SPOUSES YU VS. NGO YET TE

FACTS:Spouses Gregorio and Josefa Yu (Spouses Yu) purchased from Ngo Yet Te (Te) bars of detergent soap worthP594,240.00, and issued to the latter three postdated checks as payment of the purchase price. When Te presented the checks at maturity for encashment, said checks were returned dishonored and stamped "ACCOUNT CLOSED". Te demanded payment from Spouses Yu but the latter did not heed her demands. Acting through her son and attorney-in-fact, Charry Sy (Sy), Te filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment.

In this case, the complaint and the accompanying affidavit in support of the application for the writ only contains general averments. Neither pleading states in particular how the fraud was committed or the badges of fraud purportedly committed by the petitioners to establish that the latter never had an intention to pay the obligation; neither is there a statement of the particular acts committed to show that the petitioners are in fact disposing of their properties to defraud creditors.

Issues:I. WON the appellate court erred in not holding that the writ of attachment was procured in bad faith, after it was established by final judgment that there was no true ground therefor. YES

II. WON or not the appellate court erred in refusing to award actual, moral and exemplary damages after it was established by final judgment that the writ of attachment was procured with no true ground for its issuance.YESHELD:

The wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant automatic award of damages to the attachment defendant; the latter must first discharge the burden of proving the nature and extent of the loss or injury by reason of the wrongful attachment.

To merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment defendant must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind, which is not only capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. As to its amount, the same must be measurable based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation. In particular, if the claim for actual damages covers unrealized profits, the amount of unrealized profits must be established and supported by independent evidence of the mean income of the business undertaking interrupted by the illegal seizure.

Nonetheless, we recognize that Spouses Yu suffered some form of pecuniary loss when their properties were wrongfully seized, although the amount thereof cannot be definitively ascertained. Hence, an award of temperate or moderate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is in order.As a rule, attorneys fees cannot be awarded when moral and exemplary damages are not granted, the exception however is when a party incurred expenses to lift a wrongfully issued writ of attachment.

BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICT VS LABAYEN

FACTS:Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) is a water district established pursuant to PD 198 as a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. It is in the business of providing safe and potable water to Bacolod City. Bacolod City filed a case against BACIWA. BACIWA sought to increase water rates, which Bacolod City opposes. Bacolod City alleged that the proposed water rates would violate due process as they were to be imposed without the public hearing required under LOI 700 andPD 1479.

Lower Court's Ruling: The RTC issued an Order commanding BACIWA to stop, desist and refrain from implementing the proposed water rates for the year 2000. Eventually, the RTC issued the assailed Decision granting the final injunction, which allegedly confirmed the previous preliminary injunction. Motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Appellate Court's Ruling: The CA dismissed BACIWA's petition for review on certiorari.Issue: Whether the order issued by the RTC is a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction

Supreme Court's Ruling: The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the RTC make a clear conclusion that the Order issued was a temporary restraining order and not a preliminary injunction. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo untll the merits can be heard. A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the applicationfor preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte.

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION VS. CO

FACTS:Petitioner China Banking Corporation sold a lot locatedat St. Benedict Subdivision, Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, to petitioner-spouses Joey and Mary Jeannie Castro (the Castro spouses). It sold two other lots also located in the same place to petitioner-spouses Richard and Editha Nogoy (the Nogoy spouses).

The lots of the Castro spouses and the Nogoy spouses are commonly bound on their southeastern side by Lot No. 3783-E, which is covered by TCT No. 269758-R in the name of respondent Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings.

Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with respondent Three Kings Construction and Realty Corporation for the development of the Northwoods Estates, a subdivision project covering Lot No. 3783-E and adjacent lots. For this purpose, they contracted the services of respondent, Engineer Dale Olea.

In 2003, respondents started constructing a perimeter wall on Lot No. 3783-E.

On November 28, 2003, petitioners, through counsel, wrote respondents asking them to stop constructing the wall, and remove all installed construction materials and restore the former condition of Lot No. [3]783-E which they (petitioners) claimed to be a road lot.1 They also claimed that the construction obstructed and closed the only means of ingress and egress of the Nogoy spouses and their family, and at the same time, caved in and impeded the ventilation and clearance due the Castro spouses residential house.

Petitioners demand remained unheeded, prompting them to file before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 12834, for injunction, restoration of road lot/right of way and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

RTC denied the application of writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

CA denied their petition for certiorari

ISSUE:WON the application for injunction must be granted? NO

HELD:It is settled that the grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction rests on the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. It is likewise settled that a court should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which would effectively dispose of the main case without trial.

Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainantEs right is thus doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is improper.

The absence of a showing that the petitioners have an urgent and paramount need for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent irreparable damage, they are not entitled to such writ.

While petitioners correctly argue that certain requirements must be observed before encumbrances, in this case the condition of the lotEs registration as being subject to the law, may be discharged and before road lots may be appropriated gratuity assuming that the lot in question was indeed one, TCT Nos. 247778-R and 269758-R enjoy the presumption of regularity and the legal requirements for the removal of the memorandum annotated on TCT No. 185702-R are presumed to have been followed. At all events, given the following factual observations of the trial court after conducting an ocular inspection of Lot 3783-E, viz.: x x x The ocular inspection showed that [petitioners] will not lose access to their residences. As a matter of fact, lot 3783-E is not being used as an access road to their residences and there is an existing secondary road within St. Benedict Subdivision that serves as the main access road to the highway. With respect to the blocking of ventilation and ight of the residence of the Sps. Castro, suffice it to state that they are not deprived of light and ventilation. The perimeter wall of the defendants is situated on the left side of the garage and its front entrance is still open and freely accessible, and the absence of a showing that petitioners have an urgent and paramount need for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent irreparable damage, they are not entitled to such writ.

ESTARES VS CA

FACTS:

On May 21, 1999, petitioner Spouses Eliseo F. Estares and Rosenda P. Estares (Estares spouses for brevity) filed a complaint for Damages and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction against private respondent Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. B-5476.

Their complaint is based on the following facts. The spouses Estares secured a loan of P800k from Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) in 1998. To secure the loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land. They however only received P637k as testified by Rosenda Estares in court. She did not however question the discrepancy. At that time, her husband was in Algeria working. The loan eventually went due and the spouses were unable to pay. So PLCC petitioned for an extrajudicial foreclosure. The property was eventually foreclosed.

Now, the spouses are questioning the validity of the loan as they alleged that they agreed to an 18% per annum interest rate but PLCC is now charging them 3.5% interest rate per month; they also questioned the terms of the loan.

PLCC argued that the spouses were properly apprised of the terms of the loan. On the procedural aspect, PLCC claims that the petition filed by the spouses is invalid because the certification of non-forum shopping was only signed by Rosenda and her husband did not sign.

The lower court did not grant the application for preliminary injunction.

ISSUEWON preliminary injuction should be granted?

HELD: NO. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such an order before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.

The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the existence of their right to be protected; and (b) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of such right. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.

It must be remembered that a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.