Proposal for an International Group for a First Person Science

7/28/2019 Proposal for an International Group for a First Person Science

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Proposal for an International Group for aFirst Person Science

Eugene T. Gendlin International Focusing Institute 34

East Lane, Spring Valley, N.Y. [email protected] Don Hanlon Johnson

California Institute of Integral Studies 1453 Mission

Street San Francisco, CA 94103 415/[email protected]

We need to develop a publically recognized science in whichexperiencing by persons (you and I) is not systematically

dropped out. We need to add a third science to the two we

now have. The one that is usually called "science" employs the

atomistic unit model, but there is now also "ecology" whichemploys a holistic model. The existence of two models protectsus from some of the blind spots in either. The second model

poses questions and defines variables which could not be

conceived of within the atomistic science.

Models differ in methods, assumptions, the ways of going about

studying anything. Whatever may be studied along the lines of acertain model will seem to have certain characteristics, because

what can be defined and found has to be conceivable in terms of

the model.

The unit model which governs most of our natural sciences can

be understood most easily as the mathematical model. It is also

the model of the machine. A machine is constructed out of parts.

The parts exist separately. Each is an understandable unit. Whenwe add numbers, for example 3+4, we keep the units clear-cut,

to get seven. The number 71 is ten times this plus one moreunit. Each unit can stand alone, and unites with others only if we

unite them. With the unit model, anything we study is firstdivided into stable units, parts, atoms, particles which are

understood separately. Then we use the separate units to

reconstruct what we are studying. When we can make it

ourselves, then we say we "understand" it. So, of courseanything studied with this model seems to be somethingconstructed, made out of separable parts. This model has given

us more progress and benefits than any other kind. But like


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The fact that both sciences are successful, and that their

contributions differ, shows that the use of different models is

fruitful. Many predictions which could only have come fromecology have now been verified. The indispensability of ecology isgenerally accepted. There is every reason to think that a

scientific model more appropriate to the reflexive processes of

human beings would lead to variables and findings which might

be as important for us as the results of ecology have been for thepreservation of fish and other species.

The processes of humans and higher animals involve a self-reflexive dimension. Reflexivity is not a mere "consciousness"added to processes that can be understood without it. It is not

just an observing awareness that hovers over a merely physical

body. It is rather an inherent dimension which gives organicprocesses many characteristics which cannot appear in the two

existing sciences with third person concepts about what occursover there. Both sciences miss first persons, but we are here,

after all.

A third model exists. It is a model of processes. It involves a

philosophical shift from content to process. Instead of analyzing

separated objects, one defines different kinds of experientialprocesses. This approach has already led to many humanly

significant new variables which would never appear in the othermodels. There is already a great deal of verifiable knowledge, but

it has not yet been integrated and systematized as a publicscience. The formation of a genuine first person science

with its own model seems quite feasible.

The study of processes does not depend on stable units, nor on a

single whole. Organic process consists of a series of always

freshly created wholes. It puts the holistic model on wheels, so tospeak. A reflexive process makes itself as a string of wholes that

cannot be predicted, deduced, or constructed from previousones. The process makes its own next steps.

With a process model there is no precision in terms of units, norabout the whole. The model is precise in another way: There are

precise distinctions between different kinds of processes, precise

ways to identify whether a given kind of process is occurring or


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not, the precise conditions under which it can be brought about,

and its precise results.

WHAT COUNTS AS "SCIENCE?"

Whether a set of assertions is science or not, doesn't depend onthe basic model. It is science when one need not trustcharismatic individuals or untestable reports. It is science when

the findings of a given research group can also be found by othergroups elsewhere.

Although unit model science and ecology differ, they both lead to

the same kind of operational research with objectively defined

variables. The ultimate operational research studies are the same

for both, but ecology arrives at hypotheses and variables thatcould not arise within the atomistic model.

First person science can similarly arrive at variables andhypotheses which could not be conceived or discovered withinthe two existing sciences. Once recognizably defined, a first

person variable can give rise to an operational (third person)

version. But these objective variables can be derived only ifexperiencing is first studied. Then third person versions of these

variables can be devised, and can predict other objective

measures.

We already have such studies in a number of specialties. We also

have many scattered islands of the kind of knowledge which can

lead to defined variables.

Procedures and results have a truth apart from theories.

Someone may object to seemingly "subjective" variables but if

they can be measured with testable reliability, the erstwhileobjectors become interested in the measures.

Excellent correlational methodology has long existed. What hasoften been lacking are precise recognizable definitions of

humanly significant variables. Once reliably observable, these

can be correlated with any other measures.

This is not to say that third person variables are superior in

themselves. Validation of third person and first person measures


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is needed equally in both directions. In the human sciences the

researchers need to administer their "objective" test to

themselves, since this is the only way they can find out what themeasure actually measures. Only on the basis of their own firstperson experience of what a measure taps in them can they

determine whether their theoretical predictions have any chance

of being verified.

The purpose of a developed first person science is not to

generate correlations with the unit model science. Such

correlations would occur, but rarely. Currently many scientistsassume that anything experienced can be "reduced" or equatedto something defined just within the unit model. Here we assume

that this will turn out to be quite false. Correlations between

different models are few and they never indicate an equation.Rather, for a variable in one model the correlated variable in the

other model can only constitute an index, not something paralleland equal. For example, if a certain kind of anxiety correlates

with sweating, this won't mean that anxiety "is really" sweating,

nor is it right to assume that anxiety "is" the collection of allindices on other levels, for example the associated chemical or

neurological patterns.

Even within the unit model there is no reason to assume the

reduction of humans to lower level variables only. Organicchemistry does not in fact reduce to inorganic variables. Fodor

points out that science increasingly develops new specialties withnew variables, without anyone attempting any reduction in

practice. Neurology has overtaken organic chemistry as the

science to which humans are now said to be reducible. There is

no reason why further higher level sciences cannot soon developas well.

Human processes are not understandable in terms of physical,

mechanical or neurological levels of explanation alone. Theindividual personal living process suffuses every organ.

THE FINDING OF "NO DIFFERENCE"

Currently a new technology or a new drug is tested for

unintended effects. If otherwise no differences are found, then it


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is announced that there are no differences. But of course one

can test only for differences one can think of. Finding nothing

does not enable one to conclude that there is "no difference." Towant to "prove no difference" violates the universally acceptedprinciple of research that "one cannot prove the null hypothesis."

This is impossible because it is easy to find no difference even

where there are well-known differences, if one uses inappropriate

instruments. With a thermometer one could show no differencebetween rain and dry weather.

The first person science would provide a large field of precisevariables in terms of which one could discover and evaluate theeffects of technological manipulation. From the great number of

variables which now exist informally and scattered in many

places, the new science would soon develop a whole field ofprecisely defined variables, and would discover relationships

between them.

In additon to its own findings, the new science could also help toevaluate a new technology. Its variables might let us recognize

differences which cannot be asked about at present. When many

experiential variables have been collected and some have been

operationally specified, many differences might be recognized.

The current testing of new technological applications isunfortunately not yet a serious science even within the unitmodel. There is no systematic matrix of variables and findings.One could almost say that there is no real science

concerned with the effects of technological innovations on

humans. Genuine science builds each new study on previousstudies, develops variables that are the same in many studies,

involves a community that pays attention to any exceptions and

modifies elaborate theory when the findings go against it. Incomparison, we have one study on microwave ovens, two studies

on power lines, perhaps one comparing natural and bio-engineered soybeans. Where there is more than one study, the

variables are different and not validated against other measures.

The studies are never replicated. This field is utterly unlike the

systematic series of studies that characterize a serious branch ofscience. A first person science would remedy this lack.


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A first person science with a large number of human experiential

variables might find differences that are now not definable.

Consider the following examples:

EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENCES:

Newborns are routinely given many injections of drugs forvarious purposes, So far as can currently be determined, these

achieve their aim without other consequences. In recent researchon infants, Boukydis found that certain talented nurses and

parents are much better at holding and fondling a newborn so as

to recognize subtle difficulties, and to bring the infant to physicalbalance and well-being. He has defined a cluster of specific

variables which nurses and parents can learn to recognize,

provided that they learn a certain mode of internal attention intheir own bodies. This process is now teachable and can be

reliably recognized. This training is a good example of a firstperson process. It involves individual experiencing, but the

performance it enables can be measured. If the training becomes

established, it will probably improve our treatment of newborns.It will also enable us to measure whether a treatment duringpregnancy or at birth makes a difference on these variables.

Differences in infants need to be measured not only right after

birth, but also some years later. When a first person science hasdeveloped, we will be able to test for differences at later stages

of life and on many kinds of variables, for example different kinds

of dreams, different kinds of emotional blockages, different kindsof body-movement patterns, different capacities forconcentration, and so on.

Drug companies and investors might like to know about

undesirable effects of a treatment in advance. It would often be

cheaper to take them into account in redesigning the product.

We actually have this kind of knowledge already, but it isscattered and not organized and available.

Take for example, the current controversy about the drug Ritalingiven to small children. Attention-deficit behavior is reduced;otherwise there is said to be no difference. But gather first

person observations from close human observers: One of them


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nearly cried in describing her relief during vacations, when the

children are without Ritalin. But what are the differences she

experiences? Shall we not specify and study those?

Don Hanlon Johnson, an expert on body work has engendered a

project to define the terms used in the training of several well-known methods including the Alexander Technique and Effort-Shape. When these and other such bodily variables have been

specified, they can also be used to test for differences resulting

from technological interventions and treatments.

THE ROLE OF THE PROPOSED SCIENCE IN

SOCIAL POLICY.

It is often said that social policy decisions are influenced by thebillions invested in scientific applications. Science and finance

constitute a single system. Objective decisions seem impossible.Nevertheless, our social policies are argued and largely decidedon the basis of science.

Politicians do not take it upon themselves to decide scientific orprofessional issues. They look to the officially recognized

associations of experts in each field. In this regard the existence

of ecology now means that the unit-model scientists no longer

govern alone. Government committees making policy have totake ecology into account. We want to bring together an

organized science of humans which can also be consulted in

decisions that affect human beings.

Imagine yourself on a professional policy-making committee, for

example on whether the removal of certain genes should be

declared "safe." Certainly the company that owns the patent hasa large investment, and is pressing the agency under which yourcommittee meets. Certainly your chief has indicated which

decision would make her happy. Certainly your own upbringingand culture may make you uncomfortable about the idea. All thisweighs on you, but the crux is still: You must go by the best

available information. And the best available information is

science. Suppose science found that other than the intendedeffect, there is "no difference?" As responsible people, what else

can you and your committee go by?


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How can social policies possibly to be decided, if not on the best

available evidence? But wherever ecology is not relevant, the

best evidence today involves the assumption that human beingsare machines. You can reject the assumption from your own"cultural" point of view, but this does not entitle you to reject the

"best evidence." Therefore, under current conditions, social policy

decisions will be based on the assumption that we are machines.

The obvious fact that we are reflexive human processes and not

machines is brought home by the following science fiction story.

A computerized robot realizes its condition and what is plannedfor him. (When it can realize ..... whatever "realize" involves the robot-man becomes a "him.") The story tells how he was

made and that he is a machine. But, the story shows that if a

machine could do this ....., (whatever it is that the man does),then it is human. The "this ....." includes the self-reflexive

processes of wanting, feeling, and acting with an appreciation ofhis situation. It turns out that it hardly matters whether he is in

origin human or not; if he can appreciate his situation in being

treated like a machine, and if he can want something else andact on that, then he is not a machine.

We are in fact very largely in the position of the robot-man, withthe difference that most of us do not yet know that in social

policy-making we are assumed to be machines. But this is not ascientific finding or a well considered judgement.

It is important to let people know that the actual policies of their

society assume that they are machines. It would become possible

at least to slow down the current trends, if this assumption werepublically known and recognized as not due to findings but due to

the immensely fruitful but limited model of the natural sciences.

SCIENCE IS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

Francis Bacon created modern science. He recognized that no

social result was coming out of the scientific experiments in

which many gentlemen engaged as a fascinating hobby. Baconunderstood that if their findings could be brought together,compared and collected on a society-wide basis, then a real

science would result. And it did.


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In a public science any new discovery is soon heard about. One

knows where to announce it to all those whom it might concern.

And, what is more, those concerned will respond. The discoverywill be welcomed or contested, widely tested, then accepted orrejected.

In our own case, currently, there is a great deal of first personknowledge, but there is no single collection, no organized public

science, no one proper place to announce it. There is little

reaction to a finding. Those who don't like it feel no necessity to

retest it, to find what is wrong with it, or to accept it if theycannot find anything wrong.

In the human sciences there is hardly ever a study that aims only

to replicate an earlier study, or to determine what went wrong inan earlier study.

Currently there are hundreds of practical procedures, many of

them very valuable for many people. The crucial variables remain

the intuition of practitioners. They are capable of specificity,

but there is no public motivation or call for suchspecificity. From a scientific point of view we would want todevelop reliably recognizable marks to determine exactly what

procedure is being instituted, and when. But currently this would

not repay the effort because there is no public science in which itwould lead to interrelations with other work, and to furtherdiscoveries.

The possibility of a first person science manifestly exists. Thiskind of science is developing in a number of dispersed location.

There are many findings and a great deal of knowledge about

first person experiencing, although not yet organized, compared

and located as a socially available body of knowledge. If it were,it would make major contributions. Therefore it would soon

constitute a third science which would have to be consulted andtaken into account.

THE RECOGNITION OF MANY MODELS CAN

RAISE THE PRESTIGE OF SCIENCE

We advocate ADDING another kind of science, not in any way


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lowering our respect for the unit-model science. With computers,

elevators, airplanes, electricity and countless other technologies

on which society depends, the unit-model science is now sodeeply built into our lives that no one could wish to do without it.We are saying only that it is not the only kind of science, and

that the kind of reality it presents is not the only reality.

The public knows of many truths which science denies, ignores,

or considers impossible. The credibility of science would be

enhanced if the official scientific attitude included the limitations

of any one model. The excluded phenomena would not bestupidly denied, but rather left to be studied by a science with adifferent approach. The respect for science would no longer be

eroded by well-known effects which science denies.

Science is now widely viewed as mere political power. A large

proportion of the population does not believe in science. There is

widespread belief that nothing at all holds.

Many students arrive at the University with the attitude that

there are no truths and no values, except whatever one's socialgroup demands. "At home we say this and this, but here it will nodoubt be something else. We're ready for whatever it is. Privately

we know that nothing holds." Students pay lip service to research

because the faculty believes in it. Privately they think it's agame.

Many people currently deny even the possibility of

objectivity because findings seem to depend entirely onthe hypotheses. They miss the fact that nature responds to

experiments with more than we had in our hypotheses. Nature is

not a single set of units, but it is never arbitrary. Nature always

responds exactly just so. Nature is a responsive order withresponsive objectivity. Naive objectivism and relativism are

not the only alternatives.

WILL "EVOLUTION" BE LOST?

The unit-model science is running ahead so fast, one cannot be

sure that humans can catch up with its effects. Whole industriesand financial networks invest billions long before anyone can


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know the eventual applications. And science itself is now partly

on "automatic pilot." The findings from one experiment can be

put directly into the computer to generate the next experiment,without a human decision about what it means coming between.Ecology does reveal some effects which would otherwise be seen

only when it is too late to avoid them. But on most topics there is

no alternative science.

Behind the Bronx zoo (and in other laboratories) new animals are

being created. Defending this, one man asked me: "Well, would

you want irresponsible people to do this?"

A combination "cowpig" was recently created. It could not standup and was therefore not a practical success. It was also in

constant pain. Currently it is often said that "evolution" is nowhappening through science. But evolution was in the interest of

the creatures. The purpose of an all-lean pig is the market. The

patenting of "superior" animals is opposed by the farmers whowill have to pay a high price for them to just one company. Thecreature's own interest does not enter in.

Unit-model science is redesigning the plants, the animals, andnow also us. Certain illness-causing genes are already being

taken out. Soon anything can go if someone will pay to delete it

in a coming child. But bodily human beings are capable of animmense variety of kinds of processes, and thereby also kinds of"self," kinds of "contents," and kinds of observable results. Incertain kinds of process we find that the body has a

capacity to generate quite new life-forwarding steps. This

must not be lost. Before we redesign humans withoutunderstanding our own processes, let us establish an experiential

first-person science, not instead, but along with the other two

kinds of science.

Documents

Proposal for an International Group for a First Person Science