PROSPECTS FOR BALKAN STABILITY

Ownership, Transitional Process and Regional Integration

in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Christophe Solioz

Updated August 2001

Copyright : PSIO Occasional Paper, Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2001.

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Abstract

Thoughts about Europe's prospects for peace and stability have been characterized byconsiderable mood swings in the 1990s. Focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina, four mainchanges in contemporary international relations are addressed. Firstly, the Stability Pact for SouthEastern Europe (1999) is the starting point of an integrative policy for the Balkans. Secondly, thenew percepti on of ethnic warfare tends to reject “ ethnic cleansing” poli cy and to supporttolerance and multi ethnicity as an organizing principle for states. Thirdl y, substantive democracyinfluences more and more the understanding of democratization and transition processes.Fourthly, these shifts had a major impact on the new approach of extended peace-buildingprocesses.

Mood swings and new political paradigms alone cannot explain contemporary internationalrelations. In the post-Cold War era, the international community, especiall y the Europeaninstitutions, had to fi nd coherence and legitimacy to new international relations. Therefore,Bosnia and Herzegovina became the cutting edge of change in European security and stabil ity.The Bosnian war ended not by peace-keeping, nor by war-making, even if a military interventionwas requested, but by polit ical-engineering : the creation of the Bosnian-Croat Federation (1994)and The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995). Ifpacification and normalization were the first aims, Bosnia and Herzegovina is now engaged ina complex transition and integration process.

The ending of the war and the democratization process in Bosnia and Herzegovina required onthe one hand, the shift from the paradigm of conditionality to the concept of ownership and, onthe other hand, an interventi on characteri zed by an increasing intrusive external regulation. Thelater may be seen as contradictory to the necessity of shifting from a protectorate-like interventionto a self-ruled state. The fact is that the implementation of the General Framework Agreementfor Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina needed to be repositi oned by i ts enforcement. The HighRepresentative focused international power in support of state-bui lding objecti ves and workedfor the Bosnian ownership of a new institutional environment which will be capable of takingresponsibi lity for the new state.

The potential for the ownership paradigm needs to be investigated in a pragmatic way. Firstly,we will examine the potential for Bosnian civil society and NGOs to become autonomous andself-ruled. We wil l also consider their involvement on the regional dimension as a contributionto the Stability Pact. Secondly, we will analyze the OSCE’s field strategy and activities in buildinga sense of ownership and initiative among the Bosnian society, therefore reducing dependencyon the OSCE. We also consider OSCE’s different concrete ini tiatives, advocating a region-wideapproach, which contribute to the implementation of the Stabil ity Pact. Recommendationsconcerning the implementation of the ownership process and of the regional integration aremade in the last sections.

Ending the wars in the post-Yugoslav Republ ics required vast intervention by the internationalcommunity, which sharply limi ted the legitimacy of the new governments that have arisen. Somesmall, weak but now independent states have their country monitored by international humanrights agencies, by international financial institutions and by the UN and the EuropeanCommunity. All this has reduced the power of ci tizens and local politicians to run their ownsociety. This is the paradoxical result of struggles for greater national independence ! Recoveredsovereignty, regional and European integration presuppose ownership as the driving force of thetransiti on and state-bui lding process.

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Contents

Abstract p. 2

Contents p. 3

1. The awaited policy for the Balkan p. 4

2. Necessity for a new approach p. 6

3. New perceptions of ethnic warfare p. 9

4. Democratization and transition process p. 12

5. Toward new peace-building processes p. 15

6. The shift from conditionality to ownership p. 17

7. Why Bosnian civi l society and NGOs matter p. 20

8. OSCE’s ownership strategy p. 27

9. OSCE’s contribution to the Stabil ity Pact p. 29

10. Some challenges for the Stabil ity Pact p. 33

11. Conclusion p. 35

Bibliography p. 37

Acknowledgments

This paper forms a part o f the OSCE Cluster of Competence Annual Meeting undertaken by the Graduate

Institute of Internat io nal Stud ies (Gen eva) on behalf o f the Sw iss Interdep artm ental Coo rdi nati on Com mi ttee

for the Partn ership fo r Peace. It was first d iscussed at the OSCE Cluster which took place September 14-15,

2000 and l ater on presented at the 4 th International Security Forum hel d i n G enev a, November 15-17, 2000.

This study is determined by my field experience in Bosnia-Herzego vina as chair of the Helsinki Citizen’s

Assembly (hCa) Switzerland and as executive m ember o f hCa International (until 1997). Many analyzes were

in spired by contributions from Pierre Hassner, Mary Kaldor, Ivan Vejvoda and Xavier Bougarel. In spite of

di vergen ces of opinion, I shared many sources with D avid Chandler and he shaped part of the structure of

my argumentation. Finally, publications from IWPR, AIM , Le Courrier des Balkans, Transition , the Cent ral

Euro pe Revi ew , the Journal of D emocracy and Foreign Affairs, as well as those from the th in k-tan ks as ICG

and ESI stim ul ated regul arly my th in ki ng. As many the debts to previous wri ters are, as many are the thanks

to different friends and colleges which helped me in different places at different times. The view s expressed

in this study are those of the author and should not be ascribed to any of the persons or organizations

mention ed above.

This contribution lead the way to the organ izatio n - thanks to the sup port o f the Karl Popper Foundation

(Switzerland) - of th e panel Ow nership of t he Transit io n and the Regional I ntegrati on Process whi ch is part

of the 5 th Internation al Semi nar of th e Institute fo r Strengthen ing Dem ocracy i n Bosnia and Herzegovina

(Konjic - Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 3, 2 001). The papers of this panel wi ll b e publi shed in a book let :

Ow nership Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 2001.

1 Gustav Mahler, "D as irdische Leben", Des Knaben Wunderhorn, from the col lecti on of the german folk versespublished by Achim von Achim and Clemens Bentrano in 1806-1808.

2 Stabili ty Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne, June, 1999; available from http://www.stabili typact.org/pact.htm.

3 The text of the Stabi lity Pact mentions cl early the “leading role of EU” , see ibidem, 1999, § 18.

4 ibidem, 1999, § 22. See also OSCE, PC.DEC/306, July 1, 1999.

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1. The awaited Policy for the Balkan“M other, oh mother, I am so hungry.Give me bread or I will die.”“Wai t, only wait, my beloved child,Soon we’ ll go reaping in the morni ng"But when the corn was gathered inSti ll the chi ld kept on crying,"Mother, oh mother, I am so hungry.Give me bread or I will die.""Wait, onl y wait, my beloved chil d,

Soon we'll go threshing in the morning."And when the corn was all threshed,Sti ll the chi ld kept on crying,Mother, oh mother, I am so hungry.Give me bread or I will die.""Wait, onl y wait, my beloved chil d,Soon we'll go baking in the morning."And when the bread was baked The child l ay dead upon his coffin.

Gustav Mahler's song1 has an affirmative distinctiveness intended to engage people on nothing lessbut the truth. Life on Earth (1893) stages a stormy tension between a seemingly calm mother andher hungry screaming child. Both content and technique of this song stand close to the well-knownchild’s death-song. On close inspection, we can observe that the tragedy is overcome by themusical aesthetic. The beauty of the song recalls the child' s innocence and magni ficence, l' enfantmerveil leux. However, the tragic mother-son dialogue leads to an unavoidable disillusionment :what is most needed is coming, but far too late ! Europe did formulated the necessary policy for theBalkans, but at least ten years too late. The price for having put Maastricht before Sarajevo ?

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched on 10 June 1999 in the aftermath of theKosovo crisis2. This initiative led by the European Union (EU)3, and placed under the auspices ofthe Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)4, is intended to represent a newwindow of opportuni ty to move tow ard self-sustaining regional stability through an effectivecoordination of diplomatic, economic and mili tary resources in an integrated plan. After ten yearsof a disintegrative approach, the Stability Pact seems to give the signal that for the i nternationalcommunity regional integration is the new trend. There are just two questions: is this approach inthe Balkans really possible, and are the means for this kind of new Marshall Plan far-reachingenough ?

The major politi cal effort promoted through the Stability Pact proposes to go beyond the alreadyexisting regional ini tiatives as the Royaumont Process, the South East European CooperationInitiative (SECI), the Central European Initiative (CEI), the South East Europe Cooperation (SEEC)and the recent Adriatic Initiative. The aim is a very pragmatic one through the division into threeWorking Tables follow ing the OSCE model : Working Table I promotes human rights anddemocratization, Working Table II deals with economic reconstruction and development andWorking Table III focuses on security issues. The implementation of tasks is left to differentorganizations (as for example EBRD, IMF, SECI, NATO, OSCE, EU) and states.

The Stabil ity Pact, which was signed by the countries in the region and different components of the

1 See World Bank, The Road to Stabili ty and Prosperity i n South Eastern Europe. A Regional Strategy Paper,

Washington DC, World Bank, March, 2000, ix-171 p. See also the Inventory on the Stability Pact’s initiatives, availablefrom http://www.stabili typact.org/Inventory.

2 See The European Commission, Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament on the

Stabili zation and Association Process for Countries of South Eastern Europe, Brussels, May 26, 1999, COM (99) 235.

3 See Benn Steil & Susan L. Woodward, “A European “New Deal” for the Balkans”, Foreign Affairs, New-York, vol. 78,

no. 6, 1999, pp. 95-105.

4 The World Bank, op. cit., 2000, p. 16.

5 See the ' 2, 8, 21 and 33 to 40 of the Stabili ty Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne, June 10, 1999.

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international community, proposes the development of i ni tiatives increasing regional integration,fostering economic development and integrating those countries into Europe1. Because theintegration of South Eastern European (SEE), consisting of countries having territories or part ofterritories belonging geographically to the Balkans, needs to be a concrete prospect relevant totoday’s politi cal leaders and population, the European Commission launched a process ofstabil ization and association2. The conditions for success are the commitment of the SEE countriesto work out good neighborhood policies, and to implement more forcefully macroeconomicstabil ization and structural reform programs. The comprehensive strategy focuses on country-by-country reforms and on intra-regional integration, but the external dri ver is European integration3.

The World Bank’s assumption is that this integration process wil l facilitate and discipli ne therequested political and social changes :

“First, prospective entry into the European Union can give impetus to reform programs. Theprospect of entry into European institutions has helped discipli ne economics policies in the newdemocracies of Central Europe and provided a strong incentive for implementing domestic reformprograms. (...) Second, the prospect of eventual membership can create posit ive social and politicaldynamics which can help overcome the deep-seated resentments that have built up during the lastten years of hostil ities and wars. (...) And final ly, the prospect of entry into EU would provide aframework and specific incentives to improve economic management and strengthen politi calinstitutions, as well as cooperate more closely. The process of European integration offers examplesof successful rapid development by countries that were characterized by nascent democraticsystems, fragile macroeconomic situations, and little intra-regional integration” 4.

Nevertheless, one main purpose of this Pact remains the implementation of bilateral andmulti lateral agreements as well as domestic accords to surmount politi cal and economic structuraldeficits. Thus, the focus is put on the effective responsibil ity and the real commitment of thecountries of South Eastern Europe to work within the region and with the international communityin order to achieve these objectives and to move the promises of the Pact from paper to reality5.

For some experts this new approach contains a few basic contradictions. Firstly, promoting cross-border relations and -projects is problematic as long as the borders in the region are not settled;secondly, to ask countri es to abandon elements of their sovereignty may be diffi cul t before theyhave achieved true sovereignty, and thirdly, onl y ful l EU integration will bri ng the neededeconomic growth, but the starting point of the Stabili ty Pact is that stabil ity and cooperation withinthe region must come before wider integration and EU membership.

Concerning the two first points : it is time to abandon nineteenth-century concepts of nation-statesand borders and embrace the concept of transnational integration that will shape Europe in this newcentury. As Carl Bi ldt suggested, the al ternative “ to setti ng-up new nation-states in the region is

1 Carl Bildt, “ A Second Chance in the Balkans”, Foreign Affairs, New-York, vol. 80, No 1, 2001, p. 157.

2 Wil l Kymlicka, The Right of M inor ity Cul tures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 21.

3 Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, The Lund Recommendat ions on the Effective Participation of National

Minorities in Public Life & Explanatory Note, The Hague, 1999; http://www.osce. org/hcnm/docs/lundrecs.htm.

4 See Walter A. Kemp, “Applying the Lund Recommendations : Challenges for the OSCE”, PSIO Occasional Paper,

Geneva, HEI, 2001; also available from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/4isf.

5 Mabel Wi sse Smit, “ The Jury is still out on the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe”, Helsinki Monitor. Quartely

on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Hague, IHF, vol. 11, no. 2, 2000, p. 14.

6 It was initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The full text is

available from http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-home.htm.

7 See ICG Balkans Briefing : Stability Pact Summit, Sarajevo, ICG, July 27, 1999; and Wolfgang Petritsch, "Bosnian

Boondoggl e ?? ... while the West hurries out of the Balkans", The Wall Street Journal, Brussels, May 22, 2000;available from http://ww w.ohr.i nt.

8 Multi lateralism was negleted in the current transition approaches. See Dorothee Böhle, “Internationalism: an Isssue

neglected in the Path Dependency Approach to Post-Communist Transformation”, Democratic and CapitalistTransiti on in Eastern Europe, ed. by M. Dobry, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2000, pp. 235-261.

9 Robert Barry, "Put OSCE in charge of Balkan Policy", Wall Street Journal Europe, Brussels, May 3, 1999; available

from http://www.oscebih.org/events/wsj-barry.htm. See Paul Klein’s proposal : “Rebuilding Bosnia and Herzegovinaafter the War”, Geneva, GCSP, Mai 3, 2001; available from http://gscp.ch/e/news/Klein%20speech.htm.

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setting up new European and regional structures”1. Indeed, modern states have to confront thepolynational reality of mul ti -nation states, and “ learn to live with cultural pluralism, and to devisestrategies for co-existence that are consistent wi th the principles of freedom, justice anddemocracy” structures”2. In thi s field, the Lund Recommendations3 are providing basic principlesand good practices on how to enforce these integrative strategies, and how to promote options forself-governance short of sovereignty and secession4.

About the complex last contradiction, we have to remember that economic integration will notcome by itself. On one hand, investments are necessary and, on the other, structural reforms of allthe region’s economies and adoption of the EU provisions are needed, both of which require aclear poli tical commitment. As Mabel Wisse Smit pointed out, the Stability Pact “is a product of theinternat ional experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the international support for reformwas not always complemented by local commitment to these efforts. As a result of this, the focusof the Stability Pact has been on partnership and local ownership of the process” 5. Therefore, byfocusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina this paper intends to examine concretely the prospects forBalkan stability through massive external intervention, transition process and regional integration.

2. Necessity for a New Approach

This perspective provides a new framework for a thorough reexamination of the implementationof The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP)6. Seriousstructural obstacles aside, among them the creation of self-sustainable political and economicstructures7, it is necessary to mention three other main problems. Firstly, find a way out of theongoing confusion between the bilateral and multi lateral approaches; certainly any regionalapproach implies a multi lateralism challenge8.

Secondly, it is obvious that the international community’s effort must be restructured9. To a great

1 Wolfgang Petritsch, “Speech by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina”, New-York, Steering Board

Mini sterial Meeting, September 22, 1999; available from http://www.ohr.int/speeches/s990922b.htm.

2 See Marcus Cox, “Strategical Approaches to international Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Geneva, CASIN,

1998, Part 2, Section 6; available from http://casin.ch/gover/cluster/marcus%20cox.htm.

3 Bosnian is used here as Bosanci (which designates all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and not as Bosnjaci

(which designates since 1993 one of the three -in this case Musl im- consti tut ive nation of Bosnia and Herzegovi na).

4 Chris Hedges, "A Spaniard rules Bosnia with a strong Hand", New York Times, New-York, April 10, 1998; see also

"Bosnia, the Protectorate", The Economist, London / New-York, February 14, 1998 (US Edition).

5 On the structural elements of power in Bosnia, see the report of the European Stability Initiative, Reshaping

International Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part one : Bosnian Power Structures, Sarajevo, ESI, October 14,1999; available from http://www .esiweb.org/Report1-1999.html.

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extent the different international organizations and institutions were ini tiall y overlapping,consequently their competition was counterproductive. But this current criticism concernsespecially the first years of the GFAP implementation, at a time when the World Bank, the USAgency for International Development (USAID), the Office of the High Representati ve, the OSCEMission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union struggled to coordinate their activities.Since 1997, their representatives in Sarajevo have mostly formed an effective and coherent workingrelationship, and NATO-led peacekeeping force (SFOR) started supporting the civilian peaceagenda. Nonetheless, we may consider the necessity to restructure the different organizations inorder to become more result-oriented, to maximize their coordination and to develop a commonhanding-over strategy. One solution could be, as Ambassador Robert Barry suggested, to give at thisstage a clear lead and mandate to only one international body.

Wolfgang Petritsch, the High Representative of the International Community for the Applicationof the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, proposed to theSteering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in June 2001 to overhaul Westernorganizations operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to gradually merge into a singleorganization, with a unified budget and structure, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), theOSCE and the United Nations missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina. If this plan is properl y enforcedit would help the international authorities to make more efficient use of the powers conceded tothem in the peace agreements and, by implementing the appropriate ownership strategy, bringdomestic institutions closer to taking responsibil ity for running the country.

Thirdly, there is a need to develop a new strategy in re-building political institutions by focusingmore resolutely on ownership and regional perspective. The Bosnian state bodies must begin tohave more influence over policy development and its implementation. Instead of being passiverecipients they have to become active participants. To some commentators and politicians, theinternational administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to have created a relationship ofdependency rather than develop a democratic self-government. The dependency syndrome1 isoften presented as the result of the international administration which increased the dependenceof the Bosnian constitutional structures on outside actors2. Hence the fear that the network ofinternational community institutions would not know how to exit, and even that the Bosnians3

themselves may have forgotten how to rule their own country4. Thi s might be an exaggeration.Nevertheless, one of the main obstacles to changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not only theinternational - often paternalistic - presence which obstructed the development of Bosniangovernmental responsibi li ty, but also the unwi ll ingness of local poli tical leaders to committhemselves to the task of reforming their country.

The old nomenklatura and the new kleptocracy worked hand in glove with organized crime andthe remnants of the security services against any transition to democracy and the market economy5.Thus, if elected leaders have to take responsibil ity for their own country in order to reverse the

1 See Wi ll iam Shawcross, Deli ver us from Evil : Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Confli ct, New-York,

Simon and Schuster, 2000, 447 p.

2 Wolfgang Petritsch, op. cit., September 22, 1999.

3 Wolfgang Petri tsch, "W hat kinds of leaders Bosnia and Herzegovina needs. Removing Obstacles to Ownership",

Sarajevo, OHR, December 1, 1999; available from http://www.ohr.int/articles/a991201a.htm.

4 Wolfgang Petritsch, "TV Address by the Hi gh Representative", Sarajevo, OH R, May 25, 2000; speech broadcasted

by RTV BiH, RT RS, OBN and Radio Fern ; the transcript is available from http://www.ohr.int/press/a20000525a.htm.

5 See Wol fgang Petritsch, "Address of the High Representative for Bosnia & Herzegovina to the Peace Implementation

Council", Brussels, OHR, May 23, 2000 ; available from http://www.ohr.int/speeches/s20000523a.htm.

6 Wolfgang Petritsch,"The International Community will leave when Bosnia enters in Europe", Oslobodjenje, Sarajevo,

Saturday June 17, 2000; available from http://www.ohr.int/press/i20000622a.htm.

7 Robert Barry, "The Economics of Peace in Bosnia", The Financi al Times, London, October 22, 1999.

8 Robert Barry, "Report by Head of Mi ssion Robert Barry to the Permanent Counci l of the OSCE", Sarajevo, OSCE,

December 9, 1999; available from http://www.oscebih.org/events/barry_report-10-12-99.htm.

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trend toward dependency, firm action against obstructionism, corruption and political extremismis required. The goal of both the implementation of the GFAP and the Stability Pact, is precisely toaddress and to overcome these problems. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as in other pl aces like Haitiand Cambodia, to mention only a few, the international community has to lead a nation toward theprocess of transition. But at the end, the success of this process depends on the local leaders1.

The top international officials in charge of the transitional administration of Bosnia and Herzegovinaare absolutely aware of the ongoing necessity to adapt and enforce the implementation of theGFAP. But after six years of international presence, Bosnia and Herzegovina is more than ever anaid-dependent country. In order to progressively overcome this situation, foreign support andinvolvement wi ll remain a pre-requisite, but it must absolutely address Bosnian self-government andownership.

This became their priority objective, especially for Wolfgang Petritsch, the High Representative ofthe International Community for the Application of the General Framework Agreement for Peacein Bosnia and Herzegovina. In September 1999 he presented to the Foreign Ministers of theSteering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) a new strategy concentrated on threespecific priority areas : institution-building, the economy, and the return of refugees, and hasfocused on the concept of ownership2. Since then, he insisted consistently on the absolute necessityto develop ownership : "officials and citizens alike should take on the role of building the futureof Bosnia and Herzegovina"3. He also denounced repeatedly the obstructionists still in position ofauthority in Bosnia and Herzegovina and appealed regularly to the people in the country to bemore actively involved in the reforms4. What could be called the exit strategy of the new HighRepresentative consists of two main points : firstly, ownership as a process; secondly, an entrystrategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina into Europe5, which "will automatically mean that such a largepresence of the international community in BiH wi ll no longer be necessary"6.

Robert Barry, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina until June 2001, had thevery same position : "The international community' s preferred exit strategy for Bosnia (...) mustencourage, support and faci litate domestic efforts to set Bosnia on its own feet", and further "thediscussion must focus not on arbitrary and unrealistic deadlines, but on the creation of sustainablepolit ical and economic structures"7, now i t's time for "the elected officials to take ownership of thepeace process and move i t along themselves"8 and for Bosnians to "take ownership of their own

1 Robert Barry, "Presentation by OSCE BiH Head of Mission, Ambassador Robert Barry, to the Permanent Council of

the OSCE", Sarajevo, OSCE, March 2, 2000; available from http://www.oscebih.org/events/barry-2-3-2000.htm.

2 Bodo Hombach, "Address of the Speci al Coordinator of the Stabi lity Pact at the Meeting of Mi nisters of Foreign

Affairs of the South-East European Cooperation Process", July 14, 2000; available from http://www.stabili typact.org.

3 Sarajevo Summit Declaration, Sarajevo, 30 July, 1999, articles 5 & 6; available from http://www.stabili typact.org.

4 Arthur J. Evans, Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina on Foot during the Insurrection, August and September,1875,

London, 1877 (second ed. 1978). See also Noel Malcolm, Bosnia. A short History, New-York, New-York UniversityPress, 1996, pp. 132-135.

5 Mark Mazower, The Balkans. A Short History, New-York, The Modern Library, 2000, p. 117.

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future"1.

Finally, the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact, Bodo Hombach, is working in the samedirection. One of the main pillars of the political direction of the Pact is precisely the regionalempowerment or ownership of the process : "countries in the region must play a driving role withinthe Pact"2. On 30 July 1999, the Sarajevo Summit stressed that “ the countries of the region are theowners of the stabilization process and their full efforts in a commitment to this undertaking arecri ti cal to its success” 3.

3. New Perception of Ethnic Warfare

"At the moment that I write this, nearl y 3'000 Bosnian and Herzegovinian villages and scatteredhamlets are blackened ruins and over 200'000 Christian refugees are starving among theinhospitable ravines of the Dalmatian Al ps. In the interests of humanity as well as of Europeanpeace, in discharge of responsibil ities which no adroitness of European statesmanship can disavow,an armed occupation of Bosnia by civilized forces has become indispensable.” This was not wri ttenin 1992 but in 1875 by Arthur Evans4 ! By that time the Christian peasants’ rebell ion, which rosein Herzegovina before the insurrection spread to Bosnia, was followed in 1878 by the occupationof "civi lized forces", the Army of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In the late 19th Century, in contradiction wi th the liberal concept of nation-state, official andrelatively peaceful organized exchanges of population were seen as a solution for creatingpredominantly nationally homogeneous states. Thus, in 1876-1878, there was a wave of refugeeswho moved across the Ottoman-Serbian border and in 1877, tens of thousands of Muslim Tartarsand Circassians fled Bulgaria. At the same time, Muslim inhabitants fled Greece to avoid war orpersecution. In the 20th Century, it became a model initiated in the Balkans by the 1913 Turk-Bul garian Agreement which shifted people from their home along the borders to the other side. In1923, the Treaty of Lausanne established that Greece and Turkey agreed to exchange most of theirremaining minority population, around 2 milli on people, and in 1938, Turkey, Romania andYugoslavia discussed at the Istanbul Conference ways of encouraging massive emigration to Turkey;“for the first time in the history of the region, modern states took advantage of a mil itary confl ictto pursue long-range demographic goals” 5.

The last major forced movement of population before the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republicof Yugoslavia (SFRY) was the forcible expulsion of the German and the Italian minorities after WorldWar II. Focusing now on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the recent war (1992-1995), between 1 and1,5 million people fled the country, a simi lar number lost their homes but remained in the country -so-call ed displaced persons. The demographic impact is that there is no municipality where the pre-

1 See the figures published by UNPD, UNDDSMS, WIIW (eds), Reconstruction, Reform and Economic Management in

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vienna, January, 1997. By the end of 2000, some 330'000 refugees have returned to theFederation and 26'000 to Republika Srpska. Figures of minori ty returns, showing how many people have returned totheir homes despite their being in an area now controll ed by a different “ethnic gorup”, confirm the increase ofspontaneous returns : 35'000 to 40' 000 for 1998; 80'000 to 90' 000 for 1999 and for the period January-July 2000more than double the figure for the corresponding month a year previous.

2 See Marco Dogo, Storie Balcaniche, Gorizi a, Libreria Editri ce Goriziana, 1999, p. 15.

3 Zarko Puhovski, "The real Democracy Deficit", WarReport, London, IWPR, no. 58, 1998, p. 45.

4 Timothy Garton Ash, "Cry, the Dismenbered Country", The New Yorker Review of Books, New-York, no. 1, Januray

14, 1999 (http://ww w.nybooks.com), republished in History of the Present, London, Penguin, 2000, p. 369.

5 Thomas L. Friedman, “Not Happening”, New York Times, New-York, Januray 23, 2001 & “Bosnia, Sort Of”, New

York Times, New-York, January 26, 2001; both available from http://ww w.nytimes.com.

6 Cf. Tanja Domi, “ US to Rethink Bosnia Policy ?”, WarReport, London, IWPR, no. 223, March 2, 2001.

7 Alexandre Adler, “Pour les Balkans, chirurgie ou homéopathie ?”, Courrier internat ional , Paris, April 12, 2001, p. 6.

8 See Xavier Bougarel , Bosnie. Anatomie d’un conflit, Paris, La Découverte, 1996, p. 7; and Steven L. Burg & Paul S.

Shoup, The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethnic Confli ct and International Intervention, New-York, M. E. Sharpe,1999, p. 29.

9 See Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism : the Tragic Death of Yugoslavia, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota

(revised edn), 1996, pp. 218-221 & p. 226; and Steven L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup, op. cit., 1999, pp. 171-181.

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war “ethnic” composition has remained intact1.

Thus, the forced removals of populations have a long modern history in the area. Nevertheless, evenif the issues of ethnicity and nationality were often present and exploited, the recent wars wereprimarily a way of settling borders and of territorial prerogatives.Today, liberally minded democratsconsider them as legalized international "ethnic cleansing", illustrati ng how multicul tural societiesare destabilizi ng structurally weak states. In the name of realism, others are showing some sympathyfor that option. As Marco Dogo, who affirms that a “mono ethnic State” is a prerequisite to ademocracy tout court2; the respected Zagreb philosopher Zarko Puhovski, who argues that "afterethnic cleansing, democracy is going to have a better chance"3; and Timothy Garton Ash, whothinks, that "the least bad framework in which the peoples of former Yugoslavia might now starttheir slow journey to join a civi lized, l iberal democratic Europe would be as a group of smallnation-states wi th clear ethnic majorities"4.

More recently, the idea of partition and of redrawing the borders put forward by Lord Owen andthe American politi cal scientists Robert Mearsheimer, was picked up by Thomas L. Friedman, whoargued that “Bosnia can be democratic and self-sustaining, but only i f the country gives up beingunified and mult i-ethnic”5. Prominent US officials said the same at a symposium organized by theColumbia University in February 20016. In France, Alexandre Adler advocated the necessity toredraw the borders even at the cost of population exchanges7. These viewpoints fail to see that inBosnia and Herzegovina responsibility and terri tory cannot be divided along ethnic lines8 and thatintegrative forces have always existed.

Firstly, concerning responsibi li ty, we are not referring to the collective guil t of a community but tothe poli tical responsibi li ty of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the Croatian Democratic Party(HDZ) and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA).This opinion does not imply in any way that allsides bore equal responsibil ity for the conflict. But the penal responsibil ity of some Serbs andBosnian Serbs does not have to obstruct the view of the politi cal and moral responsibi li ty of theothers9.

1 See on this crucial subject Thierry Mudry, Histoire de l a Bosnie-Herzégovine. Fai ts et cont roverses, Paris, Ell ipses,

1999, p. 385; and Steven L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup, op. cit., 1999, pp. 16-34.

2 Nikola Kovac, “Partitions ethniques : sources de la guerre et menace sur la paix” , Les Cahiers de l’Orient, Paris, no.

59, 2000, p. 51.

3 For the constitutional aspect see Robert M. Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided : the Constitut ional Logic of the

Yugoslav Conflicts, Universi ty of M ichi gan, 1999, 224 p.; for the economical approach, see Susan L. Woodwardvarious contributions.

4 This word, mixing democracy and dictatorship, was created by Pedrag Matvejevitch.

5 See Noel Malcolm, op. cit., 1996, p. 234; and Steven L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup, op. cit., 1999, p. 16.

6 See Xavier Bougarel's excellent study of Bosnian communitarianism, op. cit.,1996.

7 Komsiluk comes from the turc and means neighbourliness, it designates in Bosnia and Herzegovina the everyday

cohabitation of the different communities. See Xavier Bougarel, op. cit., 1996, pp. 81-100.

8 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and its Destroyers, New-York, Random House, 1996

(Times Books 1999), p. 237.

11

Secondly, in matters of territory, it must be recal led that until 1992 the different communities werenot distributed uniformly. It was very uncommon that one community would be in a hegemonicposition. A demographic analysis of the distribution of the different Bosnian communities between1948 and 1991 shows that there is a shift from mixed or triangular situations to bi-polar situationsin which two communities represent the majority. Xavier Bougarel sees in this evolution one reasonof the Bosnian crisis.

Thirdly, in regards to ethnicity : on the one hand, we have to bear in mind that, except for theKosovo issue, the recent Balkan wars were not ini tiated by so-called ethnic di fferences. The disputeswere internecine, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina it was not an inter-ethnic war but an intra-ethnic one. The Bosnian society is a deeply segmented one, with Bosniac, Serbs and Croatsorganized into distinct communities. But Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs shared a common language,ethnic origin, and lifestylee1. Most urban Bosniacs are secular and culturally indistinguishable fromtheir Serbian and Croatian neighbors. Nikola Kovac reminds us that Bosnia and Herzegovina wasnor Bosniac, nor Serb, nor Croat but by the same time Bosniac and Serb and Croat2. Therefore thereal causes of the war have to be found elsewhere, in the recent Yugoslav political, economic andconstitutional disintegration process3, in the collapse of reform efforts precipitated by the post-ColdWar vacuum, and in the rise of what could be called demokratura4, a national-communist power.

Fourthly, recollecting that the focus on fragmentation overlooks integrative forces, we may favoranother point of view. We must consider that the so-called national animosities within Bosnia andHerzegovina have often become inter-community violence only as a result of pressures coming fromoutside the country5. The di fferent communities were not so much fighti ng among themselves asagainst the state, for a long time embodied by the Ottoman Empire. But, Bosnia and Herzegovinawas not only a state with a deep confli ctual history, i t was also a model of multicultural coexistenceand tolerance6. Therefore, the conflict in the 1990s became one of two value systems : the valuesof citizenship and neighbourl iness (komsiluk7) and the values of “ethnic divi sion”. This conflictacquired an international importance, in Warren Christopher's words : "the challenge to the worldcommunity is not to break up multiethnic states, but to make them more civil. It's the borders inthe mind - the borders of prejudice, supremacy, and hate - rather than the borders on the map thatare most in need of changing" 8.

The challenge today is to support multicommunity tolerance and cohabitation as a constitutive andorganizing principle for states. The task is also to avoid inter-community tensions and conflicts

1 Pierre Hassner pinpointed allready in 1971 the shift from a violence between countries to a violence within the

countries : “Force et poli tique aujourd’hui ”, republished in La violence et la paix, Paris, Esprit, 1995, pp. 67-68 & 80-

81. See Mary Kaldor, Neue und Alte Kriege. Organisierte Gewalt i m Zeitlater der Globalisierung, Francfurt am Main,Suhrkamp, 2000, 279 p.; and Victor-Yves Ghebali, “Les guerres civiles de l’après-guerre froide”, Relationsinternat ional es,Paris, spring, 2001.

2 We are following Michael Ignatieff' s distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism; see Mi chael

Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journey into the New Nationalism, New-York, Vintage,1994, 208p. On the subject seealso Vernon Bogdanor, "Overcomming the Twentieth Century ; Democracy and Nationalism in Central and EasternEurope", Political Quartely, London, vol. 66, no. 1, 1995, p. 97.

3 See Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty : Civil Society and its Rivals, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1994, p. 126 and

Keitha S. Fine, "Fragile Stability and Change : Understanding Conflict during Transitions in East Central Europe",Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World, edited by Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, WashingtonDC, Brookings Institution, 1996, p. 556.

4 Joan Kroc, "Untying Macedonia's Gordian Knot : Preventive Diplomacy in the Southern Balkans", Preventive and

Inventive Action in Intrastate Crisis, edited by J. Letterman (et ali ), Indiana, University of Notre Dame, 1996, p. 286.

5 I’m especially obligated to the studies conducted by Mary Kaldor & Ivan Vejvoda and David Chandler (see infra).

6 Vaclav Havel address’ to the Canadian Senate House of Commons in Ot tawa on April 29, 1999 illustrates this

positi on in the best way; see Vaclav Havel, op. cit.; and also Martin Woollacott, “The New Internationalism”,WarReport, London, IWPR, no. 58, 1998, pp. 9-10.

7 This would correspond to the two first waves of democratization distinguished by Samuel Huntington, The Third

Wave : Democratisation in the late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

12

whi ch threaten today' s stabi lity more than troubles between states1. The solution lies not only inpromoting democracy and especially minority rights protection, but mainly in overcoming ethnicnationalism2 by reviving the state’s sovereignty. In Bosnia and Herzegovina neighbourliness(komsiluk) was secured so long as the state was able to guarantee stability and peace. As soon asthe state vanished, komsiluk became subject to fear and tacked to crime.

Still most authors are focusing on the question of ethnicity, considering democracy in Central andSouth Eastern Europe's countries as undermined by "ethnic politics"3. The next step in theirargumentation is then to consider that East European, particularly Balkan actors are unable tomanage their own confl ict resolution autonomously and to presume that cultural incapacityrepresents a "risk that social tensions will end up at a higher level of conflict intensity"4. These kindof assumptions being quite discriminatory are meant to legitimize a policing role for theinternational community and its intervention. This reasoning tends to overlook the specificity of thesituation and to discredit the potential of local actors, the necessity for them to develop their ownstrategy of confl ict resolution, and to find their own way to democracy in a new historical situation.

4. Democratization and Transition Process

In the past ten years less attention was paid to the traditional institutional and political levels andmore to the values and culture of a democratic society5. This clear prioritization of universaldemocratic values was generally linked to the problem of the internationalization of democraticconsolidation, with the idea that problems of democratization are supposed to necessitateinternational guidance, support, and in some circumstances intervention6. Depending on whichkind of definition we adopt and which period we consider, we will have a different understandingof the transition to democracy or democratization process. From the 1820s until the early 1960s7,democratization meant essenti all y : rul e of l aw, separation of powers, elected power-holders, freeand fair elections, inclusive citizenship, freedom of expression, associational autonomy, and civilian

1 Robert Alan Dahl mentions seven attributes of democracy in his book Democracy and its Crit ics, New Haven, Yale

University Press, 1989 (1991), p. 221; see also Mary Kaldor & Ivan Vejvoda, "Democratization in Central and EastEuropean Countries", International Affairs, London, vol. 73, no. 1, 1997, pp. 63-66.

2 See Kaldor & Vejvoda's ten-country survey carried out jointly by the European Commission and the Council of

Europe; Mary Kaldor & Ivan Vejvoda, op. cit., 1997, pp. 59-82 and Mary Kaldor & Ivan Vejvoda, Democratization inCentral and Eastern Europe, London, Pinter, 1999, pp. 4-7.

3 Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis, "Introduction", Stabili sing Fragile Democracies : Comparing New Party System in

Southern and Eastern Europe, ed. by Pridham & Lewis, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 1.

4 Richard Rose, "Where are Postcommunist Countries going ?", Journal of Democracy, Baltimore, vol. 8, no. 3, 1997,

pp. 94-95.

5 Marcin Krol, "Where East meets West'" , Journal of Democracy, Bal timore, vol. 6, no. 1, 1995, p. 37.

6 Keitha Fine, op. cit., 1996, p. 559.

7 Mark Thompson, A Paper House : the Ending of Yougoslavia, London, Vintage, 1992, p. 102. Too many authors are

insisting on the presumed irrational nature of Bosnian uneducated people (!); see for example Joan Kroc, op. cit.,1996, and David Owen, Balkan Odyssey : an uncompromising personal Account of t he International Peace Efforts

following the Breakup of the Former Yugoslavia, London, Indigo, 1996, p. 3.

8 See Vladimir Gligorov, Mary Kaldor & Loukas Tsoukalis, Balkan Reconstruction and European Integration, Vienna,

WIIW, October, 1999, 56 p.

9 See Rudol f Tökes, “Transitol ogy : Global Dreams and Post-Communist Reali ties”, Central Europe Review, London,

vol. 2, no. 10, March 13, 2000.

13

control over the securi ty forces1. In the early 1990s, we moved away from this normative definitionof democracy and became more aware that the democratic consolidation is related to thesustainabil ity of democratic institutions. Thus, democracy was no more reducible to institutions,rules and procedures. The main topics became : cultural preconditions, mediating institutions, activecivil society, and even internalization of certain cultural codes, values and rules.

While Central and Eastern European States are meeting international norms in terms of formaldemocracy the reali ty is different in terms of substantive democracy2. Here the new democracies,for some "the so-called new democracies", are considered by definition as "fragi le democracies"3,"not stable ... nor perfect (!) democracies"4, situated "somewhere between real democracy and shamdemocracy"5, where people had "remarkably (!) few legal, political and civic skills"6. According toMark Thompson it could only be worse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where modern values are aliento the Bosnians : "Bosnia is full of uneducated people who don' t know what politi cs is, what theycan do, what's right and what's wrong"7. This sounds partly denigrating, and in fact it is. Thedemocratization commentators are not only turning down the traditional methods of politi calcategorization, they are also creating a new East-West divide in matters of civili zational competence:between those leading mature Western democracies and the others !

Given this, we have to be aware of the remnants of paternalistic legacies and the need to overhaulthe political, economic, social, judicial and administrative spheres. In different Central and SouthEastern countries authoritarian practices still prevail. Lack of economic reforms, stalled privatization,the development of a criminally oriented economy and the weak states, dysfunctional poli tical andlegal institutions are hindering both democratic and economic dynamics. A global evaluation of thetransition process in the Balkans shows that stabilization is on the way, but liberalization isincomplete or deficient, most privatization programs are usually inefficient and restructuring hasmainly been passive or even non-existent8. Changes in Central and South Eastern Europe arecomplex, transition is both a politi cal and economic process : transition to democracy, to a freemarket and to a new form of statehood9. This process will certainly not be linear, nor should itimitate the Western path. By combining different traditions, these countries will progressively

1 Ivan Vejvoda, "Finding their Own Way", Transiti on, Prague, June, no. 5.6,1998, pp. 80-81.

2 Vladimir Gli ronov, Task Force on Economic Strategy for South Eastern Europe, New-York, East-West Institute,

advanced copy, April, 2000, p. 14; available from http://www.iews.org.

3 As defined by the EU, the Western Balkans include : Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia and

FYR Macedonia

4 Reshaping Internat ional Priori ti es in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Part 3: the End of the Nationalist Regimes and the

Future of the Bosnian State, Berlin, ESI, March 22, 2001; available from http://www.esiweb.org, p.1.

5 For the High Representative, the GFAP should nor be abandonned nor be replaced because it can change i tself, see

Wol fgang Petritsch, “We must stay the course in Bosnia”, The Wall Street Journal Europe, Brussels, June 12, 2001;available from http://ohr.int/articles/a20010612a.htm.

14

develop their own models of democracy, for sure "a mix of local colors, and traditions, plus theWestern models” 1.

As regional considerations, the weight of the past and the diversity of situations which make uptransitions matter in important ways in shaping economic and political processes, the pathdependence approach developed in transitology, in opposition to the classic strategy approach, fitswi th our focus on ownership. Indeed, while all new democracies must wrestle with the samegeneral issue, how these tasks are carried out will vary distinctively by region. Focusing on theBalkans, the requested institutional changes are implying a transition from a mixture of old socialistand new criminal, bl ack market and corrupt institutions to legal states and free markets. Thereforeit is legitimate to introduce the concept of second transition2 in order to characteri ze the keyproblem of the region of post-socialist Balkans, especially of the Western Balkans3.

Considering former Yugoslavia, the pri vati zation programs provide another example. Privatizationschemes drawn up by international experts in Bosnia and Herzegovina didn’t pay enough attentionto the fact that the structures former Yugoslavia had developed differed basically from those in otherCentral European countries. Enterprises had a extensive degree of autonomy and experience withthe working of labor markets and commercial banks. Employees and citizens got an allegiance tothe enterprises, at least in principle, they partly managed the enterprises themselves. Furthermore,property issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina are intrinsically related to inter-community tensions andto power-distribution. Thus, privatization should go in a way that bears some simil arity to theformer system and could be acceptable for the people at large, as it was done in Slovenia.

This explains why the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is so complex. In his third report onReshaping internat ional pri orities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Stabil ity Initiative (ESI)suggests to separate the core tasks derived from the Dayton Peace agreement (GFAP) from broadergoal s of completing economic transition and creating an effective sovereign Bosnian state. With thisnew focus of international efforts, “ the core Dayton agenda can be completed within the next 2 -3years, leaving European insti tutions to tackle the longer term task of transforming Bosnia’s post-communist state and integrating it into the European Union” 4.

But this splitting approach could lead to a cheap exit strategy, leaving Bosnia’s future unsure andunsecured. Consideri ng that the constitutional and institutional set-up of Bosnia and Herzegovinais the main stumbling block to its economic development, we thi nk that transiti on has to proceedtogether wi th institution-building in a simul taneous process. But this reorientation of the GFAP5

should be conducted in a way that would effecti vely implement the ownership strategy introducedby the High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch.

Too often the specificity of a situation is neglected. Thus the idea of generalizability ofdemocratization and the common assumption in comparative studies that our understanding of

1 See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Debate : Democratic Consolidation : Illusion and Conceptual Flaws", Journal of

Democracy, Baltimore, vol. 7, no. 4, 1996, p. 164.

2 Ambassador Bernard Poncet, Head of the O SCE Mi ssion to Croati a, denunciated this at the i nternational conference

The Operational Role of the OSCE in Southeastern Europe: Contributing to Regional Stabili ty in the Balkans, Brussels,Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva), December 3-4, 1999, to be published by Ashgate, Aldershot.

3 This is the conclusion of Thomas Carothers, “W estern Aid : from Teachers to Learners”, Central Europe Review,

London, vol. 2, no. 11, March 20, 2000; available from http://www.ce-review.org/00/11/carothers11.html.

4 Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 337.

5 Béatrice Pouligny examined the same problematic focusing on El Salvador, Haiti and Cambodia : “Mul tidimensional

UN Peacekeeping Missions and the Promotion of the Rule of Law : Exploring the Intersection of Universal Norms andLocal Contexts”, Human Rights Review, to be published, available from http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org.

6 The constitution for the Bosnian Federation was signed in Washington, March 18, 1994. The document on

implementing the Federation agreement was signed in Dayton, November 9, 1995.

15

politi cal processes can be transported from one country to another is used to demonstrate the lackof democracy of some countries, and therefore the necessity for some form of regulation or evenintervention1. It appears clearly that this kind of ideological insight, which presumes that some areassisting others in order to democratize them, is totally contradictory to any ownership approach.This is not only a matter of a mistaken Western academic treatment, but it is also leading, or at leastinfluencing, the fieldwork in a rather counterproductive way2. The summation of ten years ofWestern civil society aid to the region indicates the following lesson : “they went to teach; theystayed to learn; they’re learning still”3.

5. Toward New Peace-building Processes

The language of global democratization and civil ethic contributed to significant transformations inthe understanding and management of international relations. The infringement on human rightsand democratic values implied an international duty of intervention, consequently the principlesof sovereignty and non intervention had to be adopted4. According to these shifts, internationalinstitutions which have a relation to Central and Eastern Europe (UN, EU, OSCE, Council of Europeand the EBRD) developed an externally regulated policy to encourage democracy, goodgovernance, and the promotion of democratic rights according to European standards5. Even in Somalia or in Cambodia, the Uni ted N ations never had such an ambitious mission : a trulyinternational administration first in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and recently in Kosovo. However, eachsituation is unfortunately affected by some major contradictions which are threatening its future. TheGeneral Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) was worked out on the basis of a Contact Group'splan, a division of the country : 51 %, for the Bosnian-Croat Federation6, 49 % for the Serb entity.Many di ffi cul ties in implementing the GFAP are due to the de facto division of Bosnia andHerzegovina on one hand, and it’s de jure preservation on the other. This is of course denying thelofty statements against “ethnic division” we mentioned and, of course, it contradicts the Bosnian'sovereignty recognized on 22 May 1992 by the UN.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in Dayton as an extremely decentral ized and weak state,wi th each entity having its own parliament, government, police force and army, and carrying outmost of the functions of a state within its territory. The central and common organs of governmentfor the whole country are concerned only with a short list of specified matters : foreign policy,foreign trade, monetary policy, customs, immigration, and practical concerns such as air-trafficcontrol. All other governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned to the common state

1 But we may mention that since January 11, 2001, the Constitutional Court determined the constituent status of all

three people on the entire territory of Bosnia. Thus the RS is not what it had been until then.

2 David Chandler's crit ical analysis gives an overview of the GFAP structure: Bosnia. Faking Democracy After Dayton,

London, Pluto, second edition, 2000, pp. 34-65. ICG published an excellent analysis of the GFAP and the future ofBosnian: Is Dayton fail ing ? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement, Sarajevo, Report No. 80, October 28,1999, 74 p .; see also "A farewell to arms ?", WarReport, London, IWPR, no. 58, pp. 6-54.

3 Few commentators have raised these problems as Kimberley Stanton, "Pitfalls of Intervention : Sovereingty as a

Foundation for Human Rights", Havard Internati onal Review, Cambridge (Mas), vol. 16, no. 1, 1993, pp. 14-16.

4 The OHR constitutes in fact the highest legal authority in Bosnia, even higher than the GFAP Annex 4 Constituti on.

5 See David Chandler, op. cit., 2000, pp. 69-89.

16

are reserved for the enti ties -this is about 80 % of all state or institutional functions. Thus, there isa real predominance of the entities over the central government. Further, if the constitution gave theappearance of community power sharing, in fact the provisions of the actual constitutioninstitutionalize a community based partition of the state by establishing community quali ficationsfor membership in key institutions and ethnicized processes of decision-making within them. TheBosnian constitution favors the segmentation of the state and disfavors intercommunitycooperation1.We wil l not go through all the aspects of the implementation of the GFAP2, but focus on some ofthem relevant for our purpose. Because the Uni ted Nations' Charter bounds the UN to respect Statesovereignty, the GFAP was relied on by the ad hoc grouping of states which formed theInternational Conference on Former Yugoslavia, later on transformed into the Peace ImplementationCouncil (PIC). Furthermore, the GFAP not only went far beyond a cease-fire and a boundarydemarcation agreement, but in fact aimed to reverse "ethnic cleansing" and to provide a blueprintfor a new, unified state.

Regarding the questions of Bosnian sovereignty and the difficulti es involved in imposing democracyfrom the outside, we should remember that ini tially the transitional administration was supposedto last only one year. Then, it was prolonged for a further two-year consolidation period and, inDecember 1997, indefinitely extended. This was not only due to the Bosnian circumstances, butalso to the intrinsic difficul ties of externally imposing institutions which must be sustainable at thelocal level3. Despite this forewarning remark, the GFAP process was initi ally given a quite rigid andil logical frame. On the one hand it was imposing democratization assistance under internationallaw, and on the other enforcement mechanisms were lacking.

The extent of the intrusive international influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina is impressive. It goesfrom supporting institutions with technical advice and resources to convening them, supervisingtheir operation and, very often, controlling their output. In one way or in the other, internationalagencies and intergovernmental institutions are regulating more or less all Bosnian institutions. Forexample, the OSCE has the power to impose penalties for violations of the electoral rules, includingdisquali fication of candidates and de-certification of parties. Further, the Offi ce of the H ighRepresentative (OHR) finds itself reforming witness protection laws, supervising privatizationinvestments funds and dismissing corrupt officials. Until at least 2000, the legislation process mostlyoriginated from what was drafted by the OHR, until duly adopted by the Bosnian Parliament, andevery serious politi cal incident was handled by the OHR4. Not only at state level, but also at entity,canton, municipal and city levels we can observe a far-reaching international regulation of Bosniansocial, political and economic life5.

In these conditions, to reestablish the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a self-ruled countryis an extremely difficult task. Even more, a contradiction seems to arise between this increasinglyinterventionist role of the international community, and the creation of a functioning and

1 Marcus Cox, op. cit., 1998, Part 2, Section 1.

2 The Gross domesti c product measures the gross value-added produced by domestic units -imports are excluded. As

import were in recent years much higher than expoprts, Bosnia and Herzegovina absorbed many more commodi tiesthan it produced. We have to remaind that because of lack of reliable data, only part of the standard methods can beused, thus the foundation of GDP figures is weak.

3 The implementation force (IFOR) of some 60'000 NATO and other troops was deployed to Bosnia in December

1995. IFOR operated under rules of engagement to enforce the mil itary aspects of the agreement, consistent with theCharter of UN Chapter VII authority of the Security Council Resolution 1031. In December 1996, IFOR was reducedto about 31'000 troops and renamed SFOR.

4 See Josef Pöschl, Bosnia and Herzegovina : New H ope for Economi c and Poli ti cal Progress, Vienna, WIIW, Report

no. 11, May, 1998, 26 p.

17

independent civil society and state. Indeed, there is a risk “that the internat ional community maybecome so deeply embroiled in national politics that it inhibi ts the development of genuinedemocratic institutions” 1. But the High Representative is not the proponent of a colonial solution.He uses his wide powers only in key areas, when there is a necessity of removing obstacles to thepeace process and to ensure the successful functioning of the state. Only then, would he assumethe authority granted him the GFAP to make decisions the government was unable or unwi ll ing tomake.

6. The Shift from Conditionality to Ownership

At the end of 1995, after years of war, the GFAP's initial success was to bring about a cease-fire andpeace, though a precarious one. Between 1992 and 1995 about half a mi llion people were ki lledor heavily wounded, more than half of the pre-war population have been displaced from theirhomes or have fled the country. With much of the existing physical capital destroyed, economicdamage totaling about USD 50 to 60 bill ion, the real gross domestic product (GDP)2 at about onequarter of the pre-war level, the industrial production came almost to a standstill , and most of thepeople employed lost their job. The state was no longer able to pay wages, salaries and pensions,and to complete this picture, by the end of 1995, it had accumulated between USD 3.3 and 3.5bill ion total external debt. If the peacekeeping elements of the mili tary provisions of the agreement3

and the reconstruction program - USD 5.1 bil lion - were first good steps, Bosnia and Herzegovina -by that time an extremely fragmented country - needed for a lasting peace more than militaryinterventi on, reconstruction and humanitarian activi ties.

In 1997, the GFAP was unfortunately less than half-implemented and the country was in a way evenmore divided than before : there were the Bosniac and Croat areas, supposed to form a Federation,and the two parts (!) of Republika Srpska, one loyal to Biljana Plavsic and the other one to RadovanKaradzic. There has been no reduction in the strength of the nationali st parties, and l ittl e evidenceof either grassroots community reconciliation or the kind of inter-community elite cooperation thatwould be necessary to normalize the situation, to allow the return of the refugees and displacedpersons, and to build up a common state. Despite a massive reconstruction program, the economicsituation was still in a disastrous state : the economy was operating at drastically reduced level,unemployment remained high, w ages - when paid - were low and about 60 % of the populationwere in an impoverished state, and finally, the country’s trade balance was crippli ng.

Only the massive inflow of i nternational capital provided the l ifeline which kept the Bosnianeconomy afloat, but it turned to be extremely unfavorable for both the average individual and thelocal economic development4. Against all expectations, reconstruction boosted the volume of goodsimported but did not increase the domestic production nor the domestic gross value-added (GDP).This is confirmed by the figures of the sector composition of GDP, which evidence that “the

1 3.1 % in 1995 and 5.7 % in 1998, which is still very low for a country wi th huge reconstructi on requi rements. Josef

Pöschl, Bosnia and Herzegovina after Five Years of Reconstruction, Vienna, WIIW, Report no. 15, April, 2001, p. 5.

2 High Representative Carlos Westendorp, “Speech by the High Representative to the Peace Implementation Council

in Bonn” , Sarajevo, OHR, December 9, 1997.

3 This was requested by the Bosnian co-prime minister, Haris Silajdzic, “The Dayton Peace Accord - a Treaty that is

not being implemented”, Bosnia Report, London, Bosnian Institute, December 1999 - February 2000, new series no13-14, 2000; available from http://bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/decfeb00/dayton.htm. See also Janez Kovac, "Rewri tingBosnia's Holy Book", Balkan Crisis Report, London, IPWR, no. 112, February 1, 2000.

4 Vehid Sehic in hCa, Dayton-Continued in Bosnia Herzegovina, The Hague, hCa, 1997, p. 23; and “Que l’Europe

instaure un protectorat”, Le Courrier, Geneva, November 8, 1997, p. 14. See the comments on this issue from ICG, op.cit., 1999, pp. 54-55.

5 See Zoran Pahic,"UN Trusteeship can halt Ethnic Ghettos", WarReport, London, IWPR, no. 11, 1992, p. 1; and

"Protectorates Lost", WarReport, London, IWPR, no. 58, 1998, pp. 25-26; and Zarko Puhovski,"UN Protectorate aPrerequisite for a Politi cal Solution", WarReport, London, IWPR, no. 15, 1992, p. 15.

6 The three main national ist parties (SDA, SDS, HDZ) won about 86% of the seats at the Bosnian State Parliament

election in September 1996. Including the Muslim Party for BiH and the Serbian Party for Peace and Progress, theethnic blocs accounts for about 95 % of the seats.

7 See the PIC reports of the Florence (June 14, 1996) Paris (November 14, 1996) and London (December 5, 1996)

meetings; documents available from http://ww w.ohr.i nt.

8 About the lack of effectiveness of the conditionality policy; see Martin Woollacott, op. cit., 1998, p. 9; and Marcus

Cox, op. cit., 1998, Part 2, Section 4.1.

18

comprehensive reconstruct ion program did not stimulate the creation of value-added in theconstruction sector to any large extent” 1 .

This was of course a source of dissatisfaction, especially for the i nternational powers. It was nolonger possible for them to maintain the current approach, nor to pull out immediately. Both optionswould mean the failure of the international administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, anddefi ni tely imply a new war in the Balkans and the loss of Bosnian sovereignty. Therefore, the HighRepresentative Carlos Westendorp, chose in December 1997 the only remaining option : enforcingthe GFAP process. Whil e maintaining the stated objective of Bosnian self-government, he affirmedthe necessity to i ncrease the regulations in order to speed up the process of democratization wi tha view to, later on, enable international disengagement2.

By that time, other options would have been to rewrite the GFAP3 or to create a true protectorate.This last option repeatedly received large support in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among others, VehidSehic, the President of the Citizens’ Forum Tuzla and of the Bosnian Citizens' Al ternativeParliament (GAP), pointed out the need to "force the internat ional community to be accountablefor its actions"4. The idea was also to disband all nationalist politi cal parties and groups which wereinvolved in and responsible for the war. This position had its logic in wartime, when the mainfigures of the democratic oppositi on asked for a protectorate5. By that time, it was seen as a meansto stop the war and as an alternative to partition. But after the first Bosnian postwar election6, youcould no longer ask for a protectorate, even if there was and still is the need to get rid of the ethnicnationalists and the warlords who still favored separation.

The policy of conditionality foll owed by the first High Representative Carl Bildt7, rarely applied ina credible way, was not effective on the state-building agenda8. In fact it was more a global pol iti calpro forma conditionality, wi th no specific conditions, no identified rewards, and no mechanismsfor moni toring compliance. When specific economic conditionality was applied in support of well-defi ned objectives and supported by a general institution-building strategy, i t turned out to be asuccess story, as shown by the development of the state-level Bosnian Central Bank of Bosnian and

1 See Wolfgang Petritsch, op. cit., OH R, December 1, 1999.

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Herzegovina (CBBiH). The dismantling of the unconstitutional parallel structures, the internationalfinancial support, the international management and supervision contributed to this effectiveinstitution-building process. The Central Bank was highly successful in stabili zing the internal andexternal value of the country’s currency, besides, of a total staff of 170, only three were foreigners,among them Peter Nichol l, governor of the CBBiH. Thus an example of a successful handing-overstrategy.

In this particular case, conditionality led to ownership, but more generally it was the failure of“condi tionality” that introduced “ow nership” as an alternative approach. But its prerequisite is theexistence of central institutions and political processes. Facing the absence of both, the HighRepresentative adopted a two-step strategy : on one hand he used highly intrusive methods in orderto break down extra-constitutional power structures, and on the other hand he dictated the shapeof new institutional structures which wil l allow the Bosnians to take responsibil ity for the future oftheir country. In 1997, the question was: how far would the High Representative want to go indismantling the existing power structures ? The response followed very promptly.

In December 1997, the PIC Conference in Bonn decided on the question of a more assertiveimplementation of the GFAP, and broadened the High Representative’s powers over a potentiallyunlimited range of subject matters. The so-called “Bonn powers” gave the High RepresentativeCarlos Westendorp the power to dismiss obstructive public officials and to impose legislation ifBosnian legislative bodies failed to do so. Over his two-year term Carlos Westendorp imposedabout 45 laws, on citizenship, on common car licence plates and a new flag, on privatization andon telecommunication; he also dismissed public officials, including a member of the presidency anda former minister.

His successor, Wolfgang Petritsch, pursued this policy in order to remove the obstacles to theownership objectives, especially the well -organized resistance from obstructionist local authorities1.Therefore he dismissed not only obstructive local and cantonal officials but also governors, ministersand a member of the Bosnian presidency. He also imposed laws, binding decisions and arbitrationson a wide range of subjects, from economic reforms to property rights, from state border serviceto witness protection.

Table 1 : decisions taken by the H. R. from December 1997 to August 2001

D ecision s concerni ng C. Westendorp

12.1997 - 7. 1999

W. Petr itsch

8.1999 - 8. 2001

State-level matters, constitutional issues 12 10

Economic field 8 35

Field of judi cial reform 12 8

Removals and suspensions from offi ce 14 66

Media restructuring 2 10

Property law , retu rn o f refu gees 17 24

Source : the OHR official list available from http://www.ohr.int/decisions.htm.

This firm policy testifies the increasing use of the High Representative’s strong powers.

1 See the critical comments in the reports published by the European Stability Initiative, Reshaping Internat ional

Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovi na. Part Two : Internat ional Power , Berlin, ESI, 2000; available fromhttp://www .esiweb.org/Report3-2000.html, and op. cit., 2001.

2 Emir Habul, "Cutting the Lizards' Tail", AIM Sarajevo, December 19, 1999; available from http://www.aimpress.org.

3 Senad Pecanin, Ivan Lovrenovic, Nerzuk Curak & Mil e Stojic, “ Deset tesa za Bosnu i Hercegovine”, Dani, Sarajevo,

No 139 January 28, 2000 and Wolfgang Petritsch, "Ovo nij e nasa Zemlja”, Dani, Sarajevo, No 144, March 3, 2000;both available from http://ww w.bhdani.com.

4 Haris Siladziuc, op. cit., 2000.

5 See Hadzibegovic, Kamberovic, “Civi l Society in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Origins and Background”, Survey and

Analysis of Bosnian Civil Society Organisations. Mapping, Characteritics and Strategies, Copenhagen, DialogueDevelopment, August, 1997.

6 See Neven Andjeli c, “L’évolution de la société civile dans la Bosnie-Herzégovine d’avant-guerre”, Balkanologie, Paris,

vol. IV, no. 1, September, 2000, pp. 27-51.

7 UJDI was founded in December 1989 and organized in all the major cities, including Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo,

Ljubljana, Skopje, Pristina, Rijeka,and Spli t. The Union included many of the rebel student generation of 1968,fighters for democratic reforms, some feminists and peace activists.

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Unfortunately those decisions didn’ t have immediate lasting benefits and - until recently - they havenot made Bosnian leaders take responsibi li ty for running their country1. Despite this criticism, thepoliti cal case was and is very strong, most Bosnian people perceived those moves as a clear will bythe international administration to engage in a new program whose "clear aim is to weaken thenational parties and remove the warlords"2. This was the sign democratic minded Bosnians hadwaited for so long.

To the four editors of Dani, a Sarajevo magazine, who asked on 28th January 2000 once again fora protectorate, he answered that a protectorate would only increase dependency and hamper therecovery of Bosnian sovereignty3. In his rating of the Dayton Peace process, Haris Silajdzic stated:"Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is now is too strong to die, but too weak to function as a self-supporting state” 4. A quite proper appraisal of the situation. Wolfgang Petritsch also realizes verywell that the ownership and integration process wi ll decide Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future.

We will now examine the ownership paradigm’s potential firstly at the level of the Bosnian civilsociety, and secondly in the OSCE’s field strategy.

7. Why Bosnian Civil Society and NGOs Matter

In Bosnia and Herzegovina civil society can be traced back to the second half of the 19th Century.In 1862, the right to autonomy and association was decreed by the Ottoman Empire, but theintensive development of civil society started after the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian rulein 1878. More than 1256 associations and societies were then established, ranging from culturalactivi ties to fraternities, from reading clubs and charity societies to athletic societies. The first turningpoint was after 1945, when slowly, all these societies were put to the service of building the societybased on the ideology delineated in the program of the ruling Communist party5. The second one,in the 1990s, corresponds to the end of Yugoslavia, at a time when the grassroots civil ini tiatives,similar to those prevailing in Western Europe, were marginalized6. Those who are still advocatingthe absence of civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina should remember that the war began whena massive peace rally marching through Sarajevo was fired upon by a handful of SDS snipers !

As shown by the history of Union for a Democratic Yugoslav Initiative (UJDI)7, the first open non-Communist political group in Yugoslavia, civil society is weak and powerless in front of populism

1 Fatmir Aispahic in hCa Quartely, Prague, hCa, no. 10, 1994, p. 10.

2 See Gvozden Flego, "Die gesellschaftslose Gemeinschaft", Bosnien und Europa. Die Ethnisierung der Gesellschaft,

edited by Nenad Stefanov & Mi chael Werz, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1994, pp. 76-89.

3 See Susan L. Woodward, Socialist Unemployment. The political Economy of Yugoslavia, Princeton, Princeton

University Press, 1995, xvi-443p.; and Chri stophe Sol ioz, “Fragmentation et recomposition de l’ économi e bosni enne” ,Economie et Humanisme, Lyon, no. 345, July, 1998, pp. 76-81.

4 Susan L. Woodward, “Implement ing the Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina : a Post-Dayton primer Memorandum of

Warning”, Brookings Discussion Papers, Washington DC, The Brookings Instituti on, May, 1996, p. 74.

5 See our report Perspectives de transiti on économique en Bosnie-Herzégovine, Geneva, 1997, 86 p.

6 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, 280 p.

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and authoritarian nationalism : "the citizen, as individual, is too powerless and too mortal tosuccessfully resist national-totalitarianism in the long run. The same is unfortunately true for thecivic associations and institutions, for the whole civil society"1. Indeed, the strategy of SlobodanMilosevic was to build a state as a community without a (civil ) society2. After 1991, the UJDIbecame an anachronism. Most of the members turned to organize social-democratic parties in theirrespective republics, or to initi ate civic and human rights groups, trade unions, feminist circles,independent media, and even micro and small and medium sized enterprises. Together with theemergence of a new generation of “ post-nationali sts”, most of them play a major role in rebuildingthe different post-Yugoslav republ ics.

An economic analysis helps to focus on some characteristics affecting the current situation also ofthe NGO sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Yugoslav economy was characterized by a far-reaching segmentation and fragmentation process : segmentation between public and private sector,betw een rural and urban area, and fragmentation between the different republics3. Anyhow, thisdecentralization, ini tiated by Edvard Kardelj, had as counterpart a strong regionalization of theeconomic links. Thus, the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not segmented “ethnically” .For example, the economy of Banja Luka relies heavily on trade with Croatia; Tuzla cannot prosperwithout its road and rail network and markets in Serb-held areas and Serbia proper; Bihac equallyrel ies on all iances between Bosnians, Croats and Serbs and, although politically within theFederation control, is dependent on links with Croatia and Banja Luka. Pale, the war-time capitalof Republika Srpska rel ies on the Croat-controlled Kiseljak, and Bosnian-controlled Gorazde needsits economic links wi th the surrounding Serb-controlled areas, such as Visegrad.

This explains why “economic relations and communal survival in Bosnia and Herzegovina requirecross-ethnic alliances and freedom of movement across its space and the outside. As in much ofEurope, economic regions cross politi cal boundaries, and they both require and engender co-operation. None of the three units of Bosnia as currently constituted are economically viable” 4.Indeed, even during the war, some of these links were effective and, soon after the war, parts ofthem were quickl y re-establi shed5. This must be emphasized in order to understand the Bosnianmarket situation which is affecting the development not only of state run enterprises, but also ofmicro enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), media and NGOs. This regionaldimension represents of course an opportunity to rebuild bridges between the communities andenti ties, and may also contribute to overcome the division today of Bosnia and Herzegovina andto (re)establish cross-border relations.

Robert Putnam’s well known study on civic traditions in modern Italy6 pointed out that strongassociational life in several northern regions, such as Emili a-Romagna, was unambiguouslyresponsible for good government, and was a factor in the development of a strong economy. Itshistorical and present-day absence in southern regions has led to weak government and to societiesbased on paternalism, exploi tation, corruption and poverty. Thus, as Michael Ignatieff concludes:

1 Mi chael Ignatieff, “ National ism and the Narci ssism of Mi nor Di fferences”, Queen’s Quartely, Queen’s University,

Spring, 1995. See also Xavier Bougarel, op. cit., 1996, pp. 121-138.

2 The discrepancy is explained by inconsistent registration patterns and defini tions of NGO activi ty. Of course, the

numbers tell very little and quantitatives indicators fail for assessing the effects of NGOs and civil i nitiatives groups.

3 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratization Department Semi-Annual Report. July-December 1998,

Sarajevo, OSCE, 1999, p. 25; available from http://www.oscebih.org.

4 The OSCE Democrati zati on Branch (Sarajevo) el aborated this strategy concerning certain geographicaly or politicaly

isolated municipaliti es and the entire Eastern Republika Srpska in May 1998.

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“without a free and robust civil society, market capitalism must inevitably turn into mafia capitalism(...)” 1. The links between economy and civil society exist also in other areas. Firstly, the recentflourishing of local grassroots civil initi atives and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) couldrepresent the emergence of a thi rd-sector. Thus, it could become a secure employment and anopportunity for a new educated middle class. Secondly, in the postwar area, different local NGOsdeveloped funding mechanisms for micro-enterprise development. This is a welcome contributionto the needed growth of a private sector and the expansion of SME.

Related to our focus on ownership, the fact that estimates of the number of active Bosnian NGOsrange from 250-5002 attests to the potential relevance of Bosnian civic groups and NGOs in thedevelopment of a self-rul ed country. Many of them are conversions in local organizations of projectsestablished initially by international NGOs or international organizations. These groups aregeneral ly are working in fields such as human rights protection and/or education, peace, nonviolentconfl ict resolution and mediation, women’s issues, civi l society development and democracy,ecology, refugees and displaced persons, psycho and social care, humanitarian aid, relief,reconstruction and also assistance to local business development.

During wartime, different local groups were already active, mainly in the areas of Sarajevo, Tuzlaand Zenica. It was only after the war that towns as Bihac, Mostar, Gorazde and Banja Luka showeda higher degree of local NGO activi ty. By that time a slow NGO grow th started also in theRepublika Srpska and cross-entity cooperation was initiated. By the way, this evolutioncharacteri zed also the activity of international agencies and organizations. During this period, 1996-1997, many NGOs had to reorient their activity, partly due to the effect of the new situation, partlyunder the pressure of donors’ changing pri orities. Therefore, many local groups converted to NGOdevelopment, civi l society building, self-help, therapy and micro enterprises creation. By the endof 1998, the OSCE’s Democratization Department made the following assessment :

"Local NGOs have proven to be increasingly capable partners in poli tically sensitive activi ties suchas supporting return, Domestic Election Monitoring, changing the Provisional Election Law to getmore women elected (...); yet (...) much remains to be done to develop a critical mass ofsustainable civil society that is positively engaged not only in directly delivering services to thepeople, but in the democratic processes of advocating their interests to polit icians andgovernments, monitoring polit icians and governments, and acting in partnership wi th governmentin service delivery"3.

The important increase of local NGOs after the war is explained by the Bosnian intrinsic dynamicand by the conversion of projects established initially by international NGOs. Some wanted to leavesomething behind, others had a clear strategy in promoting local initiatives, and in some cases it wasthe local staff of these organizations who took the initiative. More recently, new NGOs havedeveloped via spin-off effects, via tutoring from more experienced local NGOs, but also through ahanding-over strategy of projects initiated by international organi zati ons, and through the OSCEstrategy focusing on neglected areas4. In the best cases the “ mother structures” insured an effecti ve,

1 See the list and the excellent comments of Dave Bekkering, The World of Bosnian-Hercegovinian NGOs, Gornji

Vakuf, September (second edition), 1997; available from http://ww w.ddh.nl .

2 Ivar Evensmo evaluated CARE’s democracy assistance, see “A case study on the Western Balkans : Evaluating Sida’s

support to the Olof Palme Centre (1998-1999)”, Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Confli ctManagement and Peace Building, Stockholm, SIDA, 2000, pp. 1-31; http://www.sida.se/Sida/art icles.

3 See OSCE Mission to BiH, op. cit., 1999, p. 9.

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more or less long-term, fol low -up assistance1. This was a clear strategy for different internationalNGOs as Open Society Fund, Olof Palme Centre, CARE2, Medica, Terre des hommes, InternationalCouncil of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), International Helsinki Federation (IHF), Helsinki Citizens’Assembly (hCa) and, of course, for international organi zati ons as the OSCE.

It matters to focus briefly on one experience. A Swiss-based NGO, Terre des hommes, started in1992 with emergency aid in the Tuzl a area. In 1995 i t opened youth centers in Tuzla, Banovici,Bosanska Krupa, Mostar, Pri jedor and Banja Luka; thus in both enti ties. These centers were ini tiatedwi th the objective of preventing youth from marginalization and bringing social and psychologicalaid. In 1997, Terre des hommes introduced a negotiated progressive wi thdrawal strategy wi th localpartners : Zdravo Da Ste in Banja Luka and Prijedor, Zemlja Djece in Tuzla, Banovici and BosanskaKrupa, and Srcem in Mostar. We may mention that by the end of 1999, the Center in Prijedor getseparated from Zdravo Da Ste and created his own association, Lighthouse, which remained withinthe Terre des hommes network. Four main principles oriented Terre des hommes’ withdrawalstrategy : the presence of a coherent institutional framework, independence toward pol itical parties,rooms availability and financial autonomy. Since 1999, only local staff are working in the differentcenters, and the teams are working under the responsibil ity of the respective associations’ boards.Since then, Terre des hommes has been following the situation, providing institutional supportthrough regular e-mail and phone contacts and through two to three visits per year effected by amember of the Swiss NGO. The five-year plan of disengagement -the exi t dates were scheduledbetw een 2000 and 2001, was discussed and negotiated with the different centers and each one hasits own agenda.

The results may be summarized as follows. Firstly, we can note the effectiveness of the transitioningfrom the foreign NGOs to the local ones. Secondly, the structure and work of the differentassociations and teams are not only appropriate but very professional and dynamic. Particularlypositive are the cross-entities co-operation init iatives and the coordination among the centersthemselves as wel l as with other NGOs working in the field. The creation of the regionalcooperation axe called Actions and Regional Concertation in favor of the young people of theNorth-West of Bosnia and Herzegovina, initially a suggestion from Terre des hommes, is nowcarried out by a group of local NGOs. Di fferent objectives are met through this initi ative :cooperation, cross-entity approach, and development of a critical mass in order to be more visibleand to be more effective in fund raising. Thirdly, if the disengagement plan seems to have beenappropriate, the prevalent Bosnian pol iti cal and economical circumstances may request a delay inorder to ensure the durabili ty of the different centers. This confirms the OSCE DemocratizationDepartment’s observation that even if the established local NGOs are increasingly professional andsustainable, the quali ty and sustainabil ity of NGOs progress at a slow rate3.

Progressively, NGO development in Bosnia and Herzegovina also became the subject of criti caldiscussions and foreign studies. Some Bosnian experts and activists started to criticize the externalinfluence on the local NGO development. This ascendancy was seen as a strategy of internationalorganizations to survive, or as an attempt to create an NGO world simil ar to that of the West. Theargument was that it was time for the international organizations to let the Bosnian NGO worlddevelop more by itself. All other criticisms aside, this was a sign of the awareness for the localNGOs to be self-ruled and become independent. The strategy of some international NGOs andorganizations was also criticized by different foreign experts. In his study, Mark Duffield concluded

1 Mark Duffield, Soci al Reconstruction in Croatia and Bosnia. An Exploratory Report for SIDA, Birmingham,

University of Birmi ngham, Centre for Regional and Urban Studies, November, 1996.

2 Ian Smilli e, Service Delivery or Civil Society ? Non Governmental Organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Care,

Canada, December, 1996.

3 GAP was supported by the Internation Olof Palme Centre, the Friedri ch Ebert Sti ftung, USAID, OSCE and the Swiss

Foreign Office. See the report by Christophe Solioz, Paradis perdu ? Rapport de mission en Bosnie-Herzégovine,Geneva, hCa, March, 1997, 72 p.

4 Through al l the w ar-time we had the opportuni ty to be invol ved in this process, so this is a first hand testi fi cati on; see

Christophe Solioz, op. cit., 1997.

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that "(...) in practice international intervention has so far produced a largely weak, divided andvulnerable NGO sector"1. Ian Smillie conclusion was also very negative : "The domestic NGOcommunity in BiH (...) is in serious trouble. It is weak and fragmented, and is largely the creationof external donors and international NGOs in a hurry"2. These criticisms are globally relevant, butthey focus on the 1995-1996 critical period.

Aware of the situation, international NGOs assisting local NGOs began to coordinate amongthemselves. The Geneva-based ICVA initiated in 1996 NGO Councils in Sarajevo, Tuzla and BanjaLuka and established in Sarajevo a Working Committee on National NGO support. Outcome ofa consequent ownership strategy, the ICVA-Bosnia is now standing on its own feet. Bosnianorganizations followed the same way and developed information and cooperation efforts. At thebeginning of 1997, the Centre for Information and Support to Local NGOs was established inSarajevo as a local organization. The Tuzla Agency for Local Development Ini tiatives (TALDi) setup a local NGO support uni t, and the New Bosnia Fund is a locally run initiative supporting localNGOs.

In the field of civic activities, the Citizens’ Alternative Parliament (GAP) is, since August 1996, anation-wide attempt initi ated by the Citizens’ Forum Tuzla, Circle 99 from Sarajevo and the localbranches of hCa, to form a network of local civic groups from both enti ties3. This enterprise meritsspecial mention because GAP ini tiated at the same time a pan-Yugoslav Civic Dialogue involvingcivic groups from Croatia and Serbia. This ini tiative is in fact a formalization of relations whichexisted during wartime. Non-nationalist democratic opposition maintained networks andcommunications across warring lines, organized roundtable meetings, first in Sarajevo where UJDIhad mass support, and later on in Budapest, Szeged, Prag, Vi enna or Verona. The point is that ifduring the war these connections were supported and organized by international fora as the hCaInternational, the International Helsinki Federation and the Verona Forum, since 1995, the initiativewas clearly taken by the local actors from the di fferent post-Yugoslav republ ics4.

More recently, a Bosnia and Herzegovina NGO Council was created with 300 memberorganizations. The largest local umbrella in the country, its focus is to implement cooperationbetw een the members and to launch an initiative inspired by the Stabil ity Pact, which aims to linkall umbrella organizations in the region. Thus, BiH NGO Council , GAP, but also other BosnianNGOs, as the Open Society Fund Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSF BiH), are developing not onlycross-entity activities, but also cross-border ones. This evolution toward a greater involvement in theregional dimension must be seen as a clear NGO strategy aimed at realizing the Stability Pact goalsboth in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region. Another sign of this tendency is shown by theconstitution of the Europa South-East Policy Forum, which met for the first time in July 1999 inLjubljana. This forum brings together twenty five independent policy i nstitutes of South-East Europe,and works in cooperation with the Center for European Poli cy Studies (CPES) and the network of

1 See the Declaration of the Europa South-East Policy Forum on the Stabili ty Pact, Ljubljana, July 18-20, 1999

available from http://www.ceps.be/Pubs/SEEMonitor/Declare.htm, and the cri ti cal comments from Mable Wi sse Smit,op. cit., 2000, p. 18.

2 See Ian Smill ie, op. cit., 1996. The executive summary of his study was re-published by Christophe Solioz , op. cit.,

1997, pp. 41-43. In my report (ibi dem) I asked for grant period of one or two years; today I would focus on thedevelopment of a progressive disengagement plan and an effective ownership strategy, which request 5 to 10 years.

3 LEA/LINK secretariat’s includes OSCE, OHR, European Union, W orld Bank, USAID, Soros, the International Rescue

Committee and ICVA.

4 Ian Smill ie, op. cit., 1996, p. 9.

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Open Society Foundations1.

We tried to show the awareness of the Bosnian to be self-reliant and the potential of the local actors.Nevertheless, crucial problems stil l persist. First, there are more NGOs than the market canreal istically sustain. Second, the NGO assistance was, particularly in the first post war years,ineffective and, if not planless, often funded on too short an assistance-plan period. For example,some donor funding techniques were extremely short-term oriented, with grant periods ranging fromthree to six months2. And lastly, the obstructionist attitude of the Bosnian government and regionaland local authorities hampered a balanced development of local NGOs.

The various existing laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina are an overbearing impediment to the efficientformation, structuring and operations of local NGOs. In particular, the present legal framework doesnot allow for NGOs to work in an entity other than that in which they are registered. This meansthat there is no legal framework for the existence of truly national NGOs. Since Summer 1997, theinter-agency Legal Education and Advocacy Project (LEA/LINK)3 worked on projects whose mainaim was to improve the environment in which NGOs function. In 1998-1999, LEA/LINK drafted alaw which was discussed in different Bosnian NGO fora. In 1999, international organizations andlocal NGOs developed on that basis a new Law on Associations and Foundations, at national andentity level , which would amel iorate this situation. Actuall y, a Bosnian-wide NGO law is stilllacking, and the Laws on Associations and Foundations must be passed in order to ensure alegislative environment which facili tates the work of local civic groups and NGOs.

In the present political and economical circumstances, the emergence of the third-sector in Bosniaand Herzegovina is very problematic. In this situation, there is a risk that different NGOs, especiallythose working in the field of education, therapy and aid could become Para GovernmentalOrganizations (PGOs). Ian Smil lie focused the issue as follows :

"Donors (and many international NGOs) now characterize their interest in supporting local NGOsas an investment in a strong, pluralist, socially integrated civi l society. And yet what has beenhappening in Bosnia is something entirely different: in funding NGOs, donors have essentiallysought - and found - cheap service delivery. (...) NGO specialist Paul Stubbs suggests that thequestion is usually characterized this way: ‘the development of NGOs and civi l society as eitherthe key social development force constraining the potential extremes of state and market, or as anessentially residual ist model of social welfare’ . The latter model would view NGOs basically as acheap substitute for social welfare activities that were once within the purview of the state. Despitethe ringing declarations of donor support for civil society, this - in practice - is the fact of life forNGOs in Bosnia Herzegovina today. And by treating NGOs as cheap executing agencies, andignoring what it would really take to strengthen the sector properly, donors will not only damagethe potential emergence of a genuine civi l society, they may l ose thei r executing agencies as well"4.

The Bosnian authorities, at state, entity and municipality levels, could be tempted to follow this line

1 Massive NGO intervention may become part of a privatization and marginalization process in the State interest, as

poi nted out by Béatri ce Poul igny, “Les acteurs non étati ques et l a guerre”, contribut ion presented at the CERIcolloquium La guerre entre le local et le global : soci étés, états, systèmes, Paris, CERI, Mai 29-30, 2000, pp. 23-27; thetext is available from http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org.

2 The Institute for Strenghtening Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina organized recently an international seminar

on this issue: Welfare States and South-Eastern Europe : Rememberance, Reality, Prospects, Konjic (BiH), July, 2000(to be publ ished by the Ashgate, Aldershot).

3 See the Studies of the Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues (IBHI) on reform of the social sector and its long

term sustainabi li ty (IBHI, 1997 & 1998).

4 See Ian Smill ie, op. cit., 1996, p. v and pp. 15-21.

5 More on the crutial situation of civil society and local NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see USAID (1998), Paul

Strubbs (1998, 1999), Chip Gagnon (1998), IBHI (1998), Jason Aplon & Victor Tanner (2000), Ivar Evensmo (2000),Martina Fischer and Juli e Tumler (2000), Bel loni (2000), Yannick du Pont (2001) and Patrice McMahon (2001).

6 See Drazen Simic, “Bosnian Economy going astray. Sanctions for the Delay of Privatization”, AIM, Sarejevo, April

20, 2000.

7 See the different IBHI reports and Alec Nove, The Economic of feasible Socialism, London, Routledge, 1983, 256 p.

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and to partly outsource activities belonging to the State’s social policy and public sector1. This kindof openness would surely have counterproductive effects on locals NGOs as well as on the global,social and economical situation.

The alternative consists, firstly, in the existence of an effective public service and a welfare state2.This means its institutional development and further more, to restructure and restaff the existent aswell as the new structures by engaging expert NGO-workers, and to integrate part of the activi tiesdeveloped by some NGOs3. Secondly, in the creation of a Bosnian-wide Foundation for NGOs4

whi ch could foreshadow the development of a sustainable third-sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina.Since 1999, when this project was set in motion, the Foundation has finalized its Statute andStrategy Paper for the first year and has prepared project proposals. Due to the legal problem wementioned, the Foundation has been unable to register in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and instead hasbegun a registration process ... in the Netherlands ! Lastly, we have to be aware that even if a third-sector would exist, it would not be able to insure a normal income for all present existing groups.Thus, part of the local activists and NGO workers have to integrate “ normal ” economic structuresand demonstrate a willingness to volunteer for thei r causes5.

We focused on the economic issue because without a solid foundation for jobs, growth andimproved social welfare Bosnia and Herzegovina wil l surely coll apse. In effect, the Bosnian long-term stabil ity and non-nationali st pol itics lies in i ts economy. But, there is a risk that pri vate foreigninvestment will not follow the major international aid and that the latter will very soon decline. Thisprocess will hi t Bosnia and Herzegovina well before the needed economic reforms are complete.And by 2002 Bosnia and Herzegovina wil l have to begin the repayment on the principal of itsforeign debt ! In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as elsewhere in Central Europe, privatization6, privatesector development and growth of micro enterprises and SME will be a slow-process.

Therefore, there wi ll very probably be a transitional situation for a considerable time in the future,wi th a mixture of institutional and economic forms and with a variety of forms of ownership - publ ic,state, cooperative, private, and a mix of all the above7. Focusing again on ownership, we have toadd that the Western fashion for SME must not overlook, on the one hand that it wil l request timefor a Bosnian assimilation and, on the other hand, that Bosnian’s greatest economical potential may

1 Focused by the Stabil ity Pact (see Working Table II) because of their vi sibil ity, but what about lasting economical

effects and systemati c changes ?!

2 See Christophe Solioz, op. cit., 1998.

3 See Benn Steil & Susan L. Woodward, op. cit., 1999, p. 97.

4 The other one bei ng, early 1999, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), fol lowed in July by the OSCE Mission in

Kosovo (OSCE MIK), as organic part of the Uni ted Nations Interim Administration Mi ssion in Kosovo (UNMIK).

5 See respectively GFAP, Annex 3 and Annex 6.

6 See GFAP, Annex I-B, respectively articles IV, V and II.

7 In November 1999, the OSCE Istambul Summit addressed issue by adopting a Charter for European Security;

available from http://www.osce.org.

27

reside not so much in big infrastructures initiatives1 but in the good use of restructured state-runfirms. For a while the promotion of the private sector and market economy will create only few jobsand have limited capital2. In conclusion, a self-sustained, self-governed peace depends onfundamental politi cal and economic reforms3.

8. OSCE’s Ownership Strategy

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was established on December 1995 as one of thebiggest OSCE field mission4. Its mandate ori ginates in the General Framework Agreement for Peace(GFAP). This accord was a short two-page text with detailed annexes. As seen, the eleven annexesgave effective power over the Bosnian state to institutions of the international community. TheOSCE became the leading institution in organizing and implementing the elections, and indesigning the human rights ombudsman5. Furthermore, OSCE assists the parties to the GFAP in theirnegotiations on arms control and confidence-building measures6. After a period in the early 1990smarked by uncertainties about the potential and role of the UN and regional organizations7, OSCE’sinvolvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina considerably increased its instruments for action andoperation in post-conflict management, including cooperation with other organizations andinstitutions.

The OSCE Mission covers the entire terri tory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and includes a Sarajevo-based Head Office, five regional centers and twenty seven field offices throughout the country. Fivedepartments are structuring the Mission : Democratization, Elections, Human Rights, Media Affairsand Regional Stabil ization. The acti vi ties over the past years focused on developing an election lawfor Bosnia and Herzegovina, on supervising the implementation of election results, on widening theMission’s democratization activi ties, on monitoring the human rights situation, and on implementingthe confidence-building measures and arms control agreements embodied in GFAP. We wil l nowreview some departments’ activities focusing on OSCE’s transition strategy in Bosnia andHerzegovina.

The Elections Department managed and supervised the implementation of the Bosnian generalelections in 1996, 1998 and 2000, and of the municipal elections in 1997 and 2000. Since 1999,the main focus has been on preparing local staff and resources for an efficient, effective andsustainable hand-over of the electoral responsibi li ties to Bosnian institutions. The transfer ofownership is implemented by handing-over responsibi li ties from the OSCE staff to national staff, bytransferring responsibi lity for in-country voter registration to l ocal authorities, by transitioning theout-of-country voting program to a sustainable Bosnian program, and by establishing a BosnianAssociation of Election Officials as a sustainable independent organization. This four-points strategyis aimed to transfer OSCE’s Elections Department tasks to Bosnian institutional structures after the

1 For a general overv iew, see http://www.oscebih.org/democratization/eng/dem.htm.

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November 2000 elections. The roadmap and the strategy are clearly presented. Once the newelection law is adopted -supposedly Autumn 2001- and the Bosnian institutions ready to take off,the OSCE Mission wil l significantly reduce its role. It will still preserve its authority to intervene and,if necessary, to sanction Bosnian authorities, but its main task wil l consist in monitoring the nextelections and assure the follow-up of the handing-over process. Elections are OSCE’s traditionalexpertise domain. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the regional organization shows it capacities toorganize elections in a very difficult post-war period, and to build an effective strategy for a probablysuccessful transfer of the ownership of the election process.

The Democratization Department, initi ally part of the Human Rights Department, is working on thedevelopment of democratic structures and culture, from grassroots to state level throughout Bosniaand Herzegovina. The Department has four areas or branches : Civil Society, Political Parti es,Governance and Rule of Law1. This wide range of programs corresponds to the new understandingof democratization we outlined in a previous section. We now examine how this Departmentdeveloped an adequate ownership strategy through different i ni tiatives.

Civil society programs are one focus of the Democratization Department. Beside the support andtraining for local associations and NGOs, the development of youth centers, especially in RepublikaSrpska, and the promotion of women’s involvement in poli tics, OSCE set up Democracy Centers,also known as Readi ng Rooms. Theses Centers provide open publ ic spaces to meet, gatherinformation, access a variety of media and also serve for youth work and local NGO support. Eachcenter has developed a number of popular activi ties which enhance communication, promotedialogue and free thinking. They were established in six areas with restricted information flow :Caplji na, Livno, Visegrad, Bijeljina, Mrkonjic Grad and Bihac. Each center is managed by a Bosniancitizen trained for the position. Due to lack of legislation allowing registration at state level, thisnetwork of centers has now jointly registered as an NGO in each entity. Five of them haveindependent funding. OSCE does maintain some control as a partial donor and continue to providesupport and guidance. This successful transformation into sustainable, independent and self-financing NGO wi ll allow the OSCE to open new centers in areas of acute need as in Srebrenica,as thi s process freed up OSCE funds. Of course, this transformation to independence is proving totake some time.

The ownership strategy is also il lustrated by the local election moni toring, a program developedjointly by the OSCE and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). In 1998,3500 local monitors from 159 NGOs participated in the elections monitoring, more than a ten-foldincrease over 1997. This project succeeded i n i ts ambition to i ncrease the perception of ownershipof the elections as well as the understanding of the electoral process among the citizens. The NGOs’election reports made some very practical recommendations, such as better training for the localand international election staff, earl ier di stribution and veri fication of the l ists, less compl icatedballot design and more effective voter education. The OSCE now considers the possibi li ty thatdomestic monitors may be able to replace international supervisors, and to include their input informulating the elections rules and regulations. The goal is also to widen the ini tiative in order todevelop a cross-border elections ombudsperson network. The first step will be to start with thecooperation among local monitors from neighboring countries. Meanwhile, the Stabili ty Pactprovides the frame for implementing this regional approach.

OSCE Democratization Department also developed different democratic institution-buildingprograms seeking to implement sustainable municipal infrastructure projects through transparent,participatory and professional methods. These have an obvious influence on enforcing andempowering the Bosnian institutions. After the April 2000 municipal elections, OSCE developeda training program on democratic local governance for the newly elected municipal councillors andmajors. From May to September 2000, the seminar series train the councilors on the different

1 Bosnia and Herzegovina signed in March 2000 the European Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption

whi ch require ful l cri minal isation of corruption and give clear guidance on how to fi ght the problem in compl iancewi th international standards.

2 See the articles 108, 109 and 1606.

3 See David Chandler, op. cit., 2000, pp. 147-153.

4 ibidem, p. 150.

5 ibidem, p. 151.

6 OSCE (SG), Annual Report 1999 on OSCE activiti es (1 December 1998-31 October 1999), OSCE, Vienna,

November 17, 1999, p. 49; available from http://www.osce.org.

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function of elected office such as roles and responsibilities of councilors and municipal financialmanagement. OSCE’s main initiative is its Municipal Infrastructure Finance and Implementation(MIFI) program. Developed in 1998, its goal is to provide Bosnian municipal administrators wi thtools for better day-to-day management and operations. Another focus of the MIFI has been directassistance to municipalities’ Finance Departments in improving their management of fiscalresources, their budget planning and maintenance, including the separation of operational andcapital budgets for the 2000 planning cycle. Two aspects characterize this program. Firstly, the inter-municipal network program provides a means for participating municipalities to benefit from theexperience of other municipalities. Thus, help from outside will progressively be replaced by helpfrom inside. Secondly, improving transparent and more professional decision making will delivera major contribution to the anti-corruption priority set up by the OHR1. Beside the MIFI program,OSCE has undertaken the fol lowing measures to fight corruption : the Draft Freedom of InformationLegislat ion, the Law on Party Financing, the PEC Rules and regulations2 and the two months Anti-Corruption Campaign launched on September 15, 2000.

The OSCE has developed in Bosnia and Herzegovina a functional and effective approach which hasbeen welcomed as a long-term international commitment to democratic transition requested for along time by the local actors. If some programs were proposed by international organizations andinstitutions, others were ori ginally promoted by the Bosnians themselves. Nevertheless, besides thespecific post-war problems, the Bosnian people needs time to become familiar with the workingsof democracy. Therefore I can’ t follow David Chandler3 when he states that OSCE negates thecapacity of Bosnian people as rational political actors, and more so when he says that there "seemsto be a large gap between the civil society association funded and supported by the OSCE, andother internat ional insti tutions, and Bosnian people"4 or that "the more support given to the grass-roots civil associations by the OSCE, the less effective they tend to be"5.

9. OSCE’s Contribution to the Stability Pact

OSCE field activi ties in Bosnia and Herzegovina may also be seen as an important input to OSCE’scontribution within the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, because many of them areadvocating a region-wide approach to building peace, stabil ity and democracy throughoutsoutheastern Europe. The OSCE’s Secretary General sees the link betw een them as follows : ”TheStability Pact and the OSCE regional strategy are complementary in the sense that bothconceptualize south eastern Europe as a single pol itical and economic area. Both initiatives arebased on the idea that the region as a whole faces a number of common problems, and that manyof these problems can only be overcome through a comprehensive and coherent approach to theentire region” 6. In order to achieve the objecti ves set out in the Stability Pact, Ambassador RobertL. Barry, already Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been tasked by theOSCE Chairman-in-Office with the developing ideas on the regional role of the Organization, and

1 OSCE (SG), op. cit., 1999, p. 50.

2 See http://ww w.summit-sarajevo-99.ba.

3 “Bringing Civi l Society into the Stabili ty Pact Process”, Sarajevo, OSCE, July 28, 1999; available from

http://www .oscebih.org/pressreleases/july1999/28-7-ngos.htm.

4 See the Declaration of the Europa South-East Policy Forum on the Stabil ity Pact, Ljublj ana, July 18-20, 1999;

available from http://www.ceps.be/Pubs/SEEMonitor/Declare.htm.

5 “Ai ms of Stabili ty Pact cannot be imposed, People must be active Participants”, Sarajevo, OSCE, July 29, 1999;

available from http://www.oscebih. org/pressreleases/july1999/29-7-hs.htm.

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on OSCE’s contribution to the Stability Pact.

On 20 July 1999, OSCE Head of Missions discussed in Vienna the evolution of the regional strategy.On that occasion, the question of the ownership of the Stability Pact was notably addressed : “TheOSCE strategy thus far has focused on the need to support initi atives emerging from the countriesof the region, and on the need to include civi l society actors as acti ve participants in the process,in order to ensure the ongoing support and engagement of local actors” 1. These were not emptywords. On 28 July 1999, one day before the Sarajevo Summit2, the OSCE organized a pressconference wi th the participation of Ambassador Robert Barry, in his capacity as the OSCE’sregional co-ordinator for Southeastern Europe3, which involved NGO representatives fromthroughout the region. The participants reported on a series of NGO conferences related to theStability Pact. The establishment in Sarajevo of a Council for Democratic Alternative for Stabilityin Southeast Europe and of a Ljubljana based Europa South-East policy forum aimed at offeringconcrete policy advice on a range of Stability Pact issues were announced. The conference’sconcluding document called for a greater involvement by non-state actors in the development andimplementation of the Stabil ity Pact4.

On 29 July 1999, at the Stabil ity Pact Summit in Sarajevo, Ambassador Barry stated that NGOs’ mustbe given a greater role in the Stabil ity Pact, and that the goals and aims of the Pact must be nurturedfrom below rather than impose from above : “In many ways, the success of the Stability Pact willdepend on the ability of non-governmental organizations, political parties, business-people andindependent media to forge links across national boundaries within the region. In this sense, TheStability Pact is as much about l inking ci ti zens as it is about linking states” 5. Since then, the OSCEhas continued to develop, as we will see, follow-up activities aimed at involving more effectivelycivil society actors in the work of the Stability Pact’s three thematic working tables.

In October 1999, OSCE’s regional strategy was discussed at a working-level meeting in Skopje. Twocategories of specific regional initi atives were proposed : directly OSCE related projects that alreadyare part of the missions’ activities, and contributions OSCE could bring within the framework of theStability Pact tables. Despite this decision, OSCE’s input is quite modest. According to the StabilityPact’ s inventory from 31 May 2000, the OSCE sponsors 29 ini tiatives of a total of 591. Eight in theframework of the Working Table I, Democratization and Human Rights, and twenty-one of theWorking Table III, Security Issues. Anyhow, a brief review of some OSCE’s activities in Bosnia andHerzegovina, which may now play a vital role in re-establ ishing a regional balance in and aroundthe former Yugoslavia, follows :

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, through its Regional Stabilization Department, monitorsand implements military aspects of the GFAP (Annex 1 -B). The overall aim is to establish theconditions in which mili tary force can be reduced, and eliminated as a means of resolving conflictsin Bosnia and Herzegovina. It specifically undertakes activities promoting transparency, cooperationand confidence-building among the armed forces of both enti ties. In January 1996, the confidence-and security-building measures were spelled out in detail in an OSCE-negotiated agreement in

1 See the Agreement on Confidence- and Security Buildi ng Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OSCE, Vienna,

January, 1996; the text is available from http://www.oscebih.org/regstab/eng/regstb-articleii.htm .

2 The text is available from http://www.oscebih.org/regstab/eng/regstb-articlev.htm.

3 See the workshop report available from http://www .stabi li typact.org/WT-3.

4 See the conclusion by the Chairman Jan Eliasson; available from http://www .stabi li typact.org/WT-3.

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Vienna1. The Vienna Agreement instituted measures limiting the scope of allowable mili taryactivi ties on each side. Thus, local forces are prevented to mount any action that cannot besuppressed by international forces already on the ground. The implementation of this agreementeliminates any immediate threat of a military confrontation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Furthermore, confidence and cooperation are achieved by the Joint Consultative Commission (JCC)which supervises information exchange on military structures, budgets and activities between thedifferent enti ty armed forces. In Florence in June 1996, the Agreement on Sub-regional ArmsControl2, also known as the Florence Agreement, was signed by the state of Bosnia andHerzegovina, by the Bosnian Federation and by the Republika Srpska, but also by Croatia and bythe Republic of Yugoslavia. Its overall purpose is to create a numerical balance of heavy armamentsbetw een the armed forces in the region, thereby creating a stable military situation. Although if inthe first part of 1999 the activities of the OSCE Mission were affected by the conflict in theneighboring Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, throughout 1998 and 1999, increased transparencyand cooperation between the parties to this agreement has been noted.

These initi atives received a regional framework through their integration in the Stability Pact. On27 January 2000, at the Working Table III's Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons, differentconcrete measures to reduce the threat posed by excessive accumulation of small arms and lightweapons were discussed. There was general agreement that “a suitable regional approach wouldbe useful, as it would reflect most appropriately the idea of ownership and commitment by thecountries involved” 3. On 15-16 February 2000 in Sarajevo, the second meeting of Working TableIII acknowledged that the objecti ves of the Stabili ty Pact and the OSCE task to implement GFAPAnnex 1-B are complementary. The “ joint-venture” was even more relevant because by that timethe Stabil ity Pact did not include the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but, as seen, the GFAP did. Itwas also stressed that OSCE’s experiences concerning the confidence-building, aerial observation,budgets transparency and risk reduction mechanisms could be transferred to the Stabil ity Pactregion4. This exemplifies how OSCE’s field-mission activities may integrate the Stability Pact as anOSCE input.

Concerning Working Table III, OSCE’s contributions concern the fol lowing issues : organized crimepolicing, trafficking in human beings, prison service reform, agreement on sub-regional armscontrol, mil itary security and confidence-building measures, regional legislative website, securitystudies at the universities of SEE and defense planning, budgeting and transparency. The firstpositive results must not oversee the existing difficulties : the professionalization of the enti ty armedforces and the consolidation of the democratic control over the armed forces, not to speak aboutthe main obstacles toward the progressive integration of the enti ty armed forces into a single unifiedforce under civi lian control. The very long-term perspective will be determined by the developmentof a common security policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, transparent and affordable defensebudget, unified command and control structures, and the creation of a strong state level defenseidentity. In this matter, the perspective of the development of a state dimension of defense, and theintegration into the NATO Partnership for Peace Program wil l very probably play the role of a strongincentive. But it wil l be the responsibil ity of the Presidency and the entity Ministers of defense andarmed forces to achieve this goal.

The varied activiti es of the Democratization Department are also relevant for the Stabil ity Pact

1 Available from http://www.stabili typact.org/WT-1/Media/Charter_for_media_freedom.htm.

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process. They are even more interesting because of their strong focus on ownership. Working TableI includes following OSCE input : foster independent, professional and self-sustaining media,support regional ombudsperson institutions, improve women’s politi cal representation andparticipation, assist local Roma NGOs, and -l inked with the election issue we discussed- encouragethe professionalization of electoral systems by supporting the founding of professional associationsand develop the capaci ty of local NGOs to engage in election monitoring. The logical integrationof these activities in the frame of the Stabil ity Pact have on the projects a widening and empoweringeffect.

In the field of media, OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to support thedevelopment of independent, pluralistic, professional and in the long term self-sustainable media.It launched a media law ini tiative promoting and protecting journalists’ rights and ensuring freedomof expression, supported the development journalists’ associations, and established a MediaOmbudsman position wi th the intention to create an indigenous structure with the l egal means todeal wi th freedom-of-the-media cases. In the framework of the Stabi lity Pact, OSCE undertakesconcrete steps in meeting authorities from the region to discuss issues such as monitoring andallocation of frequencies, in forming a task force to develop a regional strategy for electronic media,in linking the different training programs, and in developing a regional press agency. In June 2000,the participating states drafted the Stability Pact Charter for Media Freedom1 setting a frameworkfor freedom of the media as a fundamental part of the development of stable societies. Thedistribution of these principles is of course only the starting point for an action plan which theStability Pact partners have now to undertake in order to implement this Charter in SoutheastEurope. In the long term, the objectives are to establish international press clubs to facili tate thework and contacts of visiting journalists, and to set up a Southeastern European Broadcasting Union.

Another successful example is the gender issue. In 1998, a coali tion of womens’ groups, activistsand politicians mounted a campaign with the OSCE assistance that succeeded in changing theProvisional Election Rules and Regulations to require three women to be evenly distributed amongthe top nine candidates on each list. In 1999, the OSCE translated the Beijing Declaration andPlatform for Action, an international instrument on strategies for empowering women. Differentlocal womens’ groups and women parliamentarians implemented this text, with the support ofamong others Sonja Lokar, former Slovenian parliamentarian and now the Executive Director of theCentral East European Network for Gender Issues. The Women in Poli tics (WIP) program focusedon the political empowerment of women to participate in local elections through training andstrategic planning for women. Very encouraging results followed at the municipal election in April2000 : of those elected 18% were women, three times as many women as Bosnia and Herzegovinahad in the last elections and more than in any local election ever in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thisprogram was pursued for the national November 2000 elections.

The WIP developed a regional component and is the active support of the Stabil ity Pact GenderTask Force, which met first, November 1999, in Sarajevo and April 2000 in Zagreb. The aim of thistask force is to promote political representation and participation of w omen throughout the SEE, andto encourage joint action and exchange of good practice among governments, women’s NGOs andinternational organizations. If we consider the evolution of the gender issue, we may note thefollow ing evolution : first, in the years 1996-1997, cross-entity cooperation in Bosnia and Herzego-vina, then, in 1998-1999, limited cross-border relations and, since the integration in the StabilityPact, development of a full cross-border and regional strategy. Other main characteristics of thisiniti ative are the important local input, the involvement of local activists, and the effecti veness asshown by the elections results and the constitution of the Stability Pact’s Gender Task Force.

On the OSCE’s field operations, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina must be evaluatedin terms of the implementation of both the GFAP and the Stabil ity Pact. Now, what about its

1 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne, June 10, 1999, paragraph 22; available from http://ww w.stability-

pact.org/pact.htm.

2 ibidem.

3 op.cit., 1999, § 23.

4 See OSCE,CIO.GAL/66/99, September 3, 1999, CIO.GAL/73/99, October 3, 1999 and CIO.GAL/83/99, November

10, 1999.

5 See the Press release of the 11 September 2000 meeting; available from http://www.oscebih.org/pressreleases.

6 See Annex to MC(6).DEC/5 in the Sixth Meeting of the Ministerial Council . 18-19 November 1997, OSCE,

Copenhagen, March 6, 1998, MC.DOC/1/97; available from http://www.osce.org.

7 OSCE, Charter for European Security, OSCE, SUM.DOC/1/99, November 19, 1999, pp. 3-4 & pp. 14-16; available

from http:// www.osce.org.

8 See OSCE, op. cit., 1999, § 12, p. 4.

9 See Mabel Wisse Smit, op. cit., 2000, p. 17, and Randol f Oberschmidt & W ol fgang Zellner, “The Contribution Civi l

Society to the Achievement of the Objectivies of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe”, PSIO Occasional Paper,Geneva, HEI, 2001; also available from http://www.isn.ethz.ch/4isf.

10 See Victor-Yves Ghebali , “Le lancement du pacte de stabi lité pour l’Europe du Sud-Est”, Annuaire français de

relati ons internat ional es, Brussels, Bruylant, vol. 1, 2000, p. 241.

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organization and general policy ? The Stabi lity Pact having a pan-European dimension, OSCE “asthe only pan-European security organization and as a regional arrangement under chapter VIII ofthe UN Charter” 1 had naturally to become a participating member of the Stability Pact and wasinvi ted to play “a key role in fostering all dimensions of security and stability” 2. Thus, OSCE’sunique competencies in SEE were recognized and requested for “ furthering the aims and objectivesof the Stabil ity Pact” 3. This requires from the OSCE to define a common approach for its differentongoing missions in the region and to foster the relationship between these and OSCE’s differentinstitutions4. This strategy is already implemented as demonstrated by the OSCE SoutheasternEurope Heads of Mission meetings5 and by the different OSCE Stability Pact linked projects’.

Another issue is the challenge to reinforce the efficiency of the interlocking cooperation amonginternational organizations and participating States. Already at the 1997 Ministerial Meeting inCopenhagen, a decision was taken on a “Common Concept for the Development of Co-operationbetw een Mutually-Reinforcing Institutions”6. In November 1999, the OSCE Istanbul Summitaddressed specifically this issue in its “Platform for Co-operative Security”, an essential element ofthe OSCE Charter for European Security7 adopted in Istanbul. On the basis of equality and in a spiritof partnership, the OSCE offers itself "as a flexible co-ordinating framework to foster co-operation,through which various organizations can reinforce each other drawing on their particularstrengths"8. But this manifest of goodwi ll wil l not be sufficient to solve the different and conflictinginterests of the numerous participants - states and international actors - involved in the Stabil ity Pactfor South Eastern Europe9. It is up to the European Union to restructure and to empower the StabilityPact, and this means to clearly take the leadership.

10. Some Challenges for the Stability Pact

Victor-Yves Ghebali mentioned three conditions for the success of the Stabil ity Pact process: theeffective commitment of the SEE countries, the involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,and the integration of the NGO input10. Concerning the crucial first point, our study was focusedon Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the same time a weak but also a key spot in the area. Other countries

1 Wol fgang Petritsch re-introduced the Robert Schumann’s concept of “functional integration” in his speech at the

Raiffesen Zentralbank in Seefeld, “The Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina in an Integrative Europe”, OHR, September7, 2000; available from http://www.ohr.int/speeches/s20000907a.htm.

2 See http://ww w.stabilitypact.org/pact.htm, article 11.

3 See http://www.stabili typact.org/WT-1/Szeged%20Process/Szeged%20March%2023-24%202000%20Conf.htm.

4 As seen wi th the international promotion of the Dodik government in Republika Srpska.

5 See Wolfgang Petritsch, “The Challenge for Kostunica”, The Financi al Times, London, October 12, 2000; available

from http://www.ohr.int/articles/a20001012a.htm.

6 See http://www.stabili typact.org/Regional%20Table/Report%20of%meeting%202.htm.

7 Concerning this issue, see Randolf Oberschmidt & Wolfgang Zellner, op. cit., 2001.

8 Available from http://ww w.stabilitypact.org/Regional%20Table/AGENDA%20%for%20Thessaloniki .doc.

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are of course more involved in the Stability Pact process such as Slovenia to mention just one. Wewant to insist that the new regional functional integration1 must be handled very cautiously.Definitely we have to consider a range of new regional factors : the disastrous outcome of GreaterSerbia politi cs and the defeat of Milosevic; the enigmatic application of the 1244 resolution inKosovo; the proposals made by the Montenegrin president, Mil o Djukanovic, for a two-stateconfederation; the new perspectives in Croatia since the death of President Tudjman; and theresignation of Alija Izetbegovic and the decline of his party in Bosnia-Herzegovina.This newsituation combines to change perceptions about re/decomposition process in the region and couldopen the way for a final settlement based on equali ty.

Secondly, the Stabil ity Pact reserved a special status for the Federal Republ ic of Yugoslavia (RFY)through the provisions of the Cologne document concerning its participation in the Stability Pact2.Until main pol itical changes occurred in the FRY, the Stabil ity Pact welcomed the involvement ofthe Republic of Montenegro and of democratically elected municipal officials from FRY. Thi s wasthe so-called Szeged process, launched in October 1999, which aims were “to support thedemocratic forces in the FRY and to advance the return of the country back into the community ofdemocratic European nations” 3. This strategy had to be short-time limited. An inclusive procedurewas urgently needed. Since the FRY was admitted on 26 October 2000 to the Stability Pact, a newconcept must be elaborated, keeping in mind that even if the internationall y supported “ moderates”and opposition parties are coming to power, there is no reason to expect that they would bythemselves be able to carry out the required structural reforms4. In this matter, the Stability Pact willhave to work toward a Serbian ownership program together with Serbs willing to act in partnershipwith the international community and the neighboring states. This impl ies for Serbia to start withthe recognition of its neighbors’ sovereignty5. Together they will have to use the opportunity of thenew politi cal situation to build new institutions capable of taking on responsible governance beforethe old Serbian structures and the state collapse.

Thirdly, the civi l society actors’ involvement in the Stabil ity Pact process was initially not seriouslyaddressed until 6 June 2000, when the Working Table for Democratization and Human Rights ofthe Stability Pact organized a consultative meeting with NGOs in Thessalonika6. This was the firstinstitutionali zed possibi li ty for NGOs to express themselves on their cooperation with the StabilityPact, and to formulate proposals on how to improve the partnership between the NGO communityand the Stability Pact7, by strengthening the role of NGOs in the evaluation and implementation ofprojects and focusing more decidedly on the needs and priorities perceived by the region. One ofthe results was that the Open Society netw ork (Soros Foundation) was given the task to spreadrelevant information about the Stabil ity Pact in the region. Only a few days later, again inThessalonika, the Regional Table meeting approved an Agenda for Stability8 whi ch summarized the

1 Randol f Oberschmidt & W ol fgang Zellner, op. cit., 2001.

2 Randol f Oberschmidt & W ol fgang Zellner are mentioni ng and comment ing the draft of thi s Charter , op. cit., 2001.

3 See Randolf Oberschmidt & W olfgang Zellner’s detailed recommendations, op. cit., 2001, and the Sinaia

Recommendations, Sinaia, May 19-22, 2000, 8 p.; available from http://www.berghof-center.org.

4 See Thomas Carothers, op. cit., 2000 and Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, Funding Virtue. Civil Society Aid

and Democracy Promotion, Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p. 16.

5 See http://www.stabili typact.org/WT-1/Parliamentary%20Cooperation/Parl%20Exch%20Action%20Plan.htm.

35

achievement of the Stabili ty Pact but mentioned only in very vague terms the NGO issue. Aspointed out by Oberschmitt and Zellner1, firstly, there is a huge contrast between the rhetoric oncivil society and the effective participation of civi l society actors in the Stabil ity Pact’s activities andsecondly, the complex structure of the Stabil ity Pact is favoring more the International Organizationsand NGOs than the local and regional ones.

OSCE experience proves that it is possible to involve regional and local NGOs not as subcontractorsbut as partners and as legitimate participants in a democratization and regional integration process.We want to stress that the focus must lie on concrete measures and on the local NGOs and not oninternational ones. Fortunately the forthcoming Charter for NGOs participation in the Stabil ity Pactwill address this issue2. But even a welcome charter is not sufficient, what is most needed is astrategy and its implementation3. The aid to promote civil society development in Central and SouthEastern Europe first focused on a few civic groups and civic activists in the region and, from the mid-1990s onwards, on a wide range of regional and local NGOs, equating NGOs with civ il societyitself, and assuming that the growth curve of NGO prol iferation was a good measure of civil societywhile many other types of organizations were disregarded. But civil society, as the sphere ofassociation of individuals and private organizations independent of the formal state, includes alsoprofessional associations, religious organizations, trade unions, educational institutions, culturalorganizations, sports groups, hobby clubs, community groups, trade unions and many others, notto forget political parties which were mostly ignored. A third phase of civil society assistance shouldaddress this issue4.

Indeed, despite the importance of civic groups and NGOs, they do not represent civil society. Weshould not forget parliamentarians’ legitimacy and their decisive influence on democratic processes.They have a major role to play in intensifying reforms to strengthen open democracies, viablemarket economies and social stability within their respective country as well as in the region. Forsure, the effectiveness of the Stabil ity Pact wil l also depend on the parliamentary contribution. OnJanuary 2000, Working Table I worked out an action plan, also call ed the Royaumont ProcessParliamentary Action Plan, promoting parliamentary cooperation in South-Eastern Europe. Mostactivi ties have a multilateral and cross-border character, they promote the exchange of experi enceson the implementation and the settings of priorities in the region5. In the near future, an electedrepresentation of the population wil l have to determine whether the Stability Pact brings validanswers to their need and their demands.

11. Conclusion

The new democratization approach legitimized the external regulation of policymaking in Bosniaand Herzegovina, with the risk of a marginalization of Bosnian representatives from thedemocratization process. The trend toward a greater external regulation : new tasks were built inthe GFAP under the “spirit of Dayton”; the more international involvement there is, the greater are

1 See the Sintra (May 1997), Bonn (December 1997) and Luxembourg (June 1998) PIC Conferences; available from

http://ww w.ohr.i nt.

2 Marcus Cox, op. cit, 1988.

3 European Stability Initiative, op. cit., 2001, p. 28.

4 David Chandler, op. cit., 2000, p. 198.

5 See the excellent contribution from Gideon Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion”, Foreign Affairs, New-York, vol. 71,

no. 1, 1998, pp. 56-67.

36

the calls for this involvement to be extended1. But this dynamic explains only partly the extensionof the influence of the High Representative on electoral and media regulations and on Bosnianinstitutions. Corruption and obstructionism from local authorities and rul ing oligarchies,permanence of war-time power structures, the fact that cheating and fraud - not law - are the ruleand the continuity of bureaucratic hurdles cannot be ignored and need to be properly addressed.

After a first period of mili tary stabil ization and reconstruction (1995-1997), and a second one of aquasi-protectorate characterized by a strong use of the powers of the High Representative (1997-2000), the objectives and challenges of the third period now under way are to enable a transitionfrom an international soft protectorate to a sustainable and sovereign Bosnian state, to create a self-sustaining constitutional order and to concentrate on the state-building aspects of the mission2. TheHigh Representative, Wolfgang Petri tsch, focuses international power precisely in support of state-building objectives and works for the Bosnian ownership of a new local institutional environmentwhich is capable of taking responsibi li ty for the new state.

As different ESI reports suggest, we have to consider the necessity for the OHR to draft every law.An interesting alternative would be the development of a legislative program and strategy focusingon a more limited range of laws aimed at advancing the state-building process. This would l imit theinternational role - sometimes perceived as aggressive - in Bosnian politics, and progressivelyenforce local sovereignty. But to think that “the international community should increasinglyproceed as though the Bosnian state were fully sovereign, renouncing the short-term solution ofimposition” and that this would “force domestic authorities to take on responsibili ty, and recreatethe space for a genuine domestic pol iti cal process (...)” 3 is nothing else but a dream. Instead, wesubscribe to a coherent and resolute handing-over strategy which would prove to be moreappropriate, realistic and efficient.

After six years progress has been very modest and Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to bedependent of external support. But i t can be expected that there are no short-term solutions to long-term problems, that misadjusments combined with misappropriations of foreign aid andobstructionism would slow down the ownership process. But this is not a reason for “ letting theBosnian people ©toª begin to work out their own way forward” 4. Recovered sovereignty, regionaland European integration presuppose a rock-steady ownership process as the driving force for thetransition and for the implementation of reforms. Let us consider few recommendations which couldfavor such a process.

Firstly, there is necessity for a timewise and more focused transition strategy. After a first medium-term protectorate-like period, the international administration should move into a step-by-steptransition returning to Bosnia and Herzegovina its sovereignty5. The evolution of the GFAP shouldabolish the three de facto entities and armies, and establ ish a central government presiding overmixed cantons, thereby abandoning the institutionalization of “ethnic division” through the abuseof the ethnic key should be abandoned.

� In order to overcome the gap between ownership and intrusive intervention, a more focused

1 See Wol fgang Petritsch’s speech at the Steering Board Ministerial Meeting, September 22, 1999; available from

http://www.ohr.int/speeches/s990922b.htm. On July 19, 2001, the High Representative introduced a Civic Forumwhi ch would be involved in the Partneship Forum intended to boster the Bosnian ownership of the politi cal process, see Wolfgang Petritsch, “New Fora for Poli tical Partnership” , Sarajevo, OHR, July 19, 2001; available fromhttp://www.ohr.int/press/p20010719a.htm.

2 See Ian Budge, The New Challenge of Di rect Democracy, Cambridge, Poli ty Press, 1997, 216 p.

3 See Marcus Cox, “State Building and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation : the Lessons of Bosnia”, Geneva, CASIN, January

2001; available from http://www.casin.ch; and the allready quoted ESI report. op. cit., 2001.

4 See the same conclusion by Ivan Krastev, “De-Balkanising the Balkans : What Prioriti es”, The International Spectator,

Rome, vol. XXXV, no. 3, July-September, 2000, pp. 7-11.

37

strategy for the international mission is required. The High Representative should first definewhi ch international goals, which publi c institutions are preconditions to constitutionalchanges and therefore get priority over the democratic process. Only then should he makeuse of his coercive power;

� The lack of a clear withdrawal strategy and deadline provoke damaging frustration andresentments, thus reinforcing local power structures and their capacity to resist the state-building agenda. The international administration must adhere to a fixed timeframe for theperiod of the transition and the recovery of sovereignty.

Secondly, if ownership is the yardstick, the actors must be involved in the transition process. TheGFAP was principally conceived as a text-book of state building from top to bottom. Fortunately,the new High Representative is aware of the necessity to involve more resolutely and effectively theBosnian citizens1.

� This policy should be given a symbol, as the 1991 Bosnian Charter 92 did, whi ch couldfederate the different civic groups and NGOs, as well as mobili ze and involve all citizens;

� Citizens must be involved not only through elections, but through debates in the media,public meetings and civic fora, as well as through direct involvement in the formulation andimplementation of projects;

� We suggest to consider the possibi li ties of direct party democracy2, adapted to the Bosniancircumstances. It could contribute to avoid many of the disadvantages of direct democracy.In fact, the necessary extension of the government’s scope of action, and the complexity ofproblems should not prevent the development of direct party democracy from materiali zing.

Only an effective state-building agenda3, the focus of the High Representative on a coherent set ofobjecti ves and the regional integration dynamic provided by the Stabil ity Pact wil l speed up theBosnian ownership and state-building process and contribute to the de-balkanization of theBalkans4.

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