decentralized government. 598. Ibid., pp. 193-194. 599. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 298.
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could be challenged.600 Asghar Khan once said, Bhutto stated time and again that he
(Asghar Khan) did not know politics, but now the nation could see who the novice was.
The opposition, he claimed, had deliberately put up a facade of disunity and
demoralization, so that Bhutto should be "trapped" into holding general elections.601
It
seemed quite true because the moment the ruling party announced the election dates; the
opposition got together and within forty-eight hours was able to hammer out a united
alliance.602 The alliance boosted the morale of the opposition. The secretary general of
PNA, Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa told to the Viewpoint reporter that the last three day
experience (since the formation of the alliance) had convinced him that the opposition is
going to "make a sweep."603 PNA was a conglomeration of nine different political parties
who joined their forces for using one central theme namely, Bhutto government was
dictatorial which must be weed out at once, because its continuation would be no more
than the end of Pakistan‘s democratic dream.604
From the start of 1976, Bhutto used governmental machinery ensuring victory for his
own party. Several months before announcing the schedule of general elections, the
PPP‘s leadership set various agencies which were given the task to prevent the coming
together of opposition political parties.605
The speed with which the leaders of different opposition parties worked and formed the
PNA was unbelievable and it surprised and shocked Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He criticized
and spoke angrily to those agencies; he was reassured by Rao Rashid, Masood Mahmood
and others that the leadership issue particularly among the religious parties would prove a
fatal stumbling block.606 The PNA alliance consisted of several influential centrist parties
as well as the religious parties, most importantly the effective cadre-based Jamaat-i-
600. Abdullah Malik,(1977). Op. cit., p. 15 601. Viewpoint. January 21, 1977. PPP and the Alliance (Report), p. 9 602. Ibid. 603. Ibid. 604. Lawrence Ziring, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 581-598. 605. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 321. 606. Ibid.
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Islami. By the time, the PPP‘s leadership had also lost the confidence and support of his
left and liberal constituents.607
The civilian governments stand or fall with the support of the masses. It becomes fairly
easy for a military dictator to take over when and if a civilian government loses its
legitimacy608
in the eyes of the public. In such a case, both the amateur and the
professional politicians doubt the authority of the same government. The government is
seen as not worth their allegiance and loyalty.609 Bhutto‘s rule suffered from the same
skepticism and doubt on the part of political leaders as well as the public. Bhutto was
basking under the illusion that he was immune from being challenged unanimously. The
same illusion was shattered by the opposition closing their ranks and joining the one
grand alliance. The same alliance was made up of parties ranging from the extreme right
to extreme left. Those political parties had very little, if anything, common between them.
The only purpose which had united them was their unanimous opposition to Bhutto. It
came, then, as no surprise that the masses who had started losing their belief and trust in
Bhutto, openly wailed against the loss of the civil liberties, rampant corruption and the
extravaganza of the PPP members of parliament. A hole had been made in the edifice of
the invincible Bhutto government and policies. It was widened further by even more
complaints and indignation on the part of the public.
Many people remained confused by the different faces PNA had. Being consisted of
political parties led by leaderships having different programs and thinking, it seemed
difficult to believe that Mufti Mahmood, Asghar Khan and Pir of Pagaro (not to mention
other partners) would be able to pull PNA in the intended direction. But it was their
enmity towards PPP‘s leadership that they buried all their differences and stood as united
force against Bhutto. Bhutto, on the other hand, was not only the leader of PPP but also
the leader of his government and the nation and he also held dictatorial power. Although,
608. Eric A. Nordlinger, (1977). Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Prentice Hall, p. 45. 609. Ibid., p. 92.
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the opposition in their election campaign, criticized Bhutto for having such dictatorial
powers and used it as a major complaint against him but such powers proved to be his
greatest asset for winning majority in the elections.610
6.4. The Issue of Election Symbol
PNA also decided to have one flag and one manifesto. PNA members applied for ‗Hal‘
(plough) as its election symbol. PPP leadership was upset with the decision Abdul Hafeez
Peerzada challenged the award of a single symbol to PNA.611 Malik Muhammad Qasim, a
PNA leader and a candidate himself in the election, in a statement to the Viewpoint
expressed his bitterness about the way the government had reacted to the allocation of
plough as election symbol to the combined opposition of PNA. He said, the government‘s
overreaction to the allocation of the symbol was ―symtomatic of its defeatist tendency‖.
As other parties outside the PNA and independents had been allowed symbol of their own
choice, so PNA too should be allowed to have election symbol of their own choice, as it
had applied united for the symbol. Malik further said that none of the PNA components
had filed nomination paper of its candidates separately, so PNA should be treated as a
party.612
Complain from PNA side was that the Election Commission had watched for
two full years the government conducted its election campaign, but when the PNA
started its own, the Commission had virtually suspended its campaign until the disposal
of the symbol‘s case.613 It meant allowing as little time for PNA campaign as possible. In
support of their claim for a common election symbol, PNA supporters also cited a similar
situation in India where Election Commission had denied recognition to the Janata Party
grouping of four different opposition political parties the status of a political party, but
had ruled that the group could nevertheless have a common election symbol.614 The PNA
leadership and supporters were in a state of anxiety. The PNA leadership had the fear that
610. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 303. 611. Abdullah Malik,(1977). Op. cit., p. 15 612. Viewpoint. January 28, 1977. Opposition Protest (Report), pp.10-11. 613. Ibid. 614. Viewpoint, February 4, 1977. Have your Plough.
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their plea would not be granted. They seemed to be suffering from feeling that they have
been discriminated by the authorities.615 Their fear and misgiving, however, came to an
end when the verdict of the Election Commission came. The Election Commission gave
the decision that under the rules, the Pakistan National Alliance could not be considered
as a party, but in the interest of the fair elections and in view of the PNA submission that
taking away of the plough from it at this stage would seriously impair its position at the
polls, the Election Commission had nevertheless, recommended to the president that the
relevant laws be suitably amended to enable this collection of opposition parties to
contest the election under a common symbol. When the Election Commission‘s made the
announcement, within hours there came the prime minister statement, paving the way for
amending ordinance, which was made the same evening616 Bhutto did the right thing by
accepting the Election Commission‘s recommendation and advising the president to
amend the relevant law which allowed PNA to use one symbol for all its candidates.617
This was, of course, a rational decision on the part of the Commission. Bhutto‘s showing
of a sense of accommodation at this critical time was good. But there were different
interpretation for showing magnanimity on the part of PPP leadership. One important
explanation is that Bhutto‘s act of accommodating PNA demand was aimed to polish his
party image which had been tarnished by the unopposed return of many important figures
of PPP including Bhutto himself and all the four Chief Ministers.618 Anyhow, whatever
may be the reason for this accommodation; it was a commendable act on the part of PPP
leadership.
6.5. Qayyum Khan’s PML (Q)
615. Ibid. 616. Ibid. 617. Viewpoint. January 4, 1977. Clash of Symbols. 618. Viewpoint. February 4, 1977. Have your plough.
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As for Muslim League (Qayyum) was concerned, some ranks in PPP were of the view
that it was no more required as a coalition partner.619 But some PPP members like
Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Mir Afzal Khan, Kausar Niazi and Rafi Raza were of the opinion
that it would be advantageous to have the support of this party because of its traditional
base in the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).620 The PPP
government was weak and unpopular in the province and needed this support to counter
JUI and former NAP. At the time of division of seats in the province, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto‘s advisors such as Abdul Hafeez Pirzada made it impossible for Qayyum Khan to
accept the poor terms. Qayyum Khan and Yusuf Khattak were later on formally asked to
resign from the cabinet.621 Consequently, launching his party‘s election Campaign at
Gujrat, Qayyum Khan stated that remaining in coalition with PPP for five years-that he
was wholly opposed to socialism and believed that only his own version of Islamic
system could guarantee Pakistan‘s existence as a sovereign state. He further stated that
the PPP did not exist in NWFP and Balochistan; that only NAP and QML had strength in
these two provinces; since the NAP had been banned, all that remains was his faction of
Muslim League. And he concluded that if QML was demolished in this region, the
province would break away from Pakistan. He then said that, having pledged his loyalty
to Quaid-i-Azam, he could not possibly accept either Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or Mufti
Mahmood as his leader. All this may be dismissed as part of the usual election
shenanigans- admissible during election campaign, even if the claims made were utterly
meaningless and the logic senile. However, Qayyum Khan went further and said that if
619. In fact, the QML had lost most of its leaders to Pakistan Peoples Party in NWFP and also QML, as
separate party was losing its identity speedily in the Frontier province. It was, therefore, not
unprotected that it was precisely on point of additions to the PPP from QML ranks that the alliance
had been disrupted. According to knowledgeable sources, Qayyum Khan, incensed over the
defections, largely brought about by Mr Nasrullah Khattak had demanded that the frontier Chief
Minister should be removed before the elections because he would work against the interests of
QML. When PPP‘s leadership did not accept this condition, Qayyum Khan and Yusuf Khattak
either resigned or were asked to leave. Available at: Viewpoint January 21, 1977. QML left high
and dry. 620. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 322. 621. Ibid.
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PPP returns to power it could only be through rigging in the elections that if it happened,
then the ruling party would not be able to remain in office for more than ten days, as
there would be a ―big revolution‖ in the country.622 This shows nothing but a threat to use
unconstitutional means to reject the voter‘s verdict, if it did not confirm to the
expectations of QML‘s leadership. It is common in Pakistan that those who are not in a
winning position, use threats of inviting non-political elements to interfere in the political
process. Actually QML leadership was frustrated after being ousted from high office and
being denied quota of seats that it wanted in the NWFP.623 Also, Qayyum Muslim League
had neither any worker nor candidate in NWFP, which was once its stronghold. Qayyum
Khan had also approached to National Democratic Party (NDP) for electoral cooperation
which was rejected by the latter because NDP was of the view that QML was responsible
for creating confusion in the national politics. Most of the opposition parties in PNA were
also against Qayyum Khan.624 Thus PPP stood alone in the field against all other political
parties. This was the isolation of PPP, which was sought and struggled by opposition.625
6.6. Selection of Candidates for 1977 Elections
Dismal was evident on the part of many aspirants as their number increased. It could be
clearly seen that in the process of tickets for national and provincial assemblies only a
few would get it and disappoint others. In some cases, the number crossed ten and a score
for the very same ticket. It was flamboyant process involving new faces on party lists. A
number of uninteresting and lifeless lawmakers were substituted by many fresh aspirants.
Unexpectedly, many of the torchbearers of the party‘s nominations who were also the
enthusiastic officials were dead. Forty out of hundred PPP members in the just dissolved
National Assembly were deprived of tickets.626 Upon investigation of the situation it came
to surface that the new entrants were from influential political backgrounds and those
622. Viewpoint. February 4, 1977, Election Shenanigans. 623. Ibid. 624. Viewpoint January 21, 1977. QML Left High and Dry. 625. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 322. 626. Marvin. G. Weinbaum, (1977). Op. cit., pp.599-618.
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who had recently joined the PPP. Interestingly, about one-fifth of them had contested last
elections as active opponents of PPP. This pouring in from the diverse backgrounds
confirmed the fact that the ideological diversity between the PPP and its opposition,
reasonably sharp in 1970, would be vague in 1977 elections. PPP‘s leftwing stumbled
down further with its already weak position.627 The lists did not display PPP‘s original
workers and loyals. The PPP leadership felt the need to revise the lists not because of the
issues within but as a response to the grouping together of the nine political parties
(PNA). Their resolve was to coordinate their efforts and choose and field a single
candidate for each National Assembly and Provincial Assembly constituency. The PPP‘s
higher-ups ignored the fact of bridging the gap between certain parties and leaders e.g.,
the Islamic fundamentalists of JUP and JI, the political moderates of Tehriq-e-Istaqlal or
the often radical-sounding NDP leaders. The establishing of PNA made PPP leaders
cautious to nominate candidates of prominent position and those having dominance in
clans.628
6.7. The Campaign for 1977 Elections
The favorite subject in those days was the March elections. Will the Peoples party win?
With what majority? Will the Opposition obtain sufficient strength to forestall the
unilateral amendments of the constitution? There were even some persons who
considered the possibility that a wind of revolt would topple Bhutto and would bring
PNA to power, just as 1970 elections had brought him to power.629
Both PPP and PNA launched their election campaign in earnest once the election dates
were announced. The Peoples Party drive was launched by chairman Bhutto at a public
meeting held at Liaqat Gardens (Rawalpindi), while PNA started its election campaign
with a public meeting at Karachi's Nishter Park.630 PPP also announced its manifesto for
627. Ibid., pp. 599-618. 628. Ibid., pp. 599-618. 629. Abdullah Malik,(1977). Op. cit., p. 15. 630. Viewpoint. January 28, 1977. The Campaign Get Under Way.
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the coming elections. With the March 7 polling date for election to the National
Assembly, less than one and a half months away, the vote seeking campaign throughout
the country was gaining strength with every passing day. PPP was banking heavily on its
achievements and reforms introduced during its previous tenure, while opposition was
trying to make out that these reforms have not, in fact, been of any real benefit to
common man. They maintained that in most cases, the government measures had just
opposite effects on country's economy and the standard of living of common man. In this
respect, they specially mentioned the fall in the production of the taken over industries,
scarcity of vegetable ghee and cement, and soaring prices of almost all commodities. The
PNA leaders promised the electorate that they would bring the prices back to the 1970's
level.631 They also blamed government‘s policies pertains to the increase in administrative
expenditures. For example, Asghar Khan told in the Karachi meeting that expenditure on
police alone had gone up from Rs. 20 crore in 1971, when East Pakistan had not been
disintegrated, to Rs. 80 crores now. Foreign loans and the disintegration of East Pakistan
were other issues that PNA discussed during election campaign.632 The opposition also
criticized
the PPP for having cramped the working people right with serious restrictions, rendering
them abstract and inane. They also alleged that in the five years of PPP's rule, graft,
corruption, bureaucratic highhandedness and self aggrandizement have touched an all
time hi and its monetary policies and excessive expenditure on unproductive activities
had all contributed in decrease in production growth and increase in inflation rate. As far
as the government foreign policy is concerned, one of the opposition leaders Mr. C. R.
Aslam, President Pakistan Socialist Party (PSP), was of the view that it moved in
opposite direction: they talked of the third world unity and yet they are tied to the world
631. Ibid. 632. Ibid.
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capitalist economy and the CENTO and RCD".633 PPP in general and the person of Z. A.
Bhutto, in particular, was targeted by the opposition. Their attacks were exclusively
directed against Bhutto‘s politics, his personal life style and his family.634
Bhutto‘s announcement that the politicians imprisoned in different jails would be freed to
compete the general elections of 1977 was one of his campaign ploys. The other one was
scaling down the size of large land holdings to make available more land to the landless
tenants/farmers.635 The PPP itself was popular amongst the populace but it was the
superimposing personality and charisma that the PPP hoped would win the day for them.
The opposition had grown pale in its appeal as compared with Bhutto. The latter had it
ensured that the opposition, even if released from behind the bars, would not endanger
his chance of securing the premiership yet again.636
Although the allied parties represented different political ideologies and it suffered from
divided leadership speaking different languages, yet they were united for their mission.
The state owned media described the opposition political parties disloyal to the country
and projected PPP as the right choice of the masses of the country particularly when the
nine opposition parties decided to coalesce in the form of PNA to oppose Bhutto
dictatorial stature, the Pakistan Times labeled PNA as an ―opportunistic alliance‘ and
stated that the voters are fully well aware of their conspiracy against ―the new order. It
was also stressed that the nation ―will reject the anti-democratic and anti-people elements
that are now making a desperate last-ditch attempt to stop the march of history."637 In one
of his meetings Bhutto stated about his close relation with the masses and also criticized
PPP opponents.638
633. Ibid. 634. Lawrence ziring, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 581-598. 635. Lawrence Ziring, (2005). Op. cit., p. 156. 636. Ibid. 637. The Pakistan Times, January 13, 1977. 638. ―In 1970, I promised you democracy. In 1973, I gave you democracy. You asked for participation at all
levels of decision making. I provided you with that opportunity. I not only asked you to participate
in the decisions I took, I also asked your permission when I took the decisions that affected all of
187
In one of his addresses, Bhutto criticized PNA by commenting that the Alliance had
adopted the plough as its election symbol and then proceeded to excoriate its membership
for making the cultivators "the puppets of jagirdars (extensive land- holders) and
capitalists." Noting the greater relevance of the PPP symbol, he remarked: "We have
adopted the sword as our election symbol because we used this sword to eliminate
exploitation, and to control capitalism. The sword had cut down the chains and freed the
poor people."639 The PPP wanted to seek a fresh mandate on the basis of its achievement
i.e. socio-economic policies, services to Islam and achievements in foreign policy.
PNA on the other hand, targeted and highlighted the loopholes in the PPP government‘s
domestic and foreign policies and especially the limiting of civil and political rights.
They showed their loyalty to Islam and promised to put in force the Islamic system
(Nizam-i-Mustafa) in its genuine form in the country if it comes to power. With the
lifting of the restrictions on public meeting and jalsas for election campaign, PNA got an
opportunity to express their opinion about people grievances against the PPP government
and get support for their program.640 The election of 1977 was one of those elections
which were contested not for the sake of grand visions about governance and progress. It
was an election which was marked by libels, slanders and vilification of personalities.
The opposition was cognizant of the importance of the charisma of Bhutto. They
considered him as the man standing their way for the realization of the attainment of a
democratic form of government.641
us. You allowed me to send Mujibur Rahman home; you permitted me to go to Shimla to discuss
peace with Ms. Gandhi; you let me to go to the countries of Middle East to seek their help in our
hour of need. You and I have trusted each other. But there are people in this country that don‘t
approve of our association. These people have attempted to put obstacles in our way; to stop us
from building a new Pakistan. They can do this because we have allowed them to do so. Should we
continue to permit them this freedom? Mustn‘t we change the rules of the game so that our progress
towards a new and dynamic Pakistan is not continuously thwarted?‖ Shahid Javed Burki, (1988).
Op. cit., p.181. 639. The Pakistan Times, January 31, 1977. 640. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2000). The Military & Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997. Sang-E-Meel Publication,
p. 219. 641. Lawrence Ziring, (2005).Op. cit., p. 156.
188
Bhutto activated every channel and launched an offensive strategy against PPP‘s
opposition political parties. He wanted no excuse and no reason either. Bhutto seemed
more nervous this time which made him aggressive. This was because of lack of unity
and discipline in his own party, disappointment with Bhutto‘s policies and programmes
and strong determination of the opposition political parties to snatch the reins of power
from PPP‘s leadership.
Bhutto made the necessary changes in both administrative and military structures to
counter any expected challenges to PPP‘s victory. He reshuffled his cabinet in February
1976 and orders were issued for reorganization of the federal secretariat and provincial
structures. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting too was restructured.642 The
state owned media was made responsible for projecting the image of PPP and its
leadership and also exposing the incapability of the opposition political parties.
Muhammad Hanif Khan took the charge of Information Ministry in February 1976, and
made an immediate review of the structure and activities of different media and
submitted, on February 15, 1976, a report to Bhutto.643
The government launched a vast publicity campaign both at domestic and international
front for projecting the achievements of PPP regime. The cost for this was massive.
Massive influx of financial grants to the Pakistan National Centre (PNC) inflated in
1975-76. This organization was for the sole purpose of PPP‘s political propagation and
highlighting its public sector projects in the same vein. The considerable and notable flow
of amount doubled and tripled in the course of these years i.e., 1975-77.644
The role of
PPP and its leadership was eulogized through several books produced for the same
purpose. 30,000 copies of a book entitled, Promises and Performance, stating the
implementation of PPP‘s manifesto in different local languages was produced. The total
642. Morning News, February 6, 1976. 643. White Paper on Misuse of Media, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan; August (1978), December 20,
1971-July 4, 1977, p.243. 644. Ibid., pp. 243-44.
189
cost for this was about Rs. 10 lakhs. Furthermore, three books costing forty thousand
rupees for 1000 copies of each book were published for government popularity for the
upcoming elections. The then information minister was patron of the publications.645 Rao
Rashid, Bhutto‘s special secretary advised for revision of electoral laws so that to put an
end to the expected moves of the opposition. The secretary further forwarded different
plans for preventing strong candidates of the opposition political parties from contesting
the elections. He also suggested removing the undesirable and unfavorable officials. For
ensuring the PPP‘s victory, Bhutto had passed some special constitutional measures. On
September 5, 1976 fifth constitutional amendment was passed through the National
Assembly which was aimed to cut down the powers of the judiciary.646
For precluding the leaders of the defunct National Awami Party from the upcoming
elections, the Peoples Representation Bill647
was passed from the National Assembly in
November 1976.648
In the same manner, the Sixth Amendment in the Constitution of 1973 was made in
December 1976 which was aimed to allow the assistants and advisors of the PPP‘s Bose
to contest the upcoming general elections.649
645. The Architect of New Pakistan, by Main Said Rasul Rasa (English); Yadon Ke Jazeeray by Raza
Hamdani (Urdu) ; and Ulsi Hindara, by Prof. Afzal Raza in Pushto. Ibid., p. 248.
646. According to the fifth constitutional amendment, the powers exercisable by the Supreme
Court were made subject to clause 2 of Article 175 of the 1973 Constitution whereby the Supreme
Court could exercise only such powers as were conferred by the constitution or under any law, and
not go beyond its jurisdiction. Particularly, it had been brought about to safeguard any law, rule or
order made in pursuance of the Emergency provisions against any challenge on the ground of
inconsistency with any of the Fundamental Rights. The Pakistan Times, September 6, 1976.
647. The People‘s Representation Bill‘ (PRB) had been introduced (in November 1976) to
disqualify a person from being elected as a member of an Assembly in case he was an office-bearer
of a dissolved party under sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Political Parties Act 1962. The PRB
also provided for a deterrent punishment for corrupt practices during elections such as
imprisonment up to five years or a fine up to Rs. 5,000. The ceiling on election expenses was put at
Rs. 40,000 for National Assembly elections and at Rs. 25,000 for Provincial Assembly elections 648. Dawn, November 19, 1976.
649. Through this amendment article 260 was amended and favorites of Bhutto holding different offices
were allowed to contest the elections. Chief Ministers, chairman and members of Law Commission
and of the Council of Islamic Ideology were excluded from the ‗purview‘ of the definition of
‗Service‘ of Pakistan. Dawn, December 24, 1976.
190
Such measures were taken just to help support the ruling party and create hurdles for the
opposition. All these sustained and carefully planned moves provided Bhutto the ground
which helped him to build up his electoral strategy. Therefore, confident of winning the
elections, Bhutto in December 1976 announced to hold free and fair general elections in
the country. Bhutto stated in his speeches that PPP has no hesitation for going to
elections. Pointing to India, Bhutto said that Pakistan would not follow other Asian
countries where elections were postponed.650
Once supporter of Z. A. Bhutto, Malik Ghulam Jilani, had described the whole situation
of the country651 at a time when the former announced the March 1977 elections in, in
some precious words;652. Malik Ghulam Jilani was sensing the situation and was sure of
PPP‘s victory and disappointment and defeat for opposition in the election. The elections
result later on, came out as expected by Jilani.
The PNA attracted an unsurprising support of the public in its meetings.653 There was a
series of heated speeches from both sides, and confrontation, each wanted to downgrade
and impose its will on the other. The opposition charged Bhutto as a drunker and
650. Addressing a Press Club meeting at Lahore on December 23, 1976, Bhutto declared that ―he had faith
in democracy‖ and as evidence thereof, he was ―willing to hold general elections in the country
according to the constitution.‖ Bhutto asked: ―why should we postpone elections? There was no
need for such an attitude.‖ Without naming a neighboring country, Bhutto said that ―though there
was a democratic system in that country, since its inception they had put off their elections twice,
firstly for one year and then for a period of two years.‖ He said that there were a number of other
countries also where elections had been postponed, and added that he would not name those
countries because it would result in a diplomatic protest from them claiming that they still had
democracy in their country. Bhutto further observed that ―Pakistan is fortunate to have both a
democratic and constitutional government.‖ Morning News, December 24, 1976. 651. Malik Ghulam Jilani. Unpublished essay, ―Time Always Passes‖, quoted in Lawrence Ziring, (1977).
‗Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm. Asian Survey, 17(7), pp. 581-598.
652. ―Justice is no longer a matter of right. It is a matter of accident notwithstanding the
elaborate judicial farce. All your rights are suspended and there is no hope that the rulers are likely
ever to revive them. All laws are meant only for the convenience of the rulers and to mislead the
world. Any law which a citizen can invoke in his defense or for his protection is quickly changed.
The so called constitution finds itself amended and mutilated the moment any court of law appears
likely to grant relief to a citizen under its provisions, and the courts accept amendments with
obvious satisfaction. The press works as an elaborate device for circulating the printed word.
Expression is stifled and dissent is frowned upon. The press dances to the music of its chain s.‖ 653 For the detailed account of election campaign, see, Lawrence Ziring, ―March 1977 Elections in
Pakistan‖, Asian Survey (May 1977), pp. 60-80.
191
indulged in Bacchanalian orgies. Bhutto responded to this charge by saying that he drank
wine not people blood.654 Bhutto was of the view that PNA leadership is grouped together
against him either ―obscurantist‖ or ―agents of capitalism‖ or ―foreign reactionaries‖.
Bhutto never respected PNA leaders and considered them as ―light-weights‖.655
6.8. The Election Results
A tough and heated contest was expected between sword (PPP election symbol) and the
plough (Opposition election symbol). Both PPP and PNA contested the elections like
vicious battle in which score of people lost their lives and many more injured. The polls
for the national assembly were held on March 7, 1977. The PPP‘s officials facilitated its
supporters to have an easy access to polls but stopped the supporters of PNA from casting
their votes.656
When the results were announced, PPP had won the elections in three of
the four provinces. PPP won nearly four-fifth of the National Assembly seats. PNA won
only 36 seats which is less than one-fifth while the remaining seats (Tribal Areas) were
captured by the independents. It was a victory more than enough, required for amending
the constitution and altering overhauling the political system. In addition, the 8
independents candidates were quasi-PPP in some sense as in the past practice, tribals
would not accept any party‘s label were expected to join the ruling party. As a result it
increased the ruling party seats in the National Assembly and gave PPP 81.5% of the
seats.657
The following table shows the National Assembly results.658
RESULTS
654. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., P. 195. 655. Stanely A. Wolpert. (1993). Op. cit., p. 301, 656. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 196. 657. Ibid. 658. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2000). Op. cit., p.219.
192
Party Number of candidates Number of Seats
PPP 191 155
PNA 168 36
PML (Qayyum) 37 1
Independent 324 8
Other Minor Parties 21 0
Total 741 200
The members of PNA from the very outset blamed the PPP for fraud and for voter
manipulation. The charisma of Bhutto maintained the same level of insurmountability in
the eyes of the observers as it had been enjoying couple of years before in the eyes of the
populace. They were dead sure about the PPP‘s victory by a landslide. The opposition
alliance was believed to secure at least a modest number of seats in the parliament so as
to resist the would-be ruling PPP‘s excesses. But, surprisingly for the public and the
opposition, and unsurprisingly for those observers who had stuck to the belief that the
PPP would win elections by a huge margin, the PPP came out as occupying an absolute
majority in the parliament. It secured 155 out of 200 general seats. The opposition had to
console itself with merely 36 seats. Accusations and allegations were natural. The
combined opposition leadership termed the election as virtually rigged and farcical.
Demand for fresh elections and removal of Bhutto gathered tremendous support.659 The
ruling party under Bhutto‘s leadership got a massive victory in 3 out of four provinces of
the country. Out of the rest 45 seats, PNA secured only 36 leaving 1 seat to Qayyum
Muslim League and 8 to independent candidates from tribal areas. Out of total 31 million
registered voters, 17 million cast their votes.660 Poor performance of PNA in Sindh and
Punjab surprised everyone. In Sindh, out of eleven Karachi constituencies and three
659. The Pakistan Times. March 10, 1977. 660. Dawn , Karachi, 13 March 1977.
193
Hyderabad constituencies, PNA was able to secure 9 and 2 constituencies respectively. In
Punjab, PNA won only 8 seats but not a single one in Lahore and Rawalpindi. In NWFP
(now KPK), PNA won 17 seats while in Balochistan it refused to take part in the
elections.661
The prospects of PNA success in the polls was dark because of the incoherence and
differences among the alliance partners, lack of access to mass media for the opposition,
restrictions imposed by government for preventing PNA members from contacting the
people and PPP‘s one sided propaganda through controlled communication media. The
opposition got a short period of only two months for campaigning when section 144
which prohibits assembly of more than four persons was lifted. Sensing the situation,
some of the PNA favorites had admitted that it would not be able to give a tough time to
PPP.662 In some areas, polling agents of PNA were thrown out of the polling stations.
There were more malpractices at the women polling stations. Also, PNA votes were
burnt. Deputy Commissioners were ordered to ensure PPP‘s victory.663
6.9. Aftermath of 1977 Elections
Consequently, the opposition was not ready to accept the results. PPP victory as
predictable came true but the members of PNA knew in advance that elections would not
be fair and free. They knew that PPP‘s leadership would not be satisfied with simple
victory. Bhutto, they knew, was determined to put an end to all the challenges to his
authority and position. When the PNA voices of vote rigging erupted, Bhutto not only
denied the claim but ordered the FSF to punish those who, according to PPP‘s leadership,
negated the will of the masses and the expression of the democratic process. PNA in
661. Mehrunnisa Ali, (1977). Pakistan: Aftermath of the March 1977 Elections. Pakistan Horizon, 30(3/4),
pp. 77-102. 662. Ibid., pp. 77-102. 663. Aslam Pervez Mamon. (n.d). Wafak-i-Pakistan aor Qumi Yakjehti, 1947 se 1971 ka Seyasi Jaiza
(Federation of Pakistan and National Integration: A Political Analysis), (PhD Thesis), p. 265.
194
response to Bhutto‘s undemocratic attitude, called for a countrywide strike.664 The huge
attendance at the public meeting of the PNA indicated that it would surely catch more
seats than the opposition captured in the first general elections of 1970. The PNA, an
alliance of nine different opposition parties, did not accept the results and charged the
PPP‘s leadership for rigging and other malpractices in the election and without any delay,
the opposition opened a campaign against the incumbent government which got
strengthened quickly.665
The General Council of Pakistan National Alliance unanimously decided, on 9th March,
to reject the National Assembly elections "rigged" and "stolen" by PPP "election
thieves.666 The PNA also boycotted the elections of the provincial assemblies.667 At the
evening when the results were announced, Z. A. Bhutto informed a press conference that
the results were as he expected. The next day he appealed publicly for a large turnout for
the elections to the provincial assemblies, emphasizing that a vote for PPP was a vote for
democracy and would frustrate the PNA boycott.668 Bhutto insisted on conducting the
provincial elections on March 10, 1977 as scheduled. He severely criticized the boycott
of the provincial elections and appealed to the electorates ―to turn out for the vote with
full vigor and enthusiasm, no less than they showed at the National Assembly polls." But
masses positively responded to the PNA appeal of boycotting the provincial elections
scheduled for March 10, 1977. It was almost a complete boycott. The masses did not go
to the polling stations669 as more than half of those who had voted for National Assembly
candidates on March 7, remained absent. The opposition alliance (PNA) leadership
decided and called for a ―strike" to "demonstrate" the nation's "loss of confidence" in its
664. Lawrence Ziring,, (2005). Op. cit., p. 157. 665. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 171. 666. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 304.
667. Dawn, 9 March 1977. Press Conference of Asgar Khan of 8 March 1977. 668. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 337. 669. Aslam Pervez Mamon, (n.d)., p. 266.
195
present leadership.670
As it proved true, the turnout was so poor that at some polling
stations there were more law enforcement personnel than voters. The patrolling military
witnessed all this. In Rawalpindi, some party members were annoyed because that had
not been consulted over the issue of tickets and at the time of voting for National
Assembly, they often found their votes already cast, so they were not ready to come
forward. To make matter worse, hugely inflated turnout was announced.671 Kausar Niazi,
a close colleague and cabinet minister in Bhutto‘s government admitted672 the fact. Abdul
Hafeez Peerzada also expressed similar opinion that PNA boycotted provincial elections
and its boycott was very effective. Not a single PNA member was seen at polling.673
The General Council also demanded the elected members of PNA to resign immediately.
The said Council also demanded the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner for
its failure to conduct free and fair elections in the country. The PNA leadership gave a
call to the people for a peaceful strike against the alleged malpractices in the elections on
11th March.674
The agitation started on March 11, 1977.675
As Burki put it, the Nawa-i-Waqt had predicted that the post election period would not be
a period of success but of trial for PPP leadership. Bhutto was very disturbed with the
opposition unease. He warned the PNA leaders,676
in a press conference a day after the
election.677
Bhutto warned the opposition to approve the results and also warned that they
would not be allowed to bring death and destruction to the people of the country. Despite
670. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 304. 671. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 336 . 672. ―The PNA‘s mass popularity was proved on the 10th of March when the Provincial Assembly elections
were scheduled and the polling booths lay deserted. That day it was only the People‘s Party
candidates who were in the field. Complete boycott of the Provincial Assembly polls gave me clear
indication that the anti-government campaign launched by the PNA…would prove very effective‖. Kausar Niazi as quoted in A Journey to Disillusionment by Sherbaz Mazari. Karachi: Oxford
University Press, p p. 445. 673. Interview with Abdul Hfeez Peerzada. (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Minister and senior member
of PPP) on 13-06-2015. 674. The Pakistan Times, 10 March, 1977. 675. Nawa-i-Waqt, March 12, 1977. 676. ‗if the opposition leaders took the law in their own hands and tried to subvert the constitution and
created agitation in that case the government is quite capable of dealing with the situation. 677. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 197.
196
Bhutto‘s warning, strike was observed on 11th March 1977. More than two hundred
persons including opposition prominent leaders were arrested in Karachi.678
On March
12, Bhutto offered the opposition to have a dialogue if they had any complaints; he
however rejected the demand for reelection. He also made an impassioned plea to the
PNA to accept their defeat in the elections and told that National Assembly elections
could not be discussed.679
Bhutto expected a positive response from Maulana Mufti
Mahmood and waited for a written confirmation as he himself wrote for it in pursuance
of the invitation. There was an air of mistrust and lack of approval of Bhutto‘s idea i.e.,
election being regarded as a settled matter. Instead of a nod, Maulana Mufti Mahmood
denied the invitation.680
On March 13, PPP‘s leadership expressed his desire that he
"would not hesitate" to invite the army if he found it "necessary" to "restore order." Both
General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, who played main role in supporting
and helping Bhutto‘s coming to power wired their resignations, as ambassadors to Greece
and Spain respectively as a reaction to Bhutto threat of using army for restoring order.681
The resignations were a bad omen as what was next in pipeline proved to be disastrous.
Both of the officers were never stopping to be the game changers and masterminds for
military.682
The protest started by PNA led to impasse. They were demanding for Bhutto resignation
and fresh elections while PPP leadership was prepared to correct only the minor
irregularities.683 To deal with such a situation needed magnanimity on the part of both
sides. But unfortunately that could not happen. Bhutto admitted that some individuals had 678. The Statesman, 13 March, 1977. 679.The Pakistan Times, 13 March, 1977. 680. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 305. 681. Rahim Khan charged Bhutto with having "made a mockery of democracy in Pakistan. . . . You have not
honoured your pledges. . . . The previous regime held fair and free elections but you have
imperiously ignored that fine precedent and allowed them to be rigged instead. I cannot sit idly by
and see the country being dragged into another civil war by power-hungry men. I am, therefore,
resigning in protest against your oppressive and dictatorial regime. Gul Hasan‘s statement was
much the same as that of Rahim Khan. Both officers were in close touch at that time, coordinating
their resignations as well as the speeches they were soon to make in Britain against Bhutto's regime. 682. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 308. 683. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 198.
197
violated the rules of the game and committed malpractices in the elections. They had
committed malpractices in their individual capacity for which the premier was not
responsible. But he also maintained that it did not mean that government had made a plan
to rig the elections.684 He rejected the allegation of rigging and also re-elections. 685
Having gathered large crowds before the elections, the PNA was expecting the proposed
strike to be one of the same. Civil disobedience was started; section 144 and threat of
being arrested were defied by the PNA. The movement grew violent. Encounters between
the demonstrators and the police/ federal security forces were increasingly becoming
common.686
The masses, having seen and participated in the political campaign on the part of
PNA, were flabbergasted by the landslide victory of the PPP. People‘s misgiving about
the results were in large part the outcome of their preconceived notion about the PNA as
being one of the most favorite before the elections. The PPP could not have been
expected to win the elections with such a majority. Fingers were raised at the
transparency and fairness of the elections. Whatever the scale of rigging might have been,
the PNA and its supporters rallied for altogether cancelling the elections687 and
conducting new one under the watch of Pakistan army and judiciary. The PNA, when it
voiced concerns about the rigging and fraud in the elections, was mocked by the people
for its poor show in the elections. It took quite some time before the people could be
convinced and won over by the PNA to acknowledge that the elections were not indeed
free and fair.
684. The Pakistan Times, March 28, 1977. 685. He said, ―I don‘t want to go down in history as a rigger of the elections, which I am not. If I have re-
elections, I would be conceding their false charge that I am a manipulator and rigger of elections...
What the hell is office of Prime Minister? I am more concerned about my place in history‖. The
Pakistan Times, April 9, 1977. 686. Mehrunnisa Ali, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 77-102. 687. Ibid., pp. 77-102.
198
In March, National Assembly voted Bhutto to power.688 He denied PNA demand of
dissolving the National Assembly by saying that there was no moral or political
justification for such action.689 However, rallies and procession organized by PNA
against the government made Bhutto to negotiate with opposition. Bhutto, at the same
time insisted for the legitimacy of the election and also offered PNA to come to
negotiation table but the opposition denied the offer until their basic demands were
accepted. 690 Observers and correspondents from abroad reported as saying the rigging
and other malpractices were circumscribed to a limited number of constituencies. But
they were clearly mistaken. The rigging was done at a scale unprecedented in the
electoral history of Pakistan. The PPP had actually been doing homework for winning the
elections, whatever opposition might come in its path. The Prime Minister‘s Secretariat,
the Intelligence Agencies and the Ministry of Information were collectively engaged in
recommending different candidates to different seats and advising various secret moves
for PPP‘s win. Some of the ministers attacked the voters and stamped the ballot papers.691
Of course the elections were rigged and the rigging was not confined to a limited
constituencies.692 Responding to the opposition insistence, the Chief Election
Commissioner ordered for the recounting of votes at some disputed polling stations.
When it became clear that malpractices had been there, the government withdrew the
authority from the Election Commission to announce the results. But the Chief Election
Commissioner admitted the rigging.693
The Election Commission of Pakistan sided with the PNA when its Chief Election
Commissioner expressed doubts about the fairness of the elections. Justice Sajjad Ahmad
688. On March 28, 1977 voting took place in National Assembly with a total membership of 168. Among
the present members 155 were from Pakistan Peoples Party while the rest were from tribal areas
and women. 689. The Pakistan Times, March 29, 1977. 690. The Pakistan Times. March 10, 1977. 691. Walter Schwarz, (1977). Why Bhutto‘s Power is Crumbling London: The Guardian, May 1,1977. 692. White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March, 1977, Government of Pakistan, July
1978. 693. Aslam Pervez Mamon, (n.d)., p. 266.
199
Jan came out on various occasions stating the fact that the elections were indeed rigged
and expressed his helplessness to put an end.694 Those allegations included the abduction
of presiding officers, use of violence to either coerce the voters to vote for the PPP or
deter them from voting altogether if they did not comply with the demands of PPP
workers, the forceful removal of ballot boxes, the casting of bogus votes and the closing
of polling stations for hours without any rhyme or reason. The PNA itself was not
innocent either. The above mentioned malpractices were committed on both sides. The
ECP had too little authority and not enough resources to ascertain which side was guilty
of the malpractices committed. The ECP was at the forefront of suggesting fresh elections
to be held for all the 200 seats.695 Later on, Sjjad said that he was shocked by such
massive irregularities and put forward the idea of reelections.696 The ECP‘s sealing of the
results of 80 constituencies convinced the PNA that the rigging, fraud and other
malpractices were indeed committed on a large scale.697But one opportunity for
ascertaining the truth about the level of rigging was discouraged by the PNA leaders.
They rejected the idea of being any help to the Election Commission in probing into the
matter on the basis of their shaky trust on the Commission. The Election Commissioner
revealed, in a statement, the horrifying abuses on several occasions of which he and his
officers were well aware of and accused particularly prominent members of Bhutto
administration to be abusing power. Later, almost after a period of five weeks, the
Election Commission announced to investigate Hafeezullah Cheema, Railways Minister
for electoral abuses in his constituency of Sargodha. The findings of the Commission
were i.e., ballot boxes stuffed with ballot papers, were tempered, intentionally invalidated
opposition votes, thumb prints were used a number of times for hideous purposes. In
certain cases, voting was banned and while in other it was pre-casted even before the
694. Tahir Amin, (2007). 1977 Coup D‘etat in Pakistan. Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, 28(2), pp.
31-52. 695. Mehrunnisa Ali, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 77-102. 696.The Pakistan Times, June 23, 1977. 697. Mehrunnisa Ali, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 77-102.
200
actual arrival of the individuals. Cheema displayed violence where his needs were not
met satisfactorily.698 It all seemed a pre-planned heinous crime to avert the smoothly
sailing purpose of elections and to manipulate things into his favor where his victory will
be more than certain. Blaming Cheema, the Election Commission accused him of using
such mean tactics in order to grasp his motive of seat. Not only Cheema but his followers
too adopted violence and were malignant to secure their nefarious designs.699 According
to Miraj Muhammad Khan who was a critics of Bhutto during 1977, Bhutto never made
any plan of rigging the elections because he had confidence in himself and in his party.
But there were black sheeps in his party (Lekin oski party me buht se kali bherain thi),
who saw their future in danger and these few peoples therefore rigged the elections and
damaged not only PPP but also Bhutto.700
Concerns about fairness and transparency in the election process occur almost
everywhere where there is democracy. What made the 1977 elections so contentious was
the fact that the malpractices of every sort were committed on too large a scale to be
overlooked as being a routine in democratic form of governments. Bhutto was not willing
to resign and he planned to hold referendum as evasive tactic. The PPP government
passed the 7th
Amendment Bill in May, 1977 which was aimed to seek legitimacy for the
ruling party through a referendum in the country.701 When the amendment bill was moved
in the National Assembly, the opposition boycotted because things were not yet settled
between PPP and the opposition leadership. The bill meant to empower the Prime
Minister to place an issue/matter to referendum. Bhutto aimed that if situation got worse
referendum would bring adjustment. Referring to the referendum Bhutto insisted that as
PNA had turned down all his reconciliatory efforts, let the people decide his fate, but the
698. Salmaan Taseer, (1979). Bhutto a Political Biography, reproduced by Sani Panhwar, pp. 166-167. 699.Ibid., p. 167. 700. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and founder member of PPP)
on 30-07-2015. 701. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Politics in Pakistan: With Special Reference to Rise and Fall of Bhutto,
Reproduced by Sani Hussain Panhwar, p. 95.
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PNA condemned and rejected it. They were of the view that it is a device for supporting
PPP‘s illegitimate rule and ensuring one-party hegemony.702
6.10. PPP-PNA Reconciliatory Dialogue
According to Abdul Hafeez Peerzada, one of the Army officers Gen. Iqbal (Core
Commonder Lahore) told Bhutto in a meeting held on May 15, 1977, ―you are acceptable
but your party is not acceptable‖, while Sindh Core Commonder Arbab Jehan Zeb said
―sir the things are so bad like Bangladesh. I do not know tomorrow some lieutenant come
to my office and shoots me‖.703 It conveys a message that there was resentment in army.
Army got divided into two groups one opposed to PPP and another favored it with the
plea that PPP should hold on to power as it had popular mandate. This meeting alarmed
PPP leadership and on the next day they approached Mufti Mahmood who was jailed in
Sihala.704 In May 1977, leaderships of both PPP and PNA, for reaching an understanding
held several meetings in Sihala (Rawalpindi). Bhutto had made offer for dialogue and
reaching an agreement with PNA. The PNA, after thoroughly discussing the proposed
settlement responded to Bhutto‘s offer along with the following demands:
1. The immediate lifting of emergency, martial law and section 144 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
2. The release of all political prisoners;
3. Removal of limitations on press;
4. Dissolution of National as well as Provincial Assemblies within seven days once the
proposed agreement was reached;
5. Holding of general elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies within a one
month period after their dissolution;
6. Dissolution of special courts and tribunals;
702. Ibid. 703. Interview with Abdul Hafeez Peerzada. (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Minister and senior
member of PPP) on 13-06-2015. 704. Ibid.
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7. Appointments of the governors for all the four provinces with a mutual consent;
8. Appointment of a new Election Commission with mutual consent;
9. Appointment of a New Chief Election Commissioner;
10. And, for ensuring free and fair elections, changes be made in certain key
appointments but with mutual agreement. 705
The above demands showed leniency on the part of the combined opposition. PNA
dropped down their basic demand of Bhutto‘s resignation. It meant they wanted a
settlement. Bhutto also asked the opposition leadership to end demonstrations and drop
some of their demands if they really wanted a solution. Bhutto ordered some of his
colleagues to hold preliminary discussions with PNA at Sihala.706
The army was now showing signs of restiveness, which only added to Bhutto‘s alarm. At
an earlier meeting, the Chief of General Staff, General Abdullah Malik, made some
remarks about the army‘s responsibility for restoring order in the country. In Bhutto‘s
presence, General Malik was sharply rebuked by General Faiz Ali Chisti, Corps
Commander ‗You are not a Corps Commander, what do you know about our difficulties!
Why should we fire? Political problems should have political solutions‘. Chisti was
followed by two of the other corps commanders present, General Sarvar Khan and Arbab
Jehanzeb, who also heatedly denounced General Malik views.707 According to Kausar
Niazi who had witnessed these proceedings PPP chairman was very upset.708
For After the odd deadlocks, several disagreements, a proposal and a counter proposal
and numerous sessions and counter sessions, a sort of compromise of sorts was reached
between the two negotiations teams. PNA‘s members Mufti Mehmood, Nawab Zada
705. Dawn, 6 May 1977. 706. Dawn, 9 May 1977. 707. Kausar Niazi, (1991). Last Days of Premier Bhutto. Lahore: Jang Publishers, p. 145
708. After this meeting …Bhutto appeared fairly upset; anxiety was writ large on his face. That
was the first occasion that the generals had spoken in this strain in his presence. Actuallay, it was
only after this episode that Bhutto started thinking seriously about having negotiations with PNA;
The importance of such an exercise had now dawned upon him. Ibid., see also: Sher Baz Khan
Mazari, A journey to disillusionment, pp. 461-462.
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Nasrullah, Prof. Ghafoor Ahmad and from government side Abdul Hafeez Peerzada and
Maulana Kausar Niazi held talks. After a lengthy discussion, both sides reached an
agreement on June 15, 1977 wherein it was decided to hold general elections on October
7, 1977.709 The 15 June 1977 agreement had been agreed upon by both sides on the eight
important terms.710
Although both sides worked hard and reached an agreement but still there existed some
sort of mistrust and credibility gap. Both parties wanted to put pressure on one another.
The agreement was not yet signed and Bhutto made a sudden decision to visit five
Islamic states and Yasir Arafat the Plaestinian leader711 to show that he had no fear of the
opposition and could remain outside the country in such a critical situation.712 This visit
should have been made once after a committee had drawn up a legal document covering
all the points of settlement including the holding of the new general elections and the
agreement was signed. The PNA leaders also claimed it would be unfair of Mr Bhutto to
give the impression to the governments of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates and Iran that agreement had been reached and peace restored.713 As the political
situation inside Pakistan remained uncomfortable, therefore, it would be better if Bhutto
had stayed at home or cut short his visit to one or two days during the tense time.
The second rate leaders of both PPP and PNA bogged down the talks because of their
skirmishes. Bhutto‘s PPP wanted the subcommittee to be an advisory body while PNA
was in favor of giving it full authority to ensure free and impartial elections. Bhutto was
not ready in that he was not to accept a super government. On the other hand, Mufti
709. Aslam Pervez Mamon, (n.d)., p. 286.
710. New elections would be held as early as possible, it was also agreed upon that army would be
withdrawn from Balochistan, all special tribunals would be shut down (with particular reference to
the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case), all political prisoners will be released, the constitutional
amendments breaching fundamental human rights would be declared null and void, press
censorship of all sorts would be stopped, both PPP and PNA would be provided with equal time on
television and radio nd on the day the agreement was signed, the state of emergency would be
lifted. Sher Baz Khan Mazari, (1999). Op. cit., p. 464. 711. The Times, June 20, 1977. 712. Tahir Amin, (2007). Op. cit., pp. 31-52. 713. The Times, June 20, 1977.
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Mahmood in the capacity of president of PNA alleged the government of avoiding the
agreement.714 At last, this dispute was also resolved on the third of July 1977 and both the
parties agreed to a new accord about the powers of the committee. It was decided
between PPP and PNA that both will send equal number of members to the committee
and the committee will have the power to review any decision taken by the government.
In case of dispute, the matter would be referred to the Supreme Court which will be
bound to give its verdict within seventy two hours.715 Unfortunately, this chance was also
missed when the PNA General Council refused to accept the accord and Tehreek-i-
Istiqlal‘s head Asghar Khan openly refused to accept the accord.716 In fact, the PNA
rejected the new agreement because Bhutto proposed some amendments e.g., Bhutto had
proposed that in the second week of July, provincial governments should be dissolved
and that the provinces should be placed under the direct federal rule but PNA found it
unacceptable.717 The Opposition had earlier accepted the amendments subject to
confirmation by the central committee. However, within hours of the announcement of an
agreement, the opposition members accused their three members negotiating team of
having accepted a government formula, different from their own revised draft. Air
Marshal Asghar Khan, who was considered to be the expected candidate for prime
ministership in case the PNA won the proposed elections in October, said that the
Government‘s amendments would strengthen Bhutto‘s power in the provinces.718
In Bhutto‘s last address on July 4, 1977, he invited PNA to talks by saying that he will
reopen as many issues as they want.719 This time he was really interested to create an
environment of peace and understanding between PPP and PNA and reach a solution. As
noted by Hamid Khan, Bhutto held his last cabinet meeting on the evening of Monday, 4
714. The Pakistan Times, July 29. 1977. 715. Tahir Amin, (2007).Op. cit., pp. 31-52. 716. Dawn, July 3, 1977. 717. The Times, July 4, 1977. 718. The Times, July 4, 1977. 719. Dawn, July 5, 1977.
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July 1977. The minutes of this meeting showed that he had second thoughts during the
day. He sensed that the ongoing clash with the opposition alliance (PNA) would not bring
any good results but would harm not only the internal stability of Pakistan but also
damage its international standing. He thought that in case the PNA revived and
revitalized its protest, and even if the government was able to control it, again the process
of discussion and dialogue had to be started. Mere controlling the agitation and restoring
of law and order would be of no use without a solution of the problem. Bhutto further
stated that the armed forces had stood by the government but they would be out to a
severe strain in case of another agitation.720
Recalling the final week of June, General Arif writes as quoted by Mazari721 that Bhutto
changed his mind about settlement with PNA.
It appears that on the evening of 4 July, apprehensive of a military coup, Bhutto was
ready to make a settlement with the PNA. He consulted further with Abdul Hafeez
Peerzada, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (the Chief Minister of Sind), and Mumtaz Ali Bhutto.
Peerzada still opposed concessions to the PNA, but the other two important personalities
counseled acceptance of PNA‘s latest demands.722
At a press conference held at 11:30
Bhutto announced his intention to accept723 the PNA‘s terms. According to General K.M.
Arif, Bhutto said in his press conference that, ‗my colleagues had not differed with me
during the past five and half years as they did now.724
The version of the evening of 4
July although given by Kausar Niazi, a close associate of Bhutto, is not free from doubt.
720. Hamid Khan, (2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. USA: Oxford University Press,
p. 317. 721. ―Zia expressed his apprehensions [to Bhutto] that, if the agitation did not end, it
could erode the army‘s discipline and cause divisions in the ranks. This would be disastrous for the
army and for the country. Mr. Bhutto sensed the mood. Employing his charm, he said, ‗you are my
brother and I trust you.‘ He went on to confide that he had taken ‗other measures‘ to deal with the
PNA agitation. That statement rang alarm bells in General Zia‘s mind.‖ Sherbaz Khan Mazari.
(1999). Op. cit., pp. 467-468. 722. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 317.
723. The PNA negotiating team had brought in ten new points; they did so apologetically, saying
they were helpless; perhaps they were; but I am not helpless, and so I shall sign the accord
tomorrow 724. Khalid Mahmud Arif, (1995). Working with Zia: Pakistan‘s Power Politics 1977-1988. Oxford
University Press, p. 84.
206
If Bhutto was really keen to sign the accord, there was nothing to stop him from doing so
on the evening of 4 July. All of the PNA leadership was available in Sihala.725
Actually the PNA team for negotiations with the PPP had not the authority to influence
the negotiation and their outcomes. The PNA spokesmen had not full power to make
decisions and take action on behalf of PNA. The unanimous approval of the PNA
Council i.e., a council/committee which was consisted of eighteen representatives, two
for each of PNA‘s nine constituent parties was required for any agreement they
negotiated with PPP. Out of these four members of the council were not sincere and did
not want PNA team to reach an agreement with PPP and they preferred the Army to
takeover the government, oust Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and then hold fresh elections. They
were Asghar Khan ( Tehrik-e-Istaqlal), Sher Baz Khan Mazari and Begum Nasim Wali
Khan (National Democratic Party) and Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (Jamiat-al-Ulema-
e-Pakistan).726 According to Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Asghar Khan trusted military and was
of the view that,
―I have contacts with military; they will hold elections within 90 days, stop talks with
PPP.‖
Mazari further said, that Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad were
opposing Asghar Khan stance. Ghafoor Ahmad was an honest man. He wanted the talks
to be successful. While Shah Ahmad Noorani and Chudhury Zahoor Ilhai were
supporting Asghar Khan. In our meeting with PPP a day or two before Martial Law
Asghar walked out of a meeting. He also confessed that Asghar Khan had also written a
letter to army in which he invited military take over.727
Asghar Khan was most prominent who made every possible effort to assure the PNA
council that Army would come for a short span and hold elections within ninety days of
725. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 317. 726. Anwar Hussain Syed, (1992). The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Macmillan, p. 237. 727. Sherbaz Khan Mazari Interview with Farrukh Sohail Goindi, downloaded from Youtube on October 10,
2015.
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its taking over. Here it is necessary to mention that the Retired Air Marshal had invited
the Army through a letter 728 as early as May 4, 1977. He was of the opinion that Bhutto‘s
government was illegal and the Army should not support the illegal regime of Bhutto.729
At last, the Army general imposed martial law on July 5, 1977. Although Bhutto had tried
his best to keep army at a distance from politics through constitution but the said
constitution failed to stop army from coming into the corridor of power once again.730
Although Bhutto had agreed to hold fresh elections on October 8, 1977, yet General Zia
imposed Martial Law in the name of Operation Fairplay. It was totally an
unconstitutional act. Both PPP and PNA leaderships were conceding towards new
elections and an agreement. They should have been allowed to seek a political solution
and had there been chaos after elections, then army could have intervened. The
Constitution allows the civil government to seek help/support of the armed force in time
of need. It is the constitutional right of the government to use/apply its discretionary
power and invite military and send it back once the situation becomes normal and if
military denies going back, it is the violation of the constitution, and is regarded as high
treason. But Zia had taken oath of his office under the said constitution and yet he
violated the same by imposing Martial Law while giving it the name of Operation
Fairplay.731
Not only Bhutto but PNA too was responsible for the sorry state of affairs. If on the one
hand, PPP‘s leadership had many more shortcomings and weaknesses for promoting
democracy in the country, on the other hand, PNA composed of leaders having different
ideologies and thinking could not present itself as a viable alternative to the autocratic
regime of Bhutto. The only thing which united them was to oppose Bhutto jointly and
728. ―As men of honor (it is for you) to do your duty and the call of the duty in these trying
circumstances is not blind obedience to unlawful commands. There comes a time in the lives of
nations when each man has to ask himself whether he is doing the right thing. For you that time has
come. Answer this call honestly and save Pakistan.‖ 729. Anwar Hussain Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 237 730. Aslam Pervez Mamon, (n.d)., p. 269 731. Ibid., p. 270.
208
oust him from power. Having such great figure like Mufti Mahmood, Attaullah Mengal,
Asghar Khan, Abdul Wali Khan, Maulana Maudodi, Sherbaz Khan Mazari and Begum
Naseem Wali, not to mention all, PNA could not convince a substantive part of the
Pakistani population.732
6.11. Opposition Faults after the 1977 Elections
Actually the 1977 general elections, for most of the PNA factions, represented as a last
chance to get rid of Bhutto. They believed that if Bhutto could not be detached from
power at the time of 1977 elections process, it was uncertain that they would ever be able
to oust him and in case if he secured a two-third majority in the National Assembly, he
would be stronger than before and would be even more secure. The opposition (PNA)
leadership speculated in case PPP won the elections, Bhutto would bring in new
constitutional amendments so that he could slip back to establish presidential system for
pursuing his dreams of third world influence while either ignoring or taking only an
occasional interest in the affairs of Pakistan by then run by his junior colleagues from the
PPP. There was a possibility that made variegated opposition to close their ranks and to
bring down PPP leadership.733
The political groups came to the conclusion that for them the democratic process can not
open the door to power, work on a policy of creating crisis of such dimensions that it
becomes necessary for Army to be called out so that to maintain law and order situation.
Some of the PNA leaders thought that once the army comes they would deal with the
crisis. Thereafter, they assumed and hoped that military regime would speedily evolve a
new constitution presumably like that of Yahya Khan and hold elections in a manner that
would make it easy for them to realize their ambitions.734 They did not hesitate to confess
that in their view only Army intervention could get them rid of Bhutto; that they could
732. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 98. 733. Salmaan Taseer, (1979). Op. cit., p. 169. 734. Viewpoint. April 1, 1977. Third Martial Law, Between the Lines.
209
never hope to attain the political power through ballot box. Some of their partners, known
for their political integrity and faith in democratic process, seemed to had resigned
themselves to the view that in that situation nothing could be done and they had to go
along with the partners, even though they did not share the confidence of the self-
appointed Army lobby that such a development would lead to a quick takeover of power,
followed by an altruistic handing over to the opposition leadership.735
It seemed quite clear that PNA had decided in advance that if the PNA won the elections,
then the results would be accepted and the constitution should be respected and if the PPP
won then the elections would be considered as rigged and the result would not be
accepted. One illustration of such a behavior of the opposition is the Air Marshal Asghar
Khan‘s press interview in Karachi, held a few days earlier than the elections in which he
stated that he and his party were not ready to accept the victory of government. He did
not advance any proof of Bhutto intention to rig the elections on this stage which
seemingly was not an issue. They blatantly refused the victory claiming it to be country‘s
disaster that PPP will rule Pakistan. He did not express the need for strike and violence
and said that it would not serve much purpose but simply by refusing to sit in the
parliament. This was the base for a full fledged agitation. Later on, this stirred up the
opposition supporter‘s emotion and they were on the streets with much the same motto as
that of the Air Marshal. Their sole purpose was to bring Bhutto down. It was their sheer
demand and they were ready to pay any price for it.736 The fact that rigging in reality did
take place in certain constituencies had served the purpose of those PNA groups very
well, in that had been able to carry with them the parties which stood to lose a great deal
by refusing to seek a political way out of that deadlock.737 It seemed that some of the PNA
hardline leaders had decided to use other means to topple Bhutto‘s regime. But what
these people had in mind could not happen and every one lost.
735. Ibid. 736. Salmaan Taseer, (1979).Op. cit., pp.170. 737. Viewpoint. April 1, 1977. Third Martial Law, Between the Lines.
210
211
6.12. Conclusion
The adopting and persisting of the undemocratic attitude and practices on the part of the
incumbent government is limiting the efficiency of the opposition political parties in
different ways and that was what PPP practiced during 1977 elections. During election
campaign the PPP tried its best to block, weaken, suppress and also to divide different
opposition parties. Limited space was made available for opposition to take part in the
elections with its full vigor. In fact, the PPP established the rules for electoral contest
which favors them. They sought to limit or disallow opposition parties‘ access to the
media. All the available resources were used for the period of election campaign to
manipulate and influence voters. Different tactics were used to keep the potentially
dangerous opposition leaders away from contesting the elections.
Bhutto should have made every possible effort to ensure the fairness and smoothness of
the March 1977 elections, and that the country remains free of any trouble that had been
forecast by a band of rumor mongers. He had to have made such arrangement that would
eliminate all possibility of clashes during the whole process of elections. He should have
reached an understanding with the PNA leadership at the earliest without any delay,
which could have kept the democratic process intact. The deadlock created in the
aftermath of 1977 elections between PPP and PNA could only be resolved by political
process. Peaceful means could have been found to expunge the electoral record of all the
seats that were considered suspect on reasonable ground. Irrespective of the PNA‘s
stance, the Election Commission had to probe the National Assembly elections and
vacate all seats where it was claimed that election was rigged. Those found guilty of
malpractices, whether officials or ministers should have been dealt with severely. They
should have arrived at an early settlement that there would be re-election on the suspected
seats and that future elections would be held without any fear of rigging or other
malpractices. Both PPP‘s leadership and PNA‘s as well had to realize that ultimately a
mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement had to be found. The opposition parties, as
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they claimed to have been interested in the restoration of full democracy, should realized
that the situation provided them with a welcome opportunity to move forward to this
goal, and also prove their own estimate of their strength by accepting the proposal for
provincial elections. That would have created conditions for the elimination of crisis. And
if the opposition parties had secured majorities in all or most provinces, this would have
helped to strengthen PNA‘s demand for the re-election of the National Assembly.
Although there were experienced politicians on both sides who cried for establishing
democracy in the country. The need was to join hands and bring Pakistan out of that
crisis. Both PPP and PNA did not move on the path of reconciliation and created a
situation that facilitated military‘s come back to the corridor of power.
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CHAPTER - 7
BHUTTO’S LEADERSHIP, RULING-OPPOSITION RELATIONSHIP,
STATUS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE DISMISSAL OF PPP: A
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
7.1. Introduction
This chapter consists mostly of the views of experts gathered through interviews. These
views are subjected to analysis with the aim to determine how sincere the ruling party
was to the establishment of a truly democratic set-up in Pakistan. The genuineness of the
charges leveled against the government of Z. A. Bhutto culminating in the dissolution of
his government are also examined.
The chapter under discussion is based mostly on the primary sources; the information the
Researcher has collected from different persons particularly contemporaries of Z. A.
Bhutto. In this research, the researcher includes interviews taken from different people
regarding their views about the real picture of PPP-Opposition relationship and style of
politics of both PPP and opposition leaders. Whether it was in line with the democratic
norms and whether it promoted democracy or hampered it? For this purpose the
researcher has set questions to accumulate the views on the above stated theme. The
questionnaire has a list of questions dealing almost all the issues regarding PPP-
Opposition relationship during Bhutto era. For these open ended questions, the researcher
has selected two types of people from the society who may be the suitable people for all
these questions i.e., politicians (contemporaries of Z. A. Bhutto) from different political
parties and academicians from different institutions. Both types of people have a wide
knowledge about topic of research. The researcher‘s plan was to cover all the four
provinces but unfortunately it could not be made possible. From Baluchistan Sherbaz
Khan Mazari was hardly approached by the researcher but he was ill and not in a position
to have a discussion. The researcher tried his best to contact Atta Ullah Mengal but in
214
vain. From Punjab Etizaz Ahsan once agreed to give time but when he was contacted, he
was on a foreign visit. Same happened in the case of Raza Rabbani. From Khyber
Pukhtunkhwa, the researcher was able to interview Abdul Akbar Khan (senior member of
PPP, ex Deputy speaker of KP and personal secretary of Bhutto). Thanks to the
Karachians who not only gave time but also shared with the researcher some in-depth
information.
In all these interviews, the researcher faced many problems in conducting interviews,
because of different issues. Many interviewees especially from PPP became conscious of
their response regarding the questions. Many times, the interviewees gave very deep
information regarding my topic but also called it off the record. The second one is the
long and comprehensive questionnaire, containing open-ended questions which have very
comprehensive answers. Some of the interviewees have pressed for time and eventually
we have concluded the interview in a restricted time. The third is the accessibility of the
interviewees. Usually, once the time was fixed, but the respondent was busy in another
activity. This occurred mostly with the politicians. Many times, the researcher went from
Mardan to Islamabad for interview but failed to conduct even an interview because of the
busy schedule of the politicians, even the researcher stayed there for a couple of days in
Islamabad but could not conduct a single interview.
How much the political parties, both ruling and opposition, during PPP‘s first rule have
fulfilled their democratic obligations can be judged from the critical study of the political
developments during Bhutto rule (1972-1977).
7.2. PPPs Success in 1970 Elections and Aftermath
PPP under the leadership of its founder Bhutto got success, in the very first general
elections, in West Pakistan. The election results also afforded PPP an opportunity to put
the country on the track of democracy. Bhutto had before him examples of populist
215
dictators such as Sukarno whom Bhutto used to imitate religiously. But the difference
was stark in the sense that those dictators had created a stable structure or took the
support of some genuine political force to help them stay in power. The truth was soon
dawned upon Bhutto to organize a strong political base for him. The PPP that Bhutto
gave birth to was formed mainly of his devotees. As a political party of the masses, the
PPP should have been organized from the bottom-up i.e. the grassroots level-the trade
unionists, the peasants and the students; had they been included in the PPP, it could have
been of far more value and worth than the family heirlooms that Bhutto handpicked. The
consequence was that he could not tolerate dissent from among those he had bestowed
favors on. Instead of projecting the PPP as being one of the major political parties, Bhutto
believed it to represent the whole of Pakistan.738 Ayub khan was blamed by Bhutto of
restricting the freedom of expression and civil liberties. The military regime was
lambasted and compared with the Kuomintang regime of pre-revolutionary china where
there was limited opportunity for free association and press freedom. Bhutto had it set as
his manifesto to help Pakistan embark on a parliamentary and participatory democracy
where all power should be vested in the people. It was primarily on these promises of
democratic demands and socialist aspirations that Bhutto won the 1970 elections.739
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto‘s ascendency to the office of the authority was a departure from the
previous bureaucracy-military axis to democratic traditions. He was one of the
democratically elected leaders of the country. He was acclaimed as leader of Pakistan
who had the international reputation as well. After the father of the nation, Muhammad
Ali Jinnah, he was believed to be the first popular charismatic leader who could sustain
the credibility of being a popular leader and soon he came to be known as Qauid-i-Awam
(Leader of the people). Bhutto‘s charisma as an endearing leader still rings in the hearts
of many people. He generated a new style in politics by departing the long standing
738. Tariq Ali, (1983). Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State. Penguin Books, p.108. 739. Ibid., p.107.
216
military civil bureaucratic traditions. After the founding fathers he is recognized as the
leader who has left his imprint on politics of the country. Even when Bhutto was ousted
by General Zia, Mehmood Sham, editer of a Journal ―Meyar‖ from Karachi stated in a
title story that ―Bhutto ka ektedar hatam howa hey Bhutto ka dauar khatam nahi
howa‖(Although Bhutto‘s rule has ended but not the period)740
. The conditions at present
have changed a lot. A lot of water has gone under the bridge; PPP has lost its luster but
Bhutto‘s personal achievements stand apart.
Bhutto was a leader who came to power and took control of state affairs in his own hands
when there was a lot of confusion. There was lack of leadership at national level
particularly in West Pakistan, and there were some from Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (NWFP)
and Balochistan whose politics was limited to regional level. The only national level
party was Awami League which was popular in the Eastern Pakistan. The PPP was
relatively a new born party but which enjoyed equally the same popularity as the Awami
League in Western Pakistan. The PPP gave slogans like: if it came to power it would
fight a long war with India; it would give respect to the poor and deprived people of the
country; it would change the whole system through democratic process. 741
Bhutto was
indeed an intelligent leader who knew how to mould public opinion and how to get
benefitted from an opportunity. Not only he raised the slogan of democracy but for the
first time he introduced popular politics in Pakistan. He himself introduced popular
issues. And the masses supported him. He visited cities, villages and all the far flung
areas of the country and created political consciousness among the Pakistani masses. He
gave them courage to take interest in political affairs. He knew that the ultimate power
rests with people. They bring leaders to power and they can oust them. He also raised the
heart touching slogan of Bread, Clothes and Shelter (Roti, Kapra aor Makan). He gave
740. Interview with Syed Jaffar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Studies
Centre, Karachi University) on 31-07-2015. 741. Iftikhar Ahmad Interview in Tv Talk Show, ―Great Debate on Bhutto‖.
217
voice to farmers, labourers and all the aggrieved sections of the society and promised to
provide Roti, Kapra and Makan to everyone.742
There were no general elections in the country from 1947 to 1970. In the first general
elections of 1970, Bhutto through his slogans, speeches and party‘s manifesto gave the
impression that if it came to power, PPP would end feudalism, landlordism and the
suppression of the poor people. PPP‘s leadership talked about the common man politics.
It gave the impression that PPP was the party of poor people. It promised it would
empower the masses in real sense. But unfortunately he violated the very basic ideals of
democracy which he stressed upon, before coming into power.743
Later on it proved that
most of PPP‘s candidates from Sindh were feudals and landlords. Similarly a lot of those
elected from Punjab too belonged to the same class.
Leftists and progressive used Bhutto, as they needed a leader for their program and
policies i.e. socialism to be spread and implemented across the broad spectrum of society.
Bhutto, by the same token, used these leaders. Bhutto‘s close relationship with masses
was due to the efforts of Miraj Muhammad Khan, Tariq Aziz and Mustafa Khar, among
others. But the same leaders were treated as exiles in their own party.744
When in the aftermath of 1970 general elections the East Pakistan debacle took place, the
meeting of the assembly was deferred till 1972. There was anxiousness in the air and
people felt deserted. In the backdrop of the same circumstances, Bhutto took charge as
president of the country. Bhutto and opposition relationship was not good enough, as
people held him responsible for Dakha debacle.745
It is considered that the seeds of
disintegration were sown during Ayub Khan‘s period and situation got worse during
Yahya Khan period and it is true that the leadership of West Pakistan was not ready to let
742. Interview with Muhammad Hussain Mehinti (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI)
on 27-07-2015. 743. Tariq Ali, (1983). Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State. Penguin Books, p. 108. 744. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Chief and Senior Member of JI)
on 29-07-2015. 745. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Chief and Senior Member of JI)
on 29-07-2015.
218
East Pakistan rule. Bhutto was also responsible and he did not let any peaceful settlement
to take place because of his thirst for power and authority. He once told, ―the keys of
Sindh and Punjab are in my pocket ant this is the source of authority‖ (Sindh aor Punjab
ki kunji mare jaib ma hey aor yahi ektedar ka sarchashma hey).746
Initially, both Sheikh
Mujib-ur-Rehman and Bhutto could not sort out the solution which resulted in the
disintegration of the country. One cannot say that Sheikh Mujib wanted to keep the
country united and Bhutto was wholly responsible for disintegration. Politicians always
have their own priorities and preferences but they should rise above their personal
interests and think of their people. By the same logic Sheikh Mujib should have been
allowed to form the government. Democracies sustain themselves on the basis of
consensus and cooperation and not on the basis of one dominant party exploiting the
other. The civil war in East Pakistan had eroded the trust of the public which they had in
the rulers and the institutions.
Bhutto, despite being recognized as a great leader, in the end was hanged but he never
sought amnesty. He avoided compromise with military general. He was supporter of Pak-
China friendship and was against US. He helped Arabs in their war against Israel. He
called Islamic summit in Lahore. He provided Pakistan military with atom bomb. That is
why US had turned against him.747 Once while delivering a speech in the National
Assembly he said, ―Sufaid hathi mere khoon ka peyasa ho geya hy‖ (the bloodhound are
after my blood) Bhutto told, ‗the bloodhounds are after my blood‘.748 The provision of
Identity Card to the citizens of Pakistan was a great achievement of PPP leadership.
Earlier, passport was allowed only to the importers and exporters. This was Bhutto‘s
contribution that every citizen got the right to have it.749
746. Haroon Rashid. Interview in Tv Talk Show, ―Great Debate on Bhutto‖. 747. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Founder Member of PPP)
on 30-07-2015. 748. Tariq Ali.(1983).Op. cit., p. 130. 749. Interview with Abdul Akbar Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex- Deputy Speaker and Senior
Member of PPP) on 18-11-2015
219
The Martial Law derailed the democratic process in its very beginning/early days.750 So
when Bhutto came to power he focused on to provide a constitution to the country. That
was a challenging task. The country was unable to create a viable constitution in the
previous 25 years. This was our bad luck that half of our population, who struggled
equally for Pakistan, was separated then. The rest of Pakistan was faced with similar
movements which we could not eliminate till today. That is because of the lack of justice
in our society. Our leadership could not deliver justice and justice come through
democratic system, where ultimate power rests with the people. They can form the
government, bring changes in it and can even oust an undesirable government. But, for
all that, there is always the need of a document i.e. constitution.751 When he assumed
power the main problem was the framing of a constitution. He soon converted the Martial
Law into an interim constitution in 1972 and with the support of other political parties
provided a permanent constitution to the country in 1973. Although, before Bhutto, there
were great democrats in the country, they were known as champions of the democracy
like Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan and a lot more from East
Pakistan like Hussain Shahed Suhurwardy who was a great democrat but they could not
provide a constitution to the country. The 1956 constitution was formed, according to
which there were going to be elections in 1959 but was nipped in the bud by imposing
Martial Law in 1958.752 The 1956 constitution could not get the chance to be implemented
and the second one i.e. constitution of 1962 was formulated by a dictator i.e. Ayub
Khan.753 So it was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who gave a federal, parliamentary democratic and
Islamic constitution to country, unanimously approved by the elected members of the
750. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 751. Interview with Prof N. D. Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07-
2015. 752. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 753. Interview with Prof N. D. Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07-
2015.
220
Assembly.754 This was a great contribution on the part of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that he
invited all the opposition parties with open heart and took all the political parties on
board despite their political differences. All the political parties whether from left, right
or centrist, framed a practicable constitution acceptable to all.755 Most of the opposition
suggestions were also accepted. For example it was on opposition suggestion that Islam
was declared as state religion. No law would be made that clashes with Quran and
Sunnah and all the existing laws would be adjusted accordingly. Fundamental rights were
guaranteed and sovereignty of parliament was ensured in the Constitution. Steps were
taken for the independence of courts. One of the very basic demand of opposition to
declare Qadianis as non-muslims was accepted after a prolong debate and discussion in
the parliament.756
The credit for the 1973 constitution goes not only to Bhutto but to opposition too, where
they withdrew from some of their important demands. If Bhutto accommodated
opposition, the opposition too accommodated Bhutto. After all both sides played their
parts and formulated a constitution and if opposition had adopted the path of
confrontation in that point of time there would be chances for a third Martial Law.757 The
environment was set for a peaceful and trustworthy relationship between the ruling and
opposition parties. The draft of the constitution was approved by parliament
unanimously. All the political parties, ruling as well as all the opposition parties played a
positive role. There were still chance of embitterment of relations between PPP and
opposition on various other issues. Consequent to such controversies, emergency was
754. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 755. Interview with Prof N. D. Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07-
2015. 756. Interview with Muhammad Hussain Mehinti (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI)
27-07-2015. 757. Interview with Syed Usmani on (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) 16-07-2015.
221
imposed in the country immediately after the promulgation of the constitution758which
made constitution practically inactive.
7.3. Ruling Party’s Relation with the Opposition Provincial Governments
However, practically Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto‘s authority was based less on the 1973
constitution and more on his personal strength. Bhutto‘s program of socialism coupled
with his skill of making powerful and effective speeches radicalized especially the urban
sectors in the second half of the 1960s and was responsible for boosting the hopes of the
public for restoration of democratic rule. But after some time factionalism and
patrimonialism erupted in the ruling party, especially in the province of Punjab. Also, the
PPP internal cohesion was affected and lost it public esteem by the political and
bureaucratic corruption, state intervention in the economy and equally the political
violence ( beating, arresting and murdering) the opponents. Although Bhutto‘s PPP
mobilized the people for overthrowing the military regimes and restoration of democracy
in the country but it failed to transform into an organized political party, based on
peaceful and cooperative functioning in an open polity.759
From the very outset the relations between federal government of PPP and NAP-JUI
coalition governments in the two provinces of NWFP (now KPK) and Baluchistan were
not cordial. Both of the coalition partners were not satisfied with Bhutto‘s style of politics
and the governmental structure as conceived by the 1973 constitution. The differences
between federal government and the two provincial governments were getting worse and
waiting for a cause to burn. PPP leadership perceived these differences as a serious threat
to his intention of ruling Pakistan for a long time. The Bhutto government had the
negotiating tools at his disposal for settling matters with the opposition governments in
the two provinces. The federal government had to give more provincial autonomy in
758. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chief and Senior Member of JI)
on 29-07-2015. 759.Pakistan: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and A New Constitutional System, available at:
http://www.mongabay.com/history/pakistan/pakistanzulfiqar_ali_bhutto_and_a_new_constitutional
_system.html
222
administrative and financial fields but unfortunately the centralized intention of Bhutto to
rule Pakistan changed provincial leadership through unfair intervention from the centre
that led to settle the issue in the battlefield and not in the assembly.760 Bhutto should had
given a free hand to the NAP-JUI leaders to govern Baluchistan within the democratic
framework, because they were the elected leaders of the masses as Bhutto and other PPP
leaders were in the centre, Punjab and Sindh. But the opposition too was responsible for
such sort of situation. After establishing provincial government they thought that they
could do whatever, which is done after a revolution. 761 In that point of time, there was
need of dialogue and negotiations but the NAP leadership particularly the youngsters
showed no signs of patience. They did not realize the seriousness of the situation and did
not play a responsible role. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, was the only opposition leader who
adopted a reasonable attitude and was not in favor of a direct clash and conflict with the
centre. He believed in democracy and considered differences of opinion as inevitable part
of any democratic system. He wanted the solution of all the problems within the
democratic framework. Rift among Baloch political leaders paved the way for Bhutto to
scrape the provincial government. 762 Neither Bhutto nor opposition from Baluchistan
showed any respect for the rules of the game, which resulted in the derailing of the
democratic process in its very early days. Baluchistan issue was not handled properly. In
point of fact the biggest problem of Pakistan was and still is that it is projected to be a
security state. It has always been remained the main issue to protect and promote its unity
and integrity. In Baluchistan such a situation was created by the mishandling of the
government that led to security risk. The use of force was not a good idea. There was
need for some democratic means to solve the problem Bhutto used undemocratic attitude
760. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford
University Press, p.396. 761. Interview with Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Karachi), on 31-07-2015. 762. Interview with Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Karachi), on 31-07-2015.
223
and strategy for the solution which disrupted the democratic process in its premature
phase.
Parliament is the main forum where difference is made and debated. But there has to be a
debate and discussion that leads towards a consensus. Differences of opinion are
something natural but try for the development of an understanding through discussion
and negotiation. It is good and inevitable to take opposition in confidence and if
consensus is not possible then at least get a majority for taking decisions. Bhutto might
want to establish relationship with opposition in accordance with the norms and values of
democracy but his attitude was aggressive and that is why that might have led to
misunderstanding. However, if PPP‘s leadership did believe in democracy then they had
to accommodate those who differed.
Sometimes PPP leadership showed a great respect for democratic norms. For example,
Tri Partite Agreement of 6th
March 1972 with NAP-JUI coalition and allowing these
parties to form governments in Baluchistan and NWFP (now KP). Bhutto also included
opposition members to Shimla Delegation, as for as the constitution making process is
concerned, Constitutional Accord of Oct 1972 is a commendable effort on the part of
ruling and opposition political parties. In the end, in the aftermath of 1977 elections
Bhutto took opposition on board to reach an understanding and agreement. Bhutto
adopted kind and democratic attitude on the above occasions. On some occasions he was
very friendly and accommodating towards opposition. But as a whole his attitude towards
different opposition political parties as well as members of his own party who ever dared
to oppose Bhutto, he was very much offensive and sometimes he took a small danger as
big one, and an ordinary opponent leader as a big enemy. He used to personalize the
political differences.763 Being recognized as a political leader, Bhutto should have
reconciled differences and ignored pity issues. It does not mean that whatever opposition
763. Interview with Syed Jaffar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Karachi) on 31-07-2015.
224
political parties were doing was right, they too adopted offensive and non-democratic
attitude, but being a ruling party, being an elected representative party, PPP should have
exhibited greater responsibility and established cordial and peaceful relations with all.
Bhutto had extraordinary quality of dialogue, and it was he who led the greatest
movement after independence of the country. He had some very good dialogues with the
opposition which no doubt bore fruits. Quite a few times there arose chances of
understanding and settlement between the ruling and opposition parties. The 1973
constitution was formed with the cooperation of opposition. The Quaidiani issue was
resolved through second constitutional amendment. And if the opposition did not agree
and showed no accommodation, the situation would surely become worse. But the
Bhutto‘s ego and vindictiveness could not allow it to happen. In fact, he had trust only on
himself and ever tried to belittle opposition. So any hope for both the sides to work in a
cooperative environment and promote democratic culture in the country proved an
illusion.764
Bhutto is still alive for his two great achievements i.e. 1973 Constitution, and nuclear
program. He formed the 1973 Constitution with the consensus of all political parties but
after that his rule did not give the required space to the opposition to play their role. The
gap between Bhutto and opposition was so wide that no opposition leader issued a
condolence message except Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Sardar Qayyum. When
Martial Law was imposed Hyderabad tribunal was established Abdul Wali Khan and
Baluch leaders were arrested. Abdul Wali Khan was admitted in Combined Military
Hospital (CMH) for treatment. Zia-ul Haq visited him in CMH where Wali Khan told
Zia.‖ admi do hen aor kabar ek, agar ye kabar ma nahi jaega to tum jaoge.‖ (there are two
men and one grave, if he does not go then you will).765 And it was this huge gap that led
to Martial Law for long time. The basic thing is political forces should provide space to
764. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of
JI) on 29-07-2015. 765. Mujib ur Rehman Shami. Interview in Tv Talk Show, ―Great Debate on Bhutto‖
225
each other. Bhutto left no stone unturned to suppress and intimidate opposition. It was
perhaps of this that Abdul Wali Khan did not protest when Bhutto was hanged. Once he
said, ―ye saala es ka kabil hy‖, (he deserved this). Begum Wali Khan has once stated in a
news paper, that Abdul Wali Kahn said, ―esko phansi charna chaheye, Bhutto Phansi se
kam nahi manega‖ (Bhutto should be hanged).766 According to Munnawar Hasan this was
NAP leader‘s reaction to what they had suffered at Hyderabad prison.767
Bhutto was an opportunist politician. Whenever he felt the need of opposition or to
protect his slogan i.e. democracy is our polity then he took the path of dialogue and
preferred consensus which is the part of democracy. So if his personal interests or PPP‘s
interests demanded he was a democrat. And once his interests were served, then he cared
but little for the rules of the democracy.768 In this undemocratic relationship between PPP
and opposition political parties particularly NAP leaders too were responsible. On the one
hand, if Abdul Wali Khan, Khair Bkhsa Marri and Communist party led by Jamal Naqvi
at that time adopted extreme approach769 Bhutto on the other was not ready to retreat. All
of them could not understand the fledgling democracy and result was the loss for each.
And once again the rightists got entry into power. If they had worked in cooperation and
had created a spirit of accommodating each other and let the PPP government to work,
the result would be different and far better than what happened thereafter.
7.4. PPP and the Local Government
During the first period of PPP in power, there were no elections within the party. All
office bearers were either appointed or approved by Bhutto himself. This was totally
against the norms of democracy. The problem was further compounded by the fact that
766. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 767. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of
JI) on 29-07-2015. 768. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of
JI) on 29-07-2015. 769. Interview with Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Ex. Chairman of Mass
Communication Department Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST)
Karachi, on 16-07-2015.
226
even though under the 6th
March accord of 1972, local body‘s elections were envisaged
on a date to be fixed as early as possible after the provincial assemblies were convened but
no such elections were held in the provinces.770 Rafi Raza admitted this in a note to Bhutto
on 21 December 1976, where he stated that looking back over past five years, one of the
greatest errors was not having local democracy at the grass root level; control continued to
be from the top.771 Looking to the politics of PPP at federal level, it was not ironic that
despite the fact that PPP manifesto provided for local government but in reality the party
leadership was not prepared to devolve power to the local governments. Local
governments are the important components of democratic process. It is only through the
devolution of power to the gross root level that strengthens democracy but Bhutto did not
show any interest, and thus the expectations of the masses were dashed to the ground.772
7.5. Freedom of Expression under Bhutto
Freedom of press, freedom of expression and freedom of association are the pillars of an
open and democratic society. Unfortunately during PPP‘s rule under Bhutto leadership
different newspapers which dared to criticize Bhutto‘s government, were either banned or
silenced by using Federal Security Force (FSF). Even a friendly U.S diplomat admitted
that "for all his suave wordiness, Bhutto craves power, total power, and he is incapable of
tolerating opposition or criticism of any sort." The Pakistani press had been frightened by
arrests and fabricated cases against editors of critical publications.773 The dissenting press
was not allowed and was rigorously suppressed. The editors of the dissenting press were
detained and imprisoned under preventive laws. The prominent among those were Altaf
Gauhar editor Dawn, Muzaffar Qadir editor Weekly Punjab Punch, Altaf Hasan Qureshi
editor Urdu Digest, Mujibur Rehman Shami editor Weekly Zindagi, Muhammad
770. Mubashir Hasan, (2000). The Mirage of Power-An Inquiry into the Bhutto Years (1971-1977). Karachi:
Oxford University Press, p.146. 771. Rafi Raza, (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press,
p.304. 772. Dawn Newspaper, November 4, 2015. Local Government Polls: Back to the Gross Root Level. 773. Newsweek, July 16, 1973. Pakistan: Life with Bhutto, p.13.
227
Salahuddin editor Jasarat.774 Under Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) not only opposition
leaders were arrested but also most of the critical newspapers and journals were censored.
He used to use force and suppress all who opposed him in any way. He terrorized some,
and caused fear to others. Through his autocratic attitude he wanted to keep everything in
his control. This situation continued till the end of his rule.775
7.6. Bhutto’s Attitude towards Members of his Party
Bhutto treated very badly even his own party stalwarts like J. A. Rahim, Miraj
Muhammad Khan, Rasul Bakhsh Talpur, Mir Ali Ahmad Talpur, Mubashar Hasan, Tariq,
Abdul Haliq Mardan. When Mahmud Ali Kasuri, vice chairman of PPP quit government
as minister of law in protest against its disregard for civil liberties, he promptly found
himself and his two sons caught up in murder blame. When the charge failed to stick, the
government launched a tax audit against all members of the Kasuri family.776 The
ministers, MNA‘s and MPA‘s of his own party could not get their due rights. Some were
ousted forcefully without any explanation, charge sheet and any respect for party
constitution and some left the party one by one due to the harsh attitude of the their party
leader.777 So if a leader is not ready to democratize his party then how he could be
believed to give democracy to the country. Resultantly, this was the proof that if he was
not ready to work in cooperation with his own party members how he could be expected
to cooperate with opposition.
7.7. Formation and Use of Federal Security Force
The military surrender and the disintegration of the country in 1971 had its basis in
Bhutto‘s role due to which Tri-Partite (Muji-ur-Rehman, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Yahya
774. Tanvir Ahmad Tahir, (2010). Political Dynamics of Sindh 1947-1977. Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Karachi, p.636. For details see, Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Misuse of
Media Islamabad ,1978. 775. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Charirman and Senior Member of
JI), on 29-07-2015 776. Newsweek, July 16, 1973,Pakistan: Life with Bhutto, p.13. 777. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Chairman and Menior Member of
JI on 29-07-2015.
228
Khan) Dialogue failed. Bhutto had the fear of military revenge and also wanted to
disengage the military from politics thus, FSF was created for limiting his reliance on
military.778 And after coming into power Bhutto sent the army into background. Although
Bhutto successfully negotiated Shimla Agreement with India in 1972 and was able to
bring back about 93000 prisoners of war but yet internally had a fear of army, so he
established FSF.779 He attempted to get two pronged objectives by the said force, first, it
was, a search for administrative reforms, which was no doubt an admirable move,
second, the FSF was used against his opponents to coerce them and ensure Bhutto‘s
paramountacy in the politics of the country.780 According to Ziring, Abdul Wali Khan‘s
allegations that Bhutto had plotted to have him murdered added fuel to the fire. Bhutto
was warned and threatened not to venture into the border provinces, forced Bhutto into
forming the federal security force (FSF) to guard him from dangers to his life.781
FSF did
increase the mistrust of opposition towards PPP. Unfortunately, it could not deliver its
objectives which PPP claimed. It interfered in the political affairs which led to the
opposition mistrust.
The said paramilitary force was formed of the retired army personnel and some of the
most notorious criminals. Akbar khan, the alleged accomplice in the Rawalpindi
conspiracy case , was handed the charge of its leadership. The FSF was, by extension,
empowered with intimidating, isolating, and attacking anyone suspected of designing
plots against PPP leadership. The FSF used indiscriminate force against the innocent
citizens which terrorized the already suspicious public. The Pakistan army was also
alarmed by the activities of this parallel force. The FSF was used as an instrument of
power. Briefly put, both the creator and his creation were widely mistrusted and resented
778. Veena Kukreja, (2003). Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises. New Dehli:
Sage Publications, p. 37 779. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 780. Ashok Kapur, (2006). Pakistan in Crisis. London: Routledge, pp.114-115. 781. Lawrence Ziring. (2005), Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History. Manas Publications, p. 141.
229
by the public in general and PPP political opposition in particular.782 According to Hafiz
Naeem ur Rehman FSF was Bhutto‘s goondaism. It was a part of Bhutto cruelty.783 It
seemed that Federal Security Force (FSF) was meant for crushing the opposition. The
said force gave a tough time to PPP‘s opposition in general and NAP and Tehrik-i-
Isteklal of Retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan in particular.784 FSF was established to
protect his personal power and position. FSF did play a role in damaging democracy.
PPP‘s leadership applied FSF and other illegal and unconstitutional means to suppress
opposition. It would be better if FSF would not have been created.
7.8. Constitutional Amendments
First Bhutto used to solve many issues through ordinances. Although there was not a
strong opposition, but he was not ready to tolerate it and often tried to bypass National
Assembly through ordinances. This was something undemocratic on the part of PPP
leadership. Then the way the Constitution was amended during Bhutto rule was not a
right one. If opposition was involved and consensus was reached upon it would be better.
Some of the amendments if not made would be better. During the amendments made
under Bhutto leadership the spirit with which the 1973 Constitution was formed was
totally lost.785 Most of the amendments were unilateral. Opposition had no role in these
amendments but to oppose. There was no participation and no initiative on the part of
opposition. Although the amendments were passed from the National Assembly but
unilaterally and opposition was not taken into confidence.786 Even some of the
amendments were approved when the opposition was on protest staying away from the
parliament. This act disappointed not only opposition but also the common man.
782. Ibid. 783. Interview with Hafiz Naeem ur Rehman (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and President JI Karachi) on
14-07-2015. 784. Interview with Syed Jafar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Karachi) on 31-07-2015. 785. Interview with Muhammad Hussain Mehinti (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI)
on 27-07-2015. 786. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of
JI) on 29-07-2015.
230
Democracy has its rules of the game. There are rules for elections, agitation, opposition,
and respect for traditions and most importantly for legislation and amending constitution
but PPP‘s leadership violated these norms and values while amending the Constitution.
Similarly the democratic claims of PPP also proved false in the process of 1977 elections.
7.9. Why the Dialogue in the Aftermath of 1977 Elections Failed
In January 1977, Bhutto announced the dates for general elections i.e. 7 March and 10
March for National and Provincial Assemblies respectively. PPP leadership found it an
opportunity for elections. Bhutto thought that if on one hand he was at the peak of his
popularity on the other hand opposition parties were in a weak and in scattered position
and they would not be able to get united. But surprisingly within hours nine different
opposition parties got united and formed PNA. Mufti Mahmood was elected as president
and Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa secretary general.787 The formation of PNA was aimed to
challenge Bhutto‘s authoritativeness.
Not only Bhutto but all the Chief Ministers and some other were elected unopposed. It
means that though election was announced but selection was preferred. According to
Munnawar Hasan Bhutto rigged the election for securing two third majority and for
weakening the opposition. But till midnight on 7 March opposition had planned what to
do next. The campaign for the election from January 7, to March 7, had made the masses
to take interest in politics. And there were chances of an organized movement on the part
of opposition against the rigging. They also boycotted the provincial elections. According
to Munnawar Hasan on 10 March Pakistan Television (PTV) showed the huge crowed of
masses that had come out to vote on 7 March. This was to negate the boycott of the
opposition and give the impression that the absence of opposition did not make any
difference and it was useless to boycott.788
787. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of
JI) on 29-07-2015. 788. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of
JI) on 29-07-2015.
231
On 23rd
March 1977 National Assembly session was called on but as opposition was on
boycott so they did not participate in the session. They rejected the March 7 election and
demanded for fresh polls. They also demanded for the dismissal of the old Election
Commission and a new one to replace it. As most of the opposition leaders were arrested
and sent behind bars, so the National Assembly session was considered as unilateral.789
If Bhutto‘s government machinery had not committed rigging and other malpractices in
the elections, PPP would yet win the election but with a little margin, but it would meant
respect for votes, respect for popular choice and respect for democracy but sorry to say
PPP autocratic leadership wasted the chance. Due to the opposition boycott the elections
lost its credentials. It became very difficult for Bhutto to keep his standing either in
media, courts or in other democratic institutions.
At last after 1977 elections, on the call of opposition, almost across the country the
protesters took to the streets for seeking their fundamental right that government is
accountable to them and responsive to their aspirations. It was a wan organized
movement led by PNA leadership that culminated in the military entrance into the
corridor of power.
7.10. Military Takeover
Bhutto wanted to establish his dictatorship after the 1977 elections but this time it was
difficult. As the situation grew beyond the control of FSF, army was called in, which took
it as a chance to get rid of the FSF. Most of the Zia‘s disenchanted colleagues denied to
act in support of Bhutto. The latter refused to yield to opposition demands and warned the
opposition of disastrous consequences if they continued the rioting and could not rein in
their supporters.790
After the March 1977 elections, during the negotiations between ruling PPP and PNA,
the opposition put forward two key demands i.e., withdrawal of cases against Pathan and
789. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of
JI) on 29-07-2015. 790. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History, 2005, p.158.
232
Baloch leaders and army should be called back into barracks. As by that time Bhutto had
made his mind to reach a settlement with the opposition so he agreed to these demands.
Zia and group of his corps commander were not ready to accept such a settlement. During
the negotiation and a few days before the military take over Zia attended a meeting of
PPP and PNA leaders with some documents and charts arguing/pleading that it would be
difficult to accept the demands and release ‗secessionists‘ and ‗traitors‘.791
Abdul Hafeez
Peerzada also expressed similar view, during interview when the researcher asked Abdul
Hafeez Peerzada that when PPP and PNA leaderships were agreed to reach a settlement
and both sides had sorted out everything then why the agreement remained unfulfilled, he
was of the view that Army showed its resistance over two points i.e., withdrawal of
Hyderabad conspiracy case and secondly army withdrawal from Boluchistan.792The
generals insisted that unless an immediate agreement was reached between the
government and the opposition parties, they would not be able to control the situation.
Bhutto was effectively trapped by this pincer movement.793 When general Chishti was
asked that an agreement was reached on 3rd
July between PPP and PNA and on 4th
July
Bhutto made a press conference and they were going to sign the agreement on the
morning of 5th
July, Abdul Hafeez Peerzada from PPP and Professor Ghafoor from PNA
who were the members of negotiation team, are on the record that things were settled
down between them and also Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan is on the record that agreement
had reached then what was the need to impose Martial Law?. General Chishti denied and
stated that they are wrong, telling lie no such agreement had been reached between the
two sides.794 When Chishti was asked that when did operation Fair Play was plan? He
replied that Zia called me and General Arif on 3rd
July and asked that situation was not
791. Tariq Ali, (1983). Op. cit., p. 134. 792. Interview with Abdul Hafeez Peerzada (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Minister and Senior
Member of PPP) on 13-06-2015. 793. Tariq Ali.(1983). Op. cit., p. 134. 794. General Faiz Ali Chishti interview with Farrukh Sohail Goindi in a talk show, Tannazur: Perspective
233
good so it might happen to impose Martial Law. Zia got a message that everything is
right. Then on 4th
July when there was cabinet meeting General Arif (military secretary)
General Riaz (Agetent General) and myself (local core commander) were present in
General Zia house. Gen Zia was standby that Bhutto would ask and he would go there.
We were sitting there and Zia got a telephonic message from Bhutto that ―apko ane ki
zarorat nahi hey, ye teek raste pe nahi arahe, hum hod sara kuch teek karlenge.‖ (You do
not need to come, they are not coming on the track, and I myself will handle them.) Then
Zia decided that no understanding had developed and there is no agreement.795
In fact it was a failure of the political parties who could not sort out a solution of their
problems. On one hand, if initially Bhutto did not agreed to the key demands of the
opposition then some forces among the opposition did not want a peaceful settlement and
even invited military intervention. In a nutshell, both PPP as a ruling party and opposition
parties (PNA) a coalition of nine different opposition political parties too played their
part in weakening democracy to the extent of allowing inviting military to take over.
Extremist elements on both sides did not allow the democratic process to be continued
smoothly. In PNA there were of course some, who wanted an understanding with PPP
leadership and did not want to derail democratic process but some of its extremist
elements, wanted military takeover like Asghar Khan and Begum Nasim Wali Khan
thought that military would come for 3 to 4 months and would conduct elections and they
would get power.796
Also the adoption of the tradition of a dictator affected Bhutto politics negatively and his
mass support which had brought him to power was decreasing day by day. The military
took advantage of that. Think tanks of military feared that Bhutto rule was not suitable
795. General Faiz Ali Chishti interview with Farrukh Sohail Goindi in a talk show, Tannazur: Perspective
[email protected] 796. Interview with Syed Jafar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre,
University of Karachi) on 31-07-2015.
234
for its own maneuvering.797 Time and again Bhutto used repressive measures and military
might to silence and punish those who opposed him. His more and more reliance on
military afforded military an opportunity to intervene in the domestic situations and thus
it slowly and gradually entered into the corridor of power and ultimately it removed
PPP‘s leadership from power in 1977.798
When ruling party is suppressing and intimidating the opposition, no doubt they had to
react. So all who suffered at Bhutto‘s hands got united and linked with military and ISI.
Wali Khan, JI, Muslim League and Asghar all sought ISI support against Bhutto Fascist
tendencies. 799
There seemed undemocratic tendencies in PNA movement and this was
negative on the part of opposition. In the end Asghar Khan, Begum Nasim Wali and
Sherbaz Khan Mazari did not let the agreement with Bhutto. All of them could not
understand the fledgling democracy and result was the loss for each. And once again the
rightists got entry into power. If they had worked in cooperation and had created a spirit
of accommodating each other and let the PPP government to work, the result would be
different.
7.11. PPP’s Slogan: ‘Democracy is our Polity’
As a civilian leader Bhutto took the control of the country as Civil Martial Law
Administrator which itself was the negation of democratic norms. Either it was the need
of the time or he had no other option, but as a democrat he got the stain that he had come
through Martial Law. Once came to power, PPP‘s leadership used to take unilateral
actions. When the constitution was approved on the very next day emergency was
imposed and he took all the authority in his own hands. Also, if constitution was
implemented, then what was the need for emergency through which he practically ruled
797. Interview with Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Chairman of Mass
Communication Department Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST)
Karachi, on 16-07-2015..) 798. Monshipouri, Mahmood, and Amjad Samuel. "Development and Democracy in Pakistan: Tenuous or
Plausible Nexus?" Asian Survey (1995): 973-989. 799 . Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Ex Chairman of Mass Communication Department Federal Urdu University
of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST) Karachi, on 16-07-2015.
235
the country? Most of the time he used undemocratic means to treat the opposition i.e.
undue interference in the NAP-JUI coalitions provincial governments of NWFP (KP) and
Baluchistan, keeping the opposition out while amending the constitution, restricting the
freedom of press, suppression and intimidation of all those who opposed him, curtailing
the freedom of judiciary etc. When the opposition sought the support of courts which
seemed only hope for them but unfortunately the courts could not help the opposition.800
All this proves that Bhutto had no respect for any law or constitution and the slogan,
―Democracy is our Polity‖ was meant to catch public imaginations and support and not a
real commitment for democracy.
Bhutto was a great leader and will be remembered as such in the history of Pakistan. He
was well educated, well learned, conscious and hard worker. He used to meet common
people every time. He was a popular leader. J. A. Rahim, Miraj Muhammad Khan,
Khurshid Hasan Mir, Hayat Muhammad Khan, Rasul Bakhsh Talpur, Mukhtar Rana were
men of respect. Asghar Khan, Wali Khan, Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo,
Khair Bakhsh Mari all were renowned political figures. Mufti Mahmood was great
political figure. Some of the Baluch leaders when asked by Zia for support against
Bhutto, they did not agree and responded that they would fight Bhutto without seeking
support from military. Attaullah Mengal was very much clear. He was against opposition
support for Zia against Bhutto. Some of the opposition leaders did not support Martial
Law. This was their greatness. But sorry to say neither PPP nor its opponents could
sustain democracy and miserably failed to curtail autocratic tendencies in the politics of
the country. But being the ruling party PPP leadership was more responsible. There was
extreme political enmity between Abdul Wali Khan and Bhutto, 801 which was
unnecessary. Bhutto wanted to suppress and sideline the opposition leaders that were not
800. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of
JI), on 29-07-2015. 801. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on
30-07-2015.
236
a good strategy because in the end he was alone to face military. If he had established
close ties with the opposition and had accommodated all the political leadership
particularly those who had secured majorities in the 1970 elections the result would have
been different. If Abdul Wali Khan remained close to Bhutto, if Attaullah Mengal, Ghaus
Bakhsh Bizenjo, Khair Bakhsh Mari, and Mufti Mahmood not to mention all stood by his
side there was no chance for military to dethrone civilian leadership and usurp power.
Bhutto attitude was a mixture. If on one hand he started discussion and negotiation with
some political leaders, then on the other he started suppression and intimidation of others.
If on one hand he took some brilliant initiative to glorify Pakistan then on the other hand
he not only hampered democratic norms but also provide a chance for military to the
corridor of power once again. In fact, there was a clash of egos. Bhutto was most popular
leader but could not take opposition into confidence. In fact, neither Bhutto did justice to
his opponents nor did they do justice with Bhutto. As stated earlier there was a clash of
egos. Urge to dominate was the biggest fault on the part of Bhutto.
In a nutshell, Bhutto was a controversial leader and met his fate the lesson for today
is…if we want to see democracy flourishing in Pakistan we have to bear and
accommodate each other, we have to change our way of politics. Unless political forces
and parties do not accommodate each other we cannot run democracy and unless we do
not follow democratic norms and values then we have to suffer.
Political leadership during PPP first term in office (1972-1977) had no real commitment
to democratization that is why it could not get roots. Before coming to power they have
good reason to cry for and advocate democracy. But once came to power most of the time
they failed the test of their democratic commitment. In the end military came to power
but the politicians themselves were responsible for ending the democratic journey.
Bhutto was an enthusiastic and articulate advocate of democracy, and like Indira Gandhi
in India, had won power through the electoral system but after consolidating his position
237
proceeded to undermine the same system. In fact there was a great difference in his
slogan for democracy and his commitment to democratic practices.
It is the irony of the fate of the people of Pakistan that they are led by those who
themselves are strangers to democracy and its norms. Their constituencies form their so
called ‗bank vote‘ either being feudals, bureaucrats, industrialists, men of clergy or any
other elitist elements. They keep harping on the tune of democracy and make the
downtrodden masses fool enough to seek their votes. Bhutto belonging himself to feudal
elite had been one of such most successful imposter of his age in deceiving public in the
name of democracy. No democracy can flourish progressively in a society which is
primarily and inherently polarized into different classes and elite power structure.
Pakistan presents the same picture since its very birth
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CHAPTER - 8
CONCLUSION
This chapter draws conclusion based on the analysis of data gathered for this study. It is on the basis of
these findings that recommendations have been set in accordance with the prevalent political scenario in
Pakistan.
Democratic system has different manifestations in different countries. Even the despotic governments are
forced to incorporate some appearance of democracy in the governing structure. Democracy is viewed as
an elastic, egalitarian and people friendly governance system that is appropriate for diversified societies
like Pakistan where people are divided on ethnic, cultural and linguistic lines. However, only the use of the
word ―democracy‖ does not make a system democratic. Realistic measures are obligatory for the political
leaders to engage all the stakeholders in the governance of state affairs.
In democracy, the elections serve as a medium through which the people bestow their confidence in one or
another political party authorizing them to govern the state on their behalf. These elected representatives,
once voted to power, are expected to serve the electorate and meet public aspirations to the best of their
abilities. On the other hand, those defeated in the elections (opposition parties) act as a watchdog and keep
a vigilant eye on the working of the ruling party and to hold it accountable for its public policy and actions.
Dissent of opinion which is the universally accepted right of opposition, is an important and unavoidable
feature of democracy. Therefore, a real democracy is only possible in the presence of a strong and stable
opposition.
The Pakistan Peoples Party led government (1972-1977) under the leadership of Z. A. Bhutto made some
great achievements for the establishment of democracy in Pakistan. Bhutto was a popular leader who made
experiment of popular politics in Pakistan by inculcating political awareness among the masses. The
politics became known in streets, in villages and homes because of Bhutto. A consensus based Constitution
of 1973, atomic power capability, Pak-China relations, unity of the Muslim world and increase in aid from
the Muslim World vis-à-vis the US were the landmark contributions of Bhutto.
For most of its ruling period, however, the PPP leadership was satisfying itself with these achievements and
could not focus on a systematic program of action to actualize the aspirations of the masses for a true
democracy on the pattern of developed countries. In other words, the party could not act as a bridge
between the government and the public and could not do much for bringing and promoting democratic
values and norms in the country.
239
After the first general elections held in December 1970, there was a need for consensus between the
political parties especially in West Pakistan. This consensus was essential for establishing and promoting a
parliamentary system. Almost all the political parties including PPP which contested the 1970 elections,
had demanded from Ayub Khan the introduction of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. Z. A. Bhutto
being the head of majority party in the post-disintegration scenario had an opportunity to introduce
parliamentary democracy. It was necessary for PPP leadership to set healthy traditions of political behavior.
But due to the unfavorable political conditions, Z. A. Bhutto‘s lust for power, rigid behavior, and
confrontational style of politics had led to the perpetuation of martial law for quite some time. Therefore, it
sowed the seeds of distrust from the very beginning between the ruling PPP and the opposition parties.
After assuming power, rifts erupted in the ranks of PPP and thus it lost its ideological harmony. The PPP
leadership was more concerned with increasing its personal influence than establishing itself as a strong
political platform. There was seen disharmony between the party leadership and senior members when the
latter showed reluctance in demonstrating unconditional loyalty to the former. Due to the autocratic
behavior of the party chief, most of the party ideologues parted their ways. No serious effort was made to
persuade and bring these disappointed members back to the party.
There was also a lack of intra-party democracy. Due to the authoritative style and aggressive behavior of
Bhutto, PPP could not emerge as a symbol of true democracy in the sense of willing to accommodate the
dissenting opinion of party leaders. The two prominent party members, Mukhtar Rana and Ahmed Raza
Kasuri started criticizing Bhutto‘s attitude. Both the leaders were penalized for their alleged violation of the
so-called party discipline. Soon Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, who was the vice chairman of PPP also parted
ways with the PPP on differences over certain provisions of the future constitution of Pakistan. Shaikh
Rashid and Meraj Muhammad Khan also resigned from PPP. The PPP thus suffered from the severe crisis
of internal rift. The ideological differences and the failure of PPP leadership to fulfill their election
commitments did play a role in creating widespread discontent among PPP members but the main thing
was the behavior of Bhutto. The new entrants included mainly the elite and feudal lords who were power
hungry and aimed at self aggrandizement. A large number of those who joined PPP were opportunists who
wished quick fortune while Bhutto himself ran the party like his estate. Transparency and accountability are
the basics of democracy and the leader must be accountable for his actions, however, this feature was
partially adhered to by the PPP leadership i.e., Z. A. Bhutto.
PPP had emerged as a dominant platform in the Western wing of Pakistan bagging the second largest
number of seats at the centre and the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The National Awami Party under the
leadership of Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Jumaat-e-Islami under the leadership of Maulana Mufti
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Mahmood formed coalition governments in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(NWFP). Unfortunately these provincial governments were not allowed to exercise the power which they
deserved under the constitution. In fact, Bhutto was not happy with such an arrangement and soon started a
move against the two provincial governments.
Bhutto‘s undemocratic and harsh attitude towards opposition parties and undue interference in the
provincial government of Balochistan compelled the latter to form an alliance against PPP. Known as the
United Democratic Front (UDF), the alliance courageously challenged the aggressive and intolerant
attitude/behavior of PPP leadership. The leaders of the alliance never hesitated in criticizing the policies of
PPP government and its leader‘s undemocratic behavior. Though on 17 April 1972, Bhutto had appointed a
committee of 25 members of the National Assembly, including six from opposition to prepare a draft of
constitution802 but the opposition was not involved in the real sense and discussions on the said constitution
were conducted in the absence of opposition as a result of their boycotting the session as a protest.
However, the alliance handled the matter in a democratic way in passing the 1973 Constitution with a
unanimous vote, which will be remembered forever as a great achievement of the then political leaders,
both the opposition and the ruling PPP. The UDF severely criticized Bhutto‘s regime for its military action
in Balochistan. The UDF also resisted the PPP government‘s attempts for amending the Constitution. On
the other hand the UDF could not maintain internal coherence, differences on petty issues among the
alliance partners, attempts on the part of major parties to dominate the alliance led to the failure of UDF to
become a stable and effective opposition platform.
Bhutto always remained antagonist towards the opposition with a few exceptions. Bhutto had a suspicious
mind and his attitude was inherently undemocratic. He attempted to establish a system where he could be
the sole decision maker. Therefore, he accepted no equals, dissent and challenge to his authority. He used
coercive measures through (FSF and Police Force) to disrupt the opposition public processions. He never
missed an opportunity to embarrass and malign the opposition leaders. He gave tough time to opposition
leaders particularly Abdul Wali Khan and Asghar Khan who were very critical utilizing every opportunity
to denounce Bhutto‘s policies and his style of politics. The NAP led by Abdul Wali Khan was also banned
for charges of anti-state activities which could not be proved. Bhutto did not spare his own party stalwarts
(particularly J. A. Rahim, Ahmed Raza Kasuri, Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Khursheed Hasan Meer and
others) whoever dared to oppose him. Some resigned from PPP as a protest against humiliationwhile others
were forced to resign.
802. Hamid Khan, (2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University
Press, p. 269.
241
PPP‘s headship took its success in the 1970 elections as a certificate to follow and practice any political
program until the next general elections. The PPP regime weakened the newly started democratic system
by resorting to what is described as the ―tyranny of the majority‖ which involved the use of voting
authority in the legislative body and approved such legislation that negated the ideals and spirit of
democracy. Vital legislation was frequently passed and approved by the regime with opposition parties
staying away from the assemblies in protest against the arbitrary style of PPP headship. Thus a genuinely
mandated government turned into an authoritarian one on account of abusing the state institutions and
processes to advance the personal power agenda.
Similarly, judiciary as the protector of fundamental rights and freedom was not spared. Through
amendments to the 1973 Constitution, the judiciary was brought under the influence of executive and was
thus deprived of its role i.e. to defend the rights of people against the unrestrained behavior of the
executive. Thus by clipping the wings of judiciary, this hope of the opposition was also eliminated. The
situation compelled the opposition to resort to confrontational and agitational politics. The opposition left
no stone unturned in resisting the maneuverings of Bhutto but to no avail. Some of the opposition leaders
also took these strategies of Bhutto as an opportunity to worsen the situation for political benefits.
Most of the amendments made during Bhutto era (1972-1977) were unilateral i.e., opposition was
either not provided with opportunity to debate and discuss the amendment bill or the views of opposition
were not incorporated in the said amendment bills. Any bill passed by the Assembly without debate and
discussion and without obtaining consensus is termed as a bad law or even as a black law. Through blindly
and blunt imposing of constitutional amendments, PPP manifested despotism.
When the 1977 elections scheduled was announced, the opposition formed Pakistan National Alliance (an
alliance of 9 opposition parties). The PNA aimed at ousting Z. A. Bhutto from power and introducing
Nizam-i-Mustafa (Islamic System) in the country. After the 1977 general elections, the PPP and PNA failed
in settling the allegations of rigging and the military under Ziaul Haq took over. But with the end of PPP
rule, the PNA also disintegrated and thus lost the chance of becoming a viable alternative government. Its
first aim (ousting of Bhutto) got fulfilled and their vested interests persuaded them to withdraw from the
second one i.e., establishing Nizam-i-Mustafa. Actually the opposition political parties regarded opposition
as a stepping stone to achieve greater influence in the politics of the country rather than acting as a torch
bearer.
The development of democracy is possible when all political parties irrespective of their differences sit
together to debate and discuss the national issues, build consensus and find solution of the common
problems. It was the lack of this consensus developing mindset of the politicians that allowed military to
242
takeover the government. All politicians both ruling and opposition, were supposed to realize the
seriousness of the post-1977 elections situation. They should have found solution to their differences within
the democratic framework. But unfortunately some of the extremist elements did not want to seek peaceful
solution of the problems with the ruling PPP. There was a division among the opposition members as some
wanted to reach a peaceful solution of the issues while others thought of resorting to agitational means.
Care should have been demonstrated for the sake of continuity of the political process that had restored
after thirteen years of military rule (1958-1971).
The opposition got the opportunity to boost its prestige but it could not muster enough support to take a
formidable stand with regard to different controversial issues. Some of the opposition leaders like Mufti
Mahmood, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Abdul Wali Khan and Attullah Mengal were
career politicians. They fulfilled the requirements for becoming an effective opposition but failed in the
process to be so. Thus the opposition could not present itself as a viable option of an alternative
government. Due to the internal differences and the rigid attitude adopted by some hardliners, the
opposition during Bhutto rule could not contribute much to the healthy growth of democracy.
Though Bhutto started a democratic process, it was not only Bhutto and his PPP but also the opposition
parties that hampered the political process. During PPP rule under Bhutto, opposition parties got the
opportunity to emerge and grow but it failed to do so. As demanded by democracy, the opposition could
not offer a viable alternative to the ruling government. If, on the one hand, Bhutto was suffering from
personality cult and wanted to establish a one party (PPP) rule, on the other hand, opposition too appeared
to be least interested in establishing a truly democratic system. In a nutshell, neither Bhutto nor the
opposition particularly from NWFP (now KPK) and Balochistan showed respect for the rules of the game
which resulted in the derailing of democratic process from the very initial stage. No doubt, there was a
parliamentary system during Bhutto‘s premiership but it was not worked out successfully. The reason was
the failure of both the ruling and opposition parties to realize their responsibility towards democracy.
The 1970 elections were the firstever general elections in Pakistan and PPP government under Bhutto
leadership was the first popularly elected government. Democracy got a chance for the first time in the real
sense. It was an opportunity after the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan that raised hopes
from all circles that onward Pakistan would be a democratic state. But democracy is not a wild rose that
grows and flourishes of its own. Despite the failure of our political leadership to maintain a democratic set-
up, the period was good for democracy. There were democratic figures on both sides i.e. ruling and the
opposition like Bhutto, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Abdul Wali Khan and Mufti Mahmood not to mention
all but certain faults on both sides, provided an opportunity to the military to exploit the situation and
243
snatch the rein of power from the civilians. Though, there were faults on both sides, it was the beginning of
the democracy and the faults had to be sorted out and improvement could be brought through reforms. The
political leadership, whether in government or opposition should have understood their responsibilities with
commitment to put the country on the path to democracy.
8.1. Findings of the Study
Following are the findings of this study:
During PPP‘s first term of office (1972-1977), politics in Pakistan had turned into the domain of the ruling
party. Intolerance to opposition and criticism was a common feature of governance during this period. The
party in power did not treat the opposition (who were also the elected members of the people) in a
democratic way and they were not provided the space to fulfill their obligations. The way the game of
politics was played by these politicians weakened rather than strengthened democratic norms in the
country.
Weak structure of political parties was another aspect of fledgling democracy in Pakistan. Most of the
political parties during PPP‘s first term were not well organized in their internal structure. Lack of intra
party elections and dominance of personalities led to the loss of national character of the political parties.
Most of the parties were personality driven. Pakistan Peoples Party was an instrument of Bhutto as today‘s
Muslim League is that of Nawaz Sharif. This mindset weakened the image of the politicians within their
parties. The parties were used as tools by the powerful personalities. Most of the political parties, whether
in power or opposition, had a dismal record as far as self-democratization and the observance of the rules of
the game is concerned. The parties were weak and vulnerable because of lacking internal democracy.
Unfortunately, the Centre-province relationship during PPP‘ first government was most of the time
complex and lacked the spirit of cooperation. Not only that PPP government under Bhutto leadership did
not provide the required space to the opposition controlled provincial governments of Balochistan and
NWFP (KP) but the leadership of respective provincial governments also availed every opportunity in
furthering the gap in centre–province relationship.
Instead of institution building and seeking institutionalized political support, the PPP leadership preferred
extra-state apparatuses aimed to coerce opponents while personally loyal people were given headships of
different state institutions. The persistently weak political institutions in Pakistan could not let democracy
to gain grounds. The PPP government was unable to create a balance between state institutions and this
situation too negated democratic traditions to strengthen.
244
In Pakistan, the politicians in power for most of the time have supported a centralized administration with
the purpose to serve their vested interests. Initially only East Pakistan but later on the other smaller
provinces of Western Pakistan also felt neglected and exploited by the centre. Decentralization (devolution
of power to provincial/local level) is very much essential for a democratic system. PPP‘s leadership, before
coming into power, strongly advocated decentralization of power but once they got into power, they
preferred centralization of authority as much as possible. This over centralization of state authority and
failure to work the federal principle, appeared to be a cardinal feature of the parliamentary system in
Pakistan under the 1973 Constitution which strengthened the centrifugal elements rather than the
democratic forces.
Time is a crucial factor in dealing with important matters of a political set-up. That may be elections,
debate and discussion for reaching a consensus based decision or an agreement etc. Lack of timely
agreement/settlement between PPP‘s leadership and NAP- JUI coalition led to the dismissal of an elected
government in Balochistan. Similarly in the end, after the elections of 1977 when allegations of rigging
were leveled against Pakistan Peoples Party, the lack of interest on the part of Z. A. Bhutto in reaching a
timely agreement with PNA leadership made matters worse. Bhutto did offer concessions but the
concessions were of no use on account of their being not only too little but also too late.
There was a gap between the perception and practice of democratic norms on the part of PPP‘s leadership.
They expressed love for and faith in these norms in public before their coming into power but once voted to
power, they barely practiced them in their true spirit. Consensus is a pre requisite for any successful
democracy but it was the non accommodative and intolerant manner of the politicians in power towards
dissent that always rendered all efforts made for reaching a consensus ineffective. There was a dire need for
the spirit of goodwill, harmony and understanding between the ruling PPP and opposition political parties
for that could have avoided the derailing of democratic process and military‘s coming into power.
The absence of a strong organization and lack of accountability during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto‘s era not only
weakened democracy but also made PPP mere a tool in the hands of powerful personalities. Bhutto enjoyed
a lot of popular support from the very beginning of his rule. This was a valuable asset for PPP‘s leadership.
Unfortunately, as noted by Hasan Askari Rizvi, he could not sustain this support because he preferred to
concentrate power in his own hands as an alternative to using his mass appeal to institutionalize
participatory framework, promote democratic norms and practices and establish self sustaining political
245
institutions. He established a patrimonial system which gave more importance to the leader than to the
system. Thus the whole edifice of the political system was built around Bhutto‘s personality.803
Unopposed election is not only undesirable but also dangerous for a democratic system. Actually PPP
leaders had lost their nerve and wished to return to assemblies without facing a contest. The unopposed
election of Z. A. Bhutto, chief ministers and others in the General Elections of 1977 further deepened the
doubts of opposition (PNA) and also of the observers about the fairness/credibility of the 1977 general
elections.
The spirit of cooperation and accommodation strengthens democracy. Confrontational and offensive
politics between the ruling and opposition parties is at all times harmful to the state interests. Sadly, the
politics of confrontation was a common phenomenon during Bhutto‘s rule. Lack of the spirit of give and
take, consultation and compromise on the part of Pakistani political leadership (both ruling and opposition)
during 1972-1977 period and considering each other as rivals played its part in hampering democracy in
Pakistan.
Bhutto came to power on the basis of his popular support and he lost office once he lost that support.
Actually after the 1977 elections, fingers were raised at election results. It was the weakening of the
populist support that Bhutto was unable to do something. PPP under Bhutto leadership was unable to stop
agitation against itself after the 1977 elections which ultimately led to the downfall of PPP government and
military intervention.
During Z. A. Bhutto rule (1972-1977) democracy has persistently remained in a state of uncertainty
because of the lust for power, clash of egos and most importantly, the extra-democratic behavior on the part
of politicians. A clash of egos was going on from both sides. Their personal rivalries and ambitions
retarded the political process. It flared more and more violence with each passing day and it was that clash
that led some politicians to facilitate/support military entrance into power. This shows the lack of political
foresight on the part of politicians not only from the PPP but also from opposition. In fact, the political
leaders had to make serious efforts and kept on the process of reconciliation.
8.2. Recommendations
Following are the recommendations of the study:
It is absolutism that does not accept and tolerate differences of opinions. If we want to nurture and promote
a true spirit of democracy, we must be tolerant towards others. Intolerant is something that betrays want of
faith in one‘s cause. The evolution and fruition of democracy is unattainable if we are not ready to hear our
opponents. Debates and discussion are the unavoidable parts of democracy and certainly during these
803. Hasan Askari Rizvi (1986), The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86, p. 216.
246
debates there would arise dissent of opinions. The holders of governmental authority should recognize that
the competitors have a convincing right and a genuine opinion. If there arises any deadlock between the
ruling and opposition political parties, they should immediately seek a mutually accepted settlement
through discussions, debates and accommodating each other and should leave no room for intolerance. The
peaceful ruling and opposition relationship is extremely essential for the success of democracy. If they
adopt flexibility giving space to each other, accommodate each other viewpoints, and struggle for broad
based consensus despite their differences and stay united, none would dare to derail the democratic process.
It was extremely important for the PPP and opposition parties to get their differences settled and not
indulged the military in the political business. With sincerity of purpose, goodwill and spirit of
accommodation not only from ruling but also from the opposition side, they should have sorted out most of
the issues.
Some drastic and severe changes are required in the functioning of political parties for ensuring an
accountable and true democracy in Pakistan, some drastic The parties should adopt transparent political
process. They should faithfully represent the people and serve their interests and aspirations. To achieve
this, the democratization of the political system is must and that can happen only when, as a forerunner,
political parties democratize themselves from within. In short, only well organized political parties
possessing intra-party democracy can promote democracy in Pakistan.
Without having the spirit of cooperation, partnership and collaboration between the federal and provincial
governments a federation cannot stay alive or endure. A federation to remain intact, fair and equitable
treatment added with mutual respect is the vital requirements. Looking to the geo-political and socio-
economic structure of Pakistan, the diverse culture and tradition, Pakistan can only survive through
democratic spirit of co-operation and partnership between the centre and provinces. Biased attitude towards
any province should be stopped and all the four provinces should be treated on an equitable basis. Peaceful
Centre-province relations are very important for a successful democracy as these lead towards cooperation,
accommodation and create the spirit of partnership. Mutual respect and just treatment of the provinces is
inevitable for a successful federation.
Both visible and hidden centralizing tendencies should be stopped. A steady and significant process of
decentralization of political power should take place and all the stakeholders should make efforts towards
this process of decentralization. Institutionalization of decentralization through an effective mechanism for
power sharing is more important. Any move to counter this effort must be nipped in bud. Only then can
democracy take roots in Pakistan.
247
If there arises any deadlock between the ruling and opposition political parties, they should immediately
seek a mutually accepted settlement through discussions, debates with the spirit of accommodating each
other. The only way out is political process and the search for any other means will lead to instability and
disaster. Debates and discussion should be set and ideas should be shared as they lead to good decisions.
More people should be involved in decisions and their suggestions should not be ignored. In any
democratic setup, it is inescapable for the ruling and opposition parties to disagree over issues that are
uncompromisable from their respective viewpoints, but where compromise is possible; it should be
achieved without the slightest delay. History tells us that too rigid an attitude in politics has not yielded in
the long run. On a very few occasions, the PPP government under Bhutto leadership demonstrated the spirit
of compromise i.e. PPP‘s leadership allowed NAP-JUI coalition to form government in the two provinces
of NWFP (KP) and Balochistan, accommodated some of the important demands of opposition at the time
of framing the 1973 Constitution and also included opposition members in Shimla delegation. Similarly,
the opposition also showed a spirit of accommodation but on rare occasions e.g. they withdrew some of
their demands during constitution framing process etc. Both should have adopted similar positive attitude
for the sake of continuity in the democratic process in the post 1977 general elections that would have
prevented the military from takeover.
Unopposed election should be avoided as much as possible. All those who want to be elected should
contest public will. PPP leadership should have avoided unopposed election and particularly in some
prestigious cases, they had to have faced a contest to prove their credibility. Muhammad Ali Jinnah enjoyed
a lot of respect from his supporters but he all the time encouraged democratic trends and carefully avoid
leaving any authoritarian instance. When the Muslim Leagures, out of their deep love for Jinnah, sought to
assign him the responsibility of president ship of Muslim League for life, he at once stopped them from
doing so.804
No politician in the world is perfect. Everyone has weaknesses. But if one has more strength than
weaknesses and if he has rendered great services for the country and its people and has protected and
promoted country‘s sovereignty, he should be given chance.
Continuity is must for democratic growth. Faults associated with the system should be removed through
reforms. Z. A. Bhutto came to power because of his power, intelligence and motivating tactics and the end
met with his destiny. He should have been given chance as he had won 1977 elections. He should have
804. ―Let me come to you at the end of every year and seek your vote and your confidence. Let your
president be on good behavior. I am definitely opposed to your electing life president‖. Mumtaz
Husain. Jinnah and Gandhi: A Comparison.The Pakistan Times, 22 December 1974.
248
been allowed to rule and there should have been another election. Democratic maturity is something that
takes decades so they were to bring an improvement slowly and gradually through reforms.
The success of democracy depends on the sanctity of elections. Free, fair and timely elections are a
guarantee for the growth of democracy. Once elections are protected from rigging and other malpractices
then those who enjoy public support can hope to complete their mandated period.
Law should be passed and constitution amended after necessary debates and discussion. Whether the
incumbent government agrees or not with the proposal of opposition members, chance must be given to the
latter to express their views on the draft bill and consensus must be preferred. In this connection,
promulgation of ordinances must be avoided as much as possible.
Violence is always dangerous for the growth of democracy. It should be the joint responsibility of all the
political stakeholders to avoid violence and adopt negotiated settlement of disputes. To achieve this end,
the parties in power should hold regular dialogue and interaction with the opposition.
Democracy would not gain grounds in Pakistan and efforts in this direction would fail unless our
leadership makes a shift from personality to a system based politics.
Undoubtedly, one indicator of political development is the manner in which transfer of power from one
party to another takes place smoothly. The political rivals may not essentially like each other but they
should, at least, tolerate one another. They should consider one another important and admit that all have a
lawful and significant function to play. Therefore, regardless of the fact which party wins elections; both
winner and the loser must be of the same mind to persuade patience and ensure a peaceful transition. It
should be an obligation on the part of both the incumbent and opposition parties. Also, there should be a
powerful and independent Election Commission with members appointed jointly by the ruling and
opposition political parties to help ensure a peaceful democratic transition.
Every agitation, movement, protests must be aimed at some essential legislation. Whenever the opposition
is disappointed of the performance of the incumbent government or it has some reservations against the
government, the opposition should not deviate from the democratic path and should get the issue sorted out
in the parliament.
Last but not the least, there is need for democratic behavior on the part of politicians. One cannot hope to
see democracy flourishing in Pakistan and all such efforts on the part of democratic forces to review
democracy in its true spirit continue to be disturbed unless and until the mindset of our politicians become
democratic and start behaving in accordance with the democratic principles.
Politics is a chaotic affair. It is sluggish, evolutionary, complex, unexpected, changeable, inter-subjective
and tedious. It is constructed around human desires, emotions, reservations and hopes rather than wisdom
249
and objectivity. A durable way out of political dilemma can only be found in the political space through
evolution, give and take, concession and compromises among country‘s legitimate political stakeholders.
This is why continuation and amplification of the democratic process notwithstanding its failing, gaps and
incompetencies is imperative. Also, the Pakistani military establishment should comprehend this and
provide more space to political stakeholders instead of further squeezing the already shrunk political space
or attempt short-range changes through handpicked politicians.
As in Pakistan, there is a vacuum for genuinely democratic politics, there is need for hard work on the part
of those active in the game of politics. And this is not an easy task that can be achieved with pressing a
button. It requires struggle for decades and counseling with intellectuals and experts. They should also
learn lessons from the experiences of the democratically advanced countries of the world like US, UK,
Switzerland and Germany. A grand strategy is the need of the time. This is all inevitable for democracy,
progress and prosperity of Pakistan.
The political leadership must remain steadfast in their commitment to cooperation, connectivity, contact
and they should have firm belief to create a peaceful atmosphere. They need to work to that end in the
larger interest of the people of Pakistan.
250
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Websites
American Institute of Pakistan Studies
http://www.pakistanstudies-aips.org/
The website provides rudimentary information about the country‘s political system and some useful links.
Guide to Law Online: Pakistan
http://www.lcweb.loc.gov/law/guide/pakistan.html
Prepared by the Law Library of Congress, the Guide to Law Online is an annotated compendium of
international sources accessible through the Internet. Links on the Pakistan section provide access
to primary documents, legal commentary and information about the Executive, Legislature and
Judiciary.
National Assembly of Pakistan
260
http://www.na.gov.pk
Even though not as comprehensive as other parliamentary websites, it is a good source to track the
performance of the assembly through press releases and the Gazette. The site also contains the
lists of government ministries, committees and political parties in the current assembly.
Pakistan’s Legislative History
http:www.jinnah.org/pakistan/legislation
The site is a commendable effort to put together Acts, Ordinances and other legal instruments that
constitute Pakistan‘s legislative history.
PILDAT
http://www.pildat.org/publications/lcp.pdf
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, a Lahore-based organization, works to
strengthen and sustain democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan. The website contains a
directory of MNAs, reference on parliamentary issues and some very useful links.
Senate of Pakistan
http://www.senate.gov.pk/Main.asp
Relatively more comprehensive and user-friendly than the National Assembly website, it contains a
complete list of senators with email addresses, some useful publications such as Rules of
Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Senate, and news about various committees.
www.mapsofindia.com. Retrieved on 23.09.2015.
http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/18.htm 12-12-2013.
Documents
UNDP, (2002). Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world.
Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March, 1977: Ministry of
Information. July 1978.
Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Misuse of Media, Islamabad, August, 1978, December 20,
1971-July 4, 1977.
Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vols.1-3, Islamabad:
Ministry of Information.1979.
National Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates. November, 1975, Vol. VII, No. 12.
National Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates, February 12, 1975, Vol. II, No. 16.
261
News Papers
The Aaj (Urdu Peshawar).
The Daily Star.
The Dawn (Karachi).
The Express (Urdu) (Islamabad).
The Herald.
The Jang.
The Mashriq (Peshawar).
The Morning News.
The Nawa-i-Waqt.
The News (Islamabad).
The Newsweek.
The Pakistan Times.
The People's Front.
The Statesman.
Interviews
Prominent among those interviewed, include the following:
Abdul Akbar Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Deputy Speaker and Senior Member of PPP) on 18-11-
2015.
Abdul Hafiz Peerzada (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Minister and Senior Member of PPP) on 13-06-
2015.
Hafiz Naeem ur Rehman (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Leader JI, Karachi) on 14-07-2015.
Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 30-07-2015.
Muhammad Hussain Mehinti (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 27-07-2015.
Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015.
Professor N. D. Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07-2015.
262
Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Ex Chairman of Mass Communication
Department Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST) Karachi, on
16-07-2015.
Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015.
Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) on 31-07-2015.
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Annexure - I
Interview Schedule
1. Your opinion about Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as a leader and advocate of democracy?
2. Do you think Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had been successful in developing a harmonious
relationship with the opposition? If not, how far was the opposition responsible
for this?
3. It is generally understood that the PPP‘s relations with the opposition was
reasonably cordial as long as the constitution of 1973was at its preparatory stage.
Do you agree? And how did it change later on?
4. What is your assessment of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto attitude towards national minority
in Pakistan (Balochistan and NWEP provincial governments)?
5. Do you think Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto style of politics was a true reflection of the
slogan, ―Democracy is our polity‖?
6. Did Bhutto‘s government provide a conducive environment where the opposition
could play the game of politics in accordance with the rules?
7. What is your assessment of the opposition‘s response to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
government?
8. What was the central idea behind the formation/establishment of Federal Security
Force (FSF) by Bhutto‘s government?
9. To what extent did the creation of Federal Security Force (FSF) contribute to the
opposition distrust of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government?
10. Politicians in Pakistan during 1972-77, both in power and in opposition were
experienced and patriotic. Why they could not stop the element of autocracy in
national politics?
11. Were the opposition leaders demonstrating a responsible attitude towards the so
called ‗autocratic‘ style of PPP politics?
12. The PPP leadership, despite their knowledge of the ―framework of ruling-
opposition relationship‖ acted contrary to the said framework. What, in your
opinion, motivated them to follow the path?
13. Do you think that the spirit with which the constitution was framed, was also
demonstrated in amending it?
14. Did PPP and other opposition parties proved as the agents of democracy during
the study period 1972-77?
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Annexure -II
Parliamentary Assembly (Council of Europe)
Resolution 1601 (2008)805
Procedural Guidelines on the Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition in a
Democratic Parliament
1. ―Democracy is founded on the right of everyone to take part in the management of
public affairs; it therefore requires the existence of representative institutions at all levels
and, in particular, a parliament in which all components of society are represented and
which has the requisite powers and means to express the will of people by legislating and
overseeing government action‖ (Universal Declaration on Democracy, Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 1997). A politically representative parliament shall embody society
in the diversity of its composition and shall work with due respect for the plurality of
opinions.
2. The promotion and consolidation of pluralist democracy is one of the main objectives
of the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly. The member states of the
Organisation shall endeavour to develop common standards and practices aimed at
promoting a free and pluralist parliamentary democracy and the means for their
implementation in national parliaments. The democratic quality of a parliament is
measured by the means available to the opposition or the parliamentary minority to
accomplish its tasks.
3. A political opposition in and outside parliament is an essential component of a well
functioning democracy. One of the main functions of the opposition is to offer a reliable
political alternative to the majorityin power by providing other policy options for public
consideration. By overseeing and criticising the work of the ruling government,
continuously evaluating government action and holding the government to account the
opposition works to ensure transparency of public decision and efficiency in the
management of public affairs, thereby ensuring the defence of the public interest and
preventing misuse and dysfunction.
4. The Assembly considers that effective follow-up should be ensured, at the level of
national parliaments, to its Resolution 1547 (2007) on the state of human rights and
democracy in Europe, in particular when it recalls that the right to form a political
opposition shall be considered as a key element of a genuine democracy. It then recalls its
Resolution 1154 (1998) on the democratic functioning of national parliaments, in which
it calls on national parliaments, inter alia, to ―give the opposition a status enabling it to
play a responsible and constructive role …‖.
5. Granting the parliamentary opposition a status according to which it is entitled to rights
contributes to the effectiveness of a representative democracy and respect for political
pluralism, and thereby to the citizens‘ support for and confidence in the good functioning
of institutions. Establishing a fair legal and procedural framework and material conditions
enabling the parliamentary minority to fulfil its role is a prerequisite for the good
functioning of representative democracy. Opposition members should be able to exercise
their mandate in full and under at least the same conditions as those members of
parliament who support the government; they shall participate in an active and effective
805. 1. Assembly debate on 23 January 2008 (6th Sitting) (see Doc. 11465, report of the Committee on
Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs, rapporteur: Mr Van Overmeire). Text
adopted by the Assembly on 23 January 2008 (6th Sitting).
265
manner in the activities of the parliament and shall enjoy the same rights. Equal treatment
of members of parliament has to be ensured in all their activities and privileges.
6. The Assembly recalls that in Resolution 1547 (2007) it calls on opposition parties and
their members not to ask only for rights and means, but also to show responsibility and
willingness to use them and make their best efforts to enhance the efficiency of the
parliament as a whole. They should not restrict themselves to merely criticising the
powers in place.
7. The Assembly welcomes the fact that procedural rights of the opposition are currently
of political relevance in several national parliaments. It recalls in this context the
conclusions reached during the last meeting of the Council of Europe Forum for the
Future of Democracy held in Stockholm/Sigtuna from 13 to 15 June 2007 regarding the
role and responsibilities of the opposition. It considers that appropriate follow-up should
be given to them at the level of national parliaments.
8. Differences exist in the degree of institutionalisation of the opposition in the
parliaments of Council of Europe member states, ranging from informal recognition in
the parliamentary rules of procedure when granting rights to the parliamentary minority
to formal recognition of the opposition in the constitution of the state. However, beyond
diversity of parliamentary systems in Europe, all parliaments of the member states grant
rights to the parliamentary minority, whether organised around political groups or not.
The Assembly notes that the notion of parliamentary opposition has undergone changes
in conjunction with the modernisation of political debate. Several innovative good
practices have been developed in a number of states which merit the attention of a wider
audience. Therefore, the Assembly welcomes the current tendency in some parliaments to
achieve full parity between the majority and the opposition concerning some rights,
irrespective of the strength they have in parliament.
9. Consequently, the Assembly invites the parliaments of the member states to reform or
update their rules on the rights of the opposition or parliamentary minority and
encourages them to draw up a charter on the rights of the opposition, or to define the
status of the opposition in parliament, taking inspiration from the guidelines below.
10. While bearing in mind the variety of parliamentary democratic institutions in Europe,
the Assembly encourages the member states of the Council of Europe to start as soon as
possible a genuine and thorough reflection on the modernisation of their democratic
institutions and the adaptation of their parliamentary institution to the needs of a modern
society. To this end, member states should take into account the guidelines set out below,
as well as good practices established in the most innovative parliaments.
11. The Assembly also invites the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) to undertake a study on the role of opposition in a modern
democratic society.
Guidelines on the Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition in a Democratic
Parliament
12. Parliamentarians must exercise their mandate independently. They shall not be bound
by any instruction or receive a binding mandate. One cannot blame a member of
parliament for defending ideas that go against the government‘s official policy or that are
not well received by a majority of the population.
13. National parliaments of the Council of Europe member states shall acknowledge the
following rights in relation to the opposition or parliamentary minority:
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13.1. freedom of expression and freedom of opinion; members of the opposition shall
enjoy freedom of speech; they must be able to express their ideas freely;
13.2. the opposition shall participate in the supervision, scrutiny and control of the action
and policy of the government:
13.2.1. opposition members have the right to information; opposition members and
members of the majority are entitled to receive the same information from the
government;
13.2.2. opposition members have the right to ask written and oral questions, and to
receive replies to these questions;
13.2.3. opposition members shall be privileged during question time with the government
(in particular they shall have the right to open question time and to ask more questions to
the government than members of the majority);
13.2.4. opposition members have the right to interpellation (oral question with debate)
and the right to move a motion of no confidence;
13.2.5. opposition members have the right to request the convening of a plenary sitting of
the parliament/chamber,which should be granted if a quorum of one quarter of members
is reached;
13.2.6. opposition members have the right, at regular intervals, to set the agenda of
plenary sittings, and to choose subjects for debate, including bills tabled by opposition
members, control
of government actions and evaluation of public policies and spending; matters selected on
those
days shall have precedence over government business;
13.2.7. opposition members have the right to ask for debates to be held, including urgent
or current affairs debates, which should be granted if a quorum of one quarter of
members is reached;
13.2.8. opposition members have the right to request the setting-up of a committee of
inquiry or a parliamentary mission of information and to become members thereof; this
should be obtained if a quorum of one quarter of members is reached; a member of the
opposition shall be appointed either chairperson or rapporteur of every committee of
inquiry or mission of information successfully requested by opposition members or
political groups;
13.3. speaking time in plenary sittings shall be allotted at least according to the respective
weight of political groups; allocation of an equal speaking time between majority and
opposition, irrespective of their strength, should be privileged under certain
circumstances;
13.4. the opposition shall participate in the organisation of legislative work:
13.4.1. opposition members have the right to participate in the management of
parliamentary business; they shall have access to posts of vice-president and other
positions of responsibility in parliament; the composition of governing bodies of
parliament shall respect the principle of proportional representation and reflect the
political composition of the parliament or chamber;
13.4.2. opposition members have the right to request the holding of an extraordinary
session, which should be granted if a quorum of one quarter of members is reached;
13.5. the opposition shall participate in the legislative procedure:
13.5.1. opposition members have the right to table bills and motions on legislative
matters;
267
13.5.2. opposition members have the right to speak and to vote in all debates;
13.5.3. opposition members have the right to table amendments;
13.5.4. opposition members have the right to present procedural motions (change in the
proposed agenda or the adopted agenda; request to ascertain a quorum; request to refer a
report back to a committee, etc.);
13.6. the opposition shall participate in parliamentary committees‘ work:
13.6.1. the presidency of standing/permanent committees shall be allocated among
parliamentary groups on the basis of proportional representation; at least one permanent
committee shall be chaired by a member of the opposition; the chairmanship of
committees responsible for monitoring government action, such as the committee on
budget and finance, the committee on audit, or the committee supervising security and
intelligence services, should be granted to a member of the opposition;
13.6.2. any committee, permanent or not, shall be composed on the basis of proportional
representation;
13.6.3. in committees, opposition members shall enjoy speaking and voting rights, the
right to table amendments and to move a procedural motion; they shall have the
possibility to append a dissenting opinion to a report adopted in committee or to present a
minority report;
13.6.4. opposition members have the right to request the organisation of committee
hearings; it should be granted if a quorum of one quarter of members is reached;
13.6.5. opposition members have the right to be appointed committee rapporteurs; in any
case, rapporteurships in committees are allocated on the basis of proportional
representation;
13.7. the opposition shall participate in political decisions; the opposition or
parliamentary minority shall be consulted prior to any decision to dissolve parliament;
13.8. the opposition shall participate in the constitutional review of laws:
13.8.1. opposition members have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court or the
appropriate legal body and to request a constitutional review of adopted laws;
13.8.2. opposition members have the right to request examination of constitutionality of
draft laws or parliamentary acts by the Constitutional Court or the appropriate legal body
prior to their adoption;
13.8.3. opposition members have the right to apply to the Court of Audit and to request
its opinion on budgetary and finance matters.
14. National parliaments shall provide political groups or individual members of the
opposition with the appropriate financial, material and technical resources and means to
enable them to properly perform their functions and duties. Opposition members shall
have fair access to state funds and allowances; they shall have free and fair access to
media, including public radio and television channels, and sources of information.
15. The provisions of the rules of procedure concerning the rights of members of
parliament and particularly of the minority should not be altered after each parliamentary
election in order to adapt them to the election results.
16. The political opposition in parliament shall show political maturity and should
exercise responsible and constructive opposition, by showing mutual respect, and using
its rights with a view to enhance the efficiency of parliament as a whole.
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Annexure -III
Legal Framework Order 1970
Yahya Khan after becoming the Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1969 announced that
he would make it possible that free and fair elections will be conducted in Pakistan and a
new constitution will be made soon. For that reason, he introduced a Legal Framework
Order in March 1970 that determined principles for the future constitution of Pakistan. It
also dissolved the One-Unit scheme on 1st July 1970.
Features of LFO 1970
Following are the features of the LFO 1970:
1: The National Assembly of Pakistan will consist of 313 seats with 13 seats reserved for
women. Out of 313, 169 seats were to be for East Pakistan, 85 for Punjab, 28 for Sindh,
19 for NWFP, 5 for Baluchistan and 7 seats were allotted to the tribal areas.
2: Each province will have a provincial assembly consisting of elected members. East
Pakistan provincial assembly will have 400 members, Punjab 186, Sindh 62, Baluchistan
21 and NWFP 42.
3: The elections for National Assembly will be held on 5 October 1970 and for provincial
assemblies not later than 22 October.
4: The new constitution of Pakistan will follow these principles:
a: Pakistan will be a Federal Republic and will be known as Islamic Republic of Pakistan
b: The head of the Pakistan state would be a Muslim and the divinity of Islam will be
preserved.
c: The principles of democracy will prevail by holding free elections for federal and
provincial legislatures on the basis of adult franchise. Independent judiciary will be made
possible along with fundamental rights for the citizens.
d: All provinces will be given maximum autonomy while the centre will also remain
strong.
e: The citizens of the country will be able to participate actively in the affairs of the state
and the state will try to eliminate economic disparities in the society.
f: The constitution of the country will make it possible for the Muslims of Pakistan to live
their lives according to the teachings of Islam. The minorities will be free to follow their
own faiths and will be able to enjoy the benefits of citizenship along with their fellow
Pakistanis.
269
g: The LFO clarified the status of national and provincial assemblies. It stated that the
National Assembly would either be the only legislature provided that federal legislature
consisting of one house or it would be the lower house if federation has two houses. Its
tenure would be for the full term in both cases. The same went for provincial assemblies.
h: Within 120 days of the first meeting of the National Assembly, it would form a
constitution bill and if it fails to do so, it will dissolve.
5: After the elections of the National Assembly, provisions will be made to arrange its
meetings.
6: The LFO set broad outlines, structures, conditions and qualifications. Any contesting
political party failing to qualify these conditions would not be able to participate in the
elections.
270
Annexure - IV
Memorandum of Settlement Between Pakistan Peoples Party, National Awami
Party and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam on 6 March 1972.
The following participated in the discussions which began on 4 March and
concluded on 6 March 1972:
PPP
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Chairman of PPP and President of
Pakistan
Mr. Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao
Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi
Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada
Maulana Kausar Niazi
Mr. Rafi Raza
NAP
Mr. Abdul Wali Khan President of NAP
MIR Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo
Mr. Arbab Sikander
Mr. Khair Bakhsh Mari
JUI
Maulana Mufti Mahmood General Secretary JUI
Maulana Ghulam Ghous Hazarvi
1. (a) The Pakistan Peoples Party proposed that a short session of the National
Assembly should be convened on 21 April 1972, for a period not exceeding 3 days.
(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the National Assembly session be convened on 23
March 1972.
(c) It was settled that the summons to the members should be issued on 23 March
1972, and the National Assembly session should be convened on 14 April 1972, for
a period not exceeding 3 days during which time the matters specified at paras 2, 3
and 4 below will be voted upon.
2. (a) The PPP proposed that the National Assembly should meet for the purpose of
endorsing an interim Constitution on the basis of the Government of India Act,
1935, read with the Independence Act, with consequential amendments, or on the
basis of 1962 Constitution with consequential amendments.
(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the interim Constitution should be passed on the
basis of the Government of India Act, 1935, read with the Independence Act, with
consequential amendments.
(c) It was settled that an interim Constitution should be prepared on the basis of the
1935 Act, read with Independence Act 1947 with consequential amendments and
that there should be a debate not exceeding 3 days at which only party leaders or
their nominee would speak. The parties for this purpose would be Pakistan Peoples
Party, Pakistan Muslim League ( Qayyum Group), Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam,
National Awami Party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Pakistan Muslim League
(Council), Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan Muslim League (Convention), one
representative from the Independents MNAs of Tribal Areas and one MNA of the
remaining independents MNAs.
271
3. (a) The PPP secondly proposed that the National Assembly on being convened on 21
April 1972 pass a vote of confidence in the Government and approve and confirm
the continuation of Martial Law till 14 August 1972.
(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that Martial Law should be continued till 7 June 1972.
(c) It was settled that there would be a vote of confidence in the Government and
approval of continuation of Martial Law till 14 August 1972.
4. (a) The PPP thirdly proposed that the National Assembly on being convened for the
short session should appoint a committee of the House to draft a Constitution to be
presented by 1 August 1972.
(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the draft Constitution should be presented by 1 July
1972 and that the National Assembly should be reconvened on 7 July 1972.
(c) It was settled that the report of the Committee on the Constitution should be
submitted by 1 August 1972, and that the National Assembly be reconvened on 14
August 1972.
5. (a) The PPP proposed that when the National Assembly was reconvened on 14
August 1972, it should act only as a constitution making body to ensure the early
framing of the Constitution.
(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that when the National Assembly meets on 14 August
1972, it should also act as a legislative body after 14 August 1972.
(c) It was settled that after 14 August 1972, the National Assembly should act both
as a constitution making body and as a legislative body till the permanent
Constitution comes into force. it was reiterated that the powers of the president in
pursuance of the Declaration of Emergency will continue till the Emergency is
lifted.
6. (a) The PPP proposed that the Provincial Assemblies should be convened after the
passing of the interim Constitution i.e., on 1 May 1972.
(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the Provincial Assemblies should be convened on
10 April 1972.
7. It was accepted that the Government both at the Centre and in the Provinces would
be formed on the basis of parliamentary majority.
8. It was accepted that till the new Constitution comes into force, a person elected as a
member of more than one Assembly would be permitted to retain his seats in both
the Houses till the Constitution is fully passed. Similarly, the President, the Vice
President, Governors, Ministers and Advisors both at the Centre and in the
Provinces will retain their seats in their respective Assemblies.
9. (a) The PPP proposed that the present Governors should continue till the new
Constitution is passed, but after the interim Constitution is passed they would cease
to be Martial Law administrators.
(b) The NAP/JUI proposed that after the Provincial Assemblies are convened, the
Governors may be appointed in consultation with the Chief Minister. Meantime
from today till the convening of the Provincial Assemblies of the Governments in
NWFP (now KPK) and Baluchistan should be given to the NAP/JUI.
(c) It was settled that until the permanent Constitution is framed by the National
Assembly, the Central Government should continue to have the right, as in the past,
to appoint the Governors in the Provinces but by way of compromise the Central
Government would, during the interim period, also appoint the Governors in
consultation with the majority in the two aforesaid provinces.
272
10. It was accepted that in the NWFP (now KPK) and the Province of Baluchistan the
majority parties are NAP and JUI and they will be entitled to form the Governments
in these two Provinces.
11. The PPP proposed that the date for the Local Bodies Elections should be fixed as
early as possible after the Provincial Assemblies are convened and that the
Elections in all the Provinces should be on the same date. This was agreed to and
the elections would be held on an agreed date soon after the convening of the
Provincial Assemblies.
12. The President said that he would announce today that Martial Law would be lifted
on 14 August 1972.
Signed by
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
Khan Abdul Wali
Khan
Maulana Mufti
Mahmood
Rawalpindi 6 March 1972.
273
Annexure - V
First Seven Amendments to the Constitution of 1973 Pakistan
Constitution (1st Amendment) Act, 1974
President's Assent Received: 4th May 1974
Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 8th May 1974
An Act to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Whereas it is expedient to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for
the purposes hereinafter appearing;
It is hereby enacted as follows:-
1. Short title and commencement
(1) This act may be called the Constitution (First Amendment) Act ,1974.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Amendment of Article1 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic Of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution, in Article 1, for clauses (2), (3) and (4) the following shall be
substituted, namely.
(2) The territories of Pakistan shall comprise:-
(a) The Province of Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier, the Punjab and Sind;
(b) The Islamabad Capital Territory, hereinafter referred to as the Federal Capital ;
(c) The Federally Administered Tribal Areas; and
(d) Such States and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan. Whether by
accession or otherwise.
(3) Parliament may by law admit into the Federation new States or areas on such
terms and conditions as it think fit."
3. Amendment of Article 8 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 8, in clause(3) in paragraph (b), after the word "day" at
the end, the words "or as amended by any of the laws specified in that schedule" shall
be added.
4. Amendment of Article 17 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 17, for clause (2), the following shall be substituted,
namely--
(2) Every citizen, not being in the service of Pakistan, shall have the right to from
or be member of a Political Party , subject to any reasonable restrictions
imposed by law in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and
274
such law shall provide that where the Federal Government declare that any
political party has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the
sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan , the Federal Government shell , within
fifteen days of such declaration , refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose
decision on such reference shall be final.
(3) Every Political Party shall account for the source of its funds in accordance with law.
5. Amendment of Article 61 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 61, after the words "Deputy Chairman" at the end, the
words, commas, brackets and figures "and as if, in the proviso to the said clause (2) of
Article 54 for the words "one hundred and thirty" the words "ninety" were
substituted" shall be added.
6. Amendment of Article 101 of The Constitution.
In the constitution, in Article 101, in clause(3), after the word "President" at the end,
the words and comma "and shall be entitled to such salary, allowances and privileges
as the President may determine"shall be added.
7. Amendment of Article 127 of the Constitution.
In the constitution, in Article 127,--
(a) in paragraph (e), the word "and" at the end shall be omitted;
(b) in paragraph (f), for the full-stop at the end the semi-colon and word ";and" shall be
substituted; and
(c) after paragraph (f) amendment as aforesaid, the following new paragraph shall be
added, namely:-
"(g) the said clause (2) of Article 54 shall have effect as if, in the proviso thereto,
for the words "one hundred and thirty" the word "seventy" were substituted".
8. Amendment of Article 193 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 193, in clause (2), after paragraph (c) the following
Explanation shall be added, namely—
"Explanation. In computing the period during which a person has been an advocate of
a High court or held judicial office, there shall be included any period during which
he has held judicial office after he became an advocate or, as the case may be, the
period during which he has been an advocate after having held judicial office".
9. Amendment of Article 199 of the Constitution.
In the constitution , in Article 199 , for clause (3), the following shall be substituted,
namely--
"
(3)
An order shall not be made under clause (1) on application made by or in relation to
a person who is a member of the Armed Forces of Pakistan , or who is for the time
being subject to any law relating to any of those Forces, in respect of his terms and
conditions of service, in respect of any matter arising out of his service, or in respect
275
of any action taken in relation to him as a member of the Armed Forces of Pakistan
or as a person subject to such law".
10. Amendment of Article 200 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 200, after clause (2), the following new clause shall be
added, namely--
"(3) If any time it is necessary for any reason to increase temporarily the number of
Judges of a High Court, the Chief Justice of that High Court may require a Judge of
any other High Court to attend sittings of the former High Court for such period as
may be necessary and, while so attending the sittings of the High Court, the Judge
shall have the same power and Jurisdiction as a Judge of that High Court.
Provided that a Judge shall not be so required except with his consent and the
approval of the President and after consolation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan
and the Chief Justice of the High Court of which he is a Judge".
11. Amendment of Article 209 of the Constitution.
In the constitution, in Article 209, in clause (2), in the Explanation, after words
"Chief Justice ", the words "otherwise than as acting Chief Justice" shall be inserted.
12. Amendment of Article 212 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution in article 212 -
(a) in clause (1),
(i) For the word "establish" the words "provide for establishment of" shall be
substituted and shall be deemed always to have been so substituted ; and
(ii) in paragraph (a) after the word "persons", the words "who are or have
been" shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted;
and
(b) in clause (2) after the words "Tribunal extends", the following words shall be inserted
and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted, namely:-
"and all proceedings in respects of any such matter which may be pending before
such other Court immediately before the establishment of the Administrative Court or
tribunal shall abate on such establishment."
13. Amendment of Article 250 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 250, in clauses (1) and (2), the words and comma "a
governor", wherever occurring., shall be omitted.
14. Amendment of Article 259 of the Constitution.
In the constitution, in Article 259,--
(a) in clauses (2), after the word " gallantry", the comma and words " meritorious service
in the Armed Forces" shall be inserted ; and
(b) in clause (3) after the word " gallantry" , the comma and words " meritorious services
in the Armed Forces" shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so
inserted.
15. Amendment of Article 260 of the Constitution.
276
In the Constitution, in Article 260, in clause (1),-
(a) after the definition of the "Chairman" , the following new definition shall be inserted, namely:-
"Chief Justice", in relation to the Supreme Court or a High Court, includes the Judge
for the time being acting as Chief justice of the Court ;"
and
(b) In the definition of "service of Pakistan" , after the words "Provincial Minister" , the
commas and words " , Attorney-General, Parliamentary Secretary" shall be inserted.
16. Amendment of Article 272 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 272, in the marginal heading , after the word " First" the words "
constitution of " shall be inserted.
17. Amendment of First Schedule to the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in the First Schedule for Part IV the following shall be substituted ,namely:-
"IV. FEDERAL ACTS
1- The Censorship of Films Act, 1963 (XVII of 1963)
2- The Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974."
Constitution (2nd Amendment) Act, 1974
President's Assent Received: 17th September 1974
Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 21st
September 1974
1. Short title and commencement
(1) This act may be called the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1974.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Amendment of Article 106 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in
Article 106, in clause (3), after the words "communities" the words and brackets "and persons of
Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 'Ahmadis')" shall be inserted.
3. Amendment of Article 260 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 260, after clause (2) the following new clause shall be added, namely--
(3) A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of The Prophethood of
MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any
sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), or
recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of
the Constitution or law.
Constitution (3rd Amendment) Act, 1974
President's Assent Received: 13th February 1975
277
Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 18th February
1975
1. Short title and commencement
(1) This act may be called the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1975.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Amendment of Article 10 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution, in Article 10-
(a) in clause (4), for the words "one month" twice occurring the words "three months" shall
be substituted;
(b) in clause (5), for the words and comma "as soon as may be, but not latter than one
week" the words "within fifteen days" shall be substituted; and
(c) in clause (7), in the proviso, after the word "enemy" the commas and words
", or who is acting or attempting to act in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security
of defense of Pakistan or any part thereof or who commits or attempt to commit any act
which amounts to an anti-national activity as defined in a Federal Law or is a member
of any association which has for its object, or which indulges him, any such anti-
national activity" shall be substituted;
3. Amendment of Article 232 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 232, in clause (7), for paragraph (b) the following new clause
shall be substituted, namely--
"(b) shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) cease to be in force upon a resolution
disapproving the proclamation being passed by the votes of the majority of the total
membership of the two Houses in joint sitting."
Constitution (4th Amendment) Act, 1974
President's Assent Received: 21st November 1975
Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 25th November
1975
1. Short title and commencement
(1) This act may be called the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975.
278
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Amendment of Article 8 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution, in Article 8-
(a) in clause (3), for paragraph (b) the following shall be substituted, namely-
"(b) any of the-
(i) laws specified in the First Schedule as in force immediately before the
commencing day or as amended by any of the laws specified in that
schedule;
(ii) other laws specified in Part I of the First Schedule,"
3. Amendment of Article 17 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 17, in clause (1), for the words "morality or public order" the
words "sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality" shall be substituted.
4. Amendment of Article 19 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 19, for the word "defamation" the words "commission
of" shall be substituted.
5. Amendment of Article 51 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 51,
(a) after clause (2), the following new claue shall be inserted, namely-
"(2-
A)
In addition to the number of seats referred to in clause (1), there shall be in the
National Assembly six additional seats reserved for the persons referred to in
clause (3) of Article 106."
and
(b) after clause (4), the following new claue shall be inserted, namely-
"(2-
A)
In addition to the number of seats referred to in clause (1), there shall be in the
National Assembly six additional seats reserved for the persons referred to in
clause (3) of Article 106."
6. Amendment of Article 54 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 54, in clause (2), the following explanation shall be added at the
end , namely:-
"Explanation. In this clause, `working days' includes any day on which there is a joint sitting
and any period, not exceeding two days, for which the National Assembly is adjourned."
7. Amendment of Article 106 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 106, in clause (3),--
(a) for the word "or" occurring for the second time; the words "and other non-Muslims and
persons belonging to" shall be substituted; and
(b) for the figure "3" against the Province of the Punjab the figure "5" shall be substituted.
8. Amendment of Article 199 of the Constitution.
279
In the Constitution, in Article 199,--
(a) after clause (3), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:-
"(3-
A)
A High Court shall not make an order under clause (1)
(a) prohibiting the making of an order for the detention of a person, or
(b) for the grant of bail to a person detained, under any law providing for
preventive detention."
and
(c) after clause (4), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:-
"(4-
A)
An interim order made by a High Court on an application made to it to
question the validity or legal effect of any order made, proceeding taken or
act done by any authority or person, which has been made, taken or done or
purports to have been made, taken or done under any law which is specified
in Part I of the First Schedule or relates to, or is connected with, assessment
or collection of public revenues shall cease to have effect on the expiration
of a period of sixty days following the day on which it is made, unless the
case is finally decided, or the interim order is withdrawn, by the court
earlier."
9. Amendment of Article 271 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 271, in clause (1),
(a) after the words "subject to", the word, figure and comma "Article 63," shall be inserted;
(b) for paragraph (a) the following shall be substituted, namely :-
"(a) the first National Assembly shall consist of-
(i) persons who have taken oath in the National Assembly of Pakistan existing
immediately before the commencing day, and
(ii) the persons to be elected in accordance with law by the members of Assembly
to fill the seats referred to in clause (2-A) of Article 51,
and unless sooner dissolved, shall continue until the fourteenth day August, one
thousand nine hundred and seventy seven; and reference to total membership of the
National Assembly in the Constitution shall be construed accordingly."
(c) in paragraph (b), after the word "vacancies" the commas, words, brackets, figures and
letter, "or to be elected to the additional seats referred to in clause (2-A) of Article
51," shall be inserted.
10. Amendment of Article 272 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 272,-
(a) the brackets and figure "(1)" occurring after the figure '272', shall be omitted ; and
(b) after the words "subject to", the words and figure "Article 63 and" shall be inserted.
280
11. Amendment of Article 273 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 273; in clause (1),-
(a) after the words "subject to", the word, figure and comma "Article 63," shall be inserted
;and
(b) for paragraph (a) the following shall be substituted, namely:-
"(a) the first Assembly of a Province under the Constitution shall consist of -
(i) the members of the Assembly of that Province in existence immediately before
the commencing day, and
(ii) the additional members to be elected in accordance with law by the members
of the Assembly to fill the seats referred to in clause (3) of Article 106,
and, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue until the fourteenth day of August, one
thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven ; and reference to total membership of
the Assembly of a Province in the Constitution shall be construed accordingly."
and
(c) in paragraph (b), after the word "vacancies", the commas, words, brackets, and figures ",
or to be elected to the additional seats referred to in clause (3) of Article 106," shall be
inserted.
12. Substitution of the First Schedule to the Constitution.
In the Constitution, for the First Schedule the Schedule set out in the Schedule to this Act
shall be substituted.
13. Amendment of the fourth Schedule to the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in the Fourth Schedule, in the Concurrent Legislative List, after entry 43,
the following new entry shall be inserted, namely;-
"43-A. Auqaf"
14. Certain orders shall cease to have effect after specified period.
An interim order such as is referred to in clause (4-A) of Article 199 of Constitution, made
by High Court before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect at the
expiration of sixty days from such commencement, unless the case is finally decided, or
the interim order is withdrawn, by the Court earlier.
Constitution (5th Amendment) Act, 1974
President's Assent Received: 16th September 1976
Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 16th September
1976
1. Short title and commencement
(1) This act may be called the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976.
281
(2) It shall come into force at once, except section 8 and section 13, which shall come into
force on the first day of December 1976.
2. Amendment of Article 101 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution, in Article 101, in clause (2), for the full-stop at the end a colon shall be
substituted and thereafter the following proviso and new clause shall be added, namely:-
Provided that, after the holding of the first general election to the National Assembly, a
person shall not be appointed to be the Governor of the Province of which he is a
permanent resident.
(2-
A)
Nothing contained in the proviso to clause (2) shall apply during the period that an
Order under paragraph (c) of clause (2) of Article 232 or a Proclamation under
Article 234 is in force."
3. Amendment of Article 160 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 160, in clause (3), for paragraph (ii) the following shall be
substituted namely :-
"(ii) taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, produced,
manufactured or consumed.;"
4. Amendment of Article 175 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 175 in clause (3), for the word "three" the word "five" shall
be substituted.
5. Amendment of Article 179 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, Article 179 shall be re-numbered as clause (1) of that Article and, after
clause (1) re-numbered as aforesaid, the following new clauses shall be added, namely :-
"(2) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, whether appointed before or after the
commencement of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, shall, unless he
sooner attains the age of sixty-five years, hold office for a term of five years and shall
thereafter have the option either :-
(a) to retire from his office and receive the pension to which he would have been
entitled if he had retired from office on attaining the age of sixty-five years; or
(b) to assume the office of the most senior of the other Judges of the Supreme Court
and to continue to receive the same salary which he was receiving while holding
the office of Chief Justice.
(3) When a Judge assumes the office of the most senior of the other Judges of the
Supreme Court under clause (2), the Judge who was until then the most senior of the
other Judges shall rank next after him in order of seniority.
(4) A person who has once held office as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, otherwise
than under Article 180, shall not again be appointed to that office.
282
(5) The provisions of clauses (2), (3) and (4) shall have effect notwithstanding anything
contained in Article 275.
6. Amendment of Article 180 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 180, for the words "the most senior of the other Judges of the
Supreme Court" the words "one of the Judges of the Supreme Court who have not
previously held the office of Chief Justice of Pakistan otherwise than under this
Article" shall be substituted.
7. Amendment of Article 187 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 187, in clause (1), for the word "The" the words, brackets,
figures and comma "Subject to clause (2) of Article 175, the" shall be substituted.
8. Amendment of Article 192 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 192, for clauses (2), (3) and (4) the following shall be
substituted, namely :-
"(2) The Sind and Baluchistan High Court shall cease to function as a common High
Court for the Provinces of Baluchistan and Sind.
(3) The President shall , by Order, establish a High Court for each of the Provinces of
Baluchistan and Sind and may make such provision in the order of the principal seats
of the two High Courts, transfer of the Judges of the common High Court, transfer of
cases pending in the common High Court immediately before the establishment of
the two High Courts and, generally, for matters consequential or ancillary to the
common High Court ceasing to function and the establishment of the two High
Courts as he may deem fit."
9. Amendment of Article 195 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, Article 195 shall be re-numbered as clause (1) of that Article and, after
clause (1), re-numbered as aforesaid, the following new clauses shall be added, namely :-
"(2) The Chief Justice of a High Court, whether appointed before or after the
commencement of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, shall, unless he
sooner attains the age of sixty-two years, hold office for a term of four years and
shall thereafter have the option either:-
(a) to retire from his office and receive the pension to which he would have been
entitled if he had retired from office on attaining the age of sixty-two years; or
(b) assume the office of the most senior of the other Judges of the High Court and to
continue to receive the same salary which he was receiving while holding the
office of Chief Justice.
(3) When a Judge assumes the office of the most senior of the other Judges of a High
Court under clause (2), the Judge who was until then the most senior of the other
Judges shall rank next after him in order of seniority.
(4) A person who has once held office as Chief Justice of a High Court, otherwise than
283
under Article 196, shell not again be appointed to be the Chief Justice of that High
Court.
(5) The provisions of clause (2), (3) and (4) shall have effect notwithstanding anything
contained in Article 275."
10. Amendment of Article 196 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 196, for the words "the most senior of the other Judges of the
High Court" the words "one of the Judges of the High Court who have not previously held
the office of Chief Justice of the High Court otherwise than under this Article" shall be
substituted.
11. Amendment of Article 199 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 199, for clause (3-A) the following shall be substituted,
namely :-
"(3-
A)
A High Court shall not make under this Article -
(a) an order prohibiting the making, or suspending the operation, of an order for the
detention of any person under any law providing for preventive detention;
(b) an order for the release on bail of any person detained under any law providing
for preventive detention;
(c) an order for the release on bail, or an order suspending the operation of an order
for the custody, of any person against whom a report or complaint has been
made before any Court or tribunal, or against whom a case has been registered
at any police station, in respect of an offence, or who has been convicted by any
Court or tribunal;
(d) an order prohibiting the registration of a case at a police station, or the making
of a report or complaint before any Court or tribunal, in respect of an offence; or
(e) any other interim order in respect of any person referred any of the preceding
paragraphs.
(3-
B)
Every such order as is referred to in clause (3-A), made at any time after the
commencement of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, shall cease to
have effect and all applications for the making of any such order that may be pending
before any High Court shall abate.
(3-
C)
The provisions of clauses (3-A) and (3-B) shall also apply to the disposal of an
application in a petition for leave to appeal, or in an appeal, from an order such as is
referred to in the said clause (3-A) that may be pending before the Supreme Court
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act,
1976."
12. Amendment of Article 200 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 200, in clause (1), for the full-stop at the end a colon shall be
substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be added, namely :-
Provided that such consent, or consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Courts, shall
not be necessary if such transfer is for a period not exceeding one year at a time.
284
Explanation. In this Article, "Judge" does not include a " Chief Justice".
13. Amendment of Article 204 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 204, for clauses (2) and (3) the following shall be
substituted, namely :-
"(2) A Court shall have the power to punish a person for contempt of Court in accordance
with law".
14. Amendment of Article 206 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, Article 206 shall be re-numbered as clause (1) of that Article and, after
clause (1), re-numbered as aforesaid, the following new clause shall be added, namely:-
"(2) A Judge of a High Court who does not accept appointment as a Judge of the Supreme
Court shall be deemed to have retired from his office and, on such retirement, shall
be entitled to receive a pension calculated on the basis of the length of his service as
Judge and total service if any, in the service of Pakistan."
15. Amendment of Article 212 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 212, in clause (2) after the word "Tribunal" occurring for the
third time, the commas and words "other than an appeal pending before the Supreme
Court," shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted.
16. Amendment of Article 260 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 260, in the definition of "Service of Pakistan", after the word
and comma "Attorney-General", the word and comma "Advocate-General," shall be
inserted.
17. Amendment of Article 280 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 280, after the word "made" at the end, the words and
figures "and shall not be called in question in any Court on the ground of inconsistency
with any of the rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II" shall be added and shall be deemed
always to have been so added.
18. Amendment of the First Schedule to the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in the First Schedule, in Part I, --
(a) under the sub-heading "II REGULATIONS", after entry 6, the following new entry
shall be added, namely :-
"7. The Settlement of Disputes of Immovable Property (Chitral)(Amendment)
Regulation, 1976 (XII of 1976)."
(b) under the sub-heading "III FEDERAL ACTS", after entry 2, the following new entries
shall be added, namely :-
"3. The Flour Milling Control and Development Act, 1976 (LVII of 1976).
4. The Rice Milling Control and Development Act, (LVIII of 1976).
285
5. The Cotton Ginning Control and Development Act, 1976 (LIX of 1976)."
and
(c) after the sub-heading "V PROVINCIAL ACT" and the entries relating thereto, the
following new sub-heading and entry shall be added, namely :-
"VI. PROVINCIAL ORDINANCE
The Land Reforms (Pat Feeder Canal) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1976."
19. Amendment of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in the Fourth Schedule,-
(a) in the Federal Legislative List,-
(i) in Part I, for entry 49 the following shall be substituted, namely:-
"49. Taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, produced,
manufactured or consumed."
;and
(ii) in Part II, in entry 3, for the words "West Pakistan Water and Power
Development Authority and the West Pakistan Industrial Development
Corporation" the words "Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority and
the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation" shall be substituted; and
(b) in the Concurrent Legislative List, for entry 41, the following shall be substituted,
namely :-
"41. Production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph films."
Constitution (6th Amendment) Act, 1974
President's Assent Received: 13th December 1976
Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 4th January
1977
1. Short title and commencement
(1) This act may be called the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1976.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Amendment of Article 179 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution, in Article 179, after clause (5), the following new clause shall be added, namely
:-
286
"(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1) or clause (2), a Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court who attains the age of sixty-five years before he has held that office for
a term of five years may continue to hold that office until he has completed that term."
3. Amendment of Article 195 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 195, after clause (5), the following new clause shall be added,
namely -
"(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1) or clause (2), a Chief justice of the
High Court who attains the age of sixty-two years before he has held that office for a
term of five years may continue to hold that office until he has completed that term."
4. Amendment of Article 246 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 246,-
(a) in paragraph (b), in sub-paragraph (i),
(i) after the brackets, words and comma "(which includes Kalam)" the words and
comma "the Tribal Area in Kohistan District," shall be inserted and shall deemed to
have been so inserted on the first day of October, 1976; and
(ii) for the word "Hazara" the word "Mansehra" shall be substituted and shall be
deemed to have been so substituted on the first day of October, 1976;
and
(b) in paragraph (c), for the sub-paragraph (v) the following shall be substituted shall be
deemed to have been so substituted on the first day of December, 1976, namely:--
"(v) Bajaur Agency:
(v-a) Orakzai Agency:"
5. Amendment of Article 260 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 260, in the definition, of "service of Pakistan", after the words
"Parliamentary Secretary", the commas and words, "Chairman or member of a law
commission, Chairman or member of the Council of Islamic Ideology, Special Assistant to
the Prime Minister, Adviser to the Prime Minister, Special Assistant to a Chief Minister,
Advisor to a Chief Minister" shall be inserted.
Constitution (7th Amendment) Act, 1974
President's Assent Received: 16th May 1977
Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 16th May 1977
1. Short title and commencement
(1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1977.
(2) It shall come into force at once and section 4 shall be deemed to have taken effect on
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the twenty-first day of April 1977.
(3) Section 2 shall cease to be in force on the thirteenth day of September, 1977.
2. Insertion of new Article 96-A, in the Constitution.
In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution, after Article 96, the following new Article shall be inserted, namely :-
"96A Referendum as to confidence in Prime Minister.
(1) If at any time the Prime Minister considers it necessary to obtain a vote of
confidence of the people of Pakistan through a referendum, he may advise the
President to cause matter to be referred to a referendum in accordance with law
made by Parliament.
(2) The law referred to in clause (1) shall provide for the Constitution of
Referendum Commission and the manner and mode of holding a referendum.
(3) On receipt of the advice of the Prime Minister under clause (1), the President
shall call upon the Referendum Commission to conduct a referendum amongst
the persons whose names appear on the electoral rolls for the immediately
preceding general elections to the National Assembly as revised up-to-date.
(4) Any dispute arising in connection with the counting of votes at referendum shall
be finally determined by the Referendum Commission or a member thereof
authorized by it and, save as aforesaid, no dispute arising in connection with a
referendum or the result thereof shall be raised or permitted to be raised before
any court or other authority whatsoever.
(5) If, on the final count of the votes cast at the referendum, the Prime Minister fails
to secure majority of the total votes cast in the matter of the confidence of the
people of Pakistan, he shall be deemed to have tendered his resignation with in
the meaning of Article 94.".
3. Amendment of Article 101 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution, in Article 101, in clause (2-A), for the word, brackets, letter and
figures "an Order under paragraph (c) of clause (2) of Article 232 or a Proclamation
under" the words and figure "a Proclamation under article 232 or" shall be substituted.
4. Amendment of Article 245 of the Constitution.
In the Constitution Article 245 shall be renumbered as clause (1), of that Article and, after
clause (1) renumbered as aforesaid, the following new clauses shall be added, namely;--
"(2) The validity of any direction issued by the Federal Government under clause (1) shall
not be called in question in any Court.
(3) A High Court shall not exercise any jurisdiction under Article 199 in relation to any
area in which the Armed Forces of Pakistan are, for the time being, acting in aid of
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civil power in pursuance of Article 245:
Provided that this clause shall not be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of the High
Court in respect of any proceeding pending immediately before the day on which the
Armed Forces start acting in aid of civil power.
(4) Any proceeding in relation to an area referred to in clause (3), instituted on or after the
day the Armed Forces start acting in aid of civil power and pending in any High Court
shall remain suspended for the period during which the Armed Forces are so acting."