Proposed Expansion of the Bulk Drug Unit At...As per OISD 119, ensure bunds provided at the solvent storage tank area have proper drainage system. 3. Ensure that foam Pourers are to

Rapid Risk Assessment

Of Proposed Expansion of the Bulk Drug Unit

At

SIPCOT, Industrial Estate, Gummidipoondi

Anjan Drug Private Limited

Rapid Risk Assessment Study for Proposed Enhancement of the Bulk Drug unit Anjan drug private limited Gummidipoondi Document id ADPL/RRA/SR/17-18/01 Revision A

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADPL : Anjan Drug Private Limited ALARP : As Low As Reasonably Practicable CMSRSL : Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Ltd. HAZOP : Hazard and Operability Study HSE : Health Safety & Environment LFL : Lower flammability limit LOC : Loss of containment NA : Not Applicable NR : Not Reached PHA : Preliminary Hazard Analysis TNT : Tri-Nitro Toluene UFL : Upper flammability limit VCE : Vapor cloud explosion


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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 5

CHAPTER 1 .......................................................................................................................... 10

1.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 11

1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................................... 11

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY ........................................................................................ 11

1. 4 Modeling Software ................................................................................................... 12

1.5 METHODOLOGY ADOPTED ....................................................................................... 13

CHAPTER 2 .......................................................................................................................... 14

2.1 PROJECT DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................. 15

CHAPTER 3 .......................................................................................................................... 16

3.1 OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................................................. 17

3.2 RISK CONCEPT .......................................................................................................... 17

3.3 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE ................................................................................ 18

CHAPTER 4 .......................................................................................................................... 20

4.1 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLGY ............................................................................. 21

4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AND RELEASE SCENARIOS .......................................... 22

4.3 FACTORS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS ............................................................ 22

4.4 TYPES OF OUTCOME EVENTS .................................................................................... 23

4.5 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS ................................................................................ 24

4.6 SELECTION OF DAMAGE CRITERIA ............................................................................ 25

4.7 PROBABILITIES .......................................................................................................... 27

CHAPTER 5 .......................................................................................................................... 32

5.1 SCENARIOS ............................................................................................................... 33

5.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 33

CHAPTER 6 .......................................................................................................................... 43

6.1. RISK PRESENTATION ..................................................................................................... 44

CHAPTER 7 .......................................................................................................................... 48

7.1 RISK ACCEPTANCE .................................................................................................... 49

7.2 RISK CONTROL MEASURES SUGGESTED .................................................................... 51

CHAPTER 8 .......................................................................................................................... 52

8.1 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 53


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LIST OF TABLES:

Table 1: Damages to human life due to heat radiation ........................................................ 26 Table 2: Effects due to incident radiation intensity .............................................................. 26 Table 3: Damage due to overpressures ............................................................................... 26 Table 4: Population Distribution .......................................................................................... 27 Table 5: Wind Direction ....................................................................................................... 29 Table 6: Probability of Immediate Ignition ........................................................................... 29 Table 7: Probability of Delayed Ignition ............................................................................... 30 Table 8: List of LOC Scenarios .............................................................................................. 33 Table 9: Inventory details .................................................................................................... 34 Table 10: Jet Fire Results ..................................................................................................... 35 Table 11: Pool Fire Results .................................................................................................. 37 Table 12: Vapor Cloud Explosion Results ............................................................................. 39 Table 13: Flammable Gas Dispersion Results ....................................................................... 41 Table 14: LOC Event Frequencies......................................................................................... 44 Table 15: Risk Acceptability Criteria..................................................................................... 49 Table 16: Risk Summary ...................................................................................................... 50

LIST OF FIGURES:

Figure 1: Overall Individual Risk Contour ............................................................................ 46 Figure 2: F-N Curve .............................................................................................................. 47


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Anjan Drug Private Limited intends to conduct a Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) study for Proposed Enhancement of the Bulk Drug unit as part of EIA. It approached Cholamandalam MS Risk Services Limited and based on the data shared by ADPL at this stage of the project, potential worst-case loss of containment (LOC) scenarios were identified for the RRA study.

Phast Risk v6.7 software is used for estimation of consequence and risk modeling. Below table shows list of LOC scenarios identified for the ADPL Gummidipoondi facility.

S No. Loss of Containment Scenarios Storage Tanks & Tank Truck

1 Leak of Furnace oil storage tank 2 Rupture of Furnace oil storage tank 3 Leak of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 4 Rupture of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 5 Leak of N-Propanol storage tank 6 Rupture of N-Propanol storage tank 7 Leak of N-Propanol tanker truck 8 Rupture of N-Propanol tanker truck 9 Leak of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank)

10 Rupture of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 11 Leak of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 12 Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck

Piping 13 Leak of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 14 Rupture of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 15 Leak of N-propanol unloading hose 16 Rupture of N-propanol unloading hose 17 Leak of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 18 Rupture of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 19 Leak of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 20 Rupture of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit


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Overall Individual Risk Contour for Anjan Drug Private Limited Gummidipoondi Facility


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Societal Risk (F-N Curve):


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S No. Location Individual Risk /avg. year

1 Admin building Negligible 2 Canteen Negligible 3 Boiler house - 1 1.77E-06 4 ETP plant 3.56E-05 5 Multipurpose finishing block 1.26E-04 6 Multipurpose plant 2.48E-06 7 Power house 1 2.96E-06 8 QC lab 7.57E-07 9 Raw material stores 1.92E-07

10 Solvent storage area 1.50E-04 11 Power house 2 Negligible 12 Boiler house 2 Negligible 13 Security room Negligible 14 At ADPL plant boundary (North side) 1.84E-06 15 At ADPL plant boundary (South side) 5.99E-08 16 At ADPL plant boundary (East side) 3.16E-13 17 At ADPL plant boundary (West side) 7.31E-05

Legend:

Acceptability of Risk is provided as per UK HSE as follows:

Unacceptable risk: Risk greater than 1.00E-04 per average year ALARP: Between 1.00E-04 and 1.00E-06 per average year Acceptable risk: Risk less than 1.00E-06 per average year

With reference to the risk acceptance criteria specified by HSE, UK in IS 15656:2006 - Code of Practice on Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis it is observed that the risk levels of Admin building, Canteen, Power house 2, Boiler house 2 and Security room are negligible, QC lab and Raw material stores are in Acceptable region. Boiler house 1, ETP plant, Multipurpose finishing block, Multipurpose plant, Power house 1, Solvent storage area are in ALARP region. The risk levels in ALARP will be maintained if all the control measures recommended in this report are implemented in addition to the existing risk control measures.

Unacceptable ALARP (As Low as Reasonable Practicable) Acceptable


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The following risk control measures are recommended in addition to the existing risk control measures to bring the risk levels within acceptable region:

Recommendations

1. Ensure that periodical inspection and thickness measurement are to be carried out for the proposed storage tanks as specified by OISD129-Inspection of Storage Tanks

2. As per OISD 119, ensure bunds provided at the solvent storage tank area have proper drainage system.

3. Ensure that foam Pourers are to be made available for the proposed storage tank area as per OISD-117.

4. Portable monitors/foam hose streams shall be provided for fighting fires in dyked area and spills.

5. Spill control kit and procedure shall be in place to contain any spill, clean them up properly and dispose off any containment waste safely.

6. Windsocks are to be installed for knowing wind direction during emergency. 7. Ensure mutual training sessions and mock drills related to first aid, fire fighting and

evacuation should be conducted to appraise and train different levels of responders in emergency control.


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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION


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1.1 INTRODUCTION

Anjan Drug Private Limited intends to conduct a Rapid Risk Assessment (RRA) study for Proposed Enhancement of the Bulk Drug unit as part of EIA.

1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Scope of the RRA study covers the following: Furnace oil storage tanks (Total Nos: 2 x 15 kl, 2 x 10 kl) Underground Diesel storage tanks (Total Nos: 2 x 15 kl) N-Propanol vertical storage tanks (Total Nos: 8 x 20 kl) N-Propanol tanker truck (Proposed 20 kl) Acetone storage tanks (Total Nos: 2x 15 kl) N-propyl bromide tanker truck (1 x 20 kl) Sodium Hypochlorite storage tanks (Total Nos: 2x 15 kl) Caustic soda lye storage tanks (Total Nos: 2x 15 kl) Hydrochloric acid storage tanks (Total Nos: 2x 15 kl) Sodium bromide storage tanks (Total Nos: 4x 15 kl) Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit N-Propanol unloading hose Piping from Acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit

Note: The following materials are not considered in the RRA study, as there are no flammable and toxic hazards associated with them

o Sodium Hypochlorite o Caustic soda lye o Hydrochloric acid o Sodium bromide o Di-Ehtyl Di-Propyle Malonate (DEDPM) o Gabapentin o Valproic Acid o Pregabalin o ITO pride HCl

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The Objective of RRA study is Identification of worst case accidental events Assessment of risk arising from the hazards and consideration of its tolerability to

personnel, facility and environment which includes the following


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o Calculation of physical effects of accidental scenarios o Identification and quantification of the risks and contour mapping on the

layouts. o Evaluation of risk against the risk acceptable limits. o Risk reduction measures to prevent incidents, to control accidents.

1. 4 Modeling Software

The software developed by DNV is used for risk assessment studies involving flammable and toxic hazards where individual and societal risks are also to be identified. It enables the user to assess the physical effects of accidental releases of toxic or flammable chemicals.

Phast v6.7 is used for consequence calculations and Phast Risk v6.7 is used for assessing risk. The software contains a series of up to date models that allow detailed modeling and quantitative assessment of release rate pool evaporation, atmospheric dispersion, vapor cloud explosion, combustion, heat radiation effects from fires etc. The software is designed to facilitate compliance with regulatory requirements of many countries, with tailor-made specifications incorporated into the program.

The software is developed based on the hazard model given in TNO Yellow Book as well as various incidents that had occurred over past 25 years. CMSRS has used the latest version of DNV software for developing the consequences for each model.


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1.5 METHODOLOGY ADOPTED

The risk assessment calculations based on the shared data was carried out at CMSRS office using Phast and Phast risk v6.7 software. Finally, risk reduction measures were suggested based on the risk levels. The above-adopted methodology is depicted in the form of flow chart below:

Introduction to study

Data collection, and discussion with ADPL-Gummdipoondi

Data input into Modeling Software

Consequence and Risk assessment of identified LOC scenarios

Risk presentation and Recommendations


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CHAPTER 2

PROJECT DESCRIPTION


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2.1 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Anjan Drug Private Limited, Gummidipoondi was founded in 1990 and has grown into a fully integrated Pharmaceutical API manufacturing Organization, backed with immense experience in development and manufacturing of bulk drugs. Anjan Drugs is now supplying the Active Pharma Ingredients (API) to leading Formulation companies across the world.

ADPL has proposed to enhance the production of their existing products (Di-Ethyl Di-Propyl Malonate, Gabapentin & n-Propyl Bromide) and addition of three new products (Valproic Acid, Pregabalin and ITO pride HCl) based upon the present market condition. The existing facility is designed to manufacture 205TPM of bulk drugs. Due to the market conditions n-propyl Bromide is not manufactured till date.

The proposed expansion will be carried out within the existing production facility and new facility within the existing land will be utilized to manufacture additional two new products

The facility is currently proposing eight numbers of N-Propanol solvent storage tanks, four numbers of furnace oil storage tanks, two numbers of diesel storage tanks, two numbers of Acetone storage tanks and one number of N-Propyl Bromide tank truck.


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CHAPTER 3

INTRODUCTION TO RAPID RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY


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3.1 OVERVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk assessment is proven valuable as a management tool in assessing the overall safety performance of the chemical process Industry. Although management systems such as engineering codes, checklists, and reviews by experienced engineers have provided substantial safety assurances, major incidents involving numerous casualties, injuries and significant damage can occur as illustrated by recent world-scale catastrophes. Risk assessment techniques provide advanced quantitative means to supplement other hazard identification, analysis, assessment, and control and management methods to identify the potential for such incidents and to evaluate control strategies. The underlying basis of risk assessment is simple in concept. It offers methods to answer the following four questions:

1. What can go wrong? 2. What are the causes? 3. What are the consequences? 4. How likely is it?

This study tries to quantify the risks to rank them accordingly based on their severity and probability. The report should be used to understand the significance of existing control measures and to follow the measures continuously. Wherever possible the additional risk control measures should be adopted to bring down the risk levels. Rapid Risk Assessment is a swift review covering limited scenarios carried out to identify the hazards using the preliminary information available.

3.2 RISK CONCEPT

of the probability of the loss or injury occurring and magnitude of the loss or injury if it

Magnitude of consequences and; Probability of occurrence.

The results of risk Assessment are often reproduced as Individual and groups risks and are defined as below. Individual Risk installation or a transport route expressed as a function of the distance from such an

a group may be expected to sustain a given level of harm (typically death) from the realization of specific hazards. Such a risk actually exists only when a person is permanently at that spot (out of doors).


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The exposure of an individual is related to: The likelihood of occurrence of an event involving a release; Ignition of hydrocarbon; The vulnerability of the person to the event; The proportion of time the person will be exposed to the event (which is termed

'occupancy' in the QRA terminology). The second definition of risk involves the concept of the summation of risk from events involving many fatalities within specific population groups. This definition is focused on the risk to society rather than to a specific individual and is termed Societal Risk. In relation to the process operations we can identify specific groups of people who work on or live close to the installation; for example communities living or working close to the plant.

3.3 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

Hazard identification and risk assessment involves a series of steps as follows: Step 1: Identification of the Hazard Hazard identification is a critical step in Risk Assessment. Many aids are available, including experience, engineering codes, checklists, detailed process knowledge, equipment failure experience, hazard index techniques, What-if Analysis, Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Studies, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). In this phase, all potential incidents are identified and tabulated. Site visit and study of operations and documents like drawings, process write-up etc are used for hazard identification. Step 2: Assessment of the Risk Consequence estimation is the methodology used to determine the potential for damage or injury from specific incidents. A single incident (e.g. rupture of a pressurized flammable liquid tank) can have many distinct incident outcomes (E.g. Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE), flash fire, etc.) Likelihood assessment is the methodology used to estimate the frequency or probability of occurrence of an incident. Estimates may be obtained from historical incident data on failure frequencies, from failure sequence models, such as fault trees and event trees or both. In this study the historical data developed by software models and those collected by CPR18E Committee for Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands (Edition: PGS 3, 2005) are used. Risks arising from the hazards are evaluated for its tolerability to personnel, the refinery and the environment. The acceptability of the estimated risk must then be judged based on IS-15656 criteria appropriate to the particular situation. Step 3: Elimination or Reduction of the Risk


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This involves identifying opportunities to reduce the likelihood and/or consequence of an accident Where deemed to be necessary. Risk assessment combines the consequences and likelihood of all incident outcomes from all selected incidents to provide a measure of risk. The risk of all selected incidents are individually estimated and summed to give an overall measure of risk. Risk-reduction measures include those to prevent incidents (i.e. reduce the likelihood of occurrence) to control incidents (i.e. limit the extent and duration of a hazardous event) and to mitigate the effects (i.e. reduce the consequences). Preventive measures, such as using inherently safer designs and ensuring asset integrity, should be used wherever practicable. In many cases, the measures to control and mitigate hazards and risks are simple and obvious and involve modifications to conform to standard practice. The general hierarchy of risk reducing measures is:

Prevention (by distance or design); Detection (E.g. fire and gas, Leak detection); Control (E.g. emergency shutdown and controlled depressurization); Mitigation (E.g. fire fighting and passive fire protection); Emergency response (In case safety barriers fail).


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CHAPTER 4

RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY


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4.1 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLGY

Recommendation to reduce the Risk

Yes

No

Define the Goal (Statutory, Emergency Planning, Consequence, Etc.

Location, Layout, Process Parameters

Hazard Identification

Quantification of Hazard

Select most Credible Scenario Select Worst Case Scenario

Estimate Consequence

Estimate Effect of Damage

Is Risk Acceptable? End

Estimate Frequency of Occurrence

Estimate Risk

Prioritize and Reduce Risk

Frequency Estimation


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4.2 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AND RELEASE SCENARIOS

Containment is defined as one or several devices; any parts which are permanently in open contact with one another, and which are intended to contain one or multiple substances. A Loss of Containment is one containment system that will not lead to the release of significant quantities of hazardous substance from other containment systems. The following data were collected to envisage scenarios:

Composition of materials flowing through equipments and pipeline; Flow rate of materials passing through pipelines; Equipment/pipeline conditions (phase, temperature, pressure);

Accidental release of flammable liquids/gases can result in severe consequences. Delayed ignition of flammable gases can result in blast overpressures covering large areas. This may lead to extensive loss of life and property. In contrast, fires have localized consequences. Fires can be put out or contained in most cases; there are few mitigating actions one can take once a flammable gas or a vapor cloud gets released. Major accident hazards arise, therefore, consequent upon the release of flammable gases.

4.3 FACTORS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS

In any installation, main hazard arises due to loss of containment during handling of flammable chemicals. To formulate a structured approach to identification of hazards, an understanding of contributory factors is essential. Inventory Inventory analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short listing of release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the potential hazard. Larger the inventory of a vessel or a system, larger is the quantity of potential release. A practice commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks and major releases from fractures of pipelines and vessels/tanks containing sizable inventories. Parameters Potential vapor release for the same material depends significantly on the operating conditions. This operating range is enough to release a large amount of vapor in case of a leak/rupture, therefore the storage tank/pipeline leaks and ruptures need to be considered in the risk Assessment calculations. Blast overpressures depend upon the reactivity class of material and the amount of gas between two explosive limits. For example, LPG once released and not ignited immediately is expected to give rise to a vapor cloud. These vapors in general have medium reactivity


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and in case of confinement of the gas cloud, on delayed ignition may result in an explosion and overpressures. Initiating Events Both the complexity of study and the number of incident outcome cases are affected by the range of initiating events and incidents covered. This not only reflects the inclusion of accidents and/or non-accident-initiated events, but also the size of those events. In this study, two types of LOC events are envisaged viz., the one in which there is a high frequency of occurrence but having low consequential effects (hole in the drain/vent line of the reactor, instrument tapping failure, etc.,) and the one in which there is a low frequency of occurrence but with high consequential effects (a catastrophic rupture of a vessel).

4.4 TYPES OF OUTCOME EVENTS

Depending on the considered LOC scenarios, the following outcomes are expected: Jet fire Pool fire Flammable gas dispersion (Flash Fire) Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)

Jet fire Jet fire occurs when a pressurized release (of a flammable gas or vapor) is ignited by any source. They tend to be localized in effect and are mainly of concern in establishing the potential for domino effects and employee safety zones rather than for community risks. The jet fire model is based on the radiant fraction of total combustion energy, which is assumed to arise from a point slowly along the jet flame path. The jet dispersion model gives the jet flame length. Pool Fire This represents a situation when flammable liquid spillage forms a pool over a liquid or solid surface and gets ignited. Flammable liquids can be involved in pool fires where they are stored and transported in bulk quantities. Early pool fire is caused when the steady state is reached between the outflow of flammable material from the container and complete combustion of the flammable material when the ignition source is available. Late pool fires are associated with the difference between the release of material and the complete combustion of the material simultaneously. Late pool fires are common when large quantity of flammable material is released within short time.


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Flammable gas dispersion (Flash fire) A flash fire is a sudden, intense fire caused by ignition of a mixture of air and a dispersed flammable gas. It is characterized by high temperature, short duration, and a rapidly moving flame front. Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) Vapor cloud explosion is the result of flammable materials in the atmosphere, a subsequent dispersion phase, and after some delay an ignition of the vapor cloud. Turbulence is the governing factor in blast generation, which could intensify combustion to the level that will result in an explosion. Obstacles in the path of vapor cloud or when the cloud finds a confined area, e.g. as under the bullets, often create turbulence. The VCE will result in overpressures.

4.5 CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS

In consequence, analysis, use is made of a number of calculation models to estimate the physical effects of an accident (spill of hazardous material) and to predict the damage (lethality, injury, material destruction) of the effects. Accidental release of flammable liquids can result in severe consequences. Immediate ignition of the pressurized chemical will result in a jet flame. Delayed ignition of flammable vapors can result in blast overpressures covering large areas. The calculations can roughly be divided in three major groups:

a. Determination of the source strength parameters; b. Determination of the consequential effects; c. Determination of the damage or damage distances.

4.5.1 SOURCE STRENGTH PARAMETERS

Calculation of the outflow of liquid vapors out of a vessel/tank or a pipe, in case of rupture. In addition, two-phase outflow can be calculated.

Calculation, in case of liquid outflow, of the instantaneous flash evaporation and of the dimensions of the remaining liquid pool.

Calculation of the evaporation rate, as a function of volatility of the material, pool dimensions and wind velocity.

Source strength equals pump capacities, etc. in some cases.


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4.5.2 CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS

Dispersion of gaseous material in the atmosphere as a function of source strength, relative density of the gas, weather conditions and topographical situation of the surrounding area.

Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/ m2] due to a fire, as a function of the distance to the source.

Energy of vapor cloud explosions [in bar], as a function of the distance to the distance of the exploding cloud.

Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of evaporated chemical. The latter can be either explosive or toxic.

4.6 SELECTION OF DAMAGE CRITERIA

The damage criteria give the relation between the extents of the physical effects (exposure) and the effect of consequences. For assessing, the effects on human beings consequences are expressed in terms of injuries and the effects on equipment / property in terms of monetary loss. The effect of consequences for explosion or fire can be categorized as: Damage caused by heat radiation on material and people Damage caused by explosion on structure and people

In consequence, analysis studies, in principle three types of exposure to hazardous effects are distinguished: Heat radiation due to fires - in this study, the concern is that of Jet fires and pool fires Explosions

The knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the exposure. Following are the criteria selected for damage estimation: Heat Radiation The effect of fire on a human being is in the form of burns. There are three categories of burn such as first degree, second degree and third degree burns. The consequences caused by exposure to heat radiation are a function of:

The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2]; The exposure duration [sec]; The protection of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body).

The limits for 1% of the exposed people to be killed due to heat radiation, and for second-degree burns are given in the table below:


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Table 1: Damages to human life due to heat radiation Exposure Duration

Radiation energy (1% lethality), kW/m2

Radiation energy (2nd degree burns), kW/m2

Radiation energy (1st degree burns), kW/m2

10 sec 21.2 16 12.5 20 sec 9.3 7.0 4.0

Table 2: Effects due to incident radiation intensity Incident

Radiation (kW/m2)

Type of Damage

0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation

4.0 Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin (first degree burns are likely)

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing etc.

37.5 Heavy Damage to process equipments

Reference: CCPS, Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis The actual results would be less severe due to the various assumptions made in the models arising out of the flame geometry, emissivity, angle of incidence, view factor and others. The radiation output of the flame would be dependent upon the fire size, extent of mixing with air and the flame temperature.

Table 3: Damage due to overpressures Peak

Overpressure Damage Type Description

0.30 bar Heavy Damage Major damage to plant equipment structure

0.10 bar Moderate Damage Repairable damage to plant equipment and structure

0.03 bar Significant Damage Shattering of glass

As per the guidelines of CPR 18 E Purple Book: The lethality of a jet fire and pool fire is assumed to be 100% for the people who are

caught in the flame. Outside the flame area, the lethality depends on the heat radiation distances.

For the flash fires lethality is taken as 100% for all the people caught outdoors and for 10% who are indoors within the flammable cloud. No fatality has been assumed outside the flash fire area.

Overpressure more than 0.3 bar corresponds approximately with 50% lethality. An overpressure above 0.2 bar would result in 10% fatalities. An overpressure less than 0.1 bar would not cause any fatalities to the public.


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100% lethality is assumed for all people who are present within the cloud proper.

4.7 PROBABILITIES

4.7.1 POPULATION PROBABILITIES

It is necessary to know the population exposure in order to estimate the consequences and the risk resulting from an incident. The exposed population is often defined using a population density. Population densities are an important part of a Risk assessment for several reasons. The most notable is that the density is typically used to determine the number of people affected by a given incident with a specific hazard area. The population density can be averaged over the whole area that may be affected or the area can be subdivided into any number of segments with a separate population density for each individual segment. In this study, based on the data from ADPL-Gummidipoondi, the following population data considered for the study.

Table 4: Population Distribution Population Data within the facility

S. No Location Population 1 Admin block 5 2 Canteen 15 3 Raw material storage area 5 4 Solvent storage area 15 5 ETP Plant 5 6 Power House 5 7 Boiler house 5 8 QC Lab 15 9 Security room 5

10 Production Area 15

Population Data surrounding the facility Population centres Total number of people

Plant (North side) (RBA exports) 650 Plant (South side) (CRP ltd) 500 Plant (West side) (Precision hydraulics) 550 Plant (East side) (Dalmia laminators) 600


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4.7.2 FAILURE / ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES

The failure data is taken from CPR 18E Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, developed by the Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands. The impacts due to internal domino effects are not explicitly covered in QRA. An internal domino needs to be considered only in case of a situation in which the failure of one component clearly leads to the failure of another component. As the biggest vessel/ tank are considered for instantaneous failure the impact due to internal domino effects are assumed to get covered in the analysis.

4.7.3 WEATHER PROBABILITIES

As per CPR 18E there are six representative weather classes:

Stability Class Wind Speed B Medium D Low D Medium D High E Medium F Low

Low wind speed corresponds with 1-2 m/s Medium wind speed corresponds with 3-5 m/s High wind speed corresponds with 8-9 m/s

Observations in the Pasquill stability classes C, C/D and D are allocated to stability class D. Wind speeds below 2.5 m/s, between 2.5 m/s and 6 m/s and above 6 m/s are allocated to the wind speed categories low, medium and high respectively.

Wind Speed A B B/C C C/D D E F <2.5 m s -1

B Medium D Low F Low

2.5-6 m s -1 D Medium E Medium

>6 m s-1 D high The wind speed in each weather class is equal to the average wind speed of the observations in the weather class. For this study, as per the standard meteorological data available for the site, wind velocity on a maximum throughout a year is 1 m/s. Based on the meteorological data, following weather conditions are considered:

1.5 F (Where F denotes Stable Condition night with moderate clouds and light moderate winds; 1.5 denotes wind velocity in m /sec)


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5 D (where D denotes neutral condition little sun and high wind or over cast / windy night; 5 denotes wind velocity in m /sec)

In general the largest effect distance for release of substances is found with stable weather. Temperature and Relative Humidity: Based on Climatologically data from the Indian Meteorological Department, an average temperature of 30°C and relative humidity of 75% is found pre-dominant in the facility.

Table 5: Wind Direction

Percentage number of days wind from

N NE E SE S SW W NW Calm

Night 11 4 2 2 12 21 27 11 10

Day 7 13 24 26 14 6 5 2 3

4.7.4 IGNITION PROBABILITIES

Immediate Ignition Probability: Immediate ignition can be considered as the situation where the fluid ignites immediately on release through auto-ignition or because the accident, which causes the release, also provided an ignition source. Immediate ignition probability is assumed based on the Reference manual BEVI risk assessments version 3.2, developed by the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Centre for External Safety, Netherlands.

Table 6: Probability of Immediate Ignition

Substance category Source term Continuous

Source term Instantaneous

Probability of direct ignition

Category 0 (average/ high reactivity gases)

< 10 kg/s < 1,000 kg 0.2

10 100 kg/s 1000 10,000 kg 0.5

> 100 kg/s > 10,000 kg 0.7

Category 0 (low reactivity gases)

< 10 kg/s < 1,000 kg 0.02

10 100 kg/s 1000 10,000 kg 0.04

> 100 kg/s > 10,000 kg 0.09 Category 1 (highly flammable liquids)

All flow rates All quantities 0.065

Category 2 (flammable liquids)

All flow rates All quantities 0.01


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Category 1(Highly flammable) Liquid substances and preparations with a flash point below 21 °C, which are not,

however, extremely flammable N-Propanol, Acetone & N-Propyl Bromide are taken as category 1 liquids

Category 2(Flammable) Liquid substances and preparations with a flash point greater than, equal to 21 °C

and less than, or equal to 55 °C. Diesel and furnace oil are taken as category 2 liquids

Delayed Ignition Probability: Delayed ignition is the result of the build-up of a flammable vapor cloud, which is ignited by a source remote from the release point. It is assumed to result in flash fires or explosions, and also to burn back to the source of the leak resulting in a jet fire and/or a pool fire. Delayed ignition probability is assumed based on the National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), Centre for External Safety, Netherlands.

Table 7: Probability of Delayed Ignition Source type Ignition source Probability of ignition Point source Adjacent process installation

Flare Oven (outside) Oven (inside) Boiler (outside) Boiler (inside)

0.5 1.0 0.9

0.45 0.45 0.23

Line source high-voltage cable (per 100 m) Ship

0.2 0.5

Population source Households (per person) Offices (per person)

0.01 0.01

4.7.5 MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS

In addition to the methods and assumptions in the modeling as noted above, the following assumptions are used:

is selected for above ground equipment as release orientation equipment this for conservative distances.

Jet fires in PHAST have been modeled using the un-impinged jet model. This leads to conservative, longer jet fire lengths as the model assumes that there are no


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obstacles to reduce jet momentum and therefore jet length and distances to radiation levels.

Isolation time (includes time for manual isolation) of 30 minutes is considered for the released inventory calculations.

The probability of failure on demand of the system as a whole is about 0.01 per demand.

TNT explosion model is used in the study. Probability of Flash fire is 0.6 and Explosion is 0.4


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CHAPTER 5

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS


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5.1 SCENARIOS

This section documents the consequence-distance calculations, which have been computed for the accident release scenarios considered. Following are the potential Loss of Containment scenarios envisaged for ADPL Gummidipoondi facility.

Table 8: List of LOC Scenarios S No. Loss of Containment Scenarios

Storage Tanks & Tank Trucks 1 Leak of Furnace oil storage tank 2 Rupture of Furnace oil storage tank 3 Leak of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 4 Rupture of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 5 Leak of N-Propanol storage tank 6 Rupture of N-Propanol storage tank 7 Leak of N-Propanol tanker truck 8 Rupture of N-Propanol tanker truck 9 Leak of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank)

10 Rupture of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 11 Leak of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 12 Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck

Piping 13 Leak of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 14 Rupture of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 15 Leak of N-propanol unloading hose 16 Rupture of N-propanol unloading hose 17 Leak of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 18 Rupture of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 19 Leak of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 20 Rupture of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit

5.2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

Sudden release of hazardous materials can result in a number of accident situations. As large number of failure cases can lead to the same type of consequences, representative failure cases are selected for this analysis. The failure cases are based on conservative assumptions and engineering judgment. Typically, failure models are considered for 100% pipe diameter/catastrophic rupture of vessels for rupture and 10% leak (hole size max 50 mm) for pipelines and 10mm leak size for vessels, based on the guidelines of CPR 18 E.


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Table 9: Inventory details

S No. Scenarios Inventory

(kL) Pressure

(bar)

Temperature (°C)

Storage Tanks & Tank Trucks 1 Leak of Furnace oil storage tank 15 Atmospheric Ambient 2 Rupture of Furnace oil storage tank 15 Atmospheric Ambient 3 Leak of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 15 Atmospheric Ambient

4 Rupture of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 15 Atmospheric Ambient

5 Leak of N-Propanol storage tank 20 Atmospheric Ambient 6 Rupture of N-Propanol storage tank 20 Atmospheric Ambient 7 Leak of N-Propanol tanker truck 20 Atmospheric Ambient 8 Rupture of N-Propanol tanker truck 20 Atmospheric Ambient

9 Leak of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 15 Atmospheric Ambient

10 Rupture of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 15 Atmospheric Ambient

11 Leak of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 20 Atmospheric Ambient 12 Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 20 Atmospheric Ambient

Piping

S No. Scenarios Flow rate

(m3/hr) Pressure

(barg)

Temperature (°C)

13 Leak of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 10 1.5 Ambient

14 Rupture of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 10 1.5 Ambient

15 Leak of N-propanol unloading hose 10 1.5 Ambient 16 Rupture of N-propanol unloading hose 10 1.5 Ambient

17 Leak of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 10 1.5 Ambient

18 Rupture of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 10 1.5 Ambient

19 Leak of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 10 1.5 Ambient

20 Rupture of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 10 1.5 Ambient


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5.2.1 SUMMARY OF JET FIRE Table 10: Jet Fire Results

S No. Scenarios

Jet fire radiation downwind damage distances in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition

4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 Kw/m2 Kw/m2

Storage tanks & Tank trucks 1 Leak of Furnace oil storage tank NR NR NR NR NR NR 2 Rupture of Furnace oil storage tank NA NA NA NA NA NA 3 Leak of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) NR NR NR NR NR NR 4 Rupture of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 Leak of N-Propanol storage tank 2.10 1.13 NR 2.16 1.21 NR6 Rupture of N-Propanol storage tank NA NA NA NA NA NA 7 Leak of N-Propanol tanker truck 3.42 NR NR 3.69 NR NR 8 Rupture of N-Propanol tanker truck NA NA NA NA NA NA 9 Leak of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 2.83 NR NR 3.01 1.68 NR

10 Rupture of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) NA NA NA NA NA NA 11 Leak of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 11.59 8.77 6.94 12.21 9.26 7.48 12 Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck NA NA NA NA NA NA

Pipelines

13 Leak of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 4.99 3.85 NR 4.26 2.88 NR

14 Rupture of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 32.97 26.86 NR 30.03 23.78 19.66

15 Leak of N-propanol unloading hose 6.66 5.96 NR 5.70 4.14 NR 16 Rupture of N-propanol unloading hose 39.67 32.29 26.27 36.58 28.92 23.93


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S No. Scenarios

Jet fire radiation downwind damage distances in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition

4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5 Kw/m2 Kw/m2

17 Leak of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 10.23 8.26 NR 8.69 6.74 6.34

18 Rupture of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 66.96 54.30 44.68 59.67 46.89 38.73

19 Leak of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 5.24 4.01 NR 4.30 2.90 NR

20 Rupture of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 39.40 31.94 25.83 34.33 27.16 22.56

Analysis:

Rupture of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit, at a weather condition of 1.5 F, will cause maximum damage due to jet fire. The jet fire radiation of 4 kW/m2 will reach up to a distance of 66.96 m, 12.5 kW/m2 will reach up to a distance of 54.30 m and 37.5 kW/m2 will reach up to a distance of 44.68 m.


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5.2.2 SUMMARY OF LATE POOL FIRE Table 11: Pool Fire Results

S No. Scenarios

Pool fire radiation downwind damage distances in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5

Kw/m2 Kw/m2 Storage tanks & Tank trucks

1 Leak of Furnace oil storage tank 24.37 15.06 6.91 25.27 16.73 8.92 2 Rupture of Furnace oil storage tank 24.37 15.06 6.91 25.27 16.73 8.92 3 Leak of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 37.80 18.04 NR 46.63 26.62 NR 4 Rupture of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 71.46 32.07 NR 89.46 32.62 NR 5 Leak of N-Propanol storage tank 21.69 13.03 5.16 22.81 15.29 5.626 Rupture of N-Propanol storage tank 21.69 13.03 5.16 22.81 15.29 5.62 7 Leak of N-Propanol tanker truck 134.32 85.10 47.73 131.88 88.13 56.89 8 Rupture of N-Propanol tanker truck 151.98 95.63 53.45 155.08 102.60 66.64 9 Leak of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 21.94 13.39 5.76 23.58 17.35 8.68

10 Rupture of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 153.31 94.22 50.12 156.79 102.53 64.48 11 Leak of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 106.90 66.37 34.80 100.62 67.02 39.40 12 Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 174.29 107.51 58.23 177.45 116.09 73.94

Pipelines

13 Leak of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 24.22 15.86 8.31 24.64 17.71 8.56

14 Rupture of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 87.49 57.14 32.58 89.00 61.39 38.25

15 Leak of N-propanol unloading hose 28.74 18.83 9.70 29.22 20.85 10.39 16 Rupture of N-propanol unloading hose 88.16 57.77 33.20 89.96 62.24 39.05


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S No. Scenarios

Pool fire radiation downwind damage distances in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5

Kw/m2 Kw/m2

17 Leak of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 18.11 11.79 6.66 17.29 12.81 6.62


19 Leak of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 17.02 8.75 6.02 17.22 9.59 5.82


Analysis:

Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck, at a weather condition of 5 D, will cause maximum damage due to pool fire. The pool fire radiation of 4 kW/m2 will reach up to a distance of 177.451 m, 12.5 kW/m2 will reach up to a distance of 116.09 m and 37.5 kW/m2 will reach up to a distance of 73.94 m.


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5.2.3 SUMMARY OF VAPOUR EXPLOSION Table 12: Vapor Cloud Explosion Results

S No. Scenarios

Over pressure damage distances in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition

0.03 0.1 0.3 0.03 0.1 0.3 bar bar

Storage tanks & Tank trucks 1 Leak of Furnace oil storage tank NR NR NR NR NR NR 2 Rupture of Furnace oil storage tank NR NR NR NR NR NR 3 Leak of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) NR NR NR NR NR NR 4 Rupture of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) NR NR NR NR NR NR 5 Leak of N-Propanol storage tank NR NR NR NR NR NR6 Rupture of N-Propanol storage tank 37.17 22.44 21.22 32.40 19.56 14.77 7 Leak of N-Propanol tanker truck 15.40 12.30 11.15 15.26 12.24 11.12 8 Rupture of N-Propanol tanker truck 43.49 30.02 25.00 39.80 22.71 16.35 9 Leak of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) NR NR NR NR NR NR

10 Rupture of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) NR NR NR NR NR NR 11 Leak of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck NR NR NR NR NR NR 12 Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck NR NR NR NR NR NR

Pipelines

13 Leak of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit NR NR NR NR NR NR

14 Rupture of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit NR NR NR NR NR NR

15 Leak of N-propanol unloading hose NR NR NR NR NR NR 16 Rupture of N-propanol unloading hose NR NR NR NR NR NR


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S No. Scenarios

Over pressure damage distances in m 1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition

0.03 0.1 0.3 0.03 0.1 0.3 bar bar

17 Leak of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit NR NR NR NR NR NR

18 Rupture of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit NR NR NR NR NR NR

19 Leak of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit NR NR NR NR NR NR

20 Rupture of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit NR NR NR NR NR NR

Analysis:

Rupture of N-Propanol tanker truck, at a weather condition of 1.5 F, will cause maximum damage due to vapor cloud explosion. An overpressure of 0.03 bar will reach up to a distance of 43.49 m, 0.1 bar will reach up to a distance of 30.02 m, 0.3 bar will reach up to a distance of 25 m.


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5.2.4 SUMMARY OF FLAMMABLE GAS DISPERSION Table 13: Flammable Gas Dispersion Results

S No. Scenarios Distance to concentration results (m)

1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition UFL LFL LFL Frac UFL LFL LFL Frac

Storage tanks & Tank trucks 1 Leak of Furnace oil storage tank 2.84 2.91 2.92 2.06 2.91 2.92 2 Rupture of Furnace oil storage tank 6.67 6.73 6.75 7.15 7.21 7.23 3 Leak of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 0.46 1.70 2.53 0.29 2.23 3.18 4 Rupture of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 3.04 50.93 82.92 3.13 3.17 3.42 5 Leak of N-Propanol storage tank 3.12 3.13 3.14 2.27 3.03 3.07 6 Rupture of N-Propanol storage tank 6.95 9.32 16.05 7.48 7.56 16.477 Leak of N-Propanol tanker truck 3.01 12.16 16.58 3.12 4.00 11.17 8 Rupture of N-Propanol tanker truck 6.13 16.64 26.23 6.28 10.70 25.17 9 Leak of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 0.36 1.52 6.78 0.30 1.57 2.45

10 Rupture of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 13.44 38.07 56.10 8.26 31.95 56.84 11 Leak of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 13.09 27.38 37.63 3.60 14.30 24.51 12 Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 22.26 47.74 68.93 14.18 40.91 66.42

Pipelines

13 Leak of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 1.83 3.26 3.29 1.42 2.92 3.55

14 Rupture of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 7.53 21.45 33.95 7.23 11.38 23.65

15 Leak of N-propanol unloading hose 2.39 3.68 3.72 1.80 3.57 3.75 16 Rupture of N-propanol unloading hose 8.23 20.16 36.15 8.07 12.23 25.92 17 Leak of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing 1.75 3.32 3.41 1.37 2.72 3.45


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S No. Scenarios Distance to concentration results (m)

1.5F Weather Condition 5D Weather condition UFL LFL LFL Frac UFL LFL LFL Frac

unit


19 Leak of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 1.72 3.00 4.52 1.30 2.13 2.70


Analysis:

In case of Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck, at a weather condition of 1.5 F, UFL concentration is present up to a maximum downwind distance of 22.26 m, In case of Rupture of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) LFL concentration is present up to a maximum downwind distance of 50.93 m and LFL Fraction concentration is present up to a maximum distance of 82.92 m.


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CHAPTER 6 RISK ASSESSMENT


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6.1. RISK PRESENTATION Individual Risk: The Individual Risk calculation can be done using the specific locations of the known sources at the establishment. The Individual Risk represents the frequency of an individual dying due to loss of containment events (LOCs). The individual is assumed to be unprotected and to be present during the total exposure time. The Individual Risk is presented as contour lines on a topographic map. Overall individual risk contour for the proposed enhancement of the bulk drug unit is presented in Figure 1. Societal Risk: The Societal Risk calculation can be done using the specific locations of the known sources at the establishment and outside the establishment. The Societal Risk represents the frequency of having an accident with N or more people being killed simultaneously. The people involved are assumed to have some means of protection. The Societal Risk is presented as an FN curve, where N is the number of deaths and F the cumulative frequency of accident s with N or more deaths. F-N curve for the proposed enhancement of the bulk drug unit is presented in Figure 2. LOC Event Frequencies:

The event failure frequency of LOC scenarios are listed below. Sources of event failure frequency are from CPR 18E and OGP database.

Table 14: LOC Event Frequencies

S No. Loss of Containment Scenarios Failure frequency

Storage Tanks & Tank Trucks 1 Leak of Furnace oil storage tank 1.00E-04 2 Rupture of Furnace oil storage tank 5.00E-06 3 Leak of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 1.00E-04 4 Rupture of Diesel storage tank (horizontal tank) 5.00E-06 5 Leak of N-Propanol storage tank 1.00E-04 6 Rupture of N-Propanol storage tank 5.00E-06 7 Leak of N-Propanol tanker truck 5.00E-07 8 Rupture of N-Propanol tanker truck 1.00E-05 9 Leak of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 1.00E-04

10 Rupture of Acetone storage tank (horizontal tank) 5.00E-06 11 Leak of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 5.00E-07 12 Rupture of N-Propyl Bromide tanker truck 1.00E-05

Piping 13 Leak of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 3.25E-04


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S No. Loss of Containment Scenarios Failure frequency

14 Rupture of Piping from N-Propanol Storage Tank to Processing unit 6.50E-05 15 Leak of N-propanol unloading hose 2.50E-02 16 Rupture of N-propanol unloading hose 2.50E-03 17 Leak of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 3.50E-04 18 Rupture of Piping from acetone Storage Tank to Processing unit 7.00E-05

19 Leak of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 1.00E-04

20 Rupture of Piping from N-Propyl bromide tanker truck to Processing unit 2.00E-05


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Overall Individual Risk Contour for Anjan Drug Private Limited Gummidipoondi Facility

Figure 1: Overall Individual Risk Contour


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Societal Risk (F-N Curve):

Figure 2: F-N Curve


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CHAPTER 7

RISK ANALYSIS AND CONTROL MEASURES


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7.1 RISK ACCEPTANCE

In India, there are no defined criteria for risk acceptance. However, in IS 15656 Code of Practice for Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis, Annexure E summarizes the risk criteria adopted in some countries. Extracts for the same is presented below:

Table 15: Risk Acceptability Criteria

Authority and Application Maximum

Tolerable Risk (Per Year)

Negligible Risk (Per Year)

VROM, The Netherlands (New) 1.0E-6 1.0E-8

VROM, The Netherlands (Existing) 1.0E-5 1.0E-8

HSE, UK (Existing Hazardous Industry) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6

HSE, UK (New Industries) 1.0E-5 1.0E-6

HSE, UK (Substance Transport) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6

HSE, UK (New Housing Near Plants) 3 x 1.0E-6 3 x 1.0E-7

Hong Kong Government (New Plants) 1.00E-5 Not Used

To achieve the above risk acceptance criteria, ALARP principle was followed while suggesting risk reduction recommendations

Unacceptable region Risk cannot be justified

The ALARP or tolerability Region (risk is undertaken Only if a benefit is Desired)

Tolerable only if further risk reduction is impractical, or the cost is not proportionate to the benefit gained

Broadly acceptable Region

Negligible risk

Risks closer to the unacceptable region merit a closer examination of potential risk reduction measures

10-4 Per annum

10-6 Per annum


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Table 16: Risk Summary

S No. Location Individual Risk /avg. year

1 Admin building Negligible 2 Canteen Negligible 3 Boiler house - 1 1.77E-06 4 ETP plant 3.56E-05 5 Multipurpose finishing block 1.26E-04 6 Multipurpose plant 2.48E-06 7 Power house 1 2.96E-06 8 QC lab 7.57E-07 9 Raw material stores 1.92E-07

10 Solvent storage area 1.50E-04 11 Power house 2 Negligible 12 Boiler house 2 Negligible 13 Security room Negligible 14 At ADPL plant boundary (North side) 1.84E-06 15 At ADPL plant boundary (South side) 5.99E-08 16 At ADPL plant boundary (East side) 3.16E-13 17 At ADPL plant boundary (West side) 7.31E-05

Legend:

Acceptability of Risk is provided as per UK HSE as follows:

Unacceptable risk: Risk greater than 1.00E-04 per average year ALARP: Between 1.00E-04 and 1.00E-06 per average year Acceptable risk: Risk less than 1.00E-06 per average year)

With reference to the risk acceptance criteria specified by HSE, UK in IS 15656:2006 - Code of Practice on Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis it is observed that the risk levels of Admin building, Canteen, Power house 2, Boiler house 2 and Security room are negligible, QC lab and Raw material stores are in Acceptable region. Boiler house 1, ETP plant, Multipurpose finishing block, Multipurpose plant, Power house 1, Solvent storage area are in ALARP region. The risk levels in ALARP is expected to come down to acceptable limits if all the control measures recommended in this report are implemented in addition to the existing risk control measures.

Unacceptable ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) Acceptable


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7.2 RISK CONTROL MEASURES SUGGESTED

Recommendations

1. Ensure that periodical inspection and thickness measurement are to be carried out for the proposed storage tanks as specified by OISD129-Inspection of Storage Tanks

2. As per OISD 119, ensure bunds provided at the solvent storage tank area have proper drainage system.

3. Ensure that foam Pourers are to be made available for the proposed storage tank area as per OISD-117.

4. Portable monitors/foam hose streams shall be provided for fighting fires in dyked area and spills.

5. Spill control kit and procedure shall be in place to contain any spill, clean them up properly and dispose off any containment waste safely.

6. Windsocks are to be installed for knowing wind direction during emergency. 7. Ensure mutual training sessions and mock drills related to first aid, fire fighting and

evacuation should be conducted to appraise and train different levels of responders in emergency control.

Conclusion: The above risk control measures are recommended in addition to the existing risk control measures to maintain the risk levels within ALARP and acceptable region.


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CHAPTER 8

REFERENCES


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8.1 REFERENCES

IS 15656:2006: Hazard identification and risk analysis - Code of Practice

Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment CPR 18E (Purple book), Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands (Edition: PGS 3, 2005)

Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures - Centre for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, 1992.

Documents

Proposed Expansion of the Bulk Drug Unit At...As per OISD 119, ensure bunds provided at the solvent storage tank area have proper drainage system. 3. Ensure that foam Pourers are to