URN 07/1613

ADVANCE ALLOCATION

Proposal on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION

NOVEMBER 2007

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Proposal on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield

Response to Consultation

Contents Pages Introduction Background About the Proposal Summary of Responses to Questions Annex A List of respondents Annex B Copy of full responses

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Introduction In June 2007 the DTI, now BERR, published a consultation seeking views on an “advanced allocation” proposal on how to manage overseas spent fuel at Sellafield. Before publishing the consultation document, BERR discussed the proposal with other relevant government departments and regulators to assess and understand the practical impact of the proposal. Those views were incorporated into the consultation document. The consultation originally ran for six weeks, ending on 26 July 2007. It was subsequently extended until 10 October. BERR is grateful to everyone who responded both formally and informally. All the views expressed have been considered carefully and have helped to determine whether there were any consequences or significant factors that could have been overlooked in our initial assessment of this proposal. A summary of the responses received to the consultation and the Government’s response is set out below. Background Overseas and UK spent fuel is reprocessed in the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at Sellafield in Cumbria to recover and separate the reusable nuclear materials, plutonium and uranium, from the waste. Much of the work done at THORP is for overseas customers. Once the materials have been recovered through reprocessing, they can be returned to the customers. However, customers often want the return of plutonium in the form of MOX fuel, which can then be reused in their reactors. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) sought the approval of DTI to allocate to overseas customers under certain circumstances, reusable nuclear materials and waste from UK stocks in advance of the actual recovery of the customers’ materials and waste from reprocessing and any subsequent use of it to produce MOX fuel. The advance allocation would be for an equal amount of materials and waste to that arising from the physical reprocessing of the overseas customer’s spent fuel and would be effected by a simultaneous transfer of titles. Such a proposal would help to ensure the return of these materials and waste to the overseas customer in a timely manner and one that would be acceptable to them.

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About the proposal The proposal would guarantee the availability of nuclear materials to overseas customers on a timescale which meets their needs and which best facilitates the timely return of waste, plutonium and uranium. This proposal does not affect the broader approach to waste management and is essentially a business matter between the customer, the NDA which owns the site and Sellafield Ltd which operates the site and manages the contracts for the benefit of the NDA through a management and operations contract. This proposal was referred to BERR for approval in line with governance arrangements relating to reprocessing activities. BERR was minded to approve the proposal on the basis that: • Advance allocation of material is within the policy covering the import of overseas spent fuel for reprocessing (Cm 2919). • It is intended that all the overseas spent fuel covered by existing overseas contracts will be reprocessed. • There will be no net increase in the stocks of nuclear materials or waste held in the UK. • The proposal is environmentally neutral. Summary of responses received. The DTI received a total of 24 responses from a variety of interested parties including, business, private individuals, local authorities, and overseas governments. A list of those who responded can be seen at annex A. Category of respondent Number

Business 7 Private individual 5 Trade association / union 3 Local Authority 3 NGO 3 Regulator 1 Overseas Government 2

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General comments Most respondents support the use of advance allocation as a pragmatic way to manage overseas customers’ spent fuel. Some, wanted to know more about the origin of the UK stocks of plutonium that would be used for advance allocation and there were some who voiced their opposition to continued reprocessing activities and suggested that advanced allocation could be used to facilitate the closure of THORP. One respondent asked for clarification on whether waste substitution was to be implemented and whether differences in the isotopic compositions between the UK plutonium and that contained in the spent fuel would be considered. Government’s Response. The Government considers that advanced allocation offers a sensible approach to managing the overseas spent fuel awaiting reprocessing at Sellafield. While we recognise that for some, the closure of THORP would be a welcome prospect, the consultation document makes it clear that THORP forms a necessary part of the overall process and that it is intended that the spent fuel will continue to be reprocessed. There is therefore no expectation that THORP will close, and fail to honour existing contracts, as a result of advance allocation. The question of whether or not waste substitution is implemented is not within the scope of this consultation. The amount of and type of waste that will be returned to overseas customers will be the same whether or not advance allocation takes place. The plutonium that may be used in advance allocation has been recovered from reprocessing spent fuel in THORP before being transferred to NDA ownership. When determining what is an equal amount of plutonium to that contained in the spent fuel belonging to overseas customers, the isotopic composition of the plutonium is a factor that is considered. The age of the material is also considered and appropriate decay calculations to take it into account ensure that equality based on the fissile plutonium content. Responses to specific questions Question 1: The proposal Are there any possible consequences of this proposal which the Government might not have anticipated? None of the responses identified any consequences that had not been anticipated. Among the comments received on this question were that the early return of foreign waste was an advantage of the proposal, the

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safe storage of nuclear materials at Sellafield cannot be compromised and must take precedence over commercial considerations, there should be Euratom agreement for the substitution and that there should be a way of addressing any discrepancies between what was allocated in advance and what was derived from actual reprocessing. Government’s Response Prior to the launch of the consultation, EURATOM had been contacted and stated that they were happy with the concept of substitution of materials under advance allocation. However, for each instance of advance allocation EURATOM agreement on the contracts will be required. The allocation of plutonium to customers under the advance allocation arrangements will be based on the fissile quantity of plutonium in their spent fuel, which together with appropriate decay calculations and taking account of historic factors for estimated versus measured isotopic composition, will ensure that there is equivalence with respect to plutonium allocated to a particular customer and that which will be recovered from the reprocessing of their spent fuel. Question 2: Other comments Are there any significant factors that we may have overlooked that would influence our decision on the NDA’s proposal? No one suggested that there were any significant factors that we had overlooked. Some respondents acknowledged the issues that may arise in the unlikely event that THORP is permanently closed before it could reprocess the material. Government’s Response Although it remains unlikely that THORP would not be able to reprocess the spent fuel belonging to the customer in the case of advance allocation, we believe that the issue was rightly identified and addressed in the consultation document. The Government is encouraged by the overall positive response and the general recognition of the benefits that advance allocation can bring. It should be noted that where advance allocation arrangements are proposed by the NDA, there remains a requirement for them to obtain agreement from the Secretary of State in line with the commitment in the White Paper “Managing the Nuclear Legacy”.

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List of respondents ANNEX A

R Hargreaves Amicus Allerdale Borough Council Magnox North D Pratt Government of Ireland Nuclear Industry Association Isle of Man Government Kansai Electric Power Co Nuclear Free Local Authorities Steering Committee Sellafield Ltd British Nuclear Energy Society Copeland Borough Council Nuclear Management Partners Ltd Overseas Reprocessing Committee J Chanay Environment Agency CORE Greenpeace Cumbria County Council Dr D Lowry

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Copy of full responses ANNEX B Consultation on managing overseas spent fuel awaiting reprocessing at Sellafield. June/July 2007 I have read the document describing the proposal under consultation (URN07/1071), and have the following comments. Irradiated nuclear fuel is a rich source of further nuclear fuel when subjected to reprocessing, and the re-use of the products from reprocessing provides an essentially ‘carbon-free’ contribution to world energy resources. The proposal as written is a reasonable, pragmatic solution to the problem of balancing supply and demand for overseas fuel customers and I see no difficulties with its implementation. It is important that the commitment to reprocessing the overseas fuel, which is clearly stated in the document, is fulfilled so that the UK stock of the reprocessed elements is not depleted. In a world facing a growing population with an understandable and quite proper expectation of a decent standard of living, we can not afford to discard this valuable source of energy. Indeed it would be quite un-ethical to do so. Given this commitment, I believe that the proposal should be supported. I write as a private individual with some 40 years experience of handling and researching irradiated nuclear fuel and associated fission products. R. Hargreaves. 15 June 2007

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DR/BH 18th June 2007 Dean Gallacher Department of Trade and Industry Nuclear Consultations and Liabilities Unit 1 Victoria Street London SW1H 0ET BY EMAIL Dear Dean, NDA – SELLAFIELD REPROCESSING PROPOSAL Thank you for your letter of 12th June 2007 together with Consultation Document, 'Proposal on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting reprocessing at Sellafield'. Our Union has over 1,000 members employed at the Sellafield Plant and we are very much involved in discussions on a range of issues with the Management team from the Sellafield Site Licence Company. With regard to this particular proposal from the NDA our Union wishes to record its support and we are of the view that the Department of Trade and Industry should agree to same. Yours sincerely, DOUGIE ROONEY National Officer

Hayes Court West Common road

Bromley Kent BR2 7AU

General Secretary Derek Simpson

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Dean, I wish to make the following points about the above, as a member of the public. 1. There is no mention in the document about agreement with Euratom about such substitution arrangements. It may be necessary to have strict accountancy methods in place to ensure accurate accounting of waste. I assume agreement has been reached with Euratom/IAEA. 2. There is no mention of legislation in the customer countries being willing to adopt such a strategy. This should be confirmed. Regards David Pratt

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Our Ref: 8/5/29-1

13th July 2007 Dean Gallacher Department of Trade and Industry Nuclear Consultations and Liabilities Unit 1 Victoria Street London SW1H 0ET United Kingdom

Consultation on Advance Allocation Dear Dean: I refer to the Consultation on Advance Allocation: Proposal on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield; distributed for comments on 13 June 2007. The comments set out below are submitted on behalf of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government. Ireland’s nuclear policy Ireland does not consider that nuclear energy provides a real sustainable energy option on the grounds of the many risks it poses to human health, the environment and the economy, as well as the risks associated with waste and transport. Many countries do not share these views on this issue and Ireland recognizes that it is the sovereign right of each country including the UK to decide on its energy mix. However, the issues for Ireland arising from decisions made by the UK on nuclear policy are well known and long standing. Issues arise for the Irish Government in regard to many aspects of the UK nuclear industry, including radioactive discharges to the Irish Sea, the danger of accidents, the continued reprocessing of spent fuel, the threat of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities, proliferation issues, marine transports of nuclear fuel as well as waste and the risks arising from the

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proximity of nuclear power stations located in the UK to Ireland itself. The views of the Irish Government are informed by the experience of past events in regard to many of these aspects of the industry. It is in regard to the continued reprocessing operations at the Sellafield nuclear facility that the Irish Government has for very many years expressed deep concerns. These concerns are informed by the long standing poor safety, environmental, and operational history of the Sellafield facility which regrettably remains a continuing feature of the Sellafield Nuclear Plant to the present day. There is a history of leaks, failed assurances, data falsification, bad management, poor training, serious operational issues, mistakes made in construction, low safety standards and discharges that will pollute the Irish Sea for millennia. These concerns have been articulated regularly by the Irish Government at Prime Ministerial, Ministerial and Senior Official level with UK counterparts and also at relevant international fora. The well documented leak at the THORP plant in April 2005 represents the most recent and serious chapter in the long standing poor operational safety record at Sellafield. It is against this policy background that the comments made in this submission on behalf of the Irish Government must be considered. In short, the Irish Government considers that reprocessing operations at Sellafield are economically and environmentally untenable and carry serious associated safety risks. For these reasons it is the firm view of the Irish Government that the necessary steps should be taken as soon as possible to bring an end to reprocessing operations and to safely decommission the plant without adverse effect on the environment. Advanced Allocation Proposal: We note in the consultation document (Para 21) that the NDA has asked DTI to agree to the NDA separating the performance of the THORP Plant from the availability of material for reprocessing This is to be achieved by allocating in advance of reprocessing, materials (wastes) in quantities that were equal to those that would be recovered following actual reprocessing. While this represents the main principle of the proposed policy adaptation under consultation here, we do not believe that such a separation is appropriate. Clearly as the consultation document acknowledges, the prolonged outage of THORP and its impact on the timely repatriation of the products of reprocessing to overseas customers has prompted the consideration of this advanced allocation proposal.

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Ireland considers that the consultation document lacks detailed information against which this issue needs to be considered. In particular, the document does not include information as to whether all currently contracted foreign spent fuel for reprocessing is on site in the UK or some remains to be transported to the UK, the amount of foreign spent fuel that this proposal potentially relates to, the planned estimated impact on throughput capacity and timetable for completion of reprocessing operations of a reopened THORP Plant (we note in this regard that THORP currently has consent to restart under which these issues will have been addressed), and a clear and unequivocal statement regarding the future of reprocessing at Sellafield. In this regard we note that the current UK Energy Review has indicated that “The Government has concluded that any nuclear stations that might be built in the UK should proceed on the basis that spent fuel will not be reprocessed”. Given the stated UK Government position on reprocessing set out in the Energy Review consultation, the fact that no new reprocessing contracts are currently planned, the prolonged outage of THORP and the uncertainties regarding the potential but unwelcome re-opening of the plant, the serious problems associated with current provision of evaporator capacity for both THORP and MAGNOX reprocessing, the stated need to prioritise the completion of the MAGNOX programme over THORP and the NII specification to address the Highly Active Liquor stocks, it is Ireland’s view that the current consultation requires a significantly wider context than that in which it is currently framed. In relation to Para 24 where it is stated that Advance Allocation will only be supported by the NDA in a given case where there is specific justification and it is satisfied an appropriate economic benefit arises, the consultation document gives little indication of the criteria on which consideration of a case for justification might be based and how an economic benefit may arise. The statement of intention to continue to reprocesss the spent fuel under contract indicates that economic rather than environmental and safety considerations remain the primary factors in determining reprocessing policy for the THORP plant. The consultation document at Paragraph 31 expresses the view that advanced allocation will be “broadly neutral in term of its net effect on the environment”. However, the proposal for advanced allocation could well go further in prompting a positive benefit for the environment if the proposal was not compromised with the stated commitment to reprocess all the spent fuel. The Irish Government believes it is wrong that there is deliberate discharge of waste to the marine and terrestrial environments

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causing contamination both in the immediate area and further afield and does not accept that it is an acceptable waste management option. Again for this reason and those referred to above, a significantly wider context for this consultation is in our view, necessary. As the consultation is currently framed, the proposal for advance allocation, were it to be proceeded with, will neither address nor exacerbate the current serious concerns the Irish Government has with the reprocessing operations at Sellafield Nuclear Plant. However the fact that it proposes no policy change in relation to the intention by the UK to maintain the current reprocessing programme of THORP compromises the proposal and represents another missed opportunity to address the ongoing significant safety and environmental concerns of the Irish Government regarding reprocessing operations at Sellafield. The Irish Government considers that advance allocation can make a significant contribution to the cessation of reprocessing in Sellafield. The cessation of reprocessing is justified on the basis of safety, economic and environmental considerations, but Advance Allocation must form part of a programmed cessation of reprocessing at Sellafield. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments on the Advance Allocation Consultation. Yours sincerely,

_________________ Peter Brazel, Assistant Principal, Nuclear Safety Section.

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DTI Consultation: Advance Allocation: Proposals on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield. Comments from the Nuclear Free Local Authorities Steering Committee The Nuclear Free Local Authorities is happy for the information in this submission to be made public. Background 1. The Nuclear Free Local Authorities (NFLA) has previously expressed concern about the merits of continuing to operate Magnox power stations, the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) and the MoX/plutonium fuel fabrication plant (SMP). [1] It was the view of the NFLA Steering Committee (NSC) legal officer that the NDA’s first Annual Plan should have been subject to a strategic environmental assessment which would have meant that alternatives to the continued operation of Magnox reactors, Magnox reprocessing, THORP and SMP should have been set out and consulted on. NFLA also opposed the [expressed concern in the past about ] the the SMP project and its implementation from the outset on all the grounds that have proved its undoing and the transport of weapons-useable plutonium fuel from the UK to Sellafield’s overseas customers in particular. Any comments made here regarding advance allocation should, therefore, not be taken as support by NFLA for either reprocessing of spent fuel or the manufacture of MoX fuel. 2. The 2007/8 Annual Plan says, subject to the re-start of THORP, the NDA expects to continue with existing contracts to manage and reprocess spent nuclear fuel for UK and overseas customers. [2] The Government has argued in the past that existing THORP reprocessing contracts must be honoured because:- “To do otherwise would break existing contractual commitments and Government Undertakings”. [3] This statement clearly only applies to overseas contracts - not those with British Energy (BE). BE has previously called for an end to its reprocessing contracts. A BE spokesman stated that: "We simply do not believe in reprocessing because of its huge costs and we want to renegotiate this contract. We are paying six times as much to deal with our spent fuel as American generators do at a time when electricity costs have fallen markedly” [4]. BE has also stated that reprocessing “…has left us with a service we don’t need, for a product we don’t want, and at a price we cannot afford” [5]. 3. THORP has now been closed for over two years. If it does not re-open at all, the Government says in the current consultation that it is prepared to consider keeping all un-reprocessed overseas fuel in the UK. It is understood that around 800 tonnes of overseas spent fuel is still waiting to be reprocessed at THORP if or when it re-starts. 4. Many of the contracts for THORP were signed in the 1970s. With the passage of time the uneconomic nature of reprocessing has become clear. There is no evidence that the NDA or BNFL has ever asked its overseas customers if they would prefer to leave their spent fuel unreprocessed. This should be the first task, before deciding whether or not to re-open THORP. 5. Even if overseas customers insist on receiving the products of reprocessing their spent fuel, there is sufficient plutonium and other materials for their needs already stockpiled at Sellafield. It would only make sense to continue reprocessing if UK plutonium owners required further plutonium. It is questionable, therefore, if virtual reprocessing is approved, whether THORP needs to be re-opened at all. Undertakings made to overseas customers could be met without reprocessing any of the outstanding spent fuel. Safety

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6. The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) has noted “strategically significant concerns” about the integrity of evaporators, which concentrate the highly dangerous liquid waste. It says there are significant uncertainties about the remaining life of the evaporators, and it continues to press BNG to develop new evaporator capacity. The inspectors have also voiced concerns about the cooling coils needed to prevent the tanks of highly radioactive liquor overheating. A number of cooling coils have failed. A failure causes a breakthrough of radioactivity into the cooling water circuits which can lead to a radioactive release if not properly managed. The cooling coil failure rates and the location of recent failed coils has led to uncertainties over the ability of the newer high level liquid waste tanks to comply with the NII’s requirements for reducing the volume of highly radioactive liquid waste. The inspectors also said BNG is not keeping staffing levels at a high enough level. [6] 7. The priority should now be the management of high level liquid waste which has already been produced, and, if at all possible, not adding to this extremely dangerous legacy. The advantages of keeping THORP closed are illustrated by the impact on stocks of highly active liquid (HAL) waste of THORP’s temporary closure over the past two years. In January 2001, the NII used its legal powers to require the backlog of HAL stocks to be reduced to a minimal working level, known as the buffer volume, by 2015. In it latest biennial review of HAL stocks the NII says the volume of HAL stored at the site has fallen approximately five times faster than the rate legally required over the last two years. [7]

Economics

8. Commercial work at Sellafield is not profitable, according to an analysis of the NDA’s Annual Plan by Jackson Consulting. The work will generate an annual income of £615.2 million (or £775.2 million with waste substitution) in 2007/08 but the operating costs will be £866.2 million, implying a loss of £91.0 million to £251.0 million. [8]

Future Strategy

9. The NDA Strategy points oUT that spent AGR fuel will be stored in the THORP storage pond for up to 85 years after THORP has closed. The Strategy says there needs to be an assessment of the full life-cycle implications of spent fuel management. “This proposal has not been fully explored and does not currently have regulatory support”. [9] Clearly, a strategy for the management of unreprocessed spent AGR fuel is going to have to be worked out whatever happens. The 2007/8 Annual Plan says that the NDA expects to complete our review of the options for the future management of civil spent nuclear fuels in 2007/8. [10] A full open and transparent debate should be conducted when this review has been published and before THORP is re-opened. Conclusion 10. The proposals set out in the DTI’s consultation on Advance Allocation represent a wasted opportunity. It would be perfectly feasible to meet the THORP’s commitments to its overseas customers without re-opening the plant – ideally by coming to an arrangement with the customers which did not involve the transport of MoX fuel or weapons-useable plutonium. 11. Not re-opening THORP would mean that stocks of dangerous highly active liquid held at Sellafield could be reduced more quickly that was envisaged by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate when it issued it legal order in January 2001. 12. There is no requirement for further reprocessing products in the UK. Indeed the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology recommended that the bulk of the UK’s

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plutonium stockpile should be declared a waste. [11] It would certainly be pre-mature to re-open THORP before the NDA has completed its review of options for the management of spent fuel, and a full open and transparent debate has been conducted. 13. The DTI says Government policy is to keep THORP open until “overseas contracts have been completed”. If advance allocation is carried out, the overseas spent fuel becomes the equivalent of UK spent fuel – since the products will then be in UK ownership. As there are no plans to extend the life of THORP beyond that required to reprocess overseas spent fuel, it is therefore illogical to continue with efforts to re-open the plant. 24th July 2007 [1] See for example, Radioactive Waste Policy Briefing No.13, September 2005. http://www.nuclearpolicy.info/docs/radwaste/RWB13.pdf [2] NDA Annual Plan 2007/8 http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=11428 [3] “Managing the Nuclear Legacy” DTI, July 2002 para 5.18 [4] Nuclear Giant in Spent Fuel Switch. James Freeman and Catherine MacLeod. Herald 15th November 2001. [5] Nucleonics Week (2001) BE Blames Reprocessing Charges for Higher UK Operating Costs. Vol. 42 No. 46. page 6. 15th November. [6] HSE Quarterly Report to the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group, January 2007 to March 2007 http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/llc/2007/sellafield1.htm [7] Appendix 1 of the HSE quarterly report to the West Cumbria Sites Stakeholder Group. (1st Jan 2007 to 31st March 2007) http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/llc/2007/sellafield1.htm [8] Nuclear Engineering International 5th June 2007 http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?sectioncode=76&storyCode=2044778 Based on a longer report: Decommissioning Spending: What’s Changing, By How Much and Why? A Brief Analysis of the Government’s Nuclear Site Spending Plan 2007/8 http://www.jacksonconsult.com/content_pdf/Updated_NDA_Spending_Report.pdf [9] NDA Strategy 2006, http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=4957 [10] NDA Annual Plan 2007/8 http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=11428 [11] House of Lords Session 1998-99 Third Report of the Select Committee on Science and Technology, “Management of Nuclear Waste” (March 1999).

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Response to the DTI (BERR) consultation on:

Advance Allocation. Proposal on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield – Dated June 2007.

Document Reference URN 07/1071 Response Deadline 26 July 2007. The British Nuclear Energy Society (BNES), the Institution of Nuclear Engineers (INucE) and the Young Generation Network (YGN) (the Organisations) are pleased to have received your invitation to respond to the consultation on “Advance Allocation: Proposal on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield” – Dated June 2007. This response has been compiled based on a draft circulated to the BNES Board of Trustees, the INucE Council and the Executive committee of the YGN. Hence it is considered to represent the considered views of the largest independent learned society related to the nuclear sector. The proposal submitted by the Nuclear decommissioning Authority (NDA) can be summarised as the repatriation of nuclear materials and radioactive waste product related to overseas spent fuel reprocessing from UK stocks in advance of the actual reprocessing of the fuel. Advantages to the overseas country involved and to the commercial position of the NDA thereby potentially releasing money for decommissioning and clean up are the benefits. Fundamentally the Organisations fully support this proposal. The consultation requested views on two specific questions: Question 1; The proposal Are there any possible consequences of this proposal which the Government might not have anticipated? Response: The proposal does not seem to include any facility for reconciliation of discrepancies in amounts between what might have been sent back and what is actually derived from the actual reprocessing of the precise spent fuel when it occurs. Presumably the amount of material returned to overseas clients is based on advised fuel enrichment, irradiation times, and the time out of the reactor before reprocessing. As this assessment is based on calculation it could actually differ from actual arisings when the specific fuel is reprocessed. Although the expectation would be that differences would be very small the capability to address and if necessary reconcile these discrepancies should be covered within these arrangements.

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Question 2; Other comments Are there any significant factors that we may have overlooked that would influence our decision on the NDA’s proposal. Response: No significant factors have been identified. Our main concern related to this proposal was the impact should THORP be prematurely shut down. However we note that this aspect is adequately addressed in paragraphs 23 and 29. Although we recognise the remote possibility; in the unfortunate eventuality that THORP is closed early, we note that in accordance with Paragraph 29 any subsequent action would be subject to a further public consultation. BNES/INucE/YGN would like to register their interest in being involved with such a consultation. We trust this consultation response proves of interest. In the event that further input or discussion is required we are jointly happy to take part in any follow up that you may feel is valid and helpful to the process. Please contact us through the Societies’ Executive Secretary.

Signature

Neil Crewdson Chair

BNES YGN

Signature Signature John E Earp Dr. David Whitworth President President BNES INucE

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Response by Nuclear Management Partners Ltd. to the Department of Trade and Industry Consultation: Proposal on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield

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Nuclear Management Partners Ltd (NMP), a consortium composed of Washington Group International, AMEC and AREVA for the “Competition for a PBO for the Sellafield SLC” thanks BERR (formerly DTI) for the opportunity to comment on its Proposal dated 14 June 2007 on “How to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting reprocessing at Sellafield (advance allocation)”. NMP’s joint comments, following consultation between the three NMP partners and based on their combined extensive experience in the relevant areas, are as follows: NMP supports the concept of the Proposal, recognising that; it is intended that all overseas spent fuel covered by existing overseas contracts will be reprocessed; there will be no net increase in the stocks of nuclear materials held in the UK; the proposal is environmentally neutral. NMP recognises and supports the revenue and administrative benefits to NDA in the shorter-term to mitigate current operational difficulties. At the same time NMP stresses its opinion of the need to ensure successful commercial operations at Sellafield , in particular noting the potential to make use of NMP’s practical experience in successful operation of recycling plants in France together with NMP Partners’ associated experience. NMP recognises the need to make a success of the environmental, safety or commercial aspects of Sellafield commercial operations together with recognition of the resulting socio-economic benefits to the region. Indeed Thorp is the main facility available on Sellafield site able to generate significant revenues in the short and longer term, so as to fund part of the NDA decommissioning programme and thus to reduce the burden on the tax payer. This is also an important element for the socio-economic sustainability of the region. With this in mind , NMP recommends that advance allocations should only be used in the minimum number of cases until the NDA’s new contractor can bring Thorp back into full scale operation, so that the overall long term economic benefit to the UK from nuclear recycling is maximised NMP remains at the disposal of BERR, if more detail on the above summary comments would be helpful. NMP informs BERR that it has no objection to the above comments being published, in the spirit of openness, which NMP regards as essential for public confidence in the civil nuclear industry and for mutually beneficial socio-economic partnership.

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RESPONSE TO DTI (now BERR) CONSULTATION

ADVANCED ALLOCATION: PROPOSAL ON HOW TO

MANAGE OVERSEAS SPENT FUEL AWAITING PROCESSING AT SELLAFIELD

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The storage and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel results in radioactive discharges to the environment; such discharges are regulated by the Environment Agency. We have an interest in the advance allocation proposals that might affect the level or timing of discharges and radioactive waste arisings.

2.0 ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF ADVANCE ALLOCATION

2.1 The consultation document states that the net effect on the environment from advanced allocation is broadly neutral provided the storage regime for the fuel is properly managed. While this statement is true, and “advance allocation” in itself should not have an adverse effect, the recent problems with highly active liquor evaporators has meant that there is currently insufficient capacity to support Magnox and THORP reprocessing. Reprocessing programmes may be deferred which would have an impact on the reprocessing timetable. During extended storage, discharges to the environment from the fuel storage ponds will continue. Also, extended fuel storage could result in additional secondary wastes released to the environment if storage conditions are not properly managed. We will expect the operator to manage fuel storage conditions in order to minimise the activity of wastes arising and any radioactive discharges.

2.2 We note the commitment given in the government’s Justification Register that "BNFL have undertaken that it will not use SMP for the manufacture of MOX fuel from plutonium other than plutonium separated in THORP and belonging to foreign customers without first seeking clearance from the responsible Secretary of State to proceed." We presume that approval from the Secretary of State will be sought in advance of UK owned fissile material being used in the manufacture of MOX fuel assemblies.

3.0 CONCLUSIONS 3.1 We do not consider that Government has overlooked any consequences, or

significant factors, in relation to the proposal.

3.2 We agree that, while the fuel is being properly managed, the proposals are environmentally neutral. However, we recommend that careful consideration

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is given to any future proposals to re-schedule reprocessing of overseas spent fuel, and that such decisions should only be taken with the agreement of the nuclear safety and environmental regulators.

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A response by CORE (Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment) to the DTI’s Advance Allocation Proposal on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield. The NDA is proposing is to allocate and use in the Sellafield MOX plant plutonium from UK stocks in lieu of overseas plutonium that remains locked up in overseas spent fuel that has not yet been reprocessed in THORP. The initial beneficiaries of the proposal are likely to be German utilities whose power stations are under scheduled closure dates. The proposal has been termed Advance Allocation which, in all but name, physically represents Virtual Reprocessing, albeit on a temporary basis and on an assumption that THORP will eventually reprocess the overseas fuel. The proposal, which the DTI is ‘presently minded to endorse’ is subject to period of public consultation reduced to 6 weeks, between 14th June and 26th July 2007. CORE’s response to the NDA proposal is less than a full response and is made with reluctance in that the consultation document contains insufficient information upon which to make a well founded and reasoned response, and that the consultation period is too short for all the necessary research to be completed and independent advice and assessment secured by the deadline. The consultation document itself contains numerous assumptions and ambiguities, and significant amounts of information considered to be highly relevant to the proposed flag-swapping and subsequent use of UK plutonium in SMP is omitted. CORE’s response is therefore based solely on the scant and, in some cases, what it considers to be misleading and irrelevant information provided in the consultation document. The response raises a significant number of questions which, to enable a full and proper response to be made, must be answered without delay and before any approval is given by the Secretary of State. Consideration is being given to the taking of further advice on the validity of the consultation process, the legitimacy of the intended use of UK plutonium in SMP and the legality of any decision taken by the Secretary of State to approve the proposal. The response highlights the many possible consequences of the proposal which Government appears not to have anticipated, and other significant factors that have been overlooked – and which should influence the DTI to reject the NDA proposal without further assessment of the points raised below. CORE’s limited response is in two Sections, the first relating to the shortcomings of the consultation document itself including questions on omissions, ambiguities, irrelevances etc. The second Section relates to the use of UK plutonium in a plant (SMP) that is not licensed for such use without prior regulatory assessment and further Justification.

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1. The Consultation Document. The title of the consultation document ‘Proposal on how to manage overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield’ is misleading in that it portrays a proposal for the physical management of spent fuel whereas in reality the proposal is about circumventing the current unavailability of overseas plutonium for use in SMP resulting from THORP’s extended shut-down following the 2005 accident. The only clue to this is that: “The temporary but prolonged outage of THORP and closure of some European reactors has meant that its reprocessing timetable is no longer in line with that for the MOX fuel fabrication , putting at risk MOX fuel delivery to overseas customers …” (para 24). By any reading, approval for the proposal – even as a stop-gap until THORP returns to full production – signals Government consent for Virtual reprocessing as a legitimate spent fuel management option. Contrary to the advice in the consultation document that the adoption of Advance Allocation constitutes no change in Policy (para 26), the NDA has earlier confirmed that virtual reprocessing ‘would represent a departure from current Government policy’ (NDA THORP non-restart and restart options paper). Such a departure from Policy has significantly wider implications in terms of assessments, approvals and justification required than are provided for this consultation. The implications, which involve a wider and more comprehensive process of consultation, are wholly omitted from the consultation document. The NDA proposal for Advance Allocation is given in ‘outline’ only for consultation purposes (para 5). This confirms that the consultation document does not contain detailed information on the proposal. Outline information cannot be construed as full information and is unlikely to meet the criteria required by Government guidelines on public consultation. On this point, CORE notes the 2006 High Court ruling (15/2/07) on the Government’s Energy Review consultation that information given to consultees was ‘wholly insufficient for them to make an intelligent response’. The Advance Allocation consultation presents a similar shortcoming. As such, and given that the proposal does indeed represent a departure from Policy, the reduction of the consultation period from 12 to 6 weeks is unjustified, particularly as the period coincides with the Summer holiday period. The proposal is based on the assumptions i) that THORP will eventually separate from overseas spent fuel the plutonium which the NDA is now proposing to swap in advance from UK stocks and ii) that SMP will manufacture MOX fuel within a timescale defined by the closure dates of German reactors. The history of both plant strongly suggests that neither assumption carries any level of guarantee.

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THORP is currently recovering from a 2+ year closure by processing a small test batch of AGR fuel. Currently scheduled to resume full operation later this year, Evaporative capacity allowing, THORP’s future throughput is permanently restricted by those plant modifications in the Feed Clarification Cell that were enforced by the 2005 accident. Coupled with the probability of further technical breakdowns, accidents and other unplanned outages, the likelihood of the outstanding overseas fuel being reprocessed by the plant’s scheduled closure date of 2011 is remote. SMP’s production rate has also been permanently reduced to around 40% of design rate as a result of production line failures that cannot be rectified. Future rates have been described by NDA appointed consultants Arthur D Little in their report (21/7/06): “British Nuclear Group has not yet been able to demonstrate that the plant will be able to sustain continuous operation at the level needed to deliver customer requirements”. The consultation document on Advance Allocation takes no account of the full or partial failure of the NDA’s assumptions on THORP and SMP, and omits the wider implications of such failures. Advance Allocation proposes to allow an advance of plutonium from UK stockpiles ‘where appropriate’ and where ‘there is a specific justification for it’. No further explanation is provided in the consultation document as to what is or isn’t considered appropriate or specifically justified. Without further explanation, this ‘pick and choose’ application of Advance Allocation by NDA, smacks of a belated knee-jerk reaction to a problem that may or may not be resolved by a proposal that may or may not be emplyed. The reality behind the proposal is the need to secure, as a result of the unavailability of appropriate plutonium, a source of UK owned plutonium to manufacture MOX fuel in SMP for German utilities. It is belatedly confirmed (24th July) by NDA that the proposal is geared to the sole use of UK owned ‘THORP-derived’ plutonium. The consultation document makes no reference to the THORP derivation of plutonium other than by an indirect inference contained in the first and second paragraphs of the document’s ‘Explanation of the wider context for the consultation……’ Neither the Executive Summary nor the main body of the document make any reference to THORP-derived plutonium. This detail could and should have been included in the consultation document, and has lead to significant confusion among consultees. Despite the principal driver behind the proposal being the use of UK plutonium in SMP, the requirement is only laid out in some detail on the ninth page of an eleven page consultation document (paragraph 22). Earlier and subsequent paragraphs which relate to the intended use of UK owned plutonium, couple it with the repatriation of uranium and waste. Uranium returns are wholly irrelevant to the proposal and there can be little justification for or realistic prospect of the claim that Advance Allocation may facilitate an earlier return of wastes to customers.

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The document refers consultees to the Review of Radioactive Waste Management Policy Cm 2919 (1995) and to Managing the Nuclear Legacy (2002). Neither contributes anything significantly relevant to the use of UK owned plutonium in SMP. Up to its closure in 2005, THORP had reprocessed several thousand tonnes of overseas spent fuel, resulting in the separation of some 40 tonnes of overseas plutonium. Given SMP’s production rate failure to date, a vast majority of this plutonium will be in store and therefore available for incorporation into MOX fuel. The consultation document itself explains that separated plutonium (from whichever customer source) is pooled with existing stocks ‘of like material’. Stored plutonium is therefore multi-national in composition and only allocated, post separation, to customers as a book-keeping exercise to ensure that customers all receive amounts of plutonium equivalent to that contained in their spent fuel. The document fails to provide any information on this or explain why the simple expedient of a reverse accounting measure would enable overseas-owned material to be re-allocated to another overseas THORP customer, thus obviating the need to use UK plutonium. Neither does the document explain why, instead of using UK owned plutonium, the use of plutonium allocated to customers from countries having no MOX burning reactors cannot be directly re-allocated to countries that have such reactors. For example, in its latest assessment of SMP for the NDA (July 2006), consultants Arthur D Little point out the possibility that plutonium belonging to Spanish, Italian and Dutch customers ‘who have no independent way of burning MOX’ could be burned on their behalf by a third party. Already under discussion by BNG with the customers, Germany power stations would be the obvious third party and as such, would exactly meet the apparent requirement of the proposal for Advance Allocation. British Energy plutonium, separated from its AGR fuel and now known to be the subject of Advance Allocation, is owned by British Energy and not the NDA. The consultation document gives no indication of how, when or for how much the transfer of ownership was effected to make it available for use in SMP under Advance Allocation. The document also fails to indicate what quantities of plutonium are expected to be used under the proposal and over what timescale. 2. SMP Licensing. From the Government’s 2001 Decision document on SMP, the introduction of British Energy plutonium into the plant requires prior regulatory assessment before its use can be approved by the Secretary of State. This requirement is not indicated in the consultation document. The use of UK owned plutonium derived in THORP is not covered under the permission given by the Secretaries of State for SMP in 2001who: “have sought and obtained from BNFL an undertaking that the company will not use the SMP for the purpose of the manufacture of MOX fuel from plutonium other than plutonium

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separated in THORP and belonging to foreign customers without first notifying the Secretaries of State and obtaining their clearance to proceed” Any ambiguity as to whether ‘plutonium separated inTHORP and belonging to foreign customers’ includes UK plutonium owned by British Energy (or subsequently by NDA) is removed by the Environment Agency which, in justifying SMP concluded: “ that the plutonium commissioning, full operation and decommissioning of the MOX plant is justified for the purpose of manufacturing mixed oxide fuel from plutonium which has been separated from foreign customers’ spent fuel in the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) and which belongs to them”. And further that “the Agency’s consideration of justification is based on using the MOX plant for this specific purpose only and any other use would require separate consideration”. (emphasis added) From the above there is no doubt that the use of UK owned plutonium in SMP was not sanctioned by the Agency who were not asked to assess the benefits/detriments of plutonium use in SMP other than that sourced from overseas customers. The Agency further concluded that: “use of separated plutonium from another source (e.g. from the UK stockpile) as a feedstock for the manufacture of MOX fuel, which might then be used in designated nuclear power reactors either in the UK or overseas, would have a different set of benefits and detriments. The question of justification would need to be examined separately for this case.” (emphasis added). From the above, it is clear that not only is Secretary of State approval for the use of UK owned plutonium as feedstock for MOX manufacture insufficient on its own to allow the NDA proposal to be implemented, but that further justification for this SMP use is required. In reaching its decision on Justification , the Agency had concluded that as all other issues relating to Justification (environmental, social etc) were broadly neutral, their Justification of SMP was predicated on the plant’s economic case put forward by BNFL and approved by consultants AD Little in 2001 who concluded that: “we believe the case for SMP is robust with an expected national economic interest NPV of £216M” This 2001 economic assessment is in stark contrast with the spectacularly deteriorated economic case for SMP today as reported by Arthur D Little in its 2006 report: “in view of the persistent operational problems with SMP, BNG’s economic analysis has been realigned with a slower ramp up and an extended operational life, the overall effect of which has been the erosion of the Reference Case ….” and “it is clear … that it is not possible to say with certainty that continuing to operate SMP is economically more attractive than immediate closure”. CORE concludes that the NDA proposal on Advance Allocation cannot be employed on Secretary of |State approval alone but must be subjected to further regulatory assessment and consideration, and testing on Justification which will necessarily be based on the current economic case for SMP.

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These requirements, or any discussion on them, are omitted from the consultation document. 27th July 2007.

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Mr D Gallacher Mr Dean Gallacher Nuclear Consultations and Liabilities Unit Cc Ms Kathleen McKinlay Consultation Co-ordinator, DTI BY EMAIL 27th July 2007 RE: QUESTIONS OF CLARIFICATION - CONSULTATION ON ADVANCE ALLOCATION Dear Mr Gallacher Following our conversation yesterday I attach, on behalf of Greenpeace UK, a list of questions concerning the transfer of British Energy plutonium, recovered in THORP, to the NDA, for processing into MOX fuel in the SMP. Please take this communication as an interim response to the consultation on Advance Allocation. A further and final response will be made when the questions in this paper are answered. Transfer of BE plutonium to the NDA From your conversation I understand plutonium recovered from the reprocessing of BE fuel in THORP will be transferred to the ownership of the NDA for the sum of £1. This plutonium will then be processed into MOX fuel, in the SMP, for overseas customers awaiting reprocessing of their spent fuel in THORP. Is this correct?

• Can you please explain the regulatory processes that will allow the NDA to

take ownership of the BE plutonium? • How does it intend to transfer plutonium back into BE’s stockpile (and from

where the NDA will find that plutonium (e.g. Magnox plutonium stockpiles)? • Does this require specific Euratom or IAEA approval?

Use of BE plutonium in SMP

On the issue of using BE/NDA plutonium in the SMP I have raises the following points and questions. Although the design of SMP is capable of fabricating MOX from either any THORP plutonium, its operating licence appears to restrict use of the SMP only to manufacture of MOX “from plutonium which has been separated from foreign customers’ fuel in the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) and which belongs to them”1; i.e. SMP is not currently licensed to manufacture MOX fuel from the ‘UK’ plutonium stockpile.

1 Document Containing the Agency’s Proposed Decision on the Justification for the Plutonium Commissioning and Full Operation of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant. Environment Agency. Oct 1998.

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This seems to be further underlined in the following: Para 63 To ensure that the use of the SMP could not be extended for the purpose of the manufacture of MOX fuel from sources of plutonium other than those reviewed by the [Environment] Agency, without consideration being given to the question of whether there should be a review under Article 6(2) of the 1996 Directive of the justification case in the light of such an extension before the extended use was adopted, the Secretaries of State have sought and obtained from BNFL an undertaking that the company will not use SMP for the purpose of the manufacture of MOX fuel from plutonium other than plutonium separated in THORP and belonging to foreign customers without first notifying the Secretaries of State and obtaining their clearance to proceed. 2

With regard to the above – both of these challenge the assumption inherent in the NDA’s proposal that so long as the fuel has come from reprocessing in THORP (and is part of the ‘UK’ stockpile) that the issue of its use in the SMP raises no concerns.

• If this is not the case can you please explain the processes (and provide relevant written information) on the decision making process which allows BE/NDA owned fuel to be processed in the SMP?

• Or, is it that in order to meet the letter of the above quoted conditions and be able to process BE-origin plutonium in the SMP, that the NDA will have to make a further transfer of ownership of the BE-origin plutonium to the overseas MOX customer to ensure it is plutonium ‘belonging to foreign customers.’

• What processes would be necessary to allow a second transfer of ownership? • Has the Secretary of State yet made a decision on whether or not justification

is needed to meet the NDA’s proposal? Or will the decision on that issue follow after consideration of the responses to the consultation?

Virtual reprocessing or advance allocation? On the issue of the proposal from the NDA concerning ‘advance allocation’ – and not virtual reprocessing – the following issues arise. If reprocessing in THORP goes ahead and the relevant organisations’ nuclear material stocks are replenished etc, then this proposal would amount to ‘advance allocation’ insomuch that the spent fuel would have been reprocessed etc, wastes returned etc. However, the consultation does flag the possibility that THORP may not reopen (of it may fail following restart) which means that today’s advance allocation could – by default – become tomorrow’s virtual reprocessing.

• At what point would the Department step in to question the NDA’s approach to advance allocation e.g. five, ten years down the track if THORP has not reopened or not fulfilled its contracts on schedule?

• When would it be decided that a policy change may have to be made and/or justification of different SMP processes undertaken? What will be done to stop policy slide on this issue?

2 Source: Secretaries of State SMP Decision Document, Defra, October 20012

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Flag swap of overseas customers' plutonium The NDA has told stakeholders (e.g. at the NDA’ Materials Issue Group meeting, Manchester, 10th January 2006) that changes to contracts with overseas customers would not be possible. Have then, the contracts being re-negotiated or will they only be renegotiated following the consultation? An option raised in informal discussion by a senior representative of BNG at the NDA’s National Stakeholder Group (6th July) with Greenpeace was that a flag-swap of plutonium from one overseas customer might be made to another in order to facilitate the return of plutonium in the form of MOX fuel.

• Can DBERR say if the NDA is considering a direct flag swap of overseas customers’ plutonium as well as the transfer of BE-origin plutonium?

• If so, how might it impact on bilateral and multilateral agreements and whether it requires specific Euratom or IAEA approval?

Ms Jean McSorley Senior Adviser Nuclear Campaign Greenpeace UK

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Economy, Culture and Environment County Offices, Kendal, Cumbria

LA9 4RQ Email information@cumbriacc.gov.uk

Date 27 July 2007 Ref RSG/S1244/002/LR

Dear Mr Gallagher CONSULTATION ON ADVANCE ALLOCATION: PROPOSAL ON HOW TO MANAGE OVERSEAS SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AWAITING PROCESSING AT SELLAFIELD. The County Council Nuclear Issues Working Group considered the issue on 24 July 2007. I would advise that the County Council raises no objections to the advance allocation proposal subject to the amounts of uranium and waste returned to the customers being equal to the quantities realised from reprocessing of each customer’s spent fuel. Yours sincerely Shaun Gorman Head of Environment

Mr D Gallagher Depot Nuclear Consultations and Liabilities Unit 1 Victoria Street London SW1H OET

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Radioactive repatriation: importing a problem, avoiding a solution The conundrum of the return-to-sender clauses in reprocessing contracts and the ‘advanced allocation’ of reprocessing products Response to BERR Consultation on proposals for Advanced Allocation on the management of overseas spent nuclear fuel awaiting processing at Sellafield By Dr David Lowry Environmental policy and research consultant* October 2007 One of the nine IAEA principles on nuclear waste established in 1995 is that: "Radioactive waste shall be managed in such a way that will not impose undue burdens on future generations. This statement was based on the ethical consideration that the generation that receives the benefit from an activity should also commit to taking care of any liabilities from that activity, in this case, the radioactive waste that arises from nuclear energy production. It has been broadly interpreted to imply that the generation that generates radioactive waste should make all the arrangements needed for the disposal of the waste." Based on a paper on the long-term storage of nuclear waste - focused upon safety & sustainability - presented to an International Conference on Issues and Trends in Radioactive Waste Management, held in Vienna in December 2002. Background to the problem Officially, the UK does not import nuclear waste. In reality, the situation is rather more complex. But it is the import of irradiated nuclear fuel for reprocessing that has caused the problem being addressed in the ‘Advanced Allocation’ consultation. The current policy was established as long ago as autumn thirty two years ago, when the then energy secretary Tony Benn pronounced “the main concern is that the United Kingdom should not become a permanent repository for storing other countries’ nuclear waste.” He was responding to the front page story splashed in banner headline across the Daily Mirror of 21 October 1975 revealing “PLAN TO MAKE BRITAIN WORLD’S NUCLEAR DUSTBIN

– although in fact the Observer had unveiled the story some six months earlier.

Mr Benn formalized the UK policy position in a statement to Parliament in reply to a written question by Sir Trevor Skeet on 29 January 1976. [The possibilities of how this might be operationalised were subsequently set out more than 10 years later, in more detail, in a further written reply to Austin Mitchell MP on 2 May 1986, when the substitution option was first mooted. (Official Report, columns 500-501).] Tony Benn launched a national debate in early 1976 over reprocessing - in the run up to what would become a path breaking 100-day Windscale Public Inquiry into what would become known as THORP (Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant) – during which he also made clear he would require any new contracts with foreign customers who signed up to have their spent irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessed in Britain, to

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include ‘return-to-sender’ clauses committing them to take back their nuclear waste afterwards. In practice, BNFL and the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) - who operate a smaller reprocessing plant at its Dounreay nuclear waste management complex in Caithness on Scotland’ northern shore on behalf of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) - had already signed several reprocessing contracts with overseas customers in Japan, Italy, and Sweden. A written parliamentary reply (as long ago as 9 May 1990) provided some figures for Sellafield’s estimated quantities of radioactive waste arisings not covered by return-to-sender clauses, broken into high-level long-lived (HLW), medium activity, relatively long-lived intermediate (ILW), and low-level, relatively short lived (LLW): HLW 100m3; ILW 4,000m3; and LLW 50,000m3. There have also been many research reactor fuels contracts signed with foreign reactor operators by UKAEA for Dounreay pre -1976, but covering in total a much smaller volume of spent fuel, perhaps around some 4000 tonnes of research reactor /materials testing reactor fuels ( according to another ministerial reply). The NIREX/NDA nuclear materials inventory, as refined during 2007, should give a much more accurate figure. In my view, the only honest and appropriate way to put into effect the repatriation commitment made by Mr Benn, as the then responsible minister, in respect of reprocessing waste from BNFL’s foreign contracts for Sellafield, and to meet the expectations created in the public mind by the minister’s clear commitment, would be to return all categories of radioactive wastes arising from the reprocessing, including all the so-called Low Level Waste - which by sleight of hand has already formed part of the UK’s ‘nuclear dustbin for the world’ at Drigg - ILW and HLW. In addition, there ought to be shipped to each customer country a part of the decommissioning waste from each of the plants used at Sellafield to process their spent fuel, calculated as a proportion of the capacity their fuel processing constituted in the use of the plants during their operational life. Commentary It seems to me the rationale behind the proposals is to speed up the return of MOX plutonium-based fuel to foreign customers who have contracted the reprocessing of their spent fuel to Sellafield, by implementing a version of plutonium swapping, to enable plutonium fuel to be manufactured from UK-origin and owned plutonium, stockpiled at the Sellafield plutonium store, in place of the as yet unreprocessed foreign spent fuel currently in Sellafield spent fuel storage ponds, following the prolonged shut down of the Thorp reprocessing line for over two years, since the serious operational accident three years ago. The Advanced Allocation proposal makes no particular mention of the following:

– The isotopic composition of the substituted plutonium; – The implications for safeguarding the substituted reprocessed products,

especially plutonium and uranium, from the original imported spent fuel; – The return of low level waste arisings to customer countries of origin from

reprocessing their spent fuel at Sellafield. Yet these are important matters.

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It is incumbent upon the operators of the Thorp and Sellafield MOX plant (Sellafield Ltd); the owners of Sellafield (the NDA), the security regulator (Office for Civil Nuclear Security, OCNS) and the safeguards division at BERR in the former two areas, and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and Environment Agency in the latter case, to make publicly clear how these matters will be handled under any ‘advanced allocation’ in practice. If the advanced allocation proposal is to include the advanced allocation of substituted High Level Waste (HLW) this would put into transport a greater quantity of HLW, at an earlier juncture, than would be returned to sender without either substitution or advanced allocation. HLW, although much smaller in quantity, is by several orders of magnitude, more radioactively concentrated, and as such provides a more attractive target for misappropriation by terrorists or pirates ( which in the case of the shipments of nuclear materials to Japan, are significant in the Moluccas Straits in Indonesia* see Annex 1). Specific safety and security concerns over the shipment of HLW, particularly to Japan, are addressed in Annex 2. In Annex 3 I have reproduced my submission to the former DTI’s consultation on ‘Proposals for Intermediate level waste substitution’, from May 2004. Specific comments on the Proposal Para19. It is unclear whether the allocations of overseas customers’ plutonium following the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel in Thorp is done by weight, or by weight and isotopic composition. If the isotopic composition is not included in the allocation, this has implications for the allocation of plutonium from low burn-up fuel in the Sellafield plutonium store. The view of both the IAEA and Euratom safeguards inspectors on any plutonium swaps should be made transparent as a part of any political endorsement of the advanced allocation. It is particularly important to know what agreement has been struck by the Government with the international safeguards authorities over the allowance of fungibility of plutonium within the Sellafield plutonium store. It is also important for public policy for the clauses in the contracts that specify the return of customers’ plutonium in a MOX fuel form – hitherto secret due to “commercial confidentiality” - are made public, as this specification is critical to the necessity of any advanced allocation. This is also relevant to paras. 22 & 23. It should also be clarified which UK-origin plutonium will be used in any advanced allocation arrangement. The Sellafield plutonium store contains reprocessed plutonium from British reactors publicly-owned by the NDA (Magnox reactors) and privately-owned by British Energy (AGRs). Have BE agreed to part of their plutonium, not currently needed as they have no reactors licensed to use MOX fuel, to be swapped for foreign-origin plutonium, in any advanced allocation arrangement? If so, the Government should publish the details. Para.23 Clarification is required as to whether the equivalent waste addressed in this paragraph is in terms of equivalent volumes of HLW, ILW and LLW, or whether substitution will be implemented. If substitution is being used, then my concerns about this procedure is set out in Annex 3.

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Para. 24 The first line of this para., viz ” The primary driver for this proposal is timely repatriation of the products of reprocessing to overseas customers” is fundamentally misleading. The urgency to which “timely repatriation” refers is about the plutonium, and possible reprocessed uranium (REPU), arising from reprocessing being returned as MOX fuel. Ther is surely no pressure from customers for the repatriation of their radioactive waste, which is equally a “product” of reprocessing. Para. 25 Again, clarification is needed on the adoption of “substitution”, particularly in respect of the third bullet point. Paras.27 & 28 As stated, this paragraph is misleading. It is conceivable that Thorp will never operate again on a commercial scale, despite Sellafield Ltd’s attempts to revamp it to re-commission the plant. The latest information I have from the director of operations of Sellafield Ltd, is it is not expected to operate again on a fully commercial basis until after April 1st 2008, depending on whether the trail re-commissioning is successful. Para. 30 Government should clarify what the word “appropriate means, and who will decide what is appropriate, using what criteria, in the sentence “Overseas customers will receive the appropriate amount of waste as normal.” AS pointed out earlier, the full text of the contracts need to be published by Government if the public are to be able to assess the meaningfulness of the assertion that “This waste material will be returned as agreed under existing contracts.” Para. 31 Sub para. c asserts “There will be no overall increase in the transportation of radioactive materials: the same amount of new fuel and waste will be sent back to the customers.” This would be untrue if substitution were implemented in conjunction with advanced allocation. It is essential this is clarified. Conclusions My answers to questions 1 & 2 as set out in the consultation proposals are set out above, read in conjunction with the annexes below. I would like to end with a personal plea that the international commerce in nuclear explosive materials such as plutonium should be halted at the earliest date, and until a complete termination has been achieved, this should be minimized, to avoid creating hostages to atomic Armageddon on the high seas.

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I request that this submission is published at the earliest moment on the BERR web site. Annex 1

• http://www.riskworld.com/Nreports/2002/MalaccaStrait/piracy.pdf

Piracy attacks in the Malacca Strait By Alex Dali The Malacca Strait is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. By using the Strait instead of the Indonesia's Lombok Straits, super-large tankers ferrying crude oil from the Middle East to the Far East can save up to 1,600 km -- roughly three days sailing time. The present-day Malacca Strait is the world's second busiest commercial shipping lane (topped only by the Dover Strait in Britain) through which an average of 200 ships pass each day. For every ship that passes through, there is a risk not only of an accident and spill of cargo that might include crude oil, toxic chemicals, or radioactive substances but also of a piracy attack! The threat of an ecological catastrophe caused by such an attack cannot be ignored. The Malacca Strait is very narrow -- at least for a supertanker - and also very crowded. Piracy attacks are often highly planned, with the whole operation being orchestrated from maritime centers. Sometimes the cargo has already been identified and sold before it has even been captured. Bulk commodities such as sugar, metals, and petrochemicals are key targets, as illustrated by an attack on the Malaysian tanker Petchem in September 2001. Piracy has become so bad, particularly in Southeast Asian waters, that representatives of law enforcement agencies and shipping countries from around the world have gathered in Kuala Lumpur for a conference on how to deal with it. Attacks are on the increase throughout the world, but they are especially serious in Southeast Asia. The worst danger spots last year were Indonesia, the Strait of Malacca, Bangladesh, India, and Ecuador. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Piracy Report, 2001, has analysed the following trends in the year 2000, a record in number of attacks :

Malaysian authorities say pirates have kidnapped the captain of an Indonesian vessel and attacked a Malaysian ship off the coast of Borneo. A Singaporean tanker chartered by Shell to transport oil and gas was hijacked by pirates in waters east of Kalimantan shortly after the tanker departed from Port Dickson in Malaysia in the Strait of Malacca. More piracy attacks occur in Indonesian waters than in any other place in the world, but they have been on the increase in and around Philippine waters, too. The record of piracy attacks in the Malacca Strait in the year 2000 has forced the countries around the busiest shipping lanes to increase their controls. In its 2001 report, the ICC acknowledges important improvements: “There was a remarkable drop in the number of piracy attacks to 17 for the year 2001 compared with 75 for the year 2000. This is due to vigilant patrols and constant operations by the relevant authorities, particularly the Royal Malaysian Marine Police. Anti-piracy measures by the Malaysian and Singaporean authorities have been effective. However the shipping industry hopes that the Indonesian authorities will increase their efforts, without which the area will always remain high risk.” Organized crime rings ICC says the increase in hijackings is due to greater involvement in piracy by organized crime networks. "The hijacking of a whole ship and the resale of its cargo requires huge resources and detailed planning," said Pottengal Mukundan, Director of ICC's Commercial Crime Services. "It typically involves a mother ship from which to launch the attacks, a supply of automatic weapons, false identity papers for the crew and vessel, fake cargo documents, and a broker network to sell the stolen goods illegally. "Individual pirates don't have these resources. Hijackings are the work of organized crime rings." Some of the more notable piracy incidents were "At approximately 02:30 hours, when the duty (seaman) was opening the starboard bridge door of the wheel house, armed pirates attacked him," reads the report. "The seaman made to run but

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was slashed on his right knee with a long parang (machete)..." Having taken control of the tanker, the 21 pirates repainted the funnel to prevent identification and changed the name. Within 24 hours the entire 2,547-ton cargo of gas oil had been unloaded into another unmarked tanker. "On Sunday 1-10-2000 the bulk Carrier MV Hazel 1 was attacked by pirates, armed with Pistols and Machetes, while the ship lay at anchor just outside Singapore port waters. The Indonesianflagged vessel lay about 11 nautical miles south-west of Tuas at 01:13.15 N - 103:34.39E. The sleeping crew was overpowered and their hands and mouths were taped. The pirates ransacked the ship as well as stealing personal belongings and cash. They fled with more than US$10,000 (S$17,500) in cash and jewelry. Initially they also tried to take the ship with its cargo of Gypsum (used in construction materials) but failed because the ship's engines were dismantled for repairs. Eventually the crew managed to free themselves and radioed for help. The Esprit Shipping agency sent 6 more men to beef up the security of the vessel." Extracted from “High Seas Piracy At Ten Year High And Has Gone High Tech” Feb. 2001. Dock Walk Crews News and Whatknots - http://www.dockwalk.com/issues/2001/february/highseas1.shtml The global piracy statistics are compiled by ICC's Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur. The centre collects data on pirate activity and advises law enforcement, governments and seafarers. It transmits daily alerts to all ships in piracy hotspots (see website : www.icc-ccs.org). According to Captain Mukundan, there is a greater than ever need to report piracy and increase awareness worldwide, as highly organized and resourced criminal networks move into the field, and attacks at sea become increasingly deadly. The work of ICC's International Maritime Bureau with Indonesian authorities led to the recovery of the Malaysian tanker Selayang and the extradition of the pirates who captured the Inabukwa, an Indonesian vessel. These are just two recent cases highlighting the effectiveness of ICC's support to law enforcement in the fight against piracy. But Captain Mukundan warned that although the overall 2001 figures were down from the previous year, the fight against maritime crime has not been won. He said: "The year 2000 was an exceptionally bad year. Figures over a longer period show an underlying upward trend in piracy, and an increase in attacks that are well organized, well funded and violent." New trend: "kidnap and ransom" The annual report on piracy at sea of the International Chamber of Commerce also notes that a new trend of ‘kidnap and ransom’ piracy was also observed in the Malacca Strait (waters around Aceh, Indonesia), a phenomenon earlier restricted to Somali waters. Two cases have been reported off Aceh involving MT Tirta Niaga IV and TB Ocean Silver. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM), which had threatened to disrupt shipping in the

Strait of Malacca, was blamed for the incidents by the Indonesian authorities. Shipping companies privately confess to attacks on their vessels but prefer not to report them. Victims of attacks are so traumatized that they often do not return to sea again. Unfortunately, ship owners fail to appreciate this fact and discourage their crew-members from reporting attacks. According to the ICC report, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States has been directed much concern towards the security of ports and ships. The report quotes: “It is not impossible that hijackers or terrorists could hijack ships, particularly LNG, LPG, or large tankers, to undertake suicide missions for their cause. Forged ship documents and crew travel documents can easily be obtained with the right connections!” Political objectives and profits drive the terrorism phenomena of hijacking and piracy at sea. It threatens maritime enterprise and disturbs law and order at sea. It is proven that naval/coast guard patrols are the most effective way to deter piracy. Greater regional politico-maritime cooperation is needed to reduce and maybe suppress the problem. Success against pirates: The vessel Juliana was hijacked in August 2000. About a month later the vessel was discovered at Bang Saen beach and had again been repainted and this time was renamed the Verona. Mr. Peng Yan Wing again went to the CSD and confirmed its identity. The captain and 16 crew members were taken into custody on 29 September. The Burmese captain Moo Zo Yee confirmed the repeated repainting and renaming of the Juliana. At the moment they are being held pending prosecution and trial. Reports in 2000, October – December 2000 - http://www.tortuga.myweb.nl/archive/modern/2krepor4.htm Watchdog warns of tanker attacks Ships carrying huge loads of highly flammable natural gas could be hijacked by terrorists and used in suicide attacks, a global piracy watchdog warned. Forged ship and crew travel documents can be easily obtained for tankers carrying oil or liquefied gases, facilitating their use by terrorists "to undergo suicide missions for their cause,"

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the International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre said. "After the Sept. 11th terrorist attacks in the US, there is now a real fear that terrorists could use a ship as a weapon," a report by the centre said. "Security should become a top priority for the maritime industry." Alexander’s Gas & Oil connections. Features volume 7, issue #4, Thursday Feb. 21, 2002 - http://www.gasan doil.com/goc/features/fex20864.htm For more information on the subject, consult the report “Disaster Risk Management in South-East Asia,” August 2001, A. Dali, (Study co-financed by the European Union working programme AsiaEcoBest). Contact publications@atlascope.com Annex 2

House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology

Sub-Committee I I -The Management of Nuclear Waste Evidence submitted on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute

30 January 1998 1. This evidence has been prepared by Dr David Lowry, an independent

environmental policy consultant based in London, on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute (“NCI” or “the Institute”), based in Washington DC. Further details of the qualifications of the authors and expertise of the NCI are included at annex 1. The NCI has decided to contribute to the Sub-Committee’s inquiry because there are some technical and policy developments outside the United Kingdom, mainly in the United States and Japan, with which the Institute has been involved, and to which it believes the attention of the Sub-Committee could usefully be drawn.

2. The main points of our evidence are included in summary form in this submission.

However as we have drawn extensively upon materials prepared by the Institute, and previously published in various forms, we have appended these texts in full for use by the Sub-Committee. In reviewing the 12 matters set out as guidance to those making written contributions to the Sub-Committee’s enquiry, we focus upon those matters where we believe we can make a unique contribution. Accordingly, this submission concentrates upon questions 9, 10, and 11.

3. The Institute strongly believes that any solution to the long term management/disposal of long-lived heat generating High Level and Intermediate Level radioactive Waste(HLW &ILW respectively), currently stored and likely to be generated in the Usnited Kingdom, will inevitably require reference to international experience outside the UK. However, by asserting this problem will require an international input, the Institute does not mean to assert that some form of international repository for HLW&ILW should be created to take such waste from around the world. This is unrealistic, as has been found in such exploratory ideas in the past with proposals for remote repositories in the Gobi Desert in China (1), in the Sudan and on various Pacific islands. It also would be unethical, in that it would inevitably result in the hazards posed by such wastes being imposed upon the chosen site or sites and nearby populations, and upon the communities along the transportation routes, most of which will have received no benefit from the processes that generated the wastes. Another factor to take into

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account is the fact that the UK nuclear industry has entered into a number of reprocessing and nuclear fuel supply contracts with utilities and institutions abroad which will have significant impact upon the future decisions to be taken on HLW&ILW management in the UK.

4. The Nuclear Control Institute is aware that there are a range of immediate,

medium-term and long-term problems posed by the considerable build-up of the radioactive waste burden from commercial and military atomic activities in the UK and abroad. We have extensive knowledge of waste management strategies in the US, Europe and Japan. The UK and US, along with Russia, France and to a lesser and somewhat different degree China(because its commercial reactor programme is as yet very small), share the problem of having been early pioneers in the atomic age and having developed extensive military nuclear programmes. This means they have collectively built-up, both by volume and range of waste streams, the most burdensome problems. An additional aspect of having entered the atomic age 50 or more years ago is that the rudimentary and---in a dangerous number of cases---experimental storage or disposal facilities, are rapidly losing their physical integrity. There are many examples from the United States Department of Energy (DOE) military production sites, those at Hanford and Savannah River being the most worrying(2); and in the former Soviet Union there are similarly decaying and leaking plants for the storage of HLW and other waste streams which have been extensively reported (3). The HLW storage tanks for liquid wastes at Sellafield have been the subject of safety assessment by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (4), independent criticism by consultants for the Nuclear Free Local Authorities (5), and expressed concern by the Rt. Hon. Tony Benn MP, based on his experience 20 years ago as the minister responsible for nuclear safety (6).

5. At the time of the HLW leaks from the Windscale storage tanks at Sellafield in 1977-78, the UK Government and nuclear research authorities were involved in an earlier attempt to find a solution to HLW disposal, which foundered on geological uncertainty and political pragmatism (7). They were at the time taking their lead from a key passage from the 1976 Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution investigation into Nuclear Power and the Environment (Cmnd 6618), prepared under the chairmanship of Lord Flowers, which asserted: “there should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe containment of long lived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future.”(paragraph 27). Yet twenty two years later, despite there being no firm policy for the future disposal of HLW, both British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) and the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) are intent on implementing further nuclear reprocessing and plutonium-based mixed oxide (MOX) fuel contracts which will increase the burden of radioactive wastes in the UK. We therefore urge the Sub-Committee to evaluate the future policy demands in this context.

6. Liquid radioactive discharges from Sellafield or Dounreay have been a

longstanding environmental and public relations problem for both plants. At the time of the preparation of this submission, the Norwegian State Radiation Protection Board has publicised a new study suggesting that there has been an 8-fold increase in radioactive contamination measurable in Norwegian waters.

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(Scotsman, 22 January 1998). Public commitments were made by the Environment Minister, Michael Meacher MP, in advance of the officials-level meeting OSPAR (Oslo and Paris) Convention on the environmental quality of the North Sea held last September (1997). He states that there would be henceforth “a general presumption against sea disposal” (of radioactive wastes), and that the Government would be willing to accept continuous reductions in radioactive discharges to the sea. If reprocessing is to continue in this context, then there will be an even greater build-up of radioactive residues from the on-site purification/extraction plants such as SIXEP and EARP. The management consequences of this development are that the volumes of liquid and solid wastes accumulated at the reprocessing plants for storage and disposal, will necessarily increase as the waste streams are converted into a different medium.

7. It is difficult to obtain reliable figures for the volumes of radioactive waste arisings

from the UK nuclear industry, especially those attributable to reprocessing. For example, the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) report, RadioactiveWaste-Where Next? which is to be taken as a starting point for the Sub-Committee’s investigation according to the ‘call for evidence’ notification, gives an estimate of 66,100m3 (cubic meters) of ILW in storage, with around 60m3 of HLW in store in 1994 (the most recent year for which figures were available to POST). But in a written Parliamentary reply by Energy Minister, John Battle, on 11 June 1997 (Official Report, column 392) -some 4 months before the POST report was published- the Government cites the stockpile of ILW as 74,000m3 and of HLW as 2,000m3 as at 1 April 1997. The ILW increase can be accounted for by the projected annual arisings of some 6,000m3; but it is hard to see how the HLW figure could have risen so sharply over the same time period. In order to clear up these confusing figures we would recommend, in the spirit of the proposals put forward in the recent Government White Paper on Freedom of Information, to ask BNFL and AEA to provide accurate figures for radioactive waste arisings, along with an explanation on how they compiled the figures. The White Paper is intended to cover information held by public bodies and quasi-public or privatised bodies such as BNFL and the AEA.

7. The POST report also states (at p.52) that it does not address the question of reprocessing. However the NCI points out that it is not possible to address the management issues associated with radioactive waste in the UK in a comprehensive manner without considering the ways in which the most voluminous and most radio-toxic waste streams are created. Indeed, it is because of the plutonium separated out during reprocessing, and the ‘return-to-sender’ clauses covering radioactive waste in the contracts signed to cover the reprocessing of imported spent fuel since 1976 (8), that the management problems for the handling of ILW and HLW in the UK have been exacerbated.

9. The NCI has tracked the changing fortunes of plutonium policy, both in the United

States and internationally, for over 17 years, and has published widely on the issue.A list of the NCI’s lead publications on plutonium are attached at annex 2 for the assistance of the Sub-Committee. The NCI would be willing to furnish the Sub-Committee with copies of the relevant publications on request. The policy on plutonium advocated by the NCI therefore may be seen to be based on considerable research and experience. The proposition the Institute would like to put before the Sub-Committee is that plutonium is most realistically considered as

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a waste material, and if it is designated as such this will have important positive implications for radioactive waste management policy. This will be particularly so in the UK because of the large size of its stockpile of already-separated, non-military plutonium, for which it has no domestic use (because all but one of its power reactors are ill-suited for recycling plutonium as fuel) and no foreign customers (because plutonium is considerably more expensive than low-enriched uranium fuel).

10. Figures released to Parliament in December last year (9) put the total stockpile

of unirradiated separated plutonium in store at UK facilities as 54,800 kilogrammes (ie 54.8 tonnes). This is a disturbingly large quantity of nuclear explosive material, when put in the context that a competent weapons designer could build a bomb with as little as 3 to 4 kgs of reactor-grade plutonium, while 8 kgs is regarded as a “significant quantity” for weapons-making by an emerging nuclear state or terrorist group. The NCI cannot over-emphasise the importance of choosing a prudent management strategy to deal with both this separated plutonium, plus the other 47,000 kgs of plutonium in as yet unseparated form in the UK. The NCI has secured the concession from the (now retired) Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr Hans Blix, that a workable nuclear weapon can be made out of so-called reactor grade plutonium (10). This admission was made importantly when Dr Blix was still in office. The NCI is also aware that the House of Lords itself was also told in a written reply to Lord Jenkins of Putney by Defence Minister Lord Gilbert on 27 October 1997 (Official Report, WA 226.) that “ a sufficiently determined group or state with nuclear aspirations might be able to overcome the(se) difficulties and produce such a device (i e a reliable weapon giving a predictable yield) using reactor grade plutonium.” (NCI emphasis). The essential question for decision-makers in Parliament and Government is what is the best way to render this plutonium stockpile as harmless as possible.

11. In the United States, there is no civilian stockpile of separated plutonium because the commercial reprocessing and MOX program was halted in the 1970s. Today, there is a high-level debate over what to do with the US military stockpile of separated plutonium, primarily from the plutonium “pits” from dismantled warheads. The National Academy of Sciences produced studies on the question in 1994 and 1995; the DOE published its own study in December 1996; and earlier this month the General Accounting Office released a study done at the behest of Senate Foreign Relations Committee (11), which inter alia examined the proliferation risks associated with a plutonium disposition policy in the US and Russia based on the recycling of plutonium in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel rather than immobilisation of the plutonium with HLW. The argument against recycle in MOX was also made in a letter from the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the US Secretary of Energy (November 1, 1996) and in an article jointly written by the President and Scientific Director respectively of the NCI, published in April last year (12), attached as annex 2. The article argues the case for a “one-track policy” which treats plutonium as waste, rather than recycling part of the stockpile, as it explains and criticises the MOX recycle strategy. A further credible explanation of why plutonium fuels are not likely to have a promising future is contained in an article prepared by two Princeton University academics published last October (14) (annex 3). The main point that the NCI seeks to stress here is that the attractiveness of the re-use of the nuclear

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explosive plutonium as a nuclear fuel has diminished to the point of vanishing, despite ill-conceived attempts at optimistic market scoping as contained in the recent report for the Environment Agency by PA Consulting Group (15) and the promotional activities of the nuclear fuel industries such as BNFL. Plutonium should therefore become part of the global waste burden and not a commodity traded in international commerce. Clearly this would alter the character of the HLW waste streams, but NCI is convinced that any additional burdens created for waste management will be significantly smaller and shorter-lived than the problems that will arise if hundreds of thousands of kilos of plutonium are put into global commerce. Immobilization of already separated plutonium in vitrified waste would be relatively inexpensive and straightforward from a technical standpoint. Termination of reprocessing and the direct disposal of spent fuel would put an end to further production of separated plutonium and to associated intermediate-and high-level waste streams.

12. The technical and economic opportunity to immobilize plutonium in vitrified glass

and co-disposed in an engineered store or long-term repository have been rigorously examined in a study(16) published last October by the Science, Technology, Energy and Environment Programme (STEEP) at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) of Sussex University, prepared by two academic experts. The NCI suggests to the Sub-Committee that it would prove extremely helpful to seriously examine the conclusions established by the SPRU authors, one of which is that “the impact of co-disposal on the waste volumes would not be sufficient to require construction of a second repository” The NCI itself strongly supports immobilization of separated plutonium in vitrified waste has prepared several analyses on the immobilization option in the US and Russian context. These can be made available to the Sub-Committee on request or downloaded directly from the NCI Web site (http://www.nci.org/nci/nci-wpu.htm).

13. The NCI would advocate that decision-makers take the prudent option in regard to

plutonium management as discussed in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12, above. This is entirely possible and would make best use of the considerable expertise built up by both BNFL and UKAEA in waste management and the handling of dangerous nuclear materials. Were such a path taken, it would obviate the build up of new waste streams. Environment minister Michael Meacher told Parliament in a written answer on 6 June last year (Official Report column 197) that “the operation of the Sellafield MOX plant would be likely to give rise to some 120 cubic metres of plutonium contaminated material per year.” A waste stream of such enormous proportions and risks could still be avoided.

14. Finally it is important to highlight the issue of the outstanding safety problems

that still remain in regard to the transportation of HLW. This an area where the NCI has done very considerable work over the past decade. As this evidence was being prepared, a shipment of HLW was underway from France to Japan -via the Panama Canal- on board the British-flagged freighter Pacific Swan. As with earlier such shipments, diplomatic protests have been registered by en route states, in this case mainly in the Caribbean (the Caribbean High Commissioners, Jamaica, the Commonwealth of Bahamas, Antigua & Barbuda, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States) as well as Venezuela and New Zealand, thus far. It is to be expected that similar protest will arise if or when the UK begins shipments

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of VHLW back to Japan as it is pledged to do under the terms of the reprocessing contracts. The NCI is however disturbed to learn that independent assessment of the safety specifications of the wastes to be returned will be hampered by virtue of the details being deemed by Government to be “confidential to the organisations concerned.”(Written answer by Energy minister John Battle, Official Report, 26 January, columns 59-60). Under these conditions it would be impossible for an independent review of safety to be undertaken, as was done by the NCI scientific director in 1996 in respect of the French shipments.(17). The NCI has attached (as annex 5) a letter of concern authored by five United States Congressmen to the President of the United States over the contemporary shipment of HLW to Japan, to illustrate some of the outstanding political and safety worries. In summary the NCI emphasizes that the assurances given by the transport companies and the international regulatory authorities-such as the IAEA and the International Maritime Organisation- on the safety of Vitrified HLW in transit deserve further scrutiny. The NCI would strongly advise against the premature shipment of such potentially deadly cargo unless and until an independent safety audit is conducted. It is a condition of the successful conduct of any such independent study that full access to the relevant data is assured . In conclusion the NCI makes the generic point that the failure of past Governments and the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom to provide candid information has bedeviled the efforts of independent authorities to conduct critical policy and technical appraisals. This is to be regretted. The NCI recommends to the Sub-Committee to make its own recommendations to ameliorate this problem.

15. The NCI is grateful for the opportunity to make this written submission for the

Sub-Committee’s perusal and consideration, and would be prepared to provide expert witnesses to expand upon these points should the Sub-Committee feel it would help its enquiry.

References

(1) Blowers, Andrew, Lowry, David &Solomon, Barry (1991) The International

Politics of Nuclear Waste. Macmillan Press, London, pp28&323. (2) There are voluminous references: NCI recommend the Sub-Committee to visit

the web site of the Hanford Health Information Service at www.doh.wa.gov/hanford which has hyperlinks to various other relevant web sites including those of the USDOE. A good short summary article covering the scope of the problem is: ‘ Hanford, Wash., may swap waste with Idaho Falls’, Tri-City Herald, 30 September 1997

(3)’Radiation Exposure in the Southern Urals’, The Science of the Total Environment, Vol. 142, Nos.1&2 (1994) pp.125; Broad, William J. Moscow Reveals a Deep Nuclear Secret’, International Herald Tribune, 22 November 1994; ‘Q&A: Environmental Catastrophes Threatening Vast Stretches of Russia’, International Herald Tribune, 24 April 1995; ‘Radionuclides in Russia’s Resources -Rich Arctic Regions’, Ambio Vol.24 No.5, August 1995, pp316-318; Edwards, Rob,’Rich pickings from Russia’s polluted soils’, New Scientist, 28 September 1996.

(4) Health and Safety Commission (1995) The Safety of the Storage of Liquid High-Level Waste at BNFL Sellafield

(5) Kemp, Stewart (1997) Safety of Highly Radioactive Wastes at Sellafield, A paper updating studies into the safety of containment of Highly Radioactive

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Wastes stored at Sellafield, presented to the 1st Irish & UK Local Authorities Joint Standing Conference on Nuclear Hazards, Dun Laoghaire, Co. Dublin, 4-5 December.

(6) Benn, Tony (1995) The Benn Diaries (Single volume edition) Hutchinson, London, pp387-388.

(7) Blowers et al (1991), pp63-74. (8) The complexity of the ‘return-to-sender’ issue has been addressed by the

Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) over the past two years in some depth. NCI recommends that the Sub-Committee refers to the RWMAC Seventeenth Annual Report, chapters 5&6, July 1997; and the RWMAC Special Report on The Import and Export of Radioactive Waste, September 1997, especially chapter 5 on the substitution of HLW.

(9) The figures are contained in an annex B to The Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium, made public to Parliament in response to a Parliamentary Question by Vernon Coaker MP, 2 December 1997, col. 163-164.

(10) Correspondence between NCI President Paul Leventhal and Dr Hans Blix, September-November 1990; Matthew Bunn, the Chair of the US National Academy of Sciences investigation into weapons plutonium disposition options, and the Assistant Director of the Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University told an IAEA Conference on plutonium held in June 1997 in Vienna, that “for an unsophisticated proliferator, making a crude bomb with a reliable, assured yield of a kiloton or more-and hence a destructive radius of one-third to one-half that of the Hiroshima bomb-from reactor grade plutonium would require no more sophistication than making a bomb from weapon-grade plutonium.”

(11) ‘US, Russian Plutonium Disposal Programs at Critical Juncture’, King Publishing Group, 23 January 1998. NAO. Nuclear Proliferation and Safety: Uncertainties About the Implementation of US-Russian Plutonium Disposition Efforts, GAO/RCED-98-46, January 1998.

(12) Leventhal, Paul, and Lyman, Edwin s., ‘Bury the Stuff’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March-April 1997,pp45-48.

(13)Comprehensive Social Impact Assessment of MOX Use in Light Water Reactors, Final Report of the International MOX Assessment,

(14) Von Hippel, Frank, and Jones , Suzanne. ‘The slow death of the fast breeder’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September-October 1997, pp69-74.

(15) ‘Assessment of BNFL’s Economic Case for the Sellafield MOX Plant. Final Report-Public Domain Version. Environment Agency. 12 December 1997.

(16) MacKerron, Gordon, & Sadnicki, Mike, ‘Managing UK Nuclear Liabilities, SPRU, October 1997, especially pp109-116. (17) Lyman, Ed,”The Sea Transport of Vitrified High-Level Radioactive Wastes: Unresolved Safety Issues.” Nuclear Control Institute, December 1996

Annex 3

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Response to the DTI consultation on: ‘Proposals for Intermediate level waste substitution’

Dr David Lowry

May 2004

Introduction It is difficult to make a response to this consultation paper because I have such disagreement with the stated premises of the authors; and remain so unconvinced by many of their pro-substitution conclusions, primarily because they assert they do not agree with several criticism put forward, mainly by NGOs, but do not provide any detailed critical assessment of the proposals they reject, that a proper response would require totally recasting the context of the paper. As a private individual I do not have the time to undertake such a broad critique, even though I have the professional expertise to conduct such an analysis (see biographical details appended below). This highlights a problem in such public consultations that no resources are available for individual consultants such as myself to pay for my time to make a response, hence its late delivery. Thus, due to limitation on time and resources, I will limit my comments to certain specific areas, but want to make clear this does not mean I agree or concur with areas I have not commented upon. My overall comment is the wrong authors were chosen to prepare this paper, as they are inevitably too close to the nuclear industry, and the disclaimers as to their professional distance included are unconvincing. Critique My overall view is that rather than conduct an objective analysis of ‘substitution’, the authors decided they were in favour of the process at the outset, and cherry picked evidence to support this conclusion. One reason I believe this is they chose to reduce the issue to a choice over relative environmental detriment, based on a comparative technocratic analysis, and they ignore, or seriously downplay, the historical and political context. These points apparently have not been, but have, been covered:

1. History The first sentence of the statement at paragraph 2.1 is true, but misleads by omission. Some, but not all, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing contracts include “repatriation” or “return-to-sender” clauses. Those contracts signed pre-1976 do not include such an obligation on BNFL’s customers to accept the return of their radioactive waste and separated reprocessing nuclear products. It is important to acknowledge this situation, as it underpins the reason the responsible minister, Tony Benn, when Energy Secretary, made the public commitment in the autumn of 1975 to ensure new reprocessing contracts for Sellafield would from that time onwards have to include a repatriation obligation upon the foreign customer companies and countries. Mr Benn’s repatriation commitment followed the public uproar created by the revelations

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in the media, led by the front page Daily Mirror report on 21 October 1975, which read:

‘PLAN TO MAKE BRITAIN WORLD’S NUCLEATR DUSTBIN’ Had the authors of the paper properly understood the importance of the historical context, and the moral and political importance of the ministerial policy commitment embodied in Mr Benn’s statement to Parliament, they would have included details of Mr Benn’s statement to Parliament in reply to a written question by Sir Trevor Skeet on 29 January 1976. The possibilities of how this might be operationalised were subsequently set out more than 10 years later, in more detail, in a further written reply to Austin Mitchell MP on 2 May 1986, when the substitution option was first mooted. (Official Report, columns 500-501).

2. Politics

The ministerial commitment to return reprocessing wastes from Sellafield, played a significant part in the debate over to the application by BNFL to build THORP, before and during at the 1977 Windscale Public Inquiry, the inspector’s subsequent support for the application, and the Parliamentary vote in May 1978 to back THORP. The proposals to apply substitution to this commitment would constitute an important political betrayal of the assurance the repatriation commitment gave to a concerned public. The book, ‘The International Politics of Nuclear Waste’(Macmillan press 2001), which I co-authored with Andrew Blowers, professor of social geography at the Open University, as well as member of RWMAC, CoRWM and a board member of UK Nirex, which is not listed in the authors’ two page list of references, would, had they read it, allowed the paper’s authors to understand this important historical and political context, and probably led them to frame the options differently.

In my view, the only honest and appropriate way to put into effect the repatriation commitment made by Mr Benn in respect of reprocessing waste from BNFL’s foreign contracts for Sellafield, and to meet the expectations created in the public mind by the minister’s clear commitment, would be to return all categories of radioactive wastes arising from the reprocessing, including all the so-called Low Level Waste - which by sleight of hand has already formed part of the UK’s ‘nuclear dustbin for the world’ at Drigg- ILW and HLW. In addition, there ought to be shipped to each customer country a part of the decommissioning waste from each of the plants used at Sellafield to process their spent fuel, calculated as a proportion of the capacity their fuel processing constituted in the use of the plants during their operational life. One final point: at paragraph 1.38, it asserts the OCNS has advised that ILW substitution would “reduce the security risks related to international waste returns.” I find this totally unconvincing, because substation will put more High Level Waste into international transit. HLW is by several orders of magnitude the most dangerous waste category, and hence most attractive waste type for terrorists. Substitution would reduce the number of shipments of ILW, but would increase the amount of HLW sent to customer countries. Even though the absolute amount of HLW involved is small, the radioactive content is high. Any increase in its quantities put into international transit increases the danger from terrorist theft, or more likely, sabotage. The present and projected security arrangements for HLW have been challenged by several independent organisations. I append as an annex one paper by the US-based

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Nuclear Control Institute demonstrating the security dangers of international transport of HLW. Conclusion Substitution should be dropped on grounds of honesty and security. Option 2 should be applied. Annex A Biographical details My credentials for making this response are that I hold a doctorate in nuclear decision making (Energy Research Group, Open University, 1987); I have published widely on nuclear security and nuclear proliferation matters; I was a co-founder, and later director, of the European Proliferation Information Centre, (EPIC), in London 1984-1997; and I have given expert evidence on nuclear security, safeguards and non proliferation matters to three nuclear public Inquiries in the UK, and one in Germany; to select committee inquiries held by both the Lords and Commons in Parliament, and to a special enquiry commission of the European Parliament on illicit nuclear trafficking. I have been consultant editor (1999-2001) for Plutonium Investigation, published by WISE-Paris; I was a research consultant for two years for the Washington DC based-Nuclear Control Institute for two years, and am also co-author of a book, The International Politics of Nuclear Waste (Macmillan Press, 1991). I am currently an independent environmental policy and research consultant, specializing in nuclear security, safeguards and waste management, and do research for one UK MP and one Irish MEP on nuclear safety and security issues. I advised Michael Meacher on nuclear issues 1996-97, when he was opposition spokesperson on environmental protection. I am currently a member of the BNFL Stakeholder Dialogue’s Plutonium Working Group, and on the Security and Safeguards Sub Group of the Dialogue. I am also a member of the SERA energy group. Annex A HLW transport risks

THE DANGERS OF SHIPPING VITRIFIED HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: AN UPDATE

Edwin S. Lyman, PhD

Scientific Director January 10, 2000

Vitrified high-level radioactive waste (VHLW) is produced by converting highly radioactive liquid waste, which results from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, into glass logs. The logs are encased in stainless steel canisters. Each log weighs nearly half a metric ton and contains as much as 600,000 curies of radioactive fission products. The VHLW shipment currently underway consists of 104 canisters packed into 4 shipping casks. We estimate that the total amount of radioactivity being carried by the Pacific Swan is approximately 50 million curies, including more than 14 million curies of the long-lived and highly radiotoxic isotope Cs-137. For comparison, the core of a typical large nuclear power reactor contains less than 10 million curies of Cs-137 during operation.

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Prior to and after the first shipment of VHLW by sea in 1995, the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) voiced its concern that these shipments are not being carried out in an acceptably safe manner, and that a potentially catastrophic risk of release of radioactivity could occur, resulting either from a shipboard accident (collision and/or fire) or from an act of radiological sabotage. The safety and security issues that NCI has raised have still not been resolved, despite numerous requests to corporate and government authorities in France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The shippers of VHLW argue that an accident that could cause a significant radiation release from a VHLW ship is practically impossible. However, the September 1999 accident at the JCO, Co. plant in Tokaimura, Japan has demonstrated that the nuclear industry is incapable of realistically assessing the risks it poses to the public through its activities. Its overconfidence leads to shockingly sloppy practices which can culminate in disaster.

New information has recently emerged that confirms NCI's concerns and raises new questions about the risks to the public and the environment posed by these shipments. These issues include: 1) 1) The consequences of a loss of a VHLW cask in coastal waters: A 1996 NCI study found that

if a VHLW cask were lost in coastal waters because of a severe accident or an act of sabotage, radiological contamination of the marine environment could result, with significant health consequences to consumers of marine products in the region. This contradicted the claims of the shippers of VHLW, who argued that the shipping casks are so robust that they would not leak. And even if they did leak, British Nuclear Fuels, Limited (BNFL) claims in its public relations materials that if VHLW became "directly exposed to the sea … the effect … would be negligible." These claims were seconded by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

However, more recent information indicates that the shipping casks will leak if submerged in

salt water, and that the health impacts on the public could be severe.

A 1998 analysis by the French safety organization IPSN concluded that if the TN28VT, the shipping cask used to transport VHLW, were lost at sea, the stainless steel grooves holding the lid seals in place could be washed away by the corrosive effects of seawater in a matter of months, allowing seawater to infiltrate the cask and radioactive particles to escape.3 [1]

Also in 1998, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in the U.S. published the results of its own

calculations of the consequences of the loss of a single shipping cask containing twelve irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in a coastal fishery.4 [2] It confirmed that there would be very severe health consequences for the public from such an event. For example, SNL calculated that the collective radiation exposure to the population could cause 27,000 to 31,500 cancer deaths over a 50-year period, comparable to the total number expected to be caused by the Chernobyl accident. For the shipment of VHLW now underway, the radioactive content is about one dozen times greater than that of the SNL study, and the health consequences would be correspondingly worse. Therefore, in terms of their potential consequences, these shipments are truly "floating Chernobyls."

2) 2) Sabotage attack on a VHLW shipping cask: In addition to sinking the ship outright, a saboteur that gained access to the ship could convert a VHLW cask into a potent radiological weapon through a judicious application of explosives. U.S. government studies at SNL have demonstrated that a cask could be penetrated by a shaped charge (an explosive that propels a metal jet through an object), but argue that the release would be limited because only the VHLW directly in the path of the jet would be shattered and become available for release.

In the context of the U.S. plutonium disposition program, SNL has identified a credible theft

scenario in which terrorists intercept a shipping cask containing weapons plutonium immobilized in VHLW, penetrate the cask with a shaped charge, fill the cask cavity with a low explosive, and

3[1] I. Piliero and G. Sert, "Seawater Corrosion of Radioactive Material Transport Packages," Proceedings of the 12th International PATRAM Conference, 10-15 May 1998, Paris, p. 1295. 4[2] J. Sprung et al., "Data and Methods for the Assessment of Risks Associated with the Marine Transport of Radioactive Materials: Results of the SeaRAM Program Studies," SAND98-1171/1, Sandia National Laboratories, May 1998.

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blow the lid off without damaging the contents. However, it has not analyzed a radiological sabotage scenario in which the saboteur sets out to maximize the radiological release by filling the cask with high explosive through the penetration and blowing the cask apart, severely damaging and dispersing the radioactive contents. This type of attack could cause much more severe health consequences to the public than the scenario that has been analyzed.

Despite repeated requests from NCI, the U.S. government has not analyzed this more severe

scenario, because it claims that such events are incredible. (However, it has not explained why it believes this types of attack is less credible than the more difficult theft scenario outlined above). Therefore, the extent of the damage that could result from a successful sabotage attack on a VHLW ship in the Panama Canal remains unknown. Nevertheless, such an attack could cause the dispersal of a large plume of respirable radioactive particles over a distance of several kilometers.

A severe accident or successful act of sabotage that caused the Pacific Swan to sink in the Canal or

in the shallow waters surrounding it could have a devastating impact on the shipping, fishing and tourism industries in the region. The government of Panama should request that a full environmental impact assessment be conducted before allowing these shipments to transit the Canal and Panamanian coastal waters.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Greenpeace/CORE

Joint response to

DTI Consultation Paper on

Proposals for Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Substitution, January 2004.

Introduction

The Government, via the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has invited comments on a document by NAC Worldwide Consulting entitled “An Assessment of the Case for Allowing BNFL to Return Radioactive Wastes to Overseas Customers via ILW Substitution” (November 2003).5 This document proposes returning larger amounts of high level nuclear waste to overseas nuclear utilities who have contracts with British Nuclear Fuels for the reprocessing of their spent nuclear waste fuel, and retaining all their intermediate level waste arisings in the UK. The exact amounts involved are unknown as the report does not give accurate figures on this point. Further, the report does not address the issue of the return of the plutonium and uranium separated from spent fuel, to overseas customers. Timing of plutonium and uranium returns (which Greenpeace and CORE would oppose) may significantly impact on the issue of substitution.

5 http://www.dti.gov.uk/nuclearcleanup/pdfs/radioactivewaste.pdf

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The above paragraph highlights just a few of the many failings of the NAC/DTI consultation document. Given this, CORE and Greenpeace are not prepared at this time to give any firm response to the issue of waste substitution as laid out in NAC’s report. Indeed, given the many unanswered questions raised by the report, it is impossible to make an informed response on this matter. The consultation contains too many contentious assumptions and is too vague in terms of reprocessing timescales for any firm conclusions to be reached. It is also premature in that it presupposes outcomes of other processes involving radioactive waste management that must be settled before this issue can be decided on. CORE and Greenpeace is not, therefore, in a position to fully discuss substitution until the goalposts are better defined – in particular neither organisation will consider this matter further until BNFL and the Government provide a cast iron commitment to an end-date for all oxide reprocessing at THORP. The main problems with the NAC document as presented are that: • It does not contain a guaranteed-end date for BNFL’s overseas reprocessing of

spent fuel contracts; • It does not mention that BNFL is actively pursuing, or considering, further

overseas reprocessing contracts; • There is no closure date for THORP for overseas reprocessing – this means a

‘boundary’ cannot be placed around the amount of ILW that might stay in the UK. This will impact on costs, volumes, packaging methods, numbers of transports, disposal/storage options;

• NAC has based all its assumptions on there being a radioactive waste dump for ILW in the UK in the next 20-100 years (presupposing this is going to be the accepted option);

• The above point shows that the consultation is premature because it pre-empts CoRWM’s current programme of work, and the subsequent development and finalisation of DEFRA’s policy on Managing Radioactive Wastes Safely; and

• It is also pre-empts inputs from the NDA whose decisions on waste management matters may materially affect substitution issues.

The NAC document raises many questions which the DTI should answer before it takes the process any further. The questions which arise from reading the document, along with discussion on relevant issues concerning substitution, are presented in the body of this response. It is important to note that the premature nature of this consultation is tacitly acknowledged by NAC (para 2.6), where it is suggested that it makes sense to revisit substitution ‘in advance of the detailed definition of the final management solution’. But it is not clear to whom it makes sense to visit substitution now. Whoever organised this exercise did not think through the impact of holding the consultation process at this time, resulting in wasting a large amount of taxpayers money and the time of those asked to respond. The consultation documents also fails because no recognition is given by NAC to BNFL’s well documented and historic ability to ‘get things wrong’ in terms of cost and timing forecasts. No allowance is therefore made for slippages or misrepresentations. Policy on nuclear waste management has been in disarray since at least 1997 and this Consultation Paper appears to be yet another exercise in an increasingly haphazard and ad hoc approach to the development of nuclear waste management policy in the UK.

Conclusion: NAC has failed to make a case for changing UK policy on substitution at this time - several decisions need to be taken, and many questions answered first. The Government must first announce a closure date for THORP, and then begin negotiations on waste returns with en-route States. It would be unacceptable for the

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DTI to make a decision on substitution simply on the basis of this consultation given all the unanswered questions the NAC document raises. Attempting to set a policy on substitution in isolation makes little sense when this should be part of an overall nuclear waste management strategy. It is our view also that the Government should go back to basics and set a timetable for consultation on establishing a set of environmental principles that will underpin all future discussions on how best to develop nuclear waste management policy in the UK.6 Recommendation: CoRWM should be asked to assess the impact of substitution as part of its work on waste management options. After CoRWM has reported, the Government can return to the issue by publishing a further consultation document which draws on far wider sources of information than are used by NAC. The DTI should be instructed not press ahead with the substitution proposal. The Government should also consult on a set of basic environmental principles to be used to underpin future policy development in the area of waste management, decommissioning and clean up activities. DTI and DEFRA should be instructed to put together principles and policies, in conjunction with relevant stakeholders, which address the full arena of waste management, decommissioning and clean up activities.

ISSUES AND QUESTIONS

The following deals with certain issues raised in the Consultation Paper. Each section is accompanied by a series of questions which we look to the DTI to respond to. GOVERNMENT POLICY

Current policy document: In 1995, Cm2919 from Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee’s (RWMAC) noted: “…view that a more rigorous environmental appraisal of the detailed characteristics of the disposal facility would be needed to reduce the remaining uncertainties … in the case of ILW … precise equivalence can be established only once a site-specific radiological assessment, based on a finalised design concept for the deep underground disposal facility, has been undertaken …until the Nirex repository has been established it would be imprudent for the UK to become irrevocably committed to the management of wastes which otherwise might need to be returned”. [para 140]7

6 See Appendix 1, Greenpeace 27th February 2004 “The Government’s proposed new decommissioning policy statement”. 7 See also RWMAC’s 15th Annual Report, May 1995.

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Thus, the 1995 White Paper set out a policy designed to take account of the uncertainties associated with agreeing to BNFL’s proposals in waste substitution. In conclusion Cm2919 said:- “… any arrangements they now enter into and implement with their overseas customers for the substitution of ILW must be conditional, at the time a Nirex repository receives planning permission, that waste equivalence has been properly calculated. Furthermore these arrangements will need to provide for ILW to be returned should the Nirex repository not be established by the time BNFL is contractually obliged to return the wastes (i.e. 25 years after they are generated)”. [para 141] As is well known, the NIREX dump plan was abandoned, giving a very different basis for any future policy on radioactive waste management (including substitution). In its response to MRWS, RWMAC said it could see “no obvious reason for changing current Government policy. If there were new circumstances, these should be fully set out and assessed and publicly debated before any change took place8”. NAC has failed to make a case for changing the policy on substitution at this time, rather than waiting, for example, until the current Managing Radioactive Waste Safely (MRWS) process has been completed. There are no new circumstances for the public to debate. Outstanding Question:

(1) Can the Government/DTI detail the reasons why it feels the need to re-visit the substitution question now, and why it cannot wait until the MRWS process has been completed?

New reprocessing contracts. The House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee (11th report, 1998) argued that the UK’s failure to “solve the question of ILW disposal … threatens to undermine a major export opportunity”. The Committee was particularly concerned that the current policy on substitution was undermining BNFL’s efforts to secure new reprocessing contracts for its Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) with Japanese utilities. Therefore, it argued, the question of waste substitution should be re-examined. Indeed BNFL’s memorandum, dated November 1997, to Committee, referring to substitution said:- “One immediate way in which the Government could give a significant boost to BNFL's commercial prospects in Japan would be to clarify their support for BNFL's preferred means of returning their waste to them”. 8 DEFRA Summary of responses to MRWS.

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Subsequently, the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee9 agreed that policy on waste substitution should be re-examined. The DEFRA MRWS Consultation document (September 2001) quoted BNFL’s concerns “that having to return wastes without offering waste substitution may cost them around £700 million in lost premiums on current and future contracts”. [emphasis added] RWMAC noted in its response to the House of Lords Select Committee (May 1999) that:- “… any decision for revision cannot be said to be based on any change in the perceived waste management implications, but rather on economic grounds if there is acceptance of the Select Committee’s view that the policy is detrimental to export opportunities”. (para 16) (emphasis added). The specification for the contract, which resulted in this NAC report even goes so far as to suggest that not agreeing to a change in substitution policy would have a negative impact on other UK companies seeking contracts in Japan:- “Customer attitudes more generally towards the UK nuclear industry would be negatively affected (particularly in Japan) making it more difficult for UK companies to win any new business with (unquantifiable) implications for UK business with Japan”. However, NAC does not argue for a change in substitution policy on the basis that not doing so would damage the prospects for new reprocessing contracts, nor does NAC accept that allowing substitution will increase the likelihood of future new THORP contracts (para 1.20). In contrast to two Parliamentary Committees, RWMAC, and BNFL itself, NAC argues that substitution “would not be a major deciding factor for a utility considering the merits of reprocessing versus the alternative strategies for spent fuel management”. Outstanding Questions:

(2) Have the Government/DTI concluded that the policy on substitution is not, after all ‘undermining export opportunities’ or does it agree with the House of Lords Select Committee rather than NAC? If it agrees with the House of Lords Select Committee, will the Government explain why it thinks NAC is wrong? (3) Does BNFL now agree that substitution in not a major factor for utilities, particular those in Japan, in deciding whether to sign new reprocessing contracts? If not, will the Government ask BNFL to explain why it thinks NAC is wrong? (4) Do the Government/DTI agree with RWMAC that any change in policy would not be based on waste management grounds, but on economic grounds?

9 House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, (March 1999) “Management of Nuclear Waste” para 8.23

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(5) If the Government/DTI agree that the current policy is not ‘undermining export opportunities’, on what basis are they now considering the rejection of RWMAC’s recommendations? Will the Government/DTI now fully set out the changed circumstances which have led to this decision as requested by RWMAC?10

Financial claims The report assumes there will be benefits to the UK economy from the substitution of ILW for HLW. This is put at £500 million. Outstanding Question:

(6) Is the figure given as a financial benefit to UK plc net or gross?

BNFL profits

NAC says that the total fees accruing to the UK of implementing substitution would be more that £650 million in January 2003 money values. Without substitution BNFL would make some profit on transporting ILW to customer countries. But no estimated figure is given for this to allow a comparison. Outstanding Question:

(7) Will the Government/DTI publish the estimated profits accruing to the UK from transporting ILW back to the customer countries to allow for proper comparison with the fees and savings accruing from substitution?

New contracts – different approaches on substitution? In what appears to be a separate, but related argument NAC suggests that because the Government would have control over the terms of any new reprocessing contracts, deciding to allow substitution for existing contracts would not necessarily mean that substitution need be offered for new contracts. Therefore allowing substitution for existing contracts need not increase the likelihood of utilities signing up to new contracts which would include substitution. This is absurd. If substitution is deemed by the Government to be acceptable (even desirable) for existing contracts, there is no conceivable reason why it would not deem it acceptable for future contracts and no reason why overseas customers would not demand this as a condition. We can only presume that NAC is forced to make use of this transparently bogus argument because of the Government’s failure to make decisions in several key areas – decisions it is necessary to make before deciding on substitution.

NAC points to three specific criteria which the UK government would use before deciding whether to approve new reprocessing business. In order to meet the last of these criteria, the UK government would have to examine

10 DEFRA Summary of responses to MRWS

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alternative spent fuel management options, as it is committed to do under the 2002 Bergen Declaration. Yet there is already sufficient evidence from, for example British Energy and the OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency11, that reprocessing is not the Best Available Technology for the management of spent fuel. Signing new reprocessing contracts for THORP cannot be compatible with meeting the UK’s international obligations. The Government should act decisively now and confirm a closure date for THORP, otherwise BNFL could be wasting resources seeking new contracts which cannot possibly meet the required criteria.

Outstanding Questions:

(8) Has NAC discussed with the Government/DTI the possibility that there might be a different policy on substitution for existing and new contracts?

Closure of THORP There has been much speculation on the closure date for THORP. The Guardian has reported that THORP would close by 2010.12 The article was based on an interview with Brian Watson, director of the Sellafield site. The Telegraph quoted the DTI saying these claims on closure were "pure speculation".13 Discussion with industry insiders and informed commentators points to an imminent announcement on a closure date, but not necessarily an end to reprocessing overseas contracts. Outstanding Questions:

(9) Can NAC say if it evaluated the impact of potential future contracts on the substitution consultation, costs of substitution, the environmental impact and the political impact? (10) Has NAC discussed this with all relevant stakeholders?

ILW MANAGEMENT OPTIONS AND ISSUES CORWM/NDA processes The NAC report assumes a policy decision, via CoRWM, will be reached around 2006 (para 2.6). This is highly optimistic as CoRWM already appears to concede. Outstanding Questions:

(11) Has NAC consulted with CORWM on its timetable? (12) Has it held discussions with the LMU on this matter?

Dumping versus storage of ILW NAC assumes waste disposal in UK will be underground (paras 1.12 and 4.2). This is not a foregone conclusion and cannot be reconciled with UK Government’s waste consultation commitment that all methods of waste management will be considered – nothing ruled in and nothing ruled out.

11 OECD/NEA (6th August 1999) Radiological Impact of Spent Fuel Management. 12 The Guardian, 26th August 2003 Sellafield shutdown ends the nuclear dream 13 Daily Telegraph 26th August 2003.Sellafield plant 'to close by 2010'

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It also assumes NIREX’s UK ILW Waste Disposal costings are correct (paras 4.59 and 4.60). Evidence given to the 1996 NIREX RCF Public Inquiry, showed these costings to be substantially underestimated and wholly unreliable (CORE/McDermott evidence). Outstanding Question:

(13) Can NAC explain why is has accepted the dumping option as inevitable and not considered the costs and environmental impacts of the storage of substituted ILW in the UK?

Radiological equivalence

Notwithstanding the fact that UK policy on nuclear waste management has yet to be decided, NAC chooses three scenarios, all of which involve deep disposal. Nirex says that: “…if deep geological disposal were not the preferred option the implications of retaining substituted ILW at an alternative facility in terms of safety, cost and radiological equivalence would need to be considered”14. NAC claims that the consequences for an extended period of surface storage have been addressed. But it fails to address the option of surface storage for a period of longer than 100 years. RWMAC says that the precise radiological equivalence cannot be established until a specific repository site and design has been assessed. NAC, however, asserts that the precise equivalence formula used will not have any great environmental significance. NAC appears to base its view on an assessment by Nirex of post-closure risk for its generic repository design.15 The risk due to substitution, it says, is less than 1 in 16.7million. This compares with the target maximum exposure of 20 microsieverts for the UK Radioactive Discharges Strategy, which is equivalent to a risk of 1 in a million. This means that the EXTRA dose from a nuclear waste dump, due to waste substitution could be around 1-2 microsieverts. No assessment of the impact from substitution of a period of surface storage longer than 100 years is given. Outstanding Questions:

(14) Do the Government/DTI agree with RWMAC or NAC on the need for a precise calculation of radiological significance before substitution is agreed? (15) Has DEFRA agreed that NAC’s “late repository” scenario is an adequate examination of the impact of substitution should deep disposal not be deemed the preferred waste management option?

Uncertainties on risk

Relying on Nirex’s risk assessments, following the conclusions of the Nirex inquiry, would be foolhardy in terms of the basis for undertaking a major shift on any policy

14 Nirex (2002) Waste Substitution and Availability of Long Term Waste Management Strategy. 15 Nirex (2003) Advice to BNFL on the Post-Closure Impact of ILW Substitution.

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concerning ILW. As the Inspector at the planning inquiry into Nirex’s Rock Characterisation Facility (RCF), highlighted: “the profound novelty and complexity of the deep disposal, multi-barrier concept.” (Paragraph 6C.151) It is not clear how far Nirex’s generic repository design has developed since the 1997 inquiry. Nirex’s repository concept largely abandoned the concept of containment in favour of dilution and dispersion in the environment as containment was not considered an achievable objective for many of the radionuclides that were to be disposed of. Whilst a repository based on the dilution approach might theoretically still meet regulatory risk targets, modelling the return of radionuclides to the surface environment has been compared with trying to predict the weather in hundreds of years time. The overwhelming weight of evidence is that the risks associated with a deep repository are poorly predictable, impossible to assess with current scientific understanding and likely to remain so for an indefinite period, despite many decades of expensive scientific research. NAC should have made its assessment based on a range of different scenarios, including one based on a repository which does not perform as intended, rather than simply on three different repository timings. Outstanding Questions:

(16) Will the Government make any assessments of the risks of substitution if radioactivity from a future nuclear repository returns to the surface environment much more quickly than expected? (17) The future of Nirex is currently uncertain. The Government appears to favour making the organisation independent of the nuclear industry, but will its remit be widened to cover all long-term waste management options, rather than just deep disposal? If so, will new-Nirex be asked to report on the impact of substitution on other waste management options?

THE PROLONGED STORAGE OPTION

Using a scenario which delays deep disposal until 2100 is not the only possible

long-term storage option. One option would be to require stores to be planned with re-building in 100-200 years time. As waste may need to be repackaged, re-packaging would have to be kept in mind.

The Nirex report (quoted by NAC) to show that the Letter of Comfort system

“is compatible with a number of other options, including long-term storage”, is in fact only “a preliminary review”. Nirex says it “is planning to carry out further work to identify the packaging requirements for different options in order to inform the debate on the waste management opportunities available in the UK”. After 1997 the LoC system should have been changed so that its focus was no longer an assessment of

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packaging for its compatibility with a nuclear waste dump. The LoC should focus instead on the compatibility of packaging with long-term storage.

Outstanding Questions:

(18) Has NAC discussed with NIREX, or any relevant agencies, if they are planning to complete further work on the packaging requirements for non-disposal long-term waste management options?

(19) Has NAC been given clearance by the Government to go ahead with substitution before the non-disposal option has been fully researched?

Integrated Toxic Potential

The NAC document gives very little indication of how the Integrated Toxic Potential (ITP) calculation is carried out. According to RWMAC this system used for comparing radiological equivalence between different waste streams uses integration over a period of 500 to 100,000 years. [RWMAC 15th Annual Report]. Whether deep disposal is the chosen option or not, the initial period whilst waste is packaged, transported, and placed in stores, or underground will be the most hazardous. Outstanding Questions:

(20) How do radiological equivalence calculations take into account the hazards associated with next 500 years if the ITP calculation does not begin the integration calculation now, rather than in 500 year’s time?

Volumes of Waste

Table 4.1 of the NAC report is misleading. Although the text reminds the reader that there are overseas reprocessing contracts, signed before 1976, which do not include waste return clauses, the table does not make clear which column includes overseas waste which BNFL/the Government is contractually committed to keep in the UK. Including a separate entry in the table for this waste would have helped to put the quantities of ILW under discussion in better perspective. The same applies to tables 4.2 and 4.3. Paragraph 4.39 says that some overseas ILW will not be returned irrespective of decisions on substitution, but no further explanation is offered. A Parliamentary reply in May 1990 set out the estimated total volume of waste arising from the pre-1976 reprocessing contracts. These figures include figures for Magnox fuel returned from Japan and Italy as well as oxide fuel from Sweden: These are: HLW 100m3, ILW 4,000m3 and LLW 50,000m3. These are not insignificant proportions of the total.

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Outstanding Questions:

(21) Will the Government detail the quantities of foreign waste contracted to remain in the UK?

Key isotopes in ILW

NAC says that Nirex has determined that two radionuclides, Chlorine-36 and Iodine-129 will make the biggest contribution to potential environmental impact from ILW. In 199516 Nirex listed ten radionuclides which “would not decay significantly” in the geosphere and another eight ‘daughter radionuclides’ which would also reach the surface environment, under Nirex’s own assumptions. Even then, this was an optimistic assessment since Nirex assumed in particular that its untried chemical containment would be effective and that there would be no fast routes for radionuclides to escape along the shafts. The escape of radioactive gases is also expected to add three more radionuclides to the list of those which are discharged from a repository. The Nirex report, which NAC draws upon, also mentions higher quantities of uranium-238 and neptunium-237 beyond 100,000 years post-closure. Nirex estimates that the net increase in risk due to substitution corresponds to a change in dose of 1 microsievert per year. Outstanding Questions:

(22) Given the uncertainties associated with the risks of radiation, indeed the uncertainties even associated with the unit of measurement – the sievert – will the Government be addressing the ethical question of whether it is right to transfer risks, no matter how small, from the present time to future generations?

Overseas customers The NAC report assumes overseas customers will pay for new waste export stores at Sellafield (para 4.56). There is no evidence to support this assumption. On the contrary, overseas customers have already fought against extra costs passed on to them by BNFL in respect of extended THORP reprocessing timescales, and the construction of a third vitrification line. A further assumption in the report is that the THORP Baseload will be finished by 2007 (Page 10, para 1.29), but ignores any current BNFL/customer discussions re new contracts (Italy for example). It also takes no account of overseas post-baseload contracts, the wastes from which would also be subject to substitution, and which could take THORP operation closer to 2010. This skews not only total HLW and ILW volumes, but also number of shipments, costs etc. NAC reports widely differing industry views as to waste ‘generation’ dates and timing of waste returns (para 4.29). It seems singularly illogical to undertake any consultation on substitution until these differences are resolved by BNFL and its customers, and to the satisfaction of respective governments, regulators and general public. In particular, this is due to the fact that NAC reports that overseas customers’ ability to receive returned wastes are at varying stages of readiness and commitment (para 4.49). Commitment from all customers must be significantly more advanced and transparent before substitution is discussed via public consultation Outstanding Questions:

(23) Has NAC had any discussions with BNFL on the date for the end of overseas reprocessing at THORP? (24) Has it discussed with BNFL whether the company is pursuing new contracts and the conditions these might be subject to?

16 Nirex (1995), ‘Nirex95: A Preliminary Analysis of the Groundwater Pathway for a Deep Repository at Sellafield : Volume 3 – Calculations of Risk, Science Report No. S/95/012. p.8.4

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(25) Have BNFL/DTI approached overseas customers yet with the proposition of returning more high level wastes instead of ILW? (26) Have any extra costs that this might entail i.e. storing more ILW, been discussed with overseas customers? (27) What is the situation re. long-term storage and/or disposal options for each of those countries that HLW might be sent to? (28) Have BNFL/DTI had talks to resolve these problems of waste generation and returns with customers, and to the satisfaction of respective governments, regulators and general public in those countries?

TRANSPORTS Ships The consultation paper assumes suitable ships will be available for waste returns starting 2007 (HLW) and continuing to 2017 (paras 4.48 and 4.54). PNTL’s newest ship Pacific Pintail will be passed its 25-year working life in 2012. It is unlikely that the lives of any existing PNTL/BNFL ship will be extended to cover the period to 2017 (the Pacific Swan and Pacific Crane were promptly retired after 25 years, both probably suffering from hull rusting). There is no evidence of any incentive or plan for BNFL or PNTL (whose shareholders include overseas customers) to purchase new ships for this purpose. Outstanding Questions:

(29) Has this issue been fully considered by NAC? (30) Have the potential costs of new ships being included in the price of HLW returns/ILW storage in the UK? (31) Have those costs been discussed with overseas customers?

En-route States

There is growing concern, particularly in the Pacific and Caribbean regions about the marine transport of nuclear waste (including spent fuel). For example, the recent meeting of Small Island Developing States (Feb 2004), a global organisation which consists of 46 small island states, called for an end to transports of radioactive materials just as a shipment of high level wastes from France was about to enter the Panama Canal en route to Japan. (www.sidsnet.org). Underlining these calls is a concern about the environmental and security implications of such transports, and particularly the failure of the transporting states to give prior notification, accept full liability and offer compensation in the event of an accident or incident. En-route States make little, if any, distinction between spent fuel travelling from Japan to Europe and vitrified HLW travelling in the opposite direction. But clearly an end to the shipment of spent fuel to Europe would put a boundary on the number of future transports through the Pacific and Caribbean. NAC makes no attempt to summarise what it dismissively calls the ‘public utterances’ of en-route States. Instead it sought only the views of industrial entities and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). This is a serious omission which needs to be corrected. Nor has NAC addressed the possibility of accidents occurring at sea, preferring instead to quote the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which says that the probability of an accident occurring at sea resulting in the release of radioactive material to the environment is “very low or negligible”. If the Government agrees with this assessment, then there should be no impediment to meeting many of the demands of the Small Island Developing States, particularly on assurances with regard to liability. Outstanding Questions:

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(32) Is the Government planning to seek the views of en-route states on waste returns and substitution? (33) Does the Government know whether the prospect of new THORP reprocessing contracts colours the views of en-route states about waste returns and substitution? (34) When will the UK Government announce its willingness to consider:-

(a) Prior notification and consultation; (b) Joint emergency response planning with coastal states; (c) Carrying out environmental impact assessments; (d) Giving assurances with regard to liability and compensation; (e) The adequacy of security arrangements for shipments; (f) Assurances that shipments will not transit EEZs or territorial waters?

Timing of waste returns

The policy of returning wastes within a period of 25 years from when the waste is ‘generated’ is unclear. BNFL interpretation of this timescale is probably simply an attempt to keep waste in the UK for up to 12 years longer than the Government intended. There does not appear to be any good reason why BNFL cannot start allocating ILW to individual customers now, rather than waiting until baseload contracts are completed. The extreme view that ILW waste returns would not need to start until 2033 is almost certainly not what the Government intended. However, it is simply absurd and not acceptable that all stakeholders, whether NAC, Greenpeace or BNFL have to spend time debating the interpretation of Government policy, when all that is required is a simple clarification. This is crucial to deciding on waste substitution. For example, if ILW waste returns do not need to begin until 2033, and if NAC are correct that substitution has little bearing on whether or not utilities will sign up to new reprocessing contracts, then changing the policy at this point in time whilst consultation on the MRWS process makes the NBAD/DTI exercise even more premature. Once some decisions have been agreed about how radioactive waste - ILW in particular - is going to be managed in the UK, this issue can be re-visited. Outstanding Questions:

(35) Does the Government plan to explain exactly what is meant by “25 years after the wastes are generated” before deciding its policy on substitution?

Dounreay

We understand that the UKAEA has begun the construction of a waste export facility at Dounreay to return waste to its overseas research reactor reprocessing customers. Yet NAC does not deal with this at all. Outstanding Questions:

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(36) How does the Government intend to report on the impact of a change of policy on waste management at Dounreay?

Martin Forewood, Campaign Coordinator, Cumbrians Opposed to a Radioactive Environment Pete Roche, Nuclear Campaign Consultant and Jean McSorley, Nuclear Campaign Coordinator, Greenpeace UK. 27th April 2004.

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Biographical Notes

David Lowry works as independent research consultant with specialist knowledge of UK and EU nuclear & environment policy.

Since 1992, David Lowry has prepared over 5,000 parliamentary questions for UK MPs and MEPs, drafted motions for resolution, speeches and articles on their behalf, suggested amendments to Euro-Parliament reports and researched, drafted and steered through to successful European Parliament Plenary Assembly endorsement two committee reports. Up to the 1997 UK General Election David Lowry acted as policy adviser and researcher for former UK environment minister Michael Meacher MP (when he was shadow Secretary of State for Environmental Protection). This consulting activity included the drafting of six policy reports upon which action was subsequently taken in Government. In 2000-01 he was a co-author of a major report on the environmental and health implication of nuclear reprocessing at La Hague & Sellafield for the Science & Technology Options Assessment (STOA) programme of the European Parliament (2000-01), acted as a contributing editor of Plutonium Investigation (www.pu-investigation.org 1999-00) and contributed to an international scientific and policy study project on plutonium fuel (International MOX Assessment IMA Project 1995-97).

David Lowry has broad experience in both lobbying & briefing the media as well as in preparing and presenting multimedia lectures and giving oral or written testimony to a wide array of audiences including academic fora, groups of politicians of several parties, European and UK Parliamentary Select Committees, pressure groups and public inquiries. He has lectured for several summers on Energy at an MSc course at Reading University, an MBA course for BNFL middle managers at Lancaster University and conducted interview research in France, Germany and Japan for an ESRC sponsored research project on global environmental change for the Open University.

David Lowry was awarded a PhD on nuclear decision making by the Open University, Milton Keynes, UK) in 1987. He previously studied at the State University of New York (1978-79) and the London School of Economics, London University (1975-78).

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In 2001 he was presented with a special award for education at the Nuclear Free Future Foundation annual awards and the UK Campaign for Freedom of Information 1995 Award in the politics category (jointly with Llew Smith MP) for the most effective and persistent campaign of parliamentary probing through the use of parliamentary questioning on civil and military nuclear issues. Since 1980, David Lowry has published a large number of specialist and populist articles (together with many letters to the editor in local and national press), in a range of magazines. These have appeared in, inter alia, Futures, Public Administration, Science, Nature, New Scientist, Economist, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, New Statesman, Nuclear Engineering International, Africa Now, Third World Quarterly and newspapers like the Asahi Weekly, Observer, Sunday Times, The Times, Financial Times, Independent, Guardian, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, London Evening Standard, International Herald Tribune, The San Francisco Examiner and The New York Times.

He is a contributing author to a book on British energy choices, “Nuclear or Not?” published in February 2007 by Palgrave Macmillan.