Property Week 15

7/22/2019 Property Week 15

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G.R. No. L-21676 February 28, 1969

VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET AL.,respondents.

Rodas and Almeda for petitioners.

Dakila F. Castro and Associates for respondents.

ZALDIVAR,J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CA-

G.R. No. 27561-R, entitled "Vicente Aldaba, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, versus

Cesar Aldaba, et al., defendants-appellees", affirming the decision of the Court

of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 41260.

When Belen Aldaba, a rich woman of Malolos, Bulacan, died on February

25, 1955, she left as her presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao

Bautista, and her brother Cesar Aldaba. Belen Aldaba was childless. Among the

properties that she left were the two lots involved in this case, situated at 427

Maganda Street, Santa Mesa, Manila.

Petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter,

respectively, lived during the last war in their house in Malate, Manila. Belen

Aldaba used to go to their house to seek the advice and medical assistance of

Dr. Vicente Aldaba. When the latter's house was burned during the liberation of

Manila in 1945, Belen Aldaba invited Dr. Aldaba and his daughter, who wasthen a student in medicine, to live in one of her two houses standing on the lots

in question, and the Aldaba father and daughter accepted the offer of Belenand they actually lived in one of those two houses until sometime in 1957 when

respondent Emmanuel Bautista filed an ejectment case against them in the city

court of Manila. Dr. Vicente Aldaba continued to act as a sort of adviser of

Belen and Jane, after becoming a qualified doctor of medicine, became thepersonal physician of Belen until the latter's death on February 25, 1955.

On June 24, 1955, the presumptive heirs Estanislao Bautista and Cesar

Aldaba, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties left by the

deceased Belen Aldaba, by virtue of which deed the two lots in question were

alloted to Cesar Aldaba. Subsequently, on August 26, 1957, herein respondents

Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, the latter being a grandson of Estanislao

Bautista by his first marriage, executed a deed whereby the two lots that werealloted to Cesar Aldaba were ceded to Emmanuel Bautista in exchange of the

latter's lot situated at San Juan, Rizal. By virtue of the deed of extra-judicial

partition and the deed of exchange, Transfer certificates of Title Nos. 1334 and

1335, respectively, covering lots Nos. 32 and 34now in questionboth in the

name of Belen Aldaba, were cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila, and

Transfer Certificates of Ti tle Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel

Bautista were i ssued in lieu thereof.

Emmanuel Bautista then required Dr. Vicente Aldaba to vacate the lots in

question and, upon the latter's refusal, filed an ejectment case against him in

the City Court of Manila. Without awaiting the final result of the ejectment case,

herein petitioners filed, on August 22, 1959, a complaint in the Court of First

Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 41260, against herein

respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista and the Register of Deeds

of Manila, alleging that they had become the owners of the two lots in

question, and praying that the deed of partition entered into by EstanislaoBautista and Cesar Aldaba be declared null and void with respect to Lot No.

32, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1334, and lot No. 34 covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No 1335; that said lots be declared the property of

therein plaintiffs (herein petitioners); and that the Register of Deeds of Manila be

ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista

and in lieu thereof issue two new TCTs in the name of therein plaintiffs.

After hearing, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the

complaint, and declaring, among others, that if the deceased Belen Aldaba

intended to convey the lots in question to Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba,

by way of donation, the conveyance should be considered a donation intervivos, for the validity of which a public instrument was necessary pursuant to

Article 749 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial

court reads as follows:

IN VIEW WHEREOF both complaint and counterclaim dismissed;

the Court holds Emmanuel Bautista to be the absolute owner of theproperty in question, land and improvement, but with the right of

plaintiffs to stay until they should have been reimbursed of P5,000.00 but

without any obligation, until such reimbursement, to pay any rental

unto defendant Emmanuel Bautista. No pronouncement as to costs.

From this decision, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals,and the latter court rendered a decision, on June 21, 1963, raising from P5,000to P8,000 the amount to be reimbursed to plaintiffs-appellants, but affirming in

all other respects the decision of the lower court. Herein petitioners' motion for

reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals,

they forthwith filed the present petition in this Court.

Before this Court, petitioners now contend that the Court of Appeals

erred: (1) in affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; (2) in holding

that the donation, as found by the Court of First Instance of Manila, was a

simple donation inter vivos and not a donation "con causa onerosa and so i t

was void for it did not follow the requirements of Article 749 of the Civil Code; (3)

in not holding that the property in question had already been donated toherein petitioners in consideration of the latter's services; (4) in not declaring


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petitioners to be the absolute owners of the property in dispute; and (5) in

considering testimonies which had been stricken out.

The errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated, We are going to

discuss them together.

Petitioners contend that petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba

had rendered services to the deceased Belen Aldaba for more than ten years

without receiving any compensation, and so in compensation for their servicesBelen Aldaba gave them the lots in dispute including the improvementsthereon. It is the stand of petitioners that the property in question was conveyed

to them by way of an onerous donation which is governed by Article 733, and

not Article 749, of the Civil Code. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code an onerous

donation does not have to be done by v irtue of a public instrument. The

petitioners point to the note, Exhibit 6, as indicating that a donation had been

made, which note reads as follows:

June 18, 1953

Jane,

Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay

para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo.

Belen A. Bautista.

Petitioners maintain that the note, although it could not transmit title,

showed, nevertheless, that a donation had already been made long before its

writing, in consideration of the services rendered before the writing and to be

rendered after its writing. And the donation being with an onerous cause,

petitioners maintain that it was valid even if it was done orally. Petitioners furthermaintain that if Exhibit 6 labors under some ambiguity, this ambiguity is cured by

Exhibit 7, which reads as follows:

June 27, 1956

Dear Nana Tering,

Narito po ang notice tungkol sa amillaramiento

na pagbabayaran diyan sa lupa at bahay na

kinatatayuan ninyo. Sa Malolos po ito tinanggap. Ang

pagbabayaran po ng Inkong ay bayad na.

Gumagalang,

"Cely."

The addressee, Tering, was the wife of Dr. Vicente Aldaba, and the

sender, Cely was the wife of respondent Emmanuel Bautista. This note,

petitioners argue, proves that respondents had recognized the ownership of the

petitioners of the house and lot, for, otherwise, Cely should have sent the notice

of real estate tax to respondent Cesar Aldaba, to whom was alloted the

property in question by virtue of the extra-judicial partition.

Respondents, Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, on the other hand,

contend that the evidence of the plaintiff does not disclose clearly that a

donation had been made. Respondents point out that the note, Exhibit 6, as

worded, is vague, in that it could not be interpreted as referring to the lots inquestion, or that which was given therein was given for a valuable

consideration. And finally, respondents contend that if the property had really

been given to petitioners, why did they not take any step to transfer the

property in their names?

The Court of Appeals, in its decision, made the following findings and

conclusions:

(1) The note Exhibit 6 did not make any reference to the lots in question,

nor to the services rendered, or to be rendered, in favor of Belen. The

note was insufficient is a conveyance, and hence could not beconsidered as evidence of a donation with onerous cause. This note

can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention to donate.

(2) There is no satisfactory explanation why from 1945 to 1955, nonotarial document was executed by Belen in favor of petitioners who

were educated persons. The reason given was "extremada delicadeza"

which reason the Court of Appeals considered as unsatisfactory.

(3) The evidence regarding the value of the services (P53,000.00)

rendered by petitioners (father and daughter) to Belen does not

improve the proof regarding the alleged donation. I f petitioners

believed that the gratuitous use of the property was not sufficient to

compensate them for their services, they could have presented their

claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have

initiated, if none was instituted.

The conclusion of the Court of Appeals, as well as that of the trial court,

that there was no onerous donation made by Belen Aldaba to petitioners is

based upon their appreciation of the evidence, and this Court will not disturb

the factual findings of those courts.lawphi1.nt

The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a disposition

of the property in question made by the deceased Belen Aldaba in favor of

herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6, considered alone, was, as held by theCourt of Appeals, confirming the opinion of the lower court, only an indication


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of the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the petitioners the property

occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion of the trial court and the

Court of Appeals. The note, in fact, expressed that the property was really

intended for the petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If the property was

only intended for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the property had not

yet been disposed of in their favor. There is no evidence in the record that such

intention was effectively carried out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch asthe mere expression of an intention is not a promise, because a promise is an

undertaking to carry the intention into effect,1 We cannot, considering Exhibit 6

alone, conclude that the deceased promised, much less did convey, theproperty in question to the petitioners. That the note, Exhibit 6, was only an

indication of an intention to give was also the interpretation given by petitioners

themselves, when they said in their memorandum, dated February 2, 1960, in

the lower court2 thus:

Legally speaking, there was a contractual relation created

between Belen Aldaba and the plaintiff since 1945 whereby the former

would give to the latter the two parcels of land, together with the

house standing thereon, upon the rendition of said services. This fact

can be gleaned from the note (Exh. "6", Plaintiffs) which in part says:

TALAGANG IYAN AY PARA SAINYO

We have said that Exhibit 6 expressed only the intention to donate. Let us

suppose, for the sake of argument, that previous to the writing of the note therehad already been a disposition of the property in favor of the petitioners. This

disposition alone, would not make the donation a donation for a valuable

consideration. We still have to ask: What was the consideration of such

disposition? We do not find in the record that there had been an express

agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would pay for

the services of the former. If there was no express agreement, could it not be at

least implied? There could not be an implied contract for payment because We

find in the record that Jane did not expect to be paid for her services. In the

memorandum of counsel for the petitioners in the trial court We find this

statement:

For all she did to her aunt she expected not to be paid.3

When a person does not expect to be paid for his services, there cannot

be a contract implied in fact to make compensation for said services.

However, no contract implied in fact to make compensation for

personal services performed for another arises unless the party

furnishing the services then expected or had reason to expect the

payment or compensation by the other party. To g ive rise to an implied

contract to pay for services, they must have been rendered by one

party in expectation that the other party would pay for them, and have

been accepted by the other party with knowledge of that

expectation. (58 Am. Jur. p. 512 and cases cited therein).

In the same manner when the person rendering the services has

renounced his fees, the services are not demandable obligations.4

Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the services of

petitioners constituted a demandable debt, We still have to ask whether in the

instant case this was the consideration for which the deceased made the(alleged) disposition of the property to the petitioners. As we have adverted to,we have not come across in the record even a claim that there was an express

agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would give

the property in question in consideration of the services of petitioners. All that

petitioners could claim regarding this matter was that "it was impliedly

understood" between them.5 How said agreement was implied and from whatfacts it was implied, petitioners did not make clear. The question of whether or

not what is relied upon as a consideration had been knowingly accepted by

the parties as a consideration, is a question of fact,6 and the Court of Appeals

has not found in the instant case that the lots in question were given to

petitioners in consideration of the services rendered by them to Belen Aldaba.

We find, therefore, that the conditions to constitute a donation cum

causa onerosa are not present in the instant case, and the claim of petitioners

that the two lots in question were donated to them by Belen Aldaba cannot be

sustained.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs

against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano,

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Sanchez, J., took no part.


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G.R. No. L-44628 August 27, 1987

CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, CELESTINO SEVILLE, TIBURCIO SEVILLE,RAVELLO SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE, LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA SEVILLE, NARACYSEVILLE, EMMANUEL SEVILLE, ORLANDO MANICAN, and PACIFICOMANICAN, petitioners,vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, VICENTE SULLAN, TRINIDAD SULLAN, TERESITASULLAN, ULYSSES SULLAN, ALEJANDRINO SULLAN, BUENAVENTURA SEVILLE, andZOILO SEVILLE, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:

This is a petition to review on appeal by certiorari the decision of the Court of

Appeals which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of

Davao del Norte, Branch 9. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed

and this case is remanded to the courta quoforimplementation of, and compliance with Rule 69, Revised Rules

of Court, and to partition the property in accordance with the

rights as herein determined, defined and declared, with costs

against defendants-appellants. (p. 48, Petitioner's brief)

Vicente Sullan and the other respondents filed a complaint with the then Courtof First Instance at Tagum, Davao del Norte against the petitioners for partition

and accounting of the properties of Arsenio Seville, alleging they are heirs of the

decedent.

The petitioners, averred the following in their answer:

xxx xxx xxx

7. That the defendants are the owners of Lots 170 and 172 and

improvements thereon, containing an area of 11.9499 and

9.6862 hectares, respectively, both covered by Original

Certificates of Title No. P-15964 .

8. That defendants are the surviving heirs of Melquiades Seville.

Melquiades Seville in turn is the brother of the deceased

Arsenio Seville. Arsenio Seville died ahead. Melquiades Seville

died later. During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville he executed an

instrument ... .

xxx xxx xxx

9. That Melquiades Seville and his family have been in actual

possession, occupation and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and

172, Cad-283, since 1954 continuously and peacefully in

concept of owner, up to the time of his death, and had

introduced valuable improvements thereon. After his demise

his heirs, the defendants herein, succeeded to the occupation

and possession of the said parcel of land and improvements

with the knowledge of the plaintiffs and with the acquiescence

of Arsenio Seville during his lifetime.

10. That even during the lifetime of the deceased Arsenio

Seville it had been his desire, intention and his wish that Lots 170

and 172 shall be owned by Melquiades Seville, the father of the

herein defendants.

11. That the ownership over the said Lots l7O and l72, Cad-283

and improvements had been vested, transmitted, conveyed

and/or descended unto the defendants by virtue of Exhibit "1"

of this answer and through continuous possession and

cultivation of the land since 1954 continuously up to thepresent, in concept of owner as alleged under paragraph "9"

hereof.

12. That by reason of this unfounded action by the plaintiffs,defendants have been compelled to engage services of

counsel for which they bound themselves to pay P3,000.00 as

attomey's fees.

13. That Melquiades Seville during his li fetime had taken legal

steps to perfect titles to these parcels of land in his name." (pp.

11, 14-15, Record on Appeal).

On September 19, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private

respondents. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of

Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Involved in this appeal is the issue of whether or not there was a valid donation

from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville.

The facts of the case are briefly stated as follows

During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned(1) a parcel of agricultural land

described as Lot No. 170 situated at Anquibit, Asuncion (Saug), Davao del Nortecontaining an area of 11-9499 hectares, more or less; (2) a parcel of agricultural


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land described as Lot No. 172 l ikewise situated at Anquibit, Asuncion (Saug),

Davao del Norte with an area of 9.6862 hectares; (3) a residential house

erected on Lot 172; (4) rice and corn mills and their respective paraphernalia

valued at P5,000.00; and (5) five (5) carabaos in the possession of the then

defendants (pp. 6-9, Petitioners' brief).

On March 4, 1963, Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades

Seville, which reads:

A F F I D A V I T

I, ARSENIO SEVILLE, of legal age, WIDOWER, Filipino, and aresident of Anquibit, Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao, Philippines,

after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law do

hereby depose and say, as follows:

That I am the declared and legal owner of a certain parcel ofland otherwise known as Lot Nos. 172 and 170 Cad- 283,

containing an area of 21.6361 has., and situated at

Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao and covered by HA No. V-77791

(E-69793) and approved by the Director of Lands as per Orderissued on March 5, 1954;

That I am a widower as indicated above and that I have no

one to inherit all my properties except my brother Melquiades

Seville who appears to be the only and rightful person upon

whom I have the most sympathy since I have no wife and

children;

That it is my desire that in case I will die I will assign all my rights,

interest, share and participation over the above- mentioned

property and that he shall succeed to me in case of my death,

however, as long as I am alive I will be the one to possess, enjoyand benefit from the produce of my said land and that

whatever benefits it will give me in the future I shall be the one

to enjoy it;

That I make this affidavit to make manifest my intention and

desire as to the way the above-mentioned property shall be

dispose of and for whatever purpose it may serve.

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 7. Appellees' brief; Exh. 4, p. 52, Folder of Exhibits).

On May 24, 1968, Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the Philippine

National Bank in consideration of a loan. This was done with the knowledge and

acquiescence of Melquiades Seville.

On May 15, 1970, Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue, and without

any debt. He was survived by his brothers, Buenaventura Seville and Zoilo Seville

who are included as respondents; brother Melquiades Seville; and sisters

Encarnacion Seville and Petra Seville. Thereafter, Melquiades died and is

survived by his children Consuelo, Celestino, Tiburcio, Ravelo, Sonita, Lucy,

Epifania, Naracy and Emmanuel, all surnamed Seville. Sisters Encarnacion and

Petra died later. Encarnacion is survived by her children Trinidad, Teresita,Ulysses and Alejandrino, all surnamed Sullan and her husband Vicente Sullan

while Petra Seville is survived by her children Orlando Manican and Pacifico

Manican.

The children of Melquiades Seville are now claiming exclusive ownership of the

properties and improvements thereon on the basis of the instrument executed

by Arsenio Seville in favor of Melquiades Seville and on their alleged actual

possession, occupation, and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172 since 1954

continuously and peacefully in the concept of owner up to the time of Arsenio

Seville's death.

The petitioners assign the following alleged errors of the respondent court:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE AFFIDAVIT IN QUESTION

A DEED OR INSTRUMENT OF DONATIONINTER VIVOS:

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING CATEGORICALLY THAT ARSENIO

SEVILLE COULD VALIDLY DISPOSE OR DONATE THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT VACATING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER

COURT AND ENTERED (SIC) A NEW ONE HOLDING THAT THE AFFIDAVIT INQUESTION IS A DEED OF DONATION AND THAT THE DONATION IS A

DONATION INTER VIVOSTHUS VALIDLY CONVEYING THE LAND UNTO THE DONEE

MELQUIADES SEVILLE. (p. 10, Petitioners' brief).

All the above assigned errors discuss the issues as relating to a donation. The trial

court was correct in stating that "a close reading reveals that Exhibit 4 is not a

donation inter vivosormortis causabut a mere declaration of an intention anda desire. Certainly, it is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating. The


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form and contents of said Exhibit 4 amply support this conclusion." (p. 3 7,

Record on Appeal).

A discussion of the different kinds of donations and the requisites for their

effectivity is irrelevant in the case at bar. There clearly was no intention to

transfer ownership from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time of the

instrument's execution. It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio

Seville that in the event of his death at some future time, his properties should

go to Melquiades Seville.

InAldaba v. Court of Appeals(27 SCRA 263, 269-270) we ruled on a similar

expression of an intention, as follows:

The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a

disposition of the property in question made by the deceased

Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6,

considered alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals,

confirming the opinion of the lower court, only an indication of

the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the petitioners the

property occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion

of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The note, in fact,

expressed that the property was really in tended for thepetitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If the property was

only intended for petitioners then, at the time of i ts writing, the

property had not yet been disposed of in their favor. There is no

evidence in the record that such intention was effectivelycarried out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the mere

expression of an intention is not a promise, because a promiseis an undertaking to carry the intention into effect, (17

American Jurisprudence, 2d p. 334) We cannot, considering

Exhibit 6 alone, conclude that the deceased promised, much

less did convey, the property in question to the petitioners. ... .

It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession ("... in case Iwin die, I will assign all my rights, share and participation over the above-mentioned properties and that he shall succeed to me in case of my death ...").

Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the

nature of testamentary provisions and shall be governed by the rules

established in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civi l Code).

The petitioners likewise contend that the document was a valid donation as

only donations are accepted by the donees. However, the petitioners could

not have accepted something, which by the terms of the supposed "donation"

was not given to them at the time. The affidavit could not transmit ownership

except in clear and express terms.

Furthermore, the homestead application was later prosecuted in the name of

Arsenio Seville and the land, much later, was mortgaged by him to the

Philippine National Bank (Annex 1, p. 100, Rollo) in consideration of a loan.

Arsenio dealt with the land and entered into transactions as its owner. All these

happened with the knowledge and acquiescence of the supposed donee,

Melquiades Seville. Contrary to the petitioners' allegations in their brief, there

was no immediate transfer of title upon the execution of Exhibit 4.

Contrary to what the petitioners aver, private respondents as legal heirs of

Arsenio Seville have actual and substantial interests in the subject of litigation

thus qualifying them as real parties-in-interest.

Common ownership is shown by the records. Therefore, any claim of ownership

of the petitioners is not based on Exhibit 4 but on the fact that they are heirs of

Arsenio Seville together with the private respondents.

It is likewise significant to note the respondents' assertion that the signed

affidavit is a forgery because Arsenio Seville was i lliterate during his lifetime. He

could not write his name. He executed documents by affixing his thumbmark as

shown in the Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibit A-4), which he executed on May 24,

1968 in favor of the Philippine National Bank. The real estate mortgage came

much later or more than five years after the supposed donation (Exhibit 4) toMelquiades Seville where Arsenio Seville allegedly affixed his signature. This fact

was not disputed by the petitioners.

Moreover, the petitioners' actions do not support their c laim of ownership.During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville, he paid the PNB amortization out of his

personal funds and out of the income on his property. The payments were not

continued by the petitioners when Arsenio Seville died so much so that the

property was extrajudicially foreclosed and had to be repurchased by Zoilo

Seville, one of the respondents, through installment arrangements. (Deed of

Promise to Sell appended as Annex 4 to respondents' brief). The actions of the

respondents are in consonance with their claim of co-ownership.

Finally, it is a well-established rule that the factual findings of the trial court are

generally not disturbed except where there is a clear cause or a s trong reason

appearing in the record to warrant a departure from such findings (Alcaraz v.

Racimo, 125 SCRA 328; People v. Tala, 141 SCRA 240; and People v. Alcid, 135

SCRA 280). There is no such clear cause or strong reason in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The judgment of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


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[Nos. L-7064 & L-7098. April 22, 1955]MARIE HOWARD, petitioner, vs. CONSTANCIA PADILLA and the COURT OFAPPEALS, respondents. CONSTANCIA PADILLA, petitioner, vs. MARIE HOWARDand the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Two petitions for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals which declares

that the donation in question is by its nature inter vivos,and not mortis causa,and as such is valid and irrevocable,

984

though it likewise declares that it is valid in so far only as the share of the donorof the property donated is concerned, because it cannot prejudice the share

of Marie Howard, widow of the donor, it being conjugal in nature, ordering at

the same time that the adjudication be noted on the title covering the

property.

HELD: The donation in question is mortis causaor one to take effect after death,

and not having been executed with the formalities of the law regarding wills,

the same is null and void and without effect. In this respect, the decision of theCourt of Appeals is reversed, but is affirmed in so far as it holds that Marie

Howard is the legal widow of the deceased. The decision of the Court of First

Instance is hereby revived and given effect, without pronouncement as to

costs. Bautista Angelo, J., ponente


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G.R. No. L-15939 January 31, 1966

ANGELES UBALDE PUIG, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.

ESTELLA MAGBANUA PEAFLORIDA, ET AL.,defendants-appellants.

Salonga and Ordonez for the plaintiffs-appellants.

Fulgencio Vega for the defendants-appellants.

R E S O L U T I O N

(Main opinion was promulgated on November 29, 1965).

REYES, J.B.L.,J.:

Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al., insist that the

reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her

lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949 indicates that title had passed to the

donee in her lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be

superfluous, and they cite American authorities in support.

This thesis would be plausible if the reservation of the power to dispose were theonly indication to be considered in deciding whether the donation of

December 28, 1949 was mortis causa orinter vivos. But such is not the case. The

Court in its decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but

also the fact that the deceased expressly and consistently declared her

conveyance to be one of donationmortis causa, and further forbade the

registration of the deed until after her death. All these features concordantly

indicated that the conveyance was not intended to produce any definitive

effects, nor to finally pass any interest to the grantee, except from and after the

death of the grantor.

We see nothing in the deed itself to indicate that any right, title or interest in theproperties described was meant to be transferred to Doa Estela Magbanua

prior to the death of the grantor, Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon. Not

ownership, certainly, for the stipulation:

Que esta escritura de donacionmortis causa no se registrara en laoficina del Registrador de Titulos de Iloilo sino despues del fallecimiento

de la Donante

necessarily meant, according to section 50 of the Land Registration Act, that

the deed in questionshould not take effect as a conveyance nor bind the

land until after the death of the "donor".

Neither did the document operate to vest possession upon Doa Estela

Magbanua, in view of the express condition that (paragraph 3) if at the date of

her death the donor had not transferred, sold, or conveyed one-half of lot 58 of

the Pototan Cadastre to other persons or entities, the donee would be bound

to pay to Caridad Ubalde, married to Tomas Pedrola, the amount of P600.00,

and such payment was to be made on the date the donee took possession of

Lot No. 58. As the obligation to pay the legacy to Caridad Ubalde would notdefinitely arise until after the death of the donor, because only by then would it

become certain that the "donor" could not transfer the property to someone

else, and such payment must precede the taking possession of the property"donated", it necessarily follows that the "donee's" taking of possession could not

occur before the death of the donor.

It being thus clear that the disposition contained in the deed is one that

produces no effect until the death of the grantor, we are clearly faced by an

act mortis causa of the Roman and Spanish law. We thus see no need of

resorting to American authorities as to the import of the reservation of the

donor's right to dispose of the donated property, for the Spanish authorities are

very clear on this point:

Desde el momento en que la muerte del donante es la que determina

la adquisicion o el derecho a los bienes; desde el montento en que ladisposicion puede ser revocada voluntariamente, se salva la linea

divisoria entre unos y otros actos: la donacion equivale a un legado;

mas aun que esto: es un legado en realidad. (5 Manresa, 5th Ed., p.

107)

Ahora bien: si el mal llamado donante no solo dilata la fecha de laejecucion para el momento de su muerte, sino que ademas se reserva

la facultad de revocar a su arbitrio la disposicion, entonces el acto no

es valido bajo la forma de contrato; hay en realidad una disposicion

mortis causa que exige las solemnidades del testamento. (V Manresa,

5th Ed., p. 109) (Emphasis supplied)

The presence of an acceptance is but a consequence of the erroneousconcept of the true nature of the juridical act, and does not indicate that in the

same is a true donation inter vivos.

Appellant Magbanua further argues that the reserved power of the donor to

convey the donated property to other parties during her lifetime is but

aresolutory condition (albeit apotestative one) that confirms the passing of the

title to the donee. In reality, this argument is a veritable petitio principii; it takes

for granted what has to be proved, i.e., that some proprietary right has passed

under the terms of the deed, which, as we have shown, is not true until

thedonor has died.


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It is highly illuminating to compare the condition imposed in the deed of

donation of December 28, 1949 with that established in the contract dealt with

in Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao & Tau Liuan, 43 Phil. 874, invoked by appellants.

In the alleged deed of donation of December 28, 1949, the late Doa Carmen

Ubalde imposed expressly that:

Que antes de su muerte, la Donante podra enajenar, vender, traspasar

e hipotecar a cualesquiera personas o entidades los bienes aquidonados a favor de la Donataria en concepto de Donacion mortis

causa.

In the Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao case, on the other hand, the condition read:

It is understood and agreed that should the machinery to be installed in

said factory fail, for any reason, to arrive, in the City of Manila within the

period of six (6) months from date hereof, this contract may becancelled by the party of the second part at its option, such

cancellation, however, not to occur before the expiration of such six (6)

months. (pp. 874-875, cas. cit.).

In the Uy Tieng Piao case the contract could only be cancelled after six months,

so that there could be no doubt that it was in force at least for that long, and

the optional cancellation can be viewed as a resolutory condition (or more

properly, a non-retroactive revocatory one); but no such restriction limited the

power of the donor, Doa Carmen Ubalde, to set at naught the alleged

conveyance in favor of Doa Estela Magbanua by conveying the property to

other parties at any time, even at the very next instant after executing the

donation, if she so chose. It requires no argument to demonstrate that the

power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any

time, and that it meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her

death made it impossible to channel the property elsewhere. Which, in the last

analysis, as held in our main decision, signifies that the liberality is testamentary

in nature, and must appear with the solemnities required of last wills andtestaments in order to be legally valid.

Wherefore, the motion to reconsider is denied.


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G.R. No. 125888 August 13, 1998

SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD, petitioners,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUDY CRISTINA M. VALDERRAMAand JESUS ANTONIO VALDERRAMA, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:

The issue raised in the appeal by certiorari at bar centers on the character of a

deed of donation executed by the late Aurora Virto DA. de Motinola of the City

of Iloiloas either inter vivosor mortis causa. That deed, entitled "DEED OF

DONATION INTER VIVOS," 1was executed by Montinola on December 11, 1979.It named as donees her grandchildren, namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy

Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama: and treated of a parcel ofland, Lot 3231 of the Cadastral Survey of Panay, located at Brgy. Pawa, Panay,

Capiz, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16105 in the name of

Montinola. The deed also contained the signatures of the donees in

acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation.

Montinola's Secretary, Gloria Salvilla, afterwards presented the deed for

recording in the Property Registry, and the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No.

T-16105 (the donor's title) and, in i ts place, issued TCT No. T-16622 on February 7,

1980, in the names of the donees.2Montinola however retained the owner's

duplicate copy of the new title (No. T-16622), as well as the property itself, until

she transferred the same ten (10) years later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses,

Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.

On March 12, 1987, Aurora Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the

donation, 3and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim on TCT No. T-

16622 (issued, as aforestated, in her grandchildren's names). Then, on August 24,1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the

cancellation of said TCT No. T-16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105

(in her name), the case being docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3311. Her

petition was founded on the theory that the donation to her three (3)

grandchildren was one mortis causawhich thus had to comply with the

formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not

effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the

issuance in its place of TCT No. T-16622.

The donees (Montinola's grandchildren) opposed the petition. In their

opposition dated August 29, 1990, they averred that the donation in their favor

was one inter vivoswhich, having fully complied with the requirements therefor

set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly valid and efficacious. Theyalso expressed doubt about the sincerity of their grandmother's intention to

recover the donated property, since she had not pursued the matter of its

revocation after having it annotated as an adverse claim.

The case, originally treated as a special proceeding, was subsequently

considered by the lower Court as an ordinary civil action in view of the

allegations and issues raised in the pleadings. Pre-trial was had, fol lowed by trial

on the merits which was concluded with the filing of the parties' memoranda.

The Trial Court then rendered judgment on March 27, 1991, holding that the

donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora Montinola's petition

for lack of merit. 4The matter of its revocation was not passed upon.

Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, her appeal being

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33202. She however died on March 10,

1993, 5while the appeal was pending.

Shortly after Montinola's demise, a "Manifestation and Motion" dated March 31,

1993 was filed by Ernesto Sicad and Evelyn Bofill-Sicad, herein petitioners, 6in

which they (a) alleged that they had become the owners of the property

covered by TCT No. T-16622 in virtue of a "deed of definite sale dated May 25,

1992" accomplished by Montinola in their favor, which was confirmed by "an

affidavit dated November 26, 1997also executed by the latter, and (b) prayed

that they be substituted as appellants and allowed to prosecute the case intheir own behalf.

Another motion was subsequently presented under date of April 7, 1993, this

time by the legal heirs of Aurora Montinola, namely: Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M.Jaen and Teresita M. Valderama. They declared that they were not interested

in pursuing the case, and asked that the appeal be withdrawn. Montinola's

counsel opposed the motion.

On June 21, 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution: (a) ordering the

substitution of the persons above mentionedOfelia de Leon, Estela M, Jaen,

and Teresita M. Valderamaas plaintiffs-appellants in place of the late Aurora

Montinola, as well as the joinder of the spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Bofill -Sicadas additional appellants; 7and (b) denying the motion for the withdrawal of the

appeal.

On June 30, 1995, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its

Decision on the case affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court; 8and

on July 31, 1996, it denied the separate motions for reconsideration filed by

Ofelia M. de Leon, Estela M. Jaen, and Teresita M. Valderrama, on the one

hand, and by the spouses, Ernest and Evelyn Sicad, on the other. 9

The Sicad Spouses have appealed to this Court; and here, they contend that

the following errors were committed by the Appellate Tribunal, to wit:


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1) **in ruling that the donation was intervivosand in not giving due weight to the

revocation of the donation; and

2) ** in not ordering that the case beremanded for further reception of evidence. 10

The Comment filed for private respondents (the donees) under date of

December 19, 1996 deals with what they consider the "principal issue in thiscase **(i.e.) whether the donation is mortis causaor inter vivos," and sets forththe argument that the "donor clearly intended to effect the immediate transfer

of ownership to the donees." that the prohibition in the deed of donation

"against selling the property within ten (10) years after the death of the donor

does not indicate that the donation ismortis causa," that the donor's "alleged

act of physically keeping the title does not suggest any intention to defer theeffectivity of the donation," that the "payment of real property taxes is

consistent with the donor's' reservation of the right of usufruct," that the donor's

intent "is not determined by ** (her) self-serving post-execution declarations,"the "donation was never effectively revoked," and petitioners "have waived

their right to question the proceedings in the trial court." 11

The Reply of the Sicad Spouses dated March 14, 1997 reiterates their thesis thatthe donation was mortis causa, that "the provisions of the deed of donation

indicate that it was intended to take effect upon the death of the donor," that

"the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed, and the subsequent

actions of the donor incontrovertibly signify the donor's intent to transfer theproperty only after her death," that the donor "did not intend to give effect to

the donation," and that the procedure adopted by the Trial Court in the casewas fatally defective. 12A "Rejoinder" dated April 3, 1997 was then submitted by

the Valderramas, traversing the assertions of the Reply. 13

Considering the focus of the opposing parties, and their conflicting theories, on

the intention of Aurora Montinola in executing the document entitled "Deed of

Donation Inter Vivos," it is needful to review the circumstances of the signing ofthat document by Montinola, as ostensible donor, and her grandchildren, as

ostensible donees.

The evidence establishes that on December 11, 1979, when the deed ofdonation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and explained

by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take

effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a

prohibition on the sale of the property for such period. Accordingly, a new

proviso was inserted in the deed reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or

encumber the properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of the

donor." 14The actuality of the subsequent insertion of this new proviso is

apparent on the face of the instrument: the intercalation is easily perceivedand identifiedit was clearly typed on a different machine, and is crammed

into the space between the penultimate paragraph of the deed and that

immediately preceding it. 15

Not only did Aurora Montinola order the insertion in the deed of that restrictive

proviso, but also, after recordation of the deed of donation, she never stopped

treating the property as her own. She continued, as explicity authorized in the

deed itself, to possess the property, enjoy its fruits and otherwise exercise the

rights of dominion, paying the property taxes as they fell dueall these she did

until she transferred the Property to the Sicad Spouses on July 10, 1990. She did

not give the new certificate of title to the ostensible donees but retained it, too,until she delivered it to the Sicads on the occasion of the sale of the property tothem. In any event, the delivery of the title to the donees would have served no

useful purpose since, as just stated, they were prohibited to effect any sale or

encumbrance thereof for a period of ten (10) years after the ostensible donor's

decease. And consistent with these acts denoting retention of ownership of the

property was Montinola's openly expressed view that the donation was

ineffectual and could not be given effect even after ten (10) years from her

death. For this view she sought to obtain judicial approval. She brought suit on

August 24, 1990 to cancel TCT No. T-16622 (issued to her grandchildren)

premised precisely on the invalidity of the donation for failu re to comply with

the requisites of testamentary dispositions. Before that, she attempted to undo

the conveyance to her grandchildren by executing a deed of revocation ofthe donation on March 12, 1987, and causing annotation thereof as an adverse

claim on said TCT No. T-16622. She also exercised indisputable acts of ownership

over said property by executing, as just stated, deeds intended to pass title over

it to third partiespetitioners herein. 16

As already intimated, the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its

language and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the

circumstances attendant upon its execution. In this respect, case law has laid

down significant parameters. Thus, in a decision handed down in 1946, 17this

Court construed a deed purporting to be a donation inter vivosto be in truth

one mortis causabecause it stipulated (like the one now being inquired into)"that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the

exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, Margarita David, during her

lifetime; and that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the

donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale,

mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible," On these essential premises, the

Court said, such a donation must be deemed one " mortis causa, because the

combined effect of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed

of donation and of the above-quoted clauses thereof ** (was that) the mostessential elements of ownershipthe right to dispose of the donated

properties and the right to enjoy the products, profits, possessionremainedwith Margarita David during her lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only

after Margarita David's death." So, too, in the case at bar, did these rights

remain with Aurora Montinola during her lifetime, and could not pass to the

donees until ten (10) years after her death.


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In another case decided in 1954 involving a similar issue, Bonsato v. Court of

Appeals, 18this Court emphasized that the decisive characteristics of a

donation mortis causa, which it had taken into account in David v. Sison, were

that "the donor not only reserved for herself all the fruits of the property

allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important, specially provided that

"without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties

could not be disposed of in any way,; thereby denying to the transferees the

most essential attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the properties."

A donation which purports to be one inter vivosbut withholds from the doneethe right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truthone mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa"the right of disposition is not

transferred to the donee while the donor is still al ive." 19

In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed ofdonation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They

did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right

to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More

importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the propertythis

would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from Montinola's death. Indeed,

they never even laid hands on the certificate of title to the same. They were

therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All thesecircumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of

donationreserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee andprohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her

deathineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a

donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees

only after the donor's demise.

The case ofAlejandro v. Geraldez20cited by the Court of Appeals in support of

its challenged judgment is not quite relevant. For in the deed of donation there

in issue, there was a partial relinquishment of the right to dispose of the property,

in the event only that this became necessary "to defray the expenses and

support of the donors." That limited right to dispose of the donated lots, said thisCourt, "implies that ownership had passed to** (the donees) by means of thedonation and **, therefore, the donation was already effective during thedonors' lifetime. That is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos." On the otherhand, in the case at bar, the donees were expressly prohibited to make any

disposition of any nature or for any purpose whatever during the donor's

lifetime, and until ten (10) years after her deatha prohibition which, it may be

added, makes inapplicable the ruling in Castro v. Court of Appeals, 21where no

such prohibition was imposed, and the donor retained only the usufruct over

the property.

The Valderramas' argument that the donation is inter vivosin character and

that the prohibition against their disposition of the donated property is merely a

condition which, if violated, would give cause for its revocation, begs the

question. It assumes that they have the right to make a disposition of the

property, which they do not. The argument also makes no sense, because if

they had the right to dispose of the property and did in fact dispose of it to a

third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would be of no utility

or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily result in

the restoration of the donor's ownership and enjoyment of the property.

It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed

one inter vivossimply because founded on considerations of love and

affection. InAlejandro v. Geraldez,supra, 22this Court also observed that "thefact that the donation is given in consideration of love and affection ** is not acharacteristic of donations inter vivos(solely) because transfers mortis

causamay also be made for the same reason." Similarly, in Bonsato v. Court of

Appeals,supra, this Court opined that the fact "that the conveyance was due

to the affection of the donor for the donees and the services rendered by the

latter, is of no particular significance in determining whether the deeds, Exhs. "1"

and "2," constitute transfers inter vivosor not, because a legacy may have

identical motivation." 23

Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil

Code to the effect that in case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the

construction must be that entailing "the least transmission of rights andinterests," 24

The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis

causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been

complied with.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33202

dated June 30, 1995 as well as the Resolution denying reconsideration thereof,

and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Case No. 3311 are SET

ASIDE. The Deed of Donation Inter Vivos(Exh. "A") executed by Aurora Virto

Vda. de Montinola on December 11, 1979 in favor of Catalino M. Valderrama,

Judy Cristina M. Valderrama and Jesus Antonio M. Valderrama is declared nulland void. The Register of Deeds of Roxas City is directed to cancel TransferCertificate of Title No. T-16622, revive and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title

No. T-16105.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 49108 March 28, 1946

In the matter of the testate estate of the late Margarita David. GONZALO D.DAVID, petitioner-appellant,vs.

CARLOS SISON,oppositor-appellant.

Gonzalo D. David in his own behalf.

Carlos M. Sison in his own behalf.

PERFECTO,J.:

This is an appeal against a resolution issued by Judge Gervasio Diaz, of the

Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering the administrator of the estate of

Margarita David to pay petitioner as attorney's fees, for services rendered to the

estate, from March, 1941, to March, 1943, in the amount of P18,000.

In the petition filed in the lower court on March 24, 1943, petitioner prayed that

he be awarded an amount equivalent to 5 per cent of the original inventoried

estate, namely, the sum of P72, 779.10, al though in his brief, dated April 11, 1944,

he claims that the 5 per cent he is charging should be estimated not only onthe basis of the inventoried estate but including besides the income thereof for

two and one-half years, totalling P1,627,507.24, the 5 per cent thereof would

amount to P81,375.36, more or less.

The oppositor contended that the amount granted by the lower court is

exorbitant, but failed to state in his brief what reasonable amount should be. Atthe hearing of this case he manifested he would consider reasonable the

amount of P3,000, although he would not mind any amount that may be fixed,provided the payment of any part of said attorney's fees would not be

shouldered by his wife, Priscila F. Sison, one of the heiresses of the estate, nor

affected any part of the property adjudicated to her.

From the above, it can be seen that the two contending parties went to

possible extremes, allowed by their respective feelings and imaginations, and

that the reasonable amount should be found between the two extremes. It is

inconceivable that two reasonable persons, such as we presume the petitioner

and the oppositor to be, neither one showing that he is beyond any standard of

normality, both cultured and trained in the science of law, disagree from P3,000

to P81,375.36 in appraising the pecuniary value of the legal services in question.

The reason for this so wide a difference must be found in the fact that bothallowed themselves to give way, not to fair dealing and fair judgment, but to

uncontrollable emotions aroused by intransigent conflict of monetary in terest.

The parties thresh in this appeal three main questions:

(1) Whether the donation executed by the deceased on September 6, 1940, as

appears in Exhibit FFFFF, should be considered as inter vivos or mortis causa, the

parties placing great importance on this question under the theory that, in the

first place, the donated properties must be excluded from the estate

proceedings; but in case the donation is mortis causa,that should be included

in the inventory of the estate.

(2) Whether heiress Priscila F. Sison should or should not shoulder the

corresponding burden in the payment of petitioner's fees for the properties

adjudicated to her.

(3) The reasonable amount that must be granted to petitioner as attorney's

fees.

The lower court, after considering the facts in the case, arrived at the

conclusion that the donation was inter vivos,on the strength of the doctrine that

a donation in order to be mortis causa must have for consideration the donor's

death.

We do not have before us the full text of the deed of donation, but only the

following paragraphs of the same as quoted in the record on appeal of

petitioner and in the briefs of both parties:

"Na and naturang "donor," Margarita David y Puato, alang-alang sa

malaki niyang pagtigin, pagligap at pagmamahal sa mga

nabanguit na "donees" Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente, sa

pamamagitan nang kasulatang ito, malayang ibinigay at

ipinagkakaloob sa mga naturang Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la

Fuente, at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, "albacea" at

"Administradores", sa habang panahon, ang kanyang mga titulo,interes at participacion sa mag sumusunod na ari-arian na pawang

malines sa lahat nang mga pananagutan: (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 209,

210.)

Datapwa't ang lahat nang mga tubo at pakinabangan nang

nagbibigay o "donor" na si Margarita David y Puato hanggang siya ay

hindi binabawian nang buhay nang maykapal; at ang mga

pinagbibigyan na si Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente ay

hindi maaaring maipagbili, maisangal, a maipagpalit o sa ano pa man

paraan, kung walang kaalaman at pahintulot nang naturang

Margarita David y Puato. (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 212, 213.)

The following facts are pointed to us concerning the deed of donation:

(1) That on December 20, 1938, Margarita David executed her first and only lastwill and testament in favor of her grandnieces Narcisa de la Fuente de Teodoro


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and Priscila de la Fuente de Sison as residuary heiresses, and other relatives of

the same degree as legatees and devisees.

(2) That on October 21, 1939, Margarita David adopted, in special proceedings

No. 55861 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, said grandnieces Narcisa de

la Fuente de Teodoro and Priscila de la Fuente de Sison, making them her

adopted children.

(3) That on September 6, 1940, Margarita David executed the deed of donationin question in favor of her newly adopted children, the same testamentaryresiduary heiresses, donating to them practically the same properties disposed

of in the will.

(4) That on November 18, 1940, the Collector of Internal Revenue rejected the

donor's and donee's gift tax returns on the deed of donation in question, on the

ground that the donation is a transfer in contemplation of death and subject to

an estate and inheritance taxes, which should be paid upon Margarita David's

death in accordance with section paid upon Margarita David's death in

accordance with section 88 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code.

(5) That, in fact, after the death of Margarita David the estate and inheritance

taxes on the properties were paid.

(6) That, acting upon the claim made by the probate clerk and by the cashier

of the Court of First Instance of Manila, said court ordered the executor to pay

an additional docketing fee of P786 based on the inventory of the estate as

valued at P1,415,581.99, including the properties disposed of in the deed of

donation.

(7) That when Margarita David signed the deed of donation she was already

irretrievably ill and she knew that the end was near and inevitable.

(8) That since the donation was executed on September 6, 1940, until MargaritaDavid's death on February 24, 1941, less than six months had elapsed.

(9) That from the execution of the deed of donation up to the donor's death,

the donation properties remained in her office entitled: "Margarita David,

Administrator's office."

(10) That Margarita David has reserved to herself the usufruct of all the donatedproperties during her lifetime, and provided that the donated properties could

not be alienated by the donees without the knowledge and consent of the

donor, Margarita David.

(11) That the donees, being the universal heirs of Margarita David, as her

adopted daughters, without the deed of donation or any wi ll, were to inherit

the donated properties by operation of law.

Petitioner mentions, furthermore, that by the adoption of the above-mentioned

grandnieces, the inheritance tax was reduced to about one-third of the

amount it would have been paid if the said grandnieces were not adopted as

children of Margarita David, the inheritance tax actually paid being P224,000,

while, otherwise, the amount would have been P672,000; and, lastly, the tax to

be paid could have been further reduced by the execution of the deed ofdonation, as the rate schedule for gift tax is lower than the rate schedule for

inheritance tax.

In one of the paragraphs of the deed of donation above quoted, it appears

that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for theexclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, Margartia David, during her

lifetime; and that, without the knowledge consent of the donor, the donated

properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage,

barter, or in any other way possible, thus making the donees just as paper

owners of the properties which , for al l practical purposes, remained the

properties of Margarita David.

From all the foregoing, we conclude that the donation in question is, in fact, a

donation mortis causa, because the combined effect of the circumstances

surrounding the execution of the deed of donation and of the above-quoted

clauses thereof could not have taken effect before the death of MargaritaDavid. According to the terms of the deed, the most essential elements of

ownershipthe right to dispose of the donated properties and the right toenjoy the products, profits, possessionremained with Margarita David during

her lifetime, and would accrue to the donees only after Margarita David's

death.

Although we arrived at the conclusion that the donation in question is a

donation mortis causa,we are not inclined to support petitioner's contentionthat, in the present case, the donated properties should be included in theinventory of the estate and should follow the same proceedings as if they were

not donated at all, it appearing that the donated properties (which, by the

way, were the object of an extrajudicial partition between the donees) are not

necessary to answer for the obligation left by the deceased, there being

enough properties not included in the donation to answer for said obligations.

The second question, that is, whether heiress Priscila F. Sison should or should not

shoulder the corresponding burden in the payment of petitioner's fees for the

properties adjudicated to her, our opinion is that the question must be

answered affirmatively. No heir, legatee, or devisee may elude the payment of

any obligation of the estate which should be answered by the estate as a


15/53

whole in which no discrimination can be made in favor of or against any heir or

heiress.

The third question is not so easy to dispose of, as no fast rules can be se up upon

which the reasonable attorney's fees of petitioner can be estimated with

mathematical accuracy.

Memorandum of legal services rendered by petitioner from March, 1941, to

March, 1943, appears as part of his petition dated March 24, 1943, reproducedin his record on appeal, pages 6 to 42. An additional memorandum of servicesrendered until August, 1943, is included in the supplement pleading, pages 121-

128 of the same record on appeal.

We have examined both memoranda of legal services and, although petitioner

spent about two years and a half, the services appear to be generally of

routinary character, not needing any special skill nor the exertion of unusual

efforts, nor the employment of long hours of legal study and research, nor the

waste or expenditure of extraordinary length of time that might deprive him of

the opportunity to render legal services in other cases and collect profitable

legal fees.

But, at the same time, while there is nothing in the services to require of justify a

special compensation, in estimating the reasonable fees that should be

awarded to petitioner, we have considered, among other factors and

circumstances, the length of time which ran from the first service to the last

around two years and a halfthe number of services rendered, and the factthat petitioner, being a near relative of the deceased, would have received a

substantial share in the numerous properties left by the deceased, if the latter

had died intestate and had not decided to adopt as her children two nieces

who were in the same rank of relationship with the deceased as petitioner. It

appears that petitioner had received only a small legacy valued at less than

P1,000.

After considering all the facts and circumstances in this case, in an effort to fixan amount that could be as reasonable as possible, the court decided that

petitioner is entitled to the sum of P10,000, as attorney's fees, to be paid by the

estate of the deceased Margarita David, and so modify the appealed

resolution, without pronouncement as to costs.

Ozaeta, De Joya, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ.,concur.


16/53

G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002

MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S.CABATINGAN, petitioners,vs.

THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M.ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OFGENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD,ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND

NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACIONCABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C.NAVADA, respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Posed for resolution before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari filed

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the sole i ssue of whether the donations

made by the late Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter vivos ormortis

causa.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother,

petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter

Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-half () portion of the former's house and

lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.1Four (4) other deeds of donation were

subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995,

bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land -

one located in Cogon, Cebu (307 sq. m.) and the other, a portion of a parcel of

land in Masbate (50,232 sq. m.); (b) petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion ofa parcel of land located in Masbate (80,000 sq. m.); and (c) petitioner Merly S.

Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property (80,000 sq. m.). 2These deeds of

donation contain similar provisions, to wit:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR

for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents,

transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-

described property, together with the buildings and all improvements

existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of theDONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE shoulddie before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemedautomatically rescinded and of no further force and effect;x xx"3(Emphasis Ours)

On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed

with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 55, an action for Annulment

And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, docketed

as Civil Case No. MAN-2599, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of

donation executed on January 14, 1995. Respondents allege, inter alia, that

petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking

advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the executionof the deeds of donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to

comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and

testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.4Respondentsprayed that a receiver be appointed in order to preserve the disputed

properties, and, that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal

shares, together with petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan.5

Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents' allegations contending

that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the

preparation of the instruments.6

On respondents' motion, the court a quorendered a partial judgment on the

pleadings on December 2, 1997 in favor of respondents, with the following

dispositive portion:

"WHEREREFORE, and in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is

hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant

and unwilling co-plaintiff with regards (sic) to the four Deeds of

Donation Annexes "A", "A-1", "B" and Annex "C" which is the subject of

this partial decision by:

Declaring the four Deeds of Donation as null and void ab ini tio

for being a donation Mortis Causa and for failure to comply

with formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil

Code;

b) To declare the plaintiffs and defendants as well as unwillingco-plaintiff as the heirs of the deceased Conchita Cabatingan

and therefore hereditary co-owners of the properties subject of

this partial decision, as mandated under Art. 777 of the New

Civil Code;

SO ORDERED."7

The court a quoruled that the donations are donations mortis causaand

therefore the four (4) deeds in question executed on January 14, 1995 are null

and void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code

on solemnities of wills and testaments.8


17/53

Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a quo's decision to this

Court,9alleging that:

"THE LOWER COURT PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE LONG-AND-WELL-

ESTABLISHED RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE

CHARACTERIZATION OF DONATIONS AS INTER VIVOSOR

MORTIS CAUSA AND, INSTEAD, PROCEEDED TO INTERPRET THE

DONATIONS IN QUESTION IN A MANNER CONTRARY THERETO."10

Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivosdonations as these were madeby the late Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of

the donor" for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that

the donations were made in consideration of Cabatingan's death.11In addition,

petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die

ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the

donation as inter vivos.

Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.

In a donation mortis causa,"the right of disposition is not transferred to the

donee while the donor is still alive."12In determining whether a donation is one

of mortis causa, the fo llowing characteristics must be taken into account:

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of

the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor

should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property

while alive;

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by thetransferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for

indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the

properties conveyed;

and

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the

transferee.13

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causais confirmed by

the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends topass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingan's death.14The phrase

"to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other

interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of

the properties to petitioners during her li fetime. Petitioners themselves expressly

confirmed the donations as mortis causain the following Acceptance andAttestation clauses, uniformly found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:

"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis

causa under the terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail herself

of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the kindness and

generosity of the DONOR."

x x x

"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this

Deed of Donation mortis causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x."15

That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the

donor" does not qualify the donations as inter vivosbecause transfers mortis

causamay also be made for the same reason.16

Well in point is National Treasurer of the Phils. v. Vda. de Meimban.17In saidcase, the questioned donation contained the provision:

"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the

DONOR has for the DONEE, the said Donor by these presents does

hereby give, transfer, and convey unto the DONEE, her heirs and

assigns a portion of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (100,000) SQUAREMETERS, on the southeastern part Pro-indiviso of the above described

property. (The portion herein donated is w ithin Lot 2-B of the proposed

amendment Plan Subdivision of Lots Nos. 1 and 2, Psu-109393), with all

the buildings and improvements thereon, to become effective upon

the death of the DONOR. (italics supplied.)"18

Notably, the foregoing provision is similar to that contained in the donation

executed by Cabatingan. We held in Meimban case that the donation isa mortis causadonation, and that the above quoted provision establishes the

donor's intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated

property to the donee only after the former's death. Further:

"As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the

formalities of a will should have been complied with under Article 728 of

the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation i s void and would produce no

effect. As we have held in Alejandro v. Geraldez (78 SCRA 245,253), "If

the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning

that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to

the donee because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the

donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which shouldbe embodied in a last will and testament. (Citing Bonsato v. Court of

Appeals, 95 Phil. 481)."19

We apply the above rulings to the present case. The herein subject deeds

expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners


18/53

predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,20one ofthe decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causais that the transfer should

be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what

Cabatingan provided for in her donations. I f she really intended that the

donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the

properties donated be transferred to the donee or independently of, and not

by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such proviso in the

subject deeds.1wphi1.nt

Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the samepartake of the nature of testamentary provisions21and as such, said deeds mustbe executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and

testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:

"ART. 805. Every will, o ther than a holographic will, must be subscribedat the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name

written by some other person in his presence, and by his express

direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible

witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the

instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each andevery page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the

pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper

part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the

will is written , and the fact that the testator signed the will and every

page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his

express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and

that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in

the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, itshall be interpreted to them. (n)

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by

the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required

to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of

Court. (n)"

The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the

donor and the donee, the documents were not executed in the manner

provided for under the above-quoted provisions of law.

Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject

deeds of donation null and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIEDfor lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.


19/53

G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954

HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO,petitioners,vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL.,respondents.

Benedict C. Balderrama for petitioners.

Inocencio Rosete for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L.,J.:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding two

deeds of donation executed on the first day of December, 1939 by the late

Domingo Bonsato in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe

Bonsato, to be void for being donations mortis causa accomplished without the

formalities required by law for testamentary dispositions.

The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Case No.

8892) on June 27, 1945, by respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo

Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for

annulment and damages) charged that on the first day of December, 1949,Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived

into signing two notarial deeds of donations (Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his

brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively,

transferring to them several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos.

5652, 12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos,

Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the

same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations

weremortis causa and void for lack of the requisite formalities. The defendants,

Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations madein their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services

rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed

freely without the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation;

and prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000.

After trial, the Court of First I nstance rendered its decision on November 13,

1949, finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the

latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were

of donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy

dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the properties donated were

presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the coverture of

Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid

as to an undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein.

Thereupon the plaintiffs duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning as

primary error the holding of the court below that the donations are inter vivos;appellants contending that they were mortis causa donations, and invalid

because they had not been executed with the formalities required for

testamentary disposition.

A division of five of the Court of Appeals took the case under consideration,

and on January 12, 1953, the majority rendered judgment holding the aforesaid

donations to be null and void, because they were donations mortis causaand

were executed without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and

ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the possession of the

properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-appellants. Two Justices dissented,

claiming that the said donations should be considered as donations intervivos and voted for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of First Instance.

The donees then sought a review by this Court.

The sole issue submitted to this Court, therefore, is the juridical nature of the

donations in question. Both deeds (Exhs. 1 and 2) are couched in identicalterms, with the exception of the names of the donees and the number and

description of the properties donated. The principal provisions are the following.

ESCRITURA DE DONATION

Yo, Domingo Bonsato, viudo de Andrea Nacario, mayor de edad,

vencino y residente del municipio de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., por la

presente declaro lo siguiente:

Que mi osbrino Felipe Bonsato, casado, tambien mayor de edad,

vecino de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., en consideracion de su largo servicio

a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente hagor y otorgo una donacion

perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor del citado Felipe Bonsato

de dos parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo.

(Description omitted)

Que durante su menor de edad de mi citado sobrino Felipe Bonsatohasta en estos dias, siempre me ha apreciado y estimado como uno

de mis hijos y siempre ha cumplido todas mis ordenes, y por esta razon

bajo su pobriza sea movido mi sentimiento para dar una recompensa

de sus trabajos y aprecios a mi favor.

Que en este de 1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha entregado a

Felipe Bonsato dichos terrenos donados y arriba citados pero de los

productos mientras vive el donante tomara la parte que corresponde

como dueo y la parte como inquilino tomara Felipe Bonsato.

Qu

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