PROPOSED PSPRS PENSION REFORM Presentation by Bryan Jeffries President, Professional Fire Fighters of Arizona Body of work provided by a collaboration

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PSPRS Challenges 1. PSPRS pension plan has seen a massive reduction in funded status and increase in unfunded liabilities over last decade. 2. Employer costs are skyrocketing for state agencies and local governments Cities like Bisbee, Prescott are facing massive unfunded liabilities that threaten services, budgets. 3. Some previous legislative reforms have been struck down by the courts, and others are under litigation. Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 3

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PROPOSED PSPRS PENSION REFORM Presentation by Bryan Jeffries President, Professional Fire Fighters of Arizona Body of work provided by a collaboration between: The Professional Fire Fighters of Arizona The Reason Foundation PSPRS staff Arizona League of Cities and Towns Why PSPRS needs pension reform Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 2 PSPRS Challenges 1. PSPRS pension plan has seen a massive reduction in funded status and increase in unfunded liabilities over last decade. 2. Employer costs are skyrocketing for state agencies and local governments Cities like Bisbee, Prescott are facing massive unfunded liabilities that threaten services, budgets. 3. Some previous legislative reforms have been struck down by the courts, and others are under litigation. Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 3 PSPRS Degrading Solvency Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 4 Causes of PSPRS Problems 1. Permanent Benefit Increases (PBI) have undermined plans solvency by skimming assets For retirees before 2011, 50% of excess returns over 9% diverted to separate PBI fund Diverted funds cannot be used to reduce unfunded liabilities, plan assets grow slower with part of the funds not allowed to earn interest over time PBI benefit has not been pre-funded like a traditional pension COLA For retirees after 2011, returns need to exceed 10.5% and no PBI unless funded ratio >60% Until 2015, PBI had been paid out annually at 4% for over 20 years despite the continuing decline in funded status 2. PBI benefits are not distributed equitably, not tied to inflation, not paid each year 1. Underperforming investment returns, unrealistic expected rate of return Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 5 Causes of Problems With PSPRS: PSPRS Actual Investment Returns, Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 6 Source: PSPRS Presentation, The Past, Present, and Future of PSPRS: An Educational Employer Seminar, February 2015 and publicly available PSPRS valuation reports. Causes of Problems With PSPRS: PSPRS Expected Rate of Return is Unrealistic Based on the historic trend, PSPRS is using an unrealistically high expected rate of return at 7.5% Actuarially valued returns have been 5% or less since 2002, nearly fifteen years We estimate the likelihood of achieving a 7.5% return over the next 30 years is just 45% If the pattern of 5% average actuarial return continues, unfunded liabilities and normal cost will increase dramatically in the coming years Consider the following two figures: the first shows forecasted employer contributions assuming no change to the plan and the 7.5% expected return; the second shows the increase in forecasted employer contributions assuming the actuarial returns continue at 5%. Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 7 PSPRS Baseline Employer Contribution as % of Payroll Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 8 Baseline Total Employer Contribution Rate Normal Cost UAAL Payment SB1609 Reversal: PSPRS Baseline Employer Contribution as % of Payroll Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Baseline Employer Contribution if SB1609 Reversed Additional Contribution to Normal Cost Baseline Employer Contribution (Plan Assumptions) PSPRS Baseline Employer Cost & Funded Ratio, w/ 5% Return Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, The light blue bars above the yellow line represent $5.5 billion in additional pension debt payments for taxpayers if returns are just 5.0% instead of the expected 7.5%. A 5% average return (FY ) would require $5.5 billion additional employer contributions (Inflation adjusted) The Risks of Inaction 1. Rising employer contribution rates result in more money to pensions, crowding out other public services 2. Inability to hire new public safety workers 3. Inability to raise public safety wages 4. New tax & debt proposals (e.g., failed Prescott PSPRS tax, pension obligation bonds) 5. Service-level insolvency 6. Municipal bankruptcy Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 11 A collaborative approach to develop a proposed reform for PSPRS Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 12 Goals of Pension Reform Establish a retirement system that is affordable, sustainable, and secure: 1. Provide retirement security for all members (current and future) and retirees 2. Reduce taxpayer and pension system exposure to financial risk and market risk 3. Reduce long-term costs for employer/taxpayers and employees 4. Stabilize contribution rates 5. Ensure ability to recruit 21 st century employees 6. Improve governance & transparency Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 13 The Reform Development Process Collaborative stakeholder working groups Public safety associations, led by Professional Fire Fighters of Arizona Representatives from the Office of Governor Doug Ducey Legislative pension workgroup, led by Sen. Lesko & Rep. Olson League of Cities & Towns pension reform task force Reason Foundation provided education, policy options, and actuarial support for all stakeholders, and facilitated consensus amongst stakeholders on conceptual design and reform framework Separate negotiation tracks have focused the fiscal elements of the reform, and the governance elements of the reform Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 14 Fixing broken PBI design Stable, affordable normal cost Reduces taxpayer risk exposure by more than half Minimizes contribution rate volatility Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 15 GENERATIONS/TIERS Tier 1 20 years of service prior to January 2012 Tier 2a Hired prior to January 2012 Tier 2b Hired after January 2012 Tier 3 Hired after January 2017 (likely enactment date) TIER 1 There is only one change for Tier 1. For all Tier 1 and Tier 2 members, the existing Permanent Benefit Increase (PBI) structure shall be eliminated and replaced with a Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) that is: A compounding COLA based on regional CPI (annual change in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI-U for Phoenix-Mesa, AZ), with a cap of 2% Actuarially accounted for in advance as part of normal cost determination In the first year of retirement, the COLA will be pro-rated based on the date of retirement The above COLA provision shall be included as a severable element in the proposed enacting legislation and shall be effectuated upon passage of a separate voter-approved constitutional amendment approving a one-time opening of the Pension Clause in the Arizona State Constitution. TIER 2a There is only one change for Tier 2a. For all Tier 1 and Tier 2 members, the existing Permanent Benefit Increase (PBI) structure shall be eliminated and replaced with a Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) that is: A compounding COLA based on regional CPI (annual change in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI-U for Phoenix-Mesa, AZ), with a cap of 2% Actuarially accounted for in advance as part of normal cost determination In the first year of retirement, the COLA will be pro-rated based on the date of retirement The above COLA provision shall be included as a severable element in the proposed enacting legislation and shall be effectuated upon passage of a separate voter-approved constitutional amendment approving a one-time opening of the Pension Clause in the Arizona State Constitution. The Proposed Reform 1. Improvements for Current Members & Retirees Replace uncertain, inequitable, unsustainable PBI with pre-funded COLA that provides certainty and equity for retirees. Requires constitutional amendment An exchange of benefit with greater value for retirees Serves public interest by correcting broken PBI that has been a major cause of increased unfunded liabilities Compounding COLA based on regional CPI, capped at 2% max provides certainty Pre-paidactuarially accounted for in advance as part of normal cost determination New "Catch-Up" Defined-Contribution Plan for Tier 2 Participants Hired On or After January 1, 2012 Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 19 Tier 2b Same COLA as Tiers 1 and 2a No change to underlying pension (2.5% multiplier) No D.R.O.P (Current Law SB1609) Addition of new mandatory defined contribution 3%/3% split ONLY FOR THOSE NOT IN SOCIAL SECURITY Employer make up period to catch up Tier 2b members for equity on DC TIER 3 NEW HIRES ONLY Option 1. DC only plan 9%/9% split Option 2. Pension No change to underlying pension (2.5% multiplier) No D.R.O.P The minimum benefit eligibility age for an unreduced pension benefit will be age 55, with 25 years of credited service. The minimum benefit eligible age for an actuarially equivalent pension benefit will be age 52.5, with 25 years of credited service. Contributions 50/50 split with no caps (exchange for board participation) Addition of new mandatory defined contribution 3% employer/3% employ split ONLY FOR THOSE NOT IN SOCIAL SECURITY The Proposed Reform 2. Changes for New Hires After January 1, 2017 Option of electing to participate in either a new Tier 3 100% Defined Contribution plan or a new Tier 3 Hybrid Plan. Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 22 TIER 3 NEW HIRES ONLY Cap on Pensionable Pay Beginning on January 1, 2017, the annual compensation of each member taken into account for purposes of the system shall not exceed $110,000. To account for inflation, this pensionable pay cap shall be calculated every year but adjusted every 3 years on a weighted average of all employers' wage increases actually paid to employees in previous time period. The Proposed Reform: New Hire Changes A. Tier 3 Defined Contribution Plan Option Employees provided with a professionally-managed defined contribution plan, with contributions consisting of: A required employer contribution of 9% of the employees regular compensation; and A required contribution by the employee of a minimum of 9% of that employees regular compensation. Employees may elect to increase the employees contribution up to the annual limits established by the IRS. 10-year vesting of employer contributions (immediate in event of disability retirement). Reasonable safeguards to ensure adequate long-term financial security, such as: Prohibitions on borrowing against assets Limited pool of funds to invest in, with options available for target-date funds and index-based funds Annuitization options Member education and advice Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 24 The Proposed Reform: New Hire Changes B. Tier 3 Hybrid Plan Defined Benefit Element Stepped multiplier based on years of service: 1.50% for years of credited service 1.75% for years of credited service 2.00% for years of credited service 2.25% for years of credited service 2.50% for 25+ years of credited service (same as current) 50/50 Cost Sharing: All costs for Tier 3 Hybrid Plan benefits are split 50/50 between employers and Tier 3 Hybrid Plan employees, including normal costs, future Tier 3 unfunded liability amortization costs, and administrative costs. No caps on employer or employee contribution rates. Tier 3 Hybrid Plan members will only contribute to any future unfunded liabilities on the obligations of the participants in the Tier 3 Hybrid Plan and no other PSPRS tier. Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 25 The Proposed Reform: New Hire Changes B. Tier 3 Hybrid Plan Defined Benefit Element Adopts sustainable COLA structure: Compounding COLA based on regional CPI with cap of 2.0% max, unless the funded ratio of the plan falls below 90%. If funded ratio of the plan is between %, cap reduced to 1.5% If funded ratio of the plan is between %, cap reduced to 1.0% No COLA will be issued in any year in which the funded ratio of the plan is below 70% Pre-funded, actuarially accounted for in advance as part of normal cost determination COLAs begin the first calendar year after the retiree reaches the 7th anniversary of their retirement date (or at age 60 regardless of whether the 7 year delay was met) Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 26 The Proposed Reform: New Hire Changes B. Tier 3 Hybrid Plan Defined Benefit Element Prevents pension spiking Reduces cap on pensionable compensation from $200,000 to $110,000 Cap adjusted every three years to account for inflation, as determined by real changes in public safety wages in Arizona Final average salary = highest 5-year average Maximum annual pension = 80% of final average salary (subject to pensionable compensation cap) Increases minimum benefit eligibility age from 52.5 to 55. Actuarially equivalent benefit available at age 52.5 with 25 years of service. Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 27 The Proposed Reform: New Hire Changes B. Tier 3 Hybrid Plan Defined Contribution Element Tier 3 Hybrid Plan members not enrolled in Social Security provided with a defined-contribution plan with contributions consisting of: A required employer contribution of 3% of the members regular pay; and A required contribution by the member of a minimum of 3% of that members regular pay. Employees may elect to increase the employees contribution up to the annual limits established by the IRS. Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 28 TIER 1TIER 2aTIER 2bTIER 3 20YRS BEFORE 1/1/2012LESS THAN 20YRS BEFORE 1/1/2012HIRED AFTER 1/1/2012HIRED AFTER ??? 20 YEAR MINIMUM 25 YEAR MINIMUM NO AGE MINIMUM 52.5 AGE MINIMUM55 AGE MINIMUM OR 52.5 ACT EQUIV. 2.5% MULTIPLIER2.5% MULITPLIER2.5% MULTIPLIER D.R.O.P - 7.5%D.R.O.P (CONT) 3.4% (VARIABLE)NO D.R.O.P. REPLACED WITH NON S.S HYBRID DC - RATIO CATCH UP SPLITNO D.R.O.P. - REPLACED WITH NON S.S HYBRID DC 3%/3% SPLIT TOP 3 YEAR CALCULATION TOP 5 YEAR CALCULATION 11.65% CONTRIBUTION? (HALL) 33/67% SPLIT % CAP50/50% SPLIT 0 CAP *ADD DC ONLY OPTION TO PLAN ADD DC ONLY OPTION TO PLAN COLA-CPI - MAX 2% COMPOUNDING COLA-CPI - MAX 2% + FUND RATIO MAXIMUM PENSIONABLE $110,000 + WAGE GROWTH 50% 20 YEARS 80% 32 YEARS * CURRENTLY NOT AVAILABLE DUE TO IRS REGULATIONS The Proposed Reform 3. Governance and Other Reforms Composition of PSPRS Board of Trustees will be modified to reflect the 50/50 sharing of costs and risks of the Tier 3 retirement formula. New unfunded liabilities associated with any future benefit increase required to be fully paid in the year of enactment and cannot be amortized over any period of years. At no time will any employers or employee's annual payment to PSPRS be less than their share of actuarially determined normal cost. No credits against normal cost shall be factored in to annual employer or employee contributions. Addition of advisory committee to include FIRE DISTRICTS Other reforms TBD, under discussion Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Employer Cost Forecast, as a % of Payroll Baseline v. Proposed Reform Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, SB1609 Reversal: Employer Cost Forecast, as a % of Payroll, Baseline v. Proposed Reform Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, New Hire Cost Projection, FY Baseline Tier 2 v. Proposed Tier 3 Baseline Tier 2 Tier 3 Hybrid: Non-Social Security (65% of Employees) Tier 3 Hybrid: With Social Security (30% of Employees) Tier 3 DC Only Option (5% of Employees) Blended Rates DB Multiplier2.5%2.5%* 0% Employer DC Rate0%3%0%9% Employee DC Rate0%3%0%9% Figures below in % of new hire payroll DB Normal Cost21.1%11.1%5.1%0%16.2% DC Normal Cost3.9%0%0.9%4.8% COLA Cost3%**1.0%0.4%0%1.4% Total New Hire Normal Cost 24.1%15.2%5.1%0.9%22.4% Employer Contribution 12.45%11.2% Employee Contribution 11.65%11.2% Unfunded Liability 100% Employer 50/50 Split for Tier 3 Employee Unfunded Liability Amortization $$ *Rate adjusted down for those with less than 25 service years. **Reasons estimate of the implicit cost for COLAs under the baseline that is not accounted for in the plan valuation, but will be for the coming years. Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Employer Cost Forecast, Baseline v. Proposed Reform (Inflation Adjusted) Employer Contributions BaselineProposed Reform Savings from Proposed Reform $3.293 billion$3.291 billion$2 million $3.39 billion$3.37 billion$20 million $3.36 billion$3.32 billion$38 million $3.08 billion$3.03 billion$52 million $2.20 billion$2.11 billion$86 million $15.3 billion$15.1 billion$200 million Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, SB1609 Reversal Baseline Proposed Reform Savings from Proposed Reform $18.7 billion$15.1 billion$3.6 billion Accrued Liabilities Forecast Change in Growth of Promised Pension Benefits, Baseline v. Proposed Reform Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Unfunded Liabilities 5% Return Scenario Baseline v. Proposed Reform: Forecast of UAAL That Employer is Responsible For Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Assumes No Change to Amortization Schedule and that 100% of Amortization Payments Made Proposed Reform Means $2.5 Billion Fewer UAAL Amort. Payments ( ) (Inflation Adjusted) Employer Cost Forecast: Underperforming Assets Additional in Employer Amortization Payments for New Hire Unfunded Liabilities Assuming a 6.5% Actual Rate of Return, Baseline v. Proposed Reform Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Employer Cost Forecast: Underperforming Assets Additional in Employer Amortization Payments for New Hire Unfunded Liabilities Assuming a 5% Actual Rate of Return, Baseline v. Proposed Reform Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Baseline: New Hire Volatility Forecast Employer Contribution Rate, as a % of New Hire Payroll Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Proposed Reform: New Hire Volatility Forecast Employer Contribution Rate, as a % of New Hire Payroll Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Summarizing how the proposed reform will address the problems and challenges of PSPRS Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, How Well Proposals Meet Objectives ElementBaseline Proposed Reform (1) Provide Retirement Security for Members & Retirees UNCERTAIN Broken PBI design & unfunded liabilities threaten plan solvency YES Certain COLA and properly funded, future potential unfunded liability payments reduced (2) Reduce Costs for Employer/Taxpayers and Employees NO YES New COLA design, equal cost sharing, stepped-multiplier based on years of service (3) Stabilize Contribution Rates for the Long-term NO YES Employer/employee equal cost sharing (4) Reduce Taxpayer and Pension System Exposure to Financial and Market Risk NO YES 21% Reduction in Accrued Liabilities by 2046, 50% Reduction in Potential New Hire Unfunded Liability Costs for Taxpayers (5) Ensure Ability to Recruit 21 st Century Employees SOME YES New hires offered choice of hybrid or portable DC plan, new DB stepped-multiplier incentivizes retention (6) Improve Governance & Transparency NO Significant commitment by all stakeholders to substantive change to governance; details to be determined. Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 43 Conclusion Employee Benefits of Proposed Pension Reform Pay lower annual employee contributions (effective pay raise for new tier employees) Choice between retirement plan designs (Hybrid DB/DC or Full DC) Employees without social security will have: A portable element of retirement benefits (the DC account) with ability to customize investment strategy based on personal retirement goals Professional DC plan management and retirement planning education and assistance Employer / Taxpayer Benefits of Proposed Pension Reform Minimize volatility of annual employer contributions Employees equally share costs and investment risk with taxpayers Reduces overall risks, slows growth of unfunded liabilities Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 44 THE PLAN Bill language is being worked on around the clock right now Bill will be dropped in a matter of days CALL YOUR LEGISLATOR!!!!!! Up against deadline for May 17 th ballot Massive campaign to support and pass FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 46 Realistic Forecasting [TABLE: Total Tier 3 employer & employee contributions rates for the next 10 years assuming different discount rates; assumed, 7%, 6%, and 5%] Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Realistic Forecasting [TABLE: cumulative Tier 3 employer and employee contribution rates for next 20 years assuming 7.5% discount rate but 5% ROR (with NC/UAAL payment breakdown) v. same assuming a 5% discount rate and 5% ROR] How much more has to be paid now to avoid a larger amount later Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Comparing projected employee benefits for the Baseline and Proposed Reform Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Fire (Large): Benefit Comparison at Minimum Benefit Eligibility Age, Inflation Adjusted Employees WITHOUT Social Security Baseline (25 YOS) Proposed Reform Actuarially equivalent (25 YOS) Proposed Reform Unreduced (28 YOS) Annual Benefit (Cumulative DB & DC Annuity) $51,536$55,096$76,819 Replacement Rate (Replacement of Final Salary) 57.8%59.9%78.9% Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Employees WITH Social Security Baseline (25 YOS) Proposed Reform Actuarially equivalent (25 YOS) Proposed Reform Unreduced (28 YOS) Annual Benefit (Cumulative DB & SS Annuity) $78,330$75,735$88,349 Replacement Rate (Including Social 62) 57.8% 87.8% 48.7% 78.7% 64.8% 94.8% Assumptions: New Hire at age 27, salary $45K Baseline benefit eligibility: 52.5 years old Proposed Reform benefit eligibility: Unreduced benefit at 55 years old with 25 service years; actuarially equivalent benefit available at age 52.5 years old with 25 service years Benefit Details at Minimum Benefit Eligibility Age ( Entry age: 27; Starting salary: $45K; Dollars are inflation adjusted, rounded) (Fire, Large) No Social SecurityWith Social Security At Retirement 55 years old 28 years of service DB 2.5% FAS x 62.5% DC 6% 3% Employer / 3% Employee DB 2.5% FAS x 62.5% DC 0% DB Annual Benefit $63,150 DC Annuity (DC Account 7% Return) $13,700 ($228,450) $0 Social Security, if starting at age 62 $0$29,200 Annual Cumulative $76,800$92,350 Replacement Rates as % of Final Year Salary: $97,500 DBDCDBSS 64.8%14.1%64.8%30% 78.9% (Total)94.8% (Total) Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Alternative Employer Contribution Rate History What Would Employer Cost Be Today if the Proposed Reforms 50/50 Cost Share Were Adopted 20 Years Ago? Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, The Risks of Inaction 1. More Pension Debt The solvency of the plan will continue to degrade and unfunded liabilities will keep rising 2. More Budget Crises, Municipal Bankruptcy Contribution rates will increase, requiring more money for pensions and leaving less money for other public services Municipalities may be required to propose new taxes to pay for pension debt (e.g. failed Prescott PSPRS tax) 3. Hiring Restrictions Increased pension costs will prevent increases in wages for public safety employees, and restrict the ability to hire new public safety workers Proposed Pension Reform Analysis 53 Objectives of Good Pension Reform 1. Provide Retirement Security for All Members (Current and Future) and Retirees 2. Reduce Long-term Costs for Employer/Taxpayers and Employees 3. Stabilize Contribution Rates 4. Reduce Taxpayer and Pension System Exposure to Financial Risk and Market Volatility 5. Ensure Ability to Recruit 21 st Century Employees Improve Portability of Benefits Create More Retirement Planning Choices for Employees 6. Improve Governance & Transparency Expert Driven Governance Improve Efficiency and Create Consistency for Employers Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17, Unfunded Liabilities Forecast Change in Growth of Pension Debt Assuming a 5% Actual Rate of Return, Baseline v. Proposed Reform (in Billions) Baseline Unfunded Liability Forecast Additional Unfunded Liabilities if 5% Actual Return Underperformance BaselineProposed Reform 2020$6.717$0.173$ $5.638$1.186$ $3.560$2.485$ $0.322$2.299$2.166 Conclusion: Proposed Reform would shield the plan from some additional pension debt in the case of an underperforming market scenario, because of the reduced liabilities. If actual returns were just 5%, Proposed Reform would mean roughly $140 million in fewer unfunded liabilities being added to the plan. Proposed Pension Reform AnalysisDecember 17,