PROTESTING FOOD: NGOs AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION IN EUROPE

Chris Ansell, Rahsaan Maxwell, and Daniela Sicurelli1

1 Chris Ansell, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; Rahsaan Maxwell, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; Daniela Sicurelli, Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento.

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Protesting Food: NGOS and Political Mobilization in Europe

From the perspective of the debate about European food safety, 1996 was both annus

horribilis (horrible year) and anus mirabilis (year of wonder) rolled into one. Five events

occurred in 1996 that set off a firestorm of controversy about the character and safety of

European food: first, the UK announced that a mind-wasting malady called Creutzfeldt-Jakob

Disease had afflicted humans and that the probable cause was consumption of beef infected

with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE); second, US- grown genetically-modified corn

and soybeans began to arrive in European ports; third, Dolly the sheep, the world’s first cloned

mammal, was born in the UK; fourth, the US and Canada lodged a complaint with the WTO

against Europe’s ban on beef raised on hormones; fifth, the US biotechnology giant Monsanto

took the European Commission to court for failing to approve the use of a genetically-

engineered hormone used to boost milk production (rbST). The wave of protest responding to

these events galvanized the emergence of a powerful European social movement opposed

genetically-modified organisms (GMOs). By 1998, a de facto European moratorium against

the planting or use of GMOs came into effect.

The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that comprise the anti-GMO movement

have taken center stage in the European contestation over genetic engineering and the politics

of food. Their influence has been pervasive. They have cut down GM crops grown on test

sites, pressured major food retailers to go GM-free, demanded the application of the

precautionary principle in approving new GM crops, monitored nations and companies for

compliance with the moratorium, staged media-savvy symbolic protests against the genetic

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patents, lobbied all levels of government in favor of a GM ban, and challenged the scientific

claims of private industry and government agencies.

In this paper, we ask how these NGOs have established themselves as critical

interlocutors between public opinion and public and private organizations. We examine the

organizations and coalitions that comprise the anti-GMO movement, their strategies and

tactics, and the ways they have sought to frame the debate about genetic engineering. Our

investigation takes us somewhat beyond the food safety debate per se into issues related to

environmental protection, farming, and globalization. This broader focus is necessary,

however, to understand the contested nature of food safety governance and the longer-term

implications of this debate. In broad terms, we argue that politics of food is so visceral in

Europe because of the way it links environmentalists, consumers, and small farmers together

around issues of trade, corporate power, and scientific risk. Opposition to GMOs has linked

these different social movement sectors together in a transnational advocacy network that

flexibly mobilizes opposition and influence at multiple levels: public and private, institutional

and non-institutional, and local, national, European and international.

This anti-GMO movement has important implications for trends in the politicization of

science and risk assessment and for the reestablishment of the legitimacy of food safety

governance. Most importantly, perhaps, this movement strongly advocates the adoption of

precautionary approaches to risk assessment—a trend that creates significant tension in food

safety regulation at the international level. Second, the anti-GMO movement has contributed

to the politicization of science, by rejecting clear demarcation between fact and value and by

providing alternative sources of information and critical scrutiny of scientific claims made by

scientists, industry, and government (Wales and Mythen 2002). To understand the depth of

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this politicization, we need only to cite the findings of Eurobarometer opinion polls that

indicate that the European public trusts environmental and consumer groups over universities,

government agencies, or industry to provide information about the hazards of biotechnology

(Gaskell, Allum, and Stares 2003, 32).

In addition to effects on the politicization of science and risk assessment, the

mobilization of an effective anti-GMO movement mobilizes dissent over the actions of private

corporations and government policy. The anti-GMO movement has been highly successful in

channeling public opinion into effective consumer pressure on private corporations at many

points along the product chain (though primarily supermarket retailers). It also operates

successfully and simultaneously at multiple governmental levels, partly through an implicit

division of labor between organizations operating at different levels (from GM Free Cymru

[Wales] to Consumers’ International) and through its ability to operate simultaneously at

multiple levels (especially Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace). And finally, it is able to tap

into both specialized issue publics and their social networks (UK Gardeners, ChristianAid, the

Danish Beekeepers’ Association, etc.) and diffuse constitutencies (environmental, consumer,

agricultural). The long term nature of this coalition remains an open question, but we will

conclude the paper with some considerations about the durability of this issue.

European Mobilization Against GMOs

A number of authors have noted that European consumer and environmental NGOs have been

critical in mobilizing opposition to GMOs and their success explains the relative stringency of

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European regulation in these terms (in comparison with the US). Bernauer and Meins (2003)

argue that the European anti-GMO movement mounted a successful campaign against GMOs

for at least three reasons: (1) because it has piggy-backed on negative public opinion toward

GMOs and public outrage toward regulatory authorities in order to mobilize protest against

GMOs; (2) because European consumer groups have created effective alliances with producer

groups, though the producer groups have not principally been motivated by protectionist rent-

seeking; and (3) because it has successfully leveraged multiple access points associated with

multilevel governance in Europe. They argue, by contrast, that American NGOs have not

mobilized as effectively because US consumers are in general more favorable toward GMOs,

more trusting of public authorities, and because they confront a more unified pro-GMO

producer coalition.

In this section, we treat the Bernauer and Meins argument as a starting point from

which to examine European anti-GMO mobilization. First, we examine the overall

composition of the movement. Table 1 identifies the frequency with which a particular NGO

was mentioned in a specialized mailing list archive devoted to information exchange among a

European network of anti-GMO groups (GENET).

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TABLE 1: NGOs and ANTI-GMO ACTIVITIES, January 1999-June 2003 (Number of Mentions in GENET’s Mailing List Archive)2 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS: *Friends of the Earth (53); *Greenpeace (68). EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS: *Ecoropa (3); European Environmental Bureau (1). NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS: France Nature Environment (1); German Society of Ecology (1); Green Environment and Society (3; Italy); *Quercus (1; Portugal); Worldwide Fund for Nature (1; Switzerland); Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (3; UK); Irish Wildlife Trust (1); Earthwatch (1; Ireland); Irish Doctors Environment Association (1); Friends of the Irish Environment (1); Green League (1; Germany); Green Library Fund (1; Sweden); GIAI Trust (UK); NABU (1; Birdlife Partner; Germany); *National Secretariat of Ecologists in Action (1; Spain); *World Wildlife Fund Switzerland (1); *Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (1); Danish Society for the Conservation of Nature (1); Danish Society of Practical Ecology. REGIONAL OR LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS: Fife Earth First! (1) POLITICAL PARTIES: Green Party UK (3); Green Party Northern Ireland (2); Green Party Scotland; Greens (1; France); *Greens (2; EU); Scottish National Party (1). ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS FOCUSING ON SUSTAINABILIITY: *A SEED Europe (6); ANPED—the Northern Alliance for Sustainability (4); *Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN; 3); SUSTAIN—Alliance for Better Food and Farming (2; UK), *Berne Declaration (2; Switzerland); the Corner House (1; UK); GENETICS GROUPS: *Basler Appeal Against Gene Technology (1; Switzerland); Genetic Concern (4; Ireland); Genetix Action (1; Scotland); Genetic Engineering Network (2; UK); GenetiX Snowball Group (3); Genewatch (6; UK); GM Free Cymru (1; Wales); Moray GM Concern (1; Scotland); People’s Biosafety Association (1; Finland); Dutch Platform on

2 The information in this table is derived from the GENET mailing list archive for the years 1999-May 2003. GENET is a European network of NGOs critical of genetic engineering. It has 38 member organizations in 15 European countries. The mailing list is designed to facilitate information exchange among organizations engaged in campaigns against GMOs. We examined each mailing list entry in the archive between 1999-2003, recording the number of times an NGOs was identified in the communications (in parentheses). We were inclusive in our coding, including a group even if it the “action” involved was merely commenting on a particular issue or event. For large federated groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, we lumped the actions of all affiliates together. The member organizations of the GENET organization are indicated by an *. Finally, note that we analyzed only the English language mailing list and did not analyze the separate mailing list devoted to German language communications. Hence, this analysis is certainly biased toward UK and Irish NGOs and probably European/International NGOs.

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Genetechnologies (1); *Schwezerische Arbeitsgruppe Gentechnologie (2; Switzerland); OGM Danger (2; France); *Genetics Forum (1; UK); Five Year Freeze (1; UK);Gen-ethisches Netzwerk (2; Germany). ANIMAL PROTECTION GROUPS: *Association for Animal Protection (1; Austria); *Scientific Antivivisection Committee (2; Italy); Royal Society for the Protection of Animals (1; Netherlands). CONSUMER GROUPS: Consumers’ International (4); Association of European Consumers (2); Active Consumers Denmark (2); the Consumers’ Association (2; UK); the Consumer Council of Norway (1); the COOP-Association of National Consumers’ Cooperatives (1; Italy); the Scottish Consumer Council (1); Alternative Consumers’ Association (1; Netherlands); Asociacion Vida Sana (1; Spain); Danish Consumers Council (1). MORE SPECIALIZED CONSUMER GROUPS: Food Commission (1; UK); National Council for Culinary Arts (1; France); Europtoques Denmark (1; European Community of Cooks). DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS: ActionAid (6); ChristianAid (6; UK); MISEREOR (1; German Catholic Church Development Agency); NOVIB (1; Netherlands); Oxfam Worldshops (1); World Development Movement (2; UK); Netherlands Centre for Indigenous People (1); German NGO Forum on Environment & Development (2). ORGANIC FARMERS: The Soil Association (9; UK); Swedish Association of Ecological Farmers (1); Biosuisse (1; Switzerland); Henry Doubleday Research Association (1 UK). FARMERS: *European Farmers Coordination (1); Confederation of European Small Farmers (2); COAG (1; Spain); Coldiretti (2; Italy); Confederation Paysanne (2; France); Small Farms Association (1; UK); Association for the Protection of Small Farmers (1; Switzerland); Farmer’s Union of Wales (1). SPECIALIZED AGRICULTURAL GROUPS: Irish Seed Savers (1); Finnish Seedsaver’s Association (1); Danish Beekeeper’s Assocation; *WERVEL-Werkgroep voor en Rechtvaardige en Veranttwoorde Landbouw (1; Working Group for an Honest and Responsible Agriculture Belgium) WOMEN’S GROUPS: Diverse Women for Diversity (1; Germany); Women’s Environmental Network (3; UK); National Federation of Women’s Institutes (2; UK); Dutch Association of Housewives (1). OTHER: Friei Kultur Aktion (1; Germany); Sindicato Comisiones Obreras (1; Spain);; Institute of Science in Society (1; UK); Genetic Food Alert (1; UK); IP Suisse (1); Biodynamic Association (1; Denmark); National Trust (1; UK); Unison (1; UK); Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environmental Services (1); Globalise Resistance (1; UK anti-globalization book); European Civic Forum (1).

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We have classified the groups by social movement sector.3 As Table 1 demonstrates,

the movement straddles many different more specialized niches. The sectoral structure might

be summarized as follows: the European anti-GMO movement straddles environmental,

consumer, development, and agricultural sectors. We believe that the broad scope of

participation must be related at some level to the mobilizing power of this issue. However, we

also note that Reiser (2001) finds essentially the same social movement landscape in the US as

we find in Europe. So the mere scope and diversity of NGOs is by no means a sufficient

explanation for successful European protest. A second conclusion that we derive from Table 1

relates to the importance of two international environmental organizations—Friends of the

Earth and Greenpeace—in the European anti-GMO mobilization. Their activity overshadows

that of any other group. Since these two groups are also well represented in the US, this

finding further accentuates the argument that the difference between the US and Europe cannot

fundamentally be attributed to the more developed organizational infrastructure of the

European movement.

Table 1 also identifies other important aspects of the European movement. First, the

activity of environmental groups is more impressive than that of consumers groups. The

activities of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth far overshadow the activities of the most

active consumers group—Consumers’ International. This is an interesting finding if you

consider the claim that European protest is piggy-backing on consumer outrage over the Mad

Cow crisis. However, we might also note the existence of many groups specializing in genetic

3 Obviously, some groups could be placed under multiple classifications. But we based our classfication on what we thought was the primary mission of the group.

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engineering (e.g., Gene Watch). These groups tend to focus on both consumer and

environmental framing of the anti-GMO protest.

Farmers are also active in the movement, though we concur with Bernauer and Meins

that there is little evidence that European GMO protest is a triumph for protectionist producer’s

groups. The farmers groups involved tend to represent small farmers or organic farmers, and

many of the organizations that represent larger farmers are conspicuously absent. Organic

farmer associations appear fairly active in the movement and the UK Soil Association, in

particular, is quite impressive (see footnote, however, on the English language bias of our

analysis). Finally, development organizations must be recognized. Concerns about poverty,

sustainability, and autonomy of third world farming were an important mobilizing issue that

we were not fully sensitive to before conducting this analysis. Among groups focusing on

sustainability, A SEED Europe, stands out. Based in the Netherlands, it has sought to provide

coordination to the anti-GMO movement as a whole. Among groups focusing on third world

poverty, ActionAid and ChristianAid have been quite active.

We can also describe this anti-GMO movement in terms of local, national, European, or

International protest. Here, we focus only on the organizational character and not the specific

target of activity. For example, Friends of the Earth is clearly an international organization,

but through its local chapter it often targets local issues and authorities. However, in strictly

organizational terms, we can identify the most important groups at each level. At the

international level, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Consumers International are the most

important actors overall. Among European groups, A Seed Europe, Ecoropa, Association of

European Consumer’s, and European Farmers’ Coordination might be mentioned. However,

given that A Seed Europe is really focused on areas outside Europe, we must conclude from

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this data that strictly European organization is not strong. Most of the groups identified, in

fact, were national rather than European or International in organizational identity. We found

few mentions of strictly subnational groups. Keep in mind, however, that we are strictly

describing organization structure rather than activity. Many of the national groups may be

much more locally rooted.

Based on our analysis of the GENET mailing list archives from January 1999-May

2003, we can partially assess the level at which NGO activity took place. Note that this

evidence must be evaluated with caution, because GENET is a European network.4 As

reported in Table 2, national activity is the predominant level of NGO action, followed by

European, international, and subnational.

4 Therefore, we expect some bias toward European and international reporting.

However, this bias is somewhat offset at the national level because the English language format, probably biases the reporting toward the UK national organizations. There is probably a more serious bias against subnational activity, since local organizations are probably unlikely to feel the need to post information on a European web-site.

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Table 2: Level of Activity of NGOs (based on evaluation of GENET mailing archive,

January 1999-June 2003).

Level of Activity Number of Memos

International 41

European 47

National 80

Subnational 13

Uncoded 23

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The data are consistent with the claim by Bernauer and Meins that NGO activity operates at

multiple political levels. We shall return to this discussion of the multi-level nature of NGO

activity in our discussion of Greenpeace and European protest.

Turning to the claim about anti-GMO public opinion and public distrust of authorities,

we now briefly summarize the evidence from public opinion polls. In the most direct

comparative polls based on 1996-7 data, Gaskell, Bauer, Durant, and Allum (1999) find that

Europeans were less supportive of GM crops and foods than Americans.5 In the 2001,

Eurobarometer poll, nearly 71% of Europeans surveyed reported that “I do not want this kind

of Food” and more than 56% believed that “GMO-based food is dangerous” (Bonny 2003, 4).6

What accounts for the difference? Gaskell, Bauer, Durant, and Allum investigate the amount

of press coverage in the US and Europe and find that it is similar until 1991. Thereafter,

biotechnology receives considerably more coverage in Europe. Through 1996, however, the

increased European coverage is not distinctly more negative than American coverage. A more

significant difference, they suggest, is the issue of institutional trust. Europeans appear to

have much less trust in public authorities than do Americans. Although Europeans are more

knowledgeable about biotechnology than Americans, they also hold far more negative images

of food biotechnology. The authors suggest that this may be related to recent European food

scares.

An obvious source of public outrage was the public handling of mad cow disease. We

have already noted the coincidence of timing, in 1996, between the identification of a probable

link between BSE and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and the first imports of GM soya and maize.

It is clear from Eurobarometer surveys that European attitudes toward GM crops and food

5 The authors found variation in support and opposition across different kinds of biotechnologies. For example, Americans were less supportive of genetic testing than Europeans. 6 Zechendorf (1998) analyzes intra-European differences in attitudes toward agricultural biotechnology.

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became significantly more negative between 1996 and 1999 (Gaskell, Allum, and Stares 2003;

see Table 5). It is also clear that in many European countries (Germany is a prominent

exception), public debate about GM foods only began in 1996 (PABE 2001, 37-8). More

specifically, a UK Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology study found that a

significant number of news articles about genetic modification also mentioned BSE,

particularly in the early phases of the debate (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology

2000, 11-12). BSE created great citizen distrust of government expertise (Jasanoff 1997).

The connection to BSE, however, is not the whole story. The PABE focus group

studies found that participants did associate BSE with the GM debate, but as representing the

typical behavior of public institutions (PABE 2001, 84). The 1991 Eurobarometer survey

already finds a pronounced bias toward consumer and environmental organizations as sources

of reliable information on bio-engineering over public authorities It also finds a more negative

attitude toward bio-engineering applied to crops, animals, and foods than toward other

applications of biotechnology (e.g., medicines, micro-organisms; Eurobarometer 1991, 41,

74).7

The Reasons for Protest

Given the often-heard argument in the scientific community that GM foods do not pose a

serious food safety hazard (at least for currently available foods), why are anti-GMO groups

7 A series of focus group studies about biotechnology held across Europe concluded that focus group participants “did not identify unconditionally with [consumer and environmental NGOs] any more than with any other group or institution” (PABE 2001, 63). Participants did not view environmental and consumer groups as “unbiased,” but did believe that they asked difficult questions and raised issues that would not otherwise be addressed. However, Henson argues that European do see consumer groups as the least biased of sources (Henson, 2001, 96-7).

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making such a big deal about them? One hypothesis is that these groups see GM foods as a

fundamental issue related to the industrialization of agriculture, corporate control over the

environment, and sustainability. These themes resonate with anti-globalization activists,

traditional environmental constituencies, and consumer groups.

[This Section Remains to Be Written]

Table 3: Issues Raised by NGO Demands and Protest Issues

Number of

Mentions Demand or Support for GM Food or Crop Moratorium 25Generic Anti-GM Sentiment or Demands 21Criticism of/Demand for Moratorium on Crop Trials 16Opposition to Genetic Patents 15Criticism of Crop “Contamination” (e.g., Cross-Pollination) 14Pressure on/Support for Firms to Adopt GM-Free Policies 11Pressure on/Support for GM-Free Regions 8Demand for a Liability Regime for GMOs 8Related to Direct Action Against GM Test Sites or Crop Imports 8Opposition to GM Crop of Food Approvals 7Criticism of Violations of GM Ban 7Demands for GM Labelling 7Critique of Corporate Control over Seeds or Corporate Power 6Demands for GMO Traceability/Segregation 6Demands for Increased GMO Regulation (e.g., increased monitoring) 5Critique of GM Debate (UK)/NGO Criticism of Access to Policy Debate 5Criticism of Product “Contamination” or Thresholds 4Demands Related to Risk Assessment (e.g., precautionary principle) 4Discussion of Health Risks of GMOs 4Uncoded/Miscellaneous 12Source: GENET Archive, January 1999-June 2003

A Critical Transnational NGO: Greenpeace

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One cannot understand anti-GMO protest in Europe without considering Greenpeace.

Greenpeace’s significant resources and representation across Europe allowed it to spread the

anti-GMO campaign quickly and deeply, plugging into national networks, with support from

national level NGOs, and catering to ideological particularities of individual nations.

The significance of Greenpeace across Europe in the anti-GMO campaign is an

indicator of its centrality in the movement. Organizational network centrality is traditionally

conceived as the degree to which other organizations consider it a partner. (Freeman 1973)

Mario Diani pushes this concept further to explain the growth of network centrality based on a)

organizational resources, b) diversity of issues covered, and c) age/institutional consolidation

of the organization. (Diani 2003) When comparing Greenpeace with other organizations in

the anti-GMO movement (Friends of the Earth/Les Amis de la Terre, Confédération

Paysanne…) these three factors offer great leverage for distinguishing Greenpeace.

Founded over 30 years ago, Greenpeace has well-established institutional networks.

With chapters in 40 countries across the world, over 1,000 full-time staff members, and a

combined income of 117,462,000 Euros, of which 112,332,000 Euros were spent on

campaigns, Greenpeace is clearly a giant of the global environmental movement.8 The fact

that Greenpeace’s budget is derived primarily from small, individual donations is evidence of

its strong public support base.9 Greenpeace conducts its own surveys across Europe to

determine public opinion and to develop campaign strategies.10

These resources and institutional networks have allowed Greenpeace to grow from a

grass-roots organization into a transnational giant, able to access a global, coordinated, flexible

8 2002 income for Greenpeace International and national Greenpeace offices. Major Greenpeace campaigns include oceans, forests, genetic engineering, toxics, climate, nuclear disarmament, anti-war protests, and sustainable trade. 9Greenpeace Annual Report 2002, available at www.greenpeace.org 10 http://archive.greenpeace.org/geneng/

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base of organizers devoted to various causes. The board of trustees represents Greenpeace’s

national offices, ensuring that general policy direction is in sync with the various national

needs. Each campaign is run by an international coordinator, who synchronizes the campaign

with Greenpeace’s global vision while delegating regional and national specifics to regional

and national campaigners.11 Greenpeace was able to develop a comprehensive anti-GMO

platform while implementing it differently in various national European (and worldwide)

contexts. Greenpeace’s established international resources, coherent but flexible

organizational structure, and diverse networks gave it movement centrality that pushed anti-

GMO sentiment further, faster, and in more countries than any other social movement

organization.

Greenpeace started its campaign against GMOs in the early 1990s as genetic

engineering became a more visible issue.12 The approach was two-pronged: lobbying national

and supranational governments to ban GMOs, and conducting a public information campaign

to sway mass sentiment against GMOs. Specific activities ranged from handing out

magnifying glasses to shoppers in Germany to help them find GMO labels, erecting large

banners highlighting farms that grow GMO crops, suing the French government for allowing

the growth of GM crops, organizing a worldwide campaign to pressure states not to accept

Monsanto’s attempt to patent seeds, directly pressuring food companies and supermarkets not

to accept GM-tainted foods, to suing the US EPA for threatening the future of organic

culture.13 Greenpeace’s extensive resources and flexible structure allowed it to partner with

local consumer and producer organizations across the world to mobilize public opinion, while

11 Information obtained from a June 2003 interview with Yannick Jadot, Campaign Director for Greenpeace France, and Wapner (1996) 12 It should be noted that GMOs fall within Greenpeace’s “larger” campaign against genetic engineering, which concerns food, the environment, moral/legal patent issues and social rights/local cultures. 13 http://archive.greenpeace.org/geneng/

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at the same time directly challenging governments, corporations, and playing a major role both

in Brussels and in national European capitals, as lobbyists, protesters, and effective anti-GMO

organizers.

Keck and Sikkink’s framework for “transnational advocacy networks” gives us

additional theoretical leverage on Greenpeace’s success (Keck and Sikkink 1998). They

emphasize how transnational advocacy networks use diverse tactics that seek multiple access

points--working from within institutional structures and mobilizing the public to challenge

institutional structures. Greenpeace works within supra-national and national institutions (via

lobbying and court cases) in addition to attacking those same institutions with protests and

demonstrations. Transnational advocacy network will achieve success, according to Keck and

Sikkink, when state authorities become convinced that a new ideology is in their best interest.

Hence, the flexibility that Greenpeace’s has to plug into each national context and adjust the

ideological pitch according to locally salient issues is critical (i.e. economic liberalism in

France and the environment in England and Italy).14

As mentioned above, national offices are responsible for much of the organization and

implementation on each campaign: developing contacts with politicians, journalists, activists

and “a network of investigators who collect tips from government officials, truck drivers and

sympathetic employees at corporate targets [of Greenpeace campaigns]” (Spencer 1991).

Greenpeace has also adapted well to the digital age, scouring the internet for information that

assists their campaigns and maintaining international coordination via email. Greenpeace

wired all of its offices to an international computer network in 1986, ensuring that disparate

14 Organizational and management theorists have long touted the virtues of centralized coordination and flexible implementation. Greenpeace has achieved this balance by strongly developing both national and international divisions and by developing a capacity for both long-term planning and rapid reaction, making it a model a model for multinational companies (Economist 1995).

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national offices could efficiently communicate (Economist 1995). Furthermore, as mentioned

above, Greenpeace International sets one overall policy, collects significant revenue from the

twelve most prosperous national organizations (24% of their net take comes from fundraising),

and ensures that all local offices are more-or-less adopt common positions (Spencer 1991).15

Greenpeace’s coordination and flexibility is often superior to that of its opponents. In

the anti-GMO campaign Greenpeace pressured the EU to pressure national governments, while

also pressuring national governments to pressure the EU. Greenpeace also targeted national

and multinational companies selling GMO products (most notably large supermarket chains

and food companies) by amassing detailed information on their product line, sales strategies,

and vulnerabilities, which varied by country, but were part of an overall European-wide

Greenpeace strategy.16 Such flexible coordination was facilitated by Greenpeace’s research

capabilities, often so sophisticated that companies (Greenpeace’s opponents) seek out their

expertise (Motavalli 1995).

Greenpeace is also noted for its ability to conduct both long-term and short-term

planning. Millions of dollars are spent doing research and laying groundwork for campaigns

that do not produce results for years (The Economist 1995). However, the activist and rapid-

reaction tradition has long been considered one of Greenpeace’s strengths, and Greenpeace

International keeps approximately half of its budget and 25% of staff time available for

contingency planning (The Economist 1995). In the anti-GMO campaign, Greenpeace was

able to launch public demonstrations across Europe in rather rapid fashion, while at the same

time excelling at the slower process of lobbying in national capitals and at the European level.

15 Naturally, implementation for each campaign varies according to national particularities, but directional policy remains the same. Greenpeace Norway, for example, is obliged to oppose whaling in spite of the protest of local fishermen. 16 www.gene.ch/archives.html

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Greenpeace’s status as a flexible transnational organization exemplifies how the anti-

GMO campaign was able to mobilize resources across borders while at the same time

intelligently exploiting national contexts. Greenpeace’s centralized coherency is found in its

uniform anti-GMO stance across Europe and its’ ability to adapt campaign strategies to

local/national particularities.

The Anti-GMO Movement in France

Greenpeace was at the core of the flexible, transnational network that mobilized the

European anti-GMO movement. Its’ success, we have argued, was its ability to link together

the particularities of national protest with European and international protest. As seen from

national perspective Greenpeace effectively inserted its own campaign into related issues that

varied from nation to nation. In this section, we investigate the role of Greenpeace within the

context of France.

In France the two most important NGOs for mobilizing anti-GMO public opinion were

Greenpeace France and Confédération Paysanne.17 Both organizations were concerned with

GMOs since the early 1990s and vocal from the beginning of the public crisis in Fall 1996.

Greenpeace France and Confédération Paysanne used their respective organizational strengths

to capture public attention and link GMOs with ideological issues salient to French society.

Greenpeace International declared itself against GMOs because of their environmental

danger, public health risk, and negative socio-economic effects on farmers.18 Greenpeace

France’s two main actions against GMOs were a public information campaign and efforts to

17 The centrality of Greenpeace France and Confédération Paysanne is a common assumption among members of the anti-GMO movement in France. 18 http://archive.greenpeace.org/geneng/

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lobby the French government and the EU to establish/maintain the moratorium on GMOs.19

Greenpeace’s considerable financial and administrative resources and international offices

(including a permanent seat in Brussels, site of much of the lobbying, conferencing, and

reporting on GMOs) allowed it to collect information about the dangers of GMOs and

disseminate it to a broad public. In addition, Greenpeace staged demonstrations on farms and

in research laboratories and stores that used, researched, and sold GMO products.

While Confédération Paysanne (CP) is much smaller than Greenpeace, CP’s dramatic

demonstrations and charismatic leader José Bové were crucial for pushing GMOs into the

spotlight.. The CP is a farmer’s union styled as an alternative to the large mainstream union,

Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA). FNSEA fights for

farmers’ economic interests, but CP expands agriculture into a social issue, directly opposing

the industrial farming supported by FNSEA and advocating sustainable farming practices and

various other social causes. As a result of CP’s sometimes-radical views and minimal financial

resources, they represent a minority of French farmers. However, their agenda resonates with

the French public and they were extremely influential in shaping anti-GMO opinion.

Immediately after Novartis’ GMO crops were authorized in France in 1997,

Greenpeace and CP began to protest, with CP taking the decidedly more radical approach.20 In

1997, CP staged well-publicized attacks on GMO crops and sabotaged supplies of GMO seeds,

while also participating in public hearings on GMOs. In 1999 the EU moratorium on GMOs

went into effect, evidence of the early success of Greenpeace, CP, and other NGOs across

Europe. In 2001, however, the French Food Safety Agency (AFSSA) reported that even non-

19 Information obtained from a June 2003 interview with Yannick Jadot, Campaign Director for Greenpeace France, and www.greenpeace.fr 20 Information obtained from a June 2003 interview with Olivier Clement, Confédération Paysanne employee in charge of GMOs, seeds, and large crops, and Bové and Dufour (2001)

21

GMO plants could be contaminated by proximity to GMO plants, 21 which re-energized the

anti-GMO campaign in France.22

While José Bové and the CP had been active for decades, their fame skyrocketed in the

late-90s, largely due to the August 12, 1999 destruction of a McDonalds franchise in Milau.

The event brought José Bové’s mustachioed caricature to global attention, and have made him

a constant news story in France to this very day (Abitbol and Couteaux 1999). It became

easier and easier to get media attention for GMO crop destructions in 2000 and 2001, and when

the activists were brought to trial the CP was very savvy about using the highly publicized

trials as a (free) platform to spread their anti-GMO, pro-sustainable development message.

Bové’s fame also spread beyond France, making him an international symbol for numerous

causes.

While Bové’s notoriety gave the French anti-GMO movement significant momentum, it

is important to situate CP within a broader transnational network. Greenpeace’s critical role

was to furnish CP with information and tactical support, which made it possible for Bové to

attract the media in the first place. In addition, one must also understand how GMOs were

ideologically linked with the dangers of economic liberalization, commodification, and the loss

of autonomy--issues at the heart of contemporary French social and political debates.

Like most nations, French public opinion is mixed on “globalization,” favoring the

aspects that benefit them (reduced global tariffs propel the significant French export market),

but resenting the aspects that harm them (European integration reduces the ability of the

21AFSSA Opinion Paper, July 23, 2001, available at: http://www.afssa.fr/ftp/basedoc/2001sa0170.pdf 22 It should also be noted that AFSSA did not make definitive statements about the health impact of the GMO “contamination,” instead calling for more research, but the NGOs and public perception have taken a more aggressive approach to the precautionary principle.

22

French government to control the local economy and rig results for favored constituencies).23

Nevertheless, despite these mixed feelings, “globalization” is a nasty word on the streets of

France, especially when understood as “economic and trade liberalization,” which are seen as o

threatening national and local identities.24

The French public is especially sensitive to aspects of globalization that threaten local

autonomy. In a SOFRES poll conducted July 2001, 76% of French respondents thought there

was not enough economic regulation, compared with 60% of the respondents asked in May

2000. Fifty-Nine percent of the respondents thought the stock market and financial markets in

general had too much influence on the world economy, 58% thought multinational companies

had too much, while 67% thought consumer movements and citizen groups did not have

enough, and 48% thought unions did not have enough.25

Economic autonomy is clearly a deeply held ideal in France, and agriculture is believed

to be a central part of the French economy. In a SOFRES poll conducted in December 2000 –

January 2001, 71% of respondents thought agriculture was an important part of the French

economy that needed to become even more important, while 81% of respondents thought

French farmers deserved aid even if it meant French products were more expensive than

imports.26 The French public is prepared to pay more to preserve traditional agriculture,

further evidence of agriculture’s sentimental importance in an age of global competitive

capitalism. And, to the degree that GMOs became linked with declining agriculture and food

quality, they were destined to be opposed. In 2000 64% of respondents thought the quality of

23 For more detailed discussion of France’s mixed-attitude towards globalization see Meunier (2000) 24 Meunier (2000) and Berger (1995) 25“The French and Globalization,” a SOFRES Poll conducted July 2001, results available at: http://www.tns-sofres.com/etudes/pol/180701_mondialisation_r.htm 26 “The French and Agriculture,” SOFRES Poll conducted December 2000 – January 2001, results available at: http://www.tns-sofres.com/etudes/pol/120101_agri_r.htm

23

food products had declined in the past 10 years, the number one goal for 21st century French

agriculture was “to contribute quality products to Europeans,”27 and in 2001 62% of

respondents thought there were not enough food safety regulations.28

GMOs were introduced in France by multinational companies (Monsanto, Novartis) at

a time when multinational companies were considered the largest (and most evil) beneficiaries

of the economic liberalization that threatened traditional French values, culture, and local

farming economies (Bonny 2003). In addition, the series of food-safety scandals in the 1990s

further shook public confidence in the safety of their food, as well as in the large companies

and governments trying to sell GMO-altered products.29 Therefore, as GMOs were considered

threats to food purity and the ability of farmers to remain independent without relying on giant

multinationals for seeds, it is not surprising that 46% of the French were against GMOs in 1996

(before the food safety crises and the appearance of Novartis seed) whereas 65% were opposed

in 1999 and 75% in 2002 (Gaskell, Allum, and Stares 2003).

The importance of the perceived threat of economic liberalism is especially important

here, because since 1999 many European nations have seen slight increases in support for

GMOs, largely due to increased public confidence in food safety institutions that were

reformed in response to the crises of mid-late 90s (Gaskell, Allum, and Stares 2003). In

France, however, public opinion has become increasingly hostile to GMOs, as Novartis and

Monsanto remain committed to implementing GMOs and general public aversion to economic

liberalization remains high. NGOs like Greenpeace France and Confédération Paysanne used 27 “The French and Agriculture,” SOFRES 28 “The French and Globalization,” SOFRES. Admittedly this number is down from 71% in May 2000. 29 In 2000 43% of French respondents felt large seed-producing companies were the least reliable source of information on food safety, 23% felt the government and agriculture ministry were the least reliable, 21% felt European experts in Brussels were the least reliable, and 20% felt large food companies were the least reliable. In addition 42% of respondents felt CNRS and INRA researchers were the most reliable source of information, 40% felt consumer organizations were the most reliable, and 28% felt NGOs were the most reliable. “The French and GMOs,” survey conducted by CSA in September 2000.

24

the coordinated and flexible resources of their transnational network to push French public

opinion against GMOs, cleverly framed in the salient national context of the fight against

economic liberalism.

The Anti-GMO Movement in Italy

The Italian movement against GMOs is a meaningful case study because it played a

relevant role in shaping the Italian government’s position with respect to that policy issue and,

in so doing, had also an indirect European-wide impact. The major reason for its success can

be found in its coalitional and framing strategies.

The consumer and environmental movement in Italy began to show its concern about

the GMO issue in the second half of 1990. Two events in 1996 contributed to push the GMO

issue into the movement’s agenda. The first is the BSE crisis, which exploded in 1996 in the

United Kingdom, but soon came to influence public opinion concern to Italy. Several cases of

BSE have been found in Italy since 2001, but the alarm was sounded earlier. In 1996, Italy

banned meat imports from the UK (Ansa 1996). The other event that mobilized public opinion

was the importation of GM soy from the US in November 1996.. Greenpeace, the first Italian

NGOs to campaign against GMOs, began its campaign in 1996.30 According to Greenpeace,

the BSE crisis and the GMO issue are directly linked because the banning of animal feeds that

result from “mad cow” desease has increased the importance of soy as an alternative protein

source. Most of the soy imported in Italy is GM soy (Greenpeace Italia 2002). In 1997, public

concern about GMOs exploded (Sassatelli, Scott 2001).

30 Interview with the representative of Greenpeace Italia in charge of the GMO campaign.

25

The anti-GMO movement in Italy has taken the shape of two basic advocacy coalitions.

The first coalition is composed of the environmental groups Verdi Ambiente Società (VAS),

Greenpeace, and Legambiente, a major farmers’ association (Coldiretti), the consumers groups

Federconsumatori and Codacons (The Coordination of Associations in the Advocacy of the

Environment and the Protection of Consumer Rights), as well as the National Confederation of

Artisans and of the Small and Middle Industry (CNA) and the Association of the Italian

Cooperatives (COOP). These groups created a cartel to lobby the Italian government through

joint position documents and joint campaigns. The second, more broadly-based advocacy

coalition called Mobiltebio is composed of 500 Italian NGOs (including the environmental

NGOs WWF Italia, Legambiente, and Lav, the organic farmers AIAB and AMAB, the social

promotion organizations Arci and the social centers Carta di Milano). Activated for the first

time against the international biotech fair, Tebio, which took place in Genoa in 2000, this

coalition pushed the government to maintain the moratorium against GMOs.

The main actors representing the Italian anti-GMO movement are environmental and

agriculture organizations. They tend to focus either on influencng policy-makers or on raising

public awareness of the GMO issue, although some adopt both tactics. The first type of

strategy has an indirect impact on public opinion, since it elevates the issue on the political

agenda and frames the terms of the public debate.

The environmental NGO VAS was particularly influential in shaping the government’s

position toward GMOs in 1999 and 2000. In 1999, VAS criticized the commercialisation of

products without complying with Community norms (CNN Italia 2000). The Italian Minister of

Health endowed the Istituto Superiore di Sanità with decision-making competence over GMO

commercialisation. In December 1999, the Istituto declared seven GM raw materials

26

incompatible with the requirement of “substantial equivalence” provided by the Community

regulation 258/97 (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2000). In response to such an irregularity, Giuliano Amato

issued a decree in 2000 (Decreto Amato) that banned the commercialisation of four types of

GM corn as incompatible with the authorization procedure. These products were among those

targetted by VAS in 1999 (CNN Italia 2000). In October 1999 the EU Standing Committee on

Food accepted the Amato decree (Il Sole24Ore 2000). Since the decree legitimises the ban on

the commercialisation of GM products, it placed Italy among the countries supporting the

international moratorium against GMOs. Italy’s stature reinforced the decision of these states

to continue the ban.31 Although VAS did not have a major impact on public opinion, it

contributed to making decision-makers and the other NGOs in its coalition aware of the

problem.32

Greenpeace Italia also played a major role in the Italian anti-GMO movement. It

adopted both an education and a direct action strategy. Its’ educational campaign was directed

at consumers and took place both in supermarkets and in the squares of cities and towns, where

GM-free organic products were advertised. Coldiretti and Aiab cooperated with Greenpeace in

the organization of these organic food fairs. This educational campaign was accompanied by

direct action, like labelling supermarket products with GM ingredients or raised with GM

feeds. In December 2002, Greenpeace organized a blitz against AIA, a firm that sells animal

products such as poultry and eggs. After several mass demonstrations in front of the firm,

Greenpeace activists met with an AIA Quality engineer to express their concern about the

presence of GMOs in the feed products used by the firm.

31 Interview with a representative of Coldiretti 32 Interview to a representative of Coldiretti

27

The association of small farmers, Coldiretti, has a different attitude toward GMOs than

other agriculture organizations (including Confagricoltura, an association representing broader

farm interests, and the organization of agriculture entrepreneurs, direct workers, tenant farmers

and sharecroppers (CIA)), that do not express concern about GMOs.33 Coldiretti engages in

both conventional lobbying and in less conventional action. It directes its lobbying activity at

both the national and the EU levels. Coldiretti has a Brussels office that closely follows EU

law-making. At the national level, it operates jointly with the other Italian consumer and

environmental groups. Less conventional activities are carried out on a local basis. Through the

semina sicura (safe sowing) project, Coldiretti tried to make agriculture entrepreneurs aware of

the need for retail certification and the conservation of information necessary for product

traceability. Furthermore, Coldiretti drafted legislative bills for several Councillors and

political groups in the Italian regions to encourage regional laws in favor of GMO-free areas.

The anti-GMO campaign found broad support among political parties in Italy.

Berlusconi’s government has only recently declared a more open attitude toward

biotechnology. The Greens Federation, however, is the political party most concerned about

mobilizing public opinion on the GM issue through mass action. For example, they organized

a sit-in on 29 May 2002 in front of the US embassy in Rome to protest the Bush

Administration’s policy towards biotechnology (Verdi 2002).

The framing of the biotechnology debate also varies across different NGOs in the

Italian anti-GMO movement. Broadly, an anti-liberalization framing coexists alongside a

framing that values the preservation of national and regional traditional production. NGOs

adopting the anti-liberalization framing, including many groups associated with Mobiltebio,

regard themselves as linked to the anti-globalization movement. Promoted by the Lilliput 33Interview with a representative of Confagricoltura

28

network and inspired by the Seattle, Davos and Washington demonstrations, their goal is to

fight the “hyper-liberalist and neo-colonial trends of the multinationals” (Greensite News not

dated). They oppose that “…robberies, made by the biotech multi-nationals, of the huge variety

of the genetic patrimony that is located in the South of the world.” They seek to link the fight

against “wild globalization” with the contribution of environmentalism, animal welfare,

feminism, and the movement committed to the fair trade and social aid to the developing world

(Greensite News not dated). Actors adopting the preservation of national and regional products

framing are primarily represented by agriculture and consumer groups and regard themselves

as distinct from the anti-globalization movement.34 Coldiretti is the major group promoting the

Italian products and defending them from territorial homogenization and delocalization.

According to Coldiretti, Italian farm enterpreneurs should be free to choose to grow GMO-free

crops and, in so doing. The fight against GMOs is considered a necessary condition to confer

value on the DOP35 and IGP36 Italian products (Coldiretti 2003). Using a language consistent

with the one used by the EU institutions, these organizations advocate the implementation of

the principle of precaution (Ansa 2003). This second group also includes conservative groups,

such as the right wing political party Alleanza Nazionale (AN). The representative of the youth

movement of AN states “We do not have ideological opposition against biotechnology

research, but we believe that the uncontrolled inclusion of GMOs in our agro-food system

would bring to a change in its nature. Italy competes in the global market thanks to its many

quality labels. The indiscriminant use of GMOs would kill our system of excellence” (Alleanza

Nazionale 2002). This group is not opposed to economic globalization, but rather advocates the

economic interest of Italian producers in the global market through the principles of labelling

34 Interview with a representative of Coldiretti 35 protect origin products 36 protect geographic origin products

29

and traceability of GMOs and the development of GM-free crops in Italy. They are concerned

about the “national interest” and believe that “the agro-food patrimony of a Nation is part of its

broader cultural patrimony and therefore it should not be changed in its nature, but enhanced

and affirmed in the global competition.” They argue that “[t]he national interest is for us more

important than the interest of the big multinationals”.

In sum, the cooperation among the different organizations fighting against GMOs has

been influential in making the issue a priority for decision-makers and has allowed the

organization of more visible public events. Furthermore, framing the issue as a bipartisan

concern, the consumer and environmental movement was able to mobilize a broad spectrum of

public opinion against GMOs.

The Anti-GMO Movement as a European Movement

The environmental and consumer movement in Europe has been successful in

mobilizing public opinion against GMOs. One reason for its success lies in its ability to

mobilize transnational movement linkages. The European anti-GMO movement involves

activists from all the EU member states, targets EU level institutions and organizations,

activates transnational NGOs, and is linked to the international anti-globalization movement.

Nevertheless, anti-GMO campaigns are tailored to local and national contexts and member

state governments and local firms remain important targets for the activists. The anti-GMO

movement in Europe is therefore better understood as a multi-level movement rather than as a

strictly transnational movement.37 In this section, we investigate the European dimensions of

37 Scholars of social movements stress the obstacles to the formation of a social movement at the transnational level and, in particular, at the European level. The main constraints to the transfer of mass mobilization from the

30

this movement, while trying not to lose sight of how European mobilization relates to other

levels.

Referring to the relationship between social movements and the EU political system,

Marks and McAdam (1999) note that Europeans have adapted their collective action to the

opportunity structure of the EU and developed techniques of interest representation (lobbying)

required by European officials. In assessing the ways in which the anti-GMO movement in

Europe is specifically European, therefore, it is useful to distinguish institutional and direct

action tactics (Marks and McAdam 1996, 1999).

The EU provides institutional movements with incentives for the access in the political

system. The European Parliament (EP) is composed of members elected through national

elections, which are mainly focused on nation specific agendas. To face the problem of the lack

of a European political discourse, the EP is open to functional interests and NGOs that

represent European-wide issues and constituencies. The Commission provides these groups

with incentives to enter the political process. Because of the complexity of the problems it

deals with and the limits of scientific knowledge about human health and the environment, the

Commission requires expert and pressure group consultation. To maintain ties with civil

society, the Commission adopts a transparency strategy and provides NGOs with financial

support. 38

local and state level to the EU are the high cost in terms of time and money required to the organization of a transnational protest and the lack of a European wide public discourse (Marks and McAdam 1999). Tarrow (1999), quoting Tilly’s (1978) mobilization model, argues that social movements usually arise on the basis of pre-existing networks of activists that take place within the social fabric mainly at the national or sub-national level, where trust, reciprocity and cultural learning intertwined. On the other hand, according to Rucht, transnational social movements, unlikely the national ones, may not have a distinct identity, but can have different layers of identity, which are not mutually exclusive. Cultural peculiarities within a multi-national constituency do not prevent the formation of a sense of common belonging, which allows a group to be both part of a local, national and transnational movement (Rucht 1999). 38 Greenpeace European Uniti, though, refuses to accept any government funds and therefore collect its economic resources through private fundations and members.

31

Working through European NGOs, the institutional side of the anti-GMO movement

does take advantage of the opportunities provided by the EU. The major anti-GMO groups

represente in Brussels are the environmental NGOs Greenpeace and Friend of the Earth and the

consumer group BEUC. They channel the views of their member groups into policy demands

at the EU level. They are European in their organization (their personnel are recruited on a

European basis) and in their target (the European institutions). They lobby the EP and the

Commission and closely follow the legislative process. By acting as “insider” pressure groups,

these NGOs aim to play the role of agenda shapers. Furthermore, the European environmental

and consumer NGOs has sympathizers within EU institutions. The Green groups in the

European Parliament, in particular, are important allies, but other political parties are also

committed to finding solutions to environmental and consumer problems. The Commission is

staffed by officials that may also exercise their discretion in favor of environmental and

consumer NGOs. Ruzza calls these social movements sympathizers “institutional activists”

(Ruzza 2000).

At the same time, the states still play a major role in the EU policy process, since they

are involved both in the decision-making and implementation phase. National governments

remain a target for state and local level social movement organizations that aim at influencing

the EU decision-making.

Besides influencing the EU policy-makers with direct pressure, the anti-GMO

movement aims to influence European public opinion through protest events that attract strong

media coverage. Notwithstanding the cultural and institutional constraints on mobilization at

the EU level, the specific features of the GMO issue is an incentive to the transfer of the mass

protest to the European arena. The global nature of the policy problem, the European wide

32

diffusion of the food scandals – which have increased the social concern about food safety--

the linkages between the anti-GMO movement and the anti-globalization movement, and the

transnational character of the key NGOs have all contributed to the Europeanization of the

mass protest. Several European-wide protest events have taken place with respect to the GMO-

policy. These events can be grouped in three major types:

- protest targeted directly at the EU institutions (for example, the rally of green parties in front of the EP, 17 July 2000);

- protest against European level firms (for example, against the European branch of Monsanto, 22 May 2003);

- solidarity between social movement organizations in different states (for example the mobilization of Italian Greenpeace activists in support of the French activist José Bové).

The anti-GMO movement has been successful in activating issue-specific mobilization

at the EU level. Nevertheless, such protests have been less frequent at the European level than

they have at the national level. With reference to the GMO protest that took place between

1995-1997 period, Kettnaker argues that actions targeting the EU were more institutional and

polite than the actions directed against national governments (Kettnaker 2001). As compared to

the EU institutions, the national government is perceived as closer to civil society and its

decision-making activity is more visible than the European institutions. National states are still

the level of governance most likely to attract mass protest.

In sum, the anti-GMO movement has a transnational nature, both in its conventional

and in its disruptive repertoire of action. At the same time, the national state remains the most

frequent target of collective action, expecially for less conventional action. The anti-GMO

movement has been able to adjust to the multi-level governance of the EU, developing a multi-

layered organization.

33

The Territorial Dimension

The anti-GMO movement is both territorially and functionally differentiated.

Territorially, the anti-GMO protest has a multi-level structure: it targets all the institutions

involved in the EU political process, it activates state- and EU-based groups, and it builds

coalitions involving groups operating at different territorial levels. With respect to the

functional dimension, it represents various interests and ideologies and expresses them in

different ways, according to the target of the protest.

Given the political relevance of the GMO issue, NGOs have intervened in each phase of

the law-making process. The movement has exerted pressure both at the Community level

(targeting the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice) and at

the national level (targeting specific ministers, Members of Parliament or national Courts).

At the initial stage of the political process the NGOs target the Commission, in order to

affect the way the problem is framed. Later, they target the European Parliament and the

Council of Ministers to affect decision-making. Since biotechnology law is subject to the co-

decision procedure, both the European Parliament and the Council play a crucial role in the

political process. With respect to the implementation stage, the national government and the

local authorities are the targets of the social movement protest. Eventually, environmental,

agriculture and consumer NGOs express their position also toward the European Court of

Justice, to raise the attention of the public and of the political authorities toward cases related

to biotechnology.

With respect to the EU judiciary process, since 1998 18 cases related to GMOs have

been brought in front of the European Court of Justice. The anti-GMO movement has tried to

raise public awareness through press releases commenting on trials related to biotechnology.

34

One of these cases involved three French NGOs representative of the anti-GMO movement:

Greenpeace France, the Confédération Paysanne and Association Ecoropa France sought the

annulment of the order of 5 February 1998 amending the official list of plant species and

varieties grown in France so as to include a genetically modified species of maize produced by

Novartis Seeds SA.

In intervening at different stages of the political process, the anti-GMO movement

builds on a multi-layered organization. The organization of the anti-GMO movement is

composed of four types of groups:

1) Groups with national constituencies located within the nation states (i.e.,

Legambiente, Confédération Paysanne, Consumers’ Organization);

2) Groups with national constituencies that have both national and European

branches (i.e. Coldiretti);

3) Groups with an international constituency and based in Brussels (i.e. Friends

of the Earth Europe, CPE, and the Greens);

4) Groups with a transnational constituency that have both national and

European branches (i.e. Greenpeace).

These four types of group vary according to their target, the way they build coalitions

with groups not under the same umbrella organization, and the way they represent the

European anti-GMO movement.

The groups of the first type have local and national targets. However, their actions may

have indirect effects on EU institutions. When targeting the ministers of a member state

governments they may affect the decisions of the Council of Ministers as a whole. These

groups tend to build coalitions with other groups or parties based at the national level. Their

35

linkage to the European anti-GMO movement is indirect, since they delegate to EU umbrella

organizations their representation at the European level and coordination of NGOs located in

different member states.

Groups of the second type target local and state authorities directly, but also the EU.

Like the first type, they are mainly involved in coalitions with national actors and tend to be

only indirectly linked with other European organizations.

Groups of the third type (the so-called “umbrella organizations”) target EU institutions

and stakeholders directly. They tend to build coalitions with actors based at the European level

and coordinate the groups they represent, which are based within the EU member states. In so

doing, they may take part in national coalitions, targeting national authorities. Since they

represent groups located in different member states, their organization has a European-wide

dimension.

Finally, groups of the fourth type target both local, national, and EU authorities. They

build coalitions within the member states, as well as with other European groups or between

groups based in different states. They have a multi-level organization, since the three territorial

levels they straddle (national, cross-national, and European) are interconnected to each other

through the coordination of campaigns. Because of their transnational nature, they most fully

represent the European dimension of the anti-GMO movement. The main difference between

international and transnational organization lies in the fact that the former represents different

groups (with partially different priorities) organized at the national level, whereas the latter are

structured on a multi-level basis, have a multi-national constituency, and include groups that

share the same policy priorities.

36

Table 4: Types of anti-GMO groups

Type of group

Target Coalition making Link with the European anti-GMO movement

National constituency; local and state branches

Local and state authorities and stakeholders

National

Indirect

National constituency; National and EU branches

Local, state and EU authorities and stakeholders

National Indirect

International constituency; EU venue

EU and national authorities and stakeholders

European or national Direct

Transnational constituency; local, state and EU branches

Local, state and EU authorities and stakeholders

National, European or cross-national

Direct

Thanks to this articulation of the social movement, the anti-GMO protest has been able

to mobilize different levels of public opinion and to create a multi-faceted advocacy coalition

encompassing activists and supporters with a broad spectrum of interests and priorities.

The coalitions built by the European groups mirror the multi-level nature of the social

movement. Groups tend to build coalitions with actors based at their same territorial level,

since their target is shared and the protest organization is less costly. Nevertheless, groups from

different levels of governance may join in the same campaign, especially if they are included in

the same umbrella organization and when events have strong media impact.

The involvement of the different territorial layers of the movement can be seen in the

following recent actions:

37

1) EU level

•April 24th, 2003. CPE, IFOAM, Greenpeace, FOEE, and EEB issue a joint press

release on the roundtable on GMOs organized by the European Commission.

•March 3rd, 2003. FOEE, Greenpeace, and EEB issue a joint press release on the

coexistence of GM and non-GM agriculture.

•March 27th, 2003. FOEE, Greenpeace, and EEB issue a joint press release on GM crop

contamination

2) EU and national level

•September 29th, 2003. Greenpeace European Unit, Greenpeace Germany and

Greenpeace Belgium jointly issue a press release about the Greenpeace action that took place

in Brussels and Vienna. Greenpeace activists handed out bags of certified GM-free seeds from

Austria to Agriculture Ministers from Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy arriving at the

Council building.

•August 26th, 2003. FOEE, Greenpeace, Amigos de la Tierra, Greenpeace Spain jointly

published a study about the effects of GM crops in Spain.

3) EU, national and international level

•July 17th, 2003. The CPE, Confédération Paysanne, and the International NGO Via

Campesina asked for the immediate release of José Bové.

38

The Functional Dimension

In this section, we investigate the way European NGOs framed the GMO issue. The

major finding of an analysis of press releases and position papers of European NGOs involved

in anti-GMO protest is that there is a significant degree of homogeneity in the concerns they

express: each of the Euro groups takes into account the implications of GMO for agriculture,

the environment and the consumer.39 The most recurrent concepts in their press releases refer

to consumer and farmer freedom of choice, environmental contamination, seed purity. 40

Nevertheless, the positions of anti-GMO NGOs vary on four different points:

(1) The stress each of them puts on these issues. The obvious distinction among the ways

groups frame the issue lies on the stress they put on particular aspects of the problem:

Greenpeace, FoE and EEB focus on the environmental impact of GMOs; BEUC, Eurocoop and

Eurocommerce focus on consumer concerns; COPA-COGECA, IFOAM and CPE focus on

farmers’ interests.

(2) Their attitude toward a tolerance threshold for GMOs. The environmental NGOs and CPE

are the most radically opposed to GMOs, while the other groups adopt a more pragmatic

position. The environmental groups CPE and IFOAM do not accept any tolerance threshold for

GMOs and underline the goal of the purity of seeds, whereas BEUC, COPA and COGECA,

Eurocommerce and Eurocoop consider the presence of traces of GMOs in food unavoidable

and therefore propose a limited acceptance of biotech products in food.

39 We think there may be two possible explanations for the homogeneity in policy framing: (1) the need for inter-group cohesion. In order to build policy coalitions, groups have to use the same language and agree on the main issues to advocate; (2) adjustment to a shared belief in the EU institutions that agriculture, environment and consumer interests must be preserved. The language these groups use mirrors the terms used by the EU institutions in their programmatic documents. Radical demands and extreme left arguments (the no-global protest) are left aside and remain limited to the national level, where political polarization is higher. 40 Only Eurocommerce does not make explicit reference to the environmental impact

39

(3) Their attitude toward science. The environmental NGOs present scientific evidence of the

negative effect of contamination for the environment in their position papers. By contrast, other

NGOs view EU institutions as responsible for scientific risk assessment.

(4) Their interpretation of the “polluter pays” principle. They differ according to whether

manufacturers (BEUC), growers (Greenpeace), or producers and users (IFOAM) should be

held liable for costs resulting from the presence of GMOs. COPA-COGECA and

EUROCOOP argue that farmers must not be held liable for costs.

In sum, NGOs have been able to mobilize anti-GMO protest by adjusting their strategies to

the political authorities and constituencies that they target. At the national level, the protest

repertoire and framing strategies change according to the functional interests represented and

the issues on the national agenda. The anti-GMO movement has been able to “Europeanize” its

protest by adjusting to the political opportunity structure of the EU while preserving, at the

same time, the national specificities of social mobilization.

Conclusion: Conjunctural or Long-Term Protest Trajectory? (to be written)

Is the anti-GMO protest a short-term phenomenon associated with a political conjucture or a

longer-term phenomenon associated with an emerging conception of environmental

sustainability? (pegged toward the issue of European food safety as “contested governance”).

Our null hypothesis is that the anti-GMO movement is linked to the political conjuncture of

outrage over mad cow disease and hence is likely to be a short-term phenomenon. However,

we think this may depend on how anti-GMO issues resonate with the deeper commitments of

European environmental and consumer movements. Therefore, in this section we examine

40

how the anti-GMO issue is linked to the broader agenda of environmental and consumer

groups. Also, in what sense is this linked to a more general politicization of risk, as suggested

by the debate over the precautionary principle.

41

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